Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Agency is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been since January 5, 1981, a medical doctor licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. His license number is ME 0037656. In or about February of 1988, a complaint was made against Respondent alleging that he engaged, or attempted to engage, in the practice of medicine in this state without an active Florida license. The complaint was reviewed by the Probable Cause Panel of the Board, which disposed of the matter by issuing, on April 23, 1988, the following Closing Order: THE COMPLAINT: Complainant alleges that the Subject of the investigation practiced or attempted to practice medicine without an active license in violation of Section 458.327 (1)(a), Florida Statutes. THE FACTS: Investigation substantiated the allegations in that Subject's license to practice medicine expired December 31, 1987, and was placed in an inactive status. Subject practiced medicine with an inactive license until approximately February 5, 1988, before he took steps to renew his license. THE LAW: Based on the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause that Subject violated Section 458.327(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and there- fore is in violation of Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes. However, as Subject's license was inactive for a period of less than six months, this case should be closed by issuing Subject a Letter of Guidance. It is, therefore, ORDERED that the complaint be, and the same is hereby CLOSED with a Letter of Guidance. In January of 1991, the Agency's predecessor, the Department of Professional Regulation, issued a 22-count Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging that, in connection with his dealings with 11 patients in 1989 and 1990, Respondent violated subsections (1)(g)(Counts Twenty-One and Twenty-Two), (1)(m)(Counts Ten, Thirteen and Eighteen), (1)(q)(Counts Two, Five, Eight, Eleven, Fifteen and Nineteen), (1)(t)(Counts One, Four, Seven, Twelve, Fourteen, Sixteen and Twenty) and (1)(v)(Counts Three, Six, Nine and Seventeen) of Section 458.331, Florida Statutes. Proceedings on these allegations were conducted in accordance with Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. On August 24, 1992, the Board issued a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in each of the 22 counts of the Administrative Complaint and disciplining him for having committed these violations. That portion of the Final Order addressing the Respondent's punishment provided, in pertinent part, as follows: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: Respondent's license to practice medicine is REPRIMANDED. Respondent shall pay an administrative fine in the amount of $5000 to the Board of Medicine, Department of Professional Regula- tion, within 3 years of the date this Final Order is filed. Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida is placed on PROBATION for a period of 3 years, subject to the follow- ing terms and conditions: . . . f. Respondent shall not practice except under the indirect supervision of a physician fully licensed under Chapter 458 who has been approved by the Board or its Probation Committee. Absent provision for and comp- liance with the terms regarding temporary approval of a monitoring physician, as provided below, Respondent shall cease pract- ice and not practice until the Probation Comm- ittee or the Board approves a monitoring physician. Respondent shall have the monitoring physician with Respondent at the first probation appearance before the Probation Committee. Prior to the approval of the monitoring physician by the Committee, the Respondent shall provide to the monitoring physician a copy of the Administrative Comp- laint and Final Order filed in this case. Failure of the Respondent or the monitoring physician to appear at the scheduled Probation Committee meeting shall constitute a violation of this Order. Prior to the approval of the monitoring physician by the Committee, Respondent shall submit to the Committee a current curriculum vitae and description of the current practice from the proposed monitoring physician. Said materials shall be received by the Board office no later than fourteen days before the first scheduled probation appearance. The attached definition of a monitoring physician is incorporated herein. The responsibilities of the monitoring physician shall include: Submit semi-annual reports, in affidavit form, which shall include: Brief statement of why physician is on probation. Description of probationer's practice. Brief statement of probationer's comp- liance with terms of probation. Brief description of probationer's relationship with monitoring physician. Detail any problems which may have arisen with probationer. Respondent shall be responsible for ensuring that the monitoring physician submits the required reports. Be available for consultation with Respondent whenever necessary, at a frequency of at least once per month. Review 50 percent of Respondent's patient records selected on a random basis at least once every other month. In order to comply with this responsibility of random review, the monitoring physician shall go to Respondent's office once every other month. At that time, the monitoring physician shall be responsible for making the random selection of the records to be reviewed by the monitoring physician. Review all patient records of patients treated with Schedule II-V controlled substances. Receive and review copies of all Schedule II-V controlled substance prescriptions in order to determine the appropriateness of Respondent's prescribing of controlled substances. Report to the Board any violations by probationer of Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. . . Respondent shall submit semi-annual reports in affidavit form, the contents of which shall be specified by the Board. The reports shall include: Brief statement of why physician is on probation. Practice location. Describe current practice (type and composition). Brief statement of compliance with probation terms. Describe relationship with monitoring/ supervisory physician. Advise Board of any problems. . . Respondent may prescribe Schedule II-V controlled substances with the restrictions set forth below: Respondent shall utilize sequentially numbered triplicate prescriptions in the prescribing of said controlled substances. Respondent shall provide one copy of each prescription for said controlled substances to the Department's investigator within 30 days. Respondent shall, within two weeks after issuance, provide one copy of each prescription for said controlled substances to his monitoring/supervising physician. Respondent shall maintain one copy of each prescription for said controlled sub- stances in the patient's medical record. This copy may be a xerox copy. During this period of probation, semi- annual investigative reports will be compiled by the Department of Professional Regulation concerning Respondent's compliance with the terms and conditions of probation and the rules and statutes regulating the practice of medicine. . . . At a meeting held November 18, 1992, Respondent received the approval of the Probation Committee to have Oliver Anderson, M.D., serve as his monitoring physician. Both Respondent and Dr. Anderson appeared before the Probation Committee at this November 18, 1992, meeting. Dr. Anderson is in his late seventies. Like Respondent, he has a general family practice. He and Respondent have known each other for over ten years. Dr. Anderson first visited Respondent's office, in his capacity as Respondent's monitoring physician, in February of 1993. At the outset of the visit, Dr. Anderson asked for, and was given, a list of all the