The Issue Whether or not the Respondent, Evers & Associates, Inc. and Dovard J. Evers, its President, a licensed mortgage broker in the State of Florida, has charged and accepted fees and commissions in excess of the maximum allowable fees or commissions on the transactions set forth in the administrative complaint, Exhibit "A," in violation of Sec. 494.08(4), F.S., and thereby subjected the Respondent to a possible suspension under the terms of 494.05(1)(g), F.S.
Findings Of Fact Evers & Associates, Inc. through the parson of Dovard J. Evers, its President, was a licensed mortgage broker in the State of Florida, during the time period contemplated by the administrative complaint. Subsequent to the time of receiving the mortgage brokers-license, Dovard J. Evers, on behalf of Evers & Associates, Inc., entered into an agreement with several other parties to sell notes secured by mortgages on real estate. One of the agreements was with David Edstrom, of a corporation known as S.E.T., Inc., Mr. Edstrom being the President of said corporation, and the location of that corporation being in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. A similar agreement was held with one Gary George of the Mortgage Consultants, Inc., Ocala, Florida. The agreement with Gary George involved a sale of mortgages for the benefit of the mortgagor, Washington Development Corporation. The third such agreement was with Phil Swan of Southeast Florida Corporation. The written conditions of the S.E.T., Inc. arrangement with Mr. Evers can be found in Respondent's Exhibits No. 2 through No. 5. Essentially, the arrangement was to have Mr. Evers, through Evers & Associates, act as a salesman for the benefit of S.E.T., Gary George and Phil Swan. Their agreement envisioned that Mr. Evers would be afforded a percentage discount varying from 14 percent to 16 percent of the amount of a mortgage loan which was a note secured by real estate. In actual , the contact was made between S.E.T., Gary George and Phil Swam Mr. Evers for purposes of placing notes that were for sale. The apparatus worked by having Mr. Evers contact mortgagees/investors who made a check payable to Evers & Associates for the full amount of the mortgage loan, whose price had been quoted by the intermediary; S.E.T., Gary George and Phil Swan. This amount was held in escrow until such time as the note and mortgage which secured the note could be drawn. The executed note and mortgage went directly to the third party mortgagee/investor without ever having the name of Mr. Evers or Evers & Associates, Inc., affixed to such documents. After this note and mortgage had been executed in behalf of the third party investor, Mr. Evers deducted a fee in favor of Evers & Associates, Inc., according to the percentage agreement with S.E.T., Gary George and Phil Swan and sent the balance of the money to S.E.T., Inc.; Washington Development Corporation through the person of Gary George and to Phil Swan of the Southeast Florida Corporation. The arrangement with Washington Development Corporation changed at a later date because Gary George was no longer involved and payments subsequent to his involvement were sent directly to Washington Development Corporation. The facts show that in the transactions found in Petitioner's Exhibit "A," the complaint, charges were made in behalf of Evers & Associates in the person of Mr. Evers which exceed the statutory allowance for fees and commissions in the amount stated in the column entitled overcharges. These overcharges are according to the percentage agreement between Mr. Evers and S.E.I., Inc., Gary George, and Phil Swan, minus adjustments made in behalf of the third party investor/mortgagee, as indicated in the testimony. This finding of facts, excludes the mortgage by M. Berkell which was stipulated between the parties as not being a matter for further consideration in the hearing. There was no evidence offered of the charge, if any, between S.E.T., Inc., Gary George, and Phil Swan in their dealings with their developer/mortgagors. At present the Respondent, Evers & Associates, Inc., and Dovard J. Evers, its President, have failed to renew the license in the current license period and, as of the moment of the hearing, have expressed no further interest in such renewal.
Recommendation It is recommended that the license of Evers & Associates, Inc., by Dovard J Evers, its President, be suspended for a period not to exceed 30 days. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Fred O. Drake, III, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Earl M. Barker, Esquire 218 East Forsythp Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Hollywood, Inc., is a licensed corporate real estate broker engaged in real estate activities. Hollywood, Inc., is also a subdivider and builder of residential homes in Broward County. One of the qualifying brokers for Respondent Hollywood, Inc., is the Respondent William D. Horvitz, who also serves as President and a Director of the corporation. On or about March 12, 1981, Mildred McGehee, a real estate salesman working for the Respondent Hollywood, Inc., showed a model home and building in Rock Creek, a Hollywood, Inc., development, to Andrew and Linda Medvin. As a result of McGehee's efforts, the Medvins, as Buyers, signed a contract with Respondent Hollywood, Inc., as Seller, to construct and purchase a dwelling unit for a total purchase price of $118,900. Pursuant to the contract, the Medvins gave the Respondent Hollywood, Inc., a good faith deposit for $11,890 at the time the contract was executed. The Medvins' deposit was not placed into a broker's escrow account by the Respondent Hollywood, Inc. The subject contract required the Medvins to supply $11,910 cash at closing and to make application to a qualified lending institution for the mortgage balance, $95,100. Under the provisions of paragraph (c) on page two of the contract, the contract was contingent upon: "BUYER obtaining a firm commitment (the term 'firm commitment' as used in this Contract shall mean a written agreement by a Qualified Lending Insti- tution to make a mortgage loan to BUYER on the Property in the amount of the above MORTGAGE BALANCE) for said loan within thirty (30) days from the date of execution hereof by SELLER." Respondent's Exhibit 1. The mortgage balance referred to in the contract was $95,100. The failure of the Medvins to make and complete an application for the mortgage financing or failure of the Medvins to timely satisfy any conditions in the firm commitment was cause for default under the contract unless the Medvins made other arrangements satisfactory to Respondent Hollywood, Inc., for payment of the total purchase price at closing. The Medvins timely filed applications for $80,000 rather than $95,100 as set forth in the contract, with four lending institutions. Two of the lending institutions rejected the application, one offered a $75,000 loan and one, Hollywood Federal, offered a commitment of $80,000 subject to the Medvins' sale and verification of the sale of the home which they then owned. The delivery by the Medvins of the disapproval for mortgage financing from a qualified lending institution would have resulted in the return of the Medvins' deposit and termination of the contract. A copy of a disapproval of financing was never delivered to Respondent Hollywood, Inc., by the Medvins. The Medvins gave the letter of commitment with conditions issued by Hollywood Federal to Respondent Hollywood, Inc., pursuant to the contract. As long as the special conditions of the mortgage loan commitment made by Hollywood Federal were met, the lender was obligated to make the loan to the Medvins. The Medvins intended to personally supply at closing the difference between the amount due Respondent Hollywood, Inc., under the contract and the mortgage financing received from Hollywood Federal. Upon receipt from the Medvins of the mortgage loan commitment with conditions, the Respondent Hollywood, Inc., commenced construction on their home pursuant to the contract. The Respondent Hollywood, Inc., constructed a residence for the Medvins in accordance with the specifications contained in the contract and the changes and modifications to the residence requested by the Medvins during the course of construction. A condition of the mortgage financing commitment from Hollywood Federal received by the Medvins was that they sell their present home prior to February 19, 1982, the scheduled date of closing. The Medvins did not sell their present home prior to February 19, 1982, the scheduled date of closing. Section 2.C of the subject contract provides: Failure by the Buyer to timely make and complete application for mortgage financing or failure by the Buyer to satisfy any conditions in the firm commitment timely shall be cause for default of Buyer under Paragraph 7 (as hereinafter) of the Contract unless Buyer makes other arrangements satisfactory to the Seller for pay- ment of the Total Purchase Price at closing. (Emphasis added.) Respondent's Exhibit 1. Pursuant to the contract, the Respondent Hollywood, Inc., notified the Medvins that their home was constructed and complete and a closing date of February 19, 1982, was set. Although Linda Medvin had repeated contact with Hollywood, Inc.'s personnel between April 20, 1981, and February, 1982, regarding extras and changes to the house being constructed for her, the Medvins did not inform Hollywood, Inc., until February 10, 1982, that they did not intend to close on the home. The Medvins failed to appear at the closing which was scheduled for February 19, 1982. The contract provides that as soon as Seller notifies the Buyer of his readiness to close, it is the duty of the Buyer to execute all documents required by the lending institution in order to close the mortgage loan and home purchase simultaneously. The Respondent Hollywood, Inc., was informed by legal counsel that the failure of the Medvins to make arrangements satisfactory to Hollywood, Inc., for payment of the purchase price at closing constituted a default by the Medvins as Buyers under the terms of the contract and all payments including the deposit were to be retained by the Seller as liquidated damages. The Medvins through counsel demanded the return of their earnest money deposit. The Respondents have refused to return the deposit based on their belief that the Medvins were in default under the contract. The Respondent, William D. Horvitz, has not personally engaged in any dealings with the Medvins and is not the only licensed broker associated with Hollywood, Inc. The Respondent Horvitz was not involved either directly or in a supervisory capacity in the transaction between the Medvins and Hollywood, Inc.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondents Hollywood, Inc., and William D. Horvitz. