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VICK GRIFFIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY vs. LONG CONTRACTORS, INC., AND NORTH FLORIDA JR. COLLEGE, 82-000654 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000654 Latest Update: Apr. 29, 1982

Findings Of Fact On or about December 29, 1981, the College solicited sealed bids for construction of alterations and additions to the Technical and Gymnasium Buildings located on its campus in Madison, Florida. In response, seven general contractors submitted bids. (P-1, P-2, P-3.) Bids were publicly opened on February 9, 1982. Griffin Construction, with a bid of $536,575, was the apparent low bidder; the second lowest bidder was Long Contractors, with a bid of $539,512. (Testimony of Griffin, Sims, Rutherford; P-3, P-4, P-5.) After the low bid was identified, Tom McClanahan, representing Long Contractors, asked that the subcontractor list accompanying the low bid be opened. Griffin Construction's subcontractor list was then opened. McClanahan asked if the license and charter numbers of the subcontractors were listed. 2/ Upon learning that these numbers were not included on Griffin Construction's subcontractor list, McClanahan protested. (Testimony of Sims, Rutherford, Griffin.) At its February 15, 1982, meeting, the College District Board of Trustees ("Board") rejected the low bid of Griffin Construction on the sole ground that the omission of subcontractor license and charter numbers constituted a failure to comply with the conditions of the bid documents. 3/ The Board then voted to award the contract to Long Contractors, the second lowest bidder, on the ground that it was the lowest bid conforming to the bid documents. In so doing, the Board followed the College president's recommendation--a recommendation based on his belief that the non-complying bid must be rejected, that it did not involve a matter of Board discretion. (Testimony of Sims, Rutherford, Griffin; Stipulation of Parties; P-41.) The bid specifications contain instructions to bidders requiring "each Bidder . . . [to] submit with his proposal a list of the subcontractors who will perform the work . . . as indicated by the `List of Subcontractors' form." (P-1, P-2.) The instructions further provide: The applicable subcontractor license registration or certification number must be noted on the bid opposite his name, and in the event that the subcontractor is a corporation, his State Corporate Charter number shall also be noted. If the subcontractor is an out of state firm, their Charter number with the Secretary of State to do business in the State of Florida should also be noted. The "Listing of Subcontractors" form provided with the specifications contains column headings for the names and addresses of the subcontractors but does not contain a separate heading for the requested license or corporate charter numbers. 4/ The form states that the subcontractor list "is an integral part of the bid." (P-1, P-2.) The bid instructions further require bidders to evaluate and determine the qualifications of their listed subcontractors. The bidder shall have determined to his own complete satisfaction that a listed subcontractor has been successfully engaged in this particular type of business for a reasonable length of time, has successfully completed installations comparable to that which is required by this agreement and is qualified both technically and financially to perform that pertinent phase of the work for which he is listed. (P-1, P-2.) The bid documents expressly reserve to the College the right "to reject any or all bids, and to waive informalities." (P-1 P-2.) No bidder correctly listed the required license and corporate charter numbers on its "Listing of Subcontractors" form. Griffin Construction. Griffin failed to include any license or corporate charter numbers. However, by subsequent letters dated February 9 and February 18, 1982, and at hearing, it supplied the required subcontractor license and charter numbers. Long Contractors. Long listed for its roofing subcontractor a sheet metal registration number, not the required roofing license number. [A sheet metal registration does not qualify a contractor for roofing work. See, 489.105, 489.113, Fla. Stat. (1981).] For its electrical subcontractor, Long omitted the prefix, "ER" from the listed number. For its plumbing subcontractor, Long listed a mechanical registration number instead of the required plumbing certification or registration number. [A mechanical registration does not qualify a contractor to perform plumbing work. See, 489.105, 489.113, supra.] Of the four areas requiring state licenses--roofing, heating and air conditioning, electrical, and plumbing--Long listed correctly only the registration number for its heating and air conditioning subcontractor. Long incorrectly listed No. FO6962 as the corporate number of Gandy Enterprises, its painting subcontractor. This is the number of a related corporation, Industrial Coatings, Inc. Remaining Bidders. Of the five other general contractors submitting bids, two-- Richard Walker Construction Company and GRC Contracting, Inc.--omitted all subcontractor license and charter numbers. The other three bidders failed to completely list all the required numbers. (Testimony of Rutherford; P-11, P-12, P-13, P-14, P-15, P-16, P-17, P-34, P-37, R-1, R-5.) The project architect testified that the submittal of incorrect or incomplete subcontractor license and charter numbers was a deficiency which a bidder should be allowed to cure after bid opening. But the failure to submit any required "number" was a deficiency which, in his opinion, could not be similarly corrected. He failed, however, to supply a reasonable basis for drawing such a distinction. Therefore, his opinion on this question is given little weight. 5/ (Testimony of Rutherford.) Subcontractor license and charter numbers are readily obtainable and can be verified by contacting the pertinent state agency--the Florida Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, or the Florida Department of State. (Testimony of Griffin, Rutherford; P-32, P-33, P- 34, P-35, P-36, P-37.) The project architect, William Rutherford, routinely requires the listing of subcontractor license and charter numbers on bids for public construction projects. The main purpose it serves is that it would enable him to identify the listed contractor, since sometimes subcontractors have similar business names. Although if he was uncertain about the qualifications of a subcontractor, he would ordinarily question the general contractor. (Testimony of Rutherford.) Although Mr. Rutherford has customarily required the listing of subcontractor "numbers" on public projects, he has never made any use of those numbers in the past. (Testimony of Rutherford.) The general contractor who is awarded the contract is responsible to Mr. Rutherford and the College for construction of the project in accordance with the bid specifications. If, after bid opening, a listed subcontractor is unable to perform, Mr. Rutherford would ordinarily arrange for substitution of a new subcontractor acceptable to the general contractor and owner. (Testimony of Rutherford.) Griffin Construction's failure to list the license and charter numbers of its listed subcontractors, and its subsequent curing of that failure, did not affect the amount of its bid 6/ by giving it an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other bidders. The bid omission did not allow Griffin Construction the opportunity to change any material element of its bid after bid opening. The inclusion or exclusion of subcontractor "numbers" at bid opening does not affect the ability of a contractors to obtain the required bond, the quality of bidding general contractors, the quality of listed subcontractors, the quality of work performed, or any material feature of the competitive bidding process. (Testimony of Griffin, Rutherford.)

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the construction contract in question be awarded to Vick Griffin Construction Company, the lowest responsible bidder. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 29th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1982.

Florida Laws (3) 120.5720.15489.105
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BUTLER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 93-003971BID (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 22, 1993 Number: 93-003971BID Latest Update: Sep. 15, 1993

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In March of 1993, the Department issued an Advertisement for Bids (hereinafter referred to as the "Advertisement") through which it solicited the submission of bids on a construction project (Department Project No. NV-30A, which is hereinafter referred to as the "Project") involving the expansion of the water treatment facility at the Martin Correctional Institution. The Advertisement, along with the other bid documents issued in conjunction with the Advertisement, including, but not limited to, the Instructions to Bidders (hereinafter referred to as the "Instructions") and the Proposal Form, were compiled in a two-volume Specifications Manual (hereinafter referred to as the "Manual") that was made available for public inspection. Section B of the Manual's first volume contained the Instructions. Section B-2 2.A.(11) thereof provided that "Section 01420 as contained in the Technical Specifications must be submitted and the qualifications listed therein must be satisfactory to the Owner and the Engineer. " "Section 01420 as contained in the Technical Specifications" was a "Bidder's Qualification Form, Reverse Osmosis Treatment System Component" (hereinafter referred to as the "R.O. Form"), on which the bidder was to provide "R.O. [Reverse Osmosis] System Supplier" information. The R.O. Form repeated the directive that the bidder was to "[r]eturn [the] [c]ompleted [R.O.] Form [w]ith [its] proposal." Section B-14 of the Instructions addressed the subject of "preparation and submission of bids" and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Each Bidder shall copy the proposal form on his own letterhead, indicate his bid prices thereon in proper spaces, for the Base Bid and for alternates on which he bids. . . . Proposals containing . . . . items not called for or irregularities of any kind may be rejected by the Owner. Section B-16 of the Instructions addressed the subject of "disqualification of bidders" and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: More than one bid from an individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association under the same or different names will not be considered. Reasonable grounds for believing that a Bidder is interested in more than one proposal for the same work will cause the rejection of all proposals in which such Bidders are believed to be interested. The subject of "contract award" was addressed in Section B-21 of the Instructions, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . The recommendation for contract award will be for the bidder qualified in accordance with Section B-2 and submitting the lowest bid provided his bid is responsible and it is in the best interest of the Owner to accept it. The qualified bidder submitting the lowest bid will be that bidder who has submitted the lowest price for the base bid, or the base bid plus additive alternates or less deductive alternates, taken in the numerical order listed in the bid documents in an amount to be determined by the Owner. The Order of the alternates may be accepted by the Owner in any sequence so long as such acceptance does not alter the designation of the low bidder. The Owner reserves the right to waive any informality in bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the Owner. Section C of Volume I of the Manual contained the Proposal Form that all bidders were required to use to indicate their bid prices. The following statement appeared at the bottom of the second page of the Proposal Form: There is enclosed: A certified check, cashier's check, treasurer's check, bank draft or Bid Bond in the amount of not less than five (5) percent of the Base Bid payable to the Department of Corrections, as a guarantee. An executed Trench Excavation Safety Certification, Section F-13. An executed Experience Questionnaire and Contractor's Financial Statement and Public Entity Criminal Conviction Form, Section L. An executed Bidder's Qualifications Form (Reverse Osmosis), Technical Specification Section 01420. While one completed R.O. Form had to accompany each bid, there was no provision in any of the bid documents issued by the Department requiring a bidder to submit only one such completed form and no more. Petitioner, McMahan and R.J. Sullivan Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Sullivan") were among the contractors that timely submitted bids in response to the Advertisement. McMahan's and Sullivan's bids were each accompanied by more than one completed R.O. Form. Petitioner, on the other hand, provided the Department with only one completed R.O. Form along with its bid. Of the bids submitted, McMahan's was the lowest, Sullivan's was the second lowest and Petitioner's was the third lowest. McMahan's base bid price was $857,000.00. Petitioner's was $905,000.00. McMahan's total price, including the nine additive alternates accepted by the Department, was $948,000.00. Petitioner's was $1,032,600.00, $84,600.00 more than McMahan's. By letter dated July 1, 1993, the Department advised McMahan of its intent "to award the contract [for Department Project No. NV-30A] to [McMahan] as the lowest responsive bidder." On July 9, 1993, Petitioner filed a formal written protest of the preliminary determination to award the contract to McMahan alleging that McMahan was not a responsive bidder inasmuch as McMahan "submitted Reverse Osmosis ("R.O.") Qualifications Forms for more tha[n] one vendor." According to Petitioner, "[t]his [was] not in conformance with the Bid Documents and gave [McMahan] an unfair advantage."

