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PINELLAS COUNTY SHERIFF`S OFFICE vs CHRISTOPHER HAMILTON, 08-004823 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Largo, Florida Sep. 29, 2008 Number: 08-004823 Latest Update: Mar. 23, 2009

The Issue The issue presented is whether Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office (PCSO or Petitioner) properly terminated Christopher Hamilton (Respondent) from his employment as a deputy sheriff for engaging in conduct prohibited in Chapter 89-404, Laws of Florida (the Civil Service Act), and Petitioner's General Order Section 3-1.3, Rule and Regulations 3.4(d) and 5.21, and General Order Section 3-1.4, Rule and Regulation 2.17.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is responsible for providing law enforcement and corrections in Pinellas County, Florida. At all times pertinent to these cases, Petitioner employed Respondent as a deputy sheriff. Respondent does not dispute that his conduct violated Petitioner’s rules and regulations. Respondent alleges that the penalty of termination is excessive, inconsistent with the progressive discipline policy, and, therefore, disparate. General Order 3-1.3, Rule and Regulation 3.4(d), relates to “Performance of Duty.” The cited provisions require that “All members will be efficient and effective in their assigned duties, performing them in a competent, proficient and capable manner.” For convenience, the cited provisions are referred to as Rule 3.4(d). The evidence shows that from March 2004 through August 8, 2008, Respondent demonstrated a pattern and practice of violating Rule 3.4(d). The individual violations are undisputed, and it is undisputed that the violations arose from Respondent’s inability to complete required reports, to do so in a timely manner, and to be punctual in attendance. It is also undisputed that the violations arose from events in Respondent’s personal life, which included a divorce and custody battle that precipitated a financial crisis for Respondent and the death of Respondent’s father. Finally, Respondent acknowledged during cross-examination that Petitioner attempted to “work with” Respondent during his personal crises. Petitioner first disciplined Respondent for violating Rule 3.4(d) in March 2004. In January 2005, Petitioner issued a formal reprimand for a second violation. Petitioner issued a second formal reprimand for the third violation in February 2005. In May 2007, Petitioner issued a third formal reprimand for a fourth violation of Rule 3.4(d). On December 6, 2007, Petitioner issued a written reprimand to Respondent for a fifth violation of Rule 3.4(d). On April 10, 2008, Petitioner found Respondent to be a Chronic Offender, as defined hereinafter, and suspended Respondent for seven days for violation of Rule 3.4(d). In June of 2008, Respondent again violated Rule 3.4(d) by failing to complete and submit reports within the required timeframe. Respondent violated Rule 3.4(d) on May 27, 2008, and again on June 24, 2008. Petitioner notified Respondent that he was required to attend a Vehicle Crash Review Board (VCRB) on May 27, 2008. However, Respondent failed to attend the VCRB. Petitioner re-scheduled the VCRB for June 24, 2008, and notified Respondent that he was required to attend that VCRB. Respondent failed to attend the VCRB on June 24, 2008. General Order 3-1.4, Rule and Regulation 2.17, relates to “Timeliness.” The cited provisions state that “Members shall not be late to work without valid reason or authorization,” The cited provisions are referred to for convenience as Rule 2.17. Respondent violated Rule 2.17 by being late to work on February 28 and March 8, 2008. Petitioner disciplined Respondent for both offenses in a single written reprimand. Respondent violated Rule 2.17 by being late to work again sometime between June 18 and July 2, 2008. On or about August 8, 2008, Respondent reported to work approximately 30 minutes late in violation of Rule 2.17, and this proceeding began. On September 11, 2008, Petitioner conducted an Administrative Review Board (ARB) meeting at which Respondent testified. The ARB concluded that Respondent had violated Rules 3.4(d) and 2.17 and found Respondent to be a Chronic Offender of both rules. General Order 3-1.1, Rule and Regulation 5.21 (Rule 5.21), defines “Chronic Offender” as a member of the PCSO who violates the same rule or regulation three or more times within an 18-month period. Respondent is a Chronic Offender of Rules 3.4(d) and 2.17. Respondent violated each rule three or more times within an 18-month period. The progressive discipline policy treats Chronic Offender violations as a more severe “Level Five” violation. Petitioner has issued written guidelines that are followed during the disciplinary process and are contained within General Order 10-2. The goal of General Order 10-2 is to standardize the disciplinary process and make the process fair and consistent in application. Consistency is important to ensure fairness for the member being disciplined and for maintaining accountability throughout the agency. General Order 10-2 sets forth a procedure for assigning points for sustained violations based on their severity level. The points range from Level Five to Level One. Level Five violations result in the most serious discipline. The total of points to be assigned in these cases is determined by considering Respondent’s prior disciplinary record. Additional points are assigned for disciplinary violations within the recent past. Total disciplinary points are comprised of points for the current offense, plus carryover points for recent discipline against Respondent. The range of discipline that is appropriate in these cases is based upon the total number of disciplinary points accumulated. The highest or most severe discipline applies because Respondent accumulated more than 100 discipline points. Respondent’s point total in Case No. 08-4823 is 108.3 points. Authorized discipline ranges from a 15-day suspension to termination of employment. Respondent’s point total in Case No. 08-4824 is 116 points. Authorized discipline ranges from a 15-day suspension to termination of employment. Termination of employment is reasonable in this proceeding. Termination of employment does not impose disparate discipline on Respondent. From 2005 through the date of the final hearing, nine members of the PCSO have been disciplined within the same discipline range as Respondent. Petitioner terminated the employment of seven of those nine members of the PCSO. Four of Respondent’s exhibits are excerpts of the case files of other PCSO members charged with violating Rule 5.21 as was Respondent. In each case, the alleged violation of the Level Five Chronic Offender rule was based upon repeated violations of Level Three rules. Respondent’s Exhibits 2 and 3 each show a member who violated the Level 3 rule, pertaining to abuse of sick leave a sufficient number of times to be considered a Chronic Offender in violation of Rule 5.21. In both cases, it was the member’s first Chronic Offender violation. Authorized discipline ranged from a suspension to termination of employment. In each case, the member received the minimum length of suspension, which is the minimum discipline in General Order 10-2. This is comparable to and consistent with the seven-day suspension Petitioner imposed against Respondent for his first violation of the Chronic Offender rule. The remaining proposed comparator introduced as Respondent’s Exhibit 1 relates to an agency member disciplined for being a Chronic Offender based on repeated violations of Rule 3.4(d). This was the member’s first violation as a Chronic Offender in Rule 5.21. Like Respondent’s seven-day suspension for his first offense as a Chronic Offender, the member in Respondent’s Exhibit 1 received a suspension corresponding to the bottom of the disciplinary range under the disciplinary policy. Prior to Respondent, no other agency member had been found to have violated the Chronic Offender rule a second time. However, Petitioner’s Exhibit 5 shows that subsequent to Respondent’s discipline, the member referenced by Respondent’s Exhibit 2 was disciplined for violating Rule 5.21 a second time. In similar fashion to Respondent, this member was disciplined as a Chronic Offender for the second time with respect to accumulated violations of the same Level Three rule as the first time he was found to be a Chronic Offender. Like Respondent, this member received the minimum suspension for the first violation of Rule 5.21 and was terminated for the second.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order terminating the employment of Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth J. Afienko, Esquire Kenneth J. Afienko, P.A. 560 First Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Sherwood S. Coleman, Esquire Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Post Office Drawer 2500 Largo, Florida 33779-2500 James L. Bennett, County Attorney Office of County Attorney 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.68