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 1983, at Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation - Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Carlos Alvarez, Esquire and Carolyn S. Raepple, Esquire HOPPING BOYD GREEN & SAMS Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Randy Schwartz, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Suite 212 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Howard Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The Respondents have been charged with multiple violations of Chapter 494, (1987), the Florida Mortgage Brokerage Act, and administrative rules promulgated pursuant to the act. The violations, described in an amended administrative complaint dated April 16, 1990, are as follows: Rule 3D-40.006(5), F.A.C.: Respondents failed to issue a statement signed by both parties, when receiving a deposit on a mortgage loan, regarding disposition of the deposit and other matters. Section 494.08(10), F.S. and Rule 3D-40.091(2), F.A.C.: Respondents failed to provide a written statement with a summary of limits and conditions for recovery from the Mortgage Broker Guaranty Fund. Section 494.055(1)(b), F.S. and Rule 3D-40.008(1), F.A.C.: Respondents assessed fees for credit reports, phone calls, appraisals and courier services, which fees were not supported by the files. Section 494.055(1)(0), F.S. and Rule 3D-40.006(4), F.A.C.: The department had to issue a subpoena for compensation records. Section 494.055(1)(g) and (p), and Section 494.08(5), F.S.: Borrowers were required to pay higher closing costs than were disclosed on the good faith estimate form. Section 494.08(5), F.S.: Respondents failed to secure executed modified mortgage loan applications from the borrowers or to return excess monies to the borrowers. Section 494.08(5), F.S. and Rule 3D-40.091(1), F.A.C.: Respondents accepted deposits from loan applicants but failed to obtain executed mortgage broker agreements which would disclose the cost of the loans. Sections 494.055(1)(b) and (g), and Sections 494.093(3)(a), (b), (c), and (4), F.S.: Respondents failed to disclose that they would retain both origination fees and discount points as their compensation, and failed to disclose compensation received from the lender in addition to brokerage fees assessed the borrowers on the closing statements. Section 494.055(1)(b), F.S., Section 494.08(5), F.S. and Sections 494.093(3)(a), (b), (c) and (4), F.S.: Respondents collected a servicing release fee from the borrowers when the Respondents were not the lender, and failed to disclose the collection. Section 494.055(1)(e), F.S. and Rule 3D-40.006(b)(a), F.A.C.: Respondents failed to maintain an escrow account.
Findings Of Fact Inlet Mortgage Company, Ltd. ("IMC") is a mortgage brokerage business operating under license #HB65002147500. Its place of business is 700 Virginia Avenue, Suite 105, Ft. Pierce, Florida 34982. John Davis is the principal mortgage broker of Respondent IMC, operating under license #HA246700273. He has been licensed in Florida since approximately 1987, and opened his business in February 1988. As authorized by Section 494.065(1), F.S. (1987), the Department of Banking and Finance ("department") conducted an examination of the affairs of the Respondents for the time period February 1988 through June 1, 1988. The examination was completed on July 5, 1988, with a written report. At the time of the examination Respondents had closed only four loans and had another six in progress. The audit was conducted because a loan processor working for IMC had applied for her mortgage broker license, and her application seemed to imply that she was already practicing mortgage brokering. The audit cleared up this question and the processor was not found to be operating improperly. However, Timothy Wheaton, the department examiner, found other violations by IMC. When an audit or review is conducted by the department, the agency staff first interviews the person in charge to explain the review and to learn about the company. The staff then looks at the licenses, reviews files of closed and active loans, and examines books and accounts, payroll records, and the like. Generally, a sampling of loan files is selected from the broker's loan log, but in this first review all loans were reviewed, as so few existed. The staff writes a preliminary report and conducts an exit interview to let the broker know its findings. Later, a formal report is completed and provided to the broker, who has thirty days to respond. Timothy Wheaton conducted his review of IMC and John Davis at the company office in Ft. Pierce on June 3, 1988 and June 7, 1988. At some point on June 3rd, Wheaton was reviewing compensation records to determine how the broker, his partner and the loan processor were paid. Davis had checkbooks available, but the accountant had not prepared his books as the office had just opened. Wheaton had questions as to whether the checkbooks were all that was available; when he asked for the payroll records, Davis told him he would have to subpoena them. Wheaton returned on Monday with a subpoena and was given the same records as before. Davis admits that he made the demand for the subpoena. He was piqued because he was very busy when the audit staff arrived, and when he suggested they return later, he felt they wrongfully impugned his motives and accused him of hiding something. Respondent Davis has admitted to several "technical" violations or oversights in the loan files at the time of the first review. A summary of the limits and conditions of recovery from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund was not being provided, but has been provided since the first audit. Deposits for credit report, appraisal fees and other costs were collected from the borrowers, but the files did not include a statement, signed by the borrowers, describing disposition of the funds in the event that the loan was not consummated, or the term of the agreement. After the first audit Davis has provided such a form statement and has included it in each file. On three closed loans, and one that was still pending, the files did not include documentation to support minimal (i.e., $25.00, $10.00, $6.56) fees for phone calls and courier fees, or fees were collected which exceeded the documentation in the file. Davis explained that these are charges made by the closing attorney, and the files now document those expenses. The difference between what was collected for a credit report and what was spent was returned to the borrower. (For example, $20.30 was returned to borrower, G. Stewart). In three loans closed at the time of the first audit, Davis and IMC received as compensation both the origination fee and a portion of the discount points. In the McCurdy loan, IMC received its 1 percent origination fee ($600.00), plus one half of the 1 percent discount fee ($300.00). In the Alexander loan, IMC received its 1 percent origination fee ($469.00), plus a .75 percent discount fee ($351.75). In the Stewart loan, IMC received its 1 percent origination fee ($612.00), plus 1/2 percent discount fee ($306.00). In each case, the Good Faith Estimate form provided to the borrowers disclosed the fees separately and did not break out which portion of the loan discount would be paid to the lender and which portion would be paid to IMC. The origination fee is sometimes called the broker's fee, although some banks also collect the fee when a mortgage broker is not involved. Discount points are a one-time payment to a lender to increase its yield on the loan. They are a percentage of the loan, paid up front, to reduce the interest rate over the term of the loan. These are distinctly different forms of charges to the borrower. Davis claims that he explained orally to each borrower how much compensation he would receive. The borrowers do not remember the specifics of that explanation, but rather consider the total origination fee and discount fee as their cost of the loan. They knew that the broker was going to be compensated for his services and understood that compensation would come from those fees in some unspecified manner. Davis claims that he checked with some lenders who told him that it was standard practice for part of the broker's compensation to be called a "discount" fee. He considered it a tax advantage to the borrower, as discount fees could be deductible, just as interest is deductible. During the audit, Davis discussed his compensation practice with the agency staff, who explained that, whatever it is called, the broker's compensation had to be fully disclosed to the borrower at the time of application on the Good Faith Estimate form. Between June 3rd and June 7th, Davis attempted to redisclose his compensation to the borrowers, but this resulted in unsigned disclosure forms in the file when the agency review staff returned on June 7th to complete the audit. At the time of the first audit, Davis and IMC maintained an escrow account for the deposits received from applicant/borrowers for audit reports, appraisal fees and other costs. Davis later closed his escrow account because he felt it was costing him money and because he did not consider the funds he received at the time of application to be escrow deposits. In most cases, the credit report and appraisal and other relevant services were ordered the same day as the loan application. Whether the loan was eventually consummated, the customer was still responsible for paying the charge if the services were provided. This is disclosed in a statement at the bottom of the Good Faith Estimate form and in a separate "Notice to Borrower", signed by the applicant which, since the first audit, is maintained in the loan file. According to the Notice to Borrower, if the loan is cancelled or denied, and the services have not been performed, the funds will be returned to the customer, less any cancellation charge by the appraisal or credit firm. These funds are deposits. When the escrow account was closed, Davis deposited the money for appraisals and credit report in his operating account. After services were rendered and an invoice received, he would pay the bill. Barbara Janet (Jan) Hutchersien, conducted the department's second audit of IMC in January 1990. This review covered the period from July 1, 1988 through December 31, 1989. John Davis provided the boxes of loans and bank records and loan log. The auditor used the logs to review a sample of loans from each lender with whom IMC works. The bank records were used to trace funds reflected in the loan files. Ms. Hutchersien found, and noted in her examination report, that no escrow account was maintained, although deposits were received in a sample of loan applications. In the Fishman loan, which closed on 4/11/89, closing costs were disclosed by IMC as $1,822.00 on the Good Faith Estimate form dated 1/12/89, yet those costs actually amounted to $2,075.00, disclosed at closing on the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Settlement form, for a difference of $253.00. In determining consistency between a good faith estimate and actual closing costs, the agency staff looks at items which are predeterminable costs. In the Fishman case, the estimate for survey was $225.00, but the actual cost was $400.00, due, according to John Davis, to an oddly-shaped lot. In two loans financed by Greentree Mortgage Corporation, IMC received a substantial fee from the lender, which fee