Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, both respondents held real estate broker's licenses. The corporate license is No. 0222663 and the individual license is No. 0159888. The individual respondent has been the only owner of the corporate respondent and the only broker the corporation has ever employed. At one time Angela Lewis worked for Broker Jim, Inc. as a licensed real estate salesperson. On October 6, 1981, it was she who signed, on the broker's behalf, a listing agreement with Laverne Lockhart and Faith Willis, the sisters who jointly owned the house at 1535 NW 116th Street in Miami, Florida (the house) . Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Kenneth G. Wilson, who wanted to buy the house, had $5000 available. The house was encumbered with a mortgage in the approximate amount of $33,000 and the sisters eventually agreed to take $44,000 for the property. On the form contract signed by both owners and Mr. Wilson, and dated November 25, 1981, under the heading "Terms and conditions of Sale:", the following was typewritten: 1,000 as mentioned above. Purchaser agrees to make an additional deposit in the amount $4,000 before closing. Purchaser agrees to assume an existing first mortgage in the Approx. amount $33,000, payab[l]e $340.00 P.I.T.I at 10.5 percent per annum in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth therein. Purchaser to obtain a P.M. 2nd mort[g]age in the amount of $6,000 at 18 percent per annum payable Approx. $152.37 for a period of 5 yrs. Balance of purchase price to be paid in cash or cashier check at time of closing. Property being purchased in its present as is condition. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Elsewhere on the printed form appears the following: When this contract is executed by the purchaser and the seller and the sale is not closed due to any default or failure on the part of the purchaser, the seller, at his option, may seek to enforce this contract, or else the seller may direct the holder of the deposit to pay the broker his brokerage fee not to exceed one-half of the deposit and to pay the balance of the deposit to the seller as consideration for execution of this agreement, and the holder of the deposit shall be held harmless by all parties for disbursement in accordance with this agreement. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Ms. Lewis prepared the form contract. Mr. Muhammad, as he is now known, read it over and approved it. In retrospect, he believes this was a mistake, because the contract fails clearly to reflect the parties' understanding that the offer was contingent on Mr. Wilson's ability to borrow $6,000, to be secured by a second mortgage on the house. A deposit ticket dated November 25, 1981, accompanied Mr. Wilson's check for $1000 when respondents deposited it to their escrow account. The bank credited the escrow account on December 1, 1981. Neither Mr. Wilson's efforts to obtain a loan, nor those of respondents on his behalf, availed, and word reached Ms. Lockhart that the transaction was doomed for want of sufficient purchase money. Over the phone, Ms. Lockhart told Helen Jackson, respondents' secretary, that she wanted a "refund" of the deposit. A lawyer Ms. Lockhart consulted communicated a similar demand to respondent Muhammad personally. Respondents gave Ms. Lockhart no money and no accounting. The money stayed in respondents' escrow account until it was used on Mr. Wilson's behalf in the purchase of another house respondents had listed.
