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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs LEONARD R. MARQUEZ GARCIA, M.D., 13-003375PL (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 10, 2013 Number: 13-003375PL Latest Update: Apr. 18, 2014

The Issue Whether Respondent, a medical doctor, practiced beyond the scope of his temporary certification and/or failed to notify the Board of Medicine of changes in employment, as Petitioner alleges; if so, whether (and what) disciplinary measures should be taken against Respondent's temporary license, which authorizes him to practice only in areas of critical need.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this case, Respondent held a temporary conditional certification to practice as a medical doctor in an area of critical need ("ACN") within the state of Florida, having been issued license number ACN 313. Petitioner has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed physicians such as Respondent. In particular, Petitioner is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a physician, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Medicine has found that probable cause exists to suspect that the physician has committed a disciplinable offense. Here, Petitioner alleges that Respondent committed three such offenses. In the three-count Complaint, Petitioner charges that Respondent violated section 458.331(1)(g), Florida Statutes, "by failing to perform any statutory or legal obligation placed upon a licensed physician"; section 458.331(1)(v) by "practicing or offering to practice beyond the scope permitted by law or accepting and performing professional responsibilities which the licensee knows or has reason to know that he is not competent to perform"; and section 458.331(1)(m) by "violating any provision of Chapter 458 or Chapter 456, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto." Respondent is certified to practice medicine pursuant to a Rear Admiral Leroy Collins, Jr., Temporary Certification to practice medicine only in ACNs that have been approved pursuant to section 458.315(3), Florida Statutes. A doctor certified to practice in an ACN receives a temporary certificate from the Board of Medicine pursuant to section 458.315, Florida Statutes. The certificate is temporary and conditional. Section 458.315(3) requires that an ACN certified physician practice in an ACN; a county health department; correctional facility; Department of Veterans Affairs clinic; community health center funded by section 329, section 330, or section 340 of the United States Public Health Services Act; or other agency or institution that is approved by the State Surgeon General and provides health care to meet the needs of underserved populations in this state; or for a limited time to address critical physician-specialty, demographic, or geographic needs for this state's physician workforce as determined by the State Surgeon General. Once issued, the certified ACN physician can practice in any Surgeon General approved area of critical need facility; however, within 30 days of accepting employment, the ACN physician must notify the Board of Health of all approved institutions in which the licensee practices and of all approved institutions where practice privileges have been denied. On or about September 24, 2008, Respondent submitted to Petitioner an application for temporary certificate to practice in an ACN. Respondent was notified via correspondence dated June 11, 2009, that his application was approved, and that he had been issued license number ACN 313. The June 11, 2009, correspondence summarily advised Respondent of the following conditions and limitations on his license: Your license limits your practice to Project Access Foundation Medical Clinics, 8000 Biscayne Blvd., Miami, FL 33188. Practicing with that limitation is a very important statutory and legal requirement. Notifying this office of your current specific practice location is equally important. Your license will expire on 1/31/2010. From June 11, 2009 through January 26, 2010, Respondent did not notify Petitioner that he had accepted employment at any medical facility. On or about January 26, 2010, Petitioner processed Respondent's ACN renewal application. In the "Financial Responsibility Form" included within the renewal application, Respondent checked the box that provides, "I do not practice medicine in the State of Florida." Nearby, Respondent wrote, "In this moment." Respondent's ACN license was renewed on or about January 29, 2010, and was valid through January 31, 2012. On or about November 17, 2010, the Agency for Health Care Administration ("ACHA") was notified that Respondent was acquiring 100 percent of the shares of stock for Global Rehabilitation Center, Inc. ("Global"). The undisputed evidence establishes that Respondent practiced medicine at Global. Respondent did not disclose this practice location to Petitioner until September 2012, during the course of an investigation. At that time, Respondent divulged that he had worked at Global for approximately two years. It is further undisputed that, at the time Respondent acquired Global, and all material times subsequent, Global was not an ACN approved facility. Respondent never applied to have Global placed on the ACN approved facility list. Respondent practiced medicine at another facility, Policlinico Pastorita, Inc. ("Policlinico"), from August 2009 to the present. Respondent first notified Petitioner of this practice location on or about January 10, 2012, as part of his renewal package. Policlinico did not become an approved ACN facility until October 8, 2012. The undisputed evidence established that Respondent also practiced medicine at Injury Rehabilitation Center, Inc.2/ Said facility was never an approved ACN facility. Respondent did not notify Petitioner of this practice location until September 2012, during the course of an investigation. On May 18, 2011, Archy's Diagnostic Center was approved as an ACN facility. On or about January 23, 2012, Respondent, as part of his license renewal process, advised Petitioner that his current practice location was Archy's Diagnostic