Findings Of Fact Prior to July 10, 1984, Son-Mar Propane, Inc. (Son-Mar) was licensed by the Department as a dealer in liquefied petroleum gas, in appliances and in equipment for use of such gas and installation. Virgil Berdeaux was the president of Son-Mar and he and his wife were the sole stockholders. Virgil Berdeaux passed the competency exam which qualified Son-Mar for licensure. Sonny Wade Berdeaux Virgil Berdeaux's son, was the manager of Son-Mar. Son- Mar's business address and place of operation was 16034 U.S. Highway 19 North in Hudson, Florida. Virgil Berdeaux and his wife owned the property located at that address and leased it to Son-Mar. A propane pumping station and a building was located on the property at 16034 U.S. Highway 19. The building housed a pawn shop and supply store for mobile home and RV equipment. Son-Mar operated the pumping station and the stores. It also installed tanks and delivered gas to customers. 1/ On July 10, 1984, a final order was entered by the Department which ordered "[t]hat any and all of [Son-Mar's] licenses issued by the State Fire Marshal Division of Liquefied Petroleum Gas and eligibility to hold said licenses are hereby revoked." The revocation of Son-Mar's licenses was due to its violation of certain safety standards and rules. Specifically, it was found that an employee of Son-Mar, Mr. John Delham, filled a cylinder that had not been recertified, that he lay it horizontally in the customer's van, and that he failed to secure the tank in the van. While the van was still parked at Son-Mar an explosion occurred which destroyed the van and killed its occupant. On July 19, 1984, nine days after Son-Mar's licenses were revoked, Virgil Berdeaux submitted an application for licensure as a dealer in appliances and equipment for use of liquefied petroleum gas, listing the business address as 16034 U.S. Highway 19, Hudson, Florida, and listing the business name as Son- Mar Pawn Shop. On August 3, 1984, twenty-four days after the revocation of Son- Mar's licenses, Sonny Wade Berdeaux submitted an application for licensure as a dealer in liquefied petroleum gas, listing the business address as 16034 U.S. Highway 19, Hudson, Florida. The Department issues several different types of liquefied petroleum gas licenses. A Type 06, Class 02 license, known as a 602 license, is issued to a dealer in appliances and equipment for use of liquefied petroleum gas. The 602 license allows the holder to sell propane appliances and equipment, such as stoves, heaters, and gas grills but it does not permit the holder to install appliances or sell propane gas. A competency examination is not required for this type of license, and there is no inspection of the place of business prior to issuance of the license. Virgil Berdeaux applied for a 602 license. He completed the application and submitted the required fee. The application listed W. C. Johnson, Virgil Berdeaux's son-in-law, as the manager of the business. Bill Johnson had run the pawn shop for Son-Mar. Sonny Wade Berdeaux applied for a Type 06, Class 04 license known as 604 license, which is issued to a dealer in liquefied petroleum gas. This type of license permits the holder to pump liquefied petroleum gas for sale to the public. An applicant for this type of license must pass a competency test and file a surety bond or certificate of insurance. Further, if the licensee has a dispensing station, an inspection of the business location must be performed to ensure that it is in compliance with all safety regulations. Sonny Wade Berdeaux passed the competency examination, filed a certificate of insurance, and submitted the proper fee. Son-Mar held a Type 06, Class 01 license (a 601 license) as a dealer in liquefied petroleum gas, in appliances and in equipment for use of such gas and installation. A 601 license permits the holder to pump liquefied petroleum gas for sale to the public, to sell appliances and equipment for use of liquefied petroleum gas, and to install such appliances and equipment. In essence, it is a combination of a 602 license, a 604 license, and a license to install equipment. Both Sonny Wade Berdeaux and Virgil Berdeaux received letters dated October 8, 1984, which informed them that their applications for licensure had been denied. Both letters referred to the revocation of Son-Mar's licenses and pointed out that the applicants would be operating on the same premises and employing the same staff as Son-Mar. Both letters concluded as follows: Thus, it would appear that your application is seeking licensure for essentially the same entity that has only recently had its liquefied petroleum gas licenses revoked. Therefore, in the interest of public safety, this Bureau cannot permit an Order of Revocation to be obviated by a mere procedural reapplication in your name. The applications for licensure both list the business address as 16034 U.S. Highway 19 in Hudson, Florida. At the time of application Virgil Berdeaux owned that property and Sonny Wade Berdeaux had leased the pumping station. However, on July 1, 1985, the property at 16034 U.S. Highway 19 was sold. The pumping station was moved out along with the inventory that remained in the pawn shop. Neither Virgil Berdeaux or Sonny Wader Berdeaux retained any interest in the property, and at this time neither could operate a business at that location. Although there was testimony concerning the manner in which the business would have been operated and controlled had licensure been granted at the time of applications there was no testimony indicating where or how the business would now be operated. There was no attempt to amend either application to reflect a current business address, and the certificate of insurance entered into evidence lists 16034 U.S. Highway 19, Hudson, Florida, as the location covered. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law; it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying petitioners' applications for licensure. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1986.
Findings Of Fact On July 14, 1982, Jimmy Haywood Nixon, an employee of petitioner, took samples of gasoline offered for sale at respondent's Beacon Store No. 7 in Milton, Florida, including a sample of regular gasoline mixed with alcohol, known as "regularhol." Pat Flanagan, a chemist employed by petitioner, performed various tests on the sample of regularhol, including ASTM method 86, and determined that the 50 percent evaporated distillation temperature of the mix as a whole was 150 F. His testimony to this effect was uncontroverted. When he learned the test results, Mr. Nixon locked the regularhol pump at respondent's store in Milton, only unlocking the pump to release the mixture when a thousand dollar bond was posted on July 16, 1982. Respondent began mixing regular gasoline with ethanol and selling it as regularhol in 1978 at the same price as regular gasoline. Until recently, Mocar made less on regularhol sales than on sales of regular gasoline. It originally offered regularhol as its way of helping to reduce the national consumption of petroleum. The Phillips' terminal in Pensacola was respondent's source of the regular gasoline it mixed to make regularhol. This gasoline reached Pensacola by barge, and petitioner's employees sampled and tested each barge's cargo. The 50 percent evaporated distillation temperature of the regular gas Mocar bought from Phillips varied over a range of more than 30 degrees Fahrenheit upwards from 180 F. Mixing ethanol with the gasoline lowered its distillation temperature, but until the batch sampled on July 14, 1982, Mocar's regularhol had passed the testing petitioner has regularly conducted.
Recommendation Respondent has not been shown to be more blameworthy than any of the fuel owners involved in the cases cited above, each of whom regained part of the bond that had been posted. It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner retain four hundred dollars ($400.00) and return six hundred dollars ($600.00) to the respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Chastain, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 513 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Milton Wilson, Esquire 201 East Government Street Pensacola, Florida 32598 The Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue There are three legal issues which remain for determination: (1) Whether Florida Petroleum has standing in this case; (2) Whether proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b), requiring constructive notice to residents or business tenants of real property into which the temporary point of compliance is allowed to extend is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes; and (3) Whether proposed rule 62-770.220(4), requiring additional constructive notice of the status of site rehabilitation is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes.i
Findings Of Fact On December 23, 2004, the Department published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding amendments to Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-770. In particular, proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b) and (4), provides: Subsequent Notice of Contamination Beyond Source Property Boundaries for Establishment of a Temporary Point of Compliance (TPOC) - Prior to the Department authorizing a temporary extension of the point of compliance beyond the boundary of the source property (i.e., the location from which the contamination originates) in conjunction with Natural Attenuation Monitoring pursuant to Rule 62-770.690, F.A.C., or Active Remediation pursuant to Rule 62-770.700, F.A.C., the PRSP shall provide the following notices: * * * (b) Constructive notice to residents [if different from the real property owner(s) notified pursuant to paragraph 62- 770.220(3)(a), F.A.C.] and business tenants of any real property into which the point of compliance is allowed to extend. Such constructive notice, which shall include the same information as required in the actual notice, shall be provided by complying with the following: * * * Status Update 5-Year Notice - When utilizing a TPOC beyond the boundary of the source property to facilitate natural attenuation monitoring or active remediation, an additional notice concerning the status of the site rehabilitation shall be similarly provided every five years to [the classes of] those persons who received notice pursuant to subsection 62-770.220(3), F.A.C., unless in the intervening time, such persons have been informed that the contamination no longer affects the property into which the point of compliance was allowed to extend. * * * (The language in brackets was added pursuant to the Department's Notice of Change and "those" was deleted.) The proposed rule implements Section 376.3071, Florida Statutes. The specific authority for the proposed rule is Sections 376.303 and 376.3071, Florida Statutes. On February 2, 2005, the Environmental Regulation Commission held a public hearing on the proposed rules and approved the proposed rules with certain amendments. On February 14, 2005, Florida Petroleum filed a Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Proposed Rule (Petition) challenging the validity of proposed amendments to proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b) and (4). The Petition was filed pursuant to Section 120.56(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, and in each instance, Florida Petroleum alleges that the proposed rule violates Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes. On March 4, 2005, the Department published a Notice of Change regarding the above-referenced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. With respect to the pending proceeding, the Notice of Change reflects revisions to language of proposed rule 62- 770.220(4), which are not subject to challenge. See Finding of Fact 1. On May 16, 2005, without objection, official recognition was taken of the Department's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Change. Florida Petroleum is a Florida voluntary, non-profit trade association, which comprise, in part, approximately 194 Marketer Members who own and/or operate petroleum storage system facilities in Florida. Florida Petroleum’s purposes include providing representation on behalf of its members in legislative and regulatory matters before the Florida legislature and agencies. Florida Petroleum routinely represents its members in rule development proceeding and other regulatory matters before the Department of Environmental Protection, Department of Revenue, and Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. Florida Petroleum’s By-Laws state that its purposes include advancing the business concerns of its members, pooling the energy and resources of its members, and communicating with elected officials at the national, state, and local levels of government. Towards those ends, Florida Petroleum has represented it members before the Florida Legislature in matters relating to the regulation of petroleum facilities under Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and has appeared before the Department in rulemaking proceedings involving the regulation of petroleum cleanups, and the various state restoration funding assistance programs. The subject matter of the rule at issue is within the general scope of interest and activity of Florida Petroleum, in particular, its marketer members, who own or operate facilities that store petroleum products for consumption, use, or sale. Florida Petroleum submitted oral and written comments, recommendations, objections, and proposed amendments to the Department and the Environmental Regulation Commission in connection with the rules at issue in this case. A substantial number of Florida Petroleum marketer members are "persons responsible" for assessment and remediation of one or more petroleum-contaminated sites. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-770, governs the remediation of petroleum-contaminated sites. A substantial number of Florida Petroleum’s marketer members are "persons responsible" for assessment and remediation of sites identified by the Department as "confirmed" or "suspected" sources of contamination beyond the boundary of the facility (i.e., "off-site contamination"). In certain instances, the Department's rules allow for the use of No Further Action with Conditions procedures in cases of petroleum contamination where applicable regulatory requirements are met because the use of conditions, such as institutional and engineering controls, may be more cost- effective than active remediation. As of February 2005, the Department estimated that it had reports of approximately 23,000 petroleum-contaminated sites. In 2004, the Department received an estimated 539 Discharge Report Forms in connection with petroleum storage facilities. As of March 2005, the Department had information indicating that approximately 2,000 "off-site" properties have been affected by contamination. Assessment Reports filed with the Department indicate that a substantial number of these sites may have been affected by discharges of petroleum or petroleum products. Petroleum discharges will in all likelihood continue to occur in the future at petroleum facilities. Petroleum discharges will in all likelihood continue to affect off-site properties in the future.
