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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF PHARMACY vs JOHN V. KELLEY, 00-000374 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Jan. 21, 2000 Number: 00-000374 Latest Update: Jan. 05, 2025
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BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs. MARK L. KLUGMAN, 88-005278 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-005278 Latest Update: Mar. 23, 1989

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Mark L. Klugman, was licensed as an optometrist having been issued license number OP 1758 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Optometry (Board). He currently resides at 16021 Villa Drive, Hudson, Florida. On or about August 15, 1987 respondent had an occasion to examine Sandra J. Dinkins for the purpose of diagnosing her eyes and to prescribe and furnish contact lenses. She had never previously warn contact lenses. Dinkins selected respondent at random from the telephone directory because his office was nearby and open on Saturdays. At that time, respondent had an office in Tampa, Florida. After being given contact lenses, and making a total of six office visits, Dinkins was unhappy with the lenses and eventually went to another optometrist. A complaint was later filed with the Board, and this culminated in the issuance of an administrative complaint charging respondent with incompetence, gross or repeated malpractice and violating a Board rule. Respondent requested a hearing to contest these charges. According to Dinkins, the contact lenses prescribed by Dr. Klugman caused "total blurriness" and "hurt her eyes." After Dinkins complained about this condition, respondent told her to "wear them for a week and come back." Because she could not see with the lenses, Dinkins was forced to take them out after the first day. On her next appointment, respondent ordered a new left lens. When this did not correct the problem, Dinkins complained again. Respondent told her to keep wearing them and return in a week. This process continued for several weeks until she gave up and went to another optometrist. By this time, Dr. Klugman had ordered another set of lens, but these were never dispensed since the patient did not return. Doctor Klugman suspected that Dinkins' problems were due to the type of lenses he had prescribed rather than the prescription. He acknowledged at hearing, however, that although his suspicion was "logical," it was not correct. He now agrees the patient needed a corrected prescription for astigmatism to resolve her problem. After Dinkins' complaint was filed with the Board, she was examined by a DPR consultant, Dr. John R. Walesby, who has been in the practice of optometry for over thirty years. Doctor Walesby found that respondent's prescription for Dinkins' left eye was in error by 1.00 diopter of cylinder. After obtaining a corrected prescription and new contact lenses, Dinkins' vision measurably improved although she acknowledged she still has a few problems with her left eye. By failing to properly diagnose her acuity, Dr. Walesby concluded that, while respondent exerted a considerable amount of time and effort in trying to fit the patient, he had failed to conform with the minimum standards of optometry in the community. By rule 21Q-3.007 the Board has mandated that, at a minimum, certain procedures be performed by an optometrist while conducting a visual analysis of a patient, and that evidence of the performance of these procedures be recorded on the patient's records. A copy of Dinkins' patient records has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 1. While the Board's complaint charged that respondent violated the foregoing rule in seven respects, at hearing its expert conceded that he had overlooked or misinterpreted certain entries. While the record is less than a model of clarity as to which procedures were performed and recorded on the records, it is found that procedures regarding the family medical history, family ocular history, and visual field testing were not performed or recorded on the records and therefore such deficiencies constitute a violation of the rule. Respondent pointed out that Dinkins could only visit his office on Saturdays and this made reexaminations difficult. However, his principal defense is that the customer wanted a refund and he did not give one, and this prompted the complaint. According to Dr. Klugman, he would not give a refund because the final set of lenses ordered for Dinkins was nonexchangeable and he could not return them to the manufacturer. In addition, he offered various financial records to show that he is heavily burdened with college loans and credit card bills and did not have the financial ability to make a refund. Even so, this does not excuse respondent from complying with Board rules and statutory requirements.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsections 463.016(1)(g) and (h), Florida Statutes (1987), that he be fined $1000, and that his license be placed on probation for twelve months under such conditions as the Board may deem appropriate. The remaining charge should be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of March, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner: Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 4. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 5. 7-8. Covered in finding of fact 8 to the extent they are consistent with the evidence. Covered in finding of fact 9. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura P. Gaffney, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Mark L. Klugman, O.D. 3611-49th Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33710 Pat Guilford Executive Director Board of Optometry 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.57463.016
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BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs. JULIUS H. REID, 83-000927 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000927 Latest Update: Oct. 23, 1990

The Issue The issues in this case are presented on the basis of an Administrative Complaint brought by the Petitioner against the Respondent. Allegations set forth in that complaint pertain to the treatment of the patient Helen Gilmore. It is alleged that Respondent failed to record on the patient's records or perform the minimum examination procedures for vision analysis related to that patient in an examination of January 26, 1982. It is further alleged that on May 29, 1982, that the patient requested a duplicate copy of the original prescription obtained from the initial examination but Respondent instead performed a new eye examination and again failed to record on the patient records or perform the minimum procedures for vision analysis concerning this patient. In the face of these factual allegations, Respondent is said to have violated Sections 463.012 and 463.016(1)(g) and (h), Florida Statutes, and Rule 21Q-3.07, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent has been licensed as a practicing optometrist in the State of Florida, license No. 40616. During this sequence, Respondent has conducted his practice in Palatka, Florida. Respondent saw the patient Helen Gilmore on January 26, 1982. Ms. Gilmore was having difficulty with her present glasses related to vision in her left eye. Following an examination which took into account the minimum procedures for vision analysis set forth in Rule 21Q-3.07, Florida Administrative Code, Respondent issued a prescription for the patient which deviated from the prescription in the glasses which she was wearing at the time of the examination. Respondent charged $30 for the examination and prescription, which was paid by Gilmore. The prescription was presented to Eckerd's Optical Service in Palatka, Florida, in March 1982, at which time Reid obtained new lenses and frames. Ms. Gilmore paid Eckerd's for the lenses and frames. Having obtained the new frames and lenses from Eckerd Optical, Ms. Gilmore wore those glasses until she started having trouble focusing one of her eyes. Specifically, the