patients that Respondent had seen in the last two months. From the list, he randomly selected the names of 71 patients (which was one half the number of patients on the list). He then obtained from Respondent, and thereafter reviewed, the records Respondent maintained on these 71 patients. Dahna Schaublin, a Department investigator, was assigned to serve as Respondent's probation monitor. On or about February 10, 1993, she prepared and transmitted to her supervisor, Crystal Griffin, an investigative report concerning Respondent's compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation. In her report, Schaublin stated the following: A Final Order was filed on 8/24/92 regarding John Jackson, M.D. for prescribing Dilaudid to patients in 1989, violating FS. 458.331 (1)(q)(v). The Probation term is 08/24/92 to 08/23/95. Dr. Jackson was contacted and presented to the Miami BIS on 01/27/93 for an interview. He brought copies of prescript- ions for controlled drugs prescribed in Dec/ 1992-Jan/1993. Dr. Jackson did not have copies of other prescriptions with him stating he mailed one copy to the Board of Medicine and one copy to his physician monitor. Dr. Anderson, a family practitioner, is supervis- ing physician. Dr. Anderson has only been to Dr. Jackson's office on one occasion (the Order states he should review 50 percent of patient records on a random basis, and shall go to Dr. Jackson's office once every other month). Dr. Jackson decided to xerox each daily chart for each patient seen in the office and then mail Dr. Anderson a copy of the treatment chart (for that one occasion). Dr. Jackson stated that the reason he is not following the Order to the letter is because it was difficult for Dr. Anderson to review 50 percent of his patient records in person every month. We told Dr. Jackson this practice was contrary to the Final Order and we suggested he inform the Probation Committee. Dr. Jackson has not paid his $5000 yet, stating that he has 5 years to do so. Dr. Jackson has gone before the Probation Committee two times. Griffin inadvertently failed to forward Schaublin's investigative report to the Probation Committee. Accordingly, the Probation Committee took no action in response to the allegations made in the report. Respondent did not provide Schaublin with copies of prescriptions he wrote in February and March of 1993, "within 30 days," as required by paragraph 3k(2) of the Board's August 24, 1992, Final Order. It was not until April 14, 1993, that Respondent furnished Schaublin with copies of these prescriptions (which were written on numbered prescription forms). Respondent wrote prescription numbers 1041 through 1047 in April and May of 1993 (more specifically, prescription number 1041 on April 12, 1993; prescription number 1042 on April 14, 1993; prescription number 1043 on April 24, 1993; prescription number 1044 on April 26, 1993; prescription number 1045 on April 30, 1993; prescription number 1046 on May 2, 1993; and prescription number 1047 on May 12, 1993). These prescriptions were not among those that Respondent furnished copies of to Schaublin on April 14, 1993, however, none of them were written 30 days or more prior to April 14, 1993. On or about March 17, 1993, Respondent submitted his first semi-annual probation report to the Department. In the fourth paragraph of his report, Respondent asserted the following: I have complied fully with the terms of my probation. I have taken the course "Protecting your Practice" at the University of South Florida. I meet as scheduled with my monitoring physician Dr. O.D. Anderson whose letter will be Coming soon to you. We cover for each other every week taking calls on Wednesdays for Dr. Anderson and Thursdays for myself. We also alternate taking calls for each other every other weekend. We discuss patient care, as per the order, for all scheduled prescriptions written. In his report, Respondent did not indicate that there were "any problems" concerning Dr. Anderson's compliance with the provisions of the Board's August 24, 1992, Final Order which prescribed the responsibilities of Respondent's monitoring physician. Dr. Anderson submitted to the Department his first semi-annual report concerning Respondent's probation on or about June 13, 1993. In the third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of his report, Dr. Anderson asserted the following: In my opinion, Dr. Jackson has been very sensitive to the Administrative Complaint and Order of the Department of Professional Regulation. This has been demonstrated by his good attitude in my visits with him, and in his compliance with providing for me duplicate copies of his Numbered Schedule II-V prescriptions. Dr. Jackson and his office personnel have been very responsive in allowing my random selection of charts for review on my visits to his office. With his wife's support, Dr. Jackson has complied well with the requirements of his probation. Although he indicated otherwise in his report, Dr. Anderson had made only one visit to Respondent's office in his capacity as Respondent's monitoring physician. It was not until September of 1993, that he next visited Respondent's office in his capacity as Respondent's monitoring physician. In conducting his review during this visit, he followed essentially the same procedure that he had followed during his February visit. In September of 1993, Respondent filed with the Board a Petition for Early Termination of Probation on the grounds of "1) hardship due to changed circumstances; and 2) fulfillment of purposes of penalty." In his petition, Respondent asserted that he had "fully complied with the requirements of probation with the exception of the fine." He did not mention that he had failed to provide Schaublin with copies of the prescriptions he wrote in February and March of 1993, "within 30 days," as required by paragraph 3k(2) of the Board's August 24, 1992, Final Order or that Dr. Anderson had failed to make the number of office visits required by paragraph 3f(3) of the Final Order. Dr. Anderson wrote a letter, dated October 21, 1993, in support of Respondent's petition. The letter read as follows: This is an interim report following the first semi-annual report dated May 19, 1993, which I submitted. I was appointed monitoring physician for Dr. Jackson at the Miami November 18, 1992, meeting of the Probation Committee of the Department of Professional Regulation. Again I have reviewed the Administrative Complaint dated January 24, 1991, and also the Notice of Right to Judicial Review, and Certificate of Service signed August 24, 1992, which were received by Dr. Jackson. He is on probation for the inappropriate prescribing of Dilaudid to eleven patients in 1989. Dr. Jackson continues his good care of his private patients, and the Insurance PPO and HMO patients here in Hialeah, Florida. In my opinion Dr. Jackson has been very sensitive to the Administrative Complaint and Order of the Department of Professional Regulation. This has been demonstrated by his continuing compliance with providing for me the duplicate copies of his Numbered Schedule II-V prescriptions. Dr. Jackson continues to be very responsive in allowing my random selection of charts for review on my visits to his office. Dr. Jackson continues to be very aware of which medications fall into Schedule II-V. We both have copies of the Drug Abuse Prevent- ion and Control Schedule II-V list. This letter is written to support Dr. Jackson's release from probation. In my opinion he is worthy of release as demonstrated by his continuing compliance. The Board considered Respondent's petition at its October 1-3, 1993, meeting. Both Respondent and Dr. Anderson addressed the Board during this meeting. Dr. Anderson told the Board that, in his opinion, Respondent had "corrected all his past difficulties very effectively." By letter dated October 6, 1993, from Crystal Griffin, Respondent was informed of the Board's action. The letter read as follows: This is to inform you that the Florida Board of Medicine, in a meeting held October 1-3, 1993, . . voted to: Terminate your probation; however, you will be required to pay your administrative fine by August, 1995 and complete 300 hours of community service per year for a period of 2 years. Furthermore, you are required to submit a plan for your community service. You should receive an Order shortly. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact the Board office at (904) 488-0595. Sometime after the Board's October 1-3, 1993, meeting, but before the Board had issued the written order promised in Griffin's October 6, 1993, letter to Respondent, Schaublin first learned about Respondent's petition and the Board's action thereon. Thereafter, on December 7, 1993, she filed an investigative report concerning Respondent's compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation from the time of her last investigative report. In her December 7, 1993, report, she stated the following: Monitoring of the Subject's Probation is impeded because Dr. Jackson's failed to comply with terms of the Probation Order. The Final Order states: "k. Respondent may prescribe Schedule II-V controlled substances with the restrictions set forth below: (2) Respondent shall provide one copy of each prescription for said controlled substances to the Department's investigator within 30 days." Dr. Jackson: Did not provide copies of controlled substances prescriptions for February/March until April 14, 1993. There are 6 missing prescription forms from numbers 1041 to 1047. Dr. Jackson has failed to provide prescriptions for October/November 1993. This investigator met with Dr. Jackson at the Miami BIS on January 27, 1993 and requested copies of prescriptions be sent to this office within the 30 day time frame as mandated in the Final Order. A U.C.F. was issued by this Investigator on 12/7/93. This Investigator spoke with Constance Campbell on December 06, 1993 regarding Dr. Jackson's lack of compliance with the terms of the Final Order. We reported on 2/10/93 that Dr. Jackson's monitoring physician was not visiting his office "every other month" and making "random selection of the record[s]" as outlined in the Final Order f.(3). We are attaching copies of prescriptions for Controlled drugs for the months February 1993 through September 1993. On May 24, 1994, the Board issued a written order terminating Respondent's probation. The order provided as follows: THIS CAUSE came on before the Board of Medicine (Board) on October 3, 1993, in Miami, Florida for the purpose of considering Respondent's request to terminate the probation imposed by the Board's Final Order filed August 2 [sic], 1992. Upon review of the request, the testimony and evidence offered in support thereof, the recommendation of the Board's Probation Committee, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Respondent's probation shall be terminated. However, Respondent is still required to pay the administrative fine of $5,000.00 imposed by the previous Final Order and said fine must be paid by August 2, 1995. Furthermore, Respondent is required to complete 300 hours per year of community service in an area where medical services are needed during each of the next two years. This Order shall take effect upon filing with the Clerk of the Department of Professional Regulation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations of subsection (1)(x) of Section 458.331, Florida Statutes, alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, with the exception of the alleged violation relating to the submission of copies of prescription numbers 1041-1047, and disciplining him for having committed these violations by fining him $2,500.00, suspending his license for a period of 30 days and placing him on probation for a period of two years (subject to those terms and conditions the Board deems appropriate) beginning immediately after the end of the suspension. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of December, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of December, 1995.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's temporary directive, which requires probation officers to request and obtain supervisor approval on a case-by-case basis before incurring travel expenses for certain field visits, meets the definition of a "rule" in section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes (2011),1/ which should have been promulgated as such.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency with "supervisory and protective care, custody, and control of the inmates, buildings, grounds, and property, and all other matters pertaining to [specified correctional facilities and programs] for the imprisonment, correction, and rehabilitation of adult offenders[.]" § 945.025(1), Fla. Stat. (setting forth Respondent's jurisdiction). By far, Respondent's resources, including personnel, are primarily devoted to Respondent's responsibilities over correctional facilities and programs. There are approximately 17,000 certified officers on the correctional institution side. Respondent also is the state agency responsible for supervising offenders who are granted conditional release from incarceration or who are granted parole by the Parole Commission (chapter 947, Florida Statutes), as well as the state agency responsible for supervising probationers placed on probation (or in community control, known commonly as house arrest) by a court (chapter 948, Florida Statutes). Collectively, persons who have been conditionally released, parolees, and probationers will be referred to as "offenders." A relatively small percentage of Respondent's resources, including personnel, are devoted to the supervision of offenders. There are approximately 2,100 certified parole and probation officers providing community supervision. Organizationally, Respondent's supervisory functions fall under the umbrella of Community Corrections. The supervision of offenders statewide is divided into a northern and southern region, each covering ten of the state's 20 judicial circuits. Each region is headed by a regional director, who oversees the supervision of offenders within the region's ten judicial circuits. Each of the 20 judicial circuits has a circuit administrator. Each circuit also used to have a deputy circuit administrator, but that position was eliminated in 2009. Reporting to the circuit administrators are probation supervisors, who supervise and coordinate the activities of individual probation officers and probation officer specialists. Offenders are assigned to certified probation officers and probation officer specialists, who directly carry out the supervisory functions. See § 948.