Conclusions THE PARTIES have entered into a Stipulated Settlement Agreement which resolves all disputed issues. A copy of that Stipulated Settlement Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit “A” and the terms thereof are incorporated into this Final Order. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached Stipulated Agreement. Based on the foregoing, these files are CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the igh day of i) erie , 2014, in Tallahassee, Florida. f 4 . fo bf Ty a f og; . f Vif tK—- L OW ELIZABETH DYDEK, SECRETARY Agency for Health Care Administration St. Lucie County, Florida vs. AHCA Consolidated Case Nos. 13-1169; 13-2372; 13-2593; 14-0498; 14-0499; 14-0500; & Case No. 13-2040 Final Order 1 Filed March 17, 2014 2:47 PM Division of Administrative Hearings A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Beverly H. Smith Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Office of the General Counsel (Interoffice Mail) Gregory T. Stewart, Esquire Carly Schrader, Esquire Nabors, Giblin and Nickerson, P.A. 1500 Mahan Drive, Suite 200 Post Office Box 11008 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (U.S. Mail) Heather Young, Esquire St. Lucie County, Florida 2300 Virginia Avenue Fort Pierce, Florida 34982 (U.S. Mail) Richard Zenuch, Bureau Chief, Medicaid Program Integrity Finance and Accounting Health Quality Assurance Florida Department of Health St. Lucie County, Florida vs. AHCA Consolidated Case Nos, 13-1169; 13-2372; 13-2593; 14-0498; 14-0499; 14-0500; & Case No. 13-2040 Final Order 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail or other designated method on this the (iz Ty of Kberh , 2014. Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630/FAX (850) 921-0158 St. Lucie County, Florida vs. AHCA Consolidated Case Nos. 13-1169; 13-2372; 13-2593; 14-0498; 14-0499; 14-0500; & Case No. 13-2040 Final Order 3
Findings Of Fact Friendly Village of Brevard, Inc. d/b/a Washington Square (herein, Washington Square) is an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR), located at 2055 North U.S. 1, in Titusville, Florida. Friendly Village of Orange, Inc., d/b/a Lake View Court (herein, Lake View Court), is also an ICF/MR located at 920 W. Kennedy Boulevard, in Eatonville, Florida. Howell Branch Court is the same type of facility, located at 3664 Howell Branch Road, Winter Park, Florida. All three facilities are operated by Developmental Services, Inc. All are certified ICF/MR's participating in the Florida Medicaid Program. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) is the state agency responsible for overseeing the ICF/MR Medicaid Program. Howell Branch entered the Florida Medicaid Program in July 1982; Washington Square entered the program on January 19, 1983; and Lake View Court entered the program on February 13, 1983. Prior to beginning operations, medicaid providers were requested to submit a budgeted cost report, a projection of what the provider anticipated spending during the coming year for services to its residents. HRS received those reports and established a per diem rate based on the costs and number of patients and arrived at a per patient, per day rate. Each month as services were provided, the ICF/MR billed the state Medicaid program for the number of patient days times the per diem. During the period in question, cost settlement would occur at the conclusion of the budgeted period. The provider would file his cost report detailing what was actually spent in Medicaid-allowable costs to provide the services, HRS would compare that amount with the amount budgeted and would settle with the provider. Prior to the July 1, 1984 ICF/MR Medicaid Reimbursement Plan, if a provider were under reimbursed (incurred allowable costs in excess of reimbursement) the provider would not receive additional reimbursement in the settlement. However, if the provider received reimbursement in excess of its allowed costs, the excess had to be paid back to HRS. This is called "one-way" cost settlement. Representatives of HRS and Florida's ICF/MR industry began negotiations on a new state reimbursement plan in 1982 and 1983. The participants in the negotiations sought to remove certain cost limitations and to insure that individual facilities would receive fair reimbursement of their Medicaid- allowable costs. The negotiations resulted in the Title XIX ICF/MR Reimbursement Plan dated July 1, 1984 (the 1984 Plan). The 1984 Plan was adopted as a rule by incorporation, in Rule 10C- 7.49(4)(a)2. Florida Administrative Code. The 1984 Plan contains a two-way cost settlement method to replace the one-way settlement method described above. This means that under the 1984 Plan, providers could receive additional reimbursement during settlement if their actual allowable costs exceeded reimbursement under the per diem rate. Washington Square and Lake View Court filed budgeted cost reports for the fiscal year ending February 19, 1984. HRS performed audits of these reports in 1985. The audits were issued in April and May 1988. The audits did not apply the two-way cost settlement method described in the 1984 Plan. Petitioners claim that a proper interpretation of the 1984 Plan is that two-way cost settlement is retroactive to January 1983 for new providers entering the program after January 1, 1983. That claim is based on the following language in the 1984 Plan and subsequent 1985 Plan: For a new provider entering the program subsequent to January 1, 1983, HRS will establish the cost basis for calculation of prospective rates using the first acceptable historical cost report covering at least a 12 month period submitted by the provider. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2, the 1984 Plan, pp 29-30. For a new provider entering the program subsequent to January 1, 1983, HRS will establish the cost basis for calculation of prospective rates using the first acceptable historical cost report covering at least a 12-month period submitted by the provider. Overpayment as a result of the difference between the approved budgeted interim rate and actual costs of the budgeted item shall be refunded to HRS. Underpayment as a result of the difference between the budgeted interim rate and actual allowable costs shall be refunded to the provider. The basis for calculating prospective rates will be the first year settled cost report. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3, the 1985 Plan, p. 31.) Neither the above, nor any other language in the plans indicate that the 1984 Plan would become effective for any providers prior to July 1, 1984. HRS intended that the plan be prospectively applied. Francis "Skip" Martin was employed in HRS' Medicaid Cost Reimbursement Planning and Analysis Unit and was involved in negotiating and drafting the 1984 plan for the agency. He remembers no discussions of retroactive application of the plan. Nor could Petitioners' witnesses expressly recall that the negotiations included retroactive application of the "two- way" settlement method. Instead, they were aware that the department was working with them to establish a more acceptable reimbursement plan and they assumed that retroactivity was part of the plan. (transcript pp 95-98, 126.) Skip Martin explained that the January 1, 1983 date was arrived at by working backwards from July 1, 1984, the date of the plan. The intent was to establish a cutoff point for providers entering the program as to whether they would be considered under prospective rates or be given an interim rate and still be considered a new provider when the plan was implemented. The January 1, 1983, cutoff allowed for a year's worth of reporting history plus sufficient time for the provider to compile his cost report and submit it to the department, and time for the department to have received the cost report and have it included in the calculations that would be used on July 1, 1984. ICF/MR's entering the program after January 1, 1983, would not have had sufficient cost history for rate setting, and as "new providers" would come under a separate rate setting provisions in the plan. Carlton Dyke Snipes has worked in HRS' Medicaid Cost Reimbursement Analysis Section since 1983, and in November 1985, he became the section Administrator. He explained that the language cited above from page 31 of the 1985 Plan was a clarification of the intent that the two-way cost settlement implemented on July 1, 1984, apply to new providers, as well as existing providers. The method had not been expressly addressed in the July 1, 1984 plan in that section relating to new providers. As an alternative to retroactive application of the two-way cost settlement provision in the July 1, 1984 Plan, Petitioners contend that they should be allowed a waiver of class ceilings as provided in the plan in effect in 1983. This issue was raised in this proceeding for the first time at the final hearing. The 1983 ICF/MR Medicaid Reimbursement Plan includes this provision regarding waivers: The class ceiling under paragraph c above may be exceeded provided; the period of the limits shall not exceed six (6) months. The HCFA Regional Office will be notified in writing at least 10 days in advance in all situations to which this exception is to be applied and will be advised of the rationale for the decision, the financial impact, including the proposed rate and the number of facilities and patients involved. (Petitioners' Exhibit #7, p. 15) In one case discussed at hearing, HRS granted an exemption under this provision. The facility was an ICF/MR cluster facility, Sunrise Cape Coral. The application by the facility was cleared in advance by the federal agency, Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). The 1983 Plan is no longer in effect and was superceded by the July 1, 1984 Plan. Petitioners did not apply for a waiver when the 1983 Plan was in effect. Instead, they claim that they did not know such an opportunity existed until discovery for this proceeding uncovered the Sunrise case. The issue with regard to Petitioner's Howell Branch facility differs from the audit issues affecting Washington Square and Lake View Court addressed above. HRS' audit of Howell Branch in 1988 includes an overpayment to the facility of approximately $115,000.00. Petitioners claim that Howell Branch should not have to reimburse those funds because during a portion of the eighteen-month cost reporting period Howell Branch was underpaid for an amount which should more than offset the overpayment. According to the provisions of the reimbursement plan which was in effect during the relevant period, July 1982 (when Howell Branch opened) through December 1983, HRS cost settled based on the lesser of: class ceilings in effect during the period, actual costs, or the budgeted interim rate. Class ceilings are established by HRS for various levels of care required by ICF/MR residents. These ceilings are based on cost reports received by HRS as of each June 30 and go into effect on October 1st of each year. Howell Branch, therefore, experienced three class ceilings during its July 1982 through December 1982 reporting period. HRS applied those three cost ceiling periods to Howell Branch, rather than monthly periods, as contended by Petitioners. As described by Carlton Dyke Snipes, MRS took the average cost determined by an audit report and every rate than had been in effect during that cost reporting period and, for every period that rate was in effect, applied the lesser of the average audited cost or the budgeted rate that was paid or the ceiling that was in effect and reprocessed the claims that had been made. This resulted in the $115,000.00 overpayment. If MRS had used average costs and average rates for the entire eighteen- month period, as advocated by Petitioners, the result would have been that ceilings would be exceeded during a portion of the eighteen month period.