Findings Of Fact Puckett reported a discharge of used oil at its site when it filed an early detective incentive program notification application with DER. Puckett, thus, advised DER that it would clean up its site and apply for reimbursement of the costs of that cleanup in accordance with Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). When it received Puckett's application, DER conducted an investigation of the site and determined that a discharge of used automotive crankcase oil had occurred there. DER was advised by Puckett that the discharge had occurred when used automotive crankcase oil was drained into a service bay floor drain. Puckett and the site operator placed the used oil in the drain in the belief that a storage tank was connected to the floor drain to receive and safely store the used oil. Unknown to Puckett, however, the storage tanks previously connected to that floor drain had been removed by a former site owner or operator. The Recommended Order entered by the Hearing Officer contains findings to the effect that Puckett was unaware that storage tanks did not any longer connect with the floor drain in question, in part, at least, because it is the custom and practice in the service station business that used oil collecting persons or entities collect from such storage tanks after the service station hours of operation. Therefore, it was customary for the operator of a service station not to be aware of when used oil was removed from storage tanks. Upon learning that used oil had been spilled at the site due to the lack of a storage tank, where formerly one had been in place, the subject application was filed. DER conducted its site investigation and after it was concluded, on April 16, 1987, issued an order denying reimbursement eligibility to Puckett. DER took this position because it opined that used oil is not "petroleum" or a "petroleum product", as those terms and substances are defined in Subsections 376.301(9)(10), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). Puckett then filed a timely petition for administrative hearing as a result of that denial of eligibility. The cause was duly transmitted to the undersigned Hearing Officer for conduct of a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, formal proceeding. In the discovery phase of that proceeding, requests for admissions were served by Puckett upon DER, in response to which DER admitted that the sole basis for denial of reimbursement eligibility was the fact that the substance discharged was used oil, which, DER contended was not "petroleum" or a "petroleum product". DER, thus, took the position that the used oil in question was beyond the scope of reimbursement eligibility allowed by the "Super Act," the statutory provisions cited above. The cause was duly scheduled for hearing for September 9-10, 1987. Shortly prior to the hearing, on August 31, 1987, DER filed a motion for continuance seeking an opportunity thereby to have time to explore the question of whether Puckett was "grossly negligent" in the maintenance of its facility, which is a ground for disqualification from Super Act reimbursement eligibility. This was an issue which had not theretofore been raised in the proceeding. See Section 376.3071(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). That motion for continuance was denied, as found and discussed in the Recommended Order in the underlying proceeding. The cause then came on for hearing as scheduled on September 9-10, 1987. A motion in limine filed by Puckett was granted at the hearing so as to preclude DER from raising any issue concerning "gross negligence" at hearing. The basis for the ruling was that DER had known of the circumstances surrounding the discharge for nearly one year, but that during the discovery process, DER assured Puckett that its position was that gross negligence would not be an issue in the proceedings and that the sole basis for its denial of the reimbursement application was that the substance discharged, being used oil, was not, in its view, "petroleum" or a "petroleum product". Following the hearing, the Hearing Officer issued the Recommended Order in question finding that used crankcase oil was, indeed, "petroleum", as well as being a "petroleum product", for the purposes of the definitions in the above- cited statutory provisions. It was thus recommended that Puckett be determined to be eligible to apply to DER for reimbursement of the cleanup costs involved. Puckett, 10 FALR at 5540. Certain findings and conclusions made in the Recommended Order are germane to the question of whether DER's actions with respect to the initial and final denial of Super Act eligibility had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time the agency action was initiated and finally taken in the Final Order. Those findings include the findings in the Recommended Order that used crankcase oil consists of "petroleum", as that term is defined by Section 376.301(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986), with particular emphasis on those findings and conclusions in the Recommended Order, incorporated by reference herein, concerning crankcase oil coming within the definition of "other hydrocarbons" for the reasons delineated in the Recommended Order. Further, DER's own expert witness admitted, and it was found by the Hearing Officer, that the predominant use of used oil is as a fuel, just as is gasoline, diesel, kerosene and certain other grades of fuel oil, which are specifically included in the statutory definition of "petroleum product". See page 20 of the Recommended Order and the transcript of the proceeding below, pages 362-363. It was also established without question that used oil is a "liquid," a "commodity" and a liquid fuel commodity for the reasons delineated in the Recommended Order. It was established further by the record in the proceeding on the merits, and found in the Recommended Order that used oil has no meaningful similarity to the substances specifically, statutorily excluded from the definition of "petroleum product", and that DER has had a policy encouraging the collection and recycling of used oil as a fuel. This was well-known and accepted by DER's own experts before the "policy makers" at DER, who engendered the subject initial agency action, took the position that used oil did not constitute petroleum or a petroleum product. Used oil has not been otherwise regulated as a hazardous waste. DER's interpretation of the statutory definition of "petroleum product" to the effect that the product, as it was initially produced, must be sold or used as a fuel in order to meet that definition, in fact, imposes an additional inconsistent criteria for determining what types of substances are included within the meaning of the term, which criteria is not enunciated in the statute, either expressly or implicitly. DER's restrictive interpretation of the statute further disregards the language of the Super Act. Sections 376.3071(12)(a) and 376.315, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986), which requires it to give "such liberal construction to the statute as will accomplish the purposes set forth in this subsection", in other words, to promote the cleanup of as many contamination sites as possible. Further, it was established by the record in the proceeding on the merits and concluded in the Recommended Order that the restrictive interpretation of the statute adopted by DER was inconsistent with existing agency policy which encourages used oil collection and recycling and that the interpretation "is clearly not one expressed or reasonably implied on the face of the statute" and "would frustrate the clear, legislative impetus of the Super Act" and is "illogical". More significantly, DER's policy makers responsible for the initial agency action and decision that used oil is not "petroleum" or a "petroleum product" did not take counsel with certain key expert personnel in DER's own used oil section concerning whether used oil is "petroleum" or a "petroleum product" prior to the initial denial of eligibility and the proceeding and hearing before the Hearing Officer. In fact, the policy makers were apparently unaware of facts critical to the subject determination and to the fact that DER's proposed (and, indeed, final) action was inconsistent with agency policy concerning treatment and definition of used oil, which DER's "in- house" experts had been aware of all along. These findings and conclusions in the Recommended Order demonstrate clearly and in detail why DER's initial agency action and position through the conclusion of the hearing, concerning rejection of Puckett's reimbursement eligibility, did not have a reasonable basis in law and fact. Those findings and conclusions appearing at pages 18-36 of the Recommended Order, which has been stipulated into the record of the instant proceeding, are incorporated by reference and adopted in the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this Final Order. Despite the findings and conclusions in the Recommended Order, DER, in its Final Order, ultimately denied reimbursement eligibility. Puckett at page 5505. DER found in its Final Order that Super Act coverage is limited to "incidents related to storage", as opposed to incidents where a contaminant is discarded. DER also found that because Puckett did not have a "petroleum storage system" at the site, the discharge was not "related to storage", despite the facility operator's proven and found intention and belief, when he dumped the product in the floor drain, that he was "storing" the used oil in question. DER acknowledged the Hearing Officer's granting of Puckett's motion in limine, which precluded denial of reimbursement eligibility on "gross negligence" grounds, but stated that it was not denying eligibility on this ground at page 18 of its Final Order. Although DER acknowledged in its Final Order that its denial of eligibility did not depend on a finding of gross negligence, this acknowledgment, which appears to re- state its position, taken in the discovery phase, that gross negligence would not be raised as an issue by DER, and is an apparent acknowledgment of the ruling on the motion in limine, is somewhat belied by the following language from the Final Order: Although my decision to deny eligibility for reimbursement to Puckett does not depend on a finding of gross negligence on the part of Puckett, any site owner who fails to ascertain whether an oil drain fitting on site is actually connected to an operational used oil system now has clear notice that it allows used oil discharges to that drain fitting only at its own peril. It is not appropriate that state funds be expended to remediate contamination caused by reckless disregard for elementary waste disposal regulations. In the future, the department will continue to deny eligibility to any site where contamination has resulted from used oil discharges to land in the complete absence of a used oil storage system. (emphasis supplied) See pages 18 and 19 of the Final Order. Puckett then appealed that denial of reimbursement eligibility. The District Court of Appeals reversed DER, finding as follows: DER's assertion that Puckett's eligibility for cleanup reimbursement of the used oil discharge was dependent on whether storage was involved and whether the used oil would be reused or recycled was never made until the final agency order was entered. These issues were not raised by the pleadings, were not litigated at the hearing, were not considered by the Hearing Officer, and were not considered by the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order. In addition, the pleadings reflect that DER was asked in a written request for admission to admit the following: 'The Department's only basis for denial of Super Act eligibility for Puckett is that the reported discharge was used oil.' DER admitted that statement. This was the only issue created by the pleadings, and it was the only issue tried and determined by the Hearing Officer. DER cannot raise and decide for the first time in the final agency order issues not previously raised or considered. See Puckett, 549 So.2d at 722 (emphasis in original). The Court then remanded the proceeding to DER for entry of an order determining Puckett to be eligible to apply for reimbursement. Puckett also petitioned the appellate court for appellate attorney's fees pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes, arguing that the Final Order was a "gross abuse" of agency discretion, a standard for granting of appellate attorney's fees under that statutory provision. The Court denied that motion on the basis that gross abuse of agency discretion had not been demonstrated. Although reliance on issues improperly raised for the first time in the Final Order may not have been a "gross abuse" of agency discretion supportive of an award of appellate costs and fees pursuant to the above- referenced statutory provision, it is found that DER has not justified as reasonable its rejection of eligibility on additional non-litigated or properly raised grounds in the Final Order. Therefore, DER's reliance on the new issues in the Final Order to deny reimbursement eligibility was not "substantially justified". After issuance of the Court's mandate, Puckett filed a petition for costs and fees pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, initiating the instant proceeding. DER filed an untimely response conceding that Puckett was a "prevailing small business party" and the other criteria for award of fees and costs provided for in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, with the exception that it did not concede that its denial of reimbursement eligibility in the related proceeding was not "substantially justified". DER did not dispute that the reasonable amount of costs and fees incurred by Puckett exceeded $15,000.00 nor did it assert that any special circumstances exist which would make an award of costs and fees unjust nor that it was a nominal party only. Since Puckett's petition was not timely responded to and since its Motion for Summary Final Order thereon was not answered by DER, the Hearing Officer issued a Summary Final Order awarding $15,000.00 in costs and fees to Puckett. DER appealed and the First District Court of Appeals reversed the award and remanded the proceedings to the Hearing Officer to consider DER's position on the issue of award of fees and costs, based generally upon the Court's view that DER's non- timely response to the petition for fees and costs should be excused, as more particularly delineated in the Court's opinion in Department of Environmental Regulation v. Puckett Oil Company, Inc., 16 FLW D.926 (Fla. 1st DCA April 3, 1991). The cause involving fees and costs, thus, became at issue before the Hearing Officer once again. In the prehearing filings, the parties limited the issues to that concerning whether DER's action on the reimbursement eligibility question was "substantially justified". On July 30, 1991, a hearing was held on this matter, during which the parties presented their arguments and stipulated that the record in this proceeding would be the record on appeal, including the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order in the reimbursement eligibility case.