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (an offender on probation or community control is to be supervised by an officer meeting the qualifications in section 943.13, Fla. Stat.). A probation officer specialist is a probation officer with a certain level of experience to whom the offenders with the most serious criminal records are assigned. Unless otherwise specified, the term probation officer will be used, in the broad sense, to include both probation officers and the more experienced probation officer specialists. In carrying out its community supervisory functions, Respondent's goals are all of the following: to ensure compliance with the conditions of supervision imposed by the court or by the Parole Commission; to ensure public safety; to foster rehabilitation of the offender; and to reduce or eliminate future victimization. Probationers may be placed on probation, in lieu of incarceration, or as part of a split sentence that includes incarceration followed by probation. §§ 948.011 and 948.012. The starting place for supervision of a probationer is the court's order of supervision, which specifies the terms and conditions of probation. Respondent is charged with preparing a form order of supervision for the courts to use. § 948.01(1)(b). The form order prepared by Respondent and used by the courts reflects the standard conditions of probation which may be imposed by the courts, enumerated in section 948.03. The form order also provides options for the court to exercise its authority and discretion to impose special terms and conditions. See, e.g., §§ 948.031 through 948.039. The standard conditions of probation that may be imposed by a court in its order of supervision are broadly worded and general in nature and include the following: Report to the probation and parole supervisors as directed. Permit such supervisors to visit him in his or her home or elsewhere. Work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as possible. Remain within a specified place. Live without violating the law. The statutes and standard terms of probation do not dictate or specify how, precisely, Respondent is to carry out its supervisory function in monitoring offenders to serve the goal of ensuring compliance with these terms. The concept of "supervision" is not quantified, such as by specifying how often an offender must report to his or her probation officer or whether and how often probation officers may or will visit an offender in his or her home or elsewhere. A court's order of supervision could theoretically provide a condition specifying that a probationer must go to his or her probation officer's office twice a month or five times a month. However, the one sample order of supervision entered in evidence in this case did not impose any such terms quantifying the number of office visits or other visits that the unidentified probationer had to make with his or her probation officer. With respect to "supervision," section 948.12 provides a distinction for violent offenders who are on probation following incarceration by providing that these offenders "shall be provided intensive supervision by experienced probation officers." However, just as the statutes do not purport to specify or quantify what is meant by "supervision," there is no statutory specification for what is meant by "intensive supervision." Respondent has had, apparently as far back as 2002, internal procedures in place to provide detailed processes for probation officers to follow in carrying out their duty to supervise offenders assigned to them. These procedures are published in a 41-page document called Procedure 302.303, which Respondent considers a "restricted access" document for internal use only. One subject addressed in Procedure 302.303 is an offender classification system. The current classification system was designed in-house and then validated by the Florida State University School of Criminology. The system considers a number of variables and is used by Respondent as a way to group offenders in an effort to ensure that supervision is provided at a level commensurate with the danger or risk the offender represents to the community. This offender classification system, which is not promulgated as a rule, is not the subject of Petitioner's challenge. Procedure 302.303 also addresses the subject of contacts expected to be made by a probation officer with individual offenders assigned to the officer. In general terms, Procedure 302.303 specifies minimum contacts, by type and frequency, that probation officers are expected to make, or try to make, for each of their assigned offenders. The types of contacts include office visits, meaning the offender comes into the probation officer's office for a meeting; other kinds of visits, scheduled or unscheduled, when the probation officer travels outside the office to visit or attempt to visit the offender in his home, in his place of employment, or another place; and field visits with third parties, when the probation officer travels outside the office to visit or attempt to visit the offender's employer, treatment providers, family, neighbors, or other third persons who might have information about the offender. Different minimum contact requirements, by type and frequency, are provided for each of the different offender risk classification categories in Procedure 302.303. The minimum contact standards are performance standards that apply to probation officers; without the minimum contact requirements, some probation officers might do less than the minimum. These minimum contact standards, which have not been promulgated as a rule, are also not the subject of Petitioner's challenge. Instead, Petitioner's challenge is directed to a recent temporary directive by Respondent that suspended some aspects of the (unpromulgated) minimum contact standards in Procedure 302.303. In lieu of these minimum contact standards, Respondent's directive provides that probation officers need to request and receive permission of their supervisors on a case-by- case basis to incur travel expenses for certain field visits. As a related part of the directive, supervisors are given discretion to approve travel expenses for any field visit if there is reason to believe there may be a violation of a condition of supervision or if there is reason to believe that there is a threat to public safety. The challenged directives were first communicated verbally on February 29, 2012, in a telephone conference call between Jenny Nimer, assistant secretary of Community Corrections, and the Community Corrections regional directors, and then reduced to writing in the following memorandum dated March 2, 2012, on the subject of "Reduced Travel" (Reduced Travel Memo) from Assistant Secretary Nimer to Community Corrections regional directors and circuit administrators: On 2/29/12 directives were provided for adjustments to be made on some non-critical supervision activities. As these directives are temporary and related to "restricted" policy areas they were given verbally; existing written policy will not be changed. Our goal is to reduce the travel budget by focusing on mission critical activities without compromising public safety. Travel related to core operational duties will continue; however all travel will be reviewed for efficiency. NO adjustments have been made to travel that involves investigation of known or suspected violations, violation proceedings/subpoenas, investigations or instruction of offenders in correctional facilities. Adjustments are focused on reduction of department established minimum contact standards and administrative duties. There is an urgent need to reduce travel costs for the remainder of the fiscal year; however public safety is the utmost priority and supervisors maintain the discretion to approve any travel that is needed to accomplish officer safety and protection of the community. For the months that adjustments are in place (March, April, May and June) officers will annotate electronic field notes for offenders requiring field contacts during the month, as follows: CN--"Contact Standards Adjusted". Alternative methods to verify (and re-verify) residence and employment during this period, including making telephone calls to the landlord and employer or instructing the offender to provide bills and paychecks to show proof of residence and employment will be utilized. Contact codes for purposes of electronic case notes for residence and employment verification will be HV, EN, or EV and text should indicate the alternative method utilized for verification. Planned Compliance Initiatives will continue; partnerships established with local law enforcement remain essential to enhance surveillance and contacts