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order denying the petitions of Washington Square, Lake View Court and Howell Branch. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of June, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-2939 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Included in Preliminary Statement. 3 through 6. Adopted in Paragraph 1. 7. Adopted in Paragraph 2. 8 through 10. Adopted in Paragraph 3. 11 and 12. Adopted in Paragraph 5. 13 and 14. Adopted in Paragraph 6. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Rejected as unnecessary. 17 and 18. Adopted in Paragraphs 8 and 9, except for the implication that two- way reimbursement applied retroactively to January 1, 1983. Adopted in part in Paragraph 9, but the retroactive application of the methodology is rejected as inconsistent with the evidence. Adopted in Paragraph 11. Adopted in part in Paragraph 10, the statement of entitlement to two-way settlement is rejected as inconsistent with the evidence. Adopted in Paragraph 15. Rejected as argument. Adopted in part in Paragraph 16, otherwise rejected as argument. Rejected as inconsistent with the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. HAS' method of cost settlement was not inappropriate. Adopted in substances in Paragraph 19. Rejected as unnecessary 29 and 30. Rejected as argument and unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in Paragraphs 2 and 3 Adopted in Paragraph 8. 4 and 5. Adopted in Paragraphs 4 and 5. Adopted in Paragraph 6. Adopted in Paragraph 10. Adopted in Paragraphs 10 and 11. Adopted in Paragraph 17. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Bittman, and Karen L. Goldsmith P.O. Box 1980 Orlando, Florida 32802 Carl Bruce Morstadt and Kenneth Muszynski 1323 Winewood Boulevard, Bldg. One Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 R.S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent applied the proper reimbursement principles to Petitioners' initial Medicaid rate setting, and whether elements of detrimental reliance exist so as to require Respondent to establish a particular initial rate for Petitioners' facilities.
Findings Of Fact There are nine Petitioners in this case. Each of them is a long-term health care facility (nursing home) operated under independent and separate legal entities, but, generally, under the umbrella of a single owner, Tzvi "Steve" Bogomilsky. The issues in this case are essentially the same for all nine Petitioners, but the specific monetary impact on each Petitioner may differ. For purposes of addressing the issues at final hearing, only one of the Petitioners, Madison Pointe Rehabilitation and Health Center (Madison Pointe), was discussed, but the pertinent facts are relevant to each of the other Petitioners as well. Each of the Petitioners has standing in this case. The Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by each Petitioner was timely and satisfied minimum requirements. In September 2008, Bogomilsky caused to be filed with AHCA a Change of Licensed Operator ("CHOP") application for Madison Pointe.1 The purpose of that application was to allow a new entity owned by Bogomilsky to become the authorized licensee of that facility. Part and parcel of the CHOP application was a Form 1332, PFA. The PFA sets forth projected revenues, expenses, costs and charges anticipated for the facility in its first year of operation by the new operator. The PFA also contained projected (or budgeted) balance sheets and a projected Medicaid cost report for the facility. AHCA is the state agency responsible for licensing nursing homes in this state. AHCA also is responsible for managing the federal Medicaid program within this state. Further, AHCA monitors nursing homes within the state for compliance with state and federal regulations, both operating and financial in nature. The AHCA Division of Health Quality Assurance, Bureau of Long-Term Care Services, Long-Term Care Unit ("Long-Term Care Unit") is responsible for reviewing and approving CHOP applications and issuance of an operating license to the new licensee. The AHCA Division of Health Quality Assurance, Bureau of Health Facility Regulation, Financial Analysis Unit ("Financial Analysis Unit") is responsible for reviewing the PFA contained in the CHOP application and determining an applicant's financial ability to operate a facility in accordance with the applicable statutes and rules. Neither the Long-Term Care Unit nor the Financial Analysis Unit is a part of the Florida Medicaid Program. Madison Pointe also chose to submit a Medicaid provider application to the Medicaid program fiscal agent to enroll as a Medicaid provider and to be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. (Participation by nursing homes in the Medicaid program is voluntary.) The Medicaid provider application was reviewed by the Medicaid Program Analysis Office (MPA) which, pursuant to its normal practices, reviewed the application and set an interim per diem rate for reimbursement. Interim rate-setting is dependent upon legislative direction provided in the General Appropriations Act and also in the Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (the Plan). The Plan is created by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS (formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration) is a federal agency within the Department of Health and Human Services. CMS is responsible for administering the Medicare and Medicaid programs, utilizing state agencies for assistance when appropriate. In its PFA filed with the Financial Analysis Unit, Madison Pointe proposed an interim Medicaid rate of $203.50 per patient day (ppd) as part of its budgeted revenues. The projected interim rate was based on Madison Pointe's expected occupancy rate, projected expenses, and allowable costs. The projected rate was higher than the previous owner's actual rate in large part based on Madison Pointe's anticipation of pending legislative action concerning Medicaid reimbursement issues. That is, Madison Pointe projected higher spending and allowable costs based on expected increases proposed in the upcoming legislative session. Legislative Changes to the Medicaid Reimbursement System During the 2007 Florida Legislative Session, the Legislature addressed the status of Medicaid reimbursement for long-term care facilities. During that session, the Legislature enacted the 2007 Appropriations Act, Chapter 2007-72, Laws of Florida. The industry proposed, and the Legislature seemed to accept, that it was necessary to rebase nursing homes in the Medicaid program. Rebasing is a method employed by the Agency periodically to calibrate the target rate system and adjust Medicaid rates (pursuant to the amount of funds allowed by the Legislature) to reflect more realistic allowable expenditures by providers. Rebasing had previously occurred in 1992 and 2002. The rebasing would result in a "step-up" in the Medicaid rate for providers. In response to a stated need for rebasing, the 2007 Legislature earmarked funds to address Medicaid reimbursement. The Legislature passed Senate Bill 2800, which included provisions for modifying the Plan as follows: To establish a target rate class ceiling floor equal to 90 percent of the cost- based class ceiling. To establish an individual provider- specific target floor equal to 75 percent of the cost-based class ceiling. To modify the inflation multiplier to equal 2.0 times inflation for the individual provider-specific target. (The inflation multiplier for the target rate class ceiling shall remain at 1.4 times inflation.) To modify the calculation of the change of ownership target to equal the previous provider's operating and indirect patient care cost per diem (excluding incentives), plus 50 percent of the difference between the previous providers' per diem (excluding incentives) and the effect class ceiling and use an inflation multiplier of 2.0 times inflation. The Plan was modified in accordance with this legislation with an effective date of July 1, 2007. Four relevant sentences from the modified Plan are relevant to this proceeding, to wit: For a new provider with no cost history resulting from a change of ownership or operator, where the previous provider participated in the Medicaid program, the interim operating and patient care per diems shall be the lesser of: the class reimbursement ceiling based on Section V of this Plan, the budgeted per diems approved by AHCA based on Section III of this Plan, or the previous providers' operating and patient care cost per diem (excluding incentives), plus 50% of the difference between the previous providers' per diem (excluding incentives) and the class ceiling. The above new provider ceilings, based on the district average per diem or the previous providers' per diem, shall apply to all new providers with a Medicaid certification effective on or after July 1, 1991. The new provider reimbursement limitation above, based on the district average per diem or the previous providers' per diem, which affects providers already in the Medicaid