patient was having trouble focusing on distant objects. Ms. Gilmore complained to Eckerd Optical about her problem several times. Eckerd Optical was unable to find the duplicate prescription related to the request for prescription by Dr. Reid and Gilmore was advised to return to Dr. Reid and receive a copy of that prescription from his office. In this regard, Dr. Reid's office, in the person of his wife, contacted Gilmore and asked if some problems were being experienced, to which Gilmore indicated that she was having difficulty with her eye and Mrs. Reid stated that Gilmore should return and have her eyes checked again by Dr. Reid. On May 29, 1982, Gilmore was seen by Respondent in his office. The purpose of this visit was to obtain a duplicate copy of the prescription which had been given by Dr. Reid on January 26, 1982 and Gilmore made this known to Respondent. Dr. Reid examined the glasses which Ms. Gilmore had purchased from Eckerd Optical and discovered that the lenses were not in keeping with the prescription which he had given to the patient in that the cylinder correction for astigmatism was not as prescribed and the bifocal had been made up round as opposed to flat. The variance in the prescription given and the prescription as filled was slight. Nonetheless Dr. Reid was of the opinion that it could cause and had caused discomfort to the patient, though not in the way of permanent damage. Having this in mind, instead of providing the duplicate copy of the prescription as requested, Respondent conducted a further vision analysis carrying out those procedures set forth in Rule 21Q-3.07, Florida Administrative Code. On the May 29, 1982 visit, and in the January 26, 1982, examination, Respondent failed to record on the patient's case record the indication that external examination including cover test and visual field testing had been done. Moreover, as established by the testimony of a qualified expert, Dr. Walter Hathaway, who is licensed and practices optometry in the State of Florida, the further examination was not optometrically indicated. This determination was made by Dr. Hathaway based upon the fact that Respondent should merely have provided a duplicate copy of the original prescription of January 26, 1982, as issued by Dr. Reid, having discovered the mistake in the efforts of Eckerd's to fill that prescription and allowed Eckerd's to rectify its error. Per Hathaway, it not being necessary to conduct further examination of the patient, to do so was outside acceptable community standards for the practice of optometry, Again, the opinion of Dr. Hathaway is accepted. As a result of the examination, Dr. Reid prepared a second prescription, which was unlike his January 26, 1982, prescription and the efforts at compliance with that prescription made by Eckerd's in fashioning the lenses. Gilmore was charged $35 for the examination and she paid the bill.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68463.012463.016
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs MUHAMMAD S. MUSTAFA, 93-005409 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 17, 1993 Number: 93-005409 Latest Update: Dec. 28, 1994

Findings Of Fact The parties Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, Division of Quality Assurance, Board of Medicine, formerly Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, is the state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty of regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.42, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 458, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Chapter 93-129, Laws of Florida. Respondent, Muhammad S. Mustafa, M.D., is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0047360. Respondent was licensed by endorsement on October 7, 1985, but did not, ostensibly, actively engage in the practice of medicine in the State of Florida until September 14, 1988. 4/ Respondent's last known address, as of the date of hearing, was 8245 North Nebraska Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33604. Respondent received his medical degree from the Oklahoma University School of Medicine in 1970, performed an internship from 1970 to 1971 at the Altoona Hospital, Altoona, Pennsylvania, did a four-year residency in general surgery from 1971 to 1975 at The Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, Ohio, and started practice as a sole practitioner in Cleveland, Ohio, in November 1975. Respondent's practice consisted of general surgery and family medicine, and he practiced in a predominately blue collar neighborhood until his license to practice medicine was revoked by the State Medical Board of Ohio, as discussed infra. While practicing in Cleveland, respondent had staff privileges at St. Vincent Charity Hospital, Luthern Medical Center, St. John's Hospital, and St. John's Westshore Medical Center, but by May 1988 had restricted his practice to Luthern Medical Center and St. John's Hospital. Respondent resigned his staff privileges at Luthern Medical Center and St. Johns in December 1989. The Ohio charges On May 11, 1988, the State Medical Board of Ohio, the licensing authority for medicine in the State of Ohio, notified respondent that it proposed to take disciplinary action against his certificate to practice medicine and surgery in Ohio. The gravamen of the Board's charges were as follows: That respondent's prescribing practices with regard to approximately 83 difference patients, as well as his overall prescribing as reflected by a listing entitled "Total Drug Amounts by Drug, Year and Month," constituted: "Failure to use reasonable care discrimination in the administration of drugs" and "failure to employ acceptable scientific methods in the selection of drugs or other modalities for treatment of disease," as those clauses are used in Section 4731.22(B)(2), Ohio Revised Code; "Selling, prescribing, giving away, or administering drugs for other than legal and legitimate therapeutic purposes," as that clause is used in Section 4731.22(B)(3), Ohio Revised Code; and "A departure from, or the failure to conform to, minimal standards of care of similar practitioners under the same or similar circumstances, whether or not actual injury to a patient is established," as that clause is used in Section 4731.22(B)(6), Ohio Revised Code. That as to Patient 152 respondent did between March 27, 1984 and December 12, 1985, and again between November 13, 1986 and April 1, 1987, prescribe controlled substance stimulants when the patient either gained weight or failed to lose weight, contrary to the provisions of Section 4731.22(B)(2), (3) and (6), Ohio Revised Code. The Board further charged that respondent's billing to Patient 152's insurance company for services rendered between March 27, 1984 and December 15, 1986, reflected a diagnosis of "hypertension, obesity, ingrown toenail, nerves, low back pain, and arthritis" when there was no indication in respondent's record that he had treated the patient for any condition other than obesity. Such conduct was alleged to constitute "publishing a false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading statement," as that clause is used in Section 4731.22(B)(5), Ohio Revised Code, and the "obtaining of, or attempting to obtain money or anything of value by fraudulent misrepresentation in the course of practice," as that clause is defined in Section 4731.22(B)(8), Ohio Revised Code. That as to Patient 151 respondent did between February 21, 1979 and April 17, 1986, and again between November 13, 1986 and April 1, 1987, prescribe controlled substances and stimulants when the patient either gained weight or failed to lose weight, contrary to Section 4731.22(B)(2), (3) and (6), Ohio Revised Code. The Board further alleged that on respondent's billing to Patient 151's insurance company for services rendered between January 10, 1984 and November 13, 1986, the diagnosis of "menopause; arthritis; glossitis; bronchitis; hypertension; nerves; and chest wall pain" were entered when the majority of services rendered by respondent were for "obesity," a diagnosis not listed, and his records contain no indication