The Issue The issue in this case is whether Rule 15A-10.043, Florida Administrative Code, and certain forms incorporated therein, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority to the extent that the rule interprets the term "drug" to include alcohol.
Findings Of Fact The following facts, stipulated to by the parties in the Stipulated Facts, are hereby accepted: On March 16, 1993, Lee Eyer was convicted of his second DUI within 5 years, and his license was suspended for a period of five years (5) pursuant to section 322.28(2)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Under section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes, a person whose license has been suspended for a period of 5 years or less may seek a reinstatement of a license for employment purposes (known as a hardship license). The statutory language requires that the person seeking the hardship license must "have been drug free for a least 12 months immediately prior to such reinstatement " Pursuant to Lee Eyer's request for a reinstatement of driving privileges restricted to business and employment purposes (hardship license), a hearing officer of the [Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles] conducted an administrative hearing on January 24, 1997. (Exhibit A). Pursuant to the direction of the hearing officer, Lee Eyer went to Bridgeway Center, Inc., in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida, on February 18, 1997, for the purpose of being evaluated for admission to its Special Supervision Services (SSS) Program, completion of which is required by the [Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles] in order to receive a hardship license. As part of the initial screening for the SSS Program at Bridgeway Center, Mr. Eyer completed a questionnaire, HSMV Form 72748 (re- numbered in 1/97 as Form 77013), on which he indicated that he consumes alcohol "4/week" and that he drank a beer on January 22, 1997. (Exhibit B). At the time of his initial screening at Bridgeway Center, Mr. Eyer was given DHSMV Form 72062 (11/96), which states that an applicant "[m]ust not have consumed any alcohol or drugs . . . for 1 year prior to reinstatement." (Exhibit C). Additionally, Mr. Eyer was given DHSMV Form 72747 (re-numbered in 1/97 as Form 77012), which states that "[a]n applicant with a revocation of 5 years or less must have not used any drugs for at least the past twelve (12) months. Drugs include alcohol . . . ." (Exhibit D). By letter dated February 19, 1997, Mr. Eyer received written notice that he was denied entry into the DUI SSS Program because of his "reported last use of alcohol on [1/22/97]." The letter further stated that he must be "drug/alcohol free for a minimum of one year prior to acceptance" into the SSS Program. (Exhibit E). Through section 15A-10.043, Florida Administrative Code (1997), the [Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles] specifically adopts and incorporates by reference Forms 77012 (formerly numbered 72747) and 77013 (formerly numbered 72748). On March 3, 1997, Lee Eyer filed a rule challenge petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings. After a hearing on March 31, 1997, Mr. Eyer was given leave to file an amended petition, which was filed on April 4, 1997. Pursuant to a hearing on May 16, 1997, Petitioner was given leave to file a second amended petition, which was filed on May 20, 1997, and which alleged that the rule promulgated by the [Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles] was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Should Lee Eyer be successful in his rule challenge, he intends to seek admission into the SSS Program offered by Bridgeway Center, Inc., in Fort Walton Beach, Florida. The following facts, which were contained in the Petition for Leave to Intervene filed by the Florida Association of D.U.I. Programs, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "FADP"), and stipulated to by the parties, are hereby accepted: . . . . FADP is a not-for-profit Florida corporation. Its membership is composed entirely of licensed DUI programs. FADP's primary goal is to enhance the safety of all Floridians through a strong statewide system of DUI enforcement, education and treatment. FADP seeks to achieve this goal by promoting high standards and uniformity in all licensed DUI programs throughout the state, and by promoting substance abuse safety education related to drinking, drugs and driving. FADP represents its members by means of education, public relations, and participation in legislative activities, administrative proceedings, and court litigation. FADP has 24 member programs, all of which are licensed DUI programs. FADP and its members will be substantially affected by any interpretation of the rules at issue in this proceeding because FADP and its members are subject to regulation by the rules, and because DUI programs must apply the challenged rule to DUI offenders on a regular basis. Bridgeway Center, Inc., the DUI program to which Petitioner applied and was denied admission pursuant tot he challenged rule, is a member of FADP. The relief sought by FADP in this proceeding is appropriate for an association to receive on behalf of its members. Pursuant to the Second Amended Petition Seeking Administrative