Center. Respondent, in his PRO, makes the following concessions: (1) that he failed to notify the Board of Medicine within 30 days of accepting employment at either an ACN approved or non-approved facility; (2) that he failed to use his ACN temporary certificate to work exclusively at ACN-approved facilities; and (3) that he did not comply with sections 458.315(4)(a), 458.331(1)(g), and 458.331(1)(v). Respondent, in mitigation, contends that he never attempted to evade the reporting requirements. Respondent testified that he initially believed Policlinco was an ACN approved facility because of the demographics of the practice and because the owner advised him that he could practice medicine at that facility. On this point, Respondent further testified as follows: "[B]ut I ignored, I didn't know that I had to report myself to Tallahassee to the health department but later on I learned that I had to do that." Concerning Global, Respondent testified that apparently he just forgot about the requirements of ACN approval or never thought of the requirements. The undersigned finds Respondent's testimony that he was unaware of the reporting requirements of his ACN license is not credible.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 458.331(1)(g), (v), and (nn); and imposing the following penalties: a two-year suspension, a $1,000.00 administrative fine, and a one-hour lecture on the reporting requirements of a temporary certificate for practice in areas of critical need. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2014.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57456.057458.315458.331
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PROFESSIONAL PAIN MANAGEMENT, INC., LICENSE NO. PMC 296 vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 11-002661 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida May 25, 2011 Number: 11-002661 Latest Update: Dec. 16, 2011

The Issue Should the certificate of registration of Petitioner, Professional Pain Management, Inc., License No. PMC 296, as a privately-owned pain management clinic, be revoked?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Professional Pain Management, Inc., License No. 296, is a pain management clinic (PMC) subject to the requirements of sections 458.3265 and 459.0137, Florida Statutes (2010).1/ PMC 296 is not wholly-owned by medical doctors (M.D.s), osteopathic physicians (D.O.s), or a combination of M.D.s and D.O.s. PMC 296 is not a health care clinic licensed under chapter 400, part X, Florida Statutes. PMC 296 has three equity shareholders. Their names and percentages of ownership interests are: Robert Ciceles (20 percent); Terra Hom (40 percent), and Erez Cohen (40 percent). None of the three equity shareholders is a physician, M.D. or D.O. Erez Cohen is, and at all pertinent times, has been president of PMC 296. He is not an M.D. or a D.O. Since at least August 2010, the owners and officers of PMC 296 were aware of the requirement that it be wholly physician-owned, effective October 1, 2010. PMC 296 was, at all times pertinent to this proceeding, not wholly-owned by physicians, M.D.s, D.O.s, or a combination of M.D.s and D.O.s. A dispute among the shareholders arising out of a dissolution of marriage proceeding has prevented PMC 296 from establishing ownership by a M.D., a D.O. or a combination of M.D.s and D.O.s. Management of PMC 296 plans to transfer ownership to physicians at an unspecified future date once the shareholder dispute is resolved. There was no evidence of any exemption from the operation of sections 458.3265 and 459.0137 presented at the hearing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health issue a final order revoking the certificate of registration of Professional Pain Management, Inc., License No. PMC 296. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2011.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68458.3265459.0137
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JEFFREY FISHER, O.D. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 02-004829 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Dec. 17, 2002 Number: 02-004829 Latest Update: Aug. 07, 2003

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to a passing score on the clinical examination of the July 2002 optometry licensure examination.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner earned a bachelor of science degree in mathematics from Baylor University in 1978 and a doctor of optometry degree from the University of Houston in 1982. He subsequently became licensed to practice optometry in West Virginia and Texas. After practicing for years in West Virginia, Petitioner practiced for 13 years in Texas before moving to Florida in June 1999. In July 2002, Petitioner took the clinical examination portion of the optometry licensure examination. To obtain a license, a candidate must pass this portion of the examination, as well as the portions pertaining to pharmacology and ocular disease and Florida laws and rules. Petitioner has already passed these other portions, so the clinical examination is what he must pass to earn a Florida license. The clinical examination is a practical examination in which a candidate must demonstrate specific procedures. Respondent selects the procedures to be demonstrated on the basis of their importance to the practice of optometry. Respondent scores the clinical examination by averaging the scores of two examiners, who score the candidate's work independent of each other. The clinical examination is divided into two sections, and a different pair of examiners score each section. An examiner must be a Florida-licensed optometrist for at least three years prior to the examination. The examiner may not be under investigation or have been found to have violated Chapter 456 or 463, Florida Statutes. Prior to performing their duties, examiners must attend a standardization program, at which they are trained in identifying the skills to be examined and the standards to be applied. All of the examiners for a specific examination date attend the same standardization program, at which Respondent's coordinators present several hundred slides