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WILBERT A. ACOSTA vs FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 10-004224 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jun. 29, 2010 Number: 10-004224 Latest Update: Dec. 29, 2010

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should grant Petitioner’s application for a real estate sales associate license.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible, in relevant part, for licensing real estate sales associates in Florida, pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes (2010).1 Petitioner applied for a real estate sales associate license on a date not established in the record. The grounds stated in the Notice of Intent to Deny Petitioner’s application for license are based on the criminal convictions stated in the application, the recent nature of the crimes, the pattern of the crimes, and the unpersuasive testimony of the applicant pertaining to his rehabilitation. The Notice of Intent to Deny concluded, in relevant part, that the criminal history showed a course of conduct in which Petitioner was incompetent, negligent, or dishonest in dealing with money within the meaning of Subsections 475.25(1)(o) and 475.181. Respondent concluded it would be a breach of its duty to the public to grant the application as provided in Section 455.201. For the reasons stated hereinafter, the testimony of Petitioner at the hearing did not provide a preponderance of evidence to overcome the grounds for denial. It is undisputed that Petitioner was convicted of two separate misdemeanors crimes for theft in Orange County, Florida, on April 21, 2004, and October 4, 2005. Petitioner served six months’ probation for the first offense and 30 days in jail for the second offense, as well as fines and community service related to both offenses. Petitioner did not present any witness, or other evidence, to support his claim of his ability to deal favorably in business matters or transactions. Petitioner did not present any evidence as to whether he was honest, truthful, trustworthy, had good character, or had a good reputation for fair dealing. Petitioner presented no evidence to show that he was competent. Petitioner presented no evidence to show he is qualified to make real estate transactions and conduct negotiations with safety to investors and to those with whom the applicant may undertake a relationship of trust and confidence. Petitioner’s testimony can be fairly summarized as a plea for a second chance. Petitioner presented no evidence of rehabilitation from his criminal past. His pleas of guilt to two different thefts are of paramount concern. These acts, coupled with a lack of any evidence of rehabilitation, fail to satisfy Petitioner’s burden of showing that he is qualified for licensure.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 2010.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68455.201475.17475.181475.25
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HUMBERTO JIMEMEZ vs. DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, 88-006428 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-006428 Latest Update: Jun. 20, 1989

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner possesses the requisite good moral character for certification as a correctional officer.

Findings Of Fact Background In June 1988, respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), acting on a tip from the local media that intervenor, Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (County), had in its employ a number of corrections officers who were not certified, undertook a review of the County's employment records. Following a comparison of the County's records and those of the Commission, the Commission identified 363 individuals, including the petitioner, who were employed by the County as correctional officers but who had not been certified by the Commission. On August 10-11, 1988, Commission personnel visited the County's personnel office, and audited the personnel file of each of the 363 individuals in question. The audit demonstrated that the files were disorganized, lacking documentation required by Rule 11B-27.002, Florida Administrative Code, to apply for certification, and that the County had failed to apply for certification on behalf of the 363 officers. 2/ Over the course of their two-day visit, the Commission's personnel set up an "assembly line" and, together with the County's staff, attempted to complete the documentation on each file. Variously, registration forms and affidavits of compliance were prepared, and birth certificates, fingerprint cards and other missing documentation was assembled. On August 12, 1988, the Commission's personnel returned to Tallahassee with the subject registration forms and affidavits of compliance. Over the course of time, these applications were processed and the vast majority of the individuals were certified; however, the Commission declined, for reasons hereinafter discussed, to certify petitioner. The pending application Petitioner, Humberto Jimenez (Jimenez), has been employed by the County as a correctional officer for approximately two and one-half years, without benefit of certification. On August 10, 1988, as a consequence of the aforementioned audit, the County, as the employing agency, applied for certification on behalf of Jimenez. 3/ Accompanying the application (registration) was an affidavit of compliance, dated August 10, 1988, signed by Fred Crawford, Director of Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which comported with existing law and which certified that such employing agency had collected, verified, and was maintaining on file evidence that Jimenez had met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8), and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. Among the provision of Section 943.13 is the requirement that the applicant be of good moral character. By letter dated November 1, 1988, the Commission notified Jimenez and the County that his application for certification as a correctional officer was denied for lack of good moral character because: You have unlawfully and knowingly possessed and introduced into your body cocaine and cannabis. Following receipt of the Commission's letter of denial, Jimenez filed a timely request for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In his request for hearing, Jimenez denied that he failed to possess the requisite good moral character necessary for certification. Good moral character Pursuant to Rule 11B-27.OO11 Florida Administrative Code, the County, as the employing agency, is responsible for conducting a thorough background investigation to determine the moral character of an applicant. Consistent with such mandate, the County routinely uses previous employment data, law enforcement records, credit agency records, inquiries of the applicant's neighbors and associates, and a pre-employment interview, at which a polygraph examination is administered, to assess an applicant's moral character. In assessing an applicant's character, the County is bound by the provisions of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides: The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant for certification, employment, or appointment at any time proximate to such application for certification, employment, or appointment conclusively establishes that the applicant is not of