Determination of Validity of Rule filed in this case, Mr. Eyer has challenged Rule 15A-10.043, Florida Administrative Code, to the extent that it adopts by reference HSMV Forms 77012 (formerly numbered 72747), 77013 (formerly numbered 72748), and 72062 (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Rule"). The Challenged Rule is a rule adopted by Respondent, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicle (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), to implement Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes. In pertinent part, Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that "the Department shall require [applicants for a restricted driver license] to have not driven and to have been drug free for at least 12 months immediately prior to such reinstatement. . . ." In implementing this language, the Department has provided the following on HSMV Form 72062, "Administrative Hearing Requirements for Revocations" for persons who have been convicted of a second DUI conviction within 5 years of the first conviction: 2. Must complete DUI school and be enrolled in DUI Special Supervision Services and receive a favorable evaluation from that program . . . . . . . . Must not have consumed any alcohol or drugs or driven a motor vehicle for 1 year prior to reinstatement* . . . . *Drugs include alcohol and those so-called non- alcoholic beers or wines which contain less than .5% of alcohol. . . . HSMV Form 77013 (formerly numbered 72748) is a "Screening Form" completed at the time of registration at the DUI Special Supervision Services school. In pertinent part, this form provides the following: 5. How often do you presently consume alcohol, including the so-called non-alcoholic beers or wines which contain less that [sic] 0.5% of alcohol? HSMV Form 77012 (formerly numbered 72747), an "Information Sheet," is also provided at the time of registration. In pertinent part, this form provides the following: An applicant with a revocation of 5 years or less must have not used any drugs for at least the past twelve (12) months. Drugs include alcohol and those so-called non-alcoholic beers or wines which contain less than .5% of alcohol. . . . Mr. Eyer is challenging the Department's interpretation of the term "drug" as used in Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes, to include alcohol.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2008),1 by revoking an accommodation which allowed Petitioner to have a support dog in his condominium on the alleged ground that the support dog presents a health hazard for Petitioner’s neighboring condominium resident.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a resident owner of a condominium in Embassy House Condominiums (Embassy House). Embassy House is a covered, multifamily dwelling unit within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(2). Petitioner’s condominium is a dwelling defined in Subsection 760.22(4). Respondent is the entity responsible for implementing the rules and regulations of the condominium association. Relevant rules and regulations prohibit residents from keeping dogs in their condominiums. Sometime after July 17, 2008, Respondent granted Petitioner’s written request to keep a support dog in his condominium as an accommodation based on Petitioner’s handicap. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner is a handicapped person within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(7). Petitioner’s handicap includes cancer and depression. After Respondent granted permission for Petitioner to keep a support dog in his condominium, Petitioner purchased a small dog that weighs less than 15 pounds. Respondent now proposes to revoke permission for Petitioner to keep the support dog. The sole grounds for the proposed revocation is that the female resident of the condominium adjacent to Petitioner’s, identified in the record as Ms. Madeline O’Connell, allegedly is allergic to pet dander. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that the support dog presents a health hazard to Ms. O’Connell. Neither Ms. O’Connell nor her physician, who is not identified in the record, testified. The admitted “sole basis” of Respondent’s position is a note from an unidentified, alleged physician that Respondent did not submit for admission into evidence. Respondent identified the note through the testimony of a lay witness, but never submitted the note for admission into evidence. The lay witness for Respondent identified the note as the note provided to him by Ms. O’Connell. The remainder of the testimony of the lay witness consists of statements by Ms. O’Connell to the lay witness concerning the alleged allergy of Ms. O’Connell. If the evidence were to show that Ms. O’Connell is allergic to pet dander, the support dog is a breed that does not have dander. The support dog is hypoallergenic. If the evidence were to show that the support dog were not hypoallergenic, adequate measures have been implemented to protect Ms. O’Connell from any threat to her health. The air conditioning vents that feed cool air from Petitioner’s condominium into the common lobby for the two condominium units have been sealed. The interior of the condominium units are cooled by separate air conditioning units. The trier of fact finds the paucity of testimony concerning the alleged health hazard to Ms. O’Connell to be less than credible and persuasive. Ms. O’Connell makes no effort to protect herself from exposure to the support dog. On at least three occasions, Ms. O’Connell voluntarily exposed herself to the support dog to make confrontational comments to Petitioner about the support dog.