showing correct and incorrect procedures and answer any questions that examiners may have. In general, Petitioner challenges the work of one of Respondent's staff in rescoring his examination and calculating his score as 74.10. Although still not a passing grade, 74.10 is one point closer to passing than was his originally reported score of 73.10. However, this staffperson rechecked her work and later confirmed that 73.10 was the correct score. At the hearing, Petitioner specifically challenged Questions 33(b), 33(c), 35(b), 37(a), and 38(b). These questions are all from the same section of the examination, so the same two examiners scored each of them. In Questions 33(b) and (c), the candidate must perform tonometry on a nondilated eye and demonstrate the proper mires width and correct mire alignment, respectively. For Question 33(b), Examiner 143 gave Petitioner no credit, noting that the mires width was "too thin," and Examiner 242 gave Petitioner no credit, noting that the mires width was "too thin" and there was "not enough flourescein." For Question 33(c), Examiner 143 gave Petitioner no credit, noting that the mires were "no [sic] aligned," and Examiner 242 gave Petitioner no credit, noting that the "mires [were] off." Petitioner has failed to prove error in either score. For Question 33(b), both examiners found the same condition. The candidate, not the examiner, as Petitioner claimed, is responsible for adding flourescein. Insufficient flourescein would leave the mires too thin. Examiner 242's additional note explains the source of Petitioner's error in Question 33(b). Petitioner's argument that he could still obtain a proper ultimate reading despite insufficient flourescein and thin mires lines misses the point of the question, which is to determine if candidates can take the conventional steps toward the ultimate objective of estimating intraocular pressure. For Question 33(c), both examiners drew similar pictures showing that Petitioner's mires lines were misaligned. Petitioner produced no evidence to the contrary. His argument that he could not have answered Question 34 correctly without solving Question 33(c) misses the point of Question 34, which is merely to determine if a candidate can accurately read a dial. For Question 35(b), the candidate must demonstrate proper illumination of an inferior angle of the eye. Examiner 242 gave Petitioner credit, but Examiner 143 gave Petitioner no credit, noting "poor lighting." It is entirely possible that Examiner 242, who was first to examine the demonstrated angle, found adequate lighting, but, due perhaps to patient movement with no readjustment, Examiner 143 found inadequate lighting. In this procedure, only one examiner can check the angle at a time. For Question 37(a), the candidate must determine the presence of iris processes by showing the correct response and clear focus. Examiner 242 gave Petitioner credit, noting that Petitioner "repositioned [patient] and got focus of angle and answered correctly," but Examiner 143 gave Petitioner no credit, noting "no view or focus." As noted by Examiner 242, Petitioner had to reposition the patient and did so to earn credit for this item. Evidently, Petitioner failed to do so for Examiner 143. For Question 38(b), the candidate must demonstrate the specified angle of the eye with proper illumination. Examiner 242 gave Petitioner credit, but Examiner 143 gave Petitioner no credit, noting "no view of angle." Again, the most likely reason for the loss of a view was patient movement without an accompanying readjustment of the focus. Petitioner has failed to prove that he is entitled to any additional points for the clinical examination portion of the optometry licensing examination that he took in July 2002.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Optometry enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the clinical examination portion of the July 2002 optometry licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Baker, Jr., Executive Director Board of Optometry Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C07 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 A. S. Weekley, Jr. Holland & Knight LLP Post Office Box 1288 Tampa, Florida 33602 Cassandra Pasley Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703

Florida Laws (2) 120.57456.014
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BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. ALBERT P. OTEIZA, 83-000122 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000122 Latest Update: Mar. 09, 1984

The Issue The following issues of fact were considered: Did the Respondent aid, assist, procure, or advise an unlicensed person to practice medicine? Did the Respondent delegate professional responsibilities to persons when he knew or had reason to know that said persons were not qualified by licensure to perform them? Did the Respondent presign prescription forms? Both parties submitted posthearing findings of fact, which were read and considered. Those findings not incorporated herein are found to be either subordinate, cumulative, immaterial, unnecessary, or not supported by the evidence.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Albert P. Oteiza, is licensed to practice medicine and surgery in the State of Florida and has been so licensed at all times relating to the charges in the Administrative Complaint. The Respondent was president and director of the Union Latina Association, Inc. (the Association), located at 1313 Southwest First Street, Miami, Florida. The Respondent was paid by the Association, which provided medical services to patients who were members of the Association. The Respondent practiced at Clinical Union Latina (the Clinic), located at 1313 Southwest First Street, Miami, Florida, and was the medical director of the Clinic. The Respondent was not an officer or director of the Clinic. The president of the Clinic was Rigoberto Garcia, and the business manager was Christian Carmona. Florencio Sanchez-Lopez was employed as a physician's assistant at the Clinic by Christian Carmona, who assigned Sanchez-Lopez's duties. Sanchez-Lopez was not a licensed physician and was