Findings Of Fact On November 5, 1987, a customer at Cowarts 66 service station complained of suspected water in the premium unleaded gasoline the customer had purchased at Cowarts 66 service station. Pursuant to the complaint, William Ford, an inspector for the Department, examined the premium unleaded gasoline storage facility at Cowarts 66 service station. The inspector obtained a sample of gasoline from the premium unleaded gasoline tank. The sample was examined by a Department of Agriculture chemist. There was no water found in the sample. However, the sample showed an end point of 455 degrees Fahrenheit which exceeded the maximum end point of 437 degrees Fahrenheit allowed by the Department under its rules governing petroleum products. Rule 5F-2.001(c)(4), F.A.C. The high end point was caused by the gasoline stored in the tank being mixed with or contaminated by another petroleum product with a high end point such as diesel fuel, thereby raising the end point of the premium unleaded. The contamination was caused by Clay Oil when their delivery driver accidentally mixed two fuels together and delivered the contaminated fuel to Cowarts 66. On November 6, 1987, the inspector issued a stop sale notice. The Department then has the right to confiscate the contaminated gasoline. However, the Department may elect to allow the station to post a bond in lieu of confiscation. In this case, the Department allowed Cowarts 66 to post a $1,000.00 bond in return for replacing the contaminated gasoline with gasoline meeting the Department's standards. The bond was posted the same day as the stop sale notice. The gasoline was likewise replaced either the same day or the morning after by Clay Oil. Cowarts 66 was later reimbursed by Clay Oil for the $1,000.00 cash bond. William Ford testified that he had been an inspector for Petitioner in the Jacksonville area for 16 years and had been familiar with Clay Oil Corporation and its operation for the past 10 or 15 years. He knew the corporation to be a reputable company. Prior to the instant case, he had never had any dealings with Clay Oil Corporation regarding dispensing of contaminated fuel. He had never had an occasion to require Clay Oil Corporation to post a bond. Ford, also, testified that the violation was clearly inadvertent and not representative of the normal business practices of Clay Oil Corporation. Furthermore, Ford testified that Clay Oil Corporation had been totally cooperative with the Department and had made immediate efforts to correct the violation regarding the contaminated fuel. Clay Oil Corporation's representative, Peter T. Eyrick, testified that upon being advised that contaminated fuel had been delivered to Cowarts' service station, he immediately instigated measures to replace the contaminated fuel with fuel that met Department standards. Furthermore, he testified that he had no knowledge that contaminated fuel had been delivered or that illegal sales had occurred until being informed by Cowarts' owner and the Department's inspector. The evidence clearly establishes that this violation was inadvertant and isolated. The violation is not representative of the normal business practice of Respondent. The evidence, also, clearly demonstrated that Respondent had no intent to sell adulterated fuel.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department refund to Clay Oil Corporation $750.00 of the $1,000.00 bond. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX CASE NO. 88-0181 Petitioner, Clay Oil Corporation, did not number its paragraphs in its recommended order. I, therefore, have numbered the paragraphs in its recommended order sequentially and utilize those numbers in this appendix. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, have been adopted, in substance, in so far as material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, have been adopted, in substance, in so far as material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact contained in paragraph 4 has been adopted, in substance, in so far as material, except for the finding regarding the number of gallons sold. The number of gallons sold was not shown by the evidence. Respondent's proposed findings of fact contained in paragraph 5 was not shown by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter T. Eyrick Clay Oil Corporation Post Office Box 8 Doctors Inlet, Florida 32030 Harry Lewis Michael, Esquire Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Paul S. Boone, Esquire 1221 King Street Jacksonville, Florida 32204 Honorable Doyle Connor Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Ben Pridgeon, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Lab Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1650
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner should be assessed special fuel taxes together with interest thereon and a penalty relating to an audit period of from August 1, 1977 through July 31, 1980. In order to resolve that ultimate question, it must be decided whether proper notice of the transfer of the business of Mattick Oil Company to the Petitioner, pursuant to Section 206.18, Florida Statutes was given the department, such that the transferee, the Petitioner, would not be liable for the taxes, interest and penalty incurred by the transferor Mattick Oil Company. Regardless of the question of the timeliness of the notice to the Department of the transfer of the business, it must be decided whether Reid B. Hughes is indeed a "transferee" as contemplated by Section 206.18, Florida Statutes, and is therefore liable for the tax, interest and penalty, if timely notice of the transfer was not given the department.
Findings Of Fact Mattick Oil Company, Inc. is a wholesaler and retailer of fuel oil, motor oil, gasoline and other petroleum products and auto accessories. On May 8, 1980, Mattick Oil Company, Inc. entered into a contract called an "Agreement for Sales and Purchase of Business" with Hughes Oil Company, also a Florida corporation. By this agreement, Reid B. Hughes, doing business as Hughes Oil Company was to purchase certain assets of Mattick Oil Company. It was stipulated by the parties that for the period of August 1, 1977 through July 31, 1980, Mattick Oil Company, Inc. failed to pay certain special fuel taxes in the amount of $5,411.04 of actual tax, $4,428.70 of interest through August 12, 1985 with interest accruing from that day forward at a rate of $1.78 per day. It was also stipulated that the relevant penalty, if applicable, would be $541.10. The purchase price pursuant to the agreement, was $225,900, with the buyer to pay the seller's actual delivered cost of inventory. The agreement provided that Hughes would purchase assets consisting of real estate and a bulk storage facility on South Seagrave Street in South Daytona, Florida; certain real estate and a service station located in New Smyrna Beach, as well as miscellaneous pumps, tanks, and other equipment, consumer and customer accounts and customer lists. The agreement to purchase also included certain contractual distributorship rights with Gulf Oil Company and Phillips Petroleum Company, prepaid expenses, vehicles and leasehold improvements, any covenants against competition which the seller held as transferrable rights, all jobberships, supply sale and purchase agreements owned by the seller, as well as city and county licenses, furniture, fixtures, signs, hoses, meters, registers and other personal property. The agreement also provided that the buyer, Hughes, would assume the seller's commitment for the 1980 yellow page advertising already purchased and the seller agreed not to engage in any business activity which involves the wholesale distribution of petroleum products and other auto accessories in Volusia County for a period of five years from the date of closing of the sale. This transfer of assets took effect on June 1 or June 2, 1980. Thereafter, on June 9, 1980, a notice was sent from Gene L. Mattick of Mattick Oil Company to the Department notifying it that he had sold his business to Hughes, giving the address and informing the Department that Hughes would be doing business as "Mattick Oil". Mr. Mattick indicated in the notice that this was his "final return". He also requested that a sales tax certificate be cancelled. In fact, Mr. Mattick had not sold his entire business to Mr. Hughes and Hughes Oil Company. Mattick Oil Company, Inc. continued to do business in other parts of Florida, especially the Tampa Bay area. It only sold to Hughes its distributorship contracts with Phillips Petroleum Company and Gulf Oil Company and the other assets described above. Hughes did not buy Mattick's distributorship contracts with Eastern Oil Company, Ashland Oil Company, or Colonial Oil Company. Hughes only purchased the Volusia County assets from Mattick Oil Company, Inc., in which location Mattick had been Hughes' competitor. In fact, Mr. Hughes was primarily interested in purchasing the service station in New Smyrna Beach in Volusia County. Mattick Oil Company, Inc. continued to engage in the petroleum business in its own right and, with the transfer of the Volusia County assets at issue, it did not cease to do business in Florida. It is true that the Department received a surety bond (Bond NO. 112789) bearing the name "Reid B. Hughes, d/b/a Mattick Oil of Daytona Beach, Florida, as principal, d/b/a Mattick Oil". Mr. Hughes testified that he had not executed the signature shown on that bond, purporting to be his signature. That possibly was done by a former controller of the company, who was terminated. In any event, it was offered to show that Reid B. Hughes was using the Mattick Oil Company name or variation thereof and was operating and using the assets purchased from Mattick Oil Company, Inc. and had essentially supplanted that entity entirely. The mere fact of the filing of the surety bond, aside, from the question of who actually executed the bond, does not establish, even with the use of the Mattick name, that Mattick Oil Company, Inc. had ceased doing business in Florida, and had transferred its entire assets and business operations to Hughes. In fact, Mattick Oil Company, Inc. continued thereafter to do business in Florida and did not transfer all its assets to Hughes, as found above. The same consideration is true concerning the document entitled "Gasoline Distributor-Confidential Questionnaire and Required Sales Information" which was provided to the Department on July 8, 1980 with a notarized signature of Reid B. Hughes depicted thereon. This document indicated that the business would operate as Mattick Oil Company, but the operations under the Mattick name were for the Volusia County area only and this, again, does not establish that Mattick Oil Company had ceased engaging in the petroleum business in Florida and transferred all assets and operations to Reid B. Hughes, the Petitioner. A new special fuel license, license No. 9454 was issued on June 18, 1980 to Reid B. Hughes, d/b/a Mattick Oil, with an alternate principal place of business listed thereon as South Daytona Florida, County of Volusia. The record does not establish that any special fuels license held by Mattick Oil Company, Inc. was correspondingly cancelled, however. Only the specific sales tax certificate number 74252470445 was returned for cancellation with the notice mentioned above, filed by Gene A. Mattick as president of Mattick Oil Company, Inc. on June 9, 1980. In summary, none of the above-mentioned facts establish that Mattick Oil Company, Inc. ceased doing business elsewhere in the state of Florida. In fact, the Petitioner established that Mattick Oil Company, Inc. is still doing business in the state, specifically the Tampa Bay area. The Petitioner never negotiated the purchase or purchased any of the business rights or assets owned and operated by Mattick in the Tampa Bay area. In any event, an audit was conducted by the Department for the period August 1, 1977 through July 31, 1980. A "Notice of Decision" was ultimately issued by the Department on September 30, 1985 and a petition for reconsideration of that decision, which had assessed the above-mentioned tax and interest, was filed on October 30, 1985. Finally, pursuant to a "Notice of Reconsideration" dated May 19, 1988, the Department sought to assess Reid B. Hughes, d/b/a Mattick Oil Company for the above-discussed unpaid taxes and interest due originally from Mattick Oil Company, Inc., and representing a period of time and audit period occurring before the transfer to Reid B. Hughes of the above-mentioned assets. The tax period involved thus ended July 31, 1980. It was at this point that the Petitioner then sought a formal proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the Petitioner, Reid B. Hughes, is not liable to pay the tax, accrued interest and related penalty, referenced above and that his petition to be relieved of this assessment be GRANTED. Case No. 88-3562 DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1989. APPENDIX PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: 1-5. Accepted. Rejected as not materially dispositive and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. Rejected as constituting a recitation of the statute instead of a finding of fact. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. 12-14. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: 1-3. Accepted. 4-7. Accepted. 8. Accepted. 9-10. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. 11. Accepted, but not itself dispositive of material issues. 12. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted, but not dispositive. Accepted, but not dispositive. Accepted, although not at issue. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven T. Vasilaros, Esq. Post Office Drawer 2140 Daytona Beach, FL 32015 Ralph R. Jaeger, Esq. Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol - Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 William D. Moore, General Counsel Department of Revenue 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Katie D. Tucker, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Car1ton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Arnold J. Smith is currently qualified and licensed as an Ordinary Combination Life and Variable Annuity, including Health Insurance Agent in the State of Florida. Smith received these licenses based upon applications filed in early September, 1986, to mid-December, 1986. He currently works as a life insurance agent for Prudential Insurance Company of America, working out of that company's Jacksonville office. Prior to being licensed in Florida, Smith engaged in the insurance business in Tucson, Arizona. He primarily operated through or under the names Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., or MBS Insurance Company, or MBS Insurance Services, Inc. The earliest Arizona insurance agency in which Smith had an ownership interest was Smith, Kelly, and Houston, Inc., in which Smith was one of three principals. In 1982, Smith formed Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd. On April 16, 1984, the Articles of Incorporation of Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd. was changed by renaming the corporation as MBS Insurance Company. Subsequently, the name of Smith, Kelly and Houston, Inc., was changed in 1984 to Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd. Ostensibly, this Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., is different then the Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., which was incorporated in 1982. Smith also did business as Arnie Smith Insurance and MBS Insurance Services, Inc. MBS Insurance Services, Inc., was never incorporated to do business in the state of Arizona. Smith continued to do business under the name Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., and MBS Insurance Services, Inc., through August, 1986. MBS Insurance Company's Certificate of Authority to transact business as a corporation was revoked by the State of Arizona on June 10, 1985. Arnold J. Smith was the President/Chief Executive Officer, Chairman of the Board of Directors and principal stockholder of Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., and MBS Insurance Company. During 1984, 1985, and 1986, Smith's agency encountered mounting financial problems. Major debts to various insurance companies and to banks were mounting. In April, 1985, Smith's auto insurance business was transferred to another agency, the Thim Agency, located in Tucson. On July 1, 1985, Smith sold the remainder of his property and casualty portion of the insurance business to another Tucson agency, the Lamb Agency. Smith retained only the life insurance business. However, he was unable to significantly reverse the financial problems. In June, 1986, Smith accepted that his agency would not be able to satisfy the mounting debts. He transferred his remaining files to another insurance agency in Tucson owned by a former employee of Smith's, Dennis Liljegren. In July, 1986, Smith left Tucson and moved to Florida. On August 12, 1986, Smith and his wife filed a Voluntary Petition for Bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in Tucson, Arizona. In 1982, Smith executed an Agency Agreement with Auto Owners Insurance Company on behalf of Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd. The Agreement provided that Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., held funds belonging to Auto Owners as Trustees. Pursuant to this Agency Agreement, Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., engaged in the sale of auto insurance from November, 1982, until Auto Owners terminated the Agency Agreement for nonpayment of indebtedness on March 27, 1985. Over this period of time, Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., became indebted to Auto Owners for more than $125,000.00 for premiums paid by insureds but never forwarded to Auto Owners. Following the termination of the Agency Agreement, in April, 1985, Auto Owners transferred the Smith Agency Auto Owners business to the Thim Agency. The Agency Sale Agreement transferring the business to the Thim Agency called for the reduction of the debt to Auto Owners by the Thim Agency from commissions on the Smith Agency's business over the next two years. The Agency Agreement between Auto Owners and Arnie Smith and Associate, Ltd., states that the "Agent shall remain liable for the balance of any indebtedness" under circumstances such as these. By the terms of that contract, the Agent is named as Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd. Smith signed that contract as president of Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd. While the Thim Agency did reduce the Smith Agency's debt, in 1987, two years after the transfer of the Auto Owners business to the Thim Agency, Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., remained indebted to Auto Owners in the amount of approximately $124,189.78 plus accrued interest. Smith bankruptcy's petition listed Auto Owners Insurance Company as an unsecured creditor without priority, having contingent and disputed claims. No evidence was presented to show that Auto Owners ever made any claim against Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., or against Smith personally after the termination of the Agency Agreement and transfer by Auto Owners of the Smith Agency's Auto Owners Insurance business to the Thim Agency. Apparently no claim was filed by Auto Owners in conjunction with the bankruptcy proceedings. In March, 1982, Smith signed a contract with Western Life Insurance Company on behalf of Smith, Kelly, and Houston, Inc. Smith also signed a personal guarantee of that contract. By signing that guarantee, Smith agreed to joint and several liability for any and all debts or other monetary obligations to the company. Subsequently, in September, 1982, Smith assigned the contract with Western Life to Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd. This Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., was the corporation which changed its name to MBS Insurance Company in March, 1984. Thereafter, Smith continued to do business with Western Life under both the name Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., and MBS Insurance Company. In November, 1985, Smith executed a contract with Western Life Insurance on behalf of MBS Insurance Services, Inc., the corporation which was never authorized to do business in Arizona. Throughout the period of Smith's involvement with Western Life, he sold that company's products called LP-85 and LP-95 policies. He sold approximately 200 of these type policies while he was working in Arizona. The LP-85 and LP-95 policies are a high premium product which builds a large cash value in the first two years. The manner in which it was marketed by Western Life allowed the insured to borrow through a "minimum deposit loan agreement" to pay the premiums from the cash value. Generally, the payment of ten months premium provided sufficient cash to fund the policy premium payments through this minimum deposit loan arrangement for at least four or five years. The agent was able to receive advance annualized commissions upon the sale of these products, when the agency sent the initial premium to Western Life. In cases where ten months in premium were paid and a minimum deposit loan agreement was used to pay the balance of the first year premium and the full second year premium, the Smith Agency actually could receive, and did receive, a second year advanced annualized commission. In January, 1986, Smith sold and Western Life issued one of these life insurance policies to Dr. Bert Strug. In May, 1986, Smith stated in a letter that the annual premium on Strug's policy was $880,000. Later, in a letter dated August 1, 1986, Smith told Strug that the annual premium was $880.00. In fact, the annual premium was really $19,200.00. Shortly after initially writing the policy, the Smith Agency received an annualized commission of $17,500.00. However, Smith did not deliver Strug's policy to Dr. Strug until August 1, 1986. Smith used the annualized commission which he received to pay the premiums on Strug's policy for the first ten months. This permitted Smith to collect the annualized commission and the low premium payment from the insured and to then use this money to pay the first ten months of premium before the minimum deposit loan arrangement took over payment of the premiums. Thereafter, Smith would be able to collect the annualized commission even though no premiums were being paid. On February 17, 1986, Smith sold and Western Life issued one of these life insurance policies to Gerry S. Hendrickson. Hendrickson never paid a premium on this policy and Smith never delivered the policy to Hendrickson. However, Smith was paid an annualized commission by Western Life of $7,300.00. It is required that policies be delivered within thirty days. Smith sold and Western Life issued one of these life insurance policies to Dr. Frank P. Hall on April 11, 1986. Dr. Hall never paid a premium on this policy and the policy was never delivered by Smith to Dr. Hall. Smith was paid an annualized commission by Western Life of $12,000.00. In May, 1986, Smith sold and Western Life issued one of these life insurance policies to Dr. Vernon W. David. This policy was never delivered to Dr. Davis by Smith. Smith did receive an annualized commission from Western Life in the amount of $12,000.00. A policy was issued to Richard Flynn on February 21, 1986, pursuant to a sale of one of these insurance policies by Smith. Smith's invoice states that the annual premium was $485.00. The actual annual premium on this policy was $9,280.00. Smith was paid an annualized commission by Western Life in the amount of $8,000.00. In each of these instances, Smith intended to and did pay the premiums on the policies from the annualized commission which he received. Each of these policies was paid through an automated bank draft arrangement. While the usual and customary arrangement for paying an insurance policy through a bank draft arrangement presupposes usage of an account of the insured, in the present case, the bank drafts were being paid from an account controlled by Smith. For a period of time, the automated bank drafts were being paid through an account called "PPF" of the Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., agency. Until the PPF account was created, for a period of time, the bank drafts were being paid from an account in the name of MBS Insurance Services, Inc. The name was changed from MBS to the premium financing account, PPF, at the instruction of Western Life official in February, 1986. At that time, Western Life was concerned with the company sending advanced commissions by check made out to the same entity as the entity that was