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order upholding the Petition for Relief and dismissing the proposed revocation of the accommodation for Petitioner to keep a support dog in his condominium. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are made: At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent Wilmon Ray Stevenson was licensed as a registered building contractor in the state of Florida, holding license numbers RB 0035005 and RB A035005. License number RB 0035005 was issued on an active status qualifying an Individual in March 1987 and is still in effect. License number RB 0035005 replaced license number RR 0035005 issued in December, 1980. License number RB A035005 was issued on an active status qualifying Yankee Construction, Inc. d/b/a Olympic Homes of Citrus County (Olympic) in June 1987 and replacing license number RR A035005 issued in August 1981. In October, 1988 Respondent submitted a change of status application which was not acted upon by Petitioner until February, 1989 when it was deleted. However, Petitioner's file (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, page 2) indicates the license was in effect only until October, 1988. The Marion County Building Department was advised of this status change in September, 1988. Findings As To Case No. 90-1637 On April 16, 1988, Frank and Margaret Orkwis entered into a contract with Olympic to construct a home for $37,900 which was later modified, increasing the contract price to $39,363.00. On July 26, 1988 a permit for the Orkwis job was obtained from the Marion County Building Department in accordance with the Respondent's letter dated January 25, 1985 authorizing certain individuals to "pull" permits on his license. There was a total of $27,583.20 paid to Olympic on the Orkwis contract which included $27,483.20 paid by draw schedules and $100.00 as a down payment. Olympic stopped work on the Orkwis home sometime around November 27, 1988 and failed to complete the work under the contract. Olympic gave no notice to Orkwis that it intended to terminate the work on the Orkwis job. In fact, Olympic kept putting Mrs. Orkwis off about completing the job until sometime in late January, 1989 or early February, 1989 when she decided to get a permit and complete construction. Olympic terminated the Orkwis job without just cause. The following liens were recorded against the Orkwis property for the failure of Olympic to timely pay for materials and labor furnished to Olympic for the Orkwis's job in accordance with Orkwis contract: (a) Florida A/C Sales and Services, Inc., filed December 13, 1988 and; (b) Florida Forest Products, Inc. filed December 15, 1988. The labor and materials had been furnished between October 24, 1988 and November 22, 1988. Olympic was contacted by Mrs. Orkwis concerning the liens, with no response. However there was insufficient evidence to establish that the liens had not been removed from the property, by payment or bond, within 30 days after the date of such liens. Sometime in early 1989, Mrs. Orkwis obtained a permit and she and her husband completed the home. Although Mr. Orkwis had obtained an estimate of $27,050.00 from a contractor to complete the home, she and her husband invested 466.5 hours of their time and $10,340.00 for materials to complete the home. In addition to the material, a reasonable amount for labor to complete the home would be $10,000.00. Findings As To Case No. 90-1889 John J. and Josephine Grillo and Madeline Chapman entered into a contract with Olympic for construction of a home on June 11, 1987. A permit was obtained for the Grillo/Chapman home under Respondent's license. The Grillo/Chapman home was completed and a certificate of occupancy issued January 13, 1989. Olympic was paid in full under the contract. Before the expiration of the one-year warranty under the contract, Olympic was advised of certain problems with the construction which Olympic attempted to correct. It is unclear whether the problems were satisfactorily corrected by Olympic but it appears that the only complaint not resolved was a water stain on the carpet that was the result of water seeping in under a door. Respondent was not aware of these problems until after the expiration of the one-year warranty and upon learning of the problems, commented that he was not obligated since the warranty had expired. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the problems were not corrected in accordance with contract. Findings As To Case No. 90-1890 Veronica McPherson entered into a contract with Olympic on March 1, 1989 to construct a home for the contract price of $36,450.00 which was later modified increasing the contract price to $37,775.00. All permits were obtained under the Respondent's license pursuant to a letter dated January 15, 1985 authorizing certain individuals to "pull" permits under Respondent's license. McPherson paid $26,442.50 to Olympic pursuant to a draw schedule in the contract as the home was being constructed. Additionally, McPherson paid a $100.00 down payment. All work performed by Olympic pursuant to the McPherson contract was prior to November 22, 1988. The exact date of termination of work is uncertain. Olympic notified McPherson that it had terminated work and would not complete construction of the home. The exact date of this notification is uncertain. There is no evidence that notice was not given within 90 after termination of work. Olympic terminated work without just cause. McPherson paid a roofing contractor $998.00 to complete the roof on her unfinished home in order to protect the interior. McPherson was financially unable to complete construction of the home. A reasonable estimate to complete construction of the McPherson home at the time work ceased would be $20,000.00. On December 15, 1988 Florida Forest Products, Inc. recorded a lien on December 15, 1988 against the McPherson property for building materials furnished to the McPherson job on order of Olympic on October 24, 1988 for construction of the home pursuant to the McPherson contract in the amount of $1,450.08. There was insufficient evidence to establish that this lien had not been removed from the McPherson property, by payment or bond, within 30 days after the date of such lien. There were three other claims of liens for labor and materials furnished to the McPherson job on order of Olympic between October 19, 1988 and December 2, 1988 for construction for the home pursuant to the McPherson contract as follows: (a) Florida A/C Sales and Services, Inc. dated December 8, 1988 for $1,059.00; (b) Masons Concrete of Crystal River dated December 14, 1988 for $354.97 and (c) Panning Lumber Company, a Division of Wheeler Consolidated, Inc. for $2,284.13. There is no evidence that any of the above liens were ever recorded against the McPherson property. Likewise, there is no evidence to establish that these liens had not been removed from the McPherson property, by payment or bond, within 30 days after the date of such lien, if in fact they were recorded. General Findings Respondent was advised by Larry Vitt in February, 1988 that Olympic was having financial problems. Respondent never supervised the financial aspects of Olympic. Respondent did not participate in the contract process or supervision of the construction of homes contracted to be built by Olympic. More specifically, he did not participate in the contract process or the supervision of the construction of the Orkwis, McPherson or Grillo/Chapman homes. Respondent's main purpose in being involved with Olympic was to use his license to qualify Olympic and to contract all of Olympic's concrete block work. In March, 1989 Respondent advised the Marion County Building Department that no one was authorized to "pull" permits under his license. However, at no time did Respondent withdraw the permits for the Orkwis and McPherson jobs that had been issued under his license. The record is clear that Respondent did not understand his relationship with Olympic nor did he understand the responsibility he incurred when he used his license to qualify Olympic. However, his inexperience or ignorance in this regard does not relieve him of his responsibility to those whose homes were built or not completely built pursuant to a permit issued under his license.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the demeanor of the witnesses and the disciplinary guidelines set out in Chapter 21E-17, Florida Administrative Code, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(k) and (m), Florida Statutes, and for such violations it is Recommended that the Board assess the Respondent with an administrative fine of $2,500.00. It is further Recommended that Counts I and II for the Administrative Complaint in Case Nos. 90-1637, 90-1889, and 90-1890 be Dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-1637 The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(20, Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings of Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1. Covered in Conclusions of Law. 2.-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2, and 3. 4.-6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15, 16, and 17, respectively. 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 19 and 20, but modified. 8.-12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 18, 4, 5, 6, and 8, respectively. 13.-14. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 10, respectively, but modified. Adopted in Findings of Fact 21 through 25. Restatement of testimony; not stated as a Finding of Fact but see Findings of Fact 10 and 14. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13 through 15. Adopted in Findings of Fact 16, but modified. Rulings of Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent 1. Covered in Preliminary Statement. 2.-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2, 3, 3, 15, 15, and 16, respectively. 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 19 and 20. 10.-11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 18 but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8 and 9. 16.-20. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 7, 11, 13 and 14, respectively, but modified. Not material. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3, but modified. Not material. Copies furnished to: Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 G. W. Harrell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Fred A. Ohlinger, Esquire P.O. Box 1007 Beverly Hills, FL 32665
