The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether the amendments to the Town of Ponce Inlet Comprehensive Plan adopted by Ordinances 2008-01 (2008 Amendment) and 2010-09 (2010 Amendment) are "in compliance" as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Pacetta, LLC, is a Florida limited liability company that owns real property in Ponce Inlet. Petitioner, Mar-Tim, Inc., is a Florida corporation that owns real property in Ponce Inlet. Petitioner, Down the Hatch, Inc., is a Florida corporation that owns real property in Ponce Inlet. Petitioner, Pacetta, LLC, controls and manages Mar-Tim and Down the Hatch. Petitioners' real property in the Town is directly affected by the challenged plan amendments. Petitioners submitted objections to the Town during the period of time beginning with the transmittal hearing and ending with the adoption of the challenged amendments. The Town of Ponce Inlet is a municipality in Volusia County that adopted a comprehensive plan in 1990 ("Town Plan"), which it amends from time to time pursuant to chapter 163, Florida Statutes. Petitioners' Property Petitioners' property is located on the north cut of the Ponce de Leon Inlet. The current uses on the property include a restaurant, a marina and boat repair yard with a marine travel lift, and vacant lands. An old cemetery is located on a portion of Petitioners' property. A shell midden (ancient refuse pile) is located on a portion of Petitioners' property. Petitioners' property has single family residences on three sides. A significant tree canopy is adjacent to Petitioners' property and large oak trees are on the property. A historic cemetery known as Pacetti Cemetery is near Petitioners' property. Several historic buildings are located near Petitioners' property. A museum and exhibit building are located nearby on Beach Street. Beach Street and Sailfish Drive are the main roads to access the Petitioners' property. These two roads have been designated by the Town as Scenic Roads. Petitioners' property comprises approximately 15 acres. About 2.4 acres are zoned for multifamily development. The remaining acreage is zoned Riverfront Commercial. There is also a special Riverfront Overlay District ("ROD") that covers Petitioners' property. Background There are at least three areas in the Town designated Riverfront Commercial. The Riverfront Commercial land use category permits wet boat storage, dry boat storage, boat sales and services, fishing charter boat dockage, fishing and boat equipment and supplies, seafood markets, restaurants, boatels, and boat construction and repairs. There is only one area in the Town designated ROD. In the ROD, land uses are more restricted. Dry boat storage facilities are allowed by special exception in Riverfront Commercial, but not within the ROD. The Town created the Riverfront Commercial District and the ROD in its Land Use and Development Code in 2004, but these land use categories were not identified in the Town Plan at that time. After the designation of the ROD in 2004, Petitioners began to acquire several parcels of land located within the ROD. The Town continued to engage its citizens in a visioning process for the Town's waterfront, which lead to the 2008 Amendment. As originally proposed, the 2008 Amendment allowed upland boat storage in the ROD under certain conditions in Future land Use Element ("FLUE") Policy 4.1.5. A citizens group obtained a sufficient number of signatures to place on the general election ballot a charter amendment to prohibit dry boat storage facilities in the ROD. Therefore, when the Town adopted the 2008 Amendment, it changed FLUE Policy 4.1.5 to prohibit dry boat storage facilities. Petitioners challenged the charter amendment in circuit court and the court determined that the charter amendment was invalid. The court also invalidated FLUE Policy 4.1.5, determining that the policy was only adopted to conform to the charter amendment. The circuit court decision was affirmed on appeal. Town of Ponce Inlet v. Pacetta, LLC, 63 So. 3d 840 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). Petitioners also asked the circuit court to invalidate the ROD provisions of the Land Use and Development Code, but the circuit court declined to rule on their validity. Following the court's invalidation of FLUE Policy 4.1.5, the Town adopted the 2010 Amendment, which creates a new Policy 4.1.5. The new policy also prohibits dry boat storage facilities in the ROD. Petitioners' Objections Petitioners' overarching objection to the plan amendments is that they prohibit Petitioners from building a dry boat storage facility. Petitioners claim the prohibition is inconsistent with other policies of the Town Plan and is not supported by data and analysis. The term "dry boat storage facility" is not defined in the Town Plan. The Volusia County Manatee Protection Plan ("MPP"), which is adopted by reference in Coastal Management Element ("CME") Objective 1.6, defines dry boat storage facility as "an upland structure used for storing watercraft." Petitioners already store some boats on trailers or boat stands on the upland while they are being repaired or refurbished in the boatyard. The Town interprets the Town Plan to allow this type of upland storage in the ROD, citing FLUE Policy 4.1.4 of the 2008 Plan Amendment which explains that dry boat storage means "multiple level boat racks" in "fully enclosed buildings" and not the "[l]imited storage of boats on trailers or boat stands" in conjunction with boatyard operations. FLUE Policy 4.1.5 Petitioners' objections to FLUE Policy 4.1.5, which was adopted in the 2010 Amendment, are addressed first because the associated issues affect the other policies that have been challenged. FLUE Policy 4.1.5 states: The Town shall maintain a zoning overlay district over those Riverfront Commercial and High Density Multi-family Residential lands west of Sailfish Drive, south of Bounty Lane and north of the most southerly portion of Sailfish Drive to promote the water-oriented character of the River and compatibility with adjacent residential properties, to ensure protection of view corridors of the River and the tree canopy in the Front Street Area, and to preserve the historic setting and unique character of this area, including, but not limited to, the scenic roads of Beach Street and Sailfish Drive. Dry boat storage facilities shall be prohibited within this overlay district. Petitioners argue that the prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in Policy 4.1.5 conflicts with the MPP adopted by reference in the Town Plan because the MPP expresses a preference for dry slips over wet slips. The MPP includes a Boat Facility Siting Plan, which contains requirements that must be met for new or expanded marina facilities. The Plan requires the Town to place a priority on the development of boat slip capacity at or south of Ponce de Leon Inlet, to encourage marinas to include both wet slips and dry slips, and to "utilize dry storage to the fullest extent possible in addition to wet slips." The Boat Facility Siting Plan includes best management practices ("BMPs"). One of these BMPs is "Use of upland dry storage shall take precedence over the creation of new wet slips." The prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in the ROD will likely reduce the number of boats launched in the ROD because fewer boats can be accomodated in wetslips than in upland dry boat storage facilities.2/ This proposition was not rebutted by Petitioners. A major objective of the MPP is to reduce manatee injuries and deaths due to collisions with boats. The fewer boats, the fewer potential collisions with manatees. Therefore, the effect of the prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in the ROD is consistent with the objectives of the MPP. Dry boat storage facilities are allowed elsewhere in the Town. The design standards and BMPs in the MPP are described as permitting requirements, not as zoning or land use restrictions. The MPP does not state that all of its design standards and BMPs must be reflected in every permit issued by the Town, County, or State. It does not require, for example, that every marina must have more dry slips than wet slips. The MPP acknowledges that marina sites must conform to local land use and zoning regulations that affect the construction of new wet and dry slips. Under the Policy 4.1.5, utilizing dry storage to the fullest extent possible in the ROD means allowing upland storage of boats on trailers and boat stands in conjunction with boatyard operations. Petitioners also contend that Policy 4.1.5 is not supported by relevant and appropriate data and an analysis by the Town. The prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in the ROD is supported by data and analysis that shows that the noise, fumes, traffic, scale, and appearance of dry boat storage facilities is incompatible with residential uses and with scenic, historic, and natural resources nearby. Petitioners showed that some of the same incompatibility factors exist in other Riverfront Commercial areas, but the factors are not as numerous and pronounced as they are in the ROD. FLUE Policy 1.2.2(g) Petitioners challenge FLUE Policy 1.2.2(g), which limits the floor area for buildings within the Riverfront Commercial District (including the ROD) to 5,000 square feet. Petitioners argue that this limit is in conflict with CME Policy 1.6.6, which requires the Town to adopt and maintain a boat slip allocation program pursuant to which the Town made an allocation of 213 dry slips to Petitioners' property. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, this argument cannot be raised in this proceeding because the 5,000 square- foot limit was already in the Town Plan before the 2008 Amendment. Petitioners argue that the floor area limit is subject to compliance review in this proceeding because its effect has been substantially altered by new provisions in the 2008 Amendment. The 2008 Amendment added a floor area ratio (gross floor area of buildings divided by upland lot area) limit of 35 percent for Riverfront Commercial, and an increase in floor area up to 10,000 square feet is made possible in a new Planned Waterfront Development District. However, these and other changes in the 2008 Amendment do not alter the fundamental effect of the existing floor area limit. The Town has adopted a boat slip allocation program as required by CME Policy 1.6.6. The allocation of 213 dry slips to Petitioners' property is not required by Policy 1.6.6 or by any other policy in the Town Plan. Petitioners cannot base a claim of internal inconsistency on matters that are external to the Town Plan.3/ Even if the floor area limit in FLUE Policy 1.1.1(g) is subject to compliance review, it is not inconsistent with the MPP for the same reasons that the prohibition of dry boat storage facilities in FLUE Policy 1.4.5 is not inconsistent with the MPP. FLUE Policy 4.2.4 Policy 4.2.4 of the 2008 Amendment states that, in developing design standards for a new Planned Waterfront Development District, limited exceptions might be allowed to the floor area limit of 5,000 square feet, up to 10,000 square feet, but this exception will not apply to dry boat storage facilities. No Planned Waterfront Development District has yet been created in the Town. Despite Petitioners' objection to the 5,000 square- foot floor area limit generally applicable in Riverfront Commercial, Petitioners argue that there is no data and analysis to support the Town's allowance for an increase in the floor area limit to 10,000 square feet in a Planned Waterfront Development District. The knowledge of what a 5,000 square foot or a 10,000 square foot building looks like is all the data needed