Findings Of Fact Although the parties to this case stipulated that the contract between the LaPointes and the Crowes was a valid contract for the purchase and sale of real estate, a genuine dispute arose between the LaPointes and the Crowes in that regard. Respondents became involved in this matter by showing the Crowes' property to the LaPointes on or before May 9, 1983, and thereby becoming a "co-operating broker'. with Deltona's Marco Island Realty Co. under an Exclusive Right To Sell agreement between Deltona and the Crowes dated January 13, 1983. Under the Exclusive Right To Sell, the Crowes agreed to pay Deltona a fee of 6% of the sales price for brokerage services and agreed, if a buyer failed to close a sales contract and forfeited a deposit to the Crowes, that Deltona could retain one- half of the deposit, but not exceeding the total amount of Deltona's fee, as compensation. The Exclusive Right To Sell also provided that Deltona was responsible to promptly pay any cooperating broker who sells the property for his services as soon as possible after receipt by Deltona of its real estate broker fee as provided in the Exclusive Right To Sell. By May 10, 1983, the LaPointes had made an offer to buy the property and the Crowes, by May 10, 1983, telegram to Deltona, agreed to sell the property for "$165,000, $500 in escrow with balance of $15,500 additional deposit after acceptance with balance at closing . . . sales commission $8,650. On May 11, 1983, Respondent Mary S. Davey, signed the sales contract for the LaPointes' purchase of the Crowes' property as "Agent (authorized by Buyer)." The sales contract also recited: "Buyer acknowledges that Marco Beach Enterprises, Inc/Deltona Marco Island Realty is the procuring real estate broker(s) in this transaction, and that the Broker is the agent for the Seller, and is being paid by the Seller." Respondent. Davey notified the LaPointes of the requirement for a $500 initial deposit and submitted the signed sales contract for the Crowes' signature. By letter dated May 12, 1983, Respondents confirmed "that the total commission to be paid on the sale of the [Crowes'] property is $8,650.00." It also confirmed: said commission is to be split 50/50 between MARCO BEACH ENTERPRISES, INC. and Deltona's Marco Island Realty." Also on May 12, 1983, the LaPointes sent Respondents a check for the $500 initial deposit with a note asking for a complete inventory of the contents of the condominium the LaPointes had inspected and a list of renters. The Crowes signed the Sales Contract on May 16, 1983. By May 24, 1983, Respondents still had not complied with the request for a complete inventory of the condominium's furnishings and for a list of renters. On that date, Respondents sent the LaPointes a copy of the signed Sales Contract with a letter requesting them to sign the Sales Contract under Respondent Davey's signature. Before they arrived, the LaPointes' May 25, 1983, letter to Respondents crossed in the mail. It requested that Respondents put something in the contract concerning pro-ration of water bills and taxes and payment of a water damage bill by the Crowes. The LaPointes repeated their request for an accurate inventory of the furnishings of the condominium and stated that they were placing their trust in Respondents to represent the LaPointes' interests. Some time between the LaPointes' receipt of Respondents' May 24 letter with a copy of the Sales Contract and June 13, 1893, the LaPointes decided to ask for cancellation of the purchase. The LaPointes cited circumstances involving their financing and their disappointment that Respondents had not furnished an inventory of the furnishings. By June 16, 1983, Respondents had responded to the request for cancellation, vigorously contending that a valid and binding contract existed between the LaPointes and the Crowes. By June 24, 1983, the Crowes, through an attorney, echoed their agreement with the position taken by the Respondents that there was a valid and binding contract. By letter dated June 29, 1983, from the LaPointes attorney, the LaPointes questioned the validity of the contract, saying that Respondent Davey had no authority to sign the Sales Contract on behalf of the LaPointes, who never did sign. The Respondents got a copy of this June 29 letter. On July 11, 1983, the LaPointes, through a Florida attorney, demanded of Respondents that their deposit be, returned. Respondents tried to extricate themselves by referring the LaPointes to the Crowes' attorney. The Crowes and the LaPointes remained at a stalemate until after May 7, 1984, when the Crowes sold their property to another purchaser for $162,500. Thereafter, by about June 19, 1984, the LaPointes, the Crowes and Deltona had negotiated their proposed resolution of the matter by disbursement of $3,000.00 to the Crowes and $13,500.00, plus all accrued interest, to the LaPointes. Respondents had not been included in any of these negotiations, and they refused to sign the agreement. As stipulated by the parties to this case, the matter remains unresolved. The Florida Real Estate Commission Handbook states in pertinent part: "But, what are the rights of the seller and the broker? In the absence of a specific agreement or custom, when a purchaser refuses to sign a contract after the offer has been accepted, the broker is only entitled to the agreed or usual commission percentage of the deposit. Where the purchaser refuses to go through with a contract by which he is bound and which can be enforced against him by the seller, the broker may, in the absence of a contract or custom, appropriate the deposit up to the amount of the earned commission."