program, shall not apply to these same providers beginning with the rate semester in which the target reimbursement provision in Section V.B.16. of this plan does not apply. This new provider reimbursement limitation shall apply to new providers entering the Medicaid program, even if the new provider enters the program during a rate semester in which Section V.B.16 of this plan does not apply. [The above cited sentences will be referred to herein as Plan Sentence 1, Plan Sentence 2, etc.] Madison Pointe's Projected Medicaid Rate Relying on the proposed legislation, including the proposed rebasing and step-up in rate, Madison Pointe projected an interim Medicaid rate of $203.50 ppd for its initial year of operation. Madison Pointe's new projected rate assumed a rebasing by the Legislature to eliminate existing targets, thereby, allowing more reimbursable costs. Although no legislation had been passed at that time, Madison Pointe's consultants made calculations and projections as to how the rebasing would likely affect Petitioners. Those projections were the basis for the $203.50 ppd interim rate. The projected rate with limitations applied (i.e., if Madison Pointe did not anticipate rebasing or believe the Plan revisions applied) would have been $194.26. The PFA portion of Madison Pointe's CHOP application was submitted to AHCA containing the $203.50 ppd interim rate. The Financial Analysis Unit, as stated, is responsible for, inter alia, reviewing PFAs submitted as part of a CHOP application. In the present case, Ryan Fitch was the person within the Financial Analysis Unit assigned responsibility for reviewing Madison Pointe's PFA. Fitch testified that the purpose of his review was to determine whether the applicant had projected sufficient monetary resources to successfully operate the facility. This would include a contingency fund (equal to one month's anticipated expenses) available to the applicant and reasonable projections of cost and expenses versus anticipated revenues.2 Upon his initial review of the Madison Pointe PFA, Fitch determined that the projected Medicaid interim rate was considerably higher than the previous operator's actual rate. This raised a red flag and prompted Fitch to question the propriety of the proposed rate. In his omissions letter to the applicant, Fitch wrote (as the fourth bullet point of the letter), "The projected Medicaid rate appears to be high relative to the current per diem rate and the rate realized in 2006 cost reports (which includes ancillaries and is net of contractual adjustments). Please explain or revise the projections." In response to the omissions letter, Laura Wilson, a health care accountant working for Madison Pointe, sent Fitch an email on June 27, 2008. The subject line of the email says, "FW: Omissions Letter for 11 CHOW applications."3 Then the email addressed several items from the omissions letter, including a response to the fourth bullet point which says: Item #4 - Effective July 1, 2007, it is anticipated that AHCA will be rebasing Medicaid rates (the money made available through elimination of some of Medicaid's participation in covering Medicare Part A bad debts). Based on discussions with AHCA and the two Associations (FHCA & FAHSA), there is absolute confidence that this rebasing will occur. The rebasing is expected to increase the Medicaid rates at all of the facilities based on the current operator's spending levels. As there is no definitive methodology yet developed, the rebased rates in the projections have been calculated based on the historical methodologies that were used in the 2 most recent rebasings (1992 and 2002). The rates also include the reestablishment of the 50% step-up that is also anticipated to begin again. The rebasing will serve to increase reimbursement and cover costs which were previously limited by ceilings. As noted in Note 6 of the financials, if something occurs which prevents the rebasing, Management will be reducing expenditures to align them with the available reimbursement. It is clear Madison Pointe's projected Medicaid rate was based upon proposed legislative actions which would result in changes to the Plan. It is also clear that should those changes not occur, Madison Pointe was going to be able to address the shortfall by way of reduced expenditures. Each of those facts was relevant to the financial viability of Madison Pointe's proposed operations. Madison Pointe's financial condition was approved by Fitch based upon his review of the PFA and the responses to his questions. Madison Pointe became the new licensed operator of the facility. That is, the Long-Term Care Unit deemed the application to have met all requirements, including financial ability to operate, and issued a license to the applicant. Subsequently, MPA provided to Madison Pointe its interim Medicaid rate. MPA advised Madison Pointe that its rate would be $194.55 ppd, some $8.95 ppd less than Madison Pointe had projected in its PFA (but slightly more than Madison Pointe would have projected with the 50 percent limitation from Plan Sentence 1 in effect, i.e., $194.26). The PFA projected 25,135 annual Medicaid patient days, which multiplied by $8.95, would equate to a reduction in revenues of approximately $225,000 for the first year of operation.4 MPA assigned Madison Pointe's interim Medicaid rate by applying the provisions of the Plan as it existed as of the date Madison Pointe's new operating license was issued, i.e., September 1, 2007. Specifically, MPA limited Madison Pointe's per diem to 50 percent of the difference between the previous provider's per diem and the applicable ceilings, as dictated by the changes to the Plan. (See Plan Sentence 1 set forth above.) Madison Pointe's projected Medicaid rate in the PFA had not taken any such limitations into account because of Madison Pointe's interpretation of the Plan provisions. Specifically, that Plan Sentence 3 applies to Madison Pointe and, therefore, exempts Madison Pointe from the new provider limitation set forth in Plan Sentences 1 and 2. However, Madison Pointe was not "already in the Medicaid program" as of July 1, 2007, as called for in Plan Sentence 3. Rather, Madison Pointe's commencement date in the Medicaid program was September 1, 2007. Plan Sentence 1 is applicable to a "new provider with no cost history resulting from a change of ownership or operator, where the previous operator participated in the Medicaid program." Madison Pointe falls within that definition. Thus, Madison Pointe's interim operating and patient care per diems would be the lesser of: (1) The class reimbursement ceiling based on Section V of the Plan; (2) The budgeted per diems approved by AHCA based on Section III of the Plan; or (3) The previous provider's operating and patient care cost per diem (excluding incentives), plus 50 percent of the difference between the previous provider's per diem and the class ceiling. Based upon the language of Plan Sentence 1, MPA approved an interim operating and patient care per diem of $194.55 for Madison Pointe. Plan Sentence 2 is applicable to Madison Pointe, because it applies to all new providers with a Medicaid certification effective after July 1, 1991. Madison Pointe's certification was effective September 1, 2007. Plan Sentence 3 is the primary point of contention between the parties. AHCA correctly contends that Plan Sentence 3 is not applicable to Petitioner, because it addresses rebasing that occurred on July 1, 2007, i.e., prior to Madison Pointe coming into the Medicaid system. The language of Plan Sentence 3 is clear and unambiguous that it applies to "providers already in the Medicaid program." Plan Sentence 4 is applicable to Madison Pointe, which entered the system during a rate semester, in which no other provider had a new provider limitation because of the rebasing. Again, the language is unambiguous that "[t]his new provider reimbursement limitation shall apply to new providers entering the Medicaid program. . . ." Madison Pointe is a new provider entering the program. Detrimental Reliance and Estoppel Madison Pointe submitted its CHOP application to the Long-Term Care Unit of AHCA for approval. That office has the clear responsibility for reviewing and approving (or denying) CHOP applications for nursing homes. The Long-Term Care Unit requires, as part of the CHOP application, submission of the PFA which sets forth certain financial information used to determine whether the applicant has the financial resources to operate the nursing home for which it is applying. The Long-Term Care Unit has another office within AHCA, the Financial Analysis Unit, to review the PFA. The Financial Analysis Unit is found within the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation. That Bureau is responsible for certificates of need and other issues, but has no authority concerning the issuance, or not, of a nursing home license. Nor does the Financial Analysis Unit have any authority to set an interim Medicaid rate. Rather, the Financial Analysis Unit employs certain individuals who have the skills and training necessary to review financial documents and determine an applicant's financial ability to operate. A nursing home licensee must obtain Medicaid certification if it wishes to participate in the program. Madison Pointe applied for Medicaid certification, filing its application with a Medicaid intermediary which works for CMS. The issuance of a Medicaid certification is separate and distinct from the issuance of a license to operate. When Madison Pointe submitted its PFA for review, it was aware that an office other than the Long-Term Care Unit would be reviewing the PFA. Madison Pointe believed the two offices within AHCA would communicate with one another, however. But even if the offices communicated with one another, there is no evidence that the Financial Analysis Unit has authority to approve or disapprove a CHOP application. That unit's sole purpose is to review the PFA and make a finding regarding financial ability to operate. Likewise, MPA--which determines the interim Medicaid rate for a newly licensed operator--operates independently of the Long-Term Care Unit or the Financial Analysis Unit. While contained within the umbrella of AHCA, each office has separate and distinct duties and responsibilities. There is no competent evidence that an applicant for a nursing home license can rely upon its budgeted interim rate--as proposed by the applicant and approved as reasonable by MPA--as