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a final order finding Petitioner's bid protest to be without merit and awarding McMahan, as the lowest responsive and qualified bidder, the contract for Department Project No. NV-30A. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of September, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 1993.

Florida Administrative Code (3) 60D-5.00260D-5.00760D-5.0071
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MARPAN SUPPLY COMPANY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 96-002777BID (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 11, 1996 Number: 96-002777BID Latest Update: Nov. 26, 1996

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly in selecting Intervenor as the lowest bidder for a contract to supply the state with lamps valued at $3,692,499.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent is the state agency responsible for soliciting bids to establish a contract for the purchase of large lamps by state agencies and other eligible users. Petitioner is a Florida corporation and the incumbent vendor under similar contracts for the preceding 10 years. Petitioner does not manufacture lamps. Petitioner sells lamps manufactured by Osram-Sylvania ("Sylvania"). Intervenor is an Ohio corporation doing business in Florida. Intervenor manufactures the lamps it sells. The ITB On March 15, 1996, Respondent issued Invitation To Bid Number 39-285- 400-H, Lamps, Large, Photo and STTV (the "ITB"). The purpose of the ITB is to establish a 24 month contract for the purchase of Large Lamps (fluorescent, incandescent, etc.), Photo Lamps (audio visual, projection, flash), and Studio, Theatre, Television, and Video Lamps ("STTV") by state agencies and other eligible users. The contract runs from July 10, 1996, through July 9, 1998. The ITB estimates the contract price at $3,692,499. The ITB contains General and Special Conditions. General Conditions are set forth in 30 numbered paragraphs and elsewhere in DMS Form PUR 7027. Special Conditions are set forth in various unnumbered paragraphs in the ITB. General Conditions Paragraphs 5, 11, and 24 of the General Conditions are at issue in this proceeding. The terms of each paragraph are: 5. ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS: No additional terms and conditions included with the bid response shall be evaluated or considered and any and all such additional terms and conditions shall have no force and effect and are inapplicable to this bid. If submitted either purposely through intent or design or inadvertently appearing separately in transmittal letters, specifications, literature, price lists, or warranties, it is understood and agreed the general and special conditions in this bid solicitation are the only conditions applicable to this bid and the bidder's authorized signature affixed to the bidder's acknowledgment form attests to this. 11. QUALITY ASSURANCE: The contractor, during the contract term, upon mutual agree- ment with the Division of Purchasing, will provide reasonable travel and lodging accommodations for one (1) to three (3) government employees to perform an on-site inspection of the manufacturing process(es) and review of the manufacturer's product quality control(s) and total quality manage- ment program(s). The contractor will reim- burse the State for actual transportation cost, per diem and incidental expenses as provided in Section 112.061, F.S. It is the State's desire that the contractor provide demonstration of quality control for improvement rather than post production detection. 24. FACILITIES: The State reserves the right to inspect the bidder's facilities at any reasonable time with prior notice. Included Items Special Conditions in the ITB require bidders to submit prices for "Item 1" and "Item 2" lamps ("included items"). 1/ Item 1 lamps consist of Group 1 and 2 lamps. Group 1 lamps are Large Lamps such as fluorescent, incandescent, quartz, mercury vapor, metal halide, and high-pressure sodium lamps. Group 2 lamps are Photo Lamps such as audio visual, projection, flash, and STTV lamps. The total price for each group is multiplied by a weighted usage factor. The product calculated for Group 1 is added to the product calculated for Group 2 to determine the total price for Item 1 lamps. Item 2 consists of a category of lamps described as "T- 10 Lamps." The total price for Item 2 lamps is determined without application of the weighted usage factor used for Item 1 lamps. The total price for Item 2 lamps is a de minimis portion of the contract price. Special Conditions in the ITB require Respondent to award a single contract for included items to a single bidder. Special Conditions state that, "During the term of the contract established by this bid, all purchases of items will be made from the successful bidder." 2/ Excluded Items Special Conditions require that, "The bidder shall offer a fixed discount from retail prices on all excluded items." Excluded items include high technology lamps. The requirement for a fixed discount on excluded items is not considered in evaluating bid prices for included items. Rather, the requirement is intended to reduce the state's cost for both included and excluded items by assuring a meaningful discount on excluded items. Formatting Requirements Special Conditions prescribe the format in which bids must be submitted. Price lists and authorized dealers' lists are required to be submitted in hard copy and on computer diskette. The format prescribed for computer diskette includes requirements for font and graphics. The Special Conditions state that, "Failure to comply with this requirement will result in disqualification of your bid." The Bids The ITB prohibits the alteration of bids after they are opened. Respondent opened bids on April 10, 1996. Seven vendors submitted bids in response to the ITB. Included Items Four vendors, including Petitioner, submitted a bid for both Item 1 and Item 2 lamps. Intervenor and two other bidders did not submit a bid for Item 2 lamps. General Conditions Intervenor deleted paragraphs 11 and 24 of the General Conditions from its bid. At the direction of Intervenor's legal department in Cleveland, Ohio, Intervenor's regional sales manager struck through paragraphs 11 and 24 and initialed the deletions. The deletions are consistent with Intervenor's corporate policy. Intervenor routinely objects to contract provisions requiring inspection of Intervenor's facilities. Excluded Items Petitioner's bid includes a fixed discount of 44 percent on excluded items. Intervenor's bid includes a fixed discount of 0 percent. Formatting Requirements Intervenor included the information required by the ITB on the diskette it submitted with its bid. However, Intervenor supplied the information in Courier 12 characters per inch ("cpi") font, not the Courier 10 cpi font prescribed in the ITB. Proposed Agency Action Respondent determined that Intervenor's bid was responsive. The purchasing specialist for Respondent who reviewed each bid to determine if it was responsive failed to observe the deleted paragraphs in Intervenor's bid. The purchasing specialist forwarded those bids determined to be responsive to the purchasing analyst assigned by Respondent to: determine if the lamps offered in each bid met the specifications prescribed in the ITB; and evaluate bid prices. The purchasing analyst noted that paragraphs 11 and 24 were deleted from Intervenor's bid. The purchasing analyst and purchasing specialist conferred. They determined that paragraph 5 of the General Conditions cured Intervenor's deletions without further action. The purchasing analyst correctly determined: that lamps offered by Petitioner and Intervenor met ITB specifications; that Intervenor's bid is the lowest bid for Item 1 lamps; that Petitioner's bid is the second lowest such bid; and that Petitioner's bid is the lowest bid for Item 2 lamps. Petitioner's bid for Item 1 lamps is approximately five percent greater than Intervenor's bid. Respondent proposes to award one contract for Item 1 lamps to Intervenor. Respondent proposes to award a second contract for Item 2 lamps to Petitioner. At 4:00 p.m. on May 20, 1996, Respondent posted its intent to award the contract for Item 1 lamps to Intervenor. Petitioner timely filed its formal protest on June 3, 1996. Respondent did not award a contract for excluded items. Respondent's failure to award a contract for excluded items is not at issue in this proceeding. Arbitrary Respondent's proposed award of a contract to Intervenor for substantially all of the items included in the ITB is a decisive decision that Respondent made for reasons, and pursuant to procedures, not governed by any fixed rule or standard prescribed either in the ITB or outside the ITB. Respondent's proposed agency action is arbitrary. Excluded Items The requirement for bidders to offer a fixed discount on excluded items operates synergistically with the requirement for Respondent to award a single contract on included items to a single bidder. The combined action of the two requirements operating together has greater total effect than the effect that would be achieved by each requirement operating independently. The requirement for a fixed discount on excluded items, operating alone, may not induce a bidder who could receive a contract solely for Item 2 lamps to offer a discount that is as meaningful as the discount the bidder might offer if the bidder were assured of receiving a contract for Item 1 and 2 lamps upon selection as the lowest bidder. 