not a certified physician's assistant. Sanchez-Lopez admitted seeing and treating patients at the Clinic. Sanchez- Lopez saw those patients who were in serious condition in the presence of the Respondent. Those patients who were not in serious condition, Sanchez-Lopez saw without the Respondent being present, and Sanchez-Lopez prescribed treatment and medications for these patients. Sanchez-Lopez examined and prescribed medications and treatment for Ralph Nunez, an investigator for the Board of Medical Examiners, in the manner Sanchez-Lopez had admitted to examining and prescribing for other patients. Valerio Matta was employed as a physician's assistant at the Clinic by Carmona, who assigned Matta's general duties. Matta was not a licensed physician or a certified physician's assistant. Matta saw patients at the Clinic, examining them and prescribing medications and treatment for them without the presence of a licensed physician, as he did with Georgina Jorge, an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation. Matta also admitted that he had performed minor surgery on patients, but only when the Respondent was present in the Clinic. Carlos Manuel Rodriguez-Murgia was employed as a physician's assistant at the Clinic by Carmona, who assigned Rodriguez-Murgia his general duties. Rodriguez-Murgia was not a licensed physician or certified physician's assistant. Rodriguez- Murgia saw patients at the Clinic, examining and prescribing medications and treatment for them without the presence of a licensed physician, as he did with Georgina Jorge, an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation. The acts performed by Sanchez-Lopez, Matta, and Rodriguez-Murgia all constituted the practice of medicine. However, these acts did not exceed the acts which could have been performed by a physician's assistant. The Respondent was aware or should have been aware that Sanchez-Lopez, Matta, and Rodriguez-Murgia were engaged in seeing patients at the Clinic and performing acts which constituted the practice of medicine. Carmona was deceased at the time of the hearing. Garcia, president of the Clinic, outlined Carmona's duties. Carmona was responsible for having Sanchez-Lopez, Matta, and Rodriguez-Murgia certified as physician's assistants. All three men confirmed that Carmona represented to them they would be licensed and they were "legal" to perform their duties. Sanchez-Lopez, Matta, and Rodriguez-Murgia could not swear that it was the Respondent's signature on the prescriptions they used or that they had seen the Respondent sign the prescriptions. There were other licensed physicians who worked at the Clinic.

Recommendation Having found the Respondent guilty of three counts of violating Section 458.331(1)(w), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, it is recommended that the Board of Medical Examiners suspend the license of the Respondent, Albert P. Oteiza, for a period of 12 months and assess a civil penalty against him of 3,000. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of October, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Blas E. Padrino, Esquire 2355 Salzedo, Suite 309 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION Petitioner, vs. Case No. 83-122 ALBERT P. OTEIZA, M.D., License No. 20879 Respondent. /

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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NAVIN SINGH vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 01-000374 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jan. 26, 2001 Number: 01-000374 Latest Update: Jul. 06, 2004

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to a passing grade on the clinical portion of the August 2000 optometry licensure examination.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner took the optometry licensure examination in August of 2000. He received passing scores on three of the four parts of the licensure examination. He received a failing score on the clinical portion of the examination. The Petitioner's score on the clinical portion of the subject examination was 70.50. The minimum passing score is 75.00. The Petitioner contested the scores awarded to him for his performance of procedures itemized on the examination as 2A, 7B, 10A, 22A, 33C, 9A, 18B, and 14B.3 During the course of the hearing, two of the challenged items were resolved without the need for evidence. The Petitioner withdrew his challenge to item 10A. The Respondent stipulated that the Petitioner's performance on item 2A had been incorrectly graded, and agreed that 1.5 points should be added to the Petitioner's grade on the subject examination. On five of the items challenged by the Petitioner, one of the examiners gave the Petitioner credit for successful completion of the procedure and the other examiner did not.4 With regard to these five items, the Petitioner's primary contention is that, if one examiner gave him credit, he should also have received credit from the other examiner. However, given the nature of the manner in which the clinical examination is conducted, different scores by examiners evaluating a candidate's performance are not unusual, and, standing alone, different scores are not indicative of any irregularity in the manner in which the examination was conducted. On the clinical portion of the optometry licensure examination, each candidate is evaluated by two examiners, each of whom grades the candidate's performance of a procedure independently of the other examiner. Further, the examiners are not permitted to confer with each other regarding a candidate's scores. Specific written grading standards have been prepared for each of the procedures candidates are required to perform as part of the clinical portion of the subject examination. These written grading standards are provided to all examiners prior to each examination so that the examiners can review the standards and be prepared to apply them in a fair and even-handed manner. Before serving as an examiner, each proposed examiner goes through a training session. During the training session, each proposed examiner practices scoring the performance of various optometry procedures. Following