to set a limit based on scale. CME Policy 1.6.6 CME Policy 1.6.6 of the 2008 Amendment states: The Town shall maintain and enforce its boat slip allocation program. This program shall provide for equitable allocations of new wet and dry slips. Upland slips may be permitted under this allocation program if they can meet the requirements of the Comprehensive Town and the Town Codes. Upland/dry slips development shall be balanced against other community policies, including neighborhood compatibility and visual impacts. Dry slips shall not take precedence over wet slips based solely on environmental concerns. Petitioners contend that Policy 1.6.6 conflicts with the building size limitations in FLUE Policies 1.2.2(g) and 4.2.4 and with the prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in FLUE Policy 4.1.5 because the size limits and prohibition do not allow for the balancing called for in Policy 1.6.6. Petitioners are interpreting the policy more literally than the Town. Things are not going to be placed on scales and made to balance in the middle. The Town interprets the policy to direct the Town to consider competing policies according to their relative importance. In Riverfront Commercial areas other than the ROD, there can be combinations of wet and dry slips, including dry boat storage facilities, but the floor area limit of 5,000 square feet is a "community policy" that will also apply to affect the outcome of the balancing. In the ROD, the prohibition against dry boat storage facilities is another community policy that must be applied. The Town has established a community policy to prohibit dry boat storage facilities in the ROD because the Town has determined that such facilities do not harmonize with nearby residential uses and scenic, historic, and natural resources. Data and analysis support this determination. Although Petitioners got a Town witness to testify that a prohibition does not allow for balancing, the record shows that the Town gives no weight to the desirability of dry boat storage facilities in the ROD and some weight to the desirability of wet slips, so that the scales always tip in favor of wet slips and for boats on trailers or boat stands in a boatyard. Petitioners contend that the statement in FLUE Policy 1.6.6 that "Dry slips shall not take precedence over wet slips based solely on environmental concerns," is directly in conflict with the MPP, because the MPP states a preference for dry slips based specifically on environmental concerns (manatees). However, the meaning of the policy statement is that environmental concerns, alone, will not determine how many dry slips are allowed. Other concerns will be taken into account in determining how many dry slips are allowed. That is not inconsistent with the MPP. Recreational and Working Waterfronts Petitioners contend that the floor area limit in FLUE Policy 1.2.2(g), the prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in FLUE Policy 4.1.5, and the floor area limit for dry storage facilities in FLUE Policy 4.2.4 are inconsistent with section 163.3177(6)(a)3.c., which requires a FLUE to include criteria to "[e]ncourage preservation of recreational and commercial working waterfronts for water-dependent uses in coastal communities." The term "recreational and commercial working waterfronts," is defined in section 342.201(2)(b): "Recreational and commercial working waterfront" means parcel or parcels of real property that provide access for water- dependent commercial activities or provide access to the public to the navigable waters of the state. Recreational and commercial working waterfronts require direct access to or a location on, over, or adjacent to a navigable body of water. The term includes water-dependent facilities that are open to the public and offer public access by vessels to the waters of the state or that are support facilities for recreational, commercial, research, or governmental vessels. These facilities include docks, wharfs, lifts, wet and dry marinas, boat ramps, boat hauling and repair facilities, commercial fishing facilities, boat construction facilities, and other support structures over the water. There is no current use of Petitioners' property that is prohibited by the challenged amendments. In other words, Petitioners' working waterfront is preserved. To the extent section 163.3177(6)(a)3.c. should be interpreted more broadly to encourage not only preservation, but also economic vitality through further development and redevelopment of waterfronts, the Town has adopted FLUE criteria to encourage their development and redevelopment. The floor area limit and the prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in the ROD do not prevent Petitioners from further developing their working waterfront to add or expand uses. Evaluation and Appraisal Petitioners challenge FLUE Policies 1.2.2(g) and 4.2.4 and CME Policy 1.6.6 as constituting a failure of the Town to update its plan to address the changes needed as identified in the Town's Evaluation and Assessment Report ("EAR"). Petitioners failed to prove that the Town did not make the changes identified in the EAR. Summary Petitioners failed to prove beyond fair debate that the 2008 Amendment or the 2010 Amendment create internal inconsistency in the Town Plan. Petitioners failed to prove that the 2008 Amendment or the 2010 Amendment is not supported by relevant data and analysis. Petitioners failed to prove beyond fair debate that the 2008 Amendment or the 2010 Amendment is not in compliance.
Recommendation Based on foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity enter a final order determining that the plan amendments adopted by Town Ordinances 2008-01 and 2010-09 are in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 2012.
The Issue Should the Respondent, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, grant the applicant, JEMAAM, INC., a dredge and fill permit pursuant to the Notice of Intent dated March 2, 1988, in File No. 361414445?
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, JEMAAM, INC., is the owner and the developer of real property contiguous to state waters in Lee County, Florida. The condominium project on the property is known as Island's End Condominiums. As part of Phase III of the condominium project, Respondent JEMAAM built a dock. This dock is the subject of this administrative hearing because the Respondent JEMAAM wants to reconfigure and relocate portions of the dock structure. Respondent JEMAAM filed an application for a dredge and fill permit with the Respondent DER in order to modify the exiting dock. The Respondent JEMAAM seeks to modify the dock by relocating a 3.92' x 61' section of the existing dock to a more waterward location. This area of the dock is the southerly extension, which fronts the Petitioners' condominium unit. The application process was begun on November 3, 1987, and completed on February 26, 1988. A Notice of Intent to Issue a dredge and fill permit for the proposed project was issued on March 2, 1988, by the Respondent DER. The dock is subject to the Respondent DER's permitting requirements because the construction activity is to take place in state waters and the dock structure exceeds 1,000 square feet in size. In addition, the Respondent JEMAAM has agreed not to undertake further dredge or fill work or any other construction in wetland areas under the Respondent DER's jurisdiction unless a valid permit had been obtained for such activities. The Petitioners, LEO J. BERGER and KATHLEEN D. BERGER, are the owners of Condominium Unit Number 102 in Phase III of Island's End Condominiums in Lee County, Florida, which is adjacent to Respondent JEMAAM's dock. The Petitioners filed an administrative complaint in which they disputed the appropriateness of the Intent to Issue dated March 2, 1988. In support of their position, the Petitioners identified a number of areas of controversy and alleged that the Respondent JEMAAM's application did not meet the "reasonable assurances" required for permit issuance. The Petitioners' allegations, which are properly before the Hearing Officer, are as follows: Shallow water in the area where the new dock configuration is to be located would result in propeller dredging of littoral shallows. The proposed waterward relocation of a portion of the dock would present a navigational hazard in the channel as well as in the shallows and around the dock. The proposed relocation would cause harmful shoaling in the area, which would affect boating safety as well as the habitat. The dock relocation and associated boat traffic will disrupt and harm bird and fish habitats. The dock may be within the Estero Bay Aquatic Preserve. Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, I find as follows as to the allegations raised by the Petitioners in their administrative complaint: There are sufficient water depths, based upon the Bathymetric profile and a number of reviews by the Respondent DER in the proposed relocation area, to prevent harmful propeller dredging by boats using the dock. However, to assure that harmful turbidity and propeller dredging does not occur, the dock extension arm can be completely handrailed in the shallow, landward area. The addition of a shielded, steady burning light and navigational markers should minimize any impediment to navigation caused by the dock relocation. The main channel is not far from this area, and most boating traffic in the general area is confined to the main channel. The additional markers and lighting requirements combine with the current conditions to alert all reasonable and prudent boaters to the hazards and challenges of the area. The evidence is inconclusive as to the extent to which the dock structure has increased shoaling in the area. Much of the shoaling is attributed to the natural conditions of the area, a back-bay coastal zone. The shoaling which has occurred is thought to be beneficial by the experts who testified at hearing because the development of grasses has increased. This creates a positive habitat for Cuban shoalweed, brittle starfish, and several species of crab. Relocation of a portion of the dock will not substantially affect the shoaling activity in the area. The bird and fish habitats in the area do not appear to be adversely affected by the current dock. It is not anticipated that the relocation of a portion of the dock will change the ongoing development of the habitats. The bird roosting area on the sandbar includes a larger variety of species now than it did before the current dock was built, according to studies done by James W. Beever III. The installation of the additional channel markers was suggested by Beever, an expert witness in the case, as a means to enhance the viability of the sandbar as a habitat. The markers aid in steering boat traffic away from the area and prevent the beaching of boats on the sandbar. James W. Beever III is the current resource and research coordinator of the Estero Bay Aquatic Preserve. Based upon his testimony, the proposed dock relocation is not within the aquatic preserve. The areas of controversy raised by the Petitioners in their administrative complaint were sufficiently met by the reasonable assurances of the Respondent JEMAAM that the purported harms would not occur. The project is not contrary to the public interest under the criteria set forth in Section 403.918, Florida Statutes, as represented by the Respondent DER in the Notice of Intent to Issue and proved at hearing.
The Issue The issue is whether petitioners' development is entitled to a favorable determination by respondent under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes (1989), and thus is exempt from development of regional impact review.