3/ By assuring bidders that a single contract for Item 1 and 2 lamps will be awarded to a single bidder, the ITB creates an economic incentive for bidders to provide a meaningful discount on excluded items. Respondent frustrated the synergy intended by the ITB by applying the requirements for a fixed discount and for a single contract independently. Respondent penalized the bidder conforming to the requirement for a fixed discount on excluded items by awarding only a de minimis portion of the contract to the bidder. Respondent rewarded the bidder not conforming to the requirement for a fixed discount on excluded items by awarding substantially all of the contract to that bidder. If Respondent elects to purchase all excluded items from Petitioner, Respondent will have used the contract for Item 1 lamps to induce a meaningful discount from Petitioner without awarding Petitioner with the concomitant economic incentive intended by the ITB. Such a result frustrates the ITB's intent. Paragraph 5 Respondent's interpretation of paragraph 5 fails to explicate its proposed agency action. Respondent's interpretation of paragraph 5: leads to an absurd result; is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms of the ITB; and is inconsistent with Respondent's actions. Respondent's interpretation imbues paragraph 5 with limitless curative powers. Respondent's interpretation empowers paragraph 5 to cure the deletion of all General Conditions in the ITB whether stricken by pen or excised with scissors. Respondent's interpretation of paragraph 5 would transform a bid containing no General Conditions into a responsive bid. Respondent's interpretation of paragraph 5 is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms. Paragraph 5 operates to cure "additional" terms. It does not operate to restore deleted terms. Respondent's interpretation of paragraph 5 is inconsistent with Respondent's actions. Respondent did not rely on paragraph 5 to cure Intervenor's deletions without further action. Respondent took further action to cure the deletions. Further Action On the morning of May 20, 1996, the purchasing analyst for Respondent telephoned Intervenor's regional sales manager. The purchasing analyst demanded that Intervenor accept the conditions Intervenor had deleted from its bid by submitting a letter of acceptance before the bid tabulations were posted at 4:00 p.m. on the same day. The regional sales manager contacted Intervenor's corporate headquarters in Cleveland, Ohio. Intervenor authorized the regional sales manager to accept the deleted paragraphs. By letter faxed to Respondent at approximately 3:20 p.m. on May 20, 1996, Intervenor accepted the paragraphs it had previously deleted. The letter stated that, "GE Lighting [will accept] the Contract Conditions noted in Paragraphs 11 and 24 of the Lamp Quotation." [emphasis not supplied] At 4:00 p.m. on May 20, 1996, Respondent posted the bid tabulation form. The bid tabulation form stated that the "award is contingent upon General Electric's acceptance of all the terms in conditions (sic)" in the ITB. Respondent argues that the purchasing analyst who contacted Intervenor on the morning of May 20, 1996, exceeded her authority. Respondent characterizes the word "contingent" in the bid tabulation form as "poorly written" and a "bad word." Agency Construction Of ITB Terms Respondent construes terms in the ITB in a manner that is inconsistent with their plain and ordinary meaning. The ITB requires that, "The bidder [shall] offer a fixed discount from retail price list on all excluded items." [emphasis supplied] Respondent interprets the quoted provision as meaning the bidder may offer such a fixed discount if the bidder elects to do so. The purpose of the ITB is to establish "[a] 24 month contract" to supply large lamps to the state. [emphasis supplied] Respondent interprets the quoted provision as meaning that the purpose of the ITB is to establish two contracts. The ITB states that, "During the term of the contract established by this bid, all purchases of items [will] be made from [the] successful bidder." [emphasis supplied] Respondent interprets the quoted provision as meaning that purchases of some items will be made from one successful bidder and that purchases of other items will be made from a second successful bidder. The ITB states that the contract "[shall] be made statewide on an all or none basis" to the responsive bidder who satisfies the conjunctive requirements for: "[the] lowest "Award Figure Item (1; [and] lowest Award figure for Item (2." [emphasis supplied] Respondent interprets the quoted provision as meaning that separate contracts may be made statewide on less than an all or none basis to separate responsive bidders who satisfy the disjunctive requirements for either the lowest bid for Item 1 lamps or the lowest bid for Item 2 lamps, or both. The ITB requires offers to be submitted for all items listed within a group for a bid to qualify for evaluation. Respondent interprets the requirement as meaning that a bidder who does not qualify for evaluation for all of the groups in the contract nevertheless qualifies for evaluation for the contract. Finally, the ITB states that failure to comply with the formatting requirements for the diskette "[will] result in disqualification of your bid." [emphasis supplied] Respondent interprets the quoted language to mean that failure to comply with prescribed formatting requirements may result in disqualification of a bid. The interpretations of the quoted terms proposed by Respondent, individually and collectively, frustrate the purpose of the ITB. They also ignore material requirements of the ITB. Material Deviation Respondent deviated from the rule or standard fixed in the ITB in several respects. First, Respondent altered the bid evaluation procedure prescribed in the ITB. Second, Respondent ignored the requirement to award a single contract to a single bidder. Third, Respondent ignored the requirement that bidders provide a fixed discount on excluded items. Fourth, Respondent ignored the requirement to comply with the formatting requirements prescribed in the ITB. Each deviation from the rule or standard fixed in the ITB is a material deviation. Each deviation gives Intervenor a benefit not enjoyed by other bidders. Each deviation affects the contract price and adversely impacts the interests of Respondent. 4/ 5.5(a) Benefit Not Enjoyed By Others Intervenor enjoyed a benefit not enjoyed by other bidders. Intervenor obtained a competitive advantage and a palpable economic benefit. Respondent altered the bid evaluation procedure prescribed in the ITB. On the morning of May 20, 1996, Respondent disclosed the bid tabulations to Intervenor alone, 5/ gave Intervenor an opportunity that lasted most of the business day to determine whether it would elect to escape responsibility for its original bid, allowed Intervenor to cure the defects in its bid, accepted Intervenor's altered bid, and conditioned the bid tabulations on Intervenor's altered bid. Respondent used a bid evaluation procedure that is not prescribed in the ITB and did not allow other bidders to participate in such a procedure. 6/ In effect, Respondent rejected Intervenor's initial bid, with paragraphs 11 and 24 deleted, and made a counter offer to Intervenor to accept a bid with paragraphs 11 and 24 restored. Intervenor accepted Respondent's counter offer. Respondent excluded other bidders from that process. Respondent gave Intervenor an opportunity to determine whether it would elect: to escape responsibility for its original bid by declining Respondent's counter offer; or to perform in accordance with an altered bid by restoring paragraphs 11 and 24. A bidder able to elect not to perform in accordance with its bid has a substantial competitive advantage over other bidders unable to escape responsibility for their bids. 7/ Respondent awarded substantially all of the contract to Intervenor even though Intervenor failed to provide a meaningful discount on excluded items. Respondent provided Intervenor with a palpable economic benefit. 5.5(b) Bid Price And Adverse Impact On The State Respondent did not award a contract for excluded items. Respondent's proposed agency action allows Respondent to purchase excluded items from either Intervenor or Petitioner. If Respondent were to purchase all of the excluded items it needs from Intervenor, Respondent could pay substantially more for excluded items than Respondent would save from the five percent price advantage in Intervenor's bid for Item 1 lamps. In such a case, Respondent's proposed agency action would effectively increase costs to the state that are inherent, but not stated, in the ITB. 8/ Conversion of incorrectly formatted data to the required font shifts prices to incorrect columns and causes other problems in accessing information in the diskette. Such problems can not be rectified easily but require substantial time and effort. Responsive Bidder Respondent did not award the contract intended by the ITB to the lowest responsive bid. Although Intervenor's bid is the lowest bid for Item 1 lamps, it is not the lowest responsive bid for Item 1 and 2 lamps. Petitioner's bid is the lowest responsive bid for Item 1 and 2 lamps. 9/ Respondent is statutorily required to award the contract to the lowest responsive bidder. 10/ Illegal Intervenor's bid is not responsive within the meaning of Sections 287.012(17), Florida Statutes (1995). 11/ It does not conform in all material respects to the ITB. Intervenor's unaltered bid deletes paragraphs 11 and 24. It does not include a fixed discount on excluded items, does not include a bid for Item 2 lamps, and does not conform to the formatting requirements in the ITB. Section 287.057 requires Respondent to award the contract to the bidder who submits the lowest responsive bid. Respondent has no authority either: to consider bids that are not responsive; or to award the contract to a bidder other than the lowest responsive bidder. Respondent's attempt to engage in either activity is ultra vires and illegal. Minor Irregularities The ITB encourages, but does require, bidders to include quantity discounts for Item 1 and 2 lamps. Petitioner's bid does not include quantity discounts. Petitioner's bid does not fail to conform to material requirements in the ITB. Petitioner does not manufacture Item 1 and 2 lamps. Sylvania manufactures the lamps Petitioner sells. Petitioner has no legal right to require Sylvania to allow inspection of its facilities pursuant to paragraph 11 of the General Conditions. Petitioner's ability to provide the requisite inspections requires the cooperation of Sylvania. Petitioner's bid requires payment by the state within 30 days of an invoice. Section 215.422 and the ITB provide that Respondent has 40 days to issue warrants in payment of contract debts and that interest does not accrue until after 40 days. The defects in Petitioner's bid are minor irregularities within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60A-1.001(16). 12/ They neither affect the bid price, give Petitioner a competitive advantage, nor adversely impact Respondent's interests. Petitioner has the practical ability to arrange inspection's of Sylvania's facilities. Petitioner is legally responsible for failing to do so. Respondent's employees have never visited Sylvania's facilities during the 10 years in which Petitioner has been the contract vendor to the state. The requirement for payment within 30 days does not obviate the provisions of Section 215.422. Private contracts can not alter mutually exclusive statutory provisions.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's protest of Respondent's proposed agency action. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of September, 1996.