good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7). The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant at any time remote from and not proximate to such application may or may not conclusively establish that the applicant is not of good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), depending upon the type of controlled substance used, the frequency of use, and the age of the applicant at the time of use. Nothing herein is intended, however, to restrict the construction of Section 943.13(7), only to such controlled substance use. The substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 are amphetamines, barbiturates, cannabis (marijuana), opiates, cocaine, phencyclidine, benzodiazepines, and methaqualone. Pertinent to this case, the County undertook a pre- employment interview of Jimenez on July 24, 1986, at which time he admitted that he had used cocaine and marijuana in the past. His use of cocaine occurred in 1983, when he was 19 years of age, and consisted of using the drug twice on the same day. His use of marijuana occurred in 1981 or 1982, while he was a high school student, and occurred on no more than four occasions. But for these isolated occasions, Jimenez has not used cocaine or marijuana. Notwithstanding the County's conclusion, based on its investigation and analysis of Jimenez's background, that Jimenez possessed the requisite good moral character for employment and certification, the Commission proposed to deny certification based on his isolated use of cocaine and marijuana. The Commission's proposed action is not warranted by the proof. Here, Jimenez, born January 1, 1964, used marijuana infrequently, the last time being about 7 years ago when he was 17 years of age and a high school student. His use of cocaine occurred on but one day in his life, and at the time he was 19 years of age. Such isolated and dated usage can hardly be termed proximate or frequent within the meaning of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), or persuasive evidence of bad moral character. 4/ Currently, Jimenez is married and the father of a fourteen-month-old daughter. He has been employed by the County as a corrections officer, a position of trust and confidence, for approximately two and one-half years. His annual evaluations demonstrated that his performance has been above satisfactory to outstanding, and his periodic drug screenings have all met with negative results. By those who know of him, he is considered an excellent employee, observant of the rules, honest, fair and respectful of the rights of others. Overall, Jimenez has demonstrated that he possessed the requisite good moral character when he was employed by the County as a correctional officer, and has demonstrated in this de novo proceeding that he currently possesses the requisite good moral character for certification.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of petitioner, Humberto Jimenez, for certification as a correctional officer be approved. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of June 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1989.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.60943.13943.131 Florida Administrative Code (3) 11B-27.001111B-27.00211B-27.00225
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NICHOLAS AUTRY vs FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 07-000587 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Feb. 02, 2007 Number: 07-000587 Latest Update: Jul. 11, 2007

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s application for a real estate sales associate license should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is 36 years old. He has a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree in environmental science. He also has a Juris Doctorate degree. Petitioner was licensed to practice law in Illinois in May 2002. His license was suspended in August 2006 by the Illinois Supreme Court as a result of the October 2005 criminal offenses discussed below. See Findings 12-14. The suspension of Petitioner’s license to practice law is for a period of 18 months and “until further order of the Court.” Thus, the suspension runs through at least February 2008. Petitioner is currently working part-time at a Barnes & Nobles bookstore in Tampa. Before that, he worked as an executive recruiter for several months. Before coming to Florida, Petitioner worked as an inspection and enforcement officer for the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in Illinois, and as an attorney and manager for title insurance companies in Illinois and Colorado. Petitioner has been offered a sales associate job by the Keller Williams real estate firm in the Tampa area. The offer is contingent upon the approval of Petitioner’s license application. Petitioner has a long history of alcohol and substance abuse, which he freely acknowledged in his testimony at the final hearing. He has been using illegal substances since his high-school years.2 Petitioner has four criminal offenses in his background, each of which involved alcohol. In June 1991, Petitioner was arrested in Indiana for driving under the influence (DUI). He pled guilty to the offense and spent four days in jail. Petitioner was 20 years old and in college at the time. In February 2004, Petitioner was arrested in Colorado for DUI with a blood-alcohol level of 0.17 percent, which was more than twice the legal limit. He pled guilty to the lesser offense of “driving while ability impaired” and was sentenced to probation and community service. In July 2004, Petitioner was arrested again in Colorado for DUI. He pled guilty and was sentenced to probation and community service. In October 2005, Petitioner was arrested at a concert in Boca Raton for possession of cocaine, criminal mischief (two counts), resisting arrest with violence, and battery of a law enforcement officer (three counts). The offenses were felonies. Petitioner testified that he does not recall any of the circumstances surrounding the incident because he was “extremely intoxicated” at the time. The police report of the incident, which Petitioner does not dispute,3 states that Petitioner punched a patron at the concert, punched a police officer, kicked another police officer, spit on a paramedic, damaged handcuffs and a police car, and was in possession of 0.5 grams of cocaine. The report also indicates that Petitioner was yelling, cursing, and acting belligerently throughout the incident. In January 2006, Petitioner pled no contest to the charges, and adjudication was withheld by the court. He was sentenced to 24 months of probation and 50 hours of community service; he was required to undergo an anger management class; and he was required to successfully complete a substance abuse treatment program and undergo random drug testing. Petitioner successfully completed his probation without incident and without any positive drug tests. An Order formally terminating Petitioner's probation was entered on March 15, 2007. Petitioner’s criminal offenses were not acts of youthful indiscretion or the result of momentary lapses of judgment. All of the offenses, except for the first DUI, were committed when Petitioner was in his 30’s and working in a professional capacity. Petitioner credibly testified that he has taken steps to turn his life around. He is active in a church group in the Tampa area, and he testified that he has not had a drink of alcohol or used illegal drugs since December 31, 2005. Petitioner does not currently attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, although he has done so in the past. He testified that he continues to live by AA’s principles and that he has a support system in place to help him remain completely abstinent from alcohol and drugs. There is no evidence that Petitioner committed any acts of fraud or dishonest dealing in connection with his work with the EPA or the title insurance companies. In October 2006, Petitioner applied for a real estate sales associate license. He was still on probation at that time. Petitioner fully disclosed his criminal history and the suspension of his license to practice law in Illinois in his license application. Petitioner’s license application was considered by the Commission at its meeting on December 13, 2006. Petitioner appeared at the Commission meeting with his attorney and responded to questions from members of the Commission. The Commission voted at the meeting to deny Petitioner’s license application. The denial was memorialized in a Notice of Intent to Deny dated January 3, 2007. The grounds for denial listed in the Notice of Intent to Deny included Petitioner’s criminal record, as revealed in the license application; the recent nature of Petitioner’s criminal offenses; the fact that Petitioner’s criminal history “shows a pattern and practice of criminal behavior over an extended period of time”; the fact that Petitioner “has not had sufficient time free of government supervision to establish rehabilitation”; and the suspension of Petitioner’s license to practice law in Illinois.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for a real estate sales associate license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2007.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57475.17475.180475.181475.25