made in the community. These contacts should always be documented in case notes. Circuit Administrators are directed to reach out to judiciary, state attorney and law enforcement to ensure that they are aware of the limited scope of this reduction and that contacts required to ensure offender supervision and/or threats to public safety will not be compromised. Thank you for your cooperation during this difficult time. The Reduced Travel Memo was distributed to probation officers as the means by which Respondent communicated to its probation officers that they would not be expected to comply with all of the minimum contact requirements set forth in Procedure 302.303 between March 1, 2012, through the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 2012. The expectation was, at the time of the challenged statement, that this cost-saving measure was temporary and that the (unpromulgated) minimum contact requirements in Procedure 302.303 would resume as of the new fiscal year beginning July 1, 2012. As of the final hearing on June 6, 2012, Respondent's expectation was unchanged. The announced temporary replacement of minimum contact requirements based on risk category with a procedure for supervisor review and approval of field contacts remained just that--temporary--and the expectation was that the minimum contact standards set forth in Procedure 302.303 would resume for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2012. Petitioner hinted at, but offered no evidence to prove the notion that Respondent did not really intend to resume the minimum contact standards in the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2012.4/ The Reduced Travel Memo and a March 2, 2012, letter from Secretary Kenneth S. Tucker (Tucker Letter), represent the challenged agency statements in that these two documents memorialize the temporary directive.5/ As explained in the Tucker Letter: Due to a 79 million dollar deficit, the Department has had to make temporary modifications to field contact requirements in order to reduce travel expenditures by probation officers. . . . Our probation officers will continue to make field contacts with sex offenders and community control offenders in order to closely monitor sex offender conditions and/or house arrest requirements. Probation officers will continue to monitor other supervised offenders' compliance with conditions of supervision and probationers will still be required to meet monthly with their probation officer at the office. In addition, probation officers will make field contacts in the community as necessary to investigate non-compliance or possible violations. Probation officers will also continue to participate with law enforcement in Planned Compliance Initiative (PCI's) in the community. Probation officers will use this opportunity to spend more time with offenders in the office or on the telephone, assisting with job referrals or other resources and services needed. Community Corrections undertook an analysis of its budget in an effort to identify expenditures where cost savings might be realized to help reduce the budget deficit. The three significant budget categories of expenditures were salaries, leases, and expenses. There had been a hiring freeze in place for some time already, and so an effort was made to not cut personnel to save salary costs. There also had been a concerted effort to reduce lease costs by consolidating offices to eliminate some leases. The viable short-term option to cut costs for the remainder of the fiscal year was in the expense category, which was predominately travel reimbursement. It was determined that, over the year, Community Corrections was averaging between $250,000 and $300,000 per month in travel reimbursement. Some travel reimbursement had already been reduced before the temporary directive challenged here. For example, Community Corrections personnel, including probation officers, might travel to participate in training programs. However, training had already been greatly limited. Some travel reimbursement could not be reduced, such as reimbursing probation officers for necessary travel for court appearances. In these instances, efforts were made to use state cars and to encourage carpooling, if possible. Community Corrections assessed the number of field contacts and attempted contacts that were being made by probation officers to comply with Respondent's minimum contact standards and the travel reimbursement associated with them (i.e., the contacts). Respondent estimated that its temporary directive, challenged here, would reduce travel costs by $150,000 per month for each of the four months in which the directives would be in place. In total, Respondent expected to save $600,000. Respondent's actual experience following issuance of the Reduced Travel Memo and Tucker Letter shows that Respondent's estimates were on target. In February 2012--the last month before the temporary suspension of some of the minimum contact standards--travel reimbursement totaled $277,000. After switching to a procedure of case-by-case probation officer request and supervisor review to approve field visits, travel reimbursement was down to $99,000 in March 2012, a savings of $187,000, compared to February. In April 2012, travel reimbursement dropped to $80,000. The evidence established that the discretion afforded probation supervisors in the Reduced Travel Memo is true discretion vested in supervisors to review requests and act on a case-by-case basis to approve field visits. That discretion has been exercised on numerous occasions to authorize a field contact. There was no evidence of any probation officer having submitted a request to make a field visit to investigate a possible violation of a probation condition or where there was a public safety issue that was not approved by his or her supervisor. To the contrary, the evidence established that requests are being made and leeway is being provided to probation officers to travel, if they can articulate a reason for doing so. However, for one or two probation officers who do not accept that they must request approval and justify their travel expense on a case-by-case basis and who simply ask for block reinstatement of the minimum contact standards, without articulating any reason why field visits are needed for particular offenders, those requests have been denied. As the Reduced Travel Memo and Tucker Letter suggest, there are other tools available to probation officers besides incurring the expense of field visits, which are often equally effective to accomplish the goal. For example, a field visit to an offender's employer is certainly one way to verify employment and to verify the offender's attendance, but telephone calls may well suffice to obtain the same information at much lower costs. There are also other ways to attempt to verify residence besides a personal home visit. An offender can be required to present documentation, such as a utility bill, rental agreement, or pay stub showing the offender's address. An offender can be made to come in for office visits more frequently than once a month. A probation officer can telephone the offender frequently, and the voice mail message or background noise may give some reason to believe there is a need for a field visit. A probation officer can call family members and neighbors to check on an offender and to verify information. A probation officer can enlist the help of a local law enforcement officer to check on an offender. In short, for the period of Respondent's urgent need to reduce costs, probation officers have been asked to work a little harder and more creatively from their desks, while reserving travel expenses for field visits to the cases where they have some reason to think a field visit is needed. Petitioner presented the