the ultimate interim rate set by the Medicaid Program Analysis Office. At no point in time did Fitch tell Madison Pointe that a rate of $203.50 ppd would be assigned. Rather, he said that the rate seemed high; Madison Pointe responded that it could "eliminate expenditures to align them with the available reimbursement." The interim rate proposed by the applicant is an estimate made upon its own determination of possible facts and anticipated operating experience. The interim rate assigned by MPA is calculated based on the applicant's projections as affected by provisions in the Plan. Furthermore, it is clear that Madison Pointe was on notice that its proposed interim rate seemed excessive. In response to that notice, Madison Pointe did not reduce the projected rate, but agreed that spending would be curtailed if a lower interim rate was assigned. There was, in short, no reliance by Madison Pointe on Fitch's approval of the PFA as a de facto approval of the proposed interim rate. MPA never made a representation to Madison Pointe as to the interim rate it would receive until after the license was approved. There was, therefore, no subsequent representation made to Madison Pointe that was contrary to a previous statement. The Financial Analysis Unit's approval of the PFA was done with a clear and unequivocal concern about the propriety of the rate as stated. The approval was finalized only after a representation by Madison Pointe that it would reduce expenditures if a lower rate was imposed. Thus, Madison Pointe did not change its position based on any representation made by AHCA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, approving the Medicaid interim per diem rates established by AHCA and dismissing each of the Amended Petitions for Formal Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2009.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be reimbursed for fiscal year 1979 and 1980 in accordance with the foregoing adjustments. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1982.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner has overpaid Respondent for medical services for which he has obtained reimbursement under the Medicaid program and, if so, by how much.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed physician engaged in the practice of medicine in Florida. From January through November 1997, Respondent worked a couple of hours each morning at the Summit Clinic in Miami before seeing patients at his own office. At the Summit Clinic, Respondent administered intravenous immunoglobulin (IVIG) to adult Medicaid patients who were infected with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Petitioner paid the Summit Clinic, which was using Respondent's Medicaid provider number, for these and other medical services. Petitioner now claims that these IVIG services were not medically necessary, and, pursuant to its "pay-and-chase" policy, Petitioner seeks repayment from Respondent. In general, the administration of IVIG transfers antibodies contained in globulin to protect the recipient from various infectious microorganisms. The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved the marketing of IVIG for the treatment of persons with certain clinical conditions, such as idiopathic thrombocytopenic purpura, Kawasaki disease, and pediatric HIV infection. However, the FDA has not approved the marketing of IVIG for the treatment of adult HIV infection. The use of a drug to treat conditions for which the FDA has not issued its approval is known as an off-label use. Some off-label uses are medically effective and prevalent, but remain unapproved by the FDA because the drug manufacturer cannot feasibly conduct expensive clinical trials generally necessary to obtain FDA marketing approval. Despite the absence of such clinical trials, not all off-label uses are experimental. In the 20 years that IVIG has been commercially available in the United States, medical researchers and practitioners have uncovered evidence in support of important off-label uses of IVIG. For instance, a common and effective off-label use of IVIG is for the treatment of Guillain-Barré syndrome. According to the University HealthSystem Consortium, the FDA estimates that 50-70 percent of IVIG use is off-label, but as much as half of the off-label use finds little, if any, support by clinical studies. This case raises the question of the medical necessity of the off-label use of IVIG for the treatment of HIV-infected adults. Unlike adult-onset HIV infections, pediatric HIV infections result in systemic immune deficiencies because the children's immune systems never develop normally. In HIV- infected children, IVIG relieves the effects of these systemic immune deficiencies by preventing serious bacterial infections. For these reasons, the FDA has approved the use of IVIG for HIV- infected children. By letter dated July 31, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent that it had reviewed various Medicaid claims submitted under his provider number. As relevant to this case, the July 31 letter disallows Medicaid reimbursement for the use of IVIG on HIV-infected adults. Stating that this use of IVIG is not "indicated" and is "investigational," the letter adds: "Medicaid policy prohibits payment for experimental procedures or non-FDA approved drugs and requires that all services rendered to Medicaid recipients be medically necessary." Chapter 1 of the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states: "Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary . . .. In addition, the services must meet the following criteria: the services must be individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the recipient's needs; the services cannot be experimental or investigational; the services must reflect the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; and the services must be furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The Handbook also provides: "Medicaid does not reimburse for non-FDA approved medications. Medicaid does not reimburse procedures that are experimental or when non-FDA approved medications are included in the procedures." The Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook (Reimbursement Handbook) defines "experimental or clinically unproven procedures" as: "Those newly developed procedures undergoing systematic investigation to establish their role in treatment or procedure that are not yet scientifically established to provide beneficial results for the condition for which they are being used." Although not directly applicable to the Medicaid program, Section 2049.4 of Chapter II, Part 3, Health Care Financing Administration Carriers Manual (HCFA Manual) states, in part: Use of the drug or biological must be safe and effective and otherwise reasonable and necessary. . . . Drugs or biologicals approved for marketing by the [FDA] are considered safe and effective for purposes of this requirement when used for indications specified on the labeling. Therefore, you may pay for the use of an FDA approved drug or biological if: It was injected on or after the date of the FDA's approval; It is reasonable and necessary for the individual patient; and All other applicable coverage requirements are met. * * * An unlabeled use of a drug is a use that is not included as an indication on the drug's label as approved by the FDA. FDA approved drugs used for indications other than what is indicated on the official label may be covered under Medicare if the carrier determines the use to be medically accepted, taking into consideration the major drug compendia, authoritative medical literature and/or accepted standards of medical practice. . . . Accordingly, the Florida Medicare Local Medical Review Policy manual recognizes the use of IVIG for pediatric HIV infections, but warns: "IVIG is not indicated for use in adult HIV patients " Except for the administration of IVIG, Respondent provided state-of-the-art services to HIV-infected adults. The present record contains scant medical evidence of the effectiveness of IVIG in treating HIV-infected adults. Against considerable evidence questioning the medical necessity of IVIG in treating HIV-infected adults, Respondent offered undocumented anecdotal evidence of successful use of IVIG among his adult patients and two synopses of undisclosed preliminary data suggesting effectiveness of IVIG in HIV-infected adults. Respondent did not effectively oppose Petitioner's explanation for the differences in IVIG's effectiveness in treating adults and children, nor did Respondent offer any rationale for his claim of IVIG's effectiveness in HIV-infected adults. On this record, Petitioner has demonstrated that the use of IVIG to treat HIV-infected adults is not effective and, thus, not medically necessary.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order ordering Respondent to reimburse the Medicaid program $74,100.04 in overpayments for services that were not medically necessary. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Anthony L. Conticello, Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Louise T. Jeroslow Law Offices of Louise T. Jeroslow 6075 Sunset Drive, Suite 201 Miami, Florida 33143