Findings Of Fact PETITIONERS' EXCEPTIONS In its Exception No. 1., Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's determination that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that Lee County Sheriff's Office, or any other local law enforcement officials strictly enforce Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51. Petitioners' exception is not supported by the record. Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51, requires that a vessel must proceed at idle speed, no wake, within five hundred feet of a water oriented structure, such as a seawall or dock. If enforced, the ordinance would require that boaters on the channel who venture closer than five hundred feet to the seawall which fronts a part of the island's shoreline or a dock located several hundred yards south of the collector canal, which is the site of Petitioners' proposed project, be obliged to travel no faster than idle speed, no wake in those areas. The Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced was based on the testimony of Lt. Graylish of the Florida Marine Patrol. Lt. Graylish appeared as a witness for Respondent and testified as to his opinion as a law enforcement officer on the impact of Lee County Vessel Control Ordinance No. 90-51 on vessel speeds in Estero Bay. During Lt. Graylish's direct examination when asked whether the Marine Patrol enforced the ordinance he replied: Well, we have the power to do it. The hardest problem for us is what in fact is that 500 foot distance. It's really hard on the water to come up with that, and then we've got a lot of transient traffic that goes through that area from out of state during season and part-time residents, and it's very difficult to enforce that when you don't have an actual sign placement indicating what in fact the condition is. [Tr. p. 118, Ins. 15-24] The lieutenant's testimony was uncontroverted. Petitioners produced no competent substantial evidence to refute Lt. Graylish's testimony. Likewise in its exceptions, Petitioners have failed to present competent substantial evidence to demonstrate why the Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced should be rejected. Accordingly, Petitioners' Exception No. 1. is therefore rejected as being contrary to the evidence presented. In its Exception No. 2, Petitioners object to the Hearing Officer's determination that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel (i.e., Coon Key Pass). Petitioners state that the parties only stipulated that "Estero Bay is an area that is, at least, frequented by manatees" and cites to the Transcript in support of its position. [See Petitioners' Exceptions] However, a review of the statement in the record which Petitioners rely on and which was made by Petitioners' own attorney at the hearing demonstrates that the Hearing Officer was correct in finding that the parties stipulated that manatees frequent the channel. In pertinent part the passage states: At this time I would like to stipulate to one thing that was omitted in here [i e., prehearing stipulation], is that we do stipulate that the areas are Outstanding Florida Waters and Class II waters, Estero Bay, and they are waters that are at least frequented by manatees . . . (emphasis added)[Tr. p. 8, Ins. 18-24] The Hearing Officer's finding that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel, which is part of Estero Bay, is consistent with the parties' stipulation. The exception is therefore rejected as unnecessary. In its Exception No. 3, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that since there was no evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced, DNR could not reasonably determine that Petitioners' project would not have an adverse impact on manatees. The issue in this case was whether Petitioners were entitled to a favorable determination under Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, that their proposed project was located so that it would not adversely impact Outstanding Florida Waters or Class II waters an would not contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. It was Petitioners' burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were entitled to a favorable determination. It was therefore incumbent upon Petitioners to present competent evidence regarding the enforcement of Ordinance No. 90-51. This Petitioners did not do. Therefore, Petitioners' Exception No. 3 is rejected as either irrelevant or not being based on competent substantial evidence. In its Exception No. 4, Petitioners allege that Respondent's committed two discovery violations. These allegations are beyond the scope of what is permitted under the rules which deal with exceptions to recommended orders; however they will be addressed. Petitioners claim they were prejudiced by improper testimony from the Respondent's expert witnesses, Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. Petitioners state that these witnesses "allegedly re-examine Petitioners' project area on the afternoon prior to the hearing and alleged the discovery of new observations and conclusions at the hearings." [See Petitioners' Exceptions] Petitioners claim that this alleged re-examination precluded any opportunity for discovery and that therefore, "no testimony relating to this site visit should have been admitted into the record." However, Petitioners raised no such objection at the hearing and by not doing so have waived any right to do so now. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure that would preclude an expert witness from engaging in a review of information to be relied on at the hearing prior to the hearing. Additionally, for clarification only, it should be noted that there is no evidence in the record which would have led Petitioner to believe that Pat Rose visited the site prior to the hearing. In Exception No. 4, Petitioner further alleged that the Hearing Officer should have disallowed the testimony of Lt. Graylish, because his name "first appeared on the prehearing stipulation (not signed by Petitioners) approximately 48 hours before the hearing . . . ." However, Petitioners' did not object at the hearing to the testimony of Lt. Graylish and furthermore, stated on the record in reference to signing the prehearing stipulation: due to our, I guess you would say our geographic differences, the prehearing stipulation was submitted . . . without my signature; and at this time I would like to on the record confirm that I stipulate to that prehearinq stipulation that was jointly prepared and finally submitted by the Department. (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 4, Ins. 21- 25] In addition to having stipulated to Respondent's witnesses, which included Lt. Graylish, Petitioners had raised this very objection prior to the hearing and the Hearing Officer had conducted a telephonic hearing on the matter. The Hearing Officer ruled that the witness would be allowed to testify at the hearing subject to Petitioners' objections at that time. A review of the record of the hearing indicates that Petitioners made no further objections to the lieutenant's testimony. Exceptions as to alleged discovery violations are improper pursuant to the rules and in this case there is no competent substantial evidence to demonstrate the existence of any discovery violations. Exception No. 4 is therefore rejected as being improper. Finally, at Exception No. 5, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's application of law to the findings of fact to support a determination that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating that their proposed project would riot "contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees." Petitioners allegation that this conclusion be rejected is based upon Petitioners' argument, discussed above, that the Hearing Officer erred in finding that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced. As stated in Paragraphs Nos. 1. and 3., any such rejection of the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Petitioners allege that the Hearing Officer's "sole conclusion of possible manatee impacts from this project was based on what he determined to be a lack of evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced. Petitioners have narrowly construed the Hearing Officer's ruling. There is ample evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Petitioners had not met their burden. In fact, the Recommended Order demonstrates that the ruling was also based on competent substantial evidence presented by Respondent that this proposed project demonstrated a potential for harm to manatees. In that regard, the Hearing Officer's conclusion was based on testimony from both Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. It was their testimony which led the Hearing Officer to conclude that a "favorable determination for Petitioners would not lie." The record is replete with evidence the Hearing Officer could have reasonably relied upon to conclude that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proof. [See Tr. p. 118, Ins. 6-9; p. 156 p. 1; p. 158, Ins. 4-6; p. 158. In. 9; p. 159, In.18; p. 176, Ins. 20-23; ; p. 218, Ins. 20-24; p. 219, In. 40p. 316, Ins. 22-23; DNR Exh. 17J Accordingly, Petitioners' exceptions to Conclusion of Law No. 5., is rejected as being contrary to Florida law and the evidence presented. RESPONDENT' S EXCEPTIONS Respondent alleges that Finding of Fact No. 15., should be rejected in its entirety inasmuch as it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. At finding of fact No. 15, the Hearing Officer implies that the Petitioners were "somehow surprised" on June 7, 1991, while the parties were preparing the Prehearing Stipulation to be filed at hearing on June Il, 1991, to learn that DNR intended to take the position at hearing that the proposed project would likely contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area frequented by manatees. In support of this finding the Hearing Officer refers to a comment made by DNR employee David Trimble at his June 5, 1990, deposition, during which he advised Petitioners that based upon the October 17, 1990 memorandum from the Division of Marine Resources he assumed that the manatee issue was "resolved" in Petitioners' favor. However, a review of the record reveals that at no time subsequent to November 8, 1990 or the date on which the unfavorable letter of determination was issued, could Petitioners reasonably claim they believed the issue regarding manatees was resolved. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is not based on competent substantial evidence and is rejected. At his deposition Mr. Trimble was asked who was responsible for making the final determination decision, to which he replied: I evaluate them and make a staff recommendation to my superiors. (emphasis added) [Tr. 22, Ins. 24-25] Q. So you go with your feeling - from what the letters say and - A. Not from my feeling, I go with what the letters say. [Tr. p. 23, Ins. 8-11] Furthermore, Trimble's statement at the deposition that he believed the manatee issue was resolved was given only after Petitioners specifically asked Mr. Trimble his opinion on the matter. Furthermore, Trimble was qualified to give only his opinion as to whether the manatee issue was resolved, not the agency's position which was memorialized in the November 8, 1991, letter of determination. Petitioners' claim that they believed the manatee issue was resolved and the Hearing Officer's subsequent finding that Petitioners' claim was meritious can not be supported on the basis of Trimble's answer to the following question: Q. Was, in your opinion - - and this is your opinion as the reviewer of the request - - was the manatee issue resolved . . . (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 26, Ins. 8-10] Further, the letter that was issued under the Executive Director's signature did not indicate that the manatee issue was resolved, quite the contrary. In fact, the Prehearing Stipulation at page 17, stipulated to by both parties after, the deposition of Trimble listed the following disputed issue for determination at the hearing: 2. Whether the DNR correctly determined that the proposed 132 wetslips in conjunction with the existing 161 slips, will contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. In order to find that Petitioners were somehow surprised by this "newly discovered revelation" (i.e., that manatees were going to be an issue at hearing) the Hearing Officer improperly attributed more weight to the deposition testimony of Trimble thanit was due. Trimble was merely the conduit through which information on the manatee issue from the Division of Marine Resources passed. As he himself stated, he was the reviewer of the information - - he was not the final decisionmaker. Once having reviewed the material sent to him from the other divisions, he merely drafted the unfavorable letter of determination for the Executive Director's consideration. The Executive Director then reviewed the material and issued the letter of determination under his signature.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent enter a final order confirming its earlier determination of November 8, 1990, under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of August 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1991.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this proceeding are whether Respondent Prospect Marathon Coquina, LLC (PMC), is entitled to an environmental resource permit for the proposed expansion of a docking facility, and whether PMC is entitled to a modified sovereignty submerged land lease for the proposed project.