the practice sessions, the work of each examiner is evaluated to determine whether the examiner is correctly applying the grading standards. If a potential examiner is unable to demonstrate the ability to apply the grading standards, then that examiner is assigned to other duties and is not assigned to grade candidates on the licensure exam. The examiners assigned to grade the Petitioner on the clinical portion of the subject examination all successfully completed the training process and were determined to be acceptable by the Department. The examiners assigned to grade the Petitioner on the clinical portion of the subject examination were all experienced examiners and a statistical analysis of their scoring of all candidates on the subject examination demonstrates that they reliably applied the grading standards. With regard to the procedure required by item 14B, the Petitioner asserts that his ability to demonstrate the required procedure was impaired by the fact that the patient was photophobic. The greater weight of the evidence is otherwise. While the subject examination was in progress, two optometrists examined the patient and determined that the patient was not photophobic. There is no competent substantial evidence of any misconduct by any of the examiners who graded the Petitioner's performance during the subject examination. Similarly, there is no competent substantial evidence that the Department acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or that it abused its discretion. There is no competent substantial evidence that the scoring of the Petitioner's examination performance was flawed, other than the additional 1.5 points that the Department agreed should be given for item 2A.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued concluding that the Petitioner is not entitled to a passing grade on the clinical section of the optometry licensure examination and dismissing the petition in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2001.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57456.014463.006 Florida Administrative Code (1) 64B-1.006
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs. ERIC A. BAUM, 87-002451 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002451 Latest Update: Oct. 07, 1988

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Eric A. Baum was a licensed physician in the State of Florida having been issued License No. ME 0027880. He is board certified as a psychiatrist and board eligible in internal medicine (Exhibit 3). Respondent has never established an active practice in Florida, although in the latter part of 1985 he maintained an office at his residence and later, for approximately 2 months, in a downtown office building in Sarasota. Between August 19, 1985 and December 30, 1985, Respondent prescribed Bentyl, Ritalin, Fiorinal, Cylert, Urecholine and Laradopa to "Terri Leigh", generally in quantities of 100 for Ritalin (10 mg.) and Fiorinal (Tab). During this period, 1250 10 mg. of Ritalin and 1550 tabs of Fiorinal were prescribed (Exhibit 14). Terri Leigh is an alias used by Respondent for his wife, Terri Baum (Exhibit 7). Ritalin is a Class II controlled substance, Fiorinal is a Class III controlled substance and Cylert is a Class IV controlled substance. During part of this time until delivery on October 21, 1985, Terri Baum was pregnant. Medical records prepared by Respondent for Terri Baum would indicate the medication was prescribed for headaches and depression. Both Ritalin and Fiorinal are contraindicated during pregnancy. Between July 30, 1985 and December 30, 1985, Respondent wrote prescriptions for "Pam Leigh" for 200 Fiorinal, 600 Cylert (37.5 mg.) and 500 Ritalin (10 mg.), (Exhibit 10). Pam Leigh is an alias for Respondent's then 16 year old daughter, Pam Baum. Respondent contends that Pam is hyperkinetic and suffered from migraine headaches, and the medication was prescribed for those diagnoses. However, Pam denies ever taking any drugs or having any illness requiring such medication. Mark Baum, Pam's twin brother, denies that Pam is or was hyperkinetic or that he ever saw her take any medication. This latter evidence is deemed to be more credible than Respondent's testimony (Exhibit 3). The quantity of controlled substances prescribed for Terri and Pam by Respondent during the periods above-noted are greater than should be prescribed for the symptoms noted and were inappropriate. On April 15, 1987, Respondent pleaded nolo contendere to the offense of obtaining drugs by fraud in the Circuit Court of Sarasota County, Florida, adjudication of guilt was withheld, and he was placed on probation for one year with certain terms (Exhibit 11). At the time Respondent's residence (and office) were searched by police pursuant to a search warrant seeking patient's records for Terri and Pam Baum, those records could not be found, and Respondent denied knowledge of their whereabouts. The records (Exhibits 6 and 7) were subsequently produced by Respondent. It is likely that Respondent prepared Exhibits 6 and 7 subsequent to the arrest of Terri Baum shortly before the search was conducted. Subsequent to the arrest, Terri Baum and Pam Baum on February 26, 1986 had an appointment with Dr. Sayers Brenner, M.D., a psychiatrist, at which Terri requested Ritalin, Cylert and Fiorinal for herself and Ritalin and Cylert for Pam. Dr. Brenner, at the time unaware of Terri's arrest, prescribed a 10-day supply of these drugs and told Terri that he would not continue to supply drugs to her and that he did not treat adolescent patients. Although an appointment was made for a subsequent visit in two weeks, neither Terri nor Pam returned. Although no charges were made in this regard, evidence was presented in Exhibit 8 that Respondent wrote prescriptions for himself for Lasix, Lanoxin and Urecholine. No evidence was submitted from which a determination can be made that Respondent has a drug dependency problem, although the evidence is clear that if Respondent does not have a drug dependency problem, his wife does, and that prescriptions were written by Respondent to several fictitious persons to support this dependency.