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a Certified Building Contractor or Residential Contractor.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 44-year-old male. He was born and raised in Tallahassee, Florida. He is a high school graduate. Petitioner passed the examination for licensure as a certified building contractor. This is a comprehensive examination that is designed to test knowledge in all aspects of the construction industry. Passing it is a mandatory prerequisite before an application can be considered by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board (FCILB). However, passing the examination does not eliminate or modify the statutory or rule experience requirements. Petitioner submitted his application for a certified building contractor license on or about March 24, 2008. By letter of May 2, 2008, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation requested additional information. Petitioner then provided a revised affidavit from Chad Banks, a certified building contractor, and a letter from the Maintenance Construction Chief of the City of Tallahassee’s Gas Utility Department, each containing more detailed information about Petitioner’s experience. These items were received by Respondent on May 23, 2008. It is not clear whether Petitioner requested and was granted a continuance of his appearance with regard to the instant license application at an earlier FCILB meeting, but on January 15, 2009, the full Board considered Petitioner’s application at a duly-noticed public meeting in Altamonte Springs, Florida. At that time, Petitioner was present. During his appearance before the full Board on January 15, 2009, Petitioner was very nervous, but he believes that one of the Board members offered him, or at least asked him if he would accept, a residential contractor’s license in place of a certified building contractor’s license, and that he answered that he would accept such a license, only to have that “offer and acceptance” voted down by the full Board. However, Petitioner does not rule out the possibility that the vote taken at the meeting was actually with regard to denying the certified building contractor license for which he had applied. There is no evidence that Petitioner has ever submitted an application for a residential contractor’s license. By a Notice of Intent to Deny, dated March 16, 2009, and mailed March 24, 2009, the FCILB formally denied Petitioner’s application for a certified building contractor License stating: The applicant failed to demonstrate the required experience, pursuant to Section 489.111, Florida Statutes and Rule 61G4- 15.001, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner seeks licensure as one who has four years of active experience and who has learned the trade by serving an apprenticeship as a skilled worker or as a foreman, at least one year of which experience is as a foreman. Petitioner has never worked as a full-time employee of a commercial or residential contractor. Petitioner got early experience in construction working around eight rental properties owned by his father. He performed light carpentry, deck construction, general handyman repairs, and some plumbing and roofing when he was approximately 16 to 21 years of age. However, Petitioner essentially relies on a work history that includes working as a plumber for Jim Bennett Plumbing from 1987 to 1993; as a foreman for the City of Tallahassee Gas Department from 1995 to 2005; as a “contractor trainee” for Chad Banks from 1999 to 2002; as having volunteered as superintendent for Gulf Coast Painting from 2003 to 2007; and as a maintenance man for the City of Tallahassee Parks Department from 2006 to 2007. Petitioner’s dates of employment overlap, because his volunteer experience was acquired mostly on weekends, holidays, in hours after he had already completed a full work day for the City of Tallahassee, or on “time off” from his regular employments with the City. Petitioner is a hard worker and wanted to learn the construction trade, but his volunteer construction jobs were intermittent, and he provided no clear assessment of the number of hours per week or month that he put in for any of them. From 1987 to 1993, Petitioner worked for Jim Bennett Plumbing. He started as a plumber’s helper and progressed to greater responsibility. In that position, he acquired a wide range of experience in plumbing for some residential, but mostly commercial, buildings. During this period, he also did some light cosmetic carpentry and tile work to restore building parts damaged by the installation of plumbing apparatus. Much of Petitioner’s construction experience relates to his association with Chad Banks, who testified that at all times material, Petitioner had “hands on” experience, working for him and that Petitioner was a competent worker. Petitioner has never been a “W-2 employee” of Mr. Banks, but there is no specific statutory or rule requirement that the experience