Findings Of Fact The Parties With the exception of Elizabeth Schuh, all Petitioners live in the Driftwood neighborhood, which is located across Big Bayou from the proposed project. All Petitioners use Big Bayou for various recreational purposes, including swimming and boating. Several Petitioners also use Big Bayou for nature observation. Petitioner Peter Pav owns waterfront property on Big Bayou. Respondents do not dispute Petitioners’ standing. The Department is charged with the responsibility to regulate construction activities in waters of the state. The Department has also been delegated authority from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Trustees) to process applications for submerged land leases for structures and activities that will preempt the use of sovereign submerged lands. PMC is a Florida limited liability corporation that owns 2,786 linear feet of upland shoreline contiguous to the state-owned submerged lands of Big Bayou. PMC is the developer of the multi-family residential condominium development on Coquina Key that the proposed project would serve, known as Coquina Key North. The Affected Waterbody Big Bayou is near the southern end of the St. Petersburg peninsula. The mouth of the bayou opens to Tampa Bay. Big Bayou is part of the Pinellas County Aquatic Preserve, which includes most of the coastal waters of Pinellas County. Like all aquatic preserves in Florida, the Pinellas County Aquatic Preserve is also designated as an Outstanding Florida Water.1 Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.001 states that the aquatic preserves in Part II of Chapter 258 (which include the Pinellas County Aquatic Preserve) “were established for the purpose of being preserved in an essentially natural or existing condition so that their aesthetic, biological and scientific values may endure for the enjoyment of future generations.” The term “essentially natural condition” is defined as “those functions which support the continued existence or encourage the restoration of the diverse population of indigenous life forms and habitats to the extent they existed prior to the significant development adjacent to and within the preserve.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(24). In the 1960s and 1970s, development activities throughout Tampa Bay caused the loss of about 80 percent of its seagrasses and significant degradation of water quality. The seagrasses and water quality in Big Bayou were also adversely affected by filling and other development activities, including the filling and bulkheading of Coquina Key where the proposed project would be located. In more recent years, the water quality in Big Bayou has improved. Although trash sometimes washes up on the shoreline and one can sometimes see a sheen on the water surface caused by gasoline or oil, the water quality in Big Bayou is generally good, with high dissolved oxygen and low nutrient concentrations. The seagrasses have also recovered to a large extent. A variety of seagrasses grow in Big Bayou, including shoal grass, manatee grass, turtle grass, widgeon grass, and a relatively uncommon species, palm grass. Seagrasses are the foundation for the marine food web. They also serve as a nursery for small fish and invertebrates, stabilize sediment, and improve water quality. Manatees regularly enter and use Big Bayou because it provides good habitat. The manatees in this area are part of the Southwest Florida manatee subpopulation. Based on data collected through 2001, that subpopulation is either stable, or possibly declining. Pinellas County is not one of the 13 Florida counties that were required to develop and implement manatee protection plans. There are two areas of Pinellas County that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) has identified as needing additional manatee protection measures, but Big Bayou is not one of them. The Proposed Project The proposed authorizations would allow PMC to expand an existing multi-family, residential docking facility on the north end of Coquina Key, along an existing seawall and adjacent to the Coquina Key North condominiums that PMC converted from a former apartment complex. The proposed project would add 60 boats slips to the existing 30 boat slips at the project site. The new slips could accommodate boats up to 25 feet in length. PMC would restrict use of the boat slips to Coquina Key North condominium owners. In converting the former apartment complex to condominiums, PMC retained ownership of a strip of land immediately upland of the submerged lands on which the proposed project would be constructed. The ground for Petitioners’ Motion for Summary Order is that the ownership retained by PMS, because it does not include ownership of the upland residences, does not entitle PMS to obtain a submerged land lease for the proposed project. That legal argument is addressed in the Conclusions of Law. Direct Impacts An earlier plan for the proposed project was to place 30 new boat slips on the north side of the existing docks and 30 new slips on the south side. However, to avoid direct impacts to seagrasses, the plan was modified to avoid an area of seagrasses on the south side. The proposed project now would add 38 boat slips on the north side and 22 slips on the south side. The over-water dock structures would be placed waterward of the seagrasses that currently grow along the seawall. The seagrasses adjacent to the proposed project are not likely to be harmed by wave action or turbulence from boating activity around and in the slips because of the distance between the slips and the seagrasses. The proposed authorizations include specific conditions that prohibit numerous activities that could cause adverse water quality impacts at the proposed project site, such as the discharge of trash, human or animal waste, or fuel; fish cleaning stations; boat repair facilities; fueling facilities; hull cleaning, painting or other external boat maintenance; and boat maintenance or repair activities requiring removal of a boat from the water, or removal of major portions of the boat for purposes of routine repair or maintenance on site, except where removal is necessitated by emergency conditions. No liveaboards would be allowed at the proposed project. PMC intends to incorporate these conditions into its agreements with the condominium owners who use the boat slips. Because Big Bayou is an Outstanding Florida Water, PMC is required to provide reasonable assurances that the project will not result in the lowering of existing ambient water quality. Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-4.242(2)(c) defines “existing ambient water quality” as the better water quality of either what existed on the date that the water body was designated an Outstanding Florida Water or what existed in the year prior to the permit application. Because the current water quality is better than it was in 1972 when the Pinellas County Aquatic Preserve was created, the current water quality is the standard to apply in this case. Although some incidental non-compliance with the conditions of the proposed authorizations could occur, such incidental non-compliance would not likely result in significant2 degradation of the existing ambient water quality in Big Bayou. Secondary Impacts – In General Petitioners’ primary concerns with the proposed project are with the secondary impacts that would be caused by increased boating activity in Big Bayou. Petitioners contend that the additional boats using the 60 new boat slips would adversely affect water quality, seagrasses, manatees, and other natural resources. Petitioners also assert that the additional boating activity would cause erosion of the north shoreline of Big Bayou and impair Petitioners’ recreational uses of the bayou. It is reasonable to assume that there would be more boat trips on Big Bayou if the proposed project were built than if it were not built. However, it is impossible to say how many more boat trips would be generated by the proposed project. It cannot be assumed that because there would be 60 more boat slips, there would be 60 more boats on Big Bayou each day, each week, or even each month. Moreover, the number of boats on Big Bayou on any given day fluctuates because it depends not only on the whims of the boat owners who have boat slips in Big Bayou, but also on the whims of the boat owners who anchor their boats in the open waters of Big Bayou, launch their boats from the public boat ramps on Big Bayou, or enter Big Bayou from Tampa Bay or more distant waters. Secondary Impacts - Erosion Petitioners did not present competent evidence to support their claim that the proposed project would cause erosion of the north shoreline of Big Bayou. Secondary Impacts – Water Quality The Department has adopted by reference the Southwest Florida Water Management District’s Basis for Review for Environmental Resource Permits (Basis of Review) to apply to applications for environmental resource permits for projects over which the Department retains permitting authority. For docking facilities, Section 3.2.4.3 of the Basis of Review requires the applicant to provide hydrographic information to demonstrate that the “flushing time” (the time required to reduce the concentration of a pollutant) is sufficiently short to prevent the accumulation of any pollutants to the point of violating water quality standards. PMC’s hydrographic analyses indicate that Big Bayou is well-flushed. The water of the bayou moves a half mile to a mile during a normal tide. The fact that the current water quality in Big Bayou is good indicates that contamination associated with the current level of boating activity in the bayou is not accumulating. Incidental discharges of contaminants from boats using the proposed project would likely be rapidly dispersed and diluted. Petitioners argued that PMC’s hydrographic analyses did not address every part of Big Bayou. The rule requires hydrographic characterization of “the project site and surrounding waters.” As the challengers, Petitioners needed to rebut PMC’s prima facie case regarding the hydrographic characteristics in the bayou with competent evidence showing PMC’s findings were inaccurate, or show that the scope of PMC’s hydrographic analyses did not conform with any reasonable interpretation of the applicable rule. Petitioners presented no such evidence or showing. Some additional, incidental contamination can be expected to occur as a result of the operation of the boats that would use the proposed project. However, PMC provided reasonable assurance that the addition of these contaminants would not significantly degrade the existing ambient water quality of Big Bayou nor cause any other applicable water quality standard to be violated. Secondary Impacts - Seagrasses The maximum water depth at which most seagrasses can grow is between five and six feet because of their need for light. When boaters attempt to cross shallow areas where seagrasses are located, they sometimes damage the grasses with the boat propellers, leaving areas of torn grass and “prop scars,” furrows in the bottom. Even when boat propellers do not touch the bottom, but come close, they can disturb the loose sediments and cause turbidity. It can be especially harmful when boats run aground, because the boater will sometimes grind away at the seagrasses in an attempt to move the boat to deeper water, causing holes 10 or 12 feet in diameter. Different seagrasses recover from such damage at different rates. In some cases, it can take years for a prop scar to become re-vegetated. A 1995 study of prop scars by the Florida Marine Research Institute found that the Tampa Bay area is one of four areas of Florida with the greatest acreage of moderate and severe scarring. There are prop scars visible in the bottom of Big Bayou and Petitioners testified about seeing boats run aground in Big Bayou. The main navigation channel on the north side of Big Bayou ranges in depth from slightly less than 8 feet to over 17 feet. There are channel markers to help boaters find and stay in this channel, but some of the original markers are missing. In addition to the main navigation channel, there is an area along the north side of Coquina Key that is used by the residents living along that shoreline to get to and from Tampa Bay. This second route, which is not marked, is much shallower than the main channel and its use by boaters at low tide is a threat to seagrasses in the area.3 If more boaters in Big Bayou stayed in the main navigational channel, there would be a decreased threat to the seagrasses. However, the evidence shows that boaters often travel out of the main channel, either by inadvertence or to take a shortcut, and cross shallow areas where the seagrasses are located. It was the opinion of David Crewz, a plant ecologist who specializes in seagrasses, that increased boating activity in Big Bayou could decrease the habitat quality of the bayou. He said that one can expect more prop scarring and more turbidity caused by stirring up the bottom sediments. He was most concerned about boats larger than 16 feet in length that do not stay in the marked navigation channel. The 1995 Florida Marine Research Institute study of prop scarring, which Mr. Crewz co-authored, recommended a four- point approach to reduce prop scarring: (1) boater education, (2) channel marking, (3) enforcement, and (4) speed zones. The conditions contained in the proposed authorizations would implement two of the four points recommended by the study. PMC would install informational signs about seagrasses at the proposed project and at Grandview Park so that boaters using the proposed project and boaters using the boat ramp at the park would be less likely to operate their boats in a manner harmful to seagrasses. PMC would replace all missing markers along the main navigation channel. The current distance between some of the channel markers may be causing some boaters to stray from the channel. PMC would mark the location of seagrasses adjacent to the navigation channel. The operation phase of the environmental resource permit would not become effective until the channel markers and seagrass markers have been installed. The proposed educational displays, channel markers, and seagrass markers would probably reduce boat traffic across seagrass areas, but they would not eliminate it. However, because the displays and markers would be viewed by boaters using Big Bayou other than just the 60 boaters who would use the slips at the