Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Robert Marriott has been a licensed real estate broker/salesman under the laws of the State of Florida, trading as Marriott Realty. In February of 1980, in his capacity as a real estate broker/salesman, Respondent obtained an offer to purchase commercial property in Miami from Orlando Villacis, a resident of Ecuador, as purchaser, for a total purchase price of $500,000. In conjunction with the offer, Villacis paid a $20,000 earnest money deposit to be held by Marriott Realty in escrow under the terms of the offer. Villacis' deposit check in the amount of $20,000 was deposited into the Marriott Realty escrow account on February 22, 1980. By March 11, 1980, Villacis' $20,000 had been withdrawn, leaving an escrow account balance of $40. This fact was never reported to Villacis. Having heard nothing definite from Respondent with regard to the offer, and because he spent most of his time out of the country, Villacis engaged the services of attorney Rafael Penalver. Prior to July 1980, Penalver contacted the Respondent and inquired as to the status of the offer. Each time, Respondent told him that the seller was still considering the offer. In July of 1980, Respondent told Penalver that the $500,000 offer had been rejected by the seller and recommended that Villacis present an offer for $570,000. Penalver prepared the offer in the amount of $570,000, again calling for a $20,000 earnest money deposit, which Penalver and Villacis assumed was still in the Marriott Realty escrow account. Receiving no response from Respondent on the second offer, Penalver attempted to contact Respondent by telephone on numerous occasions. When Penalver was successful, Respondent told him that the seller was reviewing the offer. In early September 1980, Respondent advised Penalver that the $570,000 offer had been rejected by the seller. By letter dated September 11, 1980, Penalver raised the offer to $600,000, set a deadline of September 19 for the acceptance of the offer, and directed Respondent to return the $20,000 immediately should the offer not be accepted. After September 19, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Penalver called him, at which time Respondent advised that the offer was being considered by the seller. Penalver then wrote a letter dated October 7, 1980, to Respondent demanding that Respondent deposit the $20,000 into Villacis' account. Again hearing nothing from Respondent, Penalver on numerous occasions attempted to contact him by telephone in order to again demand the immediate return of the $20,000 deposit. Being unsuccessful, Penalver wrote the Respondent on November 20, 1980, and January 22, 1981, both times demanding the return of the $20,000 earnest money deposit. After the letter of January 22, 1981, Respondent agreed to meet with Penalver in Penalver's office. On February 2, 1981, the Respondent and his wife met with Penalver. During that meeting, Respondent advised Penalver that the $20,000 was no longer available and that he and his wife had used the money to make mortgage payments and cosmetic improvements on their personal residence. Respondent challenged Penalver to sue him to get the money back. After discussing Respondent's position with Villacis, Penalver filed a civil action for return of the $20,000. In his Answer to the Complaint filed in that litigation, Respondent admitted that he had used the $20,000 deposit for mortgage payments and other personal household expenses and for payment of his IRS tax deficiency. Villacis obtained a Final Judgment in the civil action in the amount of $20,000 plus interest and costs on October 6, 1982. Respondent testified that he did not return the $20,000 earnest money deposit because, in approximately October 1980, Villacis verbally agreed to loan the $20,000 to Respondent. Villacis strongly denied making any offer of a loan to Respondent. The purported loan agreement would have occurred after Penalver had twice written Respondent regarding immediate return of the $20,000 and seven months after the $20,000 had disappeared from the escrow account. Further, after Penalver sent his November demand letter, Respondent wrote Villacis in December of 1980 asking that Villacis consider loaning Respondent the $20,000 in exchange for an unrecorded mortgage on Respondent's personal residence. Clearly, Respondent's testimony is not credible. As of the date of the formal hearing in this cause, the Final Judgment in favor of Villacis and against Respondent remained unpaid and Respondent had still not returned to Villacis the $20,000 earnest money deposit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint filed against him and revoking his license as a real estate broker/salesman. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 David I. Schlosberg, Esquire 525 North 27th Avenue, Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33125 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law stated above the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a letter of admonition to Leroy Wilson clarifying his responsibilities and the maintenance of his financial affairs and proper business office when operating as a broker. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Henry Latimer, Esquire Mavrides and Latimer 5353 Southwest 40th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Lee H. Davis, committed the offenses alleged in an Administrative Complaint issued against him on August 16, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (hereinafter referred to as the "Division"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Division is charged with the responsibility for, among other things, regulating the practice of persons holding real estate brokers' and real estate salespersons' licenses in Florida. Section 20.165, and Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Lee H. Davis, is and was at all times relevant to this matter licensed as a real estate broker in Florida, issued License Number 0186063. The last license issued was as an involuntary inactive broker, c/o 815 New Waterford Drive, No. 204, Naples, Florida 34104. On or about August 24, 1995, Respondent executed a form 400.5 and submitted it to the Division to register as a salesperson with Sentry Realty and Property Management, Inc. ("Sentry"). At all times relevant to these proceedings, Respondent was registered with the Division as employed by Sentry. On or about September 7, 1995, Respondent facilitated a contract for sale and purchase (the "contract") between Robert Trindle as buyer and John Petracelli as seller/builder for property described as Hallandale Park, Plat Book 12, Page 37, Block 37, Lots 6,7,8, a/k/a approximately 2801 North East 214 Street, North Miami Beach, Florida. Mr. Trindle testified that he intended to purchase a townhouse to be built by Mr. Petracelli as part of a project to include 40 to 50 townhouses. The contract provided that a $3,900 deposit was to be held by "Lee H. Davis Escrow Agent." Mr. Trindle gave Respondent two checks totaling $3,900, as the earnest money deposit on the purchase price of $130,000. The first check, dated October 9, 1995, was for $1,000. The second check, dated November 3, 1995, was for $2,900. The checks were made out to "Lee H. Davis-- Escrow." Also noted on the checks was "Davena Group Inc.," which Mr. Trindle understood to be Respondent's real estate company. Each check was negotiated by Respondent within a week of its receipt. At the time of this transaction, Respondent's registered broker was John Brouillette of Sentry. Respondent did not place the escrow deposit with Mr. Brouillette, who testified that he knew nothing of the transaction at the time it occurred and never saw the contract. Respondent represented to Mr. Trindle that he would maintain the escrow deposit as broker during this transaction. Mr. Trindle did not give Respondent permission to transfer the escrow deposit to the builder/seller, Mr. Petracelli. Correspondence from Respondent indicated that he did turn the escrow deposit over to Mr. Petracelli, without informing Mr. Trindle. Mr. Petracelli never built the promised townhouses. Rather, he left the country, absconding with Mr. Trindle's escrow deposit along with monies provided by other purchasers and/or investors in the project. Mr. Trindle attempted to contact Respondent regarding the status of his escrow deposit, but was unable to reach him prior to the filing of his complaint with the Division. As of the date of the hearing, the earnest money deposit had not been returned to Mr. Trindle.