Florida Laws (1) 458.331
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BOARD OF PHARMACY vs. AMERICAN APOTHECARIES, INC., D/B/A SCOTTIE DRUGS, 82-001628 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-001628 Latest Update: Feb. 22, 1983

The Issue The issues to be determined here concern disciplinary action to be taken against Respondent for those administrative offenses pertaining to the controlled substances Talwin, Dilaudid and Paregoric dispensed by Scottie Drug Store in Duval County, Florida, during the period April 2, 1981, to March 23, 1982, in violation of various provisions of Chapter 465, Florida Statutes. These contentions made by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, are more particularly described in the Administrative Complaint, DPR Case No. 0022147.

Findings Of Fact Howard E. Staats is a pharmacist who has been issued a license by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Pharmacy. The license number is 0007704. At times relevant to this proceeding, Staats practiced pharmacy in Jacksonville, Florida. At all times pertinent to the Administrative Complaint, which is the focus of this action, Staats was the managing pharmacist at American Apothecaries, Inc., which does business as Scottie Drug Store at 41 Arlington Road South, Jacksonville, Florida. A copy of Respondent's most recent license may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence, is a copy of the permit for American Apothecaries. Sometime within the period March 23, 1982, through March 29, 1982, an audit was conducted at the Scottie Drug Store. The audit revealed that in the period April 2, 1981, through March 23, 1982, the drug store had purchased 66,900 tablets of Talwin, 50 mg., had sold 29,373 tablets of that drug, had lost by robbery or theft, 1,000 tablets of the drug, leaving 36,527 tablets of Talwin unaccounted for. During that same audit period, the pharmacy purchased 4,000 tablets of Dilaudid, 4 mg., selling 3,025 tablets of that drug, losing by robbery or theft, 200 tablets of the drug and failing to account for 775 tablets of the drug. Finally, during the audit period, 2,064 ounces of Paregoric had been purchased and 699 ounces sold, with the remaining amount of 1,285 ounces being unaccounted for. See Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Talwin is a Schedule IV controlled substance within the meaning of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Dilaudid is a Schedule II controlled substance within the meaning of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Paregoric is a Schedule III controlled substance within the meaning of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. The audit which was conducted at the Scottie Drug Store revealed numerous prescriptions for the controlled substance Talwin, 50 mg., written on prescription blanks of Drs. W. W. Shell, Jr., and L. T. McCarthy, Jr., which had allegedly been signed by those physicians, when in fact the patients for whom the prescriptions were written were unknown to the physicians and the signatures of the physicians were forgeries. Those prescriptions are depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, admitted into evidence. During the period covered by the audit, it was shown that Staats filled a number of prescriptions for various patients for the controlled substance Talwin, which had been written on prescription pads of Methodist Hospital and Baptist Medical Center in Jacksonville, Florida, and signed by individuals who are not physicians having hospital privileges at those medical centers nor practicing as physicians in the Duval County area. Copies of those prescriptions may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, admitted into evidence. In the course of the time sequence related to the audit review process, it was discovered that Staats had refilled numerous prescriptions for controlled substances on more occasions than had been authorized by physicians, namely prescription No. 51632 was refilled twice although the physician indicated there were to be no refills; prescription No. 51579 was refilled once although the prescription indicated there should be no refills; prescription No. 51639 was refilled twice although the prescription indicated there should be no refills; prescription No. 51217 was refilled once although the prescription indicated there should be no refills; prescription No. 51238 was refilled once although the prescription indicated that there should be no refills; prescription No. 53010 was refilled once although the prescription indicated that there should be no refills; prescription No. 53597 was refilled four (4) times although the prescription indicated that it should only be refilled once; prescription No. 53537 was refilled once although the prescription indicated that it should not be refilled; and prescription No. 53592 was refilled twice although the prescription indicated that there should be no refills. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, admitted into evidence, is copies of prescriptions spoken to in this paragraph. Respondent Staats had operated the Scottie store under a lease arrangement during 1979 and 1980, and in January of 1981, took a position as an active pharmacist in that store. After becoming the principal operating pharmacist in the Scottie store, Staats began to receive prescriptions from doctors Shell and McCarthy for the substance Talwin and when a prescription purportedly written by those physicians was in question, Staats would call the office of the physicians for confirmation, which at times would be given over the phone and at other times an indication was made that a call back from the physician's office to Staats would be necessary. Some of the indications of physicians' prescription authority of the substances in question would be placed on a separate log and not on the back of the prescription and on other occasions, the note of the prescription information would be placed on the back of the prescription form and not in the log. Normally, this information would be reflected both in the log and on the back of the prescription. There were occasional circumstances in which the authority was not stated in either place. At approximately the same time as was covered by the audit, Staats began to ask for identification from customers who were seeking prescriptions for Talwin and noted that the demand for that substance declined with the advent of the request for identification. Staats posted a notice in the window of the pharmacy to the effect that state law imposed a fine of $5,000.00 or might cause incarceration for five (5) years for presenting forged prescriptions or conspiring or agreeing with another to have a forged prescription filled. On two (2) occasions Staats called law enforcement officials on a circumstance involving suspect prescriptions and those persons were apprehended. (Poor record keeping and mistakes in estimating the amount of losses due to a robbery and a larceny which occurred in the period covered by the audit contributed to the unaccounted for controlled substances, but those matters of record keeping and theft reports would cause only a slight differential in the disparity, as opposed to explaining the whereabouts of a substantial portion of the missing controlled substances.) Beginning on March 25, 1982, Staats began to keep a daily inventory log on the substance Talwin and a number of other controlled substances. A copy of that log may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 9, admitted into evidence. In addition, certain out-of-date and otherwise undesirable controlled substances, Schedules II, III and IV, have been removed from inventory and turned over to appropriate authorities for destruction.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57465.015465.023893.04893.07