was not disclosed on the Good Faith Estimate form, on the HUD Settlement form, or anywhere in writing to the borrower. File documents call these fees "discount for pricing". In the Meslin loan, closed on 8/11/89, the fee from the lender to broker was $432.00; in the Krueger loan, closed on 7/21/89, the payment was $820.00. These paybacks are called "par plus pricing", a relatively new (within the last five years) form of loan pricing. Par plus pricing allows a borrower who does not wish to pay cash at closing, but who would qualify for a higher interest rate in terms of monthly payments, to avoid paying discount points fee at closing. Instead, the lender pays the points to the broker, and the borrower gets a higher interest rate. This is contrasted with the discount point system where the borrower pays cash points at closing in return for a lower interest rate. Par plus pricing can work to the advantage to all parties: The borrower avoids a large cash outlay at closing, the lender enjoys a higher interest rate over the term of the loan, and the broker receives his money from the lender. The borrower, however, should understand his options, including the option to pay cash at closing for a lower interest rate. Davis did not disclose the payback from the lender in writing because that is the way he says he was told to handle the loan by Greentree's representative. Davis told the borrowers that he was getting his money from the lender. He did not, however, explain that the borrower would be paying a higher interest rate in return, and Roger Krueger did not understand why his loan was at 10 1/4 percent, rather than 9 3/4 percent, which he thought was the going rate at the time of closing. IMC also received funds from the lender in the Barnes loan, closed on 12/30/88. Cobb Financial Partners was the original lender, yet they paid IMC a service release fee ordinarily paid by one lender to another for release of servicing a loan. Although the fee from Cobb to IMC was not disclosed in writing to the borrowers, the Barnes' were told that the fee for IMC's services would come from the lender, rather from them. They were told, and it is disclosed on the Good Faith Estimate form, and on the HUD Settlement Form, that Cobb Partners Financial was paid $900.00 (1.25 percent loan discount) by the borrowers. Of this, $810.00 was returned by Cobb to IMC. John Davis concedes that Cobb, not IMC, was the lender and was not "comfortable" with how Cobb told him to handle his fee. He has not done business with Cobb since this loan and was simply trying to avoid having to charge his fee to Barnes, who had just arrived in town to become the newspaper editor. The borrowers who were the subject of the files in which the agency found violations generally did business with Davis and IMC because they thought he would get the best deal for them. They were financially unsophisticated and trusted him to represent them. They understood that he was being paid for his services and felt that he should be paid. Except for Mr. Krueger, they were generally satisfied with their mortgage rates. The mortgage broker's fiduciary responsibility is to the borrower, rather than the lender, although he must deal fairly and honestly with the lender. The service that the broker provides to the borrower is his knowledge and his ability to shop for the best product. Par plus pricing and other mechanisms by which the broker receives his fee in whole or part from the lender are not considered by the department to be a violation of standards governing the practice of mortgage brokerage, so long as the customer is fully apprised of his options and is informed of the role of those payments in the product or service they are receiving. The Barnes' and Kruegers clearly were not so apprised, nor does the record establish that the Meslins were informed, although they did not testify. Categorizing brokerage fees or compensation as "discount points" is patently misleading, as discount points are used to buy down an interest rate. When the points are diverted instead to the broker, the consumer does not receive the loan for which he has paid. John Davis admits certain technical violations, but unequivocally denies that he wilfully misled his customers or committed fraud. Since the second audit, he has restored his escrow account. He now discloses his compensation as brokers fees rather than discount points, and has learned how to disclose in writing the par plus pricing loans. In considering certain violations as "technical", and in recommending a penalty in this case, the undersigned has considered Respondents' willingness to correct the errors addressed by the department and Respondents' inexperience at the time of the first audit. Although he was involved in banking, insurance, and accounting, John Davis had not practiced mortgage brokering before moving to Florida and starting his business. In his early practice, as evidenced by his own testimony, he was willing to rely on the advice of lenders, rather than to seek guidance from his licensing authority. He misconceived his role as being jointly responsible to the borrowers and lenders with whom he worked, rather than a primary fiduciary duty to the borrowers, his clients. Although the concealment of compensation as discount points was a willful misrepresentation, the record establishes a pattern of ignorance, albeit inexcusable, rather than fraud.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED That a Final Order be entered, finding that Respondents violated Sections 494.055(1)(e), (o), and (q), F.S. (1987); Sections 494.08(5) and (10), F.S. (1987); and Section 494.093(4), F.S. (1987), and imposing a penalty of $1,000.00 fine, and one year probation, with the conditions that Respondent Davis successfully complete a specified amount and type of professional short course work and undergo periodic review and supervision by the agency. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Facts Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 6. Adopted in paragraphs 5 and 6. Rejected as redundant. - 8. Rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence except as found in paragraph 6. The department was required to obtain a subpoena due to Respondents' feigned or real refusal to produce certain records. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. - 18. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 8. Rejected as immaterial. The telephone charges were incurred by the closing agent, not Respondents. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 7. and Rejected as unnecessary and - 48. Adopted in summary in paragraph 8. 49. - 52. Adopted in summary in paragraph 14. Adopted in paragraph 15. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 13. and Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraphs 16 and 20. 59 - 74. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 16-19. Rejected as unnecessary. The conclusion that the handling of "par plus pricing" was fraudulent is rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 77. - 81. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 20 and 21. 82. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 83. Adopted in paragraphs 10 and 12. 84. Adopted in paragraph 10. 85. - 89. Rejected as unnecessary. 90. Adopted in paragraph 22. 91. - 93. Rejected as unnecessary. 94. Adopted in part in paragraph 26. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 2. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 6. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 13. - 9. Adopted in summary in paragraph 7. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Liability for payment occurs when the service is rendered, as reflected in Respondent's "Notice to Borrower". Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Rejected as unnecessary. - 19. Adopted in summary in paragraph 8. 20. - 22. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 14. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Adopted in substance in paragraph 16. Adopted in substance in paragraph 19. Rejected as unnecessary. - 29. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Included in conclusion of law number 9. Rejected as immaterial. - 33. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. The terms implied that the loans would be at a discounted rate, but were not, because the "discount" (partial) went to the broker. Adopted in paragraphs 19 and 20. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Elise M. Greenbaum, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 400 W. Robinson St., Suite 501 Orlando, FL 32801 John O. Williams, Esquire Renaissance Square 1343 East Tennessee St. Tallahassee, FL 32308 Hon. Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Dept. of Banking & Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Rm. 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact During 1982 and 1983, Petitioner was licensed as a mortgage broker and real estate broker in the State of Florida. His mortgage broker's license expired in September, 1983. At all times material hereto, Petitioner utilized his mortgage broker's and real estate broker's license to engage in real estate development speculation. He worked closely with Jeffrey Graham, who was also licensed as a mortgage broker and who was a co-owner with Petitioner of Continental Development, Continental Mortgage Company and the Real Estate Spot. They were engaged in buying and selling existing residential properties and constructing new homes for sale. Financing for Petitioner's speculative real estate transactions was provided primarily by The Bank of Florida, located in St. Petersburg, Florida. The Bank provided financing on 80 to 85 percent of his transactions, but at some point in 1982 or 1983, Petitioner and Graham found themselves unable to obtain further construction financing from the Bank. In order to continue receiving financing from the Bank, Petitioner and Graham initiated the use of "stand-in" buyers. A "stand-in" buyer would not have to use any of his own money as a deposit or down payment, even though real estate contracts executed in connection with these transactions would show an earnest money deposit by such buyers. The buyer's role was simply to lend his credit to the transaction and to share in any profits on the eventual sale of the property. On or about March 25, 1983, Petitioner executed, as seller, a contract for sale of real estate and deposit receipt with Norman Tanner, buyer. The transaction involved the sale of real estate in Pinellas County, Florida, and reflects a total purchase price of $25,000, with an earnest money deposit of $5,000 which the contract specified was to be held by Petitioner, as seller, until closing. Petitioner also executed a Settlement Statement on March 29, 1983, in connection with a loan obtained by Tanner from The Bank of Florida which indicated that Tanner had paid an earnest money deposit of $5,000. Based upon the testimony of Norman Tanner at hearing, it is found that he did not provide the earnest money deposit indicated on the sales contract or Settlement Statement which Petitioner executed as seller. Petitioner