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint that has been filed by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, against Respondents, Mary S.·Davey and Marco Beach Enterprises, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 7 day of August, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7 day of August, 1986. APPENDIX The following are rulings on proposed findings of fact to the extent required by Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985): Paragraphs 1 through 6 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as substantially factually accurate and are incorporated in the Findings Of Fact to the extent necessary. Paragraphs 8 and 10 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact would be included in paragraph 1 above except that they are unnecessary. Paragraph 7 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact is rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Paragraph 9 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and/or Findings Of Fact. It ignores the Exclusive Right To Sell which must be read together with the Sales Contract. Respondents submitted no proposed findings of fact designated as such or in a form which entitles them to specific rulings. However, their proposed findings of fact were carefully considered. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Hartmann, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Arthur V. Woodward, Esquire 940 North Collier Blvd. P. O. Box 1 Marco Island, Florida 33937 Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL
The Issue Whether respondent violated Section 498.023, Florida Statutes, by offering or disposing of an interest in subdivided lands (Pinecrest Estates) without first registering it or delivering a public offering statement to the purchasers and, if so, what penalty should be assessed or affirmative action ordered.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter an order assessing a $10,000 civil penalty against respondent for its violation of Chapter 498 Florida Statutes; requiring respondent to fully disclose the adverse features of the Pinecrest Estates property to each of its prior purchasers, such disclosure to be accomplished in a manner approved by the Division; requiring respondent to offer and make full refunds to its prior purchasers who desire a refund, such refunds to be made in a manner approved by the Division and conditioned only on reconveyance of the land to the respondent or recission of the agreement for deed; and requiring respondent to record in the official records of St. Johns County, Florida, all outstanding agreements for deeds covering lots belonging to prior purchasers who, after disclosure, choose not to request refunds. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 11th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1983.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's 1978 cost report be modified consistent with the foregoing adjustments. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1982.
The Issue Whether Norman Wayne Lund, an active broker in Lund Realty, Inc., a licensed corporate broker, failed to account or deliver to Daisy and Kenneth Parnell money in the form of a deposit which had come into his hands and which was not his property or which he was not in law or equity entitled to retain, under the circumstances, and at the time which was agreed upon or which was required by law or, in the absence of an agreed upon time, upon demand of the Parnells, who were entitled to such an accounting or delivery.
Recommendation The position and actions of the various individuals should also be considered in this case in arriving at a penalty because none of the parties have completely "clean hands." The Parnells precipitated the breach by insistence on a note and mortgage; the Hammers have made no attempt to clarify the situation by paying the commission and cost; and the attorneys kept Lund Realty completely in the dark about what was transpiring. The Lunds are the only ones involved in the transaction who have tried to carry out their obligation. Further, they also are the only one who stand to lose financially with out seeking judicial relief. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and other factors bearing on the case, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Florida Real Estate Commission place Norman Wayne Lund on probation for one year, and suspend the registration of Lund Realty, Inc. until the escrow funds concerned have been interplead in a court of competent jurisdiction to resolve the conflicting claims to said funds. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of January, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commissions 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Carleen Chalk Lund 612 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 32741 Norman Wayne Lund 612 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 32741