that she was being treated for hypertension, nerves or arthritis. Moreover, an EKG and "comprehensive office exam" performed on November 13, 1986 and billed under a diagnosis of "chest wall pain" were in fact performed as part of the physical required prior to starting the diet program. Such conduct was alleged to violate Section 4731.22(B)(5) and (8), Ohio Revised Code. That respondent's reports and billing to two different attorneys with regard to Patient 140 (who had been involved in accidents in June and November 1985) reflected dates of service and patient complaints which were not reflected in the medical records. Such conduct was alleged to violate Section 4731.22(B)(5) and (8), Ohio Revised Code. That respondent prescribed controlled substances for Patient 241 in 1979, 1982 and 1983 through 1985 contrary to Section 4731.22(B)(2), (3) and (6), Ohio Revised Code, in that the patient had admitted to respondent in 1979 that he was addicted to Codeine and in 1985 that he was addicted to Percocet. Respondent was alleged to have first prescribed Percocet in 1983, upon the patient's complaint of back pain, without noting any physical exam or findings, and had continued prescribing it on a regular basis well into 1985. His prescribing of Codeine-based medications and Percocet continued after the patient's admission of addiction to those substances. Finally, citing 13 different patients as examples, the Board alleged that respondent routinely kept inadequate patient records which did not reflect examinations performed or physical findings made to justify the medications prescribed or dispensed; prescribed controlled substances and dangerous drugs based upon patient requests for medications or patient complaints, often without utilizing appropriate testing or other methods for evaluating the validity or etiology of the complaints; and routinely prescribed controlled substance stimulants for weight loss over extended periods of time without regard to whether or not the patient demonstrated weight loss. Such conduct was alleged to violate Section 4731.22(B)(2), (3) and (6), Ohio Revised Code. Moreover, respondent's acts or omissions with regard to certain prescriptions written on or after November 17, 1986, for patients 25, 34, 130, 166, 265, and 276, were alleged to constitute violations of Rules 4731-11-02 and/or 4731-11-04, Ohio Administrative Code, and therefore Section 4731.22(B)(20), Ohio Revised Code. The aforesaid notice of charges dated May 11, 1988, advised respondent of his right to request a hearing on the matter, his right to appear at such hearing in person or through his attorney, to present his position and argument, and to present evidence and examine witnesses appearing for or against him. Respondent timely requested such hearing, and was represented by counsel. The subject charges were heard before Wanita J. Sage, Esquire, Hearing Examiner for the State Medical Board of Ohio, on September 18, 1988. Thereafter, the Hearing Examiner rendered an extensive recommendation, which contained findings of fact, conclusions and an order. Such findings of fact sustained the charges filed against respondent, and are contained in petitioner's exhibit 2. The recommendation, which summarized the factual findings, concluded: The acts, conduct, and/or omissions of Muhammad S. Mustafa, M.D., as set forth in the above Findings of Fact, constitute: "Failure to use reasonable care discrimination in the administration of drugs" and "failure to employ acceptable scientific methods in the selection of drugs or other modalities for treatment of disease", as those clauses are used in Section 4731.22(B)(2), Ohio Revised Code; "Selling, prescribing, giving away, or administering drugs for other than legal and legitimate therapeutic purposes", as that clause is used in Section 4731.22(B)(3), Ohio Revised Code; and/or "A departure from, or the failure to conform to, minimal standards of care of similar practitioners under the same or similar circumstances, whether or not actual injury to a patient is established", as that clause is used in Section 4731.22(B)(6), Ohio Revised Code. The testimony and evidence presented in this Matter amply establish that Dr. Mustafa, in the routine course of his practice, prescribed controlled substances and dangerous drugs for patients for excessive periods of time, without establishing valid medical indication or diagnosis. He prescribed potentially addictive controlled substances, often in dangerous combinations, for patients for years without adequately evaluating their complaints or attempting alternative therapies. In the case of Patient 241, Dr. Mustafa admitted that he had prescribed Codeine for this patient for a period of over one month in 1979 as treatment for his admitted Codeine addiction. Several years later, Dr. Mustafa began prescribing Percocet upon this same patient's complaint of back pain, without any evidence of evaluation, and continued to do so over a two-year period. When Patient 241 then admitted that he was addicted to Percocet, Dr. Mustafa continued to prescribe it for three addi- tional months as treatment for his addiction. Such prescribing contravenes both federal and state laws, including each of those provisions listed above. Dr. Mustafa's claim that there was no adequate treatment program available in 1979 does not satisfactorily explain his prescribing for Patient 241's addiction in 1985. The patient records clearly demonstrate Dr. Mustafa's willingness to prescribe whatever patients requested, even when objective data indicated that there was no valid medical indication for such drugs and no medical basis for the patients' complaints. In the case of Patient 36, Dr. Mustafa liberally prescribed synthetic thyroid hormone at her request, despite the fact that he had obtained tests showing her thyroid levels to be normal. He provided this same patient with narcotic pain medications, even when her complaints of pain were apparently related to urinary tract infections, menstrual cramps, or other conditions which would not appear to justify the use of controlled substances. In the case of Patient 308, Dr. Mustafa prescribed combinations of controlled substances and dangerous drugs, including narcotic analgesics, tranquilizers, hypnotics, barbiturates, antipsychotics, tricyclic antidepressants, and stimulants, even though he was aware that her complaints generally [had] no physical cause, but rather stemmed from emotional problems. On one occasion, he actually telephoned in a prescription for Compazine for Patient 308 when she was in the hospital under the care of another physician for treatment of a drug overdose. Even though Dr. Mustafa was admittedly aware that she had been hospitalized on three occasions due to drug overdoses, he continued afterwards to prescribe dangerous combinations of drugs for her, including the substances on which she had overdosed. In the case of Patient 130, Dr. Mustafa regularly prescribed and administered large amounts of narcotic analgesics over an approximately four year period. Dr. Mustafa admitted that Patient 130 was chemically dependent on narcotics, but claimed they were necessary to control his back pain. Yet, the patient record clearly indicates that Dr. Mustafa made no effort to independently evaluate or diagnose, but rather relied solely upon this patient's representations as justi- fication for his inappropriate prescribing in response to this patient's requests for addictive drugs. Furthermore, the patient record indicates that Dr. Mustafa abruptly discontinued prescribing pain medications and tranquilizers for Patient 130 in early 1987. In general, the patient records demonstrate lack of independent evaluations by Dr. Mustafa of patients' complaints of pain, for treatment of which he prescribed large amounts of controlled medications for excessive periods of time. Such prescribing violates each of the above provisions of law. Further, the patient records of Patients 152, 151, 25, 26, 36, 218, 236 and 265 support the State's allegations that Dr. Mustafa routinely prescribed controlled substance stimulants for weight loss purposes over extended periods