sending premium payments to Western Life. Western Life was concerned that this arrangement gave the appearance that the agency was paying the premiums. In fact, the agency was paying the premiums. Subsequently, in June, 1986, Western Life contacted Smith and advised that all bank drafts currently authorized through the PPF account would have to be changed to draft payments from bank accounts of the individual insureds. Coincidentally, it was at this same time that Smith reached the conclusion that he was not going to be able to solve the financial problems of his business and he began preparations for turning the business over to Liljegren. As of July 31, 1986, the combined balance due Western Life Insurance Company from Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., and from MBS Insurance Services, Inc., was approximately $16,000.00. Following Smith's departure for Florida, Western Life, through its representative, Dean Glenn, began to examine the various policies and payment practices connected with the Smith agencies. Eventually, Western Life reached the decision that it would not honor the policies sold by Smith under the above- described payment arrangements. Instead, Western Life rescinded approximately 25 policies and charged back the unearned commissions against the Smith Agency accounts. It does appear that in the course of the charging back process, Western Life did not give credit to the Smith Agency for the policy premiums which it paid from advanced annualized commission. However, the records of Western Life Insurance Company show that Arnie Smith and Associates, Ltd., is indebted to Western Life in the amount of $134,150.98, and that MBS Insurance Services, Inc., is indebted to Western Life in the amount of $57,847.12. Smith listed Western Life as an unsecured creditor with a contingent and disputed claim in the amount of $100,000.00 in the bankruptcy petition. In his various applications for different licenses filed with the Department, Smith answered "no" to question 11. Question 11 states: "Does any insurer or general agent claim you are indebted under any agency contract or otherwise?" As previously found, Smith listed Western Life Insurance Company, Auto Owners Insurance Company, and other insurers as unsecured creditors with disputed and contingent claims under Schedule A-3 of the bankruptcy petition. According to Smith, none of these insurance companies have any claim against him personally. He bases this position on advice of counsel. On all the applications filed with the Department by Smith, he answered "no" to question 12. Question 12 states "Have you ever had any agency contract cancelled?" It is undisputed that by letter dated March 27, 1985, Auto Owners Insurance Company terminated the Agency Agreement with the Smith Agency for nonpayment of indebtedness. Smith was the owner and principal of the agency. Smith takes the position that the word "you" in that question refers only to him personally and not to his corporate agency. It is found, however, that such a construction is unreasonable and that the word "you," in question 12 can only be reasonably interpreted to apply to Smith and any of his corporate or business entities which are solely owned and controlled by him.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasury enter a Final Order and therein revoke the licenses previously issued to Arnold J. Smith and therein deny Smith's pending application for licensure. DONE AND ORDERED this 24th day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this this 24th day of November, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NOS. 87-1652 and 87-2975 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Arnold J. Smith 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(2 & 3); 2(1); 4(22); 5(24); 7(5,8,21); 11(2); 12(2); 13(6,8); 15(6); 17(4); 20(4); 21(8); 26(21); 30(10); 31(10); 32(10,11); 39(4); and 44(12). 2. Proposed findings of fact 3, 8, 9, 14, 16, 18, 19, 22-25, 27-29, 37, 38, 41, 42, 45-48, 65, 68-86 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. 3. Proposed findings of fact 6, 10, 33-36, 40, 43, 49-64, 66 and 67 are rejected as irrelevant or unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Department of Insurance & Treasurer 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(22); 3-5(9); 6-8(2); 9(9); 10(2); 11(20); 12(20); 13(19); 14(21); 15(3); 16-19(6); 20(8); 21(8); 23(12); 24(12): 25-27(13); 28- 30(14); 31(15); 32(15); 33(13); 34-36(12); 37(16); 38(16); 39(6); 40(12); 41(16); 42(13) 43(14); 44(15); 45- 48(18); and 49(24) 2. Proposed finding of fact 22 is rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert V. Elias William W. Tharpe Department of Insurance and Treasurer Office of Legal Services 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tom R. Moore, P.A. Robert C. Apgar, P.A. 119 E. Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact It was Stipulated by the parties that the Petitioner timely filed a notice of protest and formal written protest (if section 120.53(5), Fla. Stat. (1986) is applicable) and timely filed a petition for formal administrative hearing. The Petitioner did not receive a written notice of the recommended award of the District as intended by paragraph 9 of the General Conditions of the second invitation for bids, and it did file a notice of protest with seventy-two hours of receiving notification of the District's decision to award the contract to Mid America as intended by paragraph 10 of the General Conditions, P. Ex. 3. It was Stipulated by the parties that the substantial interests of the Petitioner are at stake in this proceeding. The Department of Water Resources is involved in groundwater studies throughout the nineteen Florida counties that comprise the District, and is responsible for the District's drilling program. In the past, the District's waterwells have been in the 500 to 800 foot range, and have been constructed of 4, 6, and 8 inch casing. The Water Resources Department is currently constructing a regional groundwater monitoring network in the nineteen counties. The underlying geological formations differ greatly from county to county, and several water tables often have to be Penetrated before the well reaches the Floridan acquifer. To maintain mud circulation, it is often necessary to case off portions of the well from water table to water table. Moreover, wells are often in unconsolidated formations, and casing is needed to provide support for the hole, Particularly in the upper portions of the well. For these reasons, the District plans to construct step or telescoping wells in the regional groundwater monitoring network. The District expects that it will need to set 16 inch casing in the first eighty feet of some of these wells. In about 1984, by competitive bids, the St. Johns River Water Management District (the District) leased a Speedstar 15-III drill rig from Mid America Drilling Equipment, Inc. This rig was a Size larger than the drill rig that is the Subject of this formal administrative hearing, and had been manufactured in 1978. The District was satisfied with the performance of the larger Speedstar drill rig, and had very few problems with it. District staff became familiar with the operation of the rig. As the lease neared the end of its term, the District began to explore the question whether it should continue to lease, or should purchase its own rig. A member of the District Board Suggested that the District consider acquisition of a rig over a period of years by lease-purchase. This suggestion was adopted by the Department of Water Resources of the District. Due to his familiarity with the Speedstar rig, Mr. Munch decided to use that rig as a basis for bid specifications, but to use the next smaller size, a Speedstar SS-135. Mr. Munch copied the specifications from a Speedstar SS-135 specification sheet as the specifications for the first invitation for bids. Mr. Munch has had no education in engineering or in drill rig design. He has a degree and field work experience in geology, and is a licensed water well contractor. He has been a project manager on projects when outside contractors set 16 inch casing in wells as deep as 2,000 feet, but he has not personally set a 16 inch casing. P. Ex. 1 is the first invitation for bids and specifications for the invitation for bids, as well as the bid of the Petitioner, the George F. Failing Company. This invitation for bids was published on or about August 26, 1986. The invitation for bids provided six bid blanks providing six bid alternatives. The bid blanks appeared as follows: One Year Lease $ /month, renewal $ /month Two Year Lease-purchase $ /year, buy-out $ Three Year Lease-purchase $ /year, buy-out $ Four Year Lease/purchase $ /year, buy-out $ Five Year Lease/purchase $ /year, buy-out $ * * * Suggested Purchase Price $ Less 3 percent for payment in 20 days Four bids were received pursuant to this invitation for bids, including the Petitioner's bid and the bid of Mid America Drilling Equipment, Inc., P. Ex. 7. The four bids were opened on September 11, 1986. Mid America was the only bidder that bid a one year lease with an option to renew. Mid America, the Petitioner, and G & R Machine and Welding, Inc., were the only bidders to bid a lease-purchase. The Petitioners bid was $163,565.00 as an outright purchase price for a Failing model CF-15 and, relevant to the second bid, $5,432.00 per month for a three year lease-purchase, with the rig owned at the end of the three year lease period with no further buy-out payment. The Petitioner did not bid a one year lease. P. Ex. 1. Mid America bid $179,823.00 as an outright purchase price on a Speedstar SS135, and $56,340.00 per year for a three year lease-purchase, with a buy-out price of $61,920.00. Mid America also bid a one year lease at $6,125 per month, with a renewal at $5,288.00 per month. P. Ex. 7. Robert Schenk is the District's Director of the Division of General Services, and as such, Mr. Schenk was responsible for District Purchasing and evaluation of the bids received pursuant to the invitation of bids. Mr. Schenk Prepared an analysis of Several of the bids, including G & R Machine, Mid America, and the Petitioner. P. Ex. Mr. Schenk testified that he felt that the Mid America bid was unclear because of the total amount of the bid calculated over the years. He Said that he considered the Mid America bid for a three year lease-purchase to be ridiculous and out of line because it was $50,000 greater than the outright purchase bid. The bid of the Petitioner for a three year lease- purchase was about $32,000 higher than its bid for an outright purchase. P. Ex. 8. G & R Machine also bid a Speedstar SS-15. Mid America's three year lease-purchase bid was about $35,000 higher than the G & R Machine bid for the same three year lease-purchase. ($230,940.00 compared to $195,664.32.) P. Ex. 8. The bid of Mid America was also high compared to the bid of G & R Machine for a four and a five year lease-purchase, but was comparable for a two year lease-purchase and for an outright purchase. The bid of the Petitioner was $16,000 lower than the Mid America or G & R Machine bids for an outright purchase, was $31,000 lower than the G & R Machine bid and $34,000 lower than the Mid America bid for a two year lease-purchase, and was Slightly higher than the G & R Machine bid on all other bids. The bid of the Petitioner was substantially lower than the Mid America bid on all bids analyzed on P. Ex. 8. Although the Mid America bid was high, it was not an unclear bid. The bid of Mid America was clear and unambiguous. P. Ex. 7. Mr. Schenk thought that the Petitioner's bid was the clearest bid received in the first invitation for bids. Apparently on the same day as the bid opening, which was September 11, 1986, Mr. Schenk had one of his assistants telephone Mid America to ask that it clarify its bid. In response, on the same day as the bid opening, September 11, 1986, Mid America sent the District a letter, P. Ex. 9, which effectively lowered its bid for a three year lease-purchase by $36,612.00. This letter was ultimately not considered by the District in the evaluation of the bids. On September 23, 1986, four staff members of the Department of Water Resources, including Mr. Munch and Barbara A. Vergara, Director of that Department, recommended by memorandum to Mr. Schenk that the Mid America bid for a Speedstar SS-135 for an outright