Findings Of Fact The land encompassed within the mobile home park known as Mohawk Village was purchased by Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, a corporation owned and controlled by the Tanner family. The majority of the stock in Respondent is owned by the oldest son; another son is president of Respondent; and the father, L. William Tanner, served as "consultant" to the corporation. This tract was initially divided into some 700-odd lots which were being sold to the public in 1980 as mobile home sites. The land was purchased from North Orlando Sewer and Water Company, which agreed to provide sewer and water services to the subdivision and to have these facilities in place by January 1, 1981. Respondent never registered with the Petitioner in accordance with Chapter 498, Florida Statutes. North Orlando Sewer and Water Company failed to provide sewer service to this development and none of the home sites were available for occupancy January 1, 1981, as promised to buyers by Respondent. Without sewer service it became necessary to go to septic tanks and this required larger lots per mobile home site. The tract was replatted to provide 300-odd lots despite the previous sale of smaller lots to buyers. These buyers were advised their lots would have to be swapped and when some objected and demanded their money back, without success, Petitioner was made aware of the development and investigated. The investigation led to the entering of a Cease and Desist and Consent Order (Exhibit 1). Therein Petitioner essentially agreed to forego action against Respondent for prior violations of Chapter 498, which Respondent contended it was subject to; and Respondent agreed to cease all leasing until the site was ready for occupancy, to provide Petitioner with copies of all leases in effect, as well as copies of all future leases executed, to deposit funds received from buyers in escrow until after receipt of a certificate of occupancy, and to take necessary steps to ensure all future leases fall within the statutory exemptions set forth in Section 498.025(1)(g), Florida Statutes. L. William Tanner was paid a consulting fee by Respondent "in the ballpark of $100,000." In addition, he was to own the companies that provided utilities to the park (after default by North Orlando Sewer and Water Company), and furnished porches, decks, built walkways, roads, etc. Following the Consent Order funds were received payable to Tanner-controlled companies that were not deposited in the escrow account. These funds were not lease payments but came from the lessees for sewer and water hookups, porches, decks, etc. Mohawk Village received its first certificate of occupancy on 14 January 1982. Between 17 April 1981, when the Consent Order was entered, and 14 January 1982, lot leases were sold to Gould on 30 November 1981; to Herring on 12 September 1981; and to Roberts on 14 January 1982 (Exhibit 6). The sales to Gould and Herring were clearly during the period Respondent had consented not to sell leases. Exhibit 1 authorized Respondent to renegotiate and relocate current lessees to new mobile home sites under a plan to use alternate utility services from those initially to be provided by North Orlando Sewer and Water Company "if such plan is implemented at no additional cost to the individual lessees." Those who had bought leases under the original scheme agreed to pay $29 per month to lessor. Leases sold after the decision to use septic tanks where the number of lots was reduced from 700-odd to 300-odd, provided the lessees would pay the lessor $59 per month. Respondent advised the earlier lessees that they would have to pay $59 per month in lieu of $29. When they objected and demanded refunds of what they had paid, some of them were promised refunds but to date very few have received any refunds. Changing their rental fee from $29 to $59 violated the Consent Order. The only change in the lease before and after the execution of the Consent Order was the change of this monthly rental payment. Since the original lease did not qualify for exemption under Section 498.025(1)(g), Florida Statutes, the amended lease, which merely changed the monthly rental fee, did not qualify for exemption. Leases on these lots were sold at prices ranging from $1,000 to $7,000. At no time relevant hereto did Respondent hold a dealer's license to deal in or sell mobile homes (Exhibit 3) There was no valid reservation program established by Respondent pursuant to Section 498.024, Florida Statutes, nor did Respondent apply for or receive approval of a public offering statement for Mohawk Village (Exhibit 2). All leases sold provided, in addition to a habitable lot, that the seller would provide recreational facilities. Those leases sold in 1980 promised a lot on which the buyer could move his mobile-home by January 1, 1981. Not only was the deadline missed but also Respondent has provided no recreational facilities. One witness who sold her home and bought a mobile home could not move it to the site in accordance with the contract because of lack of utilities and was forced to acquire another residence. Although proper demand was made she has been refunded none of her purchase money. According to his testimony, L. William Tanner has developed about one hundred subdivisions throughout the United States since 1946. Some 20 such subdivisions have been developed by him in Florida. He is aware of the Florida statutes regulating the subdivision and sale of lands, and contends that the Mohawk Village subdivision is exempt because Petitioner does not have jurisdiction over 99-year leases. He further contends that the monthly rental payments of $29 or $59 for 99 years brings the price paid for the lots to more than $50,000, thereby exempting them from the provisions of Chapter 498. Prior to the commencement of this hearing, Mohawk Village was transferred to Gould, who had been involved in supplying mobile homes to lot purchasers in the park. According to Tanner's testimony "it was not much of a sale" with him insisting Gould and Mohician Valley (apparently the new name for the mobile home subdivision) acknowledging existing mortgage, the Consent Agreement with Petitioner, and the obligation to refund the monies. No documentary evidence was presented to show that Tanner or his immediate family does not continue to own controlling interest in this mobile home park.