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AMERICAN BOARD OF CHELATION THERAPY vs BOARD OF MEDICINE, 96-003173 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 02, 1996 Number: 96-003173 Latest Update: Jun. 05, 1997

The Issue Whether the Respondent properly denied the Petitioner’s request to be a “recognizing agency” within the parameters of Rule 59R-11.001, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Chelation therapy is the introduction of a man-made amino acid into a patient’s vein. It has been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and is used for the treatment of heavy medal toxicity and the removal of lead. American Board of Chelation Therapy (ABCT) is an autonomous organization that provides education and certification to any physician who wishes to become knowledgeable in Chelation therapy. ABCT was established in 1982 for the purpose of establishing the criteria necessary for certification in the area of Chelation therapy. The Board of Medicine is a statutory entity, established by Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, as the primary regulatory authority for the practice of allopathic medicine in the State of Florida. Pursuant to section 458.301, Florida Statutes, the legislature recognizes that the practice of medicine is potentially dangerous to the public if conducted by unsafe and incompetent practitioners. The section further provides that the primary legislative purpose in enacting the medical practices act is to “ensure that every physician practicing in this state meets minimum requirements for safe practice.” In keeping with the legislative mandate to ensure that purpose of the medical practices act, the legislature created the Board of Medicine and authorized the Board to create administrative rules for the purpose of implementing chapter 458. Rule 59R-11.001, Florida Administrative Code, is the advertising rule of the Board of Medicine.3 The rule codifies provisions of section 458.331(1)(d), Florida Statutes, and provides criteria for identifying false, deceptive, or misleading advertising. In particular, the rule governs advertising on physician letterhead and limits the use of the term “specialist” unless the specialty is recognized by (1) a specialty board of the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) or (2) a board that meets the requirements of Rule 59R-11.001, Florida Administrative Code. For those specialties recognized by organizations that do not meet the requirements of the rule, the physicians may still advertise their specialty so long as they provide a disclaimer. By rule the disclaimer must state the following “The Specialty recognition identified herein has been received from a private organization not affiliated with or recognized by the Florida Board of Medicine.” ABMS is generally recognized in the United States as the agency that approves allopathic medical specialty boards and the Board of Medicine has historically relied upon ABMS and its standards and, as reflected in the current rule, continues to rely on ABMS and its standards for approving recognizing agencies. On July 17, 1995, the Petitioner, ABCT submitted an application to Florida Board of Medicine for the purpose of being certified as a “recognizing agency” pursuant to rule 59R-11.001. ABCT is not a specialty board of the ABMS. Because ABCT is not a member board of the ABMS, the Board of Medicine looked to the requirements of rule 59R- 11.001(2)(f) to determine whether ABCT met the criteria enunciated in the rule and whether it is therefore a “recognizing agency” capable of bestowing specialty status on a physician. Rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), Florida Administrative Code, provides that non-ABMS Boards may seek recognition as “recognizing agencies” if they meet the following criteria: The recognizing agency must be an independent body that certifies members as having advanced qualifications in a particular allopathic medical specialty through peer review demonstrations of competence in the specialty being recognized. Specialty recognition must require completion of an allopathic medical residency program approved by either the Accreditation Council of Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) or the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada that includes substantial and identifiable training in the allopathic specialty being recognized. Specialty recognition must require successful completion of a comprehensive examination administered by the recognizing agency pursuant to written procedures that ensure adequate security and appropriate grading standards. The recognizing agency, if it is not an ABMS board, must require as part of its certification requirement that each member receiving certification be currently certified by a specialty board of the ABMS. The recognizing agency must have been determined by the Internal Revenue Service of the United States to be a legitimate not for profit entity pursuant to Section 501 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code. The recognizing agency must have full time administrative staff, housed in dedicated office space which is appropriate for the agency’s program and sufficient for responding to consumer or regulatory inquiries. The recognizing agency must have written by-laws, and a code of ethics to guide the practice of its members and an internal review and control process including budgetary practices, to ensure effective utilization of resources. However, a physician may indicate the service offered and may state that practice is limited to one or more types of services when this is in fact the case; On April 15, 1996, the Board of Medicine issued an order denying the ABCT’s application for specialty status. As basis for the denial, the order stated that the