Findings Of Fact The rule at issue has been variously codified, but will be referred to for purposes of the present case as Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code. The pertinent language, which was first adopted as part of Rule 10C- 7.03(5), Florida Administrative Code, on March 30, 1976, and which was repealed on July 28, 1981, provides: Reimbursement for services provided is in accord with the standards and principles of reasonable cost as defined and applied under the Social Security Act, Title XVIII, Medicare Program. In lieu of retroactive adjustment, 6 percent shall be added to a participating hospital's costs to determine a current reimbursement rate. Respondent adopted this rule on the claimed authority of Section 409.266, Florida Statutes. In its 1969 legislative session, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, entitled "Medical Assistance for the Needy," providing the original State legislative basis and authority for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program. Section 409.266(2), Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized the Florida Department of Social Services or any other department that the Governor might designate to: Enter into such agreement with other state agencies or any agency of the federal government and accept such duties with respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary to implement the provisions of subsection (1) and to qualify for federal aid including compliance with provisions of Public Law 86-778 and the "Social Security Amendments of 1965" [estab- lishing Title XIX of the Social Security Act.] Section 409.266(3), Florida Statutes, as enacted, stated that: The department of social services is authorized and directed to prepare and operate a program and budget in order to implement and comply with the provisions of public law 86-778 and the "Social Secu- rity Amendments of 1965." Chapter 69-265, Laws of Florida (1969). No provisions of Florida law other than Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized any agency to perform any function specifically to implement the Medicaid program. The State of Florida formally commenced participation in the Medicaid program effective January 1, 1970. At all times pertinent to this controversy, respondent, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services or its predecessor agencies (referred to as "HRS") , has been and continues to be the "State Agency" identified in 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a (a) (5), and charged under Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as amended, with the formulation of a State Plan for Medical Assistance ("State Plan"), 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a, and with the ongoing responsibility for the administration of the Medicaid program in the State of Florida. Since Florida's entry into the Medicaid program in 1970, HRS has been authorized essentially to "[e]nter into such agreements with appropriate agents, other State agencies, or any agency of the Federal Government and accept such duties in respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary or needed to implement the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act pertaining to medical assistance." Section 409.266(2)(a), Fla. Stat., as amended. HRS has never been authorized to enter into any agreements, accept any duties, or perform any functions with respect to the Medicaid program that are in contravention of or not authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act and implementing Federal regulations and requirements. As a prerequisite for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program, HRS prepared and filed with the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") a State Plan, pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and pursuant to its delegated legislative authority set forth in Section 409.266(2)(a), Florida Statutes. (In May, 1980, HEW was redesignated the United States Department of Health and Human Services, but for purposes of this action both shall be referred to as HEW.) C.W. Hollingsworth was the HRS official who had the responsibility for supervising the preparation, the filing, and for obtaining the approval of HEW of Florida's initial State Plan Florida's initial State Plan was approved by HEW effective January 1, 1970. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, Title XIX of the Social Security Act required state plans to provide for the payment of the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid required the State Plan to provide for reimbursement of Medicaid inpatient hospital services furnished by those hospitals also participating in the Medicare program, applying the same standards, cost reimbursement principles, and methods of cost apportionment used in computing reimbursement to such hospitals under Medicare. 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a) and (b), 34 Fed. Reg. 1244 (January 25, 1969). At the time that Florida entered the Medicaid program, Medicare cost reimbursement principles in effect governing reimbursement for the cost of inpatient hospital services required payment of a participating hospital's actual and reasonable costs of providing such services to Medicare beneficiaries, and, moreover, that such payment be made on the basis of the hospital's current costs rather than upon the costs of a prior period or upon a fixed negotiated rate. 42 U.S.C. Section 1395x (v) (1)(A) 20 C.F.R. Section 405.451(c) (2), 405.402(a) [later renumbered 42 C.F.R. Section 405.451(c)(2) and Section 405.402(a)]. Such Medicare principles and standards also provided for interim payments to be made to the hospital during its fiscal year. At the conclusion of the subject fiscal year, the hospital was required to file a cost report wherein the hospital included all of its costs of providing covered inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries. A settlement or "retroactive adjustment" process then was required to reconcile the amount of interim payments received by the hospital during the fiscal period with its allowable costs incurred during that period. If the hospital had been overpaid during the year, it was required to refund the amount of that overpayment to the Medicare program. Conversely, if the hospital had been underpaid during the year, the Medicare program was required to make an additional payment to the hospital, retroactively, in the amount of the underpayment. 20 C.F.R. Section 405.402(b)(2), 405.451(b)(2). Essentially the same Medicare principles and standards governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services described in the two preceding paragraphs have been in effect at all times pertinent to this controversy. 42 C.F.R. Section 405.401, et seq. Florida's approved State Plan as of January 1, 1970, governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under the Medicaid program, committed HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The only versions of Florida's State Plan provisions that have been approved by HEW and that have governed HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, each commit HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Attached as an appendix to the final order is the form agreement drafted under the supervision of C.W. Hollingsworth, which has been in use from January 1, 1970, until July 1, 1981. From the inception of the Florida Medicaid program, and as a prerequisite for participation therein, a hospital has been required to execute a copy of the form agreement. A hospital may not participate in the Medicaid program without having executed such an agreement, nor may it propose any amendments thereto. The intent and effect of the form agreement is to require HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a percentage " allowance in lieu of the retroactive adjustments ("percentage allowances") in determining the rates that hospitals will be paid for providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a new percentage allowance each year based on hospital cost trends. The meanings of the terms "allowance in lieu of retroactive adjustments" in all pertinent state plans and "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" contained in the form agreement are identical. In drafting the form agreement, HRS intended that the "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" be set at a level sufficient to ensure that hospitals participating in the Medicaid program would be reimbursed their "reasonable costs" of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. At all times pertinent to this controversy, participating hospitals, like petitioner, have been reimbursed by HRS for inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients in the following manner: Within ninety (90) days following the close of its fiscal year, the partici- pating hospital files a Form 2551 or 2552 Annual Statement of Reimbursable Costs, as applicable, with both Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., the major fiscal intermediary respon- sible for the administration of Part A of the federal Medicare program in the State of Florida, and with HRS. This document, also referred to as a "cost report" details various hospital and financial statistical data relating to the patient care activities engaged in by the hospital during the sub- ject fiscal period. Upon receipt of the participating hospital's cost report for a fiscal period, HRS makes an initial determination based upon Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards of the hospital's total allow- able inpatient costs, charges, and total patient days during the subject fiscal period, and then determines an inpatient per diem reimbursement rate for the period. To the inpatient per diem reimburse- ment rate is then added a percentage allow- ance in lieu of making any further retroactive corrective adjustments in reimbursement which. might have been due the hospital applicable to the reporting period. The adjusted in- patient per diem reimbursement rate is applied prospectively, and remains in effect until further adjustments in the rate are required. If HRS determines that total inpa- tient Medicaid reimbursement to a partici- pating hospital during a fiscal period exceeds the hospital's allowable and rea- sonable costs of rendering such covered inpatient services applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards, then the hospital is required to remit to HRS the amount of such overpayment. If, however, HRS determines that the total inpatient Medicaid reimbursement received by a participating hospital is less than the hospital's actual and reason- able costs of rendering such covered inpa- tient services to Medicaid patients during the period applying Medicare cost reimburse- ment principles and standards, no further retroactive corrective adjustments are made; provided, however, that should an overpayment occur in a fiscal period, it may be offset and applied retroactively against an under- payment to the participating hospital which occurred during the next preceding fiscal period only. HRS has used the following "percentage allowances" in determining Medicaid reimbursement rates for inpatient hospital services: January 1, 1970-June 30, 1972 ...12 percent July 1, 1972-approximately March 30, 1976 ... 9 percent Approximately March 31, 1976-June 30, 1981... 6 percent Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not recomputed the "percentage allowance" on an annual basis. Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not based the "percentage allowance" that it has applied in determining Medicaid inpatient hospital reimbursement rates upon hospital cost trends. HRS has used no technical methodology based upon hospital cost trends to develop any of the "percentage allowances." At least since January 1, 1974, HRS's "percentage allowances" have been less than the corresponding average annual increases in the costs incurred by Florida hospitals of providing inpatient hospital services. Prior to March 30, 1976, all of HRS's published regulations addressing reimbursement of participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients required HRS to reimburse such hospitals in accordance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In certain internal documents, Petitioner's Exhibits P-44 and P-12, HRS states that the average costs of providing inpatient hospital services in the State of Florida rose at least 18 percent during calendar year 1975. In November, 1975, the Secretary of HRS was informed by HRS officials that HRS faced a projected budgetary deficit for its fiscal year ended June 30, 1976. A decision memorandum presented options to the HRS Secretary for reducing the projected deficit. Among such options presented to and approved by the HRS Secretary was to reduce the "percentage allowance" from 9 percent to 6 percent. The reduction of the "percentage allowance" by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent was effected in response to HRS's projected deficit, and was not based upon an analysis of hospital cost trends. HRS incorporated the 6 percent "percentage allowance" into its administrative rules which were published on March 30, 1976. In response to objections raised by the Florida Hospital Association to the reduction in the percentage allowance by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent, HRS officials reexamined that reduction. During HRS's reexamination of its previous "percentage allowance" reduction, HRS was aware of and acknowledged the fact that Florida hospital costs were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of both the earlier 9 percent and the resulting 6 percent "percentage allowance." In a memorandum dated September 13, 1976, from HRS official Charles Hall to the Secretary of HRS, Petitioner's Exhibit P-45, Charles Hall informed the Secretary that the methods and standards then used by HRS to reimburse participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients was out of compliance with federal requirements. Charles Hall further informed the Secretary that the reason HRS had not theretofore been cited by HEW for noncompliance was the manner in which the Florida State Plan had been drafted, i.e., that the State Plan required HRS to reimburse hospitals under Medicaid for the reasonable costs that they would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In a letter dated September 20, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-31, HEW informed HRS that HEW had received a complaint from the Florida Hospital Association that the methods HRS was actually using to reimburse hospitals for the costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients were in violation of federal regulation 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a). A proposed amendment to Florida's State Plan submitted by HRS to HEW in November, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-49, if approved, would have allowed HRS to reimburse hospitals for the cost of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients under methods differing from Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards (an "alternative plan"). "Alternative plans" have been permitted under applicable federal regulations since October 21, 1974. A state participating in the Medicaid program may elect to establish an "alternative plan," but may not implement such "alternative plan" without the prior written approval of HEW. Florida has not had in effect an "alternative plan" of reimbursing participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients that was formally approved by HEW at any time prior to July 1, 1981. By letter dated January 7, 1977, Petitioner's Exhibit P-32, HEW notified HRS that it had formally cited HRS for noncompliance with federal regulations governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under Medicaid. HRS acknowledged their noncompliance and between November, 1976, and October 30, 1977, HRS attempted to revise its proposed "alternative plan" on at least two occasions in an attempt to obtain HEW approval. In October, 1977, HRS withdrew its proposed "alternative plan" then pending with HEW. HRS then contracted with an outside consultant, Alexander Grant & Company, to assist in the formulation of a new "alternative plan" proposal. In January, 1978, Alexander Grant & Company delivered its draft of an "alternative plan" to HRS. In October, 1978, HRS submitted a draft "alternative plan" to HEW for review and comment, and HEW expected HRS to submit a formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW for its approval by November 1, 1978. HRS did not submit the formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW until August 12, 1980. In a letter dated February 21, 1979, from Richard Morris, HEW Regional Medicaid Director, Region IV, to United States Senator Richard Stone of Florida, Mr. Morris advised Senator Stone: For more than two years the Florida Medicaid Program has not met Federal Requirements for inpatient hospital services reimbursement. Their payment methodology under-reimburses certain hospitals year after year. The pros- pective interim per diem rate paid by Florida to hospitals includes a percentage allowance to cover increased costs during the forthcom- ing year that is consistently less than increased costs in some hospitals. If the payments are less than costs, the difference is not reimbursed. This results in underpay- ments. We have worked closely with Florida to develop an acceptable alternative system that would meet Federal requirements. To date, Florida has not implemented such a system despite having received informal HEW agreement on a draft plan developed more than a year ago. It is our understanding that this alternative plan is not a high priority item at this time. We will con- tinue to work with HRS staff to secure Florida compliance regarding this require- ment. Petitioner's Exhibit P-46. Since August 12, 1980, HRS has submitted to HEW for its approval at least four more versions of an "alternative plan." Petitioner's Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. Each of these versions were approved by the Secretary of HRS, and HRS believes each to comply with applicable Florida law. Mr. Erwin Bodo, Ph.D., was and is the HRS official responsible for the development and drafting of Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. In June, 1981, HEW approved an "alternative plan" for the State of Florida (Exhibit P-152) , and such "alternative plan" was implemented effective July 1, 1981. Until July 1, 1981, HRS continued to use the 6 percent percentage allowance" to compute inpatient hospital reimbursement under Medicaid. Even after its repeal, Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is applied by respondent in calculating reimbursement for Medicaid services provided between March 30, 1976, and July 1, 1981. From November 20, 1976, until July 1, 1981 the period in which HRS was attempting to secure HEW approval for an alternative plan--HRS was aware that the costs of inpatient hospital services were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of the 6 percent "percentage allowance." From September 1, 1976, through July 1, 1981, HRS has been out of compliance with its approved State Plan provisions, and HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Since the quarter ending December 31, 1976, until July 1, 1981, HEW has formally cited HRS as being in contravention of its approved State Plan provisions, and HEW (now HHS) regulations, governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals--including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. PAN AMERICAN HOSPITAL CORPORATION Petitioner, Pan American Hospital Corporation, is a not-for-profit corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. Petitioner is a tax-exempt organization as determined by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has operated and continues to operate a duly licensed 146-bed, short-term acute care general hospital, located at 5959 Northwest Seventh Street, Miami, Florida 33126. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been and continues to be a duly certified provider of inpatient hospital services, eligible to participate in the Florida Medicaid program since January 27, 1974. The Appendix to this Final Order is a true and correct copy of the "Participation Agreement" entered into between petitioner and HRS, whereunder, inter alia, petitioner became eligible to receive payment from HRS for covered inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been a certified "provider of services" participating in the Medicare program. During the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner did provide covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and became eligible for payment by HRS of its reasonable costs of providing such services, determined in accor- dance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner timely filed all cost reports and other financial data with HRS or its contracting agents, including Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., to enable HRS to determine petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. During each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, HRS failed to reimburse petitioner for its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, determined in accordance with applicable Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Such costs incurred by petitioner were reasonable, necessary, related to patient care, and less than customary charges within the meaning of those Medicare principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute, HRS and/or its contracting agent, Blue Cross of Florida, Inc. , reviewed and audited the cost reports filed by petitioner, and as a result of such review and audits set or adjusted, as applicable, the Medicaid inpatient per diem reimbursement rate at which petitioner would be paid during the next succeeding fiscal period or until that rate was again adjusted. MOTION TO DISMISS RULE CHALLENGE DENIED Respondent sought dismissal of petitioner's challenge to Rule 10C- 7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, on