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner finding that Respondent has violated Subsections 475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(d)1, 475.25(1)(e), 475.25(1)(k), and 475.42(1)(d), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent, and that Respondent's real estate license be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Sunia Y. Marsh, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308A Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Lee H. Davis 815 New Waterford Drive, No. 204 Naples, Florida 34104 Herbert S. Fecker, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent failed to deliver a deposit to the person entitled to said delivery in violation of Section 475.25(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Respondent appeared at the hearing without legal counsel and was advised of his rights to same at his own expense. He elected to represent himself at the hearing. He was further advised as to his rights under the Administrative Procedure Act including the right to testify on his own behalf if he so desired. He indicated his understanding of his rights. It was stipulated by the parties that Joseph Sopotnick, Joseph Sopotnick, Jr., and Joe Sopotnick are one and the same person.
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times under consideration in these proceedings, Respondent was a registered real estate broker (Stipulation of parties, Exhibit 2) In March 1974, Alvin K. Whittington of Marietta, Georgia, upon the recommendation of his job supervisor, who had dealt with Respondent in the past, called the Respondent on the telephone concerning the possibility of purchasing land in Florida. Although the Respondent indicated that he had none available at that time, he called Whittington later on in the day and told him that he had certain property which was for sale and inquired as to when he could come down to Florida to look it over. Whittington informed him that he did not know when he would be able to visit Florida and Respondent advised him to send a deposit in order to hold the land since there was a contractor interested in the same property. Whittington told him that he did not like the idea of placing a deposit on property that he had not seen and inquired as to whether or not he could secure a return of the deposit if, after he had seen the land he did not wish to purchase it. Respondent told him "That's no problem. You can get your deposit back". He advised him to send the deposit and that he would hold it until he came to Florida. Accordingly, Whittington sent a check for $360.00, dated March 20, 1974, to the Respondent which indicated on its face that it was a "deposit on Fla. shore lots - N.W. corner Needle Palm & 18th". The check was signed by Mrs. Whittington on a joint account with her husband. The sum of $360.00 represented 10 percent of a purchase price of $3600.00. After talking to Whittington, Respondent on March 20 wrote to the owners of the property, advised that a deposit check would be forthcoming and enclosed a standard sales contract for the sellers to execute and return to him. This was accomplished and Respondent then forwarded the contract to the Whittingtons for execution and return which they received on April 1st. Mr. Whittington thereupon called the Respondent and told him that he could not sign the contract without seeing the property. On April 12th, he and his wife went to Florida, met with the Respondent, looked over the lots in question, and informed the Respondent that he would call him the following Monday as to whether or not he wished to make the purchase. On April 15th, Whittington called the Respondent, informed him that he did not wish to purchase the property and requested return of his deposit. Respondent informed him he could not return it and that disposition of the deposit would be a matter to be determined by the seller. Thereafter, on April 19th, Respondent wrote to the Whittingtons informing them that after careful consideration, he intended to treat the matter as a forfeiture of deposit situation, and unless he heard from them to the contrary he would disburse the deposit to the seller under the terms of the contract. However, he stated in the letter that he would apply the full deposit to any purchase that the Whittingtons might thereafter wish to make. After receipt of this letter, Whittington again called the Respondent concerning the situation at which time Respondent informed him that he would try to get 1/3 of the deposit returned if Whittington would send him a letter indicating that he would accept such an amount. Nothing further was heard from the Respondent and the deposit was never refunded (Testimony of Mr. & Mrs. Whittington, Composite Exhibit 1, Exhibits 3, 4). On or about July 2, 1974, Respondent remitted 1/2 of the deposit to sellers and retained 1/2 for himself (Stipulation of parties) Respondent testified that Whittington had insisted he accept the deposit and send the contract to the seller to insure that he would be able to purchase the property, and that the proposed deal was not contingent upon the buyer's satisfaction with the property. He denied telling Whittington he could get his deposit back. He also testified that after the Whittingtons viewed the property in Florida, he asked Whittington about the contract and the latter said that he had not brought it with him but would send it within a few days. That when he thereafter called upon his return to Georgia, he informed Respondent that he did not wish to make the purchase because his wife was about to have a baby. Respondent contended at the hearing that he was never sure that Whittington wanted his deposit back, however, conceded that Composite Exhibit 1f was his letter to the sellers advising that the Whittingtons had requested the return of the deposit. Respondent asserted that it was his impression that if a deposit had been made in good faith, it was proper to consider that there was a binding contract even though the depositor had not signed a sales contract. He further indicated that if he was wrong in this respect he would return the deposit. At no time did the Respondent ever discuss the transaction with the sellers. He was unaware of the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(c), by which a registrant may seek advice from the real estate commission if he entertains, in good faith, doubt concerning his duty to account and deliver a deposit. Respondent has been in the real estate business for twelve years (Testimony of Respondent, Composite Exhibit 1f).