testified that this transaction was carried out in his individual capacity as a personal investment, and not under the authority of his mortgage broker's license. In fact, Petitioner did not deal directly with Tanner in this transaction. Tanner's dealings were with Petitioner's partner, Jeffrey Graham. Nevertheless, the evidence and demeanor of the witnesses establishes that Petitioner was aware of the fact that Tanner had not paid the deposit reflected on the instruments he executed, and that such instruments were used to induce the Bank to make a mortgage loan to Tanner. Petitioner, as seller, received $19,665.56 cash at settlement from this transaction with Tanner. On or about February 24, 1982, Petitioner executed a contract for sale of real estate and deposit receipt with Joseph Armendinger, buyer. The transaction involved the sale of real estate in Pinellas County, Florida, and reflects a total purchase price of $48,000, with an earnest money deposit of $6,500 which the contract specified was to be held in escrow by The Real Estate Spot, Inc., until closing. Petitioner and Armendinger also executed an Affidavit of Purchaser and Vendor in connection with obtaining financing for this transaction, and said Affidavit also indicated the buyer's purported cash equity of $6,500 in the property. At the time, Petitioner was co-owner of The Real Estate Spot, and Armendinger was an electrician who was doing some work at The Real Estate Spot and became interested in the "stand-in" buyer transactions he observed while doing electrical work at Petitioner's office. On or about October 27, 1982, Petitioner and Armendinger executed another contract for sale and deposit receipt for a second piece of property, which reflects a total price of $85,000 and an earnest money deposit by Armendinger of $5,000. Thereafter, they executed an Affidavit of Purchaser and Vendor and Settlement Statement reflecting Armendinger's purported cash equity of $4,250.00. Petitioner used the proceeds from this transaction to pay off an existing mortgage and judgment on the property, and realized $1,607.46 in cash, which was shared with Jeffrey Graham, co-seller. Petitioner knew that the contracts for sale and Affidavits which he executed with Armendinger were to be presented to The Bank of Florida and used for the purpose of Armendinger obtaining financing for the purchase of these properties. Based upon the testimony of Joseph Armendinger at hearing, it is found he did not provide any earnest money deposit or downpayment in connection with these two transactions with Petitioner. Armendinger relied on Petitioner, a licensed mortgage broker and real estate broker, in these transactions, and was told by Petitioner that he would not have to put any money of his own into these transactions. Petitioner knew that Armendinger had not made any deposit or downpayments concerning these transactions at the time he executed the contracts for sale and deposit receipts, Affidavits and Settlement Statement. On December 16, 1982, Petitioner executed two mortgages in favor of Patricia G. Herren on property he had previously sold to Armendinger. These mortgages totalled $21,793.35, and were recorded in Pinellas County, Florida, on December 28, 1982. These mortgages were used by Petitioner, along with a $10,000 mortgage he executed in Herren's favor, to obtain a satisfaction from Herren of a mortgage she held on a piece of property she sold to Petitioner in October 1982 in St. Petersburg Beach. The $10,000 Herren mortgage was also recorded on December 28, 1982. Having obtained the satisfaction, Petitioner then sold the St. Petersburg Beach property to Juanita Murdaugh and Jeffrey Graham on December 17, 1982, prior to recording the $10,000 Herren mortgage. He did not disclose on the Affidavit of Purchaser and Vendor which he executed that he had an outstanding $10,000 mortgage in favor of Herren on this St. Petersburg Beach property, although this mortgage should have been disclosed as "secondary financing." In each of the Affidavits of Vendor and Purchaser executed by Petitioner in connection with sales of property as described herein, there is the following statement in Item VII: The certifications of this affidavit are for the purpose of inducing the Lender named above or its assignees to make or purchase the first mortgage described by this affidavit.... By signing the Affidavits of Vendor and Purchaser, Petitioner, as the "Property Vendor," made the following certification: The PROPERTY VENDOR hereby certifies that to the extent PROPERTY VENDOR is a party, the Financial Terms, including Total Purchase Price, and the Liens are as set forth in Items III and IV above, [and] hereby acknowledges the inducement purpose of this affidavit as set forth in Item VII above....
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage broker be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX (DOAH No. 87-0033) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 1.(a) Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 4. 2.(a) Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 2.(b) Rejected in Findings of Fact 5, 6. 2.(c) Rejected in Finding of Fact 10. 2.(d) Rejected in Findings of Fact 6-10. 2.(e), (f) Rejected in Finding of Fact 11. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 3. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 4. 5-6. Rejected as not based upon competent substantial evidence. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 6. 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 10. 10-11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 9, 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 9, 10. 14-19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: John Swisher, Esquire Dillinger & Swisher 5511 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33710 Stephen M. Christian, Esquire Office of Comptroller 1313 Tampa Street Tampa, FL 33602-3394 Honorable Gerald Lewis Department of Banking and Finance Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Plaza Level The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact For the purposes of these proceedings, Jager Industries, Inc. and Castle Realty Ltd. are synonymous as Petitioner. Through name changes, Castle Realty Ltd. became Jager Industries, Inc. Under the provisions of the Mortgage Brokerage Act, Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, the Office of the Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance (Department), is charged with the responsibility and duty of administering the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund (Fund) which includes the duty to approve or deny applications for payment from the Fund, as set forth in Section 494.042, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, 1st Federated Realty Mortgage, Inc. (1st Federated) was licensed as a mortgage broker in this state pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, having license number HE 7896. On or about January 8, 1981, 1st Federated filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa, Division. Thereafter, on or about December 16, 1981, 1st Federated was dissolved. On January 29, 1985, the Department received a letter dated January 25, 1985, by regular mail, requesting payment from the Fund on behalf of Castle Realty Ltd. Attached to the letter was a final judgment entered on April 21, 1982, in the Circuit Court for Pinellas County against 1st Federated in the principal amount of $50,000 based upon a violation of Section 494.042(2)(d), Florida Statutes, a Writ of Execution returned unsatisfied and an Affidavit of Reasonable Search. Thereafter on May 17, 1987, the Department received by certified mail a copy of the Complaint filed against 1st Federated and supporting documents including a copy of the Master Loan Commitment, Affidavit and Acceptance of Service. Pursuant to the Master Loan Commitment, Castle Realty paid $50,000 to 1st Federated as a Master Commitment Fee in exchange for a promise by 1st Federated to fund up to $4,000,000 for individual condominium loans. The individual commitments and closing of loans were subject to the lender approving the borrower's credit; however, approvals could not be unreasonable withheld. Timely notice of the institution of the action by Petitioner against 1st Federated as required by s. 494.043(5), Florida Statutes (1985), was waived by Respondent. No evidence was submitted regarding the number of claims involving 1st Federated and the amount of those claims that have been paid by Respondent from the Fund. Accordingly, no recommendation is made regarding the amount of Petitioner's claim that may be paid from the Fund pursuant to the limitations contained in s. 494.044, Florida Statutes (1985). By Notice of Intent to Deny Payment from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund dated May 22, 1987, Respondent entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and denied Petitioner's claim. As grounds therefor, Respondent concluded that the 1985 and 1986 amendments to Chapter 494 were applicable in this case as those amendments were remedial or procedural in nature and should be given retrospective application. Thereafter, Petitioner requested formal proceedings by petition filed June 16, 1987, and this request was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Comptroller's letter dated July 23, 1987.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, James W. McKibbon was not licensed as a mortgage broker in Florida (Exhibit 1). MorBanc Financial Corporation was initially registered as a mortgage broker in Florida on February 27, 1989, and remained registered through June 15, 1990 (Exhibit 1). In August 1988, Respondent was employed by Sovereign Savings Bank to procure qualified home purchases needing mortgage money to be lent by Sovereign. MorBanc Financial Corporation was incorporated circa 1988 to become a mortgage brokerage firm. It opened a bank account and an office from funds contributed by its organizers. Respondent was offered shares in MorBanc and was elected president of the company. No evidence was submitted that Respondent was an investor in MorBanc. Thomas Pollak moved to Florida in 1988 and contracted to purchase a residence. The real estate agent with whom he was working recommended he seek a loan through MorBanc which was located in the same building with the real estate agent. Pollak assumed that MorBanc was a licensed mortgage broker in Florida. McKibbon's business card shows him as President of MorBanc Financial Corporation and lists FHA-VA-Conventional -- presumably loans that can be brokered by MorBanc. Respondent never told Pollak that he or MorBanc were mortgage brokers, and no applications for a mortgage loan completed by Pollak contained the name MorBanc. Instead, all of the application forms used were those used by Sovereign Savings Bank, and the loan application was submitted to Sovereign Savings Bank. The bank paid Respondent for procuring loans. MorBanc, prior to becoming registered as a mortgage broker, processed no loans from clients procured by Respondent McKibbon and paid McKibbon no commission or other compensation.