Florida Laws (6) 112.061120.57215.422287.001287.012287.057 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60A-1.001
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BUCCANEER STEEL ERECTORS, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 86-000495BID (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000495BID Latest Update: Apr. 01, 1986

Findings Of Fact Respondent advertised for bids for work to be performed on the Statewide Regional Juvenile Detention Center located in Pasco County identified as Project Number HRS 85-300000. In response to this advertisements Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted bids on January 23, 1966. According to calculations performed by Respondent, Petitioner was low bidder and Intervenor was the next lowest bidder. The construction budget for this job is $1.5 million, and both bids are considered by Respondent to be within budget. Depending on the alternatives chosen within each bid, Petitioner's bid is lower than Intervenor's by between approximately $6,000 and $40,000. Section B-14 of the advertisement for bids requires each bidder to submit a list of the subcontractors who will perform work on the job for him and specifies that only one subcontractor shall be listed for each phase of the work. Section D of the advertisement for bids specifies the work areas for which a subcontractor must be listed and states that said list is an integral part of each bid submitted. The subcontracting areas include electrical plumbing, mechanical, roofing security control systems, food service equipment and fire protection. Petitioner's bid was rejected on February 4, 1986, because its bid failed to include a roofing subcontractor's name as required in the advertisement for bids. Petitioner does not dispute that its bid was incomplete when submitted since it failed to identify a roofing subcontractor. However, Petitioner contends this omission was a result of clerical error in typing the bide and that, in fact, it had selected Republic Roofing as its subcontractor. John Breen, Petitioner's project manager, testified that it was his intent to use Republic Roofing when he submitted the bide that he had a firm bid from Republic Roofing, and that when this omission was brought to his attention after bids were opened, he identified Republic Roofing in writing on January 24 and 29, 1986, to Brian Seufert an intern architect working for Respondent's project architect. Seufert confirms Breen's testimony through affidavit jointly filed by the parties. Seufert indicates that the project architect has no reason to believe that Petitioner could not perform the work required by the project. By affidavit jointly filed by the parties, Joyce Kleja secretary for Petitioners also supports Breen's testimony about her clerical error in omitting the roofing subcontractor when she typed the bid. Ray Scerbo, an estimator for Republic Roofing, disputes the testimony of Breen through jointly filed affidavit. Scerbo indicates it was not until a couple of days after the bid opening that he was told by Petitioner that Republic Roofing "had the job" if Petitioner was awarded the contract. This conflicts with the first written notice from Breen to Seufert dated January 24, 1986, as well as Seufert's affidavit that Petitioner told Seufert on January 24, 1986, that Republic Roofing had been selected. Scerbo is no longer employed by Republic Roofing. After considering all of the evidence, it is specifically found that Petitioner's omission of Republic Roofing from its list of subcontractors was through clerical error and that Petitioner had firmly decided to use Republic Roofing for subcontracting work prior to submission of its bid. The advertisement for bid required all subcontractors to be listed in any bid in order to allow Respondent to review prior performance and licensure of subcontractors, and also to prevent "bid shopping". Bid shopping is a practice which inflates a general contractor's bid and therefore the actual award by encouraging subcontractors to initially submit high bids to the general contractor and then negotiate a lower price with the general contractor who has received the award. The general contractor's bid remains inflated however and in this way the cost to the state is increased.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order awarding Project Number HRS 85-300000 to Intervenor. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of April 1986, at Tallahassee Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April 1986. APPENDIX (DOAH CASE NO. 86-0495B1D) Petitioner has submitted a memorandum and a Proposed Recommended Order, both of which appear to set forth proposed findings of fact in unnumbered paragraphs. For purposes of ruling thereon, the unnumbered paragraphs which appear to set forth proposed findings have been consecutively numbered. Memorandum: Introductory material and not a proposed finding of fact. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 1, 2, 3, 4, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 7. Rejected as simply a summary of testimony and evidence and not a proposed finding of fact. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 5, 6. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4, but rejected in part in Finding of Fact 2 and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Proposed Recommended Order: Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 1, 3, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2, but otherwise rejected as contrary to Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rulings on Respondent's and Intervenor's jointly filed Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. , 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 7. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis R. Long Esquire 2101 U.S. Highway 19 North Suite 201 Palm Harbor, Florida 33563 Sam Powers Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee Florida 32301 William Page; Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John P. Fons Esquire Post Office Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57255.0515
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DUVAL FORD vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 93-006790BID (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 23, 1993 Number: 93-006790BID Latest Update: Mar. 31, 1994

Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Section 287.042(2), Florida Statutes, the Department of Management Services (DMS), lets various Invitations to Bid (ITB) for the benefit of state agencies, cities, counties and other local government agencies so that these entities may purchase a variety of goods and services. On August 24, 1993, DMS issued Invitation To Bid #28-070-700-P. The bid was one of 225 Invitations to Bid issued by DMS in 1993. The bid was for the purchase of medium and heavy trucks. The bid which is the subject of this case involves truck #150. The truck #150 bid has thirteen pages with forty- seven options plus base truck bid blanks. General Condition 1 of the Invitation to Bid requires that "all corrections made by bidder to his price must be initialed." Other documents provided by the Department to interested bidders as part of the bid package reiterate the requirement that all price changes must be initialed. These documents include the "Checklist," a document entitled "Common Problems That Result in Bid Being Rejected" and the document entitled "Medium and Heavy Trucks Index." The requirement in General Condition I of the Invitation to Bid, that all price changes must be initialed, contains no printed exceptions with respect to "nonpreselected" options. The purpose of the requirements of General Condition 1 of the Invitation to Bid is to protect both the State of Florida as well as competing vendors. The reason for the requirement that all price changes or alterations be initialed by the vendor is to protect both the State of Florida against a successful bidder later inserting higher option prices and charging the state agencies those prices, and the vendor against the State later inserting lower prices and attempting to hold the vendor to those prices. General Condition 13 of the bid document states: LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: Applicable provisions of Federal, State and Local law and all ordinances, rules, and regulations shall govern development, submittal and evaluation of all bids received in response hereto and shall govern any and all claims and disputes which may arise between persons(s) submitting a bid response hereto and the State of Florida, by and through its officers, employees and authorized representatives, or any other person, natural or otherwise; and lack of knowledge by any bidder shall not constitute a cognizable defense against the legal effect thereof. . . (Emphasis added.) General Condition 13 incorporates Rule 60A-1.001(3), Florida Administrative Code, which permits the State to waive minor irregularities in the conformance of a bid proposal to the formal bid requirements. The lowest bidder is determined by two factors. The first factor is the price for the base truck. The base truck is the minimum truck which can be ordered in this contract with no options. It is basically a chassis with an engine. The second factor involves additions to the truck called preselected options or predetermined options. All of the other options for the particular vehicle are deemed nonpreselected options. Preselected options are generally the most frequently ordered additions to the base truck along with some other less frequently ordered options. The preselected options can vary from bid to bid; however, DMS always determines the preselected options before opening the bids. The price of any option cannot exceed retail price. There is, therefore, a ceiling for the prices of preselected and nonpreselected options. The preselected options are not announced until after the bid is posted to prevent dishonestly low prices on preselected options and to promote competitive prices throughout the contract document. The bidders therefore do not know which options are preselected when they are composing their bids. There is nothing to be gained by a bidder loading a particular option with a high markup, because the bidder cannot guarantee that the option will not be preselected. The bid evaluation price is the base truck price plus the price of the combined chosen preselected options. DMS received numerous bids on the ITB, including a bid from Petitioner and Intervenor. Atlantic Ford bid a combined price of $38,737.00, and was the apparent low bidder; Duval Ford bid a combined price of $39,944.00 and was the apparent second low bidder. Upon receipt of the bids from the bidders, the bids were held in a locked room until the bid opening. After the bid opening, the purchasing specialist assigned to this bid reviewed each bid for conformity to the general non-technical specifications. Only the Bureau of Procurement is responsible for the nontechnical review although other Bureaus or Divisions may review and have input into the review process. However, these other Divisions' input is not binding. In the nontechnical review the purchasing specialist reviewed each bid's signatures, whether or not the bid was signed in ink, and numerous other requirements. The purchasing specialist also reviewed the bids to determine if all base bid blanks and price blanks for preselected options were filled in and that no corrections were made to those prices without a bidder's initials acknowledging the change. The bids which failed to meet the general conditions of the bid for base bid items and preselected options were rejected as nonresponsive bids. After the initial nontechnical review, the bids were sent to the Division of Motor Vehicles and Watercraft for a technical evaluation. However, since each bid document contains bids for several trucks, there may be a mixture of responsive and nonresponsive bids for various trucks in the same document and the Division of Motor Vehicles and Watercraft may receive responsive and nonresponsive bids for technical review. John Bevins of the Division of Motor Vehicles and Watercraft reviewed the technical parts of the bid. This information included manufacturer's codes for options and base truck features as well as the manufacturer's retail price which no bidder can exceed. After John Bevins completed his review, he filled out a bid rejection recommendation form. John Bevins chose to include nontechnical items in his recommendation, although this was beyond the scope of his review. Mr. Bevins indicated on his bid evaluation form that Atlantic Ford failed to initial a typewritten correction on option 8206 of truck 150. Mr. Bevins returned the reviewed bids to the purchasing specialist along with his recommendation that Atlantic Ford's bid was not responsive since it failed to initial the typewritten correction on option 8206. The purchasing specialist discussed the failure of Atlantic Ford to initial the typewritten correction on option 8206 with H. P. Barker, Jr., the Bureau Chief of Procurement. H. P. Barker, Jr. has the final authority within the Bureau of Procurement to decide if a bid is responsive. He is the customary agency decision-maker on these matters. After careful consideration and discussion, H. P. Barker, Jr., determined that the failure of Atlantic Ford to initial the typewritten correction on a credit is a minor irregularity according to the Department's purchasing rules, since option 8206 was a nonpreselected option and did not effect the total bid price for determining the lowest bidder. Barker's decision was based on the State's interest in obtaining trucks at the lowest price, thereby obtaining the most goods per contracting dollar. Duval Ford conceded that the typewritten correction was faint and does not appear on photocopies of the bid. Barker testified that DMS accepts photocopies of bids. If Atlantic Ford had submitted a photocopy of its bid, as it could have legally done, then the typewritten correction would probably not have been noted by the Department or the other bidders. Barker also testified that bids are not rejected if nonpreselected option blanks are not filled in. Dealers can choose not to offer all nonpreselected options. Finally, in this case option 8206 was a credit. Even if a purchaser under the contract orders option 8206, it will pay six dollars ($6.00) less for the overall truck from Atlantic Ford than if the truck was ordered from Duval Ford. Duval Ford offered evidence from 1991, that DMS had rejected a bid of another dealer for failure to initial a price change on a nonpreselected option. However, Nelson Easom, Duval Ford's manager had not been able to discover any similar rejections in the subsequent two years. Barker testified that the policy regarding noninitialed nonpreselected options changed three years ago. DMS then decided to treat them as minor irregularities. The policy change was based on the public policy to award the lowest bid whenever possible and to prevent minor deviations in bids from causing the state to pay higher prices for goods and services. Moreover, the evidence did not show any abuse of the bid process which would occur should price changes not be initialed. The alleged "protection" afforded to bidders by requiring every change to be initialed is at best tenuous since any fraudulent price changes could easily be recognized by the party against whom the change was made. Given these facts, this case over initials appears to be much ado about nothing, and the failure of Atlantic Ford to initial its price change on a nonpreselected option is a minor irregularity and waiveable by DMS. DMS therefore did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner by waiving the irregularity and awarding the bid to Atlantic Ford.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a Final Order in this case dismissing Petitioner's formal protest and awarding the contract for the Project to Atlantic Ford. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-6790BID The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, and 19, of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. Paragraphs 15 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact was legal argument. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 13, 17, 18, 21 and 24 of the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 11 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were immaterial. The facts contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. 9. The facts contained in paragraphs 22 and 23 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were not shown by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Cook Howell, III Howell, O'Neal & Johnson Suite 1100 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Cindy Horne Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Kerri L. Barsh Attorney at Law Greenberg Traurig et al. 1221 Brickell Avenue Miami, FL 33131 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services 312 Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 William H. Lindner Secretary Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57287.042 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60A-1.001
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NELSON P. DAVIS vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 88-003868BID (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-003868BID Latest Update: Sep. 28, 1988