Recommendation That Respondent's registration as a real estate broker be suspended for a period of 60 days. That the period of suspension in excess of 30 days be vacated if the Respondent returns the $350.00 deposit to Mr. & Mrs. Alvin K. Whittington prior to the expiration of the aforesaid period of 30 days from the original date of suspension. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of February, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, George Sherbon, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued broker's license number 0348688 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). When the events herein occurred, respondent was employed as a salesman for V. P. Stone, Inc., a real estate firm located at 5905 Gulf Boulevard, St. Petersburg Beach, Florida. On April 1, 1987, Paul D. and Anna Martin entered into a listing agreement with Century 21 Spinning Wheel Ent., Inc. (Century 21) to sell their home at 2543 58th Terrace South, St. Petersburg, Florida. The listing agent was Cheryl Coudry, now known as Cheryl Hutton, a licensed salesperson with Century 21. On September 11, 1987 respondent solicited and obtained a contract for sale on the Martin property executed by Frank Dicenzo, a resident of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who had a daughter living in the St. Petersburg area. Dicenzo had responded to an advertisement run by Sherbon in a Pittsburgh newspaper. After a week or so of negotiations, the parties eventually agreed to a sales price of $92,500, and the final contract was executed on September 20, 1987. The contract called for Dicenzo to make an initial $100 deposit when the contract was executed and an additional deposit of $19,900 by September 25, 1987, or a total deposit of $20,000. Dicenzo gave respondent the initial $100 which was deposited into the escrow account of V. P. Stone, Inc. The contract provided further that the sale would be contingent on Dicenzo obtaining a $72,500 first mortgage. Finally, in accordance with Dicenzo's request, the contract provided that Dicenzo could take occupancy of the premises four weeks after the loan was approved. It is noted that Dicenzo initially asked for occupancy by October 16, 1987. On September 18, Sherbon introduced Dicenzo to Tony Black, a loan officer at Savings of America, a local lending institution, for the purpose of Dicenzo making a loan application. On September 24, or the day before the additional deposit was due, Dicenzo became ill with what he described as a bleeding ulcer and decided to return to Pittsburgh and stay at his mother's home. Before he left, Dicenzo did not make the additional deposit as required by the contract. According to Dicenzo, he placed no great significance on the September 25 due date and felt that if the deposit was made "within a reasonable time," it would be okay. Respondent was aware of the September 25 deadline and attempted to get a check for the $19,900 deposit from Dicenzo's daughter but was unsuccessful. Respondent contends he kept trying to contact Dicenzo in Pittsburgh during the next five week period but was unable to reach him. Dicenzo acknowledged he knew that Sherbon was trying to contact him but still made no effort to talk to Sherbon. Instead, he simply told his daughter he would take care of the matter when he returned to Florida in late October. Whether this message was conveyed to Sherbon is not of record. Sherbon prepared contemporaneous notes concerning the transaction and used these to refresh his recollection at hearing. He pointed out that such notes were kept on all real estate transactions. According to his notes, he telephoned Coudry and Black on September 24 concerning Dicenzo's illness and the fact that he was having difficulty obtaining the additional deposit from Dicenzo. Although Black recalled talking with Sherbon, he denied that Sherbon told him that there was no deposit and said such information was a material item that would have prompted him to stop processing the application until the deposit could be verified. Likewise, Coudry, who could not recall many aspects of the transaction, did recall speaking with Sherbon but remembered Sherbon simply telling her that he was in the process of showing Dicenzo various commercial properties and would be obtaining the deposit at that time. Their testimony is deemed to be more credible and persuasive and is hereby accepted. Coudry assumed that Sherbon had received the additional deposit since she was never specifically told otherwise by Sherbon. Accordingly, she did not contact the Martins until several weeks after the September 25 due date. Coudry did not learn that no deposit had been collected until mid-January 1988 when Anna Martin disclosed to her this fact. In the meantime, although the Martins knew the contract was contingent on Dicenzo obtaining a loan, they nonetheless assumed that Dicenzo would have no problem securing a loan and that such a loan would be approved in a week or so. Also, they knew the contract called for possession of the property by Dicenzo four weeks after the loan was approved. Because of these assumptions, and having received no advice from Coudry that the full deposit had not been made on September 25 as required by the contract, the Martins made application around September 28 to buy another home in a nearby modular home park and asked that the application be expedited. Unfortunately for the Martins, they were far more successful than Dicenzo in securing prompt approval of their loan application. Once approved, and after a closing was held, the Martins had the utilities hooked up, erected a storage shed, and incurred other expenses. Also, they began making mortgage payments on the second house. On October 24, 1987 the Martins telephoned Sherbon and told him their listing with Century 21 had expired. During the conversation, Sherbon did not mention that Dicenzo had failed to make the $19,900 deposit. Dicenzo's application with Savings of America was denied on October 30, 1987 because of Dicenzo's "ratio of ... expenses to ... total income." By this time, Dicenzo had returned to Florida and had spoken with Sherbon. At respondent's urging, Dicenzo reapplied to the same institution and was turned down a second time on November 12, 1987. In addition, at Coudry's suggestion, Dicenzo had already visited another lender in October but refused to pay a $250 application fee and consequently did not file an application. Also, through Sherbon, Dicenzo was given the name of a mortgage lender suggested by the Martins but, after three visits, decided not file an application. Information regarding the second Savings of America denial was conveyed to Coudry around mid-November but, for whatever reason, she did not contact Sherbon regarding the status of the contract. It is noteworthy that at that time Sherbon did not tell Coudry that Dicenzo had still failed to make an additional deposit as required by the contract. Despite the loan application denials, Sherbon encouraged Dicenzo to keep trying to arrange financing so that the deal could go through. Dicenzo agreed to do so but, as noted in the following finding of fact, at that point Dicenzo considered the contract to be "null and void." Sherbon's efforts to find financing continued until mid-January 1988. When the loan application was denied on November 12, Dicenzo construed the contract to be void since the financing contingency was not met. According to Dicenzo, he did not believe the property was tied up while his contract was pending, felt no obligation to make the $19,900 deposit because it meant he would have to transfer funds from a money market account he purportedly maintained in Pittsburgh, and felt no moral obligation to the Martins even though by then they had committed themselves to a second home. The Martins were advised by telephone on the evening of November 12 of the second turn down of Dicenzo's loan application. By then, however, they were already committed to the second purchase. They claimed they did not learn of Dicenzo's failure to make the $19,900 deposit until mid-January 1988 when Sherbon visited their home and disclosed this fact. This is also borne out by a letter from the Martins' attorney to Dicenzo on December 1, 1987 advising Dicenzo that the contract was void and a claim might be made on his deposit for damages. When the Martins learned that only $100 had been deposited, they filed a complaint with the Division. That prompted this proceeding. Because of the failed contract, the Martins were unable to maintain two mortgage payments and were ultimately forced to give up the second home at a substantial monetary loss. They have since returned to their first home. The evidence shows that in the real estate trade, it is not customary or proper for the buyer's realtor to personally contact the seller. Rather, the practice and custom is for the buyer's agent to advise the listing broker of all pertinent developments and the listing broker then relays any necessary information to the seller. Thus, Sherbon had no responsibility to personally advise the Martins of any information pertaining to the contract. Rather, this responsibility rested with Coudry. Respondent contended he kept Coudry abreast of all developments concerning Dicenzo and that he assumed Coudry would advise the Martins that no deposit had yet been collected. To the extent this version of events conflicts with previous findings, it is not accepted. Sherbon expressed sympathy for the Martins' plight but maintained he was not at fault. There is no evidence that Sherbon has been subjected to prior disciplinary action by the Division.