necessary to qualify for the certified building contractor or the residential contractor license must be as a “W-2 employee.” Cf. Conclusions of Law. Mr. Banks was not licensed as a certified building contractor until 1999. Petitioner did some work for Mr. Banks when Mr. Banks was working as a sub-contractor on commercial projects (specifically one or more Super-Lube buildings) prior to Mr. Banks obtaining his certified building contractor’s license in 1999. Most of this employment involved pouring concrete slabs. Petitioner claims experience in “elevated slabs,” limited to the construction of a single Super-Lube building, which Petitioner described as laying a slab below ground level for mechanics to stand on and an at-ground level slab for cars to drive onto the lift for an oil change. He described no truly “elevated” slabs or floors above ground level on this project, and Petitioner’s and Mr. Banks’ testimony was vague as to Petitioner’s responsibilities on this project and as to the project’s duration. The general contractor on this project for whom Mr. Banks “subbed” did not testify. From this, and other employments, Petitioner has experience pouring foundation slabs, but he has never worked on a foundation slab in excess of 20,000 square feet. Petitioner also assisted in Mr. Banks’ construction of some rental sheds, but it is unclear if this was before or after Mr. Banks was licensed. Petitioner worked for Mr. Banks d/b/a C. B. Construction, Inc., in a volunteer capacity on exclusively residential construction from 1999 to 2002, and again from February 2004 to March 2008. During these periods, Petitioner and Mr. Banks considered Petitioner a “contractor trainee,” but Petitioner’s work for Mr. Banks was neither exclusive nor continuous; both men described it as “volunteer” work; and some of it seems to have amounted to Petitioner's looking over work done personally by Mr. Banks and having Mr. Banks explain to him, via a plan sheet, what Mr. Banks had already done personally. There is no evidence that during this time frame Petitioner worked for Mr. Banks as a foreman. Petitioner has the ability to “read” many types of construction “plans.” Petitioner has experience with slab footers, but he has not constructed red iron structural steel qualified for framing a building. Petitioner has experience in decorative masonry walls, but he has not constructed structural masonry walls of a type that would support framing members of a building or other vertical construction. Petitioner also worked for the City of Tallahassee as a “W-2” employee, mostly as a foreman overseeing a crew of four workers, from 1995 to 2005. In that capacity, he worked on a church, but the church itself had been constructed several years previously, and Petitioner’s crew’s contribution was tying-in several gas lines during a roadway development project and keeping all the utilities up and running during the project, while a private contractor worked on the church. With regard to the foregoing project and many others for the City Utilities Department, Petitioner directed a crew that built sidewalks and gutters or that tied these features into existing roadways and driveways. In that capacity, he often coordinated activities with residential contractors. Over his ten years’ employment with the City Utilities, Petitioner also directed a crew that exclusively created underground vaults for the housing and shelter of utility apparatus. However, none of his endeavors for the City Utilities involved vertical structural construction for floors above ground. Petitioner has also built new gas stations for the City’s natural gas vehicles, and has erected pre-fab utility buildings, including much slab work, but the nature and duration of these endeavors is not sufficiently clear to categorize them as qualifying him for the certified building contractor license. Most of Petitioner’s experience with the City, as substantiated by the letter of the City Utilities Maintenance Construction Chief, Mr. Lavine, has been in the construction of driveways, roads, gutters, storm drains, sidewalks, culverts, underground utility structures, plumbing and gas lines. While it is accepted that Petitioner has worked on such projects, this type of work more properly falls in the categories of “plumbing contractor” or “underground utility contractor” and Mr. Lavine was not demonstrated to have any certification/licensure in a category appropriate to Petitioner’s application. (See Conclusions of Law.) Sometime after 2005, for approximately a year, Petitioner was employed by the City of Tallahassee Parks and Recreation Department and in that capacity participated in at least one construction of a dugout and a concession stand at one of its playgrounds. He also did repairs on several dugouts and concession stands, but this latter work would not be classified as “structural” construction. Petitioner’s experience in precast concrete structures is limited to his work with gas utility structures, but does not include work on precast tilt walls, which are the type of walls that are constructed off-site, delivered to the job site, placed on the slab foundation, and raised in place as part of an on- going commercial building project. Petitioner has no experience in column erection. “Columns” in