Findings Of Fact The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services currently leases approximately 22,000 square feet of space from Nelson P. Davis. The space is contained in two separate buildings, both located at 417 Racetrack Road, Ft. Walton Beach, Florida. The Department and Davis were involved in a legal dispute involving the currently leased premises, which concluded in 1986 with the entry of judgment in Davis' favor. While some antagonism remains between the parties related to the legal action instituted by Davis, Davis has been an acceptable landlord in all other respects. The current lease expires February 1, 1989. Davis has been aware, since late February or early March of 1988, that the Department would need space in excess of the currently occupied 22,000 square feet, but was not aware of the actual additional space requirements until the issuance of the invitation to bid. In general, the Department's space requirements have increased annually. In response to the anticipated need for additional space, Davis initiated plans for design of a third Racetrack Road building that could meet the additional need, but did not construct the facility. In response to the space requirements of previous years, Davis has constructed additional space. The Department has occupied the additional space in such proportions as to avoid the competitive bidding process, however, the current need for additional space exceeds the maximum which can be leased without competitive bidding. The Department on May 11, 1988, issued an invitation to Bid for approximately 26,165 square feet of space in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida. (HO #1) In response to the invitation, Davis submitted a bid proposal. The Davis proposal, the sole proposal received by the Department, was disqualified by the Department as non-responsive. On June 23, 1988, the sole bid was opened by Joseph Pastucha, HRS District One Facilities Manager, who initially reviewed the Davis bid. Mr. Pastucha identified items of concern related to the responsiveness of the bid and then provided the information to his supervisor, who in turn provided the information to Mr. James Peters. The Department did not contact Davis for further information or to provide the opportunity to correct any defects. James Peters, HRS's District One Manager for Administrative Services has expressed on at least one occasion a desire to avoid entering into business arrangements with Nelson P. Davis. The bases for Peters' opinion is the earlier litigation between the parties. Peters was on the committee which was to have evaluated bids submitted in response to the invitation. However, Peters has stated that his personal opinion would not influence his participation in the bid solicitation process. The evidence did not indicate that Peters based his opinion regarding the Davis bid submission solely on the earlier litigation or that any other person involved in the agency's action permitted personal opinions to affect the decisional process. Davis' bid proposal included the two buildings constituting approximately 22,000 square feet located at 417 Racetrack Road which the Department currently occupies, plus a third building of approximately 4,000 square feet. The proposed square footage and lease cost were acceptable. The third building was to be either a planned, unconstructed building located at the 417 Racetrack Road location or an existing building located "7/l0ths of a mile southeast of the present HRS offices," (the off-site building). However, a memorandum attached to Davis' submission stated that he did not intend to use the off-site building for HRS purposes, (HO #2). Further, Davis had previously indicated in conversation with the HRS manager of the 417 Racetrack Road offices that he planned to utilize the off-site space otherwise. On page one of the bid submittal form Davis indicated the address of the proposed location as 417 Racetrack Road. By letter dated July 5, 1988, the Department notified Davis that his bid offering was deemed non-responsive and that the Department expected to readvertise for space in Ft. Walton Beach. The letter made no mention of any opportunity to protest the determination. The statement, "[f]ailure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes," which is required to be included in the notice of agency decision by Section 120.53(5)(a), Florida Statutes, was omitted by the Department. (HO #3) On or about July 7, 1988, Davis contacted the Department of General Services to express his dismay regarding the disqualification of his submittal. A meeting, held on or about July 19, 1988, between Davis and Department representatives, did not alter the Department's position. On or about July 25, 1988, the written notice of protest and request for hearing was filed. The Department forwarded the request to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The letter dated July 5, 1988, advising Davis that his bid was deemed non-responsive enumerated five reasons for the Department's decision. The reasons stated were: No photograph of the proposed facility was submitted as requested; No floor plan of the facility was submitted as requested; A substituted site was submitted Proposed space was not an existing building and was not measurable; Three buildings in bid proposal constitute three locations and are unacceptable. The letter was signed by Chuck Bates, DHRS Deputy District Administrator, District One. The letter was drafted by James Peters. (HO #3) Mr. Bates relied upon Peters and Pastucha to provide information sufficient to justify the disqualification of the bid, and was satisfied that the action was justified prior to signing the letter. Examination of the bid submittal package reveals that Davis failed to acknowledge by initial the requirements of page seven, but that he did, on that page, appropriately respond to questions related to proposed parking spaces being bid. The Department did not base the disqualification of the bid on the failure to acknowledge the page and did not include the failure to initial the page in the stated reasons for deeming the bid non-responsive. Paragraph 9(a) of the bid submittal form requires the submission of a clear photograph of the exterior front of the building. (HO #2) Davis submitted no photographs. Paragraph 9(b) of the bid submittal form requires the submission of a scaled floor plan showing present configurations with measurements. (HO #2) Davis submitted floor plans for the proposed-to-be-constructed building and for the off-site building, but failed to submit floor plans for the two buildings which the Department currently occupies. The bid also failed to include calculations of net rentable square footage related to the omitted floor plans. The letter to Davis stated that an additional reason for disqualification of his bid from further consideration was the submission of a substituted site, (HO #3). The "substituted site" refers to Davis' inclusion of the off-site building not identified in the bid submission other than by the statement that the building was located seven-tenths of a mile southeast of the present HRS office location. No map, street address, legal description, or other identifying information was submitted. The proposal submitted by Davis included plans to construct a third building at 417 Racetrack Road, which was rejected as not measurable. The invitation to bid states that to be considered, the space must be existing, dry and physically measurable, at the time of bid submitted. (HO #1) The proposed third building clearly fails to meet this requirement. While the Department may permit the correction of minor deficiencies, the deficiencies were adjudged by the Department to be more than minor. The proposal's inclusion of nonexisting space (Racetrack Road building #3) or in the alternative a building, the location of which can not be determined from the bid information and which the bidder apparently intends not to provide, is non- responsive to the specifications of the invitation. As to the fifth enumerated reason for disqualification of the bid (three buildings/three locations) the Department and Petitioner presented extensive testimony related to paragraph 3(b) of page 15 of the bid submittal form. Page 15 of the bid submittal form is titled "Evaluation Criteria" and contains a list of weighted factors which were to be used in the evaluation of bids. (HO #2) Paragraph 3(b) states, as one factor for consideration in evaluation, whether the bid provides for the required aggregate square footage in a single building, and continues, "[p]roposals will be considered, but fewer points given, which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two locations provided the facilities are immediately adjacent to or within yards of each other." (HO #2) The space left for the specification of maximum yardage was erroneously left uncompleted by the Department and the Department did not learn of the error until the bid was submitted. The Department's disqualification of the bid on this basis relies on the Department's assertion that the three buildings included in the Davis proposal constitute three locations and that a responsive bid may contain not more than two locations. The Department's position is that "location" and "building" are synonymous and that paragraph 3(b) of the evaluation criteria prohibits consideration of a bid submission including more than two buildings. The Department's position is rejected as arbitrary. The bid package does not state that proposals including more than two buildings will be disqualified. The sole reference to the number of buildings in a responsive bid submission is as stated and contained on the page of "Evaluation Criteria", wherein it is identified with a weighting factor of five percent of total possible points.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order dismissing Case No. 88-3868BID. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-3868BID The following constitute rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner: Accepted in part. The use of the word "required in the fourth sentence is rejected. The referenced section relates to evaluation factors, not specific requirements. Accepted. Accepted in part. The third building was proposed as either the off-site building or the planned, non-existent space. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as restatement of testimony. Other testimony indicated that Petitioner planned to use the off-site location for non-HRS purposes. Rejected, immaterial. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted as modified. Accepted in part. The use of the word "technical" is rejected. Accepted. Accepted as modified. Accepted as modified. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted as modified. Accepted as modified. Accepted as modified. The change between the two invitations to bid was to clarify the obvious confusion related to the use of terms "location" and "building" and was made not to the bid specifications but to evaluation criteria. Rejected as restatement of testimony. Rejected, conclusion of law. Accepted so far as relevant. While the Davis bid was disqualified as non-responsive, the right to reject any and all bids encompasses the disqualification of a bid as non-responsive to the specific requirements of an invitation to bid. Respondent: Rejected, conclusion of law. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Floor plan of the off-site building was submitted showing that the building is essentially a hollow, box-like structure. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, irrelevant. While the usual distance may be 100 yards, the actual bid specifications do not state such. Further the sole reference to the distance between "locations" was contained in evaluation criteria. At no time prior to the June 23, 1988 bid opening did the Department attempt to identify the preferred distance between locations. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce A. McDonald, Esquire Post Office Box 887, Suite 105 151 Mary Esther Cutoff Mary Esther, Florida 32569 Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire Acting District One Legal Counsel Post Office Box 8420 Pensacola, Florida 32505-8420 Joseph J. Pastucha 3300 North Pace Boulevard Room 109 Town & Country Plaza Pensacola, Florida 32505 Jan Kline 417 Racetrack Road Ft. Walton Beach, Florida 32548 James V. Peters Department of General Services 160 Governmental Center Fourth Floor, Room 412 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Tom Batchelor Staff Director House HRS Committee The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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MICHAEL H. REVELL vs WILSON AND SON SALES, INC., AND THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SURETY, 07-004904 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 26, 2007 Number: 07-004904 Latest Update: Jul. 02, 2008