testimony of one probation officer specialist, Kimberly Schultz. As a specialist, this officer handles a case load disproportionately made up of sex offender probationers (for whom the temporary directives did not suspend minimum contact standards) and the next category down on the risk scale--maximum offenders. Officer Schultz testified that she believes that public safety is best served by the old minimum contact standards in (unpromulgated) Policy 302.303. Officer Schultz suggested, but failed to prove, that public safety is compromised by the temporary directive. Under the temporary directive, Officer Schultz has only requested approval once from her supervisor to make a field contact based on a suspicion she developed that the offender may be in violation of his probation requirements. That single request was approved. Officer Schultz did not identify any instance in which public safety was jeopardized because a field contact was not allowed. Instead, Officer Schultz spoke to the increased possibility that allowing more travel to make surprise visits to offenders' homes or places of employment would reveal suspicious behavior or incorrect information. Certainly, Officer Schultz has the experience to draw on to offer the view that, in a general sense, increased field visits would serve to increase the possibility of discovering probation violations or other issues with offenders. In an ideal situation with unlimited resources, a probation officer following every move an offender makes could well come to find that the offender is not "liv[ing} without violating the law," as required in a standard probation condition. However, such an ideal situation obviously does not exist. Instead, Respondent has taken action to manage its limited resources. The evidence did not show that Respondent's temporary directive has threatened public safety. Officer Schultz attempted to suggest that, in the single instance when she requested a field contact, she would have discovered sooner that the offender was not living where he said he was, if she had made the minimum field contacts under Procedure 302.303. Her testimony did not bear that out. Officer Schultz testified that an offender assigned to her in March 2012, came in for the required office visits in March and in April, and he filled out the required monthly reports giving his address, telephone number, and other contact information. When the offender came in for his May office visit, the offender was supposed to stay for a drug test, but he left. Officer Schultz tried to call the offender at the number he had provided to check to see if he had misunderstood. That is when she learned that the phone number the offender had given her "wasn't a good number." Officer Schultz requested and was given approval to incur travel to investigate and learned, then, that the offender was not living where he said he was. While Officer Schultz contends that, in the above example, a field visit to verify the offender's address would have identified the problem sooner, Officer Schultz admitted that she had not previously tried to call the offender. Indeed, she said that she never calls her offenders on their cell phones. Thus, instead of incurring travel expense for a field visit, Officer Schultz could have attempted to verify the offender's office report immediately in March through other ways, such as calling the phone number provided and learning much sooner that the offender had provided a phone number that was not good. Officer Schultz might have checked for a home phone number associated with the address the offender gave; she learned when she went there that the offender's cousin lived there, and the cousin volunteered that the offender did not live there. Officer Schultz could have required this offender, and could require all of her offenders, to come into the office multiple times per month. She could have required this offender to bring in a utility bill for his residence, whether in his name or someone else's name. Had Officer Schultz tried alternative verification means, she may have been able to contact the cousin sooner. It was evident from Officer Schultz' testimony that she has become accustomed to operating under the guidance provided in unpromulgated Procedure 302.303 and does not like being asked temporarily to work harder and more creatively from her office to find other ways to conduct surveillance and monitor offenders that do not cost Respondent as much in travel expenses as her travel in the field used to. It seemed that rather than trying to replace the field visit time with alternative investigation techniques, Officer Schultz has done little to fill the gap with constructive methods to monitor her offenders using alternative means. Indeed, when Officer Schultz was asked how she was making use of her new-found office time since she is spending less time in the field, her first response was, "I'm organizing my closed files." Officer Schultz expressed concern that a probation officer could be subject to discipline if he or she were to not follow the temporary directive. However, there was no evidence that any probation officer had refused to request supervisor review and approval for a field visit, much less that discipline resulted. Officer Shultz did not represent that she had refused to follow the temporary directive or that she intended to in the few weeks remaining in the fiscal year. Petitioner's representative testified that the temporary directive harms its 2,100 certified probation officer members, although the directive does not apply to the other approximately 17,000 certified members who serve on the correctional institution side of Respondent. Thus, the temporary directive applies to only about 12 percent of Petitioner's members. Nonetheless, Petitioner's representative asserted that its members are affected by the temporary directive because they are all members of communities with a concern for public safety.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at Sumter Correctional Institution near Bushnell, Florida. The Petitioner was convicted for sexual battery and robbery in proceedings before the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, State of Florida. On April 23, 1976, he was sentenced to serve 20 years for robbery and five years for sexual battery. Petitioner is presently incarcerated in accordance with these commitment orders. On December 19, 1979, Petitioner was interviewed by an examiner of the Parole and Probation Commission for the purpose of recommending a presumptive parole release date (PPRD). Under the Commission rules then in effect, the examiner was to consider the gravity of the offense for which the Petitioner was sentenced, establish a "salient factor score" and consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The examiner classified the offense as "greatest (most serious II)." He set the salient factor score as one. The examiner recommended setting the PPRD at the top of the appropriate range given the offense characteristic and salient factor score, and further recommended aggravating this period because of the concurrent conviction for robbery. The examiner recommended a PPRD of September 7, 1982. The Parole and Probation Commission reviewed the recommendation and considered the robbery conviction as being a greater aggravating factor than applied by the examiner. The Commission set the PPRD for February 25, 1986. Petitioner sought further review of the PPRD by the Commission and was unsuccessful. Petitioner has also been unsuccessful in pursuing judicial relief in connection with the PPRD. Commission Rule 23-19.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, as applied to the Petitioner, provided: If present offense of conviction involved multiple separate offenses, the severity level shall be based on the most serious of the offenses, and the other offenses may be used as aggravating factors. This shall be applied to both consecutive and con- current sentences. In adopting its rules, the Commission sought to develop criteria to predict the likelihood of successful parole. An inmate's history is the most reliable predictive device. Statistically, an inmate who has been convicted for more than one offense is a greater parole risk than an inmate who has been convicted for only one offense. The Commission's rule is thus a reasonable device for predicting the likelihood of successful parole.