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LATORY SMILEY vs AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 16-003765EXE (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jul. 01, 2016 Number: 16-003765EXE Latest Update: Dec. 16, 2016

The Issue Whether Petitioner has demonstrated rehabilitation from her disqualifying offense, and whether Respondent’s intended agency action to deny her request for an exemption is an abuse of discretion.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged with providing services to persons with developmental disabilities, including those with autism, cerebral palsy, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, and Down syndrome. The population the Agency serves is one with a heightened risk for abuse, neglect, and exploitation, and people employed to work with this population are considered to be in positions of special trust. Anyone seeking employment with an entity that serves this fragile population is required to undergo a Level 2 screening, in order to ensure that someone who has been convicted or found guilty of certain enumerated crimes is not placed in a position of trust with the people the Agency serves. Petitioner applied for a position with an entity called “The Mentor.” The position for which she applied required that she undergo Level 2 screening. A Level 2 background check was performed by the Department of Children and Families. The background check included criminal history record checks at state, national, and local levels. Petitioner’s state and local criminal record checks were clear. However, the background check revealed that Petitioner has a disqualifying offense that was committed in 2002 in Virginia. The background check also revealed some subsequent arrests and one non-disqualifying conviction occurring after the disqualifying offense. On December 14, 2015, the Department of Children and Families notified Petitioner by letter that she was disqualified from employment by virtue of her disqualifying offense, identified in the letter as grand larceny. The letter notified Petitioner of her eligibility to seek an exemption from disqualification. Petitioner completed a Request for Exemption Questionnaire, which was provided to her. She obtained those documents related to her criminal history that were available, but was unable to retrieve all of them due to the passage of time. She also submitted copies of documents related to her training and education, employment history, and restoration of her civil rights. There is an Exemption Review Request Checklist that gives some aide in completing the exemption packet, but there does not appear to be a set of instructions or any directions regarding what is sought in the questionnaire. For example, the checklist and the questionnaire speak of providing information regarding “each of your criminal offenses.” There is no explanation that “offenses” is meant to include not only convictions, but guilty and nolo contendere pleas, and arrests where the charges were dismissed. Similarly, the questionnaire asks the applicant to list “stressors” existing at the time of the disqualifying offense and existing now, but does not ask an applicant about their background. Petitioner testified that she called the Agency with questions regarding information to be supplied with the questionnaire, but did not get any meaningful assistance. By letter dated May 27, 2016, Barbara Palmer, as director of the Agency, notified her that the Agency had denied her request for exemption from disqualification because she had not submitted clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation. No further explanation of the Agency’s decision was provided. Petitioner was notified of her right to request an administrative hearing if she disputed the Agency’s decision, and she timely invoked this right. Petitioner was born June 25, 1982, and is approximately 34 years old. She never knew her father, and her mother was a drug addict. Her older brother provided what little parenting she received, and the environment in which she grew up had no real moral compass. As a result, it was easy for Petitioner to become entangled with people who were not healthy influences. The Disqualifying Offense The offense which disqualifies Petitioner from holding a position of trust occurred on February 13, 2002, when she was 19 years old. Ms. Smiley was a back-seat passenger in a stolen car. When the car was stopped by police, the others in the car fled the scene. Ms. Smiley did not flee, but refused to give up the names of those who had. As she stated in her exemption questionnaire, “I was young and dumb at the time, and believed I was protecting my friends by not giving the cops their names. I was very very foolish!” Ms. Smiley was originally charged with grand larceny (the crime that the Department of Children and Families identified), but pled to and was found guilty of receiving stolen property, a felony under Virginia law, as well as a lesser included misdemeanor offense of eluding a police officer. As a result of the plea agreement, on May 30, 2002, Ms. Smiley was sentenced to two years’ incarceration for Count 1 and 12 months’ incarceration for Count 2. The court suspended the sentences for both counts, subject to two years of unsupervised probation, payment of court costs of $1,315.50 and restitution of $700 to the owner of the car.1/ As of February 1, 2008, Petitioner paid both the costs and the restitution related to her disqualifying offense, and she received releases of judgment for them from the Norfolk County Court. She also wrote a letter of apology to the victim and stated in the questionnaire that the victim in turn had given her encouraging words regarding the importance of the company one keeps that she has taken to heart. Subsequent Criminal Events Agencies conducting disqualification exemption requests are permitted to consider arrests and convictions that occur after any disqualifying offense, whether or not the subsequent event would be considered a disqualifying offense if the applicant was found guilty, and regardless of the disposition of any arrest. Based on its authority to do so, the Agency considered the following events in Petitioner’s past when it denied her request for an exemption. There was some mention at the hearing of an arrest in 2003, which the Agency indicates was explained in an e-mail which would be in Respondent’s Exhibit I. However, as noted previously, Respondent did not submit Exhibit I after the hearing, and there is no documentation regarding this arrest. However, it appears from the brief testimony at the hearing on this issue that Petitioner was actually the victim in this incident, and the charges against her were dismissed. On January 23, 2006, Petitioner was arrested and charged with indecent language. Petitioner was 23 at the time. The charge was dismissed on January 26, 2006. Petitioner explained that she had gotten into an argument with a friend when she learned the friend was seeing Petitioner’s boyfriend, and used some off-color language during the argument. It is surprising that this could, in this day and age, even be a criminal offense that