of time, whether or not a patient demonstrated weight loss. Dr. Mustafa admitted that it had been his standard practice to prescribe a controlled substance anorectic upon a diet patient's initial visit, without first attempting to achieve weight loss through other means, such as diet or nutritional counseling. In addition, Dr. Mustafa often prescribed Lasix, a diuretic, for weight control purposes. As indicated by the testimony of Dr. Junglas, there is no valid medical indication for the use of a diuretic for weight loss. Such pre- scribing of diet medications also violates each of the above provisions of law. Certainly, both the patient records and the testimony of Dr. Mustafa support the Board's allegations that Dr. Mustafa, in the routine course of his practice, kept inadequate patient records which did not reflect examinations performed or physical findings made to justify the medications he prescribed or dispensed to his patients. Although Dr. Mustafa appeared to claim that he had done examinations or made physical findings which justified the medications he prescribed, he stated that he simply didn't have time to write down everything he knew about his patients. The patient records generally reflect only patient requests for refills of medications, non-specific patient complaints, and lists of drugs prescribed or administered by Dr. Mustafa. They are generally devoid of evidence of appropriate diagnostic testing; documentation as to the nature or severity of the patient's reported pain, illness, or injury; evidence of investigation of alter- native therapies; thorough histories, physical examinations, and diagnoses; in short, infor- mation necessary to assure that the patient receives appropriate treatment. Such records evidence Dr. Mustafa's violations of each of the above provisions of law. As indicated by the testimony of Dr. Donald Junglas, Dr. Mustafa's treatment with regard to each of the 17 patients whose records were reviewed at hearing violates each of the above provisions of law. Further, the prescriptions identified as State's Exhibits #6A through #6H and summarized by the "Prescription List by Patient Number" and the listing of "Total Drug Amounts by Drug, Year, and Month" (State's Exhibit #1) indicate that Dr. Mustafa's inappropriate, long-term prescribing of controlled substances was not confined to those 17 patients, but rather was common in his practice. Dr. Mustafa's prescribing of controlled substances for weight reduction for Patients 152 and 151 after November 17, 1986, constitutes "violating . . ., directly or indirectly, . . . any provisions of this chapter or any rule promulgated by the Board", as that clause is used in Section 4731.22(B)(20), Ohio Revised Code, to wit: Rule 4731-11-04, Ohio Adminis- trative Code, as in effect on and after November 17, 1986. Rule 4731-11-04(B) requires that a physician's use of controlled substances for purposes of weight reduction in the treatment of obesity be only as an adjunct in a regimen of weight reduction based on caloric restriction. It further requires the physician to determine, before instituting treatment with a controlled substance, that the patient has made a "substantial good-faith effort to lose weight in a treatment program utilizing a regimen of weight reduction based on caloric restriction, nutritional counseling, behavior modification, and exercise, without the utilization of controlled substances, and that said treatment has been ineffective. Further, the physician must obtain a thorough history, perform a thorough physical examination, and rule out the existence of any recognized contradictions to the use of the controlled substance. Further, according to this rule, the physician may not initiate or must discontinue utilizing controlled substances immediately upon determin- ing that the patient has failed to lose weight while under treatment with a controlled substance over a period of 14 days, such determination to be made by weighing the patient at least every fourteenth day. Dr. Mustafa's prescribing of Schedule IV anorectics for Patients 152 and failed to meet these requirements. Patient testified that he had never tried dieting before seeing Dr. Mustafa. Dr. Mustafa's lecturing Patient 152 about snacking does not constitute the institution of a regimen of weight reduction based on caloric restriction. The documentation in the patient records, parti- cularly in the case of Patient 151, fails even to establish that these patients' overweight constituted obesity which might have justified the use of a controlled substance in the event that other treatment methods had been proven ineffective. Further, Dr. Mustafa failed to discontinue prescribing Schedule IV anorectics for Patients 152 and 151 when they failed to lose weight, as required by Rule 4731-11-04(B). In fact, although Dr. Mustafa admittedly become aware of this Rule in December, 1986, he prescribed Schedule IV anorectics for Patient 152 when he demonstrated weight gains on February 5, March 5, and April 1, 1987, and he prescribed Schedule IV anorectics for Patient 151 when she demonstrated failure to lose weight on January 9, February 5, and March 5, 1987. Pursuant to Rule 4731-11-04(C), Ohio Adminis- trative Code, Dr. Mustafa's violations of Rule 4731-11-04(B) also violate Sections 4731.22(B)(2), (B)(3), and (B)(6), Ohio Revised Code. Further, Dr. Mustafa's prescribing for Patients 25, 34, 130, 166, 265, and 276, on and after November 17, 1986, constitutes "violating . . ., directly or indirectly . . . any provisions of this chapter or any rule promulgated by the Board", as that clause is used in Section 4731.22(B)(20), Ohio Revised Code, to wit: Rules 4731-11-02 and/ or 4731-11-04, Ohio Administrative Code, as in effect on and after November 17, 1986. With respect to patient 25, Dr. Mustafa violated Rule 4731-11-04(B) by prescribing the Schedule IV controlled substance Fasin 30 mg. for purposes of weight reduction on both December 19, 1986, and February 13, 1987, without: instituting a regimen of weight reduction based upon caloric restriction, first determining the ineffectiveness of other methods of weight reduction, or determining whether or not she failed to lose weight by weighing her at least every fourteenth day. Further, Dr. Mustafa violated Rule 4731-11-02(D) by telephoning in a prescription for 30 Tranxene 7.5 mg., a Schedule IV anxiolytic, for Patient 25 on April 2, 1987, without documenting any exam- ination, evaluation, diagnosis, or purpose for this controlled substance. On seven occasions from November 19, 1986, through April 29, 1987, Dr. Mustafa prescribed Vicodin, a Schedule III narcotic analgesic, for Patient 34 without documenting any examination, evaluation, diagnosis, or purpose for his use of this addictive controlled substance. In fact, four of these prescriptions were issued after Dr. Mustafa had discussed with Patient 34 the addictiveness of Vicodin and the need for him to take less of it. Such acts and omissions violate both paragraph (C) and (D) of Rule 4731-11-02. Dr. Mustafa's acts and omissions with regard to Patient 130 also constitute violations of both paragraphs (C) and (D) of Rule 4731-11-02. Without documenting any examination, evaluation, diagnosis, or purpose other than the patient's requests for pain medication, Dr. Mustafa administered IM injections of Demorel 100 mg., a Schedule II narcotic analgesic, to Patient 130 on December 13, 1986, January 6, 1987, and April 7, 1987. In addition to the Demerol injection, he also prescribed 100 Tylenol #4, a Schedule III narcotic analgesic, for this patient on April 7, 1987, solely upon Patient 130's request for pain medications for vacation. Dr. Mustafa had previously notified this patient on January 12 that he would prescribe no more tranquilizers or pain medications for him. Dr. Mustafa admitted at hearing that this patient had been chemically dependent upon narcotics, though he claimed that he had needed them to control his pain. Upon Patient 166's request, without document- ing any examination, evaluation, diagnosis, or purpose, Dr. Mustafa prescribed for her 100 Vicodin, a Schedule III narcotic analgesic, on