The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Respondents Wilson and Son Sales, Inc. (Wilson), and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, as surety, are indebted to Petitioner for certain Florida-grown agricultural products.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a producer of several vegetable crops in Hardee County. Wilson is a dealer in agricultural products. More specifically, Wilson operates an agricultural broker business in Plant City. Wilson’s surety is Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Although Wilson has written contracts with some producers, Wilson does not have written contracts with all producers. In the absence of a contract, the terms of Wilson’s broker services are almost always the same; that is, Wilson gets a commission of 10 percent on the sale of the produce and $.35 per box for palletizing and pre-cooling the produce, in return for which Wilson makes a reasonable and good faith effort to sell Petitioner’s produce for the best price. Petitioner contacted Wilson in January 2007, about bringing flat beans to Wilson to sell. Wilson expressed interest and informed Petitioner about Wilson’s standards terms as described above. These terms were agreeable to Petitioner and he brought the beans to Wilson later that month. Although Petitioner and Wilson had no written contract, the parties’ mutual understanding of the terms of their agreement created an enforceable oral contract. Wilson sold Petitioner’s beans and no dispute arose from this first transaction. The parties’ subsequent transactions for other produce were undertaken pursuant to the same oral contract terms. Because Wilson works on a commission basis, it is generally in Wilson’s self-interest to sell growers’ produce for the best price. Petitioner contacted Robert Wilson, Wilson’s owner, by telephone in February 2007, and informed Wilson of his plans to grow wax beans and “hard squash.” It was not stated in the record whether all three varieties of hard squash later grown by Petitioner, butternut squash, acorn squash, and spaghetti squash, were discussed by Petitioner and Robert Wilson during their February 2007 telephone conversation. A major dispute in the case was whether the parties’ February discussion about hard squash created some obligation on the part of Wilson beyond the oral contract terms described above. Petitioner claims that Wilson encouraged him to plant the squash and that Petitioner would not have planted the squash otherwise. Petitioner never made clear, however, what additional obligation was created by Robert Wilson’s encouragement beyond the obligation to accept delivery of and make good faith efforts to sell Petitioner’s squash at the best price. Petitioner did not use the word “guarantee,” but his claim seems to be that Wilson became obligated to guarantee that the squash would be sold for a price close to the price published in the Columbia (South Carolina) Market Report, a periodic publication of produce prices. Such an obligation on the part of a broker is contrary to the general practice in the trade. Petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove more than that Robert Wilson thought he could sell Petitioner’s squash and had a genuine interest in acting as broker for Petitioner’s squash. The evidence was insufficient to prove the existence of a contractual guarantee that Wilson would obtain a certain price for Petitioner’s hard squash or do more than was promised with regard to the beans that Wilson had sold for Petitioner; that is, to try to sell the produce for the best price. When Petitioner’s wax beans were picked in late April, he brought them to Wilson to sell. No dispute arose regarding the sale of the wax beans. Petitioner brought squash to Wilson in five deliveries between May 12 and May 29, 2007. Petitioner said that on one of these deliveries, he had to leave the boxed squash in the parking lot of Wilson’s facility because there was so much cantaloupe that had been delivered ahead of him. Petitioner says he was told by a Wilson employee that the squash would not be put in the cooler. Petitioner thinks Wilson was more interested in moving the cantaloupe than the hard squash. Petitioner thinks his squash was not put in the cooler or was put in too late. Wilson denies that Petitioner’s squash was not put into the cooler or was put in late. Robert Wilson claims that he made many calls in an effort to sell Petitioner’s squash, but he could not find interested buyers for all of the squash because (1) the demand for hard squash dried up, (2) some of Petitioner’s squash was of low quality, and (3) the squash began to spoil. Petitioner denied these allegations. Petitioner received invoices and other paperwork from Wilson showing that Wilson sold Petitioner’s first delivery of 490 boxes of acorn squash for $10.18 per box. It sold Petitioner’s second delivery of 519 boxes of acorn squash for $2.08 per box. For Petitioner’s third delivery of 110 boxes of acorn squash and 240 boxes of spaghetti squash, Wilson “dumped” the acorn squash by giving it to away for free to the Society of St. Andrews food bank, and sold the spaghetti squash for $5.15 per box. Wilson sold petitioner’s fourth delivery of 279 boxes of butternut squash for $.55 per box.1 Competent substantial evidence in the record established that it is a regular occurrence for agricultural products awaiting sale to decay and become unsellable, and for the broker to dump the products in a landfill or give the products to a charitable organization and then provide the grower a receipt for tax deduction purposes. It was undisputed that Wilson did not notify Petitioner before disposing of his squash. Petitioner claims he should have been notified by Wilson if the squash was beginning to spoil. However, Petitioner did not prove that prior notification was a term of their oral contract. Petitioner claims further that the federal Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act required Wilson to notify Petitioner before dumping the squash and to have the squash inspected to determine whether, in fact, it was spoiled. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law below, this federal law is not applicable. Competent substantial evidence in the record established that the market for agricultural products fluctuates and, at times, can fluctuate rapidly. For hard squash, which is normally prepared in an oven, the market demand can drop dramatically due to the onset of warm weather simply because people tend not to cook hard squash dishes in warm weather. Petitioner’s squash was being marketed in May, which means the beginning of warm weather for most areas of the United States. This fact supports Wilson’s claim that the demand for hard squash had been good, but fell rapidly just at the time Wilson was trying to sell Petitioner’s squash. The problem with the claims made by Petitioner in this case is simply one of insufficient proof. It is not enough for Petitioner to offer theories about what he thinks happened or to raise questions which are not fully answered. Petitioner had no proof that his squash was not put in Wilson’s cooler, that his squash did not begin to decay, that the demand for hard squash did not fall rapidly, that Wilson did not make reasonable efforts to sell the squash, that Wilson had willing buyers for Petitioner’s squash at a better price, or that Wilson sold squash from other growers at a better price. Petitioner’s evidence for his claims consisted primarily of market price reports that he contends show the approximate price Wilson should have gotten for the hard squash. Market price reports have some relevance to the issues in this case, but competent evidence was presented that the prices quoted in the publications are not always reliable to indicate the price a grower can expect to get on any given day, because there are factors that cause the published market price to be an inflated price (and applicable to the highest grade of produce) and because the market price can change rapidly with a change in demand for the product. The oral contract between Petitioner and Wilson required Wilson to try to get the best price for Petitioner’s squash, not some particular price appearing in a particular market price report. Petitioner did not show that Wilson got a better price for hard squash of equal quality, or that other brokers in the area got a better price for hard squash of equal quality at the times relevant to this case. Petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove that Wilson did not make a reasonable and good faith effort to sell Petitioner’s squash at the best price.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s amended claim. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2008.