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) to the extent noted in the conclusions of law and that his broker's license be suspended for three months. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4688 Petitioner: 1-2. Covered in finding of fact l. Rejected as being unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 2. 5-7. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 10. Covered in finding of fact 7. Rejected since respondent owed a duty to Coudry, and not the Martins, to keep her abreast of all pertinent matters. Covered in findings of fact 7 and 12. Covered in findings of fact 7 and 8. Covered in finding of fact 8. Covered in findings of fact 6 and 10. Rejected as being subordinate to other findings. Covered in finding of fact 11. 18-19. Covered in finding of fact 6. Respondent: Respondent's proposed order contains sections entitled "admitted facts", "unrebutted facts" and "uncontested facts". They are ruled upon in that order. Admitted facts: Covered in finding of fact l. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in background. Unrebutted facts: Covered in finding of fact 7. Covered in finding of fact 15. Covered in finding of fact 10. 4-6. Covered in finding of fact 6. 7-8. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 12. Rejected since Sherbon learned of the loan denial even though he did not receive a written copy of the turn-down letter. Covered in finding of fact 13. Covered in finding of fact 8. Rejected since the testimony of Anna Martin is accepted as being more credible on this factual issue. Uncontested facts: Rejected as being cumulative. Partially covered in findings of fact 6, 7 and 16. The remainder is rejected as being cumulative, argument of counsel or not supported by the more credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Daniel B. Schuh, Esquire 248 Mirror Drive St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Darlene Keller, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
The Issue Is Respondent, Victoria D. Wiedle, guilty of failure to account for and deliver funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent Wiedle was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number BK-0646846, and was principal broker of Escarosa Realty. Respondent's license is still active. Janice Marlene Christian is a realtor associate. She was an independent contractor with Escarosa Realty from December 1998 until April 1999. Accordingly, Respondent Wiedle was Ms. Christian's registered broker during this time. Ms. Beverly Lewis is the mother-in-law of Ms. Christian's brother. Ms. Lewis came to Ms. Christian in February 1999 because she was interested in looking for and purchasing a house. On February 16, 1999, Ms. Christian facilitated an Exclusive Buyer Brokerage Agreement (the Agreement) on behalf of Escarosa Realty with Ms. Lewis. The Agreement was on a form created by Formulator, a software company. "Florida Association of Realtors" appears on the face of the document. Paragraph 6 of the Agreement reads in pertinent part: RETAINER: Upon final execution of this agreement, Buyer will pay to Broker a non- refundable retainer fee of $0 for Broker's services ("Retainer"). Accordingly, Respondent was not entitled to any money as a retainer fee for broker services pursuant to this agreement. The agreement was signed by Ms. Lewis, Ms. Christian, and Ms. Wiedle and became effective on February 16, 1999. The specified termination date of the agreement was August 17, 1999. On or about February 27, 1999, Ms. Christian tendered an offer to sellers on behalf of Ms. Lewis, for property located at 107 Poi Avenue in Santa Rosa County (subject property). Pursuant to this offer, Ms. Lewis gave a $500.00 check dated February 27, 1999, to Ms. Christian as earnest money. The check is made out as follows: "Escarosa Realty Inc. Escrow". Ms. Lewis wrote in the memo section of the check that the check was escrow money for 107 Poi Terrace. The $500.00 check was deposited in Escarosa Realty's escrow account on March 1, 1999. Respondent accounted for the $500.00 check on the March 1999 monthly reconciliation statement for Escarosa Realty. The seller of the subject property made a counter- offer for a higher price which Ms. Lewis rejected. The testimony differs as to what happened next. According to Ms. Christian, Ms. Christian spoke to Respondent sometime after Ms. Lewis rejected the counter-offer about refunding the escrow money to Ms. Lewis. According to Ms. Christian, Respondent informed her that she did not have to give the escrow money back to Ms. Lewis yet because she had the buyer broker agreement. Ms. Christian further asserts that she filled out a written request on March 16, 1999, on a form entitled "EMD Request," which means earnest money deposit request, and gave it to Respondent who again asserted that the $500.00 did not need to be returned at that time because of the buyer brokerage agreement. Ms. Christian's testimony is consistent with Ms. Lewis's. According to Ms. Lewis, she talked to Ms. Christian about getting a refund of the $500.00 shortly after she rejected the counter-offer. She and Ms. Christian discussed the EMD form. She initially agreed that Respondent could temporarily maintain the escrow funds. However, when Ms. Lewis discovered that the financing she was seeking through the rural development program would take several months, she decided she wanted the money returned. Ms. Christian ended her contract with Escarosa Realty effective April 14, 1999. Because Ms. Christian was no longer at Escarosa, Ms. Lewis contacted Respondent by telephone on or about April 21, 1999. Ms. Lewis informed Respondent about the purchase offer and rejection of the counter-offer for the subject property. According to Ms. Lewis, Respondent initially told her she would return the money to her in the mail. When she did not receive it, Ms. Lewis again called Respondent and was told that the $500.00 would not be returned because of the buyer brokerage agreement was still in place. Ms. Lewis asserts that Respondent never told her any request for a refund of the $500.00 had to be in writing. Ms. Lewis then went to the Escarosa Realty office. Ms. Weidle was not there but Elnora Alexander was there. Ms. Alexander was also a realtor associate who was an independent contractor with Escarosa Realty. Ms. Lewis explained to Ms. Alexander about the circumstances of the subject property and that she wanted her earnest money back. Ms. Alexander gave a copy of the buyer broker agreement to Ms. Lewis. After going to Escarosa Realty, Ms. Lewis had numerous other telephone conversations with Respondent about the money. Respondent denies any knowledge of the Poi Terrace failed transaction until she spoke to Ms. Lewis on the phone. She also denied ever receiving the EMD request from Ms. Christian. Respondent asserts that she repeatedly told Ms. Lewis that she would return the $500.00 if Ms. Lewis would only make a request in writing, but that Ms. Lewis refused. This assertion is not credible. It is inconceivable that after all of the efforts made by Ms. Lewis to get her $500.00 returned to her, that she would refuse to make a written request for the money. In any event, there is no dispute that Ms. Lewis made