proposed project, the “net” effect of the proposed project would likely be no significant increase in prop scars or related adverse impacts to seagrasses in Big Bayou due to the proposed project. Therefore, PMC provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project would not result in significant adverse impacts to seagrasses. To go further, however, and contend as PMC does that, even with the addition of 60 boats, the effect of the proposed project would be to significantly reduce the current incidents of prop scarring, boat grounding, and other adverse impacts to seagrasses, is mere speculation without a statistical analysis of boater behavior or other evidence that was not presented in this case. PMC would also limit the use of its boat slips to vessels with a draft that would provide at least a twelve-inch clearance between the vessel’s draft in a motor-down position and the top of submerged resource at mean low tide. This condition appears to been intended to track similar wording used in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.004(5)(b)8., but because the condition leaves unstated the depth of the submerged resources and the water level of Big Bayou at mean low tide, a prospective renter of a boat slip would not know whether his or her boat would comply with the condition. The rule cannot be more specific because it applies to all waterbodies, but the specific condition in the proposed authorizations can and should be more specific to provide for adequate notice and enforcement. PMC provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project would not cause significant adverse impacts to seagrasses. Secondary Impacts – Manatees In Florida, between 25 and 30 percent of the annual manatee deaths are caused by collisions with boats. From 2002 to 2006, in Pinellas County waters, 41 percent of the manatee deaths of a known cause were watercraft-related. That percentage exceeds the state average and corresponds to an average of 3.2 deaths per year caused by boats. However the study area from which these statistics were compiled does not include Big Bayou. Dr. John Reynolds, a marine mammal expert, believes that boat speed is the primary factor in manatee deaths from boat collisions. At higher speeds, boaters and manatees have less time to avoid a collision and the severity of the injury to a manatee is generally greater when the manatee is struck by a boat moving at higher speeds. There are no boat speed zones currently established in Big Bayou. Thirty-three years of data collected by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) indicate that there are no known boat-related manatee deaths within two and a half miles of the project site. There have been two dead manatees discovered in Big Bayou, but their deaths were not attributed to boat collisions. Increasing the number of boats in an area used by manatees increases the potential for boat/manatee collisions. To minimize the potential for boat/manatee collisions, PMC would implement the standard manatee protection measures that apply during the construction of the proposed docks. PMC would also implement and maintain a manatee education program approved by the FWCC, including informational signs regarding manatees at the proposed project. Although reducing speeds by establishing, posting, and enforcing idle speed or slow speed zones in the bayou would probably be the most effective measure for the protection of manatees, PMC cannot be required by the proposed authorizations to control boat speeds because boat speed zones must be established by Pinellas County and the Florida Marine Patrol. The proposed authorizations incorporate the conditions recommended by the FWCC for the protection of manatees. Tom Logan, the former FWCC endangered species coordinator and now a consultant who focuses on endangered species and their habitat, believes that the special conditions included in the proposed authorizations provide adequate protection for manatees. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service also concluded that the proposed project is not likely to adversely affect manatees. PMC provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project would not cause significant adverse impacts to manatees. Secondary Impacts – Recreation Petitioners claim that their recreational uses of Big Bayou for fishing, swimming, canoeing, kayaking, and windsurfing would be diminished by the proposed project. However, Big Bayou is large enough to accommodate the additional boat trips associated with the proposed project and Petitioners’ recreational uses. A public water body like Big Bayou must be shared by persons living along or near its shores with all other citizens of Florida. Although some Petitioners would prefer that the bayou had the feel of a more remote or wild place, the Pinellas County Aquatic Preserve is recognized to have a “highly developed, urban nature.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.019. It already has the attributes of an urban preserve. PMC provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project would not prevent or significantly impair the existing recreational uses of Big Bayou. Cumulative Impacts Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.006 and Section 3.2.8 of the Basis of Review require that cumulative impacts be evaluated in determining whether to issue, respectively, a submerged lands lease or an environmental resource permit. PMC and the Department state in their Proposed Recommended Orders that the consideration of cumulative impacts is limited to projects that are existing or under construction, but Florida Administrative Code Rule 18.006(1) also requires, for a sovereignty submerged lands lease, consideration of “the number and extent of similar human actions within the preserve which have previously affected or are likely to affect the preserve.” Because the principal source of potential adverse impacts associated with the proposed project is boating activity, the existing docking facility at Coquina Key North, the other docks in Big Bayou, and the boat ramp at Grandview Park are existing structures generating boating activity that must be taken into account in the cumulative impacts analysis. Although the proposed project, with the conditions on its construction and operation, would, alone, have no significant adverse impact on water quality, seagrasses, manatees, or recreational uses in Big Bayou, the cumulative impacts to Big Bayou from all similar activities in the preserve have created significant (material) adverse impacts to Big Bayou in the form of trash, water contamination, damage to seagrasses, and prop scars. Public Interest Criteria Section 258.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes, requires that a lease of sovereignty submerged lands within an aquatic preserve by the Trustees must be “in the public interest.” Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.003(46) defines “public interest” in this context as “demonstrable environmental, social, and economic benefits which would accrue to the public at large as a result of a proposed action, and which would clearly exceed all demonstrable environmental, social, and economic costs of the proposed action.” Florida Administrative Code 18-20.004(2) sets forth the public interest criteria to be considered and balanced by the Trustees in determining whether to issue a submerged land lease or other authorization to use sovereignty submerged lands. The Rule identifies public boat ramps and “marking navigation channels to avoid disruption of shallow water habitats” as examples of public benefits. These benefits, however, must “clearly exceed” the “costs,” such as degraded water quality, degraded natural habitat and function, harm to endangered or threatened species and habitat, and adverse cumulative impacts. For issuance of the environmental resource permit, a determination is required that the proposed project is “clearly in the public interest,” because Big Bayou is part of an Outstanding Florida Water. Fla. Admin Code R. 62-4.242(2). This determination requires the consideration and balancing of a number of criteria set forth in Section 3.2.3 of the Basis of Review: Whether the activity will adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the activity will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the activity will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling; Whether the activity will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the activity; Whether the activity will be of a temporary or permanent nature; Whether the activity will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and archaeological resources under the provisions of s. 267.061; and The current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.4 As explained in the Conclusions of Law, the “clearly in the public interest” test does not require the applicant to demonstrate that the intended activity would have a net public benefit. The counter-intuitive result is that, to meet the “in the public interest” test for the sovereignty submerged land lease, PMC must demonstrate a net public benefit, but to meet the “clearly in the public interest test” for the environmental resource permit, PMC does not have to show a net public benefit. The measures that PMC has agreed to undertake to meet the public interest criteria for the proposed authorizations are as follows: Contribute $300,000 to the construction of a second boat ramp at the current Sutherland Bayou Boat Ramp project in Palm Harbor; Install and maintain navigational aides marking the main channel in the bayou; Install markers indicating the location of seagrass beds; Install and maintain an informational display at the public boat ramp in Grandview Park, relating to the protection of seagrasses and natural resources within the bayou; and Install and maintain an aerial map at the Grandview Park boat ramp depicting the location of the navigation channel and the seagrass beds in the bayou. The $300,000 contribution for the boat ramp was based on a similar contribution ($5,000 per slip) that was made previously by the developer of another docking facility in Pinellas County. The Department had originally suggested that PMC contribute to a spoil island restoration project to satisfy the public interest criterion. However, due to the Trustees’ and/or Department’s concern about the reduction in the number of boat slips available to the general public,5 the Department proposed that PMC contribute $300,000 to Pinellas County’s Sutherland Bayou Boat Ramp project in Palm Harbor. The definition of “mitigation” in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.003(35) states that, “Cash payments shall not be considered mitigation unless payments are specified for use in a previously identified, Department endorsed, environmental or restoration project.” No evidence was presented to show that the Sutherland Bayou Boat Ramp project is an “environmental or restoration project,” and it does not appear to qualify as such. Implicit in the boat ramp contribution proposal is the view that the public interest in providing more recreational boaters with access to Pinellas County waters outweighs the negative impacts to marine resources that are associated with increased boating activity. No evidence was presented, however, to explain or support this view. The strange result here is that PMC would be mitigating for the adverse impacts associated with increasing the boating activity in Big Bayou by helping to increased boating activity in other county waters where seagrass losses have been greater, prop scarring is a bigger problem, and more manatees are being killed by boat collisions.6 Dr. Reynolds stated that the Sutherland Bayou Boat Ramp project in Palm Harbor could be a benefit to Big Bayou if the boat ramp project took boat traffic away from the bayou, but he did not know whether it would. A reasonable inference can be made that, being so far away, the Sutherland Bayou Boat Ramp project is unlikely to add to or subtract from boat traffic in Big Bayou. As found above, the adverse environmental impacts of the proposed project, taking into account the proposed conditions, would be insignificant. However, because the record evidence shows that the Sutherland Bayou Boat Ramp project would put boats into county waters (and aquatic preserve waters) where there has been greater seagrass losses, more prop scarring, and more manatees killed by boat collisions than in Big Bayou, PMC’s $300,000 contribution to the boat ramp project actually increases the secondary impacts and cumulative impacts of PMC’s proposed project and causes it to fail to meet the public interest criteria. Without the $300,000 contribution to the Sutherland Boat Ramp project, PMC would meet the “clearly in the public interest” test for the environmental resource permit because the other mitigation offered by PMC would offset the secondary and cumulative impacts of the proposed project. However, a different result would occur in the case of the sovereignty submerged land lease. Eliminating the $300,000 contribution to the Sutherland Boat Ramp project would result in a situation where the public benefits of the proposed project do not “clearly exceed” the costs of the project and, therefore, PMC would not meet the “in the public interest” test. Although the record in this case is insufficient to demonstrate that PMC’s contribution to the boat ramp project would cause the benefits of the project to clearly exceed its costs, the record evidence is sufficient to support issuance of the lease modification if PMC were able to get the appropriate government authorities to establish a boat speed zone in Big Bayou, or if PMC contributed to the enforcement of boat speed zones in the aquatic preserve. As restated in the Conclusions of Law, whether the proposed mitigation is sufficient to offset the adverse impacts of the proposed project is a determination that rests exclusively with the Trustees and the Department, based on the record evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order denying Environmental Resource Permit No. 52-0258984-001 and the modification of Sovereignty Submerged Land Lease No. 520224543. In the event the Trustees determine to issue the submerged land lease, it is recommended that the lease be modified to add a condition that the boat slips shall only be subleased or sold to residents of Coquina Key North condominiums. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2008.