application of the ABCT failed to establish compliance with the requirements for approval as set forth in Rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, the order stated: The requirements for diplomat status in ABCT do not require advanced qualifications in a particular allopathic medicine specialty; specialty recognition given by ABCT does not require completion of an allopathic medical residency program approved by the ACGME or the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada that include substantial and identifiable training in the allopathic specialty being recognized; specialty recognition provided by the ABCT does not require successful completion of a comprehensive examination pursuant to written procedures that ensure adequate security and appropriate grading standards in that ABCT requires only a score of 60% to pass the examination, the examination consists of true false questions and answers, and the examination is not a medically comprehensive examination; ABCT is not an ABMS board and does not require that each member it certifies be currently certified by an ABMS board; and ABCT has not provided evidence that it is a legitimate not-for-profit entity pursuant to Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code as determined by the Internal Revenue Service. Each of the requirements of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f) were addressed at the administrative hearing. With regard to criteria (1) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), advanced qualifications in a particular allopathic medical specialty through peer review, the ABCT does not require an advanced qualification in a particular allopathic medical specialty. Furthermore, ABCT admitted that it does not meet the requirement of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f)(1). Criteria (2) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f) provides that the specialty recognition must require completion of an allopathic medical residency program approved by either the Accreditation Council of Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) or the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada. The ACGME is generally recognized as the organization that sets criteria for graduate medical education in the United States. The Board of Medicine has incorporated that recognition in the rule by requiring that the advanced education component of the rule be ACGME approved. The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada is ACGME’s counterpart in Canada. With regard to criteria (2) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), ABCT does not require completion of an allopathic residency program approved by either the ACGME or the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada. In fact, ABCT has no requirement for a residency program. ABCT reasoned that a there is no need for a residency program for Chelation therapists because Chelation therapy does not require overnight hospital stay. The only requirement remotely relating to residency is an ABCT requirement that applicants for diplomat status administer a minimum of 1000 Chelation treatments. There is no requirement that these treatments be supervised and no requirement for verification that the minimum number of treatments were administered. With regard to criteria (3) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), requiring successful completion of a comprehensive examination, ABCT does not require all applicants for diplomat status to complete a written examination in order to obtain certification. Specifically, some candidates are grandfathered in without being required to complete the written examination. For those applicants that are required to submit to an examination, Dr. Arthur L. Koch testified that the examination is composed of approximately sixty percent true/false questions. In addition, Dr. Koch testified that another ten percent of the test is not medically oriented but rather addresses the history and politics of Chelation therapy in the United States. At the hearing, ABCT submitted its Spring 1994 examination as an exhibit. That examination contained a majority true/false questions and a few multiple choice questions. To pass the ABCT diplomat examination, the candidate is required to achieve a score of 62.5 percent. In contrast, the Board of Medicine generally requires a passing score of at least 75%. The Board of Medicine expressed concern about the low passing score accepted by ABCT on its certification examination. The Board of Medicine also expressed concern over the large number of true/false questions used in the example examination submitted by ABCT. Uncontroverted testimony was presented at the hearing to support a finding that an examination consisting of a majority of true/false questions is not a viable method of testing knowledge. With regard to criteria (4) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), requiring members of non-ABMS boards to also be certified by a specialty board of the ABMS, the ABCT does not require that each physician seeking diplomat status be currently certified by an ABMS specialty board. Furthermore, ABCT admitted that it does not meet the requirement of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f)(4). With regard to criteria (5) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), that the recognizing agency must be a legitimate not for profit entity under the Internal Revenue Code, evidence was presented to verify that ABCT is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization. With regard to criteria (6) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), requiring the recognizing agency to have full-time administrative staff sufficient to respond to consumer or regulatory inquiries, no evidence was presented at the hearing relating to this criteria. With regard to criteria (7) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), requiring the recognizing agency to have written by-laws and a code of ethics to guide the practice of its members, ABCT submitted its Constitution and Bylaws as adopted in March of 1982 and subsequently amended. The Constitution and bylaws, however, did not include a written code of ethics and therefore did not fully comply with the requirements of the rule.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that in Case No. 96-3173, the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order denying ABCT’s application for approval as a “recognizing agency” pursuant to Rule 59R-11.001, Florida Administrative Code.DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of June, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM A. BUZZETT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1997.

Florida Laws (4) 120.56120.57458.301458.331
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