verbal requests to Respondent for the return of the escrow monies. Respondent Wiedle admits that Ms. Lewis requested the money over the telephone. Further, in an April 2, 2001 letter from Respondent to the Division of Real Estate, Respondent acknowledged that Ms. Lewis asked for a refund of the money in the beginning of May and again in early June of 1999. Clearly, if Respondent Wiedle had not previously been aware of the failed Poi Terrace transaction, she was made aware of it during the telephone conversations with Ms. Lewis. Notwithstanding Respondent's assertion that the reason she did not refund the $500.00 to Ms. Lewis was that the request was not in writing, it is clear from Respondent's testimony and from a letter she wrote to Mr. Clanton, Petitioner's investigator, that she believed the $500.00 was connected to the buyer brokerage agreement, not to any offer for purchase of property. In an undated letter from Respondent Wiedle to Mr. Clanton, Respondent wrote: Dear Mr. Clanton, This is in response to your letter dated August 17th, 1999. First Beverly A. Lewis was refunded her money on August 20, 1999 check #111. Second I would like to respond to her complaint. Beverly A. Lewis signed a Exclusive Buyer Brokerage Agreement with EscaRosa Realty, Inc. on February 16th, 1999 with it to terminate on August 17th 1999. Beverly A. Lewis knew that her deposit was a refundable deposit after the agreement is expired not before. As the Broker of this company I had no contact with Beverly Lewis until the agent Marlene Christian was asked to leave the company. If there ever was a contract for her to purchase a house then her agent Marlene Christian never informed me of nor did she ever provide any such contract. The deposit was given to me with the Exclusive Buyer Brokerage Agreement only. Nor did her agent Marlene ever fill out the EMD refund request form requesting a refund to be given to Beverly A. Lewis. However, The result would have been the same. I asked Beverly Lewis If she had changed her mind on purchasing a house she said no she was still going to buy a house but that she knew if she didn't buy her house through Marlene at her new company that Marlene would make life very hard on her. I told her I was sorry but that is the whole purpose in the contract was to secure your buyers from just going all over the place. . . .(emphasis supplied) Respondent refunded the $500.00 to Ms. Lewis on August 10, 1999. At hearing, Respondent volunteered that there was a previous complaint against her for failing to return money she held under a buyer brokerage agreement with a former client. In that instance, the Probable Cause Panel of the Florida Real Estate Commission found no probable cause but issued a letter of guidance to Respondent.1
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, the evidence of record and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission finding the Respondent, Victoria D. Wiedle, guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, in that she failed to deliver escrow money upon demand, imposing a fine of $1,000.00, and placing Respondent Wiedle on probation for a period of two years. As conditions of probation, Respondent should be required to attend a continuing education course which addresses appropriate handling of escrow funds and be subject to periodic inspections and interviews by a Department of Business and Professional Regulation investigator. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2002.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of issuing checks from his escrow account without sufficient funds so as to constitute culpable negligence, breach of trust, misrepresentation, or concealment, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; failing to reconcile escrow accounts, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e) and (k), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61J2-14.012, Florida Administrative Code; employing an unlicensed person, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(c), Florida Statutes; failing to maintain business records, in violation of Section 475.5015, Florida Statutes; and violating a lawful order of the Florida Real Estate Commission by failing to pay a citation within the required time, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. If Respondent is guilty of any of these allegations, an additional issue is the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent became a licensed real estate salesperson in 1987. The following year, he became a licensed real estate broker, and he has remained a broker continuously since that time. From September 30, 1996, through January 30, 2000, Respondent was the qualifying broker of Express Realty and Investments, Inc. (Express Realty). At no time relevant to this case was Novellete Faye Hanse a Florida-licensed real estate broker or real estate salesperson. At all relevant times, Ms. Hanse was the office manager of Express Realty. Respondent formed Express Realty in 1995. Respondent was the sole director and president. Ms. Hanse's son was an officer of Express Realty from the time of its formation. Respondent met Ms. Hanse in 1991. She informed Respondent that she was a licensed mortgage broker. Respondent and Ms. Hanse agreed in late 1991 to form a joint real estate/mortgage broker operation in a single office. However, when Hurricane Andrew struck in 1992, Respondent, who has been a licensed general contractor since 1978, engaged exclusively in construction until 1995. Respondent formed Express Realty to pursue the prior plan of a joint real estate/mortgage broker operation. The two businesses occupied an office building owned by Ms. Hanse, who did not charge Respondent's business any rent. The address was 6306 Pembroke Road in Miramar. Express Realty served as an escrow agent in a contract dated May 9, 1999, for the sale and purchase of real property located at 6360 Southwest 23rd Street in Miramar. In this capacity, Express Realty, held various funds in escrow for the closing. For the closing, Express Realty issued two checks payable to the closing agent, totaling $19,169.08, and drawn on its escrow account. The checks, which are dated July 15, 1999, and signed by Ms. Hanse, bear the name, "Express Realty & Investments, Inc. Escrow Account" and bear the address 6306 Pembroke Road in Miramar. The bank failed to pay these checks due to insufficient funds. After receiving a complaint that Express Realty had failed to produce these escrow funds at the closing, Petitioner's investigator conducted an audit of Respondent's escrow account. At the audit, which took place the day prior to the day scheduled, the investigator found Ms. Hanse, but not Respondent, at the Express Realty office. Despite repeated requests on and after the day of the office visit, the investigator could not obtain relevant records from Ms. Hanse or Respondent concerning the real estate transaction for which Express Realty had issued escrow checks with insufficient funds. On August 23, 1999, the Florida Real Estate Commission issued a citation to Respondent at 6306 Pembroke Road in Miramar. The citation was served on Respondent within one week of the date of issuance. The $100-citation was for the failure to give the required disclosure or notice in a real estate transaction. The citation gave Respondent 30 days to contest the citation or 60 days to pay the citation. After the deadline, the investigator contacted Respondent and asked him about the citation. Respondent stated that he had forgotten about it. When Respondent still failed to pay the citation, the investigator called again, and Respondent stated that he had mailed the money, but it had been returned due to a faulty address. Respondent paid the citation approximately four months after it had been served on him. Shortly after Respondent belatedly paid the citation, Petitioner received another complaint concerning a contract for the sale and purchase of real property located at 850 Southwest 9th Avenue