purchase price of $179,823.00 be accepted. These staff members were of the opinion that the drill rig bid by the Petitioner "did not meet all of the bid Specifications due to slight manufacturing differences." But they were also of the opinion that "[t]hese differences may not be critical to the performance and capabilities of the equipment." P. Ex. 10. The staff comparison of the Mid America bid and the Petitioner's bid included calculations for rental costs due to the differing delivery times of the equipment, and calculated that the Mid America bid had a net cost of $184,435 compared to the Petitioner's bid having a net cost of $182,013. Attached to the staff recommendation of September 23, 1986, was a comparison of the three drill rigs by specifications. The comparison used the incorrect specification sheet for the Mid America rig, and thus contained the following errors: the rig bid by Mid America had a single sheave, 3 part block, not a double sheave, 4 part block; the rig also had a working hook load of 20,000 pounds, not 32,700 pounds. Two to four days after September 11, 1986, (the date of the letter from Mid America changing its bid for a three year lease-purchase) Robert Auld, the Florida Branch Manager for the Petitioner, learned that such a letter had been requested, written, and received by the District, and called District staff to protest. Mr. Schenk thereafter apparently concluded that solicitation and receipt of the bid change from Mid America had been procedurally erroneous because he testified that as a result of all of the discussion and criticism that surrounded that event, on the second invitation for bids he concluded that he was procedurally unable to contact any of the bidders to request clarification of bids, even though he then thought that the Petitioner's bid was unclear. Mr. Schenk decided to reject all the bids from the first invitation for bids before Mr. Auld's telephone call. P. Ex. 15, p. 10. But he did not communicate this decision to the staff of the Department of Water Resources before they wrote their memorandum that was initiated through the chain of command on September 23, 1986. Mr. Schenk initially decided to reject all of the bids because the bidders had not all bid on all of the requested alternatives. Later, other reasons for rejection of all of the bids became apparent. Another major reason for rejection of all of the bids was because the specifications were drawn from the Speedstar SS-135 specifications, and unfairly eliminated the Petitioner's rig. Mr. Auld admitted that the Failing CF-15 did not meet the specifications of the first invitation for bids because the Failing CF-15 did not have an 8 1/2 inch rotary table, but was of the opinion that it met all other specifications. Mr. Schenk also rejected all of the bids because of the irregularity of having solicited and received the bid change from Mid America. On October 1, 1986, the District informed all bidders that the bids were all rejected and that the purchase would be again advertised for bids. No protest was filed concerning the first invitation for bids, and it was ruled during the formal administrative hearing that the foregoing facts are admissible as explanatory of the basis for the second invitation for bids, and not as a basis for challenge to the first invitation for bids. Mr. Munch then drafted specifications for the second invitation for bids. This time, he Specified "Speedstar SS-135 or equivalent." Mr. Munch had determined from his experience with the rented Speedstar that the Speedstar SS-135 was capable of fulfilling the needs of the District for drilling. His intention was to allow bids for other types of drill rigs that were the equivalent of a Speedstar SS-135. Ms. Vergara defined the term "equivalent" to mean no differences between a Speedstar SS-135 and the alternative drill rig with respect to doing work in the field that needs to be done by the District. At some time before the second invitation for bids was advertised, or at least before the second bids were filed, the District became Primarily (though not exclusively interested in receiving bids on a three year lease-purchase of a drill rig. Both the Petitioner and Mid America knew this before they prepared their second bids. P. Ex. 3 is the second advertisement for bids and was published on November 6, 1986. The advertisement asks for bids on a "lease-purchase of One Rotary Drill Rig." The attached sheet marked "specifications" stated that what was sought was a "[b]id for purchase or one year lease of a new Speedstar 135 rotary drill rig or at least the equivalent equipment with the following options." Following that were eight technical specifications. The second invitation for bids also specified the following: "Bidder must indicate any and all exceptions to specifications. "Bid shall be awarded to the lowest qualified, responsible bidder whose bid meets all specifications in the Invitation to Bid, including delivery, price and other factors most advantageous to the District." All bidders were to bid using the bid blank attached to the invitation for bids. The bid blank was different from the first invitation for bids apparently with the intent to make bid comparisons easier. The bid blank provided the following alternatives for bids: Purchase Price $ Lease Price $ /Month, first year (renewable) $ /Month, second year (renewable) $ /Month, third year One year guarantee non-routine, major maintenance and repair on lease equipment (renewable annually for term of leased $ . Make and Model of Equipment . Manufacturers Warranty . (minimum of 6 months or 1000 hours) Delivery days (from date of order) Delivery Charges $ . Location of Maintenance Services . Since the District was then "primarily" (but not exclusively) "interested in" a three year lease-purchase, the bid blank form was incomplete and unclear. Paragraph A) of the bid blank form clearly provides for a bid for an outright purchase only, not a "lease-purchase." And Paragraph B) provides only for a lease without any mention of purchase; Paragraph B) asks for a price by month for the first year, with the notation that the lease is renewable (apparently at the option of the District, a lease price by month for the second year, with the notation again that the lease is renewable (at the option of the District), and a lease price per month for a third year, with no mention of any further renewability. Paragraph B) says nothing about purchase of the drill rig, ownership at the end of the lease term, or the buy- out price at the end of the lease term. Moreover, the rest of the invitation for bids is similarly incomplete and unclear. Although the first page of the invitation for bids states that bids were requested on a "lease-purchase" of one rotary drill rig, the specification sheet attached to the invitation stated the specification that the bid should be "for purchase or one year lease...." P. Ex. 3 (E.S.). The specification said nothing about a three year lease-purchase. P. Ex. 3, the second invitation for bids, was sent to all entities that had submitted a bid in response to the first invitation for bids. These included five companies that were Speedstar SS-135 dealers and the Petitioner. Only two bids were received in response to the second invitation for bids, one from Mid America and one from the Petitioner. The second Mid America bid is P. Ex. 11. The Petitioner's second bid is P. Ex. 4. The bids were opened on November 20, 1986. The opening was attended by Ron Owens, President of Mid America, and Robert Auld. Mr. Schenk announced that the Petitioner was the apparent low bidder. Mr. Schenk may have only intended his announcement of apparent low bid to have been with relationship to the bid for outright purchase. A bid tabulation sheet was prepared. P. Ex. Mr. Schenk also announced that the recommendation by the staff to the District Board as to which company should be awarded the contract would be made at the next Board meeting. At that time, the next Board meeting was January 14, 1987. The Petitioner's bid, typed on the bid blank required by the District, provided in pertinent part the following: Purchase Price $146,976.00 Lease Price $ NO BID /Month, first year (renewable) (OWNED AT END OF SECOND YEAR) $6,885.00 /Month, second year (renewable) (OWNED AT END OF THIRD YEAR) $4,592.00 /Month, third year One year guaranteed non-routine, major maintenance and repair on lease equipment (renewable annually for term of lease) $NOT AVAILABLE Make and Model of Equipment FAILING MODEL CF-15 Combination Drill GEORGE E. FAILING COMPANY standard Manufacturers Warranty warranty policy will apply, extended for 9 months (minimum of 6 months or 1000 hours) Delivery 120 days (from date of order) Delivery Charges $ NO CHARGE Location of Maintenance Services GEORGE E. FAILING COMPANY 2101 Starkey Road Largo, Florida 33541 Mid America Submitted its bid on the bid blank form as follows: Purchase Price $179,823.00 Lease Price $5,241.00 /Month, first year (renewable) $5,241.00 /Month, Second year (renewable) $5,241.00 /Month, third year (SEE CONDITIONS BELOW) One year guaranteed non-routine, major maintenance and repair on lease equipment (renewable annually for term of lease) $3,000.00 per year Make and Model of Equipment Speedstar SS-135 Manufacturers Warranty 6 months or 1000 hours (minimum of 6 months or 1000 hours) Delivery 21 days (from date of order) Delivery Charges $ Included/No Charge Location of Maintenance Services Ocala, Florida * * * CONDITIONS #1. If the lease is written for a guaranteed 36 month period, there will be a purchase option available at the end for $1.00 #2. If the lease is written as a yearly renewable lease and runs 3 consecutive years there will be a purchase option available after the 36th payment for $8,092.00. The bid of Mid America was for a Speedstar SS-135, and thus complied with the specifications in that respect. The bid of Mid America was clear and enable the District to understand what its annual budgetary obligations might be should the alternatives in the bid be accepted. The Mid America bid provided the following three alternatives: Outright purchase for $179,823, which was $32,847 more than the bid of the petitioner of $146,976. Payment of a total of $188,676 over a three year period plus an additional payment of $8,092 at the end of the lease if the lease were to be written as yearly renewable for 3 consecutive years, for a total cost of $196,768. Payment of a total of $188,676 (plus a $1 buy-out option) over a three year period if the lease were to be written for a guaranteed 36 month period. This is the alternative ultimately accepted by the District. After publication of the second invitation for bids, but before the opening of those bids, Ms. Vergara appeared before the District Board to explain the manner in which the invitation for bids had been drafted. In particular she explained that the invitation used a "brand name or equivalent" specification. She further advised the Board that the staff recommended the Speedstar SS-135 as the equipment most capable of handling the drilling needs of the District, and that any equipment purchased must be at least equivalent to the Speed star SS-135. At some time before the opening of the second set of bids, Mr. Munch and his supervisor, Ms. Vergara, traveled to the offices of Mid America and inspected a Speedstar SS-135. The owner and President of Mid America was Present to explain the design advantages of the Speedstar SS-135. He was a Salesman, and had no background in engineering or drill rig design. None of the District staff visited the Petitioner's place of business to inspect a Failing CF-15. Mr. Munch and Ms. Vergara did not see a Failing CF-15 until preparations began for the formal administrative hearing. In a deposition prior to the formal hearing, Mr. Schenk testified under oath that the staff had already decided that they wanted a Speedstar SS-135 rather than a Failing CF-15 based upon the report of Ms. Vergera to the District Board. In a deposition prior to the formal hearing, Mr. Munch testified that he was never asked which rig he would rather have, that the issue was Strictly a cost decision, that he probably would have had no objection to purchase of the Failing CF-15 had it been cheaper than the Speedstar SS-135, and that the Failing CF-15 would probably have done the job needed by the District to be done. On December 12, 1986, Mr. Schenk sent