USC (2) 7 U. S. C. 499a7 U.S.C 499b Florida Laws (4) 120.569604.15604.20604.21
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SWEEPING CORPORATION OF AMERICA, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 91-008230BID (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Dec. 26, 1991 Number: 91-008230BID Latest Update: May 01, 1992

Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. On October 11, 1991, DOT's District Four office let out for bid district contracts E4551 and E4554. Contract E4551 calls for the mechanical sweeping of Interstate 95 in Broward County. Contract E4554 calls for the mechanical sweeping of Interstate 95 in Palm Beach County. At a mandatory pre-bid conference, the bidders for the Contracts were provided with a packet which included a Notice to Contractors and Standard Specifications. The Notice to Contractors is a four page document which is specific to each contract. The Standard Specifications are the same for all district contracts. Both the Notice to Contractors and the Standard Specifications to the bidders required bidders to submit proof of the ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price. Bidders could satisfy this requirement by submitting a bid guarantee of 5% of the bid, submitting a notarized letter of intent from a bonding company or by providing a Certificate of Qualification issued by Respondent. The Notice to Contractors for both Contracts provided as follows: Failure to provide the following with each bid proposal will result in rejection of the contractor's bid.... District contracts of $150,000 or less require the following as proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond: A notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a performance and payment bond in the amount of your bid, should your firm be awarded the project; in lieu of a notarized letter the following may be substituted: (1) a bid guarantee of five percent (5%); or (2) a copy of the Contractor's Certificate of Qualification issued by the Department. (No emphasis added) Similarly, the first Standard Specification provides: 1.1 Bidders (contractors) A contractor shall be eligible to bid on this contract if:... (2) Proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price is provided to the District Contract Administrator with the bid proposal. As such proof all bids must be accompanied by a notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a bond in the amount of your bid, should your firm be awarded the project.... The requirement to submit proof of the ability to acquire a performance and payment bond has been imposed on the Districts by DOT Directive 375-00-001-a (hereinafter the "Directive".) This Directive was in place at all times material to this proceeding. Section 3.2.2 of the Directive provides: A contractor shall be eligible to bid if: ...Proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price is provided to the minicontract administrator with the bid proposal. As such proof all bids must be accompanied by a notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a bond in the amount of the bid, should the firm be awarded the project. A bid guaranty as specified above may substitute as proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. This applies to bids amount over or under $150,000. A copy of the Contractor's Certificate of Qualification issued by the Department may be substituted in lieu of a notarized letter for those contracts not requiring a bid bond. The bids for the Contracts were opened on October 11, 1991 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Bids were received from four bidders: CPM, SCA, Florida Sweeping, Inc. and P. F. Gomez Construction Co., Inc. In its bid proposals, SCA included executed bid bonds in an amount sufficient to cover the amount of each bid proposal. Each bid bond cost $55.00. CPM did not submit executed bid bonds with its proposals. Instead, CPM submitted letters from Mark A. Latini dated September 25, 1991. Those letters were provided on the stationery of Bonina-McCutchen-Bradshaw, Insurance and indicate that Mr. Latini is the "bond manager." The letters provide as follows: Amwest Surety Insurance Company is the surety for the above-referenced contractor and stands ready to provide the necessary performance and payment bond for the referenced bid should Certified Property Maintenance, Inc., be low and awarded the referenced contract. All bonds are subject to normal underwriting requirements at the time of the bond request.... The letters submitted by CPM with its bid proposals were not notarized and were not binding obligations to issue bonds since they were conditioned upon meeting certain unspecified underwriting requirements at the time of the bond requests. The submitted bids were reviewed by the District Four Contractual Services Office. The bids submitted by CPM were the lowest for each contract. Its bid for Contract No. E4551 was $109,343.97. Its bid for Contract No. E4554 was $30,312.63. SCA's bids for the Contracts were $139,442.14 and $44,100.00, respectively. During the initial review of the bid proposals, the Contractual Services Office rejected CPM's bids for failure to have its bonding company "letters of intent" notarized. In addition, the bid proposals submitted by Florida Sweeping, Inc. were rejected for failure to note a required addendum and the bids submitted by P. F. Gomez Construction Co., Inc. were rejected because the "proposal bond was not of proper character". On October 18, 1991, DOT posted its Notice of Intent to Award the Contracts to SCA, the only bidder for the Contracts whose proposals had not been rejected. CPM timely filed protests of the proposed awards to SCA on October 22, 1991. The protests filed by CPM argued that its bids should not have been invalidated simply because the bonding company's letters did not include notary seals. At this point, the sole basis for the disqualification of CPM's bids was the failure to have the bonding company letters notarized. Respondent contends that, except for the absence of the notary seal, the letters submitted by CPM met the requirements of the Notice to Contractor and the Standard Specifications cited above. However, those letters are equivocal and do not evidence a binding commitment to issue a bond upon award of the contract. The DOT officials admit that they do not know what "normal underwriting requirements" would or could be required by CPM's bonding company. This conditional language makes it uncertain whether CPM could obtain the necessary bond. Therefore, it is concluded that those letters do not meet the requirements of the Notice to Contractors, the Standard Specifications or the Directive. A hearing on CPM's protest was not held. CPM's president, Raymond Hanousek, who prepared CPM's bid and attended the pre-bid meeting, called DOT's District office the day the bids were opened and was informed that his company's bid was low, but was rejected because its bond commitment letter was not notarized. Mr. Hanousek spoke with Joseph Yesbeck, the District's Director of Planning and Programs. After their conversation, Mr. Yesbeck reviewed the file and met with Teresa Martin, the District's contract administrator for construction and maintenance contracts, and other members of the contracting staff. Ms. Martin explained why CPM's bid had been disqualified, and the matter was thereafter discussed with the District and Department attorneys. After reviewing the situation, Mr. Yesbeck determined that the failure to submit notarized letters should be considered a non-material deviation and the bids submitted by CPM should be accepted and considered the low responsive bids. Mr. Yesbeck concluded that the absence of the notary seal did not give any competitive advantage to CPM and that defects of this nature are routinely allowed to be cured. Therefore, he reversed the contract administrator's decision to disqualify CPM on both Contracts. The District secretary concurred in the decision reached by Mr. Yesbeck to repost the award of the Contracts. Mr. Yesbeck prepared a joint letter of reposting which removed CPM's disqualification and declared CPM to be the low bidder for both Contracts. At the time Mr. Yesbeck made his decision, he had not reviewed the Directive from the Assistant Secretary's office stating that there must be a notarized letter showing proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. Mr. Yesbeck did not review the Directive until his deposition was taken one week prior to the hearing in this case. According to Ms. Martin, the option to provide a notarized letter from a bonding company as an alternative to the posting of a 5% bid guarantee or obtaining prequalification was designed to promote participation in state contracting by small business and minority business enterprise applicants. While DOT was apparently trying to make it easier and cheaper for companies to bid by not requiring a bond to be posted, the DOT Directive and the bid documents still clearly required unconditional proof that a bid bond would be issued if the contract was awarded to the bidder. CPM was not prequalified nor did it post a bond. Thus, in order to meet the requirements of the Notice to Contractors and the Standard Specifications, CPM's only option was to submit a notarized letter showing proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. DOT was never provided with any proof that CPM had been prequalified by the bonding company for a bond and/or that a bond would unconditionally be issued if CPM was awarded the Contracts. Because the letters stated they were "subject to normal underwriting requirements at the time of the bond request", there was some possibility CPM would not be able to obtain a bond. Such a condition was not permissible under the bid doucments. The decision to accept CPM's bid was contrary to the DOT Directive, the Notice to Contractors and the bid specifications which require that a bidder demonstrate proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. Consequently, it is concluded that DOT's decision to accept the conditional, unnotarized letters submitted by CPM was arbitrary and capricious. There is some indication that other DOT Districts have, on occasion, waived the notarization requirement for the bond letter. However, it is not clear whether the language in the bid documents was the same or similar in those cases and/or whether the bond letters were conditional. In the past, whenever District Four has gotten a bid without a notarized bond letter, the bid was rejected. Apparently, there has never been a protest based on such a denial in District Four. Under Section 337.18, DOT does not need to require notarized, unconditional bond letters on contracts under $150,000. Indeed, there was a suggestion that some DOT Districts have dropped the requirement for certain contracts under $150,000. However, the bid documents in this case clearly required some proof that the bidder could acquire a performance and payment bond upon award of the Contracts. It was incumbent for all bidders to meet this requirement. It was arbitrary to delete this requirement after the bids were submitted.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding the bids submitted by CPM to be non-responsive and rejecting those bids. Petitioner should enter into negotiations with SCA regarding the award of the contract. In the absence of a favorable negotiation, Petitioner should enter a Final Order rejecting all bids and opening the Contracts up for new bids. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1992.