December 24, 1986, and 50 Vicodin on January 29 and again on April 23, 1987. Such acts violate Rule 4731-11-02(D). With respect to Patient 265, Dr. Mustafa initiated treatment with Adipex-P, a Schedule IV stimulant anorectic controlled substance, on December 9, 1986, without first determining the effectiveness of other methods of weight reduction, without instituting a regimen of weight reduction based on caloric restriction, and without obtaining a thorough history or performing a thorough physical examination to rule out the existence of any contradiction. Dr. Mustafa continued to prescribe Apidex-P through April 31, 1987, without weighing Patient 265 at least every fourteenth day and without immediately discontinuing such treatment when this patient showed a weight gain on February 10, 1987. Such acts and omissions violate Rule 4731-11-04(B). Furthermore, from December 9, 1986, through May 11, 1987, Dr. Mustafa prescribed Valium for her on three occasions, two of which prescriptions he telephoned in. On five occasions during this period, he prescribed Darvon Compound 65 for her, including one occasion when Patient 265 indicated that she had 30 tablets left from a previous prescription, two occasions where Dr. Mustafa provided her with postdated prescriptions, and one occasion where he telephoned in a prescription. At no time did Dr. Mustafa document any examination, evaluation, diagnosis, or purpose other than the patient's stated complaint, for his prescribing of these controlled substances. Such acts and omissions constitute violation of both paragraphs (C) and (D) of Rule 4731-11-02. In an approximately five month period from November 17, 1986, through April 28, 1987, Dr. Mustafa prescribed for or administered to Patient 276 a total of 519 dosage units of controlled substances, including: 25 Demerol 50 mg., a Schedule II narcotic analgesic; 2 IM injections of Demerol 50 mg.; 2 IM injections of Demerol 75 mg.; 60 Fiorinal, a Schedule III barbiturate analgesic; and 430 Darvocet N-100, a Schedule IV narcotic analgesic. Of these, 230 dosage units were prescribed by telephone. Throughout this period, Dr. Mustafa failed to document examination, evaluation, diagnosis, or purpose for this prescribing other than patient requests and complaints. On one occasion, he did note a physical finding of severe pain and tenderness in the back, radiating downward; however, no further evaluation was done and no diagnosis was indicated. On another occasion, Dr. Mustafa noted a diagnosis of severe migraine headache, but failed to state any information upon which that diagnosis was based. In view of the addictiveness and volume of the substances so prescribed, it is concluded that Dr. Mustafa's acts and omissions with regard to Patient 276 constitute violations of both paragraphs (C) and (D) of Rule 4731-11-02. Pursuant to Rule 4731-11-04(C), Ohio Administ- rative Code, Dr. Mustafa's violations of Rule 4731-11-04(B) also violate Sections 4731.22(B)(2), (B)(3), and (B)(6), Ohio Revised Code. Pursuant to Rule 4731-11-02(F), Ohio Adminis- trative Code, Dr. Mustafa's violations of Rule 4731-11-02(C) and (D) also violate Sections 4731.22(B)(2) and (B)(6), Ohio Revised Code. Further, in view of the nature and/or amounts of the drugs prescribed and the circumstances with regard to such prescribing, Dr. Mustafa's acts and omissions with regard to Patients 130, 265, and 276 are found to constitute purposeful, knowing, or reckless violations of paragraph (C), and thus, pursuant to paragraph (F), also violate Section 4731.22(B)(3), Ohio Revised Code. Dr. Mustafa's acts, conduct, and/or omissions, as set forth in Findings of Fact #7 and #13, above, constitute: "Publishing a false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading statement", as that clause is used in Section 4731.22(B)(5), Ohio Revised Code; and "The obtaining of, or attempting to obtain, money or anything of value by fraudulent misrepresentations in the course of practice", as that clause is used in Section 4731.22(B)(8), Ohio Reviewed Code. Claim forms submitted by Dr. Mustafa or his office staff to insurers for reimbursement for Dr. Mustafa's services for both Patient 152 and Patient 151 reported diagnoses for which he had not treated those patients. The fact that diagnoses appeared on claim forms, but not in the patient records, cannot be attributed merely to Dr. Mustafa's poor documentation. Although Dr. Mustafa's patient records clearly indicate that the EKG's done in November, 1986, were part of physical examinations for initiation of diet programs, these EKG's were claimed under diagnoses of hypertension for Patient 152 and chest wall pain for Patient 151. In fact, the "Weight Reduction Program" form contained in Patient 152's file indicates that he had no history of hypertension or heart disease. It must be concluded that false diagnoses were reported for purposes of obtaining reimbursement from the insurer for performance of these routine tests. Although not included in the Board's allegations, it is noted that a similar billing was submitted on behalf of another patient reviewed in this Matter, Patient 25 (See Finding of Fact #19). Although Dr. Mustafa denied knowledge of or responsibility for these false billings, copies of the claims, many of which were signed by Dr. Mustafa, were made a part of the patients' records. Furthermore, contrary to Dr. Mustafa's contentions, he is responsible for the billing procedures of his office. It must be concluded that Dr. Mustafa knew or should have known of the fraudulent billings submitted on behalf of Patients 152 and 151. Further, Dr. Mustafa's acts, conduct, and/or omissions, as set forth in Findings of fact #15 and #16, above, constitute: "Publishing a false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading statement", as that clause is used in Section 4731.22(B)(5), Ohio Revised Code; and "The obtaining of, or attempting to obtain, money or anything of value by fraudulent misrepresentations in the course of practice", as that clause is used in Section 4731.22(B)(8), Ohio Revised Code. Dr. Mustafa submitted billings and reports of Patient 140's attorneys, listing dates of service and fees not reflected in the patient record. In addition, he billed both attorneys for a January 28, 1986, office visit. Dr. Mustafa's attempts to explain these discrepancies are not convincing. The reports to the attorneys listed no specific treatments or medications for the dates reported; thus, they could not be adequate substitutes for clinical notes which Dr. Mustafa claimed to have recorded on separate cards. Further, Dr. Mustafa claimed that he had made clinical notes on cards, later discarded, because Patient 140 had come to his home, rather than to his office, for treatment; yet he had earlier testified that his office was in his home (Tr. at 41). Also, Dr. Mustafa's attempt to blame his receptionist for the double billing of the January 28, 1986, visit is not well taken. Dr. Mustafa signed the reports submitted to both attorneys and was responsible for their accuracy. It is evident that the billings submitted to Patient 140's attorneys for reimbursement for professional services fraudulently misrepresented the extent of and fees for Dr. Mustafa's services. Although not part of the Board's charges, it is further noted that the patient record for Patient 166 contains a billing submitted to an attorney which contains both dates of service and fees which are not reflected in the patient record (see Finding of fact #31). * * * * * The testimony and evidence in this Matter sub- stantially shows that Dr. Mustafa, in the routine course of his practice, engaged in inappropriate, indiscriminate prescribing of controlled substances and dangerous drugs. The patient records evidence his willingness to prescribe at the patient's request, without regard for medical indications or patient welfare. In at least one case, he admittedly prescribed narcotics to a known addict for an inappropriate period of time without referring him to an authorized treatment program. Both the State's exhibits and the testimony of its expert, Dr. Junglas, rob Dr. Mustafa's claim, that