a memorandum to the District Board concerning the purchase of the rotary drill rig. The memorandum advised the Board that the District had received two bids. It then presented five alternatives for the Board to consider. All of the bid alternatives (alternatives 1 through 4) related to the Mid America bid on the Speedstar SS-135, and presented all of the options bid by Mid America. None of the bid alternatives related to the petitioner's bid. The District Board was not advised as to the comparative purchase prices bid by the two bidders (the Petitioner's price being $32,000 less than Mid America's), it was not advised as to the two interpretations of the three year option in the Petitioner's bid, and it was not advised that under the second interpretation of the Petitioner's three year lease-purchase bid, the Petitioner's bid had a net cost, after accounting for delivery time, that was $9,529 less than the Mid America bid. (See finding of fact 60.) Mr. Schenk thought that paragraph B), as modified by the "CONDITIONS" placed on the bid by Mid America, presented an option to "renew" the lease monthly at $5,241 per month, for an annual cost of $62,892. Evidentially, then, Mr. Schenk thought that the word "renewable" pertained to renewal by month. P. Ex. 15, p. 2, para. 2. With respect to this option, nothing is mentioned about purchase. Mr. Schenk also treated the word "renewable" to be intended to be exercised annually, resulting in a three year lease (renewable annually). The differing use of the word "renewable" came as a result of the modifications placed on the bid form by Mid America. The District Board chose option 3, which was condition number 1 on the bid blank submitted by Mid America, (a guarantee 36 months lease with a purchase option of $1.00) with the addition of the words "Subject to the availability of funds." The Second invitation for bids had Stated in Paragraph 3 of the third page that "all lease-purchase agreements must include a nonappropriation of fund Paragraph as required by Florida Statutes." Thus, the condition that the lease be "guaranteed" was modified by the District consistent with the specification of the invitation for bids relating to the appropriation of funds. On the day of the District Board meeting approving a lease-purchase with Mid America, January 14, 1987, the District entered into a contract with Mid America for the lease-purchase of a Speedstar SS-135. SJRWMD Ex. 3. The lease agreement contains a Paragraph allowing the District to terminate the lease upon nonappropriation of funds, Subject to certain conditions. Id., para. 11. In February, 1987, Mr. Auld learned at a trade show in Orlando that the District had awarded the contract to Mid America. Mr. Auld called Ms. Mildred Horton, the Assistant Executive Director of the District, to ask for the reasons why his bid was not accepted. Ms. Horton wrote a letter to Mr. Auld dated February 17, 1987, Setting forth the reasons for the award to Mid America and attaching two amortization Schedules, one for each bid. The letter and attachments is P. Ex. 6. Ms. Horton stated that the Schedules attached were the only ones in existence, to her knowledge. None of the reasons given by Ms. Horton for the rejection of the Petitioner's bid could have been known prior to the opening of the bids. The amortization schedules attached to Ms. Horton's letter had been prepared by Mr., Schenk. The schedule for the Petitioner's bid showed a total cost over a three year period of $224,344, which resulted in an effective interest rate of 31 percent compared to the outright purchase price on the Petitioner's bid of $146,976. The schedule assumes that the Petitioner's bid was for a monthly payment of $6,885 for two years followed by a monthly payment of $4,592 in the third year. P. Ex. 6. Mr. Schenk testified that he considered the possibility that the Petitioner's bid for a three year lease purchase was $4,592 per month for 36 months, and prepared an alternative amortization table based upon that possible interpretation as well as the amortization table attached to the letter sent to Mr. Auld by Ms. Horton described above. P. Ex. 12. Mr. Schenk concluded, however, that the Petitioner's bid should be interpreted as a bid of $6,885 per month for two years and $4,592 for the third year, for a total cost of $224,344. He testified that it was confusing that the Petitioner's bid did not contain a price for the first year, but he also concluded that the price of $6,885 placed on the second line of paragraph B) of the Petitioner's bid was intended to be a price for both the first year and the second year. He further testified that the Petitioner's bid may have been more understandable had the word "renewable" been stricken on the bid form. Finally, he testified that he disregarded the additions to the Petitioner's bid form because these were "alterations" to the form, but considered the additions to the bid form by Mid America because these were only "additions." As discussed above, after the Second invitation for bids was published, the District was Primarily interested in receiving bids for a three year lease-purchase. The bid blank in the second invitation for bids, however, failed to provide a clear method for bidders to bid that option. Paragraph B) of the bid blank drafted by the District was defective because it did not in any manner state that a purchase (a transfer of ownership) was included in the "lease" for which a price was being asked, because it failed to state whether the District wanted bids on a one year lease- purchase, a two year lease-purchase, a three year lease-purchase, or only a lease for those periods of time, because the word "renewable" was susceptible of being interpreted as renewal from month to month as well as from year to year, as so construed in Mr. Schenk's December 12, 1986 recommendation to the District Board. Paragraph B) was also defective because it failed to provide a place to show the price of the purchase option at the end of the lease, or zero if there were to be none. Without the "CONDITIONS" attached to the Mid America bid, the filled-in blanks of Paragraph B) on the bid form only resulted in a bid on a lease. Mr. Schenk recognized this as he construed Paragraph B) of the form as only asking for a lease bid when he informed the District Board of option number 2 in his memorandum of December 12, 1986. P. Ex. 13. Since the bid form was defective, it was foreseeable that bidders would have to have added additional words to the bid form to make it sensical. It was also foreseeable that different bidders would take different approaches in trying to draft additions to the form to enable them to bid all critical aspects of a lease that included a purchase at the end of the lease. The bid of the Petitioner should have been construed with this foreseeability in mind. In particular, the failure of the Petitioner to place a price on the first line of paragraph B) (relating to the first year) coupled with the placing of a price at the second year line and the third year line, and the addition of the words "owned at end of second year" and "owned at end of third year" should have been construed as the Petitioner's attempt, like the attempt of Mid America, to cure the ambiguities in the bid form. As discussed above, without such words, a price in the first line of paragraph B) of the bid form would have only been a bid for a renewable lease for one year, with no purchase option. The District argues that it did not ask for a bid on a two year lease-purchase, and that the Petitioner's attempt to bid on that as well as on a three year lease-purchase caused confusion. But the problem is that the bid form, as discussed above, did not ask for any purchase associated with a lease, and asked for prices for a lease that could have either a one, two or three year term based upon the option to renew. It was not unreasonable, then, for the Petitioner to have bid a two year lease-purchase. The interpretation of Petitioner's bid as a bid for a total cost of $224,344 over three years is not reasonable. The interpretation of the Petitioner's bid as providing for a total cost of $224,344 over three years results in an interest cost of 31 percent, a rate of interest that is facially unreasonable. But more important if, as assumed in that interpretation, the District were to enter into a contract with the Petitioner at a monthly charge of $6,885 per month for two years, it would own the Failing drill rig at the end of the second year. This is so because the Same line that contains the price ($6,885) also has the added words "owned at end of second year." If it owned the rig after two years, the District Surely would not continue leasing it for the third year at $4,592 per month. Payment of $6,885 for 24 months would cost a total of $165,240, which reasonably compares to Petitioner's outright purchase price of $146,976, plus the cost of paying over a two year period. Since it was more reasonable to construe line two of the Paragraph B) of the Petitioner's bid form as a bid for a two year lease-purchase, the third line should have been given the same construction, that is, to construe the price placed on the line as the price each month for the entire period (here, three years) with ownership automatic at the end of the term. The reasonable interpretation of line 3 of Paragraph B) of the Petitioner's bid is for a lease-purchase for three years at $4,592 per month, for a total cost over three years of $165,312, the rig then being owned by the District at the end of 36 months with no buy-out cost. The reasonableness of this interpretation is further supported by the fact that payment of $165,312 on a machine that cost $146,976 to buy outright results in an interest rate for payment over three years of 7.9 percent, which is a normal and usual interest rate that would be expected in a competitive bid. P. Ex. 12. Mid America's bid offered to deliver in 21 days, while the Petitioner offered to deliver in 120 days. Since the District was then renting drilling equipment at $4,612 per month, it would potentially have incurred about one month extra rental ($4,612) on the Mid America bid, and $18,448 for four months extra rental on the Petitioner's bid, or an additional cost of $13,836 on the Petitioner's bid. Including this cost of rental during the potential delivery period, the net cost of the Petitioner's three year lease-purchase bid was $183,760, and the net cost of the Mid America bid alternative that was accepted by the District was $193,289. Thus, with respect to the bid actually accepted by the District, the Petitioner's bid was $9,529 less than the bid of Mid America. During the formal administrative hearing, it appeared from the evidence that the District relied upon the following additional issues, other than price, as the reasons for selection of the Mid America bid: One year guaranteed non-routine, major maintenance and repair on the lease equipment, renewable annually for the term of the lease. A manufacturers warranty of at least 6 months or 1,000 hours. The delivery date. The location of the maintenance Services. All of the foregoing were bid specifications printed on the bid form. P. Exs. 11 and 4. Of these, only the issue of non-routine maintenance was mentioned in the letter of Ms. Horton to Mr. Auld on February 17, 1987. P. Ex. 6. Mid America bid $3,000 per year for non-routine maintenance. The Petitioner Stated on its bid form that this item was "not available." Non-routine maintenance is needed only at the end of the warranty Period. In the industry, its is well understood that non-routine maintenance normally does not apply and is not Purchased until the end of the warranty period. The District had not purchased the non-routine maintenance at the time of the formal administrative hearing. The prices quoted in the bids, pursuant to the invitation for bids, were to have been fixed only for 90 days. Thus, it is uncertain whether the $3,000 bid of Mid America for non-routine major maintenance would still hold. The term "non-routine, major maintenance and repair" was not further defined by the bid form. Although the Petitioner did not bid on non-routine maintenance, it did offer a one year warranty which was six months beyond the minimum specified by the District. Thus, for this six months period only, the Petitioner effectively provided a free non-routine maintenance offer at least to