in Hallandale. In this transaction, Ms. Hanse represented herself to be a licensed real estate broker, showed the property to prospects, and accepted $5000 in escrow on behalf of Express Realty. In July 2000, Petitioner's investigator conducted an audit of Express Realty's escrow account. Again, the investigator was unable to find any documents by which he could undertake an independent reconciliation of the account or otherwise document the role of Express Realty in the subject transaction. At the hearing, Respondent claimed that he was unaware that Ms. Hanse had been conducting real estate business without his authority in the name of Express Realty. Although he admitted that she was an employee of Express Realty, he disclaimed any knowledge that she had removed him from the escrow account and otherwise taken over the management of the real estate broker company. However, Respondent could not explain why, after his claimed discovery of these misdeeds in the summer of 1999, he did nothing to prevent Ms. Hanse from continuing to use Express Realty as the means by which to conduct unlicensed real estate activities, as she did a few months later. Under the circumstances, Petitioner proved that Respondent was at all times aware that Ms. Hanse was conducting unlicensed real estate activities through Express Realty.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in Counts I-IV and VI of the Amended Administrative Complaint, imposing a $5000 administrative fine, and suspending his license for three years; provided, however, if Respondent fails to pay the fine in full within 180 days of the final order, his license shall be revoked without further notice. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Hisey, Deputy Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Dean Saunders, Chairperson Florida Real Estate Commission Division of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Hardy L. Roberts, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Juana Carstarphen Watkins Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Wayne Wagie 11900 North Bayshore Drive, Unit No. 5 Miami, Florida 33181
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Respondent Marvin M. Kornicki has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued License Nos. 0265344 and 0252335. The last license issued was as a broker for Waterway Properties, Inc., t/a Waterway Properties. At all times material hereto, Respondent Waterway Properties, Inc., t/a Waterway Properties, has been a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued License No. 0265344. At all times material hereto, Respondent Kornicki was licensed and operating as the qualifying broker and an officer of Respondent Waterway Properties, Inc. On January 7, 1990, Respondents solicited and obtained an offer in the amount of $155,000 from Alda Tedeschi and John Tocchio, buyers, to purchase real property, to-wit: Unit 422 at Mariner Village Garden Condominium, Aventura, Florida, from Arthur Goldstein and Myra Goldstein, sellers. The buyers' offer reflected a $1,000 deposit to be held in trust by the Respondent Waterway Properties, Inc. The offer reflected that if the offer was not executed by and delivered to all parties, or fact of execution communicated in writing between the parties, on or before January 10, 1990, the deposit would be returned to the buyers and the offer would be withdrawn. The offer also reflected that "time is of the essence." On January 8, 1990, Respondents sent the buyers' offer to the sellers in New Jersey by air express. On January 10, 1990, the sellers signed the offer but made it a counteroffer by requiring the buyers to furnish an additional deposit of $14,500 by January 12, 1990, and requiring the buyers to sign a condominium rider and an agency disclosure form. The sellers returned the counteroffer with condominium rider and agency disclosure form to the Respondents. On January 12, 1990, Respondents sent the counteroffer, condominium rider, and agency disclosure form, together with a letter dated January 11, 1990, to the buyers for the buyers' initials and signatures. Although the buyers could not have received the counteroffer until after its expiration date, they advised Respondents by telephone that they had in fact initialed the counteroffer and mailed it back to Respondents. Respondents never received from the buyers that accepted counteroffer. The buyers subsequently verbally demanded the return of their $1,000 deposit, but Respondents wrote to the buyers on February 9, 1990, advising the buyers that they were in default. On February 8, 1990, Respondents had already disbursed the $1,000 deposit to Respondents' operating account since the sellers had told the Respondents to use the deposit to cover the costs incurred advertising the sellers' property. Since he was uncertain as to whether he had "conflicting demands upon an escrow deposit" Respondent Kornicki telephoned the Florida Real Estate Commission and discussed the matter with one of the Commission's attorneys. Because Respondent Kornicki believed that the buyers were "in default," Respondents failed to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission in writing that they had received conflicting demands. No explanation was offered as to why Respondent Kornicki believed the buyers were in default when the counteroffer could not have been signed by the buyers prior to its expiration and when Respondent Kornicki had never seen a fully executed document. Further, no explanation was offered as to why the sellers believed they were entitled to the money. Since that transaction, Respondents have experienced other transactions where conflicting demands were made. In those subsequent instances, they have timely notified the Florida Real Estate Commission in writing as to those conflicting demands. On June 18, 1990, Petitioner's investigator conducted an office inspection and escrow/trust account audit of Respondents' office and escrow/trust account. That audit revealed that Respondents wrote a trust account check on September 1, 1989, in the amount of $369.15, which was returned on October 3, 1989, for insufficient funds. A second trust account check in the amount of $800 was also returned for insufficient funds on October 3, 1989. Respondents had received rental monies from a tenant by check. Respondents had written checks out of those monies for the mortgage payment on the rental property, not knowing that the tenant's check would fail to clear. The worthless check written by the tenant caused these checks written by Respondents to be returned for insufficient funds. Respondents have changed their office policies so that they no longer accept checks from tenants except before tenants move into rental properties and the checks must clear before the tenants are allowed to take possession of the leased premises.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent Kornicki guilty of Counts I, III, V, VII, IX, and Finding Respondent Waterway Properties, Inc., guilty of Counts II, IV, VI, VIII, X, and XII; Dismissing Counts XIII and XIV; Ordering Respondent Marvin M. Kornicki to pay a fine of $1,000 to the Division of Real Estate within 60 days and revoking Respondents' licenses should such fine not be timely paid; Placing Respondents on probation for a period of one year if the fine is timely paid; Requiring Respondent Kornicki to complete and provide satisfactory evidence of having completed 60 hours of approved real estate post-licensure education for brokers, 30 hours of which shall include the real estate broker management course, during the probationary period; Establishing terms for the probationary period except that such probationary terms shall not require Respondent Kornicki to retake any state licensure examinations and Requiring Respondent Kornicki to appear before the Commission at the last meeting of the Commission preceding the termination of Respondents' probation. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of February, 1991. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-5863 Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-4, 6-14, and 16-19 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 15 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack McCray, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Legal Division 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Marvin M. Kornicki Waterway Properties, Inc. 16560 Biscayne Boulevard North Miami Beach, Florida 33160