his prescribing was in accordance with acceptable community standards for the time, of credence. Dr. Mustafa admitted that he had ignored the warnings of drug manufacturers and FDA labeling with regard to his long-term prescribing of controlled substances, relying on information he claimed to have obtained from his colleagues. At best, Dr. Mustafa's prescribing practices reflect a willful ignorance of the properties and effects of drugs. Neither willful ignorance nor the lack of moral character demonstrated by Dr. Mustafa's fraudulent billings would seem to be remediable. PROPOSED ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the certificate of Muhammad S. Mustafa, M.D., to practice medicine and surgery in the State of Ohio shall be and is hereby REVOKED. This Order shall become effective thirty (30) days from the date of mailing of notification of approval by the State Medical Board of Ohio, except that Dr. Mustafa shall immediately surrender his United States Drug Enforcement Administration certificate and shall not order, purchase, prescribe, dispense, administer, or possess any controlled substances, except for those prescribed for his personal use by another so authorized by law. Further, in the interim, Dr. Mustafa shall not undertake treatment of any individual not already under his care. Wanita J. Sage Attorney Hearing Examiner The Hearing Examiner's proposed findings of fact, conclusions and order were adopted by the State Medical Board of Ohio on December 6, 1989. Respondent appealed the Board's order through the courts and on May 4, 1992, the Ohio Supreme Court refused respondent's request that it take jurisdiction of the case. Consequently, the order of the State Medical Board of Ohio revoking respondent's license to practice medicine became effective June 15, 1992. Other matters At hearing, respondent offered the opinion of Adnan E. Mourany, M.D., Soundiah Selvaraj, M.D., and Marcello Mellino, M.D., by way of deposition (Respondent's exhibits 9-11), concerning respondent's reputation as a physician. Dr. Mourany is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Ohio, as well as Indiana, Minnesota and New York, and has practiced since 1986. He is Chairman of Surgery and Chief of Otolarynology at St. John's Westshore Hospital, and has known respondent professionally and personally since 1979. Dr. Selvaraj is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Ohio, and has practiced since 1974. he is Chief of Internal Medicine and Ambulatory Care at the Luthern Medical Center, and has known respondent professionally since 1976. Dr. Mellino is licensed to practice medicine in Ohio, and has practiced for 13 years. He is a cardiologist, and has known respondent professionally since 1978. It was the opinions of Doctors Mourany, Selvaraj and Mellino that respondent was an excellent surgeon who enjoyed a reputation as a good physician. 5/ At hearing, respondent also presented proof that during medical school he received an award from the Governor of Oklahoma for having performed volunteer work with charitable organizations, and that during his practice in Cleveland he received a ten-year service award from Luthern Medical Center and an award from the United States Senate recognizing his volunteer work for the Cleveland Foundation. Respondent also participated in two projects in Cleveland, one in 1983 and one in 1987, to treat patients without charge. All such activities predated the charges filed by the Ohio Board of Medicine. Since revocation of his Ohio license, respondent attended three courses of continuing medical education programs. The first, "Medical Malpractice and Risk Management--1993," was apparently completed in October 1993; the second, "AIDS and Florida Law--1993," was apparently completed in October 1993; and the third, "Surgical Education and Self-Assessment Program," was apparently completed in November 1993. Other than having attended such courses, respondent's activities since the revocation of his Ohio license do not appear of record.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of September 1994. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September 1994.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.6020.42458.331766.102
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BOARD OF PHARMACY vs. CORAL WAY PHARMACY, INC., AND RAUL PRADA, 76-000401 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000401 Latest Update: Jun. 03, 1977

The Issue Whether Respondent's permit to operate a pharmacy should be suspended or revoked for alleged violations of Sections 465.18(1)(b), 465.18(2)(b), 465.22(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 21S-1.14, Florida Administrative Code. At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for Respondent moved to continue the proceedings in order that Detective Robert Delgado could be deposed. There being no showing that a timely notice of taking deposition had been issued or a subpoena requested therefor, the Motion was denied.

Findings Of Fact While on a routine inspection of a pharmacy, Vernon K. Bell, investigator for the Petitioner, obtained a prescription issued by Dr. Rafael Cardella, Miami, Florida for 30 tablets of cardilate, 10 miligrams, that had not been picked up at the pharmacy by the person designated in the prescription. Bell secured this prescription for use in investigation of other pharmacies. Cardilate is a vasodilator that is used by cardiac patients with angina pectoris as a maintenance medication to prevent one from having angina pectoris attacks. It is a product made by Burroughs Wellcome Pharmaceutical House and consists of scored white tablets. The tablets act similarly to nitroglycerin medication and are dispensed only upon prescription (Testimony of Bell, Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) Acting upon a prior complaint against Respondent's pharmacy, Bell conducted an investigation into its practices with regard to dispensing prescription medicine. At 8:50 P.M., January 14, 1976, he provided the cardilate prescription to officer Robert Delgado, intelligence investigator, Dade County Public Safety Department, who entered Respondent's pharmacy to see if the prescription would be filled during a period when it was assumed that the registered pharmacist was not on duty. He handed the prescription to Concepcion Prada and asked that it be filled. She went to the prescription area of the pharmacy through an unlocked door and in five or ten minutes came back with a bottle of pills labeled "cardilate 10". Delgado had been unable to observe who had filled the prescription. Mrs. Prada told him that she only had ten tablets, but that he could come the next day for the remainder of the prescription of thirty tablets. He paid her $1.50 for the medicine, left the pharmacy, and turned the bottle over to Bell who was outside (Testimony of Delgado, Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) Bell thereupon entered the Pharmacy, identified himself and asked Mrs. Prada if there was a pharmacist on duty. She responded in the negative. Bell then proceeded through an open door into the prescription department and picked up the prescription that he had given to Delgado. He then asked Mrs. Prada who had filled the prescription and she informed him that she had done so. He then told her that he would be issuing a violation complaint in the matter. Mrs. Prada had been a registered pharmacist in Cuba, but had informed Bell on a prior occasion that she was not a registered pharmacist in Florida. At the time of the incident described above, she told him that she was going to attend classes at Loyola School. This school prepares individuals who desire to obtain qualifications for taking examinations for registration before the Board of Pharmacy. Circumstances surrounding the statements made by Mrs. Prada to Bell establish that they were made voluntarily (Testimony of Bell.) It is possible that cardilate could save a life under certain circumstances. At the time of the dispensing of the medicine in question, three or four pharmacies within 10 blocks of Respondent's pharmacy were open (Testimony of Bell.)