is actually charged. One cannot help but wonder how small the employment pool would be if all who used indecent language could not hold positions of trust. Nonetheless, this ten-year-old arrest is a factor that the Agency considered, concluding that it was evidence of Petitioner’s lack of judgment. On June 1, 2009, Petitioner was arrested for failure to appear. The Norfolk, Virginia, criminal records indicate that the offense date was June 30, 2008. The charge was dismissed on June 29, 2009. Petitioner testified candidly that she totally forgot her court date and was remorseful about doing so. On June 14, 2009, Petitioner was arrested for obstruction of justice, a misdemeanor. Petitioner apparently pled guilty and was sentenced to 90 days in jail, with 80 days of the sentence suspended. Petitioner paid the costs associated with this offense on or before October 5, 2009. Petitioner explained that she and some friends had been partying, and that she “mouthed off” at a security guard. She described her behavior has “completely out of line,” for which she took full responsibility. She no longer drinks alcohol or parties, because she wants to be a better role model for her children. As is explained below, Petitioner left the Norfolk area and moved to Fairbanks, Alaska, where she sought and received training in counseling for alcohol and drug abuse. She worked as a counselor in Fairbanks until moving to Florida in 2013. Her efforts to obtain employment in Florida have been stymied by the requirement for Level 2 screening. While she has not been employed since moving to Florida, she has worked toward obtaining her education and has been active in her church and her children’s education. Educational History On June 15, 2002, after the entry of the felony plea, Ms. Smiley graduated from Granby High School in Norfolk, Virginia. On October 6, 2011, Ms. Smiley received her certification from the Regional Alcohol and Drug Abuse Counselor Training Program (RADACT), in Anchorage, Alaska, as a Counselor Technician/Behavioral Health Aide I. To earn this certification, she completed 112 hours of coursework from September 19 through October 6, 2011. On January 26, 2012, Petitioner completed two hours of continuing education in clinical documentation, approved by the State of Alaska, DHSS Behavioral Health. On June 7, 2012, Petitioner received a certification for the completion of a Motivational Interviewing course offered by RADACT, representing 16 contact hours. On October 4, 2012, Ms. Smiley received her certification from RADACT, as a Level I Counselor. To earn this certification, she completed 112 hours of coursework from September 17 through October 4, 2012. All of the certifications from RADACT indicate that the coursework has been approved by the National Association of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors and will be accepted by the Alaska Commission for Behavioral Health Certification. Ms. Smiley submitted documentation indicating that she had attended classes at Valencia College in the summer of 2015, taking classes toward her college degree. She also has taken courses at Seminole State College, although the time frame for this coursework is unclear from the documentation presented. Employment History Petitioner submitted the following information related to her work history on the exemption questionnaire. From May 14, 2000, to September 16, 2003, Ms. Smiley worked on a seasonal basis as a summer camp worker for the City of Norfolk Parks and Recreation Department. The undersigned notes that she was employed in this capacity during the time period when her disqualifying offense occurred, and that the City of Norfolk continued to employ her working with children, despite her felony conviction. There is no indication that any child was harmed as a result of the care she provided to children during her employment with the city. From October 1, 2003, to June 10, 2005, Petitioner worked as a youth counselor for the YMCA in Norfolk. Her job duties included assisting with homework and after-school activities in the YMCA’s before and after school programs. Ms. Smiley held this job working with children not long after her felony conviction, in the same town where the conviction occurred. Petitioner worked for the City of Norfolk, Parking Division, from June 10, 2006, through October 1, 2008, collecting parking fees. The City of Norfolk employed her in a position involving the collection of money despite her felony conviction for receiving stolen property. Ms. Smiley moved to Alaska, and from February 2, 2009, to February 13, 2013, Petitioner worked for Fairbanks Native Associates in Fairbanks, as a counselor.2/ In that capacity, she worked with clients to develop ways to cope with issues such as HIV, grief, stress, and addiction, and, potentially, to incorporate 12-step programs to assist with recovery and prevent relapse. With each of her jobs, Petitioner remained employed for a minimum of 20 months to approximately four years. Ms. Smiley left her job in Alaska in order to move to Florida. While she has sought employment in Florida, she has been unable to get past the Level 2 screening and cannot work in the field for which she has trained because she does not have an exemption. Community Involvement On December 9, 2015, Ms. Smiley’s civil rights to vote, hold public office, serve on a jury, and to be a notary public were restored by the Governor of Virginia. She has completed an application to register to vote in Florida. Ms. Smiley has three special-needs children and is an involved parent. She attends all of her children’s school functions and belonged to the PTA at her children’s elementary school. She also attends church twice a week and is active in a faith-based organization called “I am Judah.” Petitioner also provided to the Agency two positive letters regarding her character, from Daquisha Presley and Shavon Haskins. Both letters are glowing in their praise of Ms. Smiley, but contain no real explanation of how the writers know her or any description of activities in which she is involved that would point to rehabilitation. However, both letter-writers are from Virginia, making their attendance at a hearing in Florida unrealistic. Both writers speak of Ms. Smiley’s thoughtfulness and giving heart, with Ms. Presley also referring to her strength, grace, compassion, leadership, courage, and faith. The Agency’s Decision The Agency declined to grant Petitioner’s request for exemption, stating that she had not provided clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation. At the hearing, the Agency gave little explanation regarding the reasoning behind its decision. It is unclear whether Agency personnel realized that Ms. Smiley’s disqualifying offense was receiving stolen property, as opposed to grand larceny, as identified in the Department of Children and Families’ December 14, 2015, letter. Mr. Sauve testified that Ms. Smiley’s lack of employment after moving to Florida was troubling and that the Agency had considered her non- disqualifying offenses since the 2002 conviction. In its Proposed Recommended Order, the Agency asserts that Petitioner “has not demonstrated any rehabilitation specific to the disqualifying offense, and a majority of the evidence given for her rehabilitation existed during the ensuing non-qualifying offenses.” The Agency did not indicate what would qualify as rehabilitation “specific to the disqualifying offense.” However, the record at hearing demonstrated that Petitioner paid all of the court costs and restitution related to the disqualifying offense, and wrote a letter of apology to the victim. She has stopped drinking alcohol, which contributed to her past indiscretions, and moved away from the environment where her troubles began. All of these actions are evidence of steps toward rehabilitation. Moreover, the statement that the majority of evidence Petitioner presented related to rehabilitation existed during the ensuing non-qualifying offenses is incorrect. With the exception of her high school diploma, all of the training and education that Petitioner has received occurred after the 2009 charge, which is the last encounter Petitioner had with the criminal authorities. The same can be said of