this context within the construction trade refers to supports for upper level structural members, which would entail vertical construction. Petitioner’s experience in concrete formwork does not include experience in the structurally reinforced concrete formwork that would be used in vertical buildings, such as all floors above ground level. FCILB’s Chairman testified that the Board interprets the type of experience necessary to comply with the statutes and rules, more particularly Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4- 15.001(2), to be “structural experience.” There is no affirmative evidence that Petitioner has ever notified the Clerk of the Agency that he was relying on a right to a default license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a Final Order denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a Certified Building Contractor. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009.
The Issue Did the action of Respondent, in denying Petitioner the use of an emotional support dog in her condominium unit for her son, violate a legal duty to reasonably accommodate the needs of her son, A.C.?
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of relevant and material facts: Facts From Pre-hearing Stipulation Filed June 20, 2016 Petitioner was aware that the Association had a "no pet" policy and signed a document acknowledging same. Petitioner was sent a letter on February 24, 2014, from the Association's then property manager advising Petitioner that the Association had been advised that a dog was being kept in their unit, and reminding Petitioner of the Association's no pet policy. A Fines Committee hearing was scheduled for March 10, 2014, in regard to Petitioner's violation of the no pet policy. Petitioner was not issued a fine for violating the pet policy. Prior to the Fines Committee hearing, Petitioner made her first claim that her son had a disability and required an emotional support animal. Prior to the Fines Committee hearing, Petitioner made her first request to the Association for a reasonable accommodation. The Association's Board of Directors scheduled an interview with Petitioner on April 30, 2014, wherein Petitioner would be able to explain her request for a reasonable accommodation, the need for the emotional support animal, and her son's disability. The Association advised Petitioner, prior to the scheduled interview, that Petitioner may provide the Association with any documents Petitioner believes support her position. An interview and/or meeting occurred on April 30, 2014, between Petitioner, her husband, Yovani Cabreriza, Petitioner's attorney, and certain members of the Board of Directors, along with the Association's attorney, to discuss Petitioner's request for an accommodation. The Association determined that Petitioner was not in need of a reasonable accommodation and requested that the dog be removed via written correspondence dated May 19, 2014. The Association again requested that the subject dog be removed via written correspondence dated May 22, 2015, and advised Petitioner that an arbitration action would follow if the dog was not removed. A Petition for Arbitration was filed on June 4, 2015. Petitioner's response to the arbitration petition was filed on September 14, 2015. The arbitrator issued an order striking the complainants' defense and requiring proof of filing a Fair Housing Complaint. Petitioner filed her housing complaint with FCHR and Housing and Urban Development on November 2, 2015. On March 8, 2016, the FCHR housing investigator issued a "Notice of Determination of No Cause," concluding that reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred. On April 8, 2016, FCHR received a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Housing Practice from Petitioner. Findings of Fact From the Hearing This case involves a family who lives at Respondent's condominium complex, Arlen House Condominium, located at 300 Bayview Drive, Sunny Isles Beach, Florida 33160. Petitioner owns condominium unit PH05. Petitioner resides at this location with her husband and minor son, A.C. Petitioner's son was 11 years old in 2014. Her son has suffered from an anxiety disorder since he was a young boy. A.C.'s anxiety disorder problem became worse in 2012. He cried every morning and did not want to go to school. Apparently, he had difficulty breathing during anxiety or panic attacks. His mother described him as being "completely withdrawn" at school.1/ To help her son cope with his anxiety problem, Petitioner bought him a small dog, Jake, in the latter part of 2012. When she bought the dog, she knew that the condominium had a "no pet policy," but failed to alert the condominium or request permission to keep the dog.2/ In early 2014, the Association discovered that the dog was being kept in violation of the Association's rules and regulations. It notified Petitioner in writing on February 24, 2014, and told her to remove the animal. Resp. Ex. 2(e). March 10, 2014, Meeting Petitioner met with the Association's Fine Committee on March 10, 2014. During the meeting, Petitioner presented, for the first time, a letter or letters from the child's doctor, Rasciel Socarras, M.D.3/ Resp. Ex. 2(f). After the meeting before the Fine Committee, counsel for the Association