Recommendation It is recommended that the charges against James W. McKibbon that he acted as a mortgage broker without being licensed to do so in Florida be dismissed. ENTERED this 20th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings Not Accepted. 2. Respondent helped set up the furniture in the office that was provided by one of the financial founders of MorBanc. Not accurate to call Respondent "instrumental" in this task. Teresa Tyler was the real estate agent procuring the contract with Pollak. No evidence was submitted that she was Respondent's real estate salesperson. While Pollak testified that Respondent mentioned he (Respondent) could work with more than one lender, the only lender mentioned by Respondent was Sovereign, and the loan was processed through Sovereign. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen M. Christian, Esquire Office of Comptroller 1313 Tampa Street, Suite 615 Tampa, FL 33602-3394 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 James W. McKibbon 5770 Dartmouth Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33710 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in Case No. 94-2065 is whether National Mortgage Bankers, Inc. violated certain disciplinary proceedings governing mortgage brokers and, if so, what penalty should be imposed. The issue in Case No. 94-2066 is whether National Mortgage Bankers, Inc. is entitled to licensure as a correspondent mortgage lender.
Findings Of Fact As of September 3, 1992, the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Department), issued a mortgage lender's license to National Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (NMB). At all material times, NMB acted as a mortgage broker, not a mortgage lender. NMB originated mortgaged loans, which were funded by third parties. NMB's principal place of business was in Pt. Charlotte. At all material times, Sheldon Voron was employed as the chief executive officer of NMB. Business was slow for NMB during the first few months after it acquired its mortgage lending license. NMB was operated by Mr. Voron, who supervised loan officers and the processing of loan applications, and Mark Asciutto, who handled bookkeeping, payroll, and the checking accounts, including the escrow account. Mr. Asciutto left the company in September 1993. By the end of 1992, the net worth of NMB was $89,115.23, according to an audited financial statement issued on February 12, 1993. The net worth deteriorated during 1993, dropping to $63,533 by December 31, 1993, according to an audited financial statement issued on March 7, 1994. At no time did NMB ever advise the Department that its net worth was below $250,000. In early 1993, business picked up from late 1992, and NMB hired a second loan processor. Refinancing activity in early 1993 required that NMB continually add new help. At this time, the approval of uncomplicated conventional loan applications took 30-45 days, and the operation ran smoothly. But business continued to increase. From March to June, NMB opened up offices in Naples and Sarasota. A branch in office in Englewood was opened and quickly closed due to its proximity to other offices. By April, the volume of business at NMB was increasing rapidly, aided in part by the addition of government loans. An average of 75 cases monthly during the first three months increased to 125 cases in April. Employing four to five loan processors, NMB continued to hire additional employees, but soon had problems finding qualified persons, as competition in the lending business was increasing due to considerable refinancing activity. Mr. Asciutto handled the escrow account during these busy months, until another employee assumed these duties in late July or August 1994. Mr. Asciutto routinely transferred money from the escrow account to the general operating account when Mr. Asciutto determined that NMB was entitled to retain the money, such as when customers had not been responsive to inquiries from NMB employees. The only such transfer for which a specific amount was identified at the hearing was $860, which was swept from escrow to general operations by check dated April 16, 1993. As is obvious from the trend in net worth, profitability did not increase in direct proportion to increases in business volume. In fact, total income increased from $82,716.01 in 1992 to $556,907 in 1993, but net income increased only from $30,714.88 to $43,528. NMB simply could not keep up with the business, as is evidenced by the experiences of its customers. In July 1993, William Zinser read an NMB advertisement in the newspaper offering an adjustable mortgage rate and a low fixed-rate mortgage. He called the number and set up an appointment to visit the office. He met with an employee of NMB, who discussed interest rates and closing fees. She assured Mr. Zinser that it would take only about 30 days to close the loan. Mr. Zinser submitted a loan application, and the employee said NMB would be back in touch with him. Mr. Zinser waited three or four weeks and heard nothing. He called and was told that there were no problems. On two or three occasions, an NMB employee requested from Mr. Zinser a profit and loss statement or a verification of his wife's income. However, NMB had the wife's income information since the start of the loan application process and twice had received the profit and loss statements. On January 4, 1994, Mr. Zinser applied for a loan with another lender. Shortly thereafter, an NMB employee called him and said that his loan was approved. When he said that he had gone elsewhere, she reminded him that he had obligated himself to pay a $1250 fee in connection with the loan. He refused to pay. On or about July 15, 1993, Janice Hamann first contacted NMB about refinancing her home. She applied for a mortgage, and an NMB employee asked for more information. She supplied it the following day, and the employee said everything was fine. The employee said that it would probably take 4-6 weeks to close. On August 13, 1993, Ms. Hamann called NMB to check on the status of the loan application. An NMB employee said that they would probably close when she returned from a week's vacation. On August 23, Ms. Hamann called and was told to provide some additional information on her payment history. She provided the requested information by September 20. For a second time, she had to provide verification of her husband's employment. On September 18, Ms. Hamann received notification from her homeowner's insurer that they had changed her insurance, evidently to show a new loss payee. No one from NMB had told her that the loan was ready to close. A couple of months later, surveyors showed up and surveyed the property that was to have been the subject of the loan and additional property. Ms. Hamann called NMB and informed them of the mistaken inclusion of additional property. On November 22, Ms. Hamann called NMB and said that she wanted her paperwork and was withdrawing her application. Ten days later, someone from NMB called her and said they were ready to close. Ms. Hamann restated her demand for her paperwork and refused to close. A few days later, she received a letter demanding $1500 in addition to the $300 that she had paid for the credit check, survey, and appraisal. She still receives bills from the surveyor. On September 9, 1993, Richard Chadbourne contacted NMB about refinancing a mortgage. At the first office visit, he completed an application and delivered a check to NMB in the amount of $300. An NMB employee said they would contact him for more information and said it would take 30-45 days to close his loan. At the first meeting, Mr. Chadbourne stated that he wanted the 3.259 percent variable rate mortgage with a six point cap, which NMB was offering. An NMB employee said that they could get him a 3.375 percent rate. On the one or two occasions that NMB contacted Mr. Chadbourne for more information, he provided it to them immediately. Repeated calls to NMB by Mr. Chadbourne or his agent were never returned. No one from NMB ever called Mr. Chadbourne to tell him whether his loan was approved or denied, and he never withdrew his application. On September 10, 1993, Katherine Healey and her husband visited the NMB office to apply for a refinancing loan. Responding to a newspaper advertisement for a 3.375 percent interest rate, the Healeys learned that they would have to pay $1250 in fees to obtain such a low rate. They agreed to pay the sum. They were asked only for salary information and certain documentation concerning their liabilities. An NMB employee said they could lock in the quoted rate when they returned from vacation in a couple of weeks. After returning from vacation, the Healeys called NMB repeatedly, but often could not find anyone to speak to or to return their calls. When they finally talked to someone about their loan, they were told they had to pay another $100 or $150 to lock in at 3.375 percent. They continued calling NMB without much success for two months after returning from vacation. They could not get a closing date, and nothing was happening. In response to their repeated requests to lock in an interest rate, they were told only that they could not lock in until two weeks before closing. By the end of November, the Healeys applied elsewhere for a refinancing loan. Shortly after the Healeys applied elsewhere for a loan, which closed about three weeks later, they received a call from an employee of NMB, who told them that they had a closing date. They said that they had decided to obtain a loan elsewhere. The employee demanded the $1250 fee, which the Healeys had not yet paid, and threatened to sue them if they did not pay. The Healeys refused to pay the fee and were able to use the appraisal, for which they had already paid, with their new application. However, they had to pay for a second credit report. In November 1993, Wendy Harrison contacted NMB for two mortgages--one on a home in Massachusetts and one on a home in Punta Gorda. She filed mortgage applications on or about December 15, 1993, but, by mutual agreement, she withdrew her application on the Florida home. Ms. Harrison subsequently left several telephone messages that were not returned. In January, she was assigned a new loan processor, who