The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by committing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, etc., or by violating a duty imposed upon him by law or by the terms of a listing contract and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty; Whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(d)1., by failing to timely account or deliver to any person any personal property such as money, funds, deposit, check draft, etc. and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty; and Whether Respondent, a sales associate, registered as an officer, director of a brokerage corporation, or general partner of a brokerage partnership is in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-5.016 and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of real estate pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. DOAH has jurisdiction, pursuant to section 120.574, to render a decision in this matter, which shall be final agency action subject to judicial review under section 120.68. Mr. Rivas is a licensed real estate sales associate, holding license number 3385508, issued by the State of Florida. Structure of the Brokerage Corporation On or about April 7, 2015, Respondent registered GREH with the State of Florida, Division of Corporations ("Division of Corporations"), identifying himself as the registered agent and manager of GREH. Respondent filed documents on behalf of GREH with the Division of Corporations on the following dates and identified himself with the following titles with GREH: On April 13, 2016, March 14, 2017, and April 17, 2018, Respondent identified himself as the registered agent, managing member, and president; On November 22, 2017, and April 17, 2018, Respondent identified himself as an authorized member; On April 22, 2019, Respondent identified himself as a registered agent, an authorized member, and managing member; On October 23, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent and member; On November 27, 2019, Respondent identified himself as a registered agent, member, and manager; On December 6, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent and shareholder; and On December 10, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent. On March 23, 2017, GREH registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission") as a real estate corporation in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CQ 1053189. At no time was Respondent registered with the Commission as a real estate broker in the State of Florida. From November 27, 2017, to October 3, 2019, Mr. Avila, who at that time was a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number BK 3401612, was the qualifying broker of GREH. From October 3, 2019, to October 15, 2019, and from November 25, 2019, to December 9, 2019, GREH's license was invalidated due to it not having a qualifying broker. From October 15, 2019, to November 25, 2019, Gamila Murata was the qualifying broker for GREH. From December 9, 2019, to July 29, 2020, Mr. Henson was the qualifying broker for GREH. On August 22, 2019, without the authority of the qualifying broker for GREH, Respondent filed a civil action on behalf of GREH against Arnauld and Annelyn Sylvain (collectively, the "Sylvains") in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in case number 502019CA008774XXXXMB, seeking, among other things, to recover real estate commissions allegedly claimed due by GREH and Respondent. Respondent subsequently retained attorney Monica Woodard to represent GREH in the civil proceedings, and GREH's complaint was dismissed. On or about November 19, 2019, the Sylvains filed a separate civil action against GREH in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in case number 502019CC015230XXXXMB, seeking to recover a $10,000.00 escrow deposit. Respondent failed to inform the qualifying broker of record for GREH, Mr. Henson, who assumed that position shortly after the filing of the civil action, of the pending lawsuit. Respondent opened bank accounts on behalf of GREH, including an account called an "Escrow Account," which was controlled by Respondent and at no time was controlled by a qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent deposited escrow funds into the Escrow Account for GREH, without the authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent closed the Escrow Account held in the name of GREH and removed funds that were to be held in trust from the account without authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent controlled all communications regarding certain real estate transactions on behalf of GREH, without the knowledge or authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Contract 1 On or about March 4, 2019, an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase ("Contract 1") was entered into between the Sylvains, as buyers, and Frederick F. Breault and Evelyn Breault (the "Breaults"), as sellers, for property located at 16595 93rd Road North, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 ("Subject Property 1"). Respondent facilitated Contract 1 on behalf of the Sylvains. Pursuant to the requirements of Contract 1, the Sylvains deposited $10,000.00 with GREH, to be held in escrow as the initial deposit. The escrow funds were delivered to Respondent in the form of a certified check drawn from SunTrust Bank in the amount of $10,000.00 and purchased by Mr. Sylvain on March 4, 2019 ("SunTrust Certified Check"). The $10,000.00 escrow funds were deposited into a bank account held in the name of GREH. The SunTrust Certified Check was deposited into a bank account over which Respondent had sole control. The GREH account in which the SunTrust Certified Check was deposited was at no relevant time controlled by a Florida licensed real estate broker. Contract 1 provided that the Sylvains had 20 days from the effective date to obtain loan approval ("Loan Approval Period"). Paragraph 18(F) of the Contract provided as follows: TIME: Calendar days shall be used in computing time periods. Time is of the essence in this Contract. Other than time for acceptance and Effective Date as set forth in Paragraph 3, any time periods provided for or dates specified in this Contract, whether preprinted, handwritten, typewritten or inserted herein, which shall end or occur on a Saturday, Sunday, or a national legal holiday (see 5 U.S.C. 6103) shall extend to 5.