extent of the warranty. But the Petitioner failed to offer non-routine major maintenance for the 24 month period following the first year of the lease. Both bidders complied with the specifications with respect to the manufacturer's warranty, but the Petitioner offered a warranty that was better by six months. The District Board was incorrectly advised that the Petitioner's warranty was only for 90 days (and thus not in compliance with specifications). P. Ex. 13. The delivery date was considered during the hearing only with respect to the cost of rental of equipment until the new rig would be delivered, and thus was an element of net cost discussed above. The Petitioner's delivery date caused its bid to have an additional rental cost of $13,836 as compared to the Mid America bid, but the Petitioner's total net cost still was lower than the Mid America bid, as discussed above. The Petitioner's location of maintenance services was Largo, Florida, and Mid America's location was Ocala, Florida. Mid America's location is approximately 100 miles closer to Palatka than the Petitioner's location. The difference is a difference of about 4 hours in travel time, roundtrip, or only two hours for delivery of a part. Mr. Schenk testified that this factor carried only "some weight." Mr. Schenk did not know how often maintenance at the seller's location might occur, what percentage of maintenance might be in the field rather than in the seller's shop, or the problems that might occur from lack of a part. From the testimony of Mr. Winchester, who was the only rig expert who testified, and the testimony of Mr. Munch regarding the leased Speedstar rig, it appears that maintenance on the rig for major problems should not occur very often, if at all, and that many problems can be corrected in the field. In most cases, parts will have to come overnight by bus. It is inferred that a part from Ocala will arrive no sooner by overnight bus than a part from Largo by overnight bus. Thus, the closer location of the Mid America shop is of little importance on this record. The February 17, 1987, letter from Ms. Horton to Mr. Auld Stated that the failure of the Petitioner to bid on a one year lease was one of the reasons for not accepting the Petitioner's bid. As discussed above, the District was primarily seeking a three year lease-purchase, not a one year lease, and communicated this to the two bidders. Indeed, it was the existing one year lease that prompted the desire by the Board to explore a purchase over time. The District did not enter into a one year lease with Mid America, either. Thus, a bid on a one year lease was not a material or substantial part of the bid specifications. Specification number 2, listed as a desired option, was that the drill rig have a five speed transmission. The Speedstar SS-135 had a five speed transmission, thus giving it a lower first gear, and the Failing CF-15 did not. There is no evidence that the Petitioner could have have offered a five speed-transmission. On the other hand, there is no evidence that a four speed transmission would not effectively meet the needs of the District. The only evidence was that the five speed transmission would have a lower first gear, but there was not substantial evidence that the District would encounter drilling circumstances needing only the lower gear of the Speedstar SS-135. When the rotary table is retracted on the Speedstar SS- 135, the opening is 18 inches in diameter, thus allowing the Speedstar SS-135 to set 16 inch casing. The Speedstar SS-135 otherwise marginally has the power and related mechanical ability to drill and set 16" casing, particularly lighter PVC casing, to depths of 80 feet in about six hours. Drilling the first 80 feet in six hours is very slow in comparison to the normal operation of either the Speedstar SS-135 or the Failing CF-15, and would be more a matter of use of the mud pump to wear away the soil rather than actually drilling the hole. However, the Speedstar SS-135 is in fact being used in Florida by other owners to drill and set 16 inch casing. When the rotary table is retracted on the Failing CF-15, the opening is 14 1/2 inches in diameter, and thus the Failing CF- 15 does not have any capacity to drill or set 16 inch casing. If the District had chosen the Failing CF-15, in those cases in which it needed to drill and set 16 inch casing, it would have to contract out to a larger drill rig to drill and set such casing. In all other respects the Speedstar SS-135 and the Failing CF-15 are functionally equivalent machines, and are considered to be equivalent in the industry. For the most part, the design differences explained by Mr. Munch with respect to the video tape of views of both machines were not differences causing the machines to be not functional equivalents, except as discussed above. The recommendation of the staff of the District to purchase the Speedstar SS-135 would probably have been the same, based upon factors other than price, had the staff considered the bid of the Petitioner to have been $9,529 less than that of Mid America for a three year lease-purchase, as discussed in finding of fact 60. While the District entered into the process of obtaining bids for the drill rig with a preference for a rig capable of performing like the Speedstar SS-135, it did not intend to favor the Mid America Company over the Petitioner, nor did it act in bad faith. At all times relevant to these invitations for bids and award of the contract, the District did not have rules governing purchasing of commodities or governing the notification to interested persons concerning the procedures for contesting a proposed purchase. It did not have any policy or rule requiring that the lowest bid be accepted without consideration of other factors. It did have written policies, SJRWMD Exs. 1 and 2, providing for the following: Purchases in excess of $5,000 must be advertised in a newspaper of general circulation no less than ten days prior to bid opening. The District Purchasing Director may withdraw the entire proposal, and may reject all bids or parts of bids, if the District's interest will be served by that action. Departments or Divisions of the District submitting requisitions must do so with items described in such terms to allow unrestricted bidding and to afford full opportunity to bid to all qualified bidders. Any purchase order made contrary to the provisions of the purchasing policies shall be of no effect and void.
Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the St. Johns River Water Management District enter its final order that the bid of the George E. Failing Company pursuant to Bid Number 87-01, second call for bids, dated November 6, 1986, was properly rejected because it did not meet all specifications of the invitation to bid. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of August, 1987. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1606BID The following are rulings upon findings of fact proposed by the parties which have been rejected. The numbers correspond to the numbers used by the parties. Findings of fact proposed by the George F. Failing Company: 2. The third sentence is rejected because Mr. Munch chose the Speedstar SS-135 as a basis for the Specifications due to his familiarity with the leased drill rig of the same make. 6. Not relevant. 19 and 20. Mr. Auld's testimony that a manufacturer's warranty on a 1985 truck would be less inclusive that on a 1987 truck was hearsay, and cannot support a finding of fact as to that point. Thus, those portions of these proposed findings concerning a 1985 truck are irrelevant. 36. Ms. Vergara did not testify that the planned monitoring wells would be 2,000 feet deep. 38. Subordinate to finding of fact 71. 45. Rejected by finding of fact 42. Rejected by finding of fact 50. There is no evidence that the Speedstar SS-135 bid by Mid America was a display model. The delivery date of the Speedstar SS-135 is not in evidence. Findings of fact proposed by the St. Johns River Water Management District: 4. There is no evidence as to the depths of the proposed monitoring well network, and thus a finding of fact that the depth will be 1000 feet cannot be made. 8. The existence of a buy-out price in the first Mid America bid did not cause the bid to be unclear. 12. The fourth sentence, as to what the District thought the second bid blank "should" contain, is not supported by the evidence. The last sentence is rejected because it is not clear that the bid blank was a "renewable lease-purchase in one year intervals." See findings of fact 34, 55, and 56. 14. The evidence is that the Speedstar SS-135 can set 16 inch casing, not 17 1/2 inch casing. The findings concerning the failure of the Petitioner's bid to give the District the option of being able to "exit the lease" in one year is rejected because that option was securely provided in the invitation for bids, so securely so that it was construed by the District to be an implicit part of the Mid America bid that ultimately was accepted by the District. See finding of fact 50 concerning the non-appropriation of funds condition. Additionally, the findings concerning the inability of the District to construe the bid of the Petitioner to know its first year fiscal obligations are rejected for the reasons stated in findings of fact 56 through 58. The second sentence is rejected for the reasons stated in findings of fact 34 and 55. The last sentence is rejected by these findings of fact as well; the ambiguity was created by the bid form, not by the bidders. These findings of fact have essentially been rejected by findings of fact 34 and 55. Further, the word "renewable" was not inconsistent with ownership at the end of a two year period because the word "renewable" could be given the construction given it by Mr. Schenk, renewable from month to month. See finding of fact 49. 22 and 23. Rejected for the reasons stated in findings of fact 34 and 55 through 58. These proposed findings of fact are essentially correct as a matter of law, but are not facts. These findings of fact are rejected by findings of fact 34 and 55 through 58. 27. The last sentence of proposed finding of fact (4) is rejected for the reasons stated in finding of fact 66. 29. Subordinate to finding of fact 71. 32. While these Proposed findings are true and have been Substantially adopted, the proposed findings are not relevant in view of the stipulations contained in findings of fact 1 and 2. COPIES FURNISHED: Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Henry Dean, Executive Director St Johns River Water Management District Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32078-1429 Linda M. Hallas, Esquire 9455 Koger Boulevard, Suite 209 St. Petersburg, Florida 33702 Wayne E. Flowers, Esquire Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32078-1429
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Big "S" Oil Company, operates a gasoline station at 4002 North Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida. The station sells gasoline products to the general public. On or about December 9, 1981, a petroleum inspector of Petitioner, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, took a gasoline sample for analysis of regular gasoline from the Respondent's storage tanks during the course of a routine inspection. This sample was tested in Petitioner's mobile laboratory and was found to have an elevated End Point of 494 degrees Fahrenheit 1/ Department regulations provide that the End Point for leaded gasoline offered for sale in Florida shall not exceed 446 degrees Fahrenheit. A second test conducted in a private laboratory confirmed the initial testing results. On the basis of this information, a stop sale notice on the tank that dispensed the gasoline was issued on December 9, 1981. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). Petitioner determined that prior to the issuance of the notice, approximately 1,900 gallons of contaminated gasoline had been sold to the public. A bond of $1,000 was paid by Respondent to Petitioner in lieu of confiscation of the remaining leaded or regular gasoline in the storage tanks (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). The hearing was requested to contest the forfeiture of the bond.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be required to forfeit the $1,000 bond posted with Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