The Issue Whether Rule 33-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, Richard Charles Gaston, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rule at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent stipulated that the Petitioner has standing to institute this proceeding. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Rule 33-7.005, Florida Administrative Code. Section 944.292, Florida Statutes, provides that the civil rights of persons convicted of a felony as defined in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution of the State of Florida, are suspended "until such rights are restored by a full pardon, conditional pardon, or restoration of civil rights granted pursuant to s. 8, Art. IV of the State Constitution." Section 8, Article IV of the Constitution of the State of Florida, authorizes the Governor to grant pardons restoring civil rights with approval of three members of the Cabinet. The initiation of the process for consideration of whether an inmate should have his or her civil rights restored pursuant to Section 8, Article IV of the Constitution of the State of Florida, is governed by Section 944.293, Florida Statutes (1989). Section 944.293, Florida Statutes (1989), provides the following: Initiation of restoration of civil rights. --With respect to those persons convicted of a felony, the following procedure shall apply: Prior to the time an offender is discharged from supervision, an authorized agent of the department shall obtain from the Governor the necessary application and other forms required for the restoration of civil rights. The authorized agent shall insure that the application and all necessary material are forwarded to the Governor before the offender is discharged from supervision. In implementing Section 944.293, Florida Statutes, the Respondent has promulgated Rule 33-7.005, Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Rule"). The Challenged Rule provides, in pertinent part: Discharge of an Inmate. When an inmate has completed all combined sentences imposed upon him or is released by parole, pardon or court order, the Secretary or his designated agent shall furnish such inmate with a certificate of discharge upon his release from custody. All qualified inmates shall be given the opportunity at the time of their release to complete an application for restoration of civil rights, Form DC4-322, Restoration of Civil Rights. Form DC4-322 is hereby incorporated by reference. A copy of this form may be obtained from any institution or from the Bureau of Admission and Release, Department of Corrections . . . . The Respondent releases approximately 40,000 to 45, 000 inmates each year. The release of an inmate, including an inmate convicted of a felony, involves a somewhat lengthy process and the completion of a number of forms, including a form for restoration of civil rights. The date upon which an inmate is to be released from prison becomes "frozen" seven days prior to the inmate's release. Even after the release date is determined and considered "frozen", however, that release date may be modified because of conduct of the inmate after the date is "frozen" but before the inmate is actually released. The completion of the forms necessary to institute a determination of whether an inmate's civil rights should be restored begins approximately 120 days prior to the inmate's projected release. Pursuant to the Challenged Rule, the Respondent has designated an employee of the Respondent at Marion Correctional Institute to interview inmates to be released and provide a Form DC4-322, Restoration of Civil Rights (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"), to inmates to be released. A completed Application is mailed by the Respondent to the Florida Parole Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") on the date that the inmate is released from prison. The Respondent does not send the completed Application until the day the inmate is actually released from prison because the release date may change at any time prior to the actual time the inmate is released. The weight of the evidence failed to prove, however, that the Respondent cannot inform the Commission after it has forwarded an application that the inmate's proposed release date has been modified or that the Commission would not ignore an application upon such notification. Some, but not all, inmates convicted of felonies may not be eligible for restoration of their civil rights at the time of their release from prison; these inmates are subject to supervision after leaving prison. Some inmates convicted of felonies, such as the Petitioner, have, however, completely served their sentences and are released from all supervision at the time they are released from prison. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that such inmates are not eligible for restoration of their civil rights immediately upon their release from prison.
The Issue The primary issue for determination is whether Dr. Jones violated provisions of Chapter 458, F.S. by violating terms of his probation, more specifically, those terms requiring attendance at Grand Rounds and monitoring by a local, Board certified pediatrician. If those violations occurred, an appropriate disciplinary action must be determined.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Dr. Jones, is now, and has been at all relevant periods, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME0017104. His practice is located in Seminole, Florida. On April 21, 1986, a Final Order was entered by the Board of Medical Examiners, resolving by an amended stipulation, a twenty-count Administrative Complaint that had been filed against Dr. Jones on December 1, 1983. Pertinent provisions of the Final order included: Placement on probation for a period of five years commencing with the effective date of the order; Attendance at Grand Rounds weekly during probation at both All Children's Hospital in St. Petersburg, Florida and the University of South Florida in Tampa, Florida; and, Monitoring by a local Board-certified pediatrician, John H. Cordes, Jr., M.D., who was to make visits to Dr. Jones' office every two weeks and to randomly select 15 percent of Dr. Jones' medical charts to verify appropriateness of care and thoroughness of record-keeping. Dr. Jones was out of the country, in Antigua, when the order arrived, and it was in his office when he returned on May 4, 1986. Approximately two weeks later, around May 19th, Dr. Jones tried to call Dr. Cordes, the designated monitoring physician, and was told he was out of town. When he reached Dr. Cordes in early June, Dr. Cordes told him that under no circumstances would he serve as his monitoring physician and that he had written a letter to DPR advising them of such. After making some unspecified and unsuccessful efforts to locate a substitute, Dr. Jones contacted Lewis A. Barness, M.D., Chairman of the Department of Pediatrics at the University of South Florida. In a letter to Dr. Jones dated July 11, 1986, Dr. Barness agreed to review "about ten or fifteen percent of your charts on a biweekly basis." (Petitioner's exhibit #4) Dr. Jones was out of the country again the last two weeks