[:]00 p.m. (where the Property is located) of the next business day. Because 20 days from the effective date fell on a Sunday, the Loan Approval Period expired on Monday, March 25, 2019. Paragraph 8(b)(i) of Contract 1 provided that: "Buyer [the Sylvains] shall ... use good faith and diligent effort to obtain approval of a loan meeting the Financing terms ('Loan Approval') and thereafter to close this Contract." Paragraph 8(b)(v) of the Contract further provided that if neither party timely cancelled the Contract pursuant to paragraph 8, the financing contingency would "be deemed waived." Paragraph 8(b)(vii) finally provided that "[i]f Loan Approval has been obtained, or deemed to have been obtained, as provided above, and Buyer fails to close this Contract, then the Deposit shall be paid to Seller … ." The parties agreed to close Contract 1 by April 10, 2019. The Sylvains did not obtain final loan approval ("clear to close") within the Loan Approval Period. The loan was not denied for any of the exceptions set forth in paragraph 8(b)(vii), to release of the escrow deposit to the seller. The Sylvains did not terminate the contract within the Loan Approval Period. After the Loan Approval Period expired, the Sylvains sought to extend Contract 1, without consideration for the extension. The Breaults countered the Sylvains' request to extend with an offer that an extension would be granted for consideration that the Sylvains agree to forfeit the earnest money deposit. The parties never reached an agreement to extend Contract 1 and Contract 1 failed to close. On or about May 2, 2019, the Sylvains's loan application for Contract 1 was denied. On May 8, 2019, the Breaults executed a Release and Cancellation of Contract demanding release of the $10,000.00 escrow deposit on Contract 1, which Respondent received by email on that date from Betty Khan, the sales associate representing the Breaults. The Sylvains also executed a Release and Cancellation of Contract seeking return of the $10,000.00 escrow deposit on Contract 1, which Respondent communicated to Ms. Khan on May 8, 2019. Also, on May 8, 2019, Respondent informed the Sylvains of the Breaults's claim on the earnest money deposit. Despite knowing that there were conflicting demands for the escrowed funds, Respondent failed to inform Mr. Avila, the qualifying broker for GREH at the time, or the Department, of the escrow dispute. The Breaults were never informed of any escrow dispute filed with the Department, were never sued in relation to the escrow deposit, and never went to mediation or arbitration with regard to the escrow deposit, despite making a demand for the escrow deposit. Respondent claimed that he applied the $10,000.00 escrow funds to another contract under which the Sylvains were buyers. Respondent closed the GREH Escrow Account, removing the $10,000.00 from the account, without consent of either the Sylvains or the Breaults. Contract 2 On or about May 2, 2019, an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase (Contract 2) between the Sylvains, as buyers, and the Mossuccos, as sellers, for property located at 7584 Apache Boulevard, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 ("Subject Property 2"). Respondent facilitated Contract 2 on behalf of the Sylvains. In relation to Contract 2, specifically paragraph 2(a), which required an earnest money deposit in the amount of $10,000.00, Respondent requested that the Sylvains provide him a check in the amount of $10,000.00 to show the Mossuccos. On or about May 6, 2019, the Sylvains then drew a check from a business account held with TD Bank in the amount of $10,000.00 and payable to Global Business Financial Investment ("TD Bank Check"), which the Sylvains delivered to Respondent. Respondent took a photograph of the check and promised the Sylvains that the check would not be cashed or deposited. On or about May 6, 2019, Miledy Garcia, now known as Miledy Rivas, Respondent's spouse, a Florida licensed real estate sales associate, having been issued license number SL 3383271, issued an escrow deposit receipt for $10,000.00 for Contract 2 on a GREH form ("May 6, 2019, GREH Receipt"). The TD Bank Check was never deposited or cashed by Respondent; rather, the Sylvains immediately issued a stop payment order on the check to TD Bank. Despite having never deposited the TD Bank Check, Respondent communicated the May 6, 2019, GREH Receipt and a photo of the TD Bank Check to Mrs. Mossucco and Ms. Weintraub. The $10,000.00 escrow funds from Contract 1 were the escrow funds represented on Contract 2. Respondent represented that the $10,000.00 escrow funds were applied to Contract 2, prior to cancellation of Contract 1, and continued to represent the same, even after Respondent knew the Breaults were making a claim against the funds. Contract 2 failed to close. After Contract 2 failed to close, the Mossuccos and Sylvains agreed to cancel Contract 2 and release each other from liability under the terms of Contract 2, and further agreed that any earnest money deposit could be returned to the Sylvains. Respondent failed to deliver the escrow funds to the Sylvains. Rather, Respondent believed that the funds belonged to him (or one of his companies) and that he was entitled to remove the escrow funds and use them as he (or his company) saw fit. Respondent testified that he submitted a notice of escrow dispute, dated "9-30-2019," to the Department, identifying the parties to the transaction as the Mossuccos and the Sylvains, and the subject property as 7584 Apache Boulevard, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470. Respondent gave conflicting testimony, including, for example: First testifying that he believed the $10,000.00 escrow funds belonged to him (or his company) to be spent as he saw fit; then, after a break in the proceedings and on re-direct by his counsel, changing his story by saying that counsel for Petitioner put words in his mouth and that he meant only that there was a "dispute on the funds." First testifying that Mr. Avila was a signatory on the GREH "Escrow Account," then admitting that Mr. Avila was not a signatory on the account. There was also conflicting testimony between Respondent and several of the witnesses; however, where there were inconsistencies, Petitioner's witnesses' testimony was substantially consistent and supported by the documentary evidence presented. Parts of Respondent's testimony were inconsistent with documentary evidence admitted into evidence by stipulation of the parties. Facts Concerning Aggravation or Mitigation of Penalties Respondent collected escrow funds and deposited them into an account that he, only a licensed real estate sales associate, controlled, rather than one that was controlled by the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent admittedly removed escrow funds in the amount of $10,000.00 from the bank account in which they were deposited, without all parties having a claim to the escrow funds executing a release. Respondent testified that he believed the escrow funds belonged to him (or one of his companies) and that he had a right to do with the funds as he (or he through one of his companies) saw fit. Respondent used vulgar language, threats, and demeaning language toward his clients, other real estate professionals, and title agents to attempt to coerce those individuals into submitting to his demands. Respondent failed and refused to comply with the direction of the qualifying broker with supervisory responsibility over Respondent and GREH. Respondent failed to keep the qualifying broker of GREH apprised of the real estate transactions in which Respondent was involved. There was significant testimony establishing that Respondent was performing tasks that are only allowed to be performed by a licensed real estate broker, not a real estate sales associate, mortgage broker, or mortgage loan originator. Additional Facts Raised by Respondent In his proposed conclusions of law, Respondent raises, as a matter of fact, that the "Department failed to plead sufficient facts underpinning its argument" regarding the handling of escrow funds. In paragraph 25 of his Proposed Final Order, Respondent states: Nowhere in the administrative complaint does the Department allege that Mr. Rivas falsely represented that GREH received the TD Bank Check as earnest money for Contract 2, or that he falsely represented to the Sylvains that the Breaults did not have a legitimate claim against the $10,000.00 escrow funds deposited by the Sylvains toward Contract 1, or that he misrepresented to the Sylvains that the $10,000.00 funds from the SunTrust Certified Check could be and were applied to Contract 2. Respondent further argued that none of the "facts relevant to aggravation or mitigation" set forth in the Department's Proposed Final Order were pled in the A.C., in violation of Respondent's due process rights. Both of these arguments are rejected as set forth in paragraphs 108 and109 below. Additional Facts Concerning Department Costs The Department presented competent evidence that it incurred investigative costs in the amount of $1,551.00.