sent Petitioner's counsel a letter dated March 21, 2014. Resp. Ex. 2(g). Essentially, the letter reiterated the "no pet policy" and concluded that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate to the Fine Committee that her son had a disability that substantially limited a major life activity or that an accommodation was necessary to afford him an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their condominium unit. The letter also requested a meeting to help the Association "conduct a meaningful review of your client's request for an accommodation."4/ Prior to the next meeting between the parties on April 30, 2014, counsel for the Association sent a letter to Petitioner's counsel dated April 18, 2014. In that letter, counsel requested copies of any and all documents that may support the boy's disability and need for an accommodation, including but not limited to the medical records that demonstrate his disability.5/ April 30, 2014, Meeting As arranged, Petitioner and her husband, along with their legal counsel, met with the Board of Directors on April 30, 2014. At the meeting, Petitioner explained her son's anxiety problem.6/ Although the record was not clear on this point, based on the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, the undersigned concludes that the two (2) letters (dated and undated) from Dr. Socarras were reviewed and discussed during the April 30, 2014, meeting with Petitioner.7/ The board members asked Petitioner several questions about her son's condition. Petitioner informed the Board of Directors that her son was not on any medication to treat his anxiety, nor was he receiving any mental health counseling or therapy. Petitioner told the Board of Directors that she had diagnosed the child as having problems with anxiety. The Board of Directors also asked her how her son was performing in school and learned that he was enrolled in the gifted learning program at his school.8/ As a result of the meeting, the Board of Directors concluded: (1) that it did not have enough information to determine whether the child was limited in his ability to live in the unit; (2) that he had a disability; or (3) that the pet was medically necessary for him. As a follow-up to that meeting, on May 19, 2014, the Association's counsel sent a letter to Petitioner. The letter outlined the Board of Directors' position and speaks for itself. See Resp. Ex. 2(i). The letter stated in relevant part: At this time, the Board of Directors can neither approve your request for an accommodation nor can it provide an exception to its "no pet" policy. You have been unable to provide information that supports that your son suffers from a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his daily activities. There has been no documentation to support that your son has been diagnosed or treated for a disability. More importantly, you have not provided relevant information that your son has a disability or that the dog helps alleviate any identified symptoms. The letter concluded by demanding that the dog, Jake, be removed from the condominium unit no later than Monday, June 2, 2014.9/ Nearly a year of "radio silence" passed with no activity by either party. The Association did not check on the removal of the pet, and Petitioner did not remove the dog despite the demand by the Association. A year later, on May 15, 2015, the Association acted and sent another letter to Petitioner demanding that she remove the pet. Again, Petitioner did not remove the pet. On June 4, 2015, the Association filed a petition for mandatory non-binding arbitration with the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Ultimately, the arbitrator entered an order on November 19, 2015, staying the arbitration case until the resolution of the discrimination complaint filed by Petitioner with FCHR. Based on the evidence presented, the undersigned concludes that during the meeting on April 30, 2014, with the Board of Directors, that other than the letter(s) from Dr. Socarras, and an identification certificate for their pet dog Jake, there was no other medical information or documentation provided by Petitioner to assist Respondent in reviewing and evaluating her request for the accommodation to keep Jake in the unit.10/ As a related topic, the Board of Directors had previously approved service animals for at least two (2) other residents.11/ One resident had suffered a stroke and needed assistance to walk. Another resident had a serious medical condition and was allowed to keep a service animal which was trained to detect the onset of the person's medical condition. In both instances, the Board of Directors followed the same process followed in Petitioner's case. Letters were sent and meetings were held. However, in the cases where a service animal was approved, the Board of Directors requested and was provided medical records which it relied upon to conclude that a service animal was needed as a reasonable accommodation. Prior to this hearing before DOAH, the Board of Directors had not been informed, and no claim was made, that "learning" was a major life activity that was substantially impaired by A.C.'s anxiety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint for discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2016.