her employment as a counselor. Her civil rights were restored in 2015; also well after the 2009 charge. Petitioner’s actions and her efforts to move past the behaviors leading to her legal issues must be viewed from two different perspectives: first, through the lens of her background and upbringing, in order to understand the environment in which she found herself and that which she now lives; and second, through the significant and laudable goal of the Agency to ensure that the fragile population it serves is not exploited or endangered. Petitioner testified at the hearing, and her testimony is something the Agency did not have the advantage of hearing before making its initial decision. As noted above, Petitioner did not have the benefit of a solid family structure. She did not know her father, and her mother was a drug addict. She views her behavior as a young adult for what it was: the foolish and irresponsible behavior of a young woman hanging out with the wrong people, and not thinking about the future. She admitted that her behavior in 2009 also was irresponsible, stating that she was “completely out of line.” She testified that she has removed herself from those influences in her life and no longer drinks or parties, instead focusing on being a mother to her children. The Agency points out that she also was a mother in 2009 when the final non-disqualifying offense occurred. While that is true, Petitioner has taken steps to improve her situation since that time: by obtaining training for employment and working in the counseling field, by attending her church and faith-based organization activities, and by being active in her children’s elementary school PTA. All are efforts that Petitioner has made in the last six to seven years to be a positive role model for her children and to rise above the circumstances in which she was raised. In short, she is attempting to provide for her children what no one provided for her. She also has used the time while she has been unable to gain employment to continue her education. The evidence considered at the hearing shows a woman who was truly remorseful for the actions in her past and who is doing her best to overcome the limitations of her upbringing and be a contributing member of society. Ms. Smiley has proven rehabilitation from the single disqualifying offense by clear and convincing evidence. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, it also demonstrates that Petitioner presents no danger to the vulnerable population served by the Agency. The credible hearing testimony, coupled with the information presented to the Agency, established that Ms. Smiley presents no danger to APD clients, including children. Since her disqualifying offense, she has worked with children, been entrusted with money, and worked with those battling addiction and other stressors. While the Agency is right to take its responsibility to protect a particularly vulnerable population seriously, Ms. Smiley has demonstrated her ability and passion to work with those who are less fortunate than herself. As she stated in her Proposed Recommended Order, “I want to work with trouble teens [sic] because I know the STRUGGLE, I know how trouble is easy to get into and HARD to get out, even 15 years down the road.” She should be allowed to do so.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order granting Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification from a position of trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 2016.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57435.04435.07817.563893.13893.147
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HECTOR LOPEZ vs. PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, 81-000495RX (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000495RX Latest Update: Jun. 09, 1981

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder, and is presently serving a sentence in the custody of the State of Florida on that conviction. He is currently incarcerated at Glades Correctional Institution in Belle Glade, Florida. The Respondent is responsible for establishing "presumptive parole release dates" for prisoners such as the Petitioner. Petitioner was interviewed on July 19, 1979, for the purpose of setting his presumptive parole release date. By action dated August 8, 1979, the Respondent set the date at May 1, 1984. Petitioner requested a special review, but the Commission did not change its decision. The Respondent has adopted guidelines for setting presumptive parole release dates by rule. Chapter 23-19, Florida Administrative Code. The rule originally became effective March 20, 1979. When first promulgated, the guidelines established a "matrix" which provided that second degree murder fell within the offense severity rating of "VI--Greatest Most Serious." A prisoner convicted of second degree murder would have the presumptive release date computed according to the following matrix, which was set out at Rule 23-19.05, Florida Administrative Code: 18-39 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 0. 38-59 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 1. 58-79 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was between 2 and 6. 78-120 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 7-11. The salient factor score is a number computed by looking at past criminal behavior. The Respondent has amended its Rule 23-19.05, and increased the offense severity rating of second degree murder from VI to "VII--Greatest Most Serious II." Under the amended rule, an inmate convicted of second degree murder has the presumptive parole release date computed according to the following matrix: 60-84 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 0. 83-107 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 106-130 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 2 to 6. 129-183 months, if the inmate's salient factor score was 7 to 11. Petitioner's salient factor score was zero, and in accordance with the amended rule, his presumptive parole release date was set in the sixty to eighty-four month range, and specifically at the top of that range. The amendment to Rule 23-19.05 which changed the matrix time range for the offense of second degree murder is the subject of this rule challenge proceeding. Had the Petitioner's presumptive release date been computed according to the rule prior to the amendment, his presumptive parole release date would have been set in the eighteen to thirty-nine month range. The amendment to Rule 23-19.05 became effective June 25, 1979. The Respondent prepared a document entitled "Economic Impact Statement" in support of the amendment. The statement provided: The objective parole criteria rules to which this statement is attached, have been promulgated in response to legislation which demanded the same. See Chapter 78-417, Laws of Florida. Therefore, the economic impact, if any, presently flows from the statutes, not from the rules. In its notice of the amended rule published in the "Florida Administrative Weekly," the Respondent stated that the estimate of economic impact on all affected persons of the amendment was "$0." The instant rule challenge proceeding was initiated by a petition filed at the Division of Administrative Hearings on March 13, 1981. In adopting the amendment to its Rule 23-19.05, the Respondent Commission relied upon the collective experience of its individual members. This experience includes the Commissioners' experience in reviewing individual cases as well as each Commissioner's background. Neither the Commission nor its staff had any statistical data available. The Commission did not formally notify the Department of Corrections of the need for any statistical information, and it does not appear that the Department of Corrections provided any such data.

Florida Laws (4) 120.54120.5620.315947.165
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ROBERTO MERA vs. DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, 88-006435 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-006435 Latest Update: Jun. 20, 1989

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner possesses the requisite good moral character for certification as a correctional officer.