Findings Of Fact On February 9, 1984, Respondent Fernandina Marine Terminals, Inc., by its agent Harbor Engineering Company, filed a joint application with the Department of the Army/Florida Department of Environmental Regulation for the rehabilitation of its existing marine facility located on the Amelia River at Fernandina Beach, Florida. The application was subsequently amended several times and eventually included the construction of a 1,000 foot dock to be constructed on the applicant's property parallel to the shoreline. (Testimony of Ray, FMT Exhibits 1-3, DER Exhibit 2) An environmental supervisor of the Department of Environmental Regulation inspected the site on March 17 and April 17, 1984, and prepared a permit application appraisal on May 21, 1984, in which he determined that the Department had permitting jurisdiction under Chapter 253, Florida Statutes, due to the fact that the Amelia River constitutes navigable waters of the state. He found that the proposed dock would extend some 42 feet farther into the river than a previously existing dock which presently consists mostly of old pilings. He further determined that from a navigational standpoint, the proposed dock should present no problem. This view was concurred in by his supervisor Dr. Marvin Collins, III, who recommended issuance of the permit. On September 6, 1984, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to issue the requested permit. Thereafter, by letter of September 14, 1984, Petitioners requested a hearing to contest the issuance of the permit. On July 9, 1984, the Department of the Army/Corps of Engineers had issued a permit to the applicant to perform the requested work. (Testimony of Deuerling, Collins, DER Exhibits 1, 3, FMT Exhibit 4) Petitioner A. B. Cook, Jr., Seafood Company is located immediately to the south of the proposed site. Shrimp boats unload at the north end of Petitioner's dock. The boats average from 60 to 70 feet in length. Petitioner is concerned that the cement pilings of the applicant's proposed pier will interfere with and prohibit the dockage of the shrimp boat due to the fact that a strong current is generated at the site where the Bells River joins the Amelia River. Petitioner therefore believes that the proposed placement of the applicant's dock would constitute a navigational hazard and that therefore it should be constructed further to the north or closer to the shoreline. (Testimony of Mrs. Cook, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Applicant's design engineer took cognizance of the need for shrimp boats to unload at the Cook dock. At the time the project was designed he conducted surveys of the uplands to ensure that adequate land was available for the proposed facility. In his expert engineering opinion, which is accepted, the proposed site is ideal for a marine terminal since no maintenance dredging will be required and because the river curves at the site, thus making it the widest place of the river in the vicinity. The planned length of the dock is sufficient to enable the docking of two vessels at the same time. If the proposed dock were to be placed further north, it would he unable to berth two vessels. If it were placed closer to shore, it would be necessary to utilize the adjoining marsh area and-would require constant dredging. Although the dock will extend some 42 feet into the Amelia River on the southwest end, it is almost in line with the applicant's property because of the bend in the river. The dock will be located approximately 115 feet from the Cook dock. The existing dilapidated dock is only approximately 50 feet from the Cook dock, although it is more in line or more parallel to the Cook dock. (Testimony of Ray, Cavanaugh, E. Cook, DER Exhibits 1 (photos), 2, FMT Exhibits 1-3) Expert testimony from riverboat captains presented by both the applicants and petitioners is in conflict as to the extent of difficulty that will be encountered in docking shrimp boats at the Cook pier after the applicant's dock is built, and as to whether it will constitute a navigational hazard. The proposed dock will be put on pilings to avoid eddies which would be caused by a bulkhead, and will prevent change in existing currents. It is acknowledged even by the applicant's experts that a problem would exist with a falling tide and a west wind, and also in conditions of fog. However, the president of Johnson Petroleum Company which operates what is known as the "Gulf" dock located 100 feet south of the Cook dock, is familiar with the tide in the area and testified that the tide is used to spring vessels in and out of the docking area. In light of all the evidence presented, it is found that although the alignment of applicant's proposed pier will to some degree make it more difficult for boats to dock at the Cook pier, it nevertheless constitutes an appropriate use of the applicant's property and sufficient evidence has been presented to show that it will not constitute a navigational hazard or a serious impediment to navigation. (Testimony of Ray, Thompson, Ferguson, Mrs. Cook, E. Cook, Little, Johnson, Cavanaugh)
Findings Of Fact D.S.I. Forms, Inc. is a for-profit corporation with facilities in Palatka, Florida. It is the owner of a river- front house known as the "DSI Lodge," which is the location of the boat dock at issue here. The DSI Lodge has an existing boat dock similar to those of other waterfront homes in the area along this section of St. Johns River, which is a Class III Florida Water.1 The area is predominantly single family residential, but is not so restricted by zoning ordinance. The DSI Lodge is used as a weekend and holiday retreat by the owner of D.S.I. Forms, Inc., who resides in Atlanta, Georgia, and by his business and personal guests. Although the DSI Lodge has a business character, there is no charge to guests for using lodge or dock facilities. The proposed DSI dock extension would add a two-boat covered slip measuring 20 by 22 feet to the end of the existing dock. Since DSI only seeks mooring facilities for one additional boat,2 it has agreed with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to remove its inside boat slip. Although DNR was not a party to this proceeding, the Applicant's stated intent to remove a portion of the existing dock should be reflected in any permit issued by DER. The existing dock is approximately 700 square feet in surface area. With the application as now framed, the total surface area would exceed 1,100 square feet. However, with removal of the inside slip, the proposed dock area would apparently increase to less than 1,000 square feet, and thus may be exempt from DER permitting altogether.3 Petitioners presented a series of grievances concerning use of the DSI Lodge by inconsiderate guests. These complaints included discharging a rifle and fireworks, high speed operation of power boats adjacent to the river's edge (bulkhead) and congestion of boating activity resulting from numerous guests using the DSI facilities during holiday periods. The careless or congested boating activity may affect the quality of life for DSI Lodge neighbors and endanger wildlife such as manatee which sometimes inhabit these waters. However, it was not shown that the proposed dock extension would affect these environmental considerations since D.S.I. Forms, Inc. already owns and operates the boat which would be accommodated by the additional slip (see footnote 2 above). Further, the testimony of the DER field representative established that the presence of the extended dock, as well as its construction, would not degrade water quality.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a final order issuing the proposed permit to D.S.I. Forms, Inc. with an added condition requiring removal of the existing inside boat-slip. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of July, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are seeking a permit to cut a channel from a boat basin to the Caloosahatchee River. The basin, which has been constructed, is located approximately forty to sixty feet inland from the Caloosahatchee River. Petitioners are also seeking a permit to operate the proposed basin. The basin would serve as a recreational facility for a trailer park. The proposed basin has dimensions of approximately 140 feet by 148 feet. It is surrounded by a concrete seawall. The basin would provide facilities for approximately 20 boats no larger than twenty-two feet in length. The trailer park is located across the street from the river and basin. The street is approximately 600 feet from the river. Sewage treatment and water treatment plants for the trailer park are located in the corners of the park farthest from the river. The basin is surrounded by vegetation. All water going into the basin would be filtered through grass. The project is located approximately one mile east of the City of Alva, fourteen miles from the City of Tice, and seventeen miles from the City of Ft. Myers. The basin is eight and one-half miles up river from Lee County's pumping stations, which are used to pump water from the river to wells which augment the county's water supply. The Caloosahatchee River was channelized approximately twenty years ago. It no longer follows a natural course. The river is a part of the Cross Florida system connecting with Lake Okeechobee. The proposed boat basin would not enhance the waters of the Caloosahatchee River. The project could reasonably be expected to be a source of water pollution unless rules and regulations, which Petitioners have adopted, are scrupulously followed. These rules and regulations are set out in Figure 3 attached to Petitioner's Exhibit 7. If the rules and regulations are followed, the basin would not be a source of pollutants. There is no evidence in the record to the contrary. If the rules and regulations are not followed then there is a likelihood that the basin will be a source of pollutants, and that the pollutants would be discharged into the Caloosahatchee River. Petitioners do not object to having the proposed rules and regulations made a part and a condition of any permits issued by Respondent.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should have his license suspended and an administrative fine imposed for allegedly committing fraud and deceit in the practice of contracting, providing septic tank contracting services without an operating permit, and submitting a fabricated building permit number to obtain a final inspection approval of a job.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Generally When the events herein occurred, Respondent, Willie A. Harmon, operated a septic tank business in Santa Rosa County, Florida, under the name of Willie Harmon's Septic Tank Service. That profession is regulated by Petitioner, Department of Health (Department). In this proceeding, the Department alleges that Respondent violated its rules law on three separate occasions in 1995, 1996, and 1997. Each alleged violation is discussed below. The Iris Lane Citation In April 1997, William M. Newell, who manages various rental properties in Santa Rosa County (County), hired Respondent to pump out a backed up septic tank system located at 1824 Iris Lane, Navarre, Florida. The system was an older one with a sand bottom, a type sometimes found in the southern part of the County. The job was performed by Respondent on April 21, 1997, and it called for Respondent to pump the tank dry. Respondent received payment from Newell for these services. On the evening of April 22, 1997, Newell returned to the premises and found the lid back on the system. Assuming that the job was completed, he telephoned the Santa Rosa County Health Department to request an inspection of the tank, as required by law. Larry Thomas, an environmental supervisor, inspected the tank on April 23, 1997, and found approximately five inches of solids still remaining in the tank and the remainder of the tank full of water. A properly pumped out tank would be dry. Newell immediately contacted Superior Septic Tank Service in Crestview, Florida, to repump the tank. Earl Raybon, an employee of that firm, inspected the tank and assumed it had not been pumped out since it was full of water and had a layer of sludge at the bottom. Raybon observed that the walls and lid of the system were "in good shape," but it needed a replacement liner. Raybon then repumped the tank until the system was dry. When Respondent was later asked by Newell and Thomas why the tank had sludge and water, Respondent advised them that water and solids must have bled (leached) back into the tank through the sand bottom. Although it is not uncommon for groundwater to seep back into a tank through a sand bottom, it is highly unlikely that the tank would completely refill with water within two days, unless the area experienced heavy rains. There was no evidence that this occurred. Further, it is not possible for solids to seep back into the tank under any circumstances. Respondent's explanation that this accounted for the solids in the tank is not deemed to be credible. Respondent also explained that in order to prevent the ingestion of sand into his equipment, he had to leave some sludge at the bottom of the tank. Raybon established, however, that under current industry standards, it is the responsibility of the contractor to pump a tank dry, even if one gets sand in his equipment. Consistent with that practice, Raybon pumped the tank dry. Respondent finally contended that if he had pumped the tank dry, the sides of the system might have collapsed. This occurs, however, only when there is water pressure on both sides of the system. Because the second contractor pumped the system dry without incident, it is found that a collapsing system was not a valid concern. By failing to pump the tank dry, as required by industry standards, Respondent committed fraud and deceit on the customer. In addition, this misconduct caused the customer to incur monetary harm in that the customer had to pay a second contractor to finish the job. The Deer Lane Citation In early December 1995, Respondent installed a new septic tank system on a mobile home lot at 9050 Deer Lane, Navarre, Florida. Before the final written inspection approval for a new septic tank system can be given by the Department, the building permit must be attached to the application. It is the responsibility of the owner, and not the septic tank contractor, to obtain the building permit. Alternatively, if the lot is still undeveloped, as it was here, approval of the system may be obtained without a building permit by simply securing a yellow- green temporary sticker from the Department. On December 5, 1995, Respondent submitted paperwork to the Santa Rosa County Health Department reflecting that building permit number 95-608 had been issued to the owner. He contended that this number was obtained over the telephone from the owner, and this claim was not contradicted. However, a building permit was not issued to the owner until December 7, 1995, and it carried permit number 95-4144. The local department immediately discovered the difference in the two numbers and charged Respondent with fraud and deceit. There was no intent on the part of Respondent to commit fraud or deceit on the Department. Indeed, he could have obtained an inspection and final approval without a building permit being issued since the lot was still undeveloped. Moreover, he had no financial incentive to fabricate the permit number. Therefore, it is found that he did not commit fraud or deceit in the practice of contracting. The Webster Street Citation In order to perform septic tank services, a contractor must be registered with a county health department. By having an operating permit from one county health department, a contractor may perform services in other counties as well. Therefore, an operating permit in Okaloosa County would enable Respondent to perform services in Santa Rosa County. On June 27, 1996, Respondent partially pumped a tank at 7843 Webster Street, Navarre, Florida. At that time, he held no active registrations to perform the work. He eventually obtained an operating permit from the Okaloosa County Health Department on July 29, 1996. According to a representative of the Okaloosa County Health Department, it allows contractors who have previously had permits issued by that Department to work without a valid registration while their applications are being processed. This process usually, but not always, takes no more than two or three weeks. Whether Respondent had previously been issued a registration by the Okaloosa County Health Department is not of record. It is also unknown when Respondent filed his application with that Department, although he says that he had an application pending when the questioned job was performed. Because of these record deficiencies, it is found that, even though Respondent had no valid operating permit on June 27, 1996, he rightly assumed that such work was permissible under then existing policy of the Okaloosa County Health Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Rules 64E-6.022(1)(k) and (l)2., Florida Administrative Code, and that Respondent be assessed a $500.00 administrative fine. The charges in the two citations should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building 6, Room 102 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire 1295 West Fairfield Drive Pensacola, Florida 32501 Willie A. Harmon Post Office Box 733 Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32548 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Health Building 6, Room 102 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent has violated the standards of practice in septic tank contracting, Florida Administrative Code rule 64E-6.022, and, if so, the penalty. (All references to Respondent are to Arlender Miller. All references to Ms. Rooter are to Ms. Rooter, Inc.)