still did not return calls. Around this time, Ms. Harrison's husband received a notice from the mortgagee on the Florida property concerning a payoff amount. The Harrisons contacted NMB and told them that this was the wrong property. Mortgage rates began to increase in January. Ms. Harrison called repeatedly on the status of her mortgage refinancing from mid-January to mid- March. A new person assumed loan processing duties on her file. She called Ms. Harrison on or about March 9 and said that the credit report raised some problems. This was the first time either Mr. or Ms. Harrison had been told that there were problems with the credit report, which NMB had received in late December. Ms. Harrison mailed the requested explanatory documents on the following day. Two weeks later, after hearing nothing, Ms. Harrison called NMB and learned that the interest rate would be 8 percent annually, which was higher than the rate in effect when she initiated the loan approval process. The NMB employee explained that the higher rate was due to the fact that the Massachusetts property was a rental property, but NMB employees had known that from the start. However, the NMB employee assured Ms. Harrison that the file was complete and being forwarded to Miami for final approval. The following day, Ms. Harrison sent a certified letter withdrawing the application and asking for the appraisal and any other services for which she had already paid. NMB received the letter on March 26. On April 5, Ms. Harrison found in her mailbox an unstamped, uncancelled envelope that had evidently been hand- delivered by an NMB employee or agent. Inside was a rejection letter backdated to March 23, so as to look like the Harrison application had been rejected before it was withdrawn. Based on customer complaints, the Department financial examiner conducted an unannounced inspection of NMB from November 15-17, 1993. In addition to discovering a violation of the minimum net worth requirement imposed upon mortgage lenders, the examiner found several violations of requirements imposed upon mortgage brokers. At no time did NMB disclose in writing that it could not guarantee acceptance into a particular loan program and could not promise any specific loan conditions or terms. When taking applications, NMB failed to disclose the nature of the mortgage brokerage fee charged by NMB. The fee varied according to the terms of the loan, and NMB only disclosed a broad range of fees at the time of the application. NMB received monies from customers, but did not record check numbers for checks used to pay vendors on behalf of specific customers. NMB thereby failed to maintain an updated record of escrow account activity on an appropriate form. In fact, NMB had the Department-promulgated form, but, as discussed below, used it improperly to try to record mortgage brokerage transactions. NMB did not maintain supporting documentation for monies paid from its escrow account on behalf of customers. NMB often used courier prepayments to pay unrelated expenses. NMB did not record the dates and amounts paid out of escrow. NMB maintained a mortgage brokerage transaction journal, but it lacked the date the customer applied for the mortgage loan, the date of disposition of the application, the total amount of brokerage fees, and the name of the lender. NMB used the Department-promulgated form for escrow account activity and tried to adapt it for mortgage brokerage transactions, but failed to include the above-cited crucial items of information. Concerning NMB's application for a correspondent mortgage broker's license, there is evidence, in at least one case, of fraud or deceit. Ms. Harrison, who was very credible, described an act of fraud or dishonest dealing in the postdating and delivery of her rejection letter. The atmosphere of incompetence and neglect that prevailed at NMB might well have left a typed letter unmailed for days or even weeks. However, an employee or other agent committed a wilful act of deceit in driving the letter out to Ms. Harrison's home and leaving it in the mailbox, rather than simply dropping it in the mail.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order revoking the mortgage lender's license of National Mortgage Bankers, Inc. and denying its application for licensure as a correspondent mortgage lender. ENTERED on November 3, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on November 3, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Susan E. Steinberg Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller 1313 Tampa St., Suite 615 Tampa, FL 33602-3394 Sheldon Voron 775 Tamiami Tr. Port Charlotte, FL 33953
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the factual stipulations into which the parties have entered, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: From approximately October of 1989, to February of 1990, Respondents were employed as telephone consultants by United Financial International, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "UFI"), a Florida-based business owned by Laura Correa and Anita "Ann" Cuevas that offered to provide assistance to consumers seeking various types of loans, including mortgage loans. Respondents were not then, nor have they ever been, licensed by the Department as mortgage brokers in the State of Florida. Furthermore, at no time did UFI have a license or registration issued by the Department to operate as a mortgage broker, mortgage brokerage business, correspondent mortgage lender or mortgage lender, although it did have at least one employee during the period of Respondents' employment, telephone consultant John Archer, who possessed a Department-issued mortgage broker's license. As telephone consultants for UFI, Respondents answered and screened telephone calls placed by potential UFI clients. Among the callers Respondent Cook screened were Dudley Phipps and Arthur McCullough. Among the callers Respondent Jelich screened was Connie Wiscaver. Phipps, McCullough and Wiscaver were all interested in obtaining mortgage loans. While on the telephone with a potential client, Respondents, as a general rule, identified themselves by name, explained to the caller the services offered and fees charged by UFI, and obtained from the caller the following information, which they recorded on a form provided by their employer: the caller's name, address, telephone number, date of birth, social security number, employer, salary, financial standing, and credit history; and the type, amount and purpose of the loan sought by the caller. Respondents also typically asked what the caller hoped for in terms of interest rate, size of monthly payments and loan repayment schedule. In addition, they indicated what items the caller needed to send to UFI to complete the caller's loan application package. The representations that Respondents made during a typical telephone conversation with a potential client seeking a mortgage loan gave the impression that, if the caller submitted a complete loan application package along with the requisite loan application processing fee, and everything "checked out," Respondents would make the arrangements necessary for the caller to obtain the mortgage loan he or she wanted from one of the lenders with whom UFI had an established relationship. UFI management, in writing, instructed all of its telephone consultants, including Respondents, to incorporate the following in their presentation to potential clients and it randomly monitored the consultants' telephone conversations to make sure that these instructions were being followed: We Co-Broker loans. We are not lenders nor do we have a Funding Committee to evaluate the Loan Package after we receive it. It takes twenty one (21) to thirty (35) [sic] business days from the day we receive ALL the information to evaluate the package. We have an application Fee of $399.00. MANDATORY Please use these statements to increase your credibility and assertiveness with potential clients. The maximum life of the loan will be determined by the investor/lender. The interest rates will be fixed and vary between 12-18 percent. The application fee is non-refundable and the assessed fees to your loan are separate from the application fee. There will be a Brokerage fee of 1-5 percent assessed to your loan upon closing. To increase your potential, please make sure when your [sic] finishing with your potential client to ask them [sic] when they [sic] would like to obtain a loan. Also in your closing statements be sure to tell your client to Bill Recipient with our Federal Express/Express Mail Service to Guarantee overnight delivery. Be advised this is for the return of the Application Fee Only! The application istself [sic] is returned at the client's own expense. The client may pay the application fee by personal check; however, as the checks will be out-of-state it will take approximately (21) days for the check to clear which will hold up the clients [sic] processing. Therefore, we recommend a money order to expidite [sic] the process. We do not like to use regular mail for sending the money orders, we rather the client use our courier sevice [sic]. (see above) If you need assistance please do not hesitate to phone us at 1-800-729-5666. We want to help you secure the funds you require as soon as possible. We sincerely thank you for giving us the opportunity to serve you. In most cases, Respondents followed these instructions. As compensation for performing their duties as UFI telephone consultants, Respondents received a percentage (either 20 or 30 percent) of the non-refundable loan application processing fee submitted by each caller whose call they screened. In an effort to encourage a caller to submit the fee, Respondents sometimes told the caller that, based upon the preliminary information provided, the chances of the desired loan being approved "looked good." They never stated, however, that loan approval was "guaranteed."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Respondents guilty of having violated Section 494.093(1), Florida Statutes (1989), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and imposing upon each of them an administrative fine of in the amount of $5,000.00 for having engaged in such wrongdoing. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of August, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent Ronald E. Clampitt is the President of Respondent Action Mortgage Corporation and is the person designated to act on behalf of said corporation under the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Action Mortgage Corporation currently holds a mortgage brokerage license. The individual mortgage broker license issued to respondent Clampitt expired on August 31, 1980, and has not been renewed. Respondent Joseph W. Langford currently holds a license as a mortgage solicitor for and on behalf of Home Mortgage Investment Corporation. His prior individual mortgage broker license expired on August 31, 1980, and has not been renewed. COUNT I The respondents were counter codefendants in a civil suit filed in the Circuit Court of Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of the Florida in and for Pinellas County, which case was numbered 78-12033-18 and styled Action Mortgage Corporation, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Denture Services, Inc., etc., et al., Defendants. On February 8, 1980, a Final Judgment was entered in that proceeding by Circuit Court Judge David Seth Walker. Judge Walker found, as a matter of fact, that a limited confidential/fiduciary relationship existed between Langford and the counter-plaintiffs, and opined that certain activities on the part of the individual counter-defendants were "bedecked with the badge of fraud." The Court, inter alis, awarded the counter-plaintiffs Final Judgment in the nominal sum of $1.00, plus costs. It was noted that the claim of the counter-plaintiffs for punitive damages had previously been denied. Subsequent to the Final Judgment enteed in Case No. 78-12033-18, the counter-plaintiffs filed a Motion for Rehearing on the matter of punitive damages, since the Court had noted in its Final Judgment that the activities of the counter-defendants were "bedecked with the badge of fraud." The counter- defendants (respondents herein) also moved the Court to alter or amend its Final Judgment so as to remove the fraud language quoted above. By Order filed on March 10, 1980, both motions were denied by Judge Walker. Judge Walker's deposition was taken on August 22, 1980, and was received into evidence in this proceeding as petitioner's Exhibit 9. Referring to the language in the Final Judgment "bedecked with the badge of fraud," Judge Walker makes the following comments: "I do not interpret that as a finding of fraud absolute, but just that there were indicia of fraud." (p.4) "But I did not consider this to be an absolute finding of fraud. I think I mentioned that on one of the motions that the counter-plaintiffs made to reconsider the judgment of $1.00 or the refusal to grant punitive damages. I reiterated at that hearing that I found that it was an indicia, but I did not go so far in my own mind as to specifically find fraud." (p. 4) "If I had wanted to find specifically that they were in fact guilty of fraud, I would have said as much. The phrase, in my mind, 'bedecked with a badge of fraud,' is meant to suggest the indicia of fraud. Fraud is a legal conclusion that must be based upon several legally accepted circumstances. And in law school we learned the term, 'badges of fraud.' But a badge of fraud does not per se constitute fraud. I didn't feel that I needed to go too deeply in the questions, because of my finding that the counter-plaintiffs had not in fact suffered any real damage." (pp. 7 and 8) "I listed a certain series of circmustances and activities which had taken place, rather specifically. And I found that these activities and circumstances were bedecked by the badge of fraud which is admittedly a little bit flowery for normal language, but that's what I said. I did not specifically find fraud. Fraud always carries with it the badges of fraud in and of it- self does not collaterally, and on the other hand mean that fraud exists. I did not go that far in this particular judgment. I did not feel I had to." (pp. 18 and 19) "I did not feel that it was necessary for the Court to delve into the ultimate determination of fraud." (p. 20) "I do not perceive that my final judgment made an absolute finding of fraud. Again, the phrase, 'badge of fraud,' simply menas to me an indicia of fraud, and I'm confortable with the finding that that indicia is there. But as far as a finding of fraud is concerned, I did not proceed to that point, and it's not there." (pp. 20 and 21) COUNT II In 1978, Dorothy L. Jones and Byron A. Jones were the owners of real property located at 2656 Granada Circle East in St. Petersburg, Florida. The first mortgage on that property held by Molten, Allen and Williams, Inc. or the Mortgage Corporation of the South, was in default and a foreclosure action, and is pendens against the property had been filed. The monthly mortgage payments were approximately $225. At that time, Dorothy Jones was separated from her husband, lived in the home with her five minor children and was having financial difficulties. Having seen a newspaper advertisement, Dorothy Jones contacted the Respondents in an effort to obtain a second mortgage or additional funds with which to pay her debts and preserve her homestead. Neither of the Respondents agreed to make a second mortgage loan to Mrs. Jones. Instead, they agreed to make an outright purchase of the Jones's residence and lease the property back to Dorothy Jones at a monthly payment which approximated her prior monthly mortgage payment. The lease payments were later increased to $275 per month due to the loss of homestead exemption on the property. It was Mrs. Jones' understanding that she would be given the opportunity to repurchase the home at less than fair market value though she may have to pay a down payment and higher monthly payments. No appraisal was performed on the property. The closing of the transaction took place at a title company, independent of the Respondents. Mrs. Jones understood that she was signing a deed to the property and other documents transferring title to Respondents. The property was purchased by the Respondents in February of 1978 for $23,656.54 and the transfer was made subject to the mortgage to Molten, Allen and Williams, Inc., in the amount of $21,848.44. No funds were paid to Mr. or Mrs. Jones at the time of closing. During the months which followed, Dorothy Jones fell far behind in her lease payments to the Respondents. In May of 1979, Respondent Langford notified Mrs. Jones that the property owners had elected to sell the property in the near future, and advised her to contact his office if she was still interested in purchasing the property. In July of 1979, Dorothy Jones filed a Complaint against the Respondents in the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County seeking a declaratory decree as to her rights under the aforementioned deed, lease and oral agreement to repurchase the property. (Civil No. 79-7307-17). Mrs. Jones was represented by an attorney in that action. By Order filed on July 29, 1980, the Circuit Court approved the terms and conditions of a Stipulation entered into by the Respondents and Mrs. Jones whereby Mrs. Jones was given the opportunity to purchase the subject property from the Respondents for $32,000 within 90 days, and was also required to pay back rental payments to the Respondents. For some reason not clear from the evidence adduced in the proceeding, Mrs. Jones did not repurchase the property from the Respondents. By Final Judgment filed on October 15, 1980, Mrs. Jones' claim against the Respondents was dismissed with prejudice and Respondents were awarded a judgment against Mrs. Jones in the amount of $2,887.50. Apparently, an eviction action in the County Court for Pinellas County resulted in the award of possession of the home to the Respondents. Mrs. Jones vacated the subject property in October of 1980. In April of 1981, Respondents sold the subject property to Harold and Peralita Odlam for a purchase price of $41,7000. COUNT III Respondent Clampitt was licensed as an individual mortgage broker for the years 1978 and 1979. His 1979 license expired on August 31, 1979, as did the license of Action Mortgage Corporation. Mr. Clampitt made an attempt to renew his individual mortgage broker license on October 16, 1979. The renewal license for Action Mortgage Corporation also bears the date of October 16, 1979. During the period of time between August 31, 1979 (the date upon which his individual mortgage broker license expired) and October 16, 1979 (the date upon which said renewal license was issued), respondent, Clampitt, as an individual mortgage broker, received at least three mortgage brokerage fees or commissions. A broker is considered to be licensed by the petitioner when a completed application form accompanied by the correct fee is received by the petitioner. It is the petitioner's practice to mail out renewal application to its approximately 6,500 licensees on July 15 of each year with the request that they be returned by August 15. All licenses expire on August 31 and are reissued for the following year to be effective from September 1 to August 31. Those applications which are received by the petitioner after August 31 bear a different license date. The correct amount to be remitted for the renewal of respondent Clampitt's individual license was $125-- a $75 license fee and a $50 guaranty fund fee. The $190 check received by the petitioner from the respondent on or before August 31, 1979, was accompanied by three renewal application cards. The petitioner did not apply $125 of the $190 to the renewal of respondent Clampitt's individual license because petitioner could not ascertain how the respondent desired to have the funds applied. Although a small minority of licensees do not renew their licenses in a timely fashion, it is not the practice of the petitioner to directly notify a licensee that his license has expired. Respondent Clampitt did hold a license with an effective date of September 13, 1979, as an additional broker for Fickling and Walker, Inc. in Winter Park, Florida. Under this license, respondent Clampitt would have no authority to act individually or on behalf of anyone other than Fickling and Walker, Inc. COUNT IV Respondent Clampitt arranged for a loan to a Mr. and Mrs. Fink. When examining the respondent's books, petitioner's financial examiner was unable to account for an apparent overcharge of $13.80 for credit life insurance on the loan. The examiner did not examine the loan closing documents with regard to this transaction. The evidence establishes that there had been a clerical error in the respondent's office concerning this transaction, that the cost of the credit life insurance had been miscalculated and that respondent Clampitt was entitled to the $13.80. COUNT V It is the practice of the respondent Clampitt to interview his clients over the telephone, look at the involved property and then, if he agrees to make a loan, send the client to a title insurance company to sign the necessary papers. These papers include a loan closing statement, the required RESPA statement and a recision notice which allows the customer to cancel the transaction within 72 hours without cost or obligation. Thereafter, generally five to seven days later, the customer returns to the title company to receive the loan proceeds. Respondent Clampitt does not take deposits and most often does not even meet this clients on a face-to-face basis. All borrower disclosures and rights required by law are provided respondent's clients by the title insurance company.