Findings Of Fact Background In June 1988, respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice standards and Training Commission (Commission), acting on a tip from the local media that intervenor, Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (County), had in its employ a number of corrections officers who were not certified, undertook a review of the County's employment records. Following a comparison of the County's records and those of the Commission, the Commission identified 363 individuals, including the petitioner, who were employed by the County as correctional officers but who had not been certified by the Commission. On August 10-11, 1988, Commission personnel visited the County's personnel office, and audited the personnel file of each of the 363 individuals in question. The audit demonstrated that the files were disorganized, lacking documentation required by Rule 11B-27.002, Florida Administrative Code, to apply for certification, and that the County had failed to apply for certification on behalf of the 363 officers. 2/ Over the course of their two-day visit, the Commission's personnel set up an "assembly line" and, together with the County's staff, attempted to complete the documentation on each file. Variously, registration forms and affidavits of compliance were prepared, and birth certificates, fingerprint cards and other missing documentation was assembled. On August 12, 1988, the Commission's personnel returned to Tallahassee with the subject registration forms and affidavits of compliance. Over the course of time, these applications were processed and the vast majority of the individuals were certified; however, the Commission declined, for reasons hereinafter discussed, to certify petitioner. The pending application Petitioner, Roberto Mera (Mera), has been employed by the County as a correctional officer for approximately two years, without benefit of certification. On August 10, 1988, as a consequence of the aforementioned audit, the County, as the employing agency, applied for certification on behalf of Mera. 3/ Accompanying the application (registration) was an affidavit of compliance, dated August 10, 1988, signed by Fred Crawford, Director of Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which comported with existing law and which certified that such employing agency had collected, verified, and was maintaining on file evidence that Mera had met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8), and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. Among the provision of section 943.13 is the requirement that the applicant be of good moral character. By letter dated November 1, 1988, the Commission notified Mera and the County that his application for certification as a correctional officer was denied for lack of good moral character because: You have unlawfully and knowingly possessed and introduced into your body cocaine and cannabis. You have unlawfully and knowingly purchased stolen property. Following receipt of the Commission's letter of denial, Mera filed a timely request for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In his request for hearing, Mera denied that he failed to possess the requisite good moral character necessary for certification. Good moral character Pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011, Florida Administrative Code, the County, as the employing agency, is responsible for conducting a thorough background investigation to determine the moral character of an applicant. Consistent with such mandate, the County routinely uses previous employment data, law enforcement records, credit agency records, inquiries of the applicant's neighbors and associates, and a pre-employment interview, at which a polygraph examination is administered, to assess an applicant's moral character. In assessing an applicant's character, the County is bound by the provisions of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides: The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant for certification, employment, or appointment at any time proximate to such application for certification, employment, or appointment conclusively establishes that the applicant is not of good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7). The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant at any time remote from and not proximate to such application may or may not conclusively establish that the applicant is not of good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), depending upon the type of controlled substance used, the frequency of use, and the age of the applicant at the time of use. Nothing herein is intended, however, to restrict the construction of Section 943.13(7), only to such controlled substance use. The substances enumerated in rule 11B-27.00225 are amphetamines, barbiturates, cannabis (marijuana), opiates, cocaine, phencyclidine, benzodiazepines, and methaqualone. Pertinent to this case, the County undertook a pre-employment interview of Mera on April 16, 1987, at which time he divulged that he had used marijuana one time in 1977, that he had used cocaine one time in 1982, and that he had purchased a stolen VCR for $100 in 1982. While the used VCR he purchased was apparently stolen property, Mera did not know such fact when he purchased it, and turned it over to the police when they advised him it was stolen property. Other than heretofore noted, Mera has never used marijuana or cocaine. Notwithstanding the County's conclusion, based on its investigation and analysis of Mera's background, that Mera possessed the requisite good moral character for employment and certification, the Commission proposed to deny certification based on the foregoing isolated incidents. The Commission's action is unwarranted. Here, Mera, born August 20, 1963, used marijuana one time 12 years ago when he was 14-15 years of age, and cocaine one time 7 years ago when he was 19 years of age. At no time did he knowingly purchase stolen property. Such isolated and dated usage of marijuana and cocaine can hardly be termed proximate or frequent within the meaning of rule 11B-27.0011(2), or persuasive evidence of bad moral character. 4/ To date, Mera has been employed by the County as a corrections officer, a position of trust and confidence, for approximately two years. His annual evaluations have ranged from above satisfactory to outstanding, and his periodic drug screenings have all met with negative results. By those who know of him, he is considered an excellent employee, observant of the rules, honest, fair and respectful of the rights of others. Overall, Mera has demonstrated that he possessed the requisite good moral character when he was employed by the County as a correctional officer, and has demonstrated in this de novo proceeding that he currently possesses the requisite good moral character for certification.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of petitioner, Roberto Mera, for certification as a correctional officer be approved. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of June 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1989.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.60943.13943.131 Florida Administrative Code (3) 11B-27.001111B-27.00211B-27.00225
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WILLIAM M. BARNETTE vs. SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 83-002416RX (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-002416RX Latest Update: Mar. 13, 1984

Findings Of Fact Prior to March 9, 1983, Petitioner had been employed by Respondent for a period of approximately 13 years. On March 9, 1983, Petitioner was serving as Superintendent of Respondent's West Palm Beach Field Station, a position which required that he supervise some 88 of Respondent's employees. By memorandum dated March 9, 1983, Petitioner was terminated from his position with Respondent by virtue of Respondent's contention that he discharged his responsibilities in an unsatisfactory manner. In the memorandum of March 9, 1983, Petitioner was advised that he had been advised of the shortcomings leading to his discharge in performance reviews conducted pursuant to Respondent's Merit Review Program from as early as April 1977, through October of 1982. Respondent's Merit Review Program, which was in effect at the time of Petitioner's termination, "...establishes policies and procedures for evaluating and recognizing employee performance This policy....applies to all District employees filling a permanent position The program establishes a procedure whereby Respondent's employees are evaluated twice yearly to determine their level of performance and to make salary adjustments. There is no provision in the Merit Review Program for either disciplining or discharging a District employee as a result of performance reviews conducted pursuant to the policy. The Merit Review Program establishes six types of merit reviews, which include normal, interim, initial probation, proportional, positional probation, and special probation. Supervisory personnel conducting reviews are required to follow specific procedures within each of these categories. In addition to the six categories of merit reviews, the Merit Review Program establishes a complex and mandatory evaluation procedure for supervisors conducting reviews. The program also establishes