Florida Laws (8) 120.53120.57120.68287.012287.057337.11337.18343.97
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SYNERGY GAS CORPORATION vs BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 91-007494BID (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Nov. 20, 1991 Number: 91-007494BID Latest Update: Mar. 18, 1992

The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether the School Board of Broward County properly awarded Bid 92-143T for the procurement of propane gas for the school system for three years.

Findings Of Fact In August, 1991, the School Board of Broward County issued ITB's to various potential suppliers to supply it with liquid propane gas, (LP gas), for the next three years, under ITB number 92-143T. The current supplier under the contract let in 1989 is the Petitioner herein, Synergy. Synergy was one of the potential suppliers to receive a copy of the Board's new ITB. Paragraph 12 of the Special Bid Conditions required any protest of the specifications or conditions of the ITB to be filed within 72 hours of its receipt. Paragraph 15 of the Special Conditions allowed prospective bidders to address questions concerning the ITB to the Board's purchasing department. That agency's activity was limited to referring the inquirer to bid provisions which they could read and interpret for themselves. No Board employee was authorized to interpret any portion of the ITB or to release any information regarding requirements other than was contained in the written bid document. That Special Condition also notified prospective bidders that any official interpretations of the bid documents or its requirements, if necessary, would be communicated to the bidders in writing. The ITB was mailed on August 19, 1991 and bid opening was noticed therein to be at 2:00 pm on October 2, 1991 at the Board's purchasing department. The ITB was mailed to Synergy's Hollywood, Florida office and was, from there sent to the head office in New York. Mr. Garey, the responsible individual in Synergy's marketing department believes he received it on or about August 25, 1991. The general and special conditions and specifications of this ITB were, for the most part and as pertinent here, identical to those set forth in the 1989 ITB except that the current bid calls for delivery of the gas to the Board at specified locations which was not required in the prior contract. Shortly after receiving the ITB, Joel Garey, a long time employee of Synergy, who has prepared thousands of bids for government procurements, because gas prices were widely fluctuating, began to collect data on the price of LP gas preparatory to formulating Synergy's bid. Shortly before the bid was due, based on the latest available price information, Mr. Garey prepared Synergy's bid for the signature of Jeffrey Vogel, Synergy's vice president. The first bid prepared by Mr. Garey contained an error on the bid summary sheets. When, on October 1, 1991, one day before the bid was due, he noted what to him was an inconsistency in the bid specifications which, at paragraph 13, called for the bidder to deliver "full 100# tanks [of LP gas]," and to price invoice tickets, "with the conversion rate of 22 gallons per cylinder shown." The Board also wanted the filling of several 40# tanks for which delivery tickets and invoices, "will be in gallons based on the standard of 4.24 pounds per gallon." The parties agree that the accepted weight of a gallon of liquid propane gas weighs 4.24 pounds. Extrapolating from that point, Mr. Garey reasoned that if the Board wanted its tanks "filled to capacity", the 100# tanks would take 23.5 gallons of LP gas, (100 divided by 4.24), and the 40# tanks would take 9.43 gallons, (40 divided by 4.24). As a result, and being somewhat confused, Mr. Garey telephonically contacted the Board's contact point, Mr. Toman, who referred him to Mr. Combs, another Board official. Mr. Combs, notwithstanding the weight of 4.24 lbs/gal for LP gas listed in the Board's specifications, would not accept that figure from Mr. Garey without independent proof. Mr. Combs gave Mr. Garey his fax number so the proof could be sent when available and, in the meantime, said to fill the tanks to capacity. When he hung up from talking with Mr. Combs, Mr. Garey called his local manager and determined that under the 1989 contract which Synergy had with the Board, it had been filling the Board's tanks to capacity. When he called Mr. Tomans back at 4:00 PM that same day, Garey was told that Tomans had not heard from Combs about the problem, but that Garey should submit his bid timely or be out. Tomans also wanted to know why the issue had not been raised during the existing contract. Mr. Garey had no answer to that question. Based on the information he then had, Mr. Garey changed Synergy's bid and submitted one based on full tanks rather than the 22 and 6 gallons, respectively, mentioned in the bid specifications. Coincidentally, the bid as submitted was still in error in that Item C of the bid specs misstated the price per gallon delivered and this error was reflected in Items D, E, and G, and, ultimately, the total. This error was corrected, however, and did not play in the Board's decision to reject the Petitioner's bid. In arriving at Petitioner's bid based upon the "totally full" basis, Mr. Garey computed using the 23.5 and 9.43 gallon capacity cost divided by the 22 and 6 gallon conversion figures dictated by the Board. Mr. Garey was subsequently advised that Synergy was not the successful bidder. He also determined, from a telephone conversation with Mr. Tomans on October 3, 1991, that had the Petitioner's bid price not been raised to accommodate the larger volume, it's bid price would have been lower than that submitted by the successful bidder, Peoples Gas. During that conversation, Mr. Tomans advised Mr. Garey that ordinarily a bidder had 72 hours from receipt of the ITB to protest the specifications, but since there was some merit to Petitioner's contentions of an inconsistency regarding volume, he, Tomans, felt there should be an exception. However, Special Condition 15 specifically cautions prospective bidders it could not rely on any information given orally by Respondent and must submit any questions as to the bid consistent with the terms of General Condition 7. Mr. Garey admits he was remiss in not reading the fine print of paragraph 7 of the ITB and the protest provisions but on the afternoon of October 1, 1991, when he discovered the discrepancy, he immediately called the school board. If at that time they had told him he was too late to protest the specifications, this would have satisfied him and he would not have filed an appeal or protest. Instead, he was told that due to the merit of his argument he could protest, and he did so. His letter of protest was accepted even though not timely and the matter was brought to a hearing before the school board which ruled against Synergy on grounds other than time. He contends that the executive summary prepared for the school bard misled it into rejecting his protest. Mr. Garey also asserts that the bids were so close, if the margin had been greater than the discrepancy in the number of gallons to go into the cylinders he would have accepted the loss. Here, however, the total discrepancy is accounted for by the 3,770 gallons difference out of over 300,000 gallons. Mr. Arthur Hanby is the Director of Purchasing for the Broward County School Board and is familiar with this procurement and Synergy's bid. The provision in the ITB which provides for questioning of specifications was designed to comply with the requirements of Florida Statutes and the school board's policy. It is put in to equalize the opportunity for all prospective bidders to protest on an equal basis. It has been used by others in the past and when invoked, the bid solicitation process has been suspended until resolution of the matter in question. Mr. Hanby was also employed by the school board when the prior contract for propane was let with essentially the same specifications as are in issue here. The conversion rate was changed this year to more accurately reflect the market place. Even then no challenge was filed to the bid specifications. No written inquiry was received as to how to interpret them either, and at no time since Synergy, the winner then, has had the contract has it shown any confusion at to what it was to provide. Penny Good, General Manager for Peoples Gas, and the individual who prepared that company's bid read the bid solicitation thoroughly before preparing her company's bid. She was also employed with Peoples Gas when the prior contract was bid but had nothing to do with the bid at that time. She claims to have had no confusion as to what the school board wanted on this solicitation. She asked no questions of the school board because it was clear to her and she was satisfied the board wanted 22 gallons in a 100 # tank and 6 gallons in a 40 # tank, less than a tank filled to capacity. As she understands the business, there is no such thing as a "legal limit" on a tank. Admitting that an empty 100# tank would hold 23.5 gallons, which, practically, would be the maximum amount it could hold, it is easy to put less than 22 gallons in a 100# tank and less than 6 gallons in a 40 # tank. Under the terms of the agreement, tanks would not be filled on site. Empty tanks would be picked up and replaced with other tanks filled with either 22 gallons or 6 gallons as pertinent. From a review of all the evidence, it is clear that Synergy and Peoples Gas were not bidding the same thing. The quantity's to be provided were different and this accounts for the difference in bid price.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's protest of the Board's award of Bid No. 92-143T to Peoples Gas Company, and denying Peoples Gas Company's request for an award of costs and attorney's fees. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 24th day of January, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-7494-BID The following constitutes my specific rulings on all Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this proceeding under Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes. FOR THE PETITIONER: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but more a comment on the state of the evidence. Accepted. Not a proper Finding of Fact. & 13. Accepted. & 15. Rejected as not Findings of Fact but more Conclusions of Law. Accepted but Synergy's bid is not responsive to the Bid specifications. Rejected. Not a Finding of Fact. FOR THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5. - 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 15. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of the evidence. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 20. Not Findings of Fact pertinent to the issues herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Joel Garey Marketing Department Synergy Gas Corporation 23102 Sandalfoot Plaza Drive Boca Raton, Florida 33428 Joel Garey Synergy Gas Corporation 175 Price Parkway Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735 Edward J. Marko, Esquire Suite 201 Victoria Park Centre 1401 East Broward Blvd. Post Office Box 4369 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33338 Arthur S. Hamby, Jr. Director Purchasing and Warehousing Broward County School Board 1320 Southwest Fourth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312-7535 James L. Brady Director Business Affairs Broward County School Board 1320 Southwest Fourth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312-7535 Peoples Gas Company 2700 Southwest Second Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33315 Jeffrey R. Sonn, Esquire Mishan, Sloto, Hoffman & Greenberg Suite 2350 Southeast Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Virgil L. Morgan, Superintendnet School Board of Broward County 1320 Southwest Fourth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312-7535 Sydney H. McKenzie, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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