of July, and the monitoring by Dr. Barness began on August 15, 1986. Dr. Barness was approved by the Board of Medical Examiners as a substitute on August 2, 1986. Dr. Jones continues to be monitored by Dr. Barness at Dr. Barness' office at the University. Dr. Jones brings his appointment book (although Dr. Barness never reviews it) and his charts, and Dr. Barness pulls, at random, fifteen to twenty percent of the charts and reviews them. Grand Rounds, lectures on pediatric medical topics, are held at 8:00 A.M. on Fridays at the University of South Florida Medical Center, and at 12:30 P.M. on Fridays at All Children's Hospital. Between his receipt of the Final Order and June 15, 1986, (the date specified in the amended complaint) Dr. Jones never attended Grand Rounds at the University of South Florida. He attended once, June 6th, during this period at All Children's Hospital. The basis for non-attendance is specified for each Friday session during the relevant period as follows: May 9, 1986 (the first Friday after Dr. Jones returned and saw the Final Order)--Dr. Jones' van was broken. His wife, a part-time employee at an interior design shop, was called in for work that day, so he did not have transportation. Further, he met with the mother of one of his patients at noon on this date. May 16 and 23, 1986--Dr. Jones' recently-widowed mother was visiting, and since she was also quite ill, he spent time with her. Further, Grand Rounds were cancelled at the University of South Florida on May 16th. May 30, 1986--Dr. Jones' van was again broken and his wife was called to work leaving him without transportation. June 6, 1986--Dr. Jones awoke with gastroenteritis, so he did not attend the morning session at the University of South Florida; he did attend the session at All Children's Hospital. June 13, 1986--Grand Rounds were cancelled at the University of South Florida on this date. Dr. Jones decided to take his children to Disney World as they lived out of state and were leaving the next day. June 15, 1986 was the close of the relevant period regarding attendance at Grand Rounds, according to the Administrative Complaint, as amended. From the testimony and evidence, I am unable to determine conclusively whether Dr. Jones has attended regularly since that date. Except for weekends and the trips out of country, Dr. Jones continued to practice medicine as a pediatrician between April 21, 1986 and July 1986, the date of the Administrative Complaint. He stipulated that he understood the terms and conditions of the Board's Order regarding probation. His testimony at the hearing revealed that he was thoroughly familiar with the details of the order. Nevertheless, he violated the terms of probation. Although he knew that the Board had approved the Stipulation in January 1986, and that the stipulation specified Dr. Cordes as the monitoring physician, he waited until the last minute (two weeks after he received the order) to contact Dr. Cordes about commencing the monitoring. While Dr. Cordes' refusal to participate is not attributable to Dr. Jones, the delay in obtaining a substitute could clearly have been eliminated with better planning by Dr. Jones. Technically, the monitoring conducted by Dr. Barness does not comply with the terms of the probation order, as Dr. Jones brings the charts to him for review. Dr. Barness has impressive credentials and is understandably unable to visit Dr. Jones' office every two weeks. However, Dr. Jones admitted that he never asked the Board to modify the terms of his probation in that regard. Dr. Jones' lack of judgment regarding the terms of probation is also reflected in his uncontroverted excuses for non-attendance at Grand Rounds. With the obvious exception of the cancellation of the lectures, the excuses fail to mitigate the violations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: Finding that Respondent, Archbold M. Jones, M.D. violated subsections 458.331(1)(h) and (x) F.S.. Suspending Dr. Jones' license for three months (conforming to the approximate period that he practiced without supervision). Requiring Dr. Jones to appear before the Board with Dr. Barness to outline the details of the monitoring process and insure that proper review can be made at Dr. Barness' office, rather than Dr. Jones' office. Providing for Dr. Jones' immediate notification to the Board in the event Dr. Barness is unable to continue with monitoring consistent with the Board's direction. Outlining specific guidelines for excused non-attendance at Grand Rounds and providing for notification by Dr. Jones to the Board each time he fails to attend, and the reason for such failure. Providing that future violations will result in nullification of the stipulation and immediate proceeding on the original multi-count complaint. Providing that all other terms and conditions of the April 21, 1986 Order remain in full force and effect. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 6th day of July, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3920 The following constitute my specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in paragraph #1. 2. Rejected as unnecessary. 3. Adopted in substance in paragraph #2. 4. Rejected as unnecessary. 5-6. Adopted in substance in paragraph #2. 7-8. Adopted in paragraph #7. 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph #4. 10-11. Adopted in paragraph #9. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in paragraph #1. 2-3. Adopted in substance in paragraph #2. The closing date is addressed in paragraph #7, however the June 15, 1986, date relates only to attendance at Grand Rounds and not to the period during which monitoring did not occur. (See motions to amend complaint.) Adopted in paragraph #3. Adopted in paragraph #6. 7-15. Adopted in substance in paragraph #7. However, the characterization of a "medical emergency" in paragraph #9 is unsupported by the record, as are the characterizations, "justification" for not attending Grand Rounds and "legitimately prevented" from attendance. Respondent was not unable to attend Ground Rounds, except when the rounds were cancelled. He chose rather not to attend for various reasons which to him were more important than his attendance. Adopted in paragraph #4. Adopted in paragraph #5, except however the "diligence" of the search was not established by competent credible evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph #5. 19-27. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as unsupported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. The "diligence" is unsupported by competent credible evidence. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Michael I. Schwartz, Esquire Suite 100, Capitol Office Center 119 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Petitioner, Ernest Walker, was an inmate incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution. Respondent is a state agency charged by law with determining what persons may be placed on parole, fixing the timing conditions of parole, and determining violations of parole. Respondent is charged by Section 947.16, Florida Statutes, with the responsibllity of interviewing inmates, and establishing presumptive parole release dates, and thereafter reviewing those dates. Pursuant to its statutory charge, Respondent conducted an interview of Petitioner, Ernest Walker, and established his original presumptive parole release date to be June 21, 1988, by action certified by Respondent on September 2, 1981. Subsequently, in special Commission action taken on October 17, 1983, Petitioner's PPRD was extended to June 21, 2008, based upon the receipt of a mental health status report, which, according to the record in this cause, was treated as "new information" not available at the time the Petitioner's initial PPRD was established.