a mandatory appeal procedure should an employee disagree with his rating. Evaluation factors utilized in the program are defined and established from "outstanding" performance to "unacceptable" performance. The program establishes specific performance categories including planning, organization, coordination, administration, control, human relations, knowledge of work, leadership, dependability, communications skills, efficiency, judgment, performance skills, initiative, cooperation, and job knowledge. Effective July 18, 1982, Respondent effectuated a Corrective Action Policy for resolving performance problems and violation of Respondent's rules of conduct. This policy categorizes unsatisfactory behavior, divides disciplinary action into four categories according to the Seriousness of the offense, and establishes penalties ranging from verbal warnings for less serious offenses to termination of employment for more serious violations. This policy is not challenged in this proceeding. The Merit Review Program, which is the subject matter of this proceeding, provides a procedure whereby employees may appeal the result of a merit review within five days of receipt of their copy of the Merit Review Form should they disagree with the contents of that review. Although Petitioner had received merit review ratings for at least seven years prior to the date of final hearing in this cause, there is no evidence that he ever appealed any such evaluation. Although it is undisputed that Respondent did not comply with the rulemaking procedures established In Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, prior to adoption of the Merit Review Program, it is equally clear that results from the Merit Review Program in this case were used solely to document Petitioners performance problems for purposes of applying Respondent's Corrective Action Policy, thereby resulting in Petitioner's discharge from employment

Florida Laws (2) 120.54120.56
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IVAN CARRANDI vs. DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, 88-006417 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-006417 Latest Update: Jun. 19, 1989

Findings Of Fact Background In June 1988, respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), acting on a tip from the local media that intervenor, Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (County), had in its employ a number of corrections officers who were not certified, undertook a review of the County's employment records. Following a comparison of the County's records and those of the Commission, the Commission identified 363 individuals, including the petitioner, who were employed by the County as correctional officers but who had not been certified by the Commission. On August 10-11, 1988, Commission personnel visited the County's personnel office, and audited the personnel file of each of the 363 individuals in question. The audit demonstrated that the files were disorganized, lacking documentation required by Rule 11B-27.002, Florida Administrative Code, to apply for certification, and that the County had failed to apply for certification on behalf of the 363 officers. 2/ Over the course of their two-day visit, the Commission's personnel set up an "assembly line" and, together with the County's staff, attempted to complete the documentation on each file. Variously, registration forms and affidavits of compliance were prepared, and birth certificates, fingerprint cards and other missing documentation was assembled. On August 12, 1988, the Commission's personnel returned to Tallahassee with the subject registration forms and affidavits of compliance. Over the course of time, these applications were processed and the vast majority of the individuals were certified; however, the Commission declined, for reasons hereinafter discussed, to certify petitioner. The pending application Petitioner, Ivan Carrandi (Carrandi), has been employed by the County as a correctional officer since June 17, 1985, without benefit of certification. On August 10, 1988, as a consequence of the aforementioned audit, the County, as the employing agency, applied for certification on behalf of Carrandi. 3/ Accompanying the application (registration) was an affidavit of compliance, dated August 10, 1988, signed by Fred Crawford, Director of Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which comported with existing law and which certified that such employing agency had collected, verified, and was maintaining on file evidence that Carrandi had met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8), and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. Among the provision of section 943.13 is the requirement that the applicant be of good moral character. By letter dated November 1, 1988, the Commission notified Carrandi and the County that his application for certification as a correctional officer was denied for lack of good moral character because: You have unlawfully and knowingly possessed and introduced into your body cocaine and cannabis. Following receipt of the Commission's letter of denial, Carrandi filed a timely request for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In his request for hearing, Carrandi denied that he failed to possess the requisite good moral character necessary for certification. Good moral character Pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011, Florida Administrative Code, the County, as the employing agency, is responsible for conducting a thorough background investigation to determine the moral character of an applicant. Consistent with such mandate, the County routinely uses previous employment data, law enforcement records, credit agency records, inquiries of the applicant's neighbors and associates, and a pre-employment interview, at which a polygraph examination is administered, to assess an applicant's moral character. In assessing an applicant's character, the County is bound by the provisions of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides: The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant for certification, employment, or appointment at any time proximate to such application for certification, employment, or appointment conclusively establishes that the applicant is not of good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7). The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant at any time remote from and not proximate to such application may or may not conclusively establish that the applicant is not of good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), depending upon the type of controlled substance used, the frequency of use, and the age of the applicant at the time of use. Nothing herein is intended, however, to restrict the construction of Section 943.13(7), only to such controlled substance use. The substances enumerated in rule 11B-27.00225 are amphetamines, barbiturates, cannabis (marijuana), opiates, cocaine, phencyclidine, benzodiazepines, and methaqualone. Pertinent to this case, the County undertook a pre-employment interview of Carrandi on January 1, 1985, at which time he freely admitted that he had used cocaine and marijuana. Regarding such use, the proof demonstrates that during the years 1980 and 1981, while a student at Miami Dade Community College, Carrandi used marijuana approximately two or three times and cocaine approximately two or three times. He has not, however, otherwise used controlled substances. Notwithstanding the County's conclusion, based on its investigation and analysis of Carrandi's background, that Carrandi possessed the requisite good moral character for employment and certification, the Commission proposed to deny certification based on his isolated use of marijuana and cocaine approximately 8 years ago. The Commission's action is unwarranted. Here, Carrandi, born November 12, 1960, used marijuana two or three times and cocaine two or three times about 8 years ago when he was 20-21 years of age and a student at Miami Dade Community College. Such isolated and dated usage can hardly be termed proximate or frequent within the meaning of rule 11B- 27.0011(2), or persuasive evidence of bad moral character. 4/ To date, Carrandi has been employed by the County as a corrections officer, a position of trust and confidence, for approximately four years. His annual evaluations have ranged from satisfactory to above satisfactory, and his periodic drug screenings have all met with negative results. By those who know of him, he is considered an excellent employee, observant of the rules, honest, fair and respectful of the rights of others. Overall, Carrandi has demonstrated that he possessed the requisite good moral character when he was employed by the County as a correctional officer, and has demonstrated in this de novo proceeding that he currently possesses the requisite good moral character for certification.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of petitioner, Ivan Carrandi, for certification as a correctional officer be approved. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th of June 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1989.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.60943.13943.131 Florida Administrative Code (3) 11B-27.001111B-27.00211B-27.00225
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