Recommendation That a civil penalty in the sum of $500.00 be imposed against Respondent under the authority of Section 465.101(3), Florida Statutes, for violation of Section 465.18(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rule 21S-1.14, Florida Administrative Code. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Schwartz, Esquire 201 Ellis Building 1311 Executive Center Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Stanley P. Kaplan, Esquire 404 Biscayne Building Miami, Florida Guillermo F. Mascaro, Esquire 301 Almeria, Suite 3 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Emilio De La Cal, Esquire 301 Almeria Avenue Coral Gables, Florida

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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs JORGE ARTURO FLORES, 92-004948 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Aug. 14, 1992 Number: 92-004948 Latest Update: Apr. 27, 1993

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the parties' prehearing stipulation, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been for approximately the past 15 years, a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. He specializes in internal medicine and cardiology and is board certified in these specialities. He currently is the Chief of Cardiology and head of the Coronary Care Unit at North Ridge Hospital and has staff privileges at approximately five other hospitals in the Broward County area. At all times material to the instant case, Health Imaging, Inc., (Health) was in the business of providing ultrasound imaging services in the State of Florida at the request of physicians, hospitals and members of the community at large. The tests performed by Health were non-invasive studies that involved no health risks. They included echocardiograms, carotid ultrasounds and other studies of the heart and vascular system done with ultrasound equipment. Unlicensed technicians operated the equipment and administered the tests. Florida-licensed physicians interpreted the test results. In August of 1987, Warren Green and his wife, the owners of Health, contacted Respondent and asked him if he would be interested in contracting with Health to provide such interpretive and diagnostic services. After looking into the matter and satisfying himself that Health's equipment was of good quality and that its technicians were well qualified, Respondent entered into a written agreement (Agreement) with Health, the body of which provided as follows: This agreement made and entered into this 18 day of August 1987 by and between Health Imaging, having its principal business address at 6278 North Federal Highway, Suite 372, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, hereinafter referred to as "HEALTH" and Jorge Flores, M.D., having his principal business address at 5700 N. Federal Highway, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, hereinafter referred to as "DOCTOR" is made with reference to the following: WHEREAS, HEALTH is engaged in business throughout the Florida area providing ultrasound and vascular services to hospitals, physician offices and the community. DOCTOR is engaged in the business of providing medical services to his patients and patients of other doctors and hospitals in the Ft. Lauderdale, Florida area. Health desires to contract from DOCTOR for certain diagnostic interpretation services for its own patients and patients of other doctors and hospitals in the Florida area. NOW THEREFORE, HEALTH AND DOCTOR AGREE AS FOLLOWS: Equipment. HEALTH agrees to provide all necessary equipment and supplies to perform the services according to the schedule set forth on Exhibit A, attached hereto. Personnel. Health shall provide qualified technologists to operate the equipment for the services set forth on Schedule A, attached hereto. Solicitation of Employees. DOCTOR shall not during the term of this agreement nor a period of One (1) year after its termination, solicit for employment or employ, whether as employee or independent contractor, any person who is or has been employed by HEALTH during the term of this agreement without the prior written consent of HEALTH. Physician Interpretation Personnel. DOCTOR agrees to provide necessary qualified physicians for interpretations. Payment. For and in consideration of the services and promises contained herein by DOCTOR, HEALTH agrees to pay DOCTOR in accordance with the fee schedule set forth on Schedule A, attached hereto. All fees are to be paid in advance or at time of interpretation. Default. In the event of the default of any payment this contract may be terminated by DOCTOR. Term, Termination. The term of this agreement is for one (1) year. After Thirty (30) days either party may terminate this agreement, without cause, by giving Thirty (30) days written notice provided that in no event may HEALTH terminate this agreement unless all monies owing to DOCTOR under the terms hereof are paid in full. Compliance with Law. Both parties agree to comply with all municipal, state and federal laws and regulations. Governing Law. This agreement shall be construed under the laws of the State of Florida. Independent Contractor. DOCTOR is performing the service and duties required hereunder as an independent contractor and not as an employee, agent, partner, or joint venturer with HEALTH. Entire Agreement. This instrument shall be deemed to contain the entire agreement between HEALTH and DOCTOR and supercedes [sic] any prior or existing agreements, understandings, arrangements, terms, conditions, negotiations, or representations, oral or written, made by either party concerning or affecting the subject matter hereof. No modification of this agreement may be made except in writing, signed by HEALTH and DOCTOR. Schedule A, which was referenced in and appended to the Agreement, read as follows: INTERPRETATION FEE SCHEDULE Community, Corporate, Club and Association Screening Program Fee Schedule. EXAM: Echocardiography only FEE: One thousand dollars (1,000.00) per month for 400 studies in any thirty (30) day period. Five dollars ($5.00) per study for all studies exceeding four Hundred (400) studies in any given thirty (30) day period. Community, Corporate, Club and Association Screening Program Fee Schedule. EXAMS: (Any combination of the following) Carotid Ultrasound with Doppler and Periorbital Doppler Echocardiography Upper and Lower Extremity Doppler Study FEE: Three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) per month for any combination of the above studies, not to exceed 1,500 studies in any thirty (30) day period. Any combination of the above studies will be at a rate of Five Dollars ($5.00) per study in any given thirty (30) day period. Hospital and Physician offices fee Schedule: (Any studies performed in a hospital or Physician office, ordered by a physician) EXAMS Carotid ultrasound with doppler $65.00 Echocardiography $65.00 Abdominal ultrasound $65.00 Holter monitoring $65.00 Peripheral arterial examination $35.00 Peripheral venous examination $35.00 The Agreement and Schedule A were drafted by the Greens without the assistance of an attorney. Respondent furnished Health with interpretive and diagnostic services under the Agreement for approximately 18 months. He provided Health with no other services. Respondent was compensated $1,000 per month the first four months and $3,000 per month the remaining 14 months for his services. Most of the individuals whose test results Respondent interpreted during his 18-month association with Health were self-referred. The remainder of the test takers were referred by physicians. None had any prior professional relationship with Respondent. 1/ Respondent prepared a signed, written report of his findings for each test taker. 2/ He sent the report, along with the materials that he had reviewed in making his findings, to Health, which in turn provided the report to the test taker or to the referring physician, if there was one. 3/ Respondent did not consider the test takers to be his patients. He therefore did not keep copies of the reports he had prepared and sent to Health or the test materials upon which these reports had been based. 