grounds that the challenged rule provision has now been repealed (effective July 28, 1981). By this motion, respondent raises the question whether petitioner remains "substantially affected" notwithstanding the repeal. The parties are in agreement that respondent still applies Rule 10C-7.39(6) , Florida Administrative Code, in calculating reimbursement for providers like petitioner who furnished Medicaid services during the time between adoption of the rule and its repeal. The present case resembles State Department of Transportation v. Pan American Construction Company, 338 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), app. dism. 345 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1977). The rule challenged in that case had been promulgated pursuant to a statute that was later amended by legislation which took effect after the Section 120.56 hearing, but before entry of a final order invalidating the rule. In response to the statutory amendment, moreover, the agency whose rule was under challenge adopted an emergency rule superseding the challenged rule. On appeal, the agency argued that the rule challenge was moot. The court ruled: While normally the law as it exists at the time of review will be applied to a pending case, in this proceeding, begun under the old law and rules adopted pursuant to it, we consider that respondents are entitled to construction of such law and rules. Their rights under contracts with peti- tioner which were in existence during the life of the former statute and rules may be affected by the construction of that statute and the rules adopted pursuant to it. State Department of Transportation v. Pan American Construction Co., 338 So.2d 1291, 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) In the present case there has been no statutory amendment, but here as in State Department of Transportation v. Pan American Construction Co., the proceedings pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, began before the repeal of the challenged rule; and the parties' "rights under contracts . . . which were in existence during the life of the former . . . [rule] may be affected by the construction of that . . . [rule]." 338 So.2d at 1294. Simultaneously with the present proceedings, petitioner and respondent are litigating the question of what moneys, if any, respondent owes petitioner as reimbursement for Medicaid services furnished during periods which include the entire time that Rule 10C- 7.39(6) was in effect. No. 80-112. Even though Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, stands repealed, petitioner remains "substantially affected by" the rule, within the meaning of Section 120.56(1), Florida Statutes (1979). MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED Respondent contends that these proceedings are defective "for failure to join an indispensable party," viz., the federal government, because it "is Respondent's intention, should any liability result from this action, to make a claim for federal financial participation as to approximately fifty-nine percent of such liability [See generally] 42 U.S.C. Section 1320b-2(a)(2)." Motion to Dismiss, p. 2. This motion is also addressed to the petition in the companion substantial interest case, No. 80-112, and discussed in the recommended order in that case. For present purposes, it suffices to state the self-evident: No agency can avoid an administrative challenge to a rule it alone has promulgated on grounds that some other party's interest may be adversely affected by invalidation of the rule. CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS Among other things, petitioner contends that Rule 10C-7.39 (6), Florida Administrative Code, should be invalidated as violative of state and federal constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contractual obligations. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Florida proscribes "law[s] impairing the obligation of contracts," and the federal constitution also forbids any "State . . . [to] pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts." Article I, Section 10. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 975 (1977). Challenges to administrative rules brought pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1979), cannot, however, be predicated on constitutional grounds. State Department of Administration, Division of Personnel v. State Department of Administration, Division of Administrative Hearings, 326 So.2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). See Department of Environmental Regulation v. Leon County, 344 So.2d 290, 295 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). INVALID EXERCISE OF DELEGATED LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY The main thrust of petitioner's challenge to Rule 10C-7.39 (6), Florida Administrative Code, is its contention that respondent adopted the challenged rule not to implement Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, but in an attempt to avoid obligations imposed by Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, and the provisions of federal law incorporated by reference in that State statute. The challenged rule pertains to agreements made between respondent and providers of medical services in accordance with the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The statute authorizes respondent to "[e]nter into . . . agreements as may be necessary or needed to implement the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act pertaining to medical assistance." Section 409.266(2)(a) , Florida Statutes (1979). No party suggests that any other State statutory provision furnishes substantive authority for promulgation of Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, and the parties have stipulated that "HRS has never been authorized to . . . perform any functions with respect to the Medicaid program that are in contravention of or not authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act and implementing Federal regulations and requirements." Agency rules must conform to enabling statutes and may not repeal, amend, or modify any statute. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. McTigue, 387 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Psychiatric Society, 382 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); State Department of Transportation v. Pan American Construction Co., 338 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) app. dism. 345 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1977) Incorporated by reference into Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, was the federal statutory requirement that hospitals providing Medicaid services be reimbursed by respondent for reasonable costs incurred in accordance with an approved State Plan. 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a (a)(13)(B) , Pub. L. 89-97, Section 121(a), redesiquated 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a (a) (13)(D), Pub. L. 90- 248, Section 224(a). At the time of its incorporation into State law, this federal statute had been definitively explicated by federal regulations requiring that reasonable cost for Medicaid purposes be calculated in accordance with applicable Medicare principles for purposes of reimbursing hospitals like petitioner that furnished both Medicaid and Medicare services. 2/ 42 C.F.R. Section 50.30(b), 34 Fed. Reg. 1244 et seq. (January 25, 1969). In addition, all Florida "State Plan provisions . . . approved by HEW and. . govern[ing] HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, . . . commit HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards." Pre-hearing Stipulation, 19. Even before adopting Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida had begun setting Medicaid reimbursement rates by adjusting the previous year's rates upward to reflect inflation, as a matter of policy. As the parties have stipulated, in November of 1975, a budgetary deficit was projected for HRS; and, even though HRS was aware that inflation was substantially higher than 6 percent, HRS eventually decided to promulgate the rule now under challenge, setting the adjustment at 6 percent. HRS promulgated Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, not in furtherance of its statutory charge to reimburse Medicaid providers for costs reasonably incurred, but in order expediently to cut its own costs by disregarding the statutory scheme and reimbursing Medicaid providers less than the costs they had reasonably incurred. Cf. Patricia Godboldt v. David Pingree, Secretary, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida, No. 81-2862 (2d Cir.; Prelim. Inqy., Nov. 25, 1981). UNCODIFIED POLICY CHALLENGED AS RULE Petitioner challenges not only Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, but also, as "an illicit rule," HRS's prior practice of setting reimbursement rates by adjusting the previous year's rates. The percentage allowances under preexisting practice were higher (9 and 12 3/ percent) but the methodology was the same as that codified in Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code. The parties stipulated to the existence of a practice that reflected a policy that changed over time, see McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) , but did not stipulate that this practice reflected a hard and fast "rule." The parties stipulated that "HRS used [12 percent from January 1, 1970, to June 30, 1972, and 9 percent from July 1, 1972, to approximately March 30, 1976] . . . in determining Medicaid reimbursement rates for inpatient hospital services," but did not prove or stipulate to the existence of any formal document or other written statement "issued by the agency head for implementation by subordinates with little or no room for discretionary modification." State Department of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In the absence of such a stipulation or proof, the agency's practice of requiring a 9 percent "percentage allowance, has not been shown to amount in itself to an illicit rule. Department of Corrections v. McCain Sales of Florida, Inc., 400 So.2d 1301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). ATTACHMENT 4.19A Petitioner's challenge to Attachment 4.19A of the Florida State Plan for Medical Assistance was conditioned by the words "to the extent that Attachment 4.19A . . . Is interpreted in a manner different than that set forth in Paragraph 15" of the petition. Since the parties stipulated, in substance, to the allegations of paragraph 15 of the petition, the condition for the challenge never occurred. In any event, it is very clear that Attachment 4.19A did not have the force of a rule, inasmuch as its key pronouncement, viz., that "retroactive adjustments are prohibited by skate statute" was completely disregarded by respondent. Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, the policies which preceded that rule, and every contract respondent entered into with providers of Medicaid services contemplated retroactive adjustments. It is, accordingly, ORDERED: The final sentence of respondent's Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is hereby declared to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioner's challenge to the percentage allowance policies that preexisted Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is dismissed. Petitioner's challenge to Attachment 4.19A of the Florida State Plan for Medical Assistance is dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1981.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, and if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Department of Health has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed physicians such as Respondent. In particular, Petitioner is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Medicine has found probable cause exists to suspect that the physician has committed one or more disciplinable offenses. In or around 2002, Petitioner issued Respondent a restricted medical license that was thereafter converted, on June 19, 2004, to an unrestricted license to practice medicine in the State of Florida (number ME 90680). Instant Allegations On May 22, 2008, Respondent was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida with nine criminal charges, all but one of which were ultimately dismissed. Count Two of the indictment——to which a guilty plea was later entered——alleged that Respondent, in violation of 18 § 1349, conspired with a fellow physician to commit health care fraud, an offense prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1347. In relevant part, Count Two provided: COUNT 2 Conspiracy to Commit Health Care Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349) Paragraphs 1 through 9 of the General Allegations section of this Indictment are realleged and incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein. From in or around November 2002, through in or around April 2004. . . the defendants, CARLOS CONTRERAS and RAMON PICHARDO, did knowingly and willfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree with others, known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to violate Title 18, Untied States Code, Section 1347, that is, to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud a health care benefit program . . . by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, money and property owned by, and under the custody and control of, said health care benefit program, in connection with the delivery of and payment for health care benefits, items, and services. PURPOSE OF THE CONSPIRACY It was a purpose of the conspiracy for CARLOS CONTRERAS, RAMON PICHARDO, and their co-conspirators to unlawfully enrich themselves by, among other things, (a) submitting false and fraudulent claims to Medicare; (b) offering and paying cash kickbacks and bribes to Medicare beneficiaries for the purpose of such beneficiaries arranging for the use of their Medicare beneficiary numbers by the conspirators as the bases of claims filed for HIV infusion therapy; (c) concealing the submission of false and fraudulent claims to Medicare, the receipt and transfer of the proceeds from the fraud, the payment of kickbacks; and (d) diverting proceeds of the fraud for the personal use and benefit of the defendants and their co-conspirators. MANNER AND MEANS The allegations in paragraphs 4 through 10 of the Manner and Means Section of Count 1 of this Indictment are incorporated as though fully set forth herein as a description of the Manner and Means of this conspiracy. All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349. (emphasis added). As indicated above, Count Two of the indictment incorporated the general allegations contained in paragraphs one through nine of the charging instrument, as well as paragraphs four through ten of the "Manner and Means" section of Count One. Those incorporated paragraphs alleged, in relevant part: General Allegations At all times relevant to this Indictment: The Medicare Program was a federal health care program providing benefits to persons who were over the age of 65 or disabled. Medicare was administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") . . . . Medicare was a "health care benefit program," as defined by Title 18, United States Code, Section 24(b). "Part B" of the Medicare program paid Medicare providers and suppliers for covered goods and services, including medically necessary Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") infusion therapy, that were provided and ordered by physicians, clinics, and other qualified health care providers. . . . Payments under the Medicare program were often made directly to a provider of the goods or services, rather than the beneficiary. This occurred when the provider accepted assignment of the right to payment from the beneficiary. In that case, the provider submitted the claim to Medicare for payment, either directly or through a billing company. Physicians, clinics, and other health care providers that provided services to Medicare beneficiaries were able to apply for and obtain a "provider number." A health care provider who was issued a Medicare provider number was able to file claims . . . to obtain reimbursement for services provided to beneficiaries. . . . C.N.C. Medical Corp. ("CNC Medical") was a Florida corporation, purportedly doing business . . . [in] Miami, Florida. . . . CNC Medical was a medical clinic that purported to specialize in treating patients with HIV by providing infusion therapy. From in or around November 2002 through in or around April 2004, approximately $6.8 million in claims were submitted to the Medicare program for HIV infusion services allegedly rendered at CNC Medical. Defendant Contreras, a resident of Miami-Dade County, was a medical doctor who purported to order and provide HIV infusion services to Medicare beneficiaries at CNC Medical. Contreras was also the president, director, and registered agent of CNC Medical. Defendant RAMON PICHARDO, a resident of Miami-Dade County, was a medical doctor who purported to order and provide HIV infusion services to Medicare beneficiaries at CNC Medical. From in or around November 2002 through April 2004, CNC Medical submitted claims to Medicare under the provider number of [Respondent's co-defendant], which was 03813. * * * MANNER AND MEANS The manner and means by which Carlos Contreras, Ramon Pichardo, and their co- conspirators . . . sought to accomplish the objects and purpose of the conspiracy included, among other things as follows: CARLOS CONTRERAS would cause the establishment and incorporation of CNC Medical in the State of Florida and serve as president, director, and registered agent of CNC Medical. CARLOS CONTRERAS would work as a physician at CNC Medical, and be an authorized signer on the CNC Medical bank accounts. RAMON PICHARDO would work as a physician at CNC Medical. CARLOS CONTRERAS, RAMON PICHARDO, and their co-conspirators . . . would cause unnecessary tests to be ordered, medical forms to be signed, and treatments to be authorized to make it appear that legitimate services were being provided to Medicare beneficiaries at CNC Medical. CARLOS CONTRERAS, RAMON PICHARDO, and their co-conspirators . . . would cause the payment of cash kickbacks to Medicare beneficiaries in exchange for the patients signing documents at CNC Medical stating that they had received the treatments that were billed to Medicare, when those treatments were not provided and were not medically necessary. CARLOS CONTRERAS, RAMON PICHARDO, and their co-conspirators . . . would cause the submission of approximately $6.8 million in claims to the Medicare program under the provider number of CNC Medical, for services that were never provided and services that were not medically necessary. After reimbursements from Medicare were deposited into CNC Medical's bank accounts, CARLOS CONTRERAS and his co-conspirators . . . would cause to transfer approximately $1.7 million to sham management, marketing and investment companies owned and operated by their co-conspirators, and approximately $244,000 to other fraudulent HIV infusion clinics owned and operated by their co- conspirators. On or about September 11, 2008, Respondent entered into a plea bargain whereby he agreed to plead guilty to Count Two of the indictment; in return, the government agreed to dismiss Respondent's 11 remaining charges at the conclusion of the sentencing process. Attached to the written plea agreement is a two-page statement signed by Respondent that, by its terms, was made "knowingly and voluntarily and because [Respondent is] in fact guilty of the crimes charged." Consistent with the allegations contained in the indictment, Respondent admitted credibly in the statement, among other things, that he: willfully conspired to commit health care fraud with Dr. Contreras and other individuals; approved costly and medically unnecessary HIV infusion treatments in furtherance of the conspiracy; signed documents that contained false information about treatments purportedly provided to beneficiaries; and approved, in conjunction with Dr. Contreras, fraudulent medical bills totaling approximately $6.8 million. Finally, Respondent acknowledges in the statement that approximately $4.2 million in fraudulent claims were ultimately paid to CNC Medical by the Medicare Program. Subsequently, on November 20, 2008, was adjudicated guilty of Count Two of the indictment and sentenced to a 48- month prison term, to be followed by three years of supervised release. In addition, Respondent was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $4.2 million.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board of Medicine: Finding that Respondent violated section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count One of the Complaint; Revoking Respondent's license to practice medicine; and Imposing a fine of $10,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2013.