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: The Administrative Charges and Complaint filed on March 23, 1981, against Joseph W. Langford be DISMISSED; The Administrative Charges and Complaint filed on February 3, 1981, against Action Mortgage Corporation be DISMISSED; Counts I, II, IV and V of the Administrative Charges and Complaint filed against Ronald E. Clampitt on February 3, 1981, be DISMISSED; and Respondent Ronald E. Clampitt be found guilty of accepting fees at a time when his individual license had expired, but, because of the unintentional violation of the pertinent statutory provisions, no disciplinary action be imposed for this offense. Respectfully submitted and entered this 27th day of July, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Walter W. Wood Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302 - The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John C. Dew and Jay Emory Wood Harris, Barrett and Dew Post Office Drawer 1441 600 Florida National Bank Building St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Comptroller Gerald A. Lewis State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Sections 494.0043(1)(b), 494.0038(1)(a) and (b)1, and 494.0038(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), by failing to provide a mortgagee's title insurance policy; by obtaining a mortgage broker fee without a written agreement; and by failing to disclose the receipt of rates, points, or fees on behalf of a lender; and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating mortgage brokers in Florida. Until September 1999, Respondent was licensed in the state as a mortgage broker pursuant to license number MB9804519. Respondent's license became inactive when Respondent did not renew her license. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was the sole owner and operator of Blackstone. Blackstone is licensed in the state as mortgage brokerage business pursuant to license number MBB9901308. On January 8, 1996, Mr. Brian S. Carter and Ms. Lisa G. Carter closed on the purchase of real property located at 1503 Mobile Avenue, Holly Hill, Florida 32117. A non-institutional lender provided a purchase money second mortgage of $19,100 through Karlis and Uldis Sprogis, as co-trustees of the K. E. Sprogis Trust. Respondent was the mortgage broker responsible for the loan in the Carter transaction (the "Carter loan"). On November 12, 1995, Respondent entered into a mortgage brokerage contract with the Carters on behalf of Blackstone. Respondent failed to obtain, or retain in the Carter loan file, a written receipt from the non-institutional lender for the title policy, an opinion of title by an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida, a binder of the title insurance or a conditional opinion of title, or a waiver thereof by the non- institutional lender. In her Petition for Hearing, Respondent admits the foregoing findings pertaining to the Carter loan. On July 11, 1996, Ms. Kay George closed on the purchase of real property located at 2753 Foxdale Drive, Deltona, Florida 32738. Ms. George obtained a purchase money first mortgage in the amount of $56,000 from an institutional lender. Respondent was the mortgage broker responsible for the loan in the George transaction (the "George loan"). On June 15, 1996, Respondent entered into a mortgage brokerage contract with Ms. George on behalf of Blackstone. The mortgage broker contract stated that the mortgage brokerage fee to be paid by Ms. George would not exceed $400. However, the contract disclosed that Respondent would receive between $500 and $2,000 in additional compensation from the lender. The loan-closing documents in the George loan disclose that Respondent received additional compensation of $1,140 comprised of $840 in loan origination fees and $300 in processing fees. The mortgage broker contract failed to disclose the loan origination and processing fees paid by the lender to Respondent. On December 29, 1997, Mr. Roy J. Piper and Ms. Laura A. Piper closed on the purchase of real property located at 30 Arrowhead Circle, Ormond Beach, Florida 32174. EMB Corporation ("EMB") provided a purchase money first mortgage of $68,400. Respondent was the mortgage broker responsible for the loan in the Piper transaction (the "Piper loan"). On December 1, 1997, Respondent entered into a mortgage brokerage contract with the Pipers on behalf of Blackstone. The mortgage broker contract failed to state the amount of the mortgage brokerage fee to be paid by the Pipers. The contract also failed to disclose any additional compensation Respondent was to receive from EMB. The closing documents show that EMB paid Respondent $1,926.25 in additional compensation as a "broker service release premium." On April 9, 1998, Ms. Sunday S. Reiland closed on the purchase of real property located at 300 Chipeway Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida 32118. Ms. Reiland obtained a first mortgage in the amount of $96,000 from an institutional lender. Respondent was the mortgage broker responsible for the loan in the Reiland transaction (the "Reiland loan"). On March 9, 1998, Respondent entered into a mortgage brokerage contract with Ms. Reiland on behalf of Blackstone. The mortgage broker contract stated that the mortgage brokerage fee to be paid by Ms. Reiland would not exceed $250. However, the contract disclosed that Respondent would receive between $960 and $3,000 in additional compensation from the lender. The loan closing documents in the Reiland loan disclose that Respondent received additional compensation of $730 comprised of a $480 "cash out fee" and a $250 processing fee. The mortgage broker contract failed to disclose the "cash out fee" and processing fee the lender paid to Respondent. On April 23, 1998, Mr. Brian M. Reigel closed on the purchase of real property located at 931 Aspen Drive, South Daytona, Florida 32119. Mr. Reigel obtained a first mortgage in the amount of $39,425 from an institutional lender. Respondent was the mortgage broker responsible for the loan in the Reigel transaction (the "Reigel loan"). On April 8, 1998, Respondent entered into a mortgage brokerage contract with Mr. Reigel on behalf of Blackstone. The mortgage broker contract stated that the mortgage brokerage fee for the Reigel loan would not exceed $550. However, the contract also stated that Respondent would receive additional compensation from the lender ranging between $0 and $3,000. The loan closing documents in the Reigel loan disclose that Respondent received additional compensation of $1,038 from the borrower's funds for a loan discount fee and a processing fee. On October 16, 1998, Mr. William M. Netterville, III, closed on the purchase of real property located at 808 South Grandview Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida 32118. Mr. Netterville obtained a first mortgage in the amount of $66,000 from an institutional lender. Respondent was the mortgage broker responsible for the loan in the Netterville transaction (the "Netterville loan"). On September 10, 1998, Respondent entered into a mortgage brokerage contract with Mr. Netterville on behalf of Blackstone. The mortgage broker contract stated that the mortgage brokerage fee to be paid by the Mr. Netterville would not exceed $1,000. The loan-closing documents in the Netterville loan disclose that an additional mortgage broker fee of $500 was paid from the borrower's funds to Grandview Financial. The mortgage broker contract failed to disclose the fee paid to Grandview. The mortgage broker contract in the Carter loan stated that the mortgage broker "can make loan commitments." However, Respondent could not make loan commitments. Only the lender could make loan commitments pursuant to a written commitment or "lock-in" for the loan. There is no evidence that the Carters ever obtained the necessary loan commitment from the lender. Respondent represented that the mortgage broker was able to provide loan commitments without disclosing the necessity for a written commitment from the lender.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Section 494.038(1) in the George, Reiland, and Reigel transactions; guilty of violating Sections 494.043(1)(b) and 494.038(2) in the Carter transaction; guilty of violating Section 494.038(1) in the Piper and Netterville transactions; and issuing a written reprimand for Respondent's violations in the Carter transaction; and imposing fines totaling $2,426.25 for Respondent's violations in the Piper and Netterville transactions. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry Hooper, General Counsel Fletcher Building, Suite 526 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Chris Lindamood, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Hurston Tower South, Suite S-225 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Teresa M. Steininger 8907 Roberts Drive Dunwoody, Georgia 30350