Findings Of Fact At the times of the alleged jobs, Respondent was registered as a septic tank contractor and served as the qualifying agent for Ms. Rooter. At the time of all three jobs, Respondent had apparent authority to serve as the agent of Ms. Rooter in contracting for and performing the septic tank contracting work described below. However, nothing in the record establishes any relationship between Respondent and Ms. Rooter at the time of the issuance of the Administrative Complaint, so as to justify treating the notice of this proceeding, when served upon Respondent, as notice to Ms. Rooter. Hans Seffer, who testified, is the son of the woman who owns the apartment complex located at 14950 North Miami Avenue, Miami. Mr. Seffer found Ms. Rooter on the internet and spoke with Carolyn Futch, operations manager of Ms. Rooter, about septic tank contracting services needed at the apartment complex. Respondent later met with Mr. Seffer at the property. Initially, Mr. Seffer believed that the existing septic tank needed only to be pumped out. However, upon inspection, Respondent determined that the system also required a new drainfield, pump, and dosing tank. Accordingly, on February 20, 2008, Respondent, as "technician," and either Mr. Seffer or his mother signed a one-page contract on a form identifying the contractor as Ms. Rooter, license number SA0071430. The contract describes the following work: Install 1,000 sq. ft. drainfield with 300 gallon dosing tank including immediate (2/21/08) tank pump out. Additionally if tank requires pumpout prior to securing all necessary permits, Ms. Rooter will perform pumpout at no additional cost. Manhole cover included. Respondent and either Mr. or Mrs. Seffer initialed this section of the contract. The contract states that the total due for this work is $10,500. Ms. Seffer paid $5,000 by check on February 21, 2008, leaving a $5,500 balance due. On March 1, 2008, Respondent, as agent for Ms. Rooter and on behalf of the property owner, submitted to Petitioner an application for a construction permit for an onsite sewage disposal system. The application describes the property improvements as a multifamily complex with ten bedrooms and 5,284 square feet of building space. The site plan attached to the application states: "Replace drainfield only." On April 2, 2008, Ms. Futch emailed Mr. Seffer to confirm an earlier discussion between them. The discussion addressed a requirement of Petitioner that Ms. Rooter install a second tank. The email states that the property owner will pay $5,600 for the installation of a "2nd tank (1,050-gal)," so the new total contract price is $11,100. This email restates the scope of the work as the installation of a 1,000-square-foot drainfield and 300-gallon dosing tank. By return email two days later, Mr. Seffer agreed to the additional work. On April 11, 2008, Petitioner issued to the property owner a construction permit that specifies a 2,575-gallon septic tank and a 1,000 square-foot drainfield. The permit states: "The licensed contractor installing the system is responsible for installing the minimum category of tank in accordance with sec. 64E-6.013(3)(f), F.A.C." This rule does not refer to tank capacities. On April 23, 2008, Petitioner issued a "construction inspection and final approval" form that shows the installation of two 1,200-gallon septic tanks and a 1,005-square-foot drainfield. The form states that items bearing an "X" are "not in compliance with statute or rule and must be corrected." The construction and final system are approved by Petitioner's inspector. During the course of the work, Respondent told Mr. Seffer that the existing tank was damaged and needed to be replaced, at an additional cost of $5,000, so the remaining balance rose to $16,100. Mr. Seffer agreed to this change. By email dated April 30, 2008, to Mr. Seffer, Ms. Futch confirmed the additional cost of $5,000 for the second septic tank and expressed "hope [that] Ms. Rooter has met your expectations." The email acknowledges, however, that "we must complete the electrical portion of the job." On May 2, 2008, Mr. Seffer sent Ms. Rooter two checks totaling $15,000, leaving a balance of $1,100. On the same date, Mr. Seffer sent Ms. Futch an email that, pursuant to their agreement, he would retain this amount for the "electric and final raking work." By email dated May 27, 2008, to Ms. Futch, Mr. Seffer noted that the manhole that Ms. Rooter had installed in the middle of the lawn was not level and was sunken, presenting a tripping hazard; the final grading was incomplete, leaving low spots and holes; a large rock remained near the palm tree and needed to be removed. Mr. Seffer sent Ms. Futch a reminder email on June 4, 2008, that resent the May 27 email. Mr. Seffer sent another email to Ms. Futch on June 21, 2008. In it, he notes that a Ms. Rooter employee worked on digging an electrical trench on June 13, but left mid-day, and no work had been performed since that day. In the meantime, recent rains had revealed a lack of compaction in the backfilling done by Ms. Rooter, as the fill had settled and undermined a sidewalk. After failing to obtain a response, on July 26, 2008, Mr. Seffer sent a final email to Ms. Futch warning her that he would file complaints with governmental agencies and advising that the unconnected pump was not pumping sewage throughout the entire system. The record does not contain the contracts for the septic tank contracting services involved in the second and third jobs alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Also, Petitioner did not present the testimony of the property owners involved in these jobs. The record for these jobs is limited to the permitting documentation. On September 26, 2008, as agent of Ms. Rooter and on behalf of the property owner, Shoreview Properties, Respondent submitted an application for a construction permit for an onsite sewage disposal system for 9999 Northeast 2nd Avenue, Miami Shores. This application describes the property as commercial with a 47,771 square-foot building. On October 1, 2008, Petitioner's inspector inspected the property. The inspector found an opened drainfield area with contaminated material and other conditions capable of hosting various disease vectors. He also found a backhoe and worker, who claimed that someone else had excavated the drainfield. The inspector immediately posted an ONASN, pursuant to the authority of chapter 386, Florida Statutes, that required the immediate abatement of the listed insanitary conditions. The inspector also determined that the existing onsite sewage disposal system exceeded Petitioner's jurisdictional threshold of 5,000 gallons per day. On September 10, 2008, as agent of Ms. Rooter and on behalf of the property owner, Lisa Mullin, Respondent submitted to Petitioner an application for a construction permit for an onsite sewage disposal system for 101 Northeast 195th Street, Miami. This application describes the property as 0.19 acres, on which is situated a single family residence comprising 1,663 square feet and three bedrooms. On September 22, 2008, an agent of the property owner called Petitioner and complained that Ms. Rooter had commenced the work without having first obtained a permit. Petitioner's inspector visited the site on the same day and found "very recent" earthwork. The owner informed the inspector that the contractor had installed three drainlines, cut an old water line, and installed a new water line over the drainfield. However, the record fails to establish the amount of time that elapsed between the work claimed to have been performed by Ms. Rooter and the report by the property owner. Respondent has paid numerous fines imposed by Petitioner for improper septic tank contracting. In 1999, Respondent paid a fine in an unspecified amount for performing an unpermitted drainfield repair and making the repair without the required filter sand. On January 27, 2000, Respondent paid a fine of $250 for performing unpermitted system repairs. On February 4, 2000, Respondent was assessed a fine of $1,000 for performing unpermitted and uninspected system repairs and failing to honor a warranty. On January 8, 2004, Respondent received a cease and desist order for qualifying more than one septic tank contracting business. In 2007, Respondent paid separate fines of $1,500 and $1,000 for illegal septic tank contracting work in Dade and Monroe counties, respectively.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the three violations identified in paragraphs 26, 27, and 29 above, dismissing the remaining charges against him, dismissing any charges against Ms. Rooter, and revoking Respondent's septic tank contracting registration. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Arlender Miller 640 Northwest 129th Street Miami, Florida 33168 Jenea Reed, Esquire Miami Dade County Health Department 8323 Northwest 12th Street, Suite 214 Miami, Florida 33126 R.S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 E. Renee Alsobrook, Acting General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Shairi Turner, Deputy Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Kim Berfield, Deputy Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) should issue a letter of consent to use State-owned submerged lands (SL) and an environmental resource permit (ERP) (which are processed together as a SLERP) for the single-family dock proposed by Pamela C. Damico, which would extend 770 feet into the Atlantic Ocean from her property on Plantation Key in Monroe County (DEP Permit 44-0298211-001).