4/ The Greens had assured Respondent at the outset, however, that they would maintain these records and make them available to Respondent upon his request should he need them for some reason. The Greens were true to their word. Whenever Respondent asked to see a copy of a report or test materials, 5/ the Greens complied with his request. The Greens still have in their possession copies of the reports Respondent had prepared and transmitted, as well as the related test materials. While Respondent was aware that Health advertised to generate business, he was not asked to assist in any way, either as a consultant or otherwise, in the preparation or placement of any of Health's advertisements. Indeed, the first time he saw one of these advertisements was approximately five or six months after he began his association with Health. The advertisement was in a local newspaper that he happened to be reading. Some months later he saw another advertisement in the same newspaper. He found the contents of this particular advertisement to be "totally unacceptable." He therefore telephoned the Greens and complained about the advertisement. The Greens responded to Respondent's complaint by discontinuing the advertisement. A short time thereafter, upon the suggestion of a Department investigator who warned Respondent "to stay away from these people," Respondent severed his relationship with Health. He did so, not because he believed that he had done anything wrong, but because the Department, through its investigator, had expressed its concerns regarding the matter.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of January, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1993.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68458.305458.331
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs DANIEL ZALUZEC, M.D., 11-002244PL (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port St. Lucie, Florida May 04, 2011 Number: 11-002244PL Latest Update: Jan. 05, 2025
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BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs MARK L. KLUGMAN, 91-004121 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jul. 03, 1991 Number: 91-004121 Latest Update: Oct. 07, 1991

Findings Of Fact On or about March 15, 1990, A.J.F., an 86 year old white male went to the office of Respondent for the purpose of getting an eye examination and new glasses. A.J.F. had lens implants in both eyes in 1984 and had some astigmatism. Respondent examined A.J.F. and prepared a prescription for new glasses for A.J.F. The glasses were made by Disston Optical, a company independent of Respondent, but located in the same building as Respondent's office. A.J.F. picked up his glasses a week or two after his prescription was written and started home with them. After driving with the new glasses for about five minutes, A.J.F. concluded that he could not see well through the right lens of the glasses and replaced them with his old glasses. Later that evening, A.J.F. tried to read with his new glasses and again found he could not see well through the right lens. Within 24 hours of picking up these new glasses, A.J.F. returned to Respondent's office with the glasses complaining that he couldn't see well through the right lens. Respondent told A.J.F. that he should wear the glasses for a week or two before deciding they were unacceptable. A.J.F. demurred, and Respondent took the glasses from A.J.F. and walked into the back of his office. Respondent made no offer to check the glasses or reexamine A.J.F. Earlier A.J.F. had problems with glasses prescribed by another optometrist and complained to the optometrist who put the glasses in A.J.F.'s pocket. Although A.J.F. wrote a letter to Medicare not to pay for the unsatisfactory glasses, he found they did pay because he had taken the glasses. A.J.F. did not intend to repeat that mistake. Following Respondent's refusal to do anything about A.J.F.'s glasses, A.J.F. complained to the Department of Professional Regulation and sent a letter to a Channel 8 TV ombudsman (8 on your side) complaining of Respondent and optometrists in general. The complaint of A.J.F. was investigated by Petitioner which investigation included A.J.F.'s medical records from Respondent and from an ophthalmologist previously seen by A.J.F. and also seen by the ophthalmologist subsequent to having been seen by Respondent. These records show that Respondent's prescription for the right eye of A.J.F. contained an axis of 45 degrees for the astigmatism adjustment while prior examinations contained an axis of 85 to 95 degrees for this same adjustment. Following his failure to obtain satisfactory glasses from Respondent, A.J.F. went to the ophthalmologist he had previously seen, Dr. Don B. Knapp, II, M.D., to obtain glasses. Dr. Knapp's examination on June 7, 1990 (Exhibit 2) determined the astigmatism field adjustment was 85 degrees for the right eye. The axis for the astigmatism in A.J.F.'s right eye of 90-95 degrees in earlier examinations, a 45 degree axis in Respondent's examination, and an 85 degree axis in Dr. Knott's examination a couple of months after Respondent's examination constitutes a significant change which would indicate a distinct possibility exists that the axis determined by Respondent was inaccurate. The fact that there was approximately a 45 degree change in this axis between A.J.F.'s earlier examination and the examination conducted by Respondent should have alerted Respondent that his examination could have been in error when A.J.F. returned with the glasses complaining that he could not see clearly through the right lens. An error of that magnitude could very well lead to the patient being unable to see through the glasses. By failing to conduct a further examination of A.J.F. or to check the lens to see if it was made in accordance with the prescription he issued, Respondent was negligent in the practice of optometry. It is also clear that A.J.F. has a history of complaining about new glasses that are prescribed for him, and he can be characterized as a difficult patient. By Final Order entered June 22, 1989, Dr. Klugman was found guilty of violating Section 463.016(1)(g)(negligence of the practice of optometry) and Section 463.016(1)(h)(violation of Rule 21Q-3007, Florida Administrative Code), was fined $1,500, and his license was placed on probation for 12 months. By Final Order entered March 14, 1991, based upon a Stipulation, Respondent was ordered to pay a civil judgment entered against him in Hillsborough County Court in the amount of $177 and to refrain from violating Chapters 455 and 463, Florida Statutes.

Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Mark L. Klugman, O.D., guilty of violating Section 463.016(1)(g), Florida Statutes, assessing an administrative fine of $2,000, suspension of his license for three months, and placing Mark L. Klugman's license on probation for a period of 12 months under such terms and conditions as the Board of Optometry deems appropriate. ENTERED this 7th day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner are accepted, except for finding 9. While a licensee on probation would be expected to be more careful than one not on probation, there is no legal requirement that the probationee exercise a higher standard of care than a licensee not on probation. Respondent's proposed findings are accepted, except for: Finding 3 - No evidence was submitted that Respondent verified the accuracy of the spectacles or that A.J.F. returned the spectacles to Disston Optical. Finding 4 - Last sentence rejected. No evidence was submitted that A.J.F. returned the spectacles to Disston Optical. COPIES FURNISHED TO: Laura P. Gaffney, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Mark L. Klugman 4201 49th Street North No. 202 St. Petersburg, FL 33709 Patricia Guilford Executive Director Board of Optometry Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (1) 463.016
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC vs LISA RENEE CALHOUN, 00-004187PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida Oct. 10, 2000 Number: 00-004187PL Latest Update: Jan. 05, 2025
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