Findings Of Fact Pamela C. Damico owns property at 89505 Old Highway on Plantation Key in the Upper Florida Keys in Monroe County. Her property includes submerged land extending between 212 and 233 feet into the Atlantic Ocean, which is an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW). She applied to DEP for a permit to build a dock and boat mooring at her property. In its final configuration, the proposed docking structure would have an access pier from the shoreline that would extend across her submerged land, and then farther across State-owned submerged lands, for a total distance of 770 feet from the shoreline. A primary goal of the application was to site the mooring area in water with a depth of at least -4 feet mean low water (MLW). Mrs. Damico’s consultants believed that this was required for a SLERP in Monroe County. In addition, they were aware that -4 feet MLW would be required to get a dock permit from Islamorada, Village of Islands. The beliefs of Mrs. Damico’s consultants regarding the depth requirement for the mooring site were based in part on incorrect interpretations of DEP rules by certain DEP staff made both during Mrs. Damico’s application process and during the processing of other applications in the past. Those incorrect interpretations were based in part on ambiguous and incorrect statements in guidance documents published by DEP over the years. (Similarly, certain DEP staff made incorrect interpretations of DEP rules regarding a supposedly absolute 500-foot length limit for any dock in Monroe County.) See Conclusions of Law for the correct interpretations of DEP rules. Petitioner owns oceanfront property to the south and adjacent to Mrs. Damico’s. As expressed by Petitioner’s owner and operator, Dr. William Carter, Petitioner has concerns regarding impacts of the proposed docking structure on navigation, boating safety, and natural resources, including seagrasses, stony corals, tarpon, and bonefish. Several changes were made to the proposed docking structure to address concerns raised by Petitioner. In the earlier proposals, the access pier would have been supported by 10-inch square concrete piles, which must be installed using a construction barge and heavy equipment. In its final form, to reduce the direct impacts to the seagrasses and stony corals, it was proposed that the first 550 feet of the access pier from the point of origin on the shoreline would be installed using pin piles, which are made of aluminum and are 4.5 inches square inside a vinyl sleeve five inches square, and can be installed by hand. Instead of the planks originally proposed for the decking of the access pier, a grating material was substituted, which would allow greater light penetration to the seagrasses below. The orientation and length of the proposed docking structure was modified several times in an effort to achieve the optimal siting of the mooring platform. Handrails were proposed for the access pier, and no tie-up cleats are provided there. In combination with the elevation of the decking at five feet above mean high water (MHW), the handrails would discourage use of the pier for mooring by making it impractical if not impossible in most cases. Railing also was proposed for the north side of the mooring platform to discourage mooring there, and a sign was proposed to be placed on the north side of the platform saying that mooring there is prohibited. These measures were proposed to restrict mooring to the south side of the mooring platform, where a boat lift would be installed, which would protect the large seagrass beds that are on the north side of the terminal platform. (Mooring an additional boat along the end of the 8-foot long mooring platform, which faces the prevailing oceanic waves, is impractical if not impossible.) To make the docking structure less of a navigation and boating safety hazard, it was proposed that a USCG flashing white light would be installed at the end of the terminal platform. In its final configuration, the docking structure would preempt approximately 2,240 square feet of State-owned submerged land, plus approximately 200 square feet preempted by the proposed boat lift. In addition, it would preempt approximately 900 square feet of Mrs. Damico’s privately-owned submerged land. Mrs. Damico’s private property has approximately 352 linear feet of shoreline. Dr. Lin testified for Petitioner that the proposed docking structure would preempt a total of 3,760 square feet. This calculation included 520 square feet of preemption by the boat lift, but the proposed boat lift is for a smaller boat that would preempt only approximately 200 square feet. Intending to demonstrate that the proposed docking structure would wharf out to a consistent depth of -4 feet MLW, Mrs. Damico’s consultants submitted a bathymetric survey indicating a -4 MLW contour at the mooring platform. In fact, the line indicated on the survey is not a valid contour line, and the elevations in the vicinity do not provide reasonable assurance that the mooring area of the docking structure in its final configuration is in water with a consistent depth of -4 feet MLW, or that there is water of that depth consistently between the mooring area and the nearest navigable channel. The evidence does, however, provide reasonable assurance that the proposed mooring platform is in water with a consistent depth of at least -3 feet MLW, and that there is water of that depth consistently between the mooring area and the nearest navigable channel, which would avoid damage to seagrass bed and other biological communities. The evidence was not clear whether there is another possible configuration available to Petitioner to wharf out to a mooring area with a consistent depth of at least -3 feet MLW, not over seagrasses, and with water of that depth consistently between the mooring area and the nearest navigable channel, that would not require as long an access pier, or preempt as many square feet of State-owned submerged land. A noticed general permit (NGP) can be used for a dock of 2,000 square feet or less, in water with a minimum depth of -2 feet MLW, and meeting certain other requirements. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-341.215 and 62-341.427. The evidence was not clear whether an NGP can be used in an OFW in Monroe County in water less than -3 feet FLW, according to DEP’s interpretation of its rules. Cf. Fla. Admin. Code Ch. 62-312.400, Part IV. Initially, mitigation for impacts to natural resources was proposed. However, DEP’s staff determined that no mitigation was required because there would not be any adverse effects from the docking structure, as finally proposed. For the same reason, DEP staff determined that there would be no significant cumulative adverse impacts and that no further analysis of cumulative impacts was necessary. Actually, there will be adverse impacts to natural resources. The biologist for Mrs. Damico determined that there are some seagrasses and numerous stony corals in the footprint of the access pier, in addition to other resources less susceptible to impacts (such as macro-algae and loggerhead sponges). These organisms will be disturbed or destroyed by the installation of the access pier. The biologist quantified the impacts to round starlet corals by assuming the placement of two supporting piles, four feet apart, every ten feet for the length of the pier, and assuming impacts to the stony corals in a quadrat centered on each pile location and three times the diameter of the pile. Using this method, it was estimated that approximately 1,505 square centimeters of the stony corals would be destroyed by the installation of the docking structure. The impacts assessed by Mrs. Damico’s biologist and DEP assume that construction would “step out” from shore and, as construction proceeds, from already-built segments of the pier, until water depths allow for the use of a construction barge without unintended damage to the natural resources in the area. This construction method is not required by the proposed SLERP. It would have to be added as a permit condition. Petitioner did not prove that the impacts to a few seagrasses and approximately 1,505 square centimeters of the stony corals would damage the viability of those biological communities in the vicinity of the proposed docking structure. Direct and indirect impacts to other species from the installation and maintenance of the docking structure would not be expected. Impacts to listed species, including manatees and sawfish, would not be anticipated. Manatees sometimes are seen in the vicinity but do not rely on the area for foraging or breeding. Sawfish are more likely to frequent the bay waters than the ocean. Migratory tarpon and bonefish use the area and might swim out around the docking structure to avoid passing under it. Resident tarpon and some other fish species might congregate under the docking structure. The proposed docking structure does not block or cross any marked navigation channel and is in a shallow area near the shore where boats are supposed to be operated at reduced speeds. Nonetheless, the proposed structure poses more than a casual navigation hazard, especially due to its length, which is significantly greater than any docking structure in the vicinity. In conducting its staff analysis of the impacts on navigation and boating safety, DEP understood that the closest marked navigation channel is at least two miles away from the proposed docking structure. Actually, there also is a marked channel at the Tavernier Creek, which is less than half a mile north of the site. It is not uncommon for boaters to leave the marked Tavernier Creek channel to motor south in the shallow water closer to shore; they also sometimes cut across the shallow waters near the site to enter the Tavernier Creek channel when heading north. There also are other unmarked or unofficially-marked channels even closer to the proposed docking structure. In good weather and sea conditions, the proposed docking structure would be obvious and easy to avoid. In worse conditions, especially at night, it could be a serious hazard. To reduce the navigational hazard posed by the dock, reflective navigation indicators are proposed to be placed every 30 feet along both sides of the access pier, and the USCG flashing white light is proposed for the end of terminal platform. These measures would help make the proposed docking structure safer but would not eliminate the risks entirely. The light helps when it functions properly, it can increase the risk if boaters come to rely on it, and it goes out. Both the light and reflective indicators are less effective in fog and bad weather and seas. The risk increases with boats operated by unskilled and especially intoxicated boaters. It is common for numerous boaters to congregate on weekends and holidays at Holiday Isle, which is south of the proposed docking structure. Alcoholic beverages are consumed there. Some of these boaters operate their boats in the vicinity of the proposed docking structure, including “cutting the corner” to the Tavernier Creek pass channel, instead of running in deeper water to enter the pass at the ocean end of the navigation channel. This increases the risk of collision, especially at night or in bad weather and sea conditions. DEP sought comments from various state and federal agencies with jurisdiction over fisheries and wildlife. None of these agencies expressed any objection to the proposed docking structure. No representative from any of those agencies testified or presented evidence at the hearing. Area fishing guides and sports fishermen fish for bonefish and tarpon in the flats in the vicinity of the proposed docking structure. If built, the proposed docking structure would spoil this kind of fishing, especially bonefishing, or at least make it more difficult. The more similar docking structures installed in the area, the greater the difficulties in continuing to use the area for this kind of fishing. On the other hand, resident tarpon and some other fish species could be attracted by such docking structures. Mrs. Damico’s application initially offered a money donation to the Florida Keys Environmental Restoration Trust Fund if mitigation was required. The proposed permit includes a requirement to donate $5,000 to the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary (FKNMS), before construction begins, for the maintenance of mooring buoys to reduce recreational boater impacts at the coral reef areas. The reefs are miles from the site of the proposed docking structure, and the donation does not offset project impacts. Rather, as stated in the proposed permit, its purpose is to “satisfy public interest requirements.” As a federal agency, the FKNMS does not accept donations directly. Donations would have to be made to the Sanctuary Friends of the Florida Keys (SFFK) for use by the FKNMS for buoy maintenance. A condition would have to be added to the ERP to ensure that the donation would be used for the intended purpose. In a bid to defeat Mrs. Damico’s attempt to satisfy public interest requirements, Petitioner offered to donate $10,000 to SFFK for the buoy maintenance if DEP denied the permit. Petitioner’s offer should not affect the evaluation of the proposed docking structure under the public interest criteria. DEP staff evaluated the proposed ERP under the public interest criteria to be essentially neutral and determined that the $5,000 donation would make it clearly in the public interest. This analysis was flawed. With or without the $5,000 donation, the proposed docking structure would have an adverse effect on the public health, safety, and welfare; an adverse effect on navigation; an adverse effect on fishing or recreational values in the vicinity; and an adverse effect on the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity. It would not have any positive public interest effects. Its effects would be permanent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order denying a permit for the proposed docking structure; if granted, there should be a condition requiring construction to “reach out” from shore and, as construction proceeds, from already-built segments of the pier, until water depths allow for the use of a construction barge without unintended damage to the natural resources in the area. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia M. Silver, Esquire Silver Law Group Post Office Box 710 Islamorada, Florida 33036-0710 Brittany Elizabeth Nugent, Esquire Vernis and Bowling of the Florida Keys, P.A. at Islamorada Professional Center 81990 Overseas Highway, Third Floor Islamorada, Florida 33036-3614 Ronald Woodrow Hoenstine, III, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Herschel T. Vinyard, Jr., Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Tom Beason, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
