The Issue Whether Appellant should be granted variances in setback lines to allow construction of a retail store on a lot at the northeast corner of the intersection of Papaya Street and Gulfview Boulevard on Clearwater Beach, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Appellant purchased the property at 24 Papaya Street in Clearwater Beach (lots 29-32, inclusive, Clearwater Beach Park) approximately two years ago. The only inquiry made of zoning officials regarding use of the property, other than zoning, was what part of the lot could be covered with a building. This lot is nearly square but is nonstandard in both width and depth to construct a building without a variance. These variances were granted at the initial variance request heard in December 1992. Appellant proposes to construct a retail store containing some 4700 square feet of floor space. To erect a building of this size on the lot a variance of 3 percent to allow 48 percent coverage of the lot was required. This variance was granted by the Board; however, without the variances in setback on the four sides of the parcel, this 3 percent variance in lot coverage is useless to the Appellant. This lot currently has four old buildings with a combined total of 2723 square feet. The largest is nearly square and contains approximately 1120 square feet. There are rental apartments in some, if not all, of these buildings. It is proposed to remove these buildings, if the permit to construct the proposed store is granted. The existing buildings are nonconforming and three are between 2 to 4 feet of the lot lines on the north, east and south sides of the property. The property is zoned CR-28 (Resort Commercial) and the proposed use is authorized in this zoning classification. The plans are and the applicant proposes to provide the required parking spaces for this establishment under the proposed structure. Appellant presented evidence that adjacent properties were built to the lot line with no setback. Most of these buildings were erected before setbacks were required in this area and are grandfathered in so long as the structures remain. In 1986 the Development Code Adjustment Board granted setback variances on all four sides of the property across Gulfview Boulevard from Appellant's property. That parcel was also nonstandard and even smaller than the parcel of land here involved. Because of the size of the property the Board found a hardship existed and without the requested variances the property had little value. One significant difference in these two parcels is that one had been owned by one family since 1932 while the instant parcel was required circa 1990. Further, evidence was presented that being one block east of Mandalay Avenue, the main traveled beach road, the proposed structure needs to be seen from Mandalay to attract pedestrian traffic. The building just west of Appellant's lot is built to the lot line and partially blocks the view of Appellant's property from Mandalay. The use of the property sought here is consistent with the Comprehensive Land Use Plan and no protest to the granting of the variances requested were received from adjacent property owners. Razing the existing structures and erecting the proposed store in which the applicant intends to sell upscale beach wear would improve the appearance of the neighborhood.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Department’s withdrawal of its request for proposals on lease number 790.0068, of property located in Clearwater, Florida, was illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent.
Findings Of Fact Sometime prior to February 18, 1998, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation issued a Request For Proposal for lease number 790.0068 for approximately 4,137 square feet of office space within a specified portion of Pinellas County, Florida. The lease was to be for a period of seven years, to begin on September 1, 1998, and to contain a provision for five one-year renewals thereafter. Bids were to be opened on March 24, 1998. Only two proposals were received. One was from Dr. Alan Felker, a Petitioner herein, and the other was from D.C.S. Real Estate, Inc. At the opening, on March 24, 1998, both proposals were reviewed for responsiveness consistent with the requirements of the Department of General Services’ Real Property Leasing Manual, and an initial determination made that both were responsive. This initial review for responsiveness was not made in detail, however, but included only a check to see that all required documents and information areas were included. The leasing manual provides that in general, the agency soliciting bids for a lease has to accept the representations made by the bidder at face value. If a later check shows the representation was inaccurate, the lease provisions can be amended to conform to the facts as they exist. The Department of Management Services requires all properties to be checked for size conformity. The office space offered by D.C.S. is currently occupied by the Respondent under a prior lease which was to expire and be replaced by the lease under proposal. Notwithstanding that the request for proposal called for approximately 4137 square feet of space, plus or minus three percent, (no less than 4,013 nor more than 4261 square feet, excluding rest rooms, mechanical rooms stairwells, etc.), a floor plan of the existing facility submitted with the proposal by D.C.S. reflected the existing offices encompassed 4102 net square feet, with the existing toilets outside the confines of the leased space. The request for proposal called for restrooms to meet the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and of Section 553.604(12-13), Florida Statutes, dealing with accessibility by handicapped persons. Rest rooms to be provided must include, for men, one public and two staff water closets, one public and two staff urinals, and one public and one staff lavatory with mirror. The women’s facilities must include one public and two staff water closets and one each lavatory with mirror for the public and staff. The request for proposal was silent as to how these facilities were to be configured - whether separate facilities must be furnished for both the public and the staff, or whether both could be included in one facility. By letter dated March 23, 1998, Daniel Slesser, president of D.C.S., sent the Department an amended floor plan for its facility proposing to cut two doors through from the existing facility to the area of the private ADA compliant rest rooms by taking a closet and a portion of an existing office and making hallways thereof. It is still impossible to tell, even from the amended floor plan, whether the public and staff rest facilities will be separate or combined. Upon receipt of the bid package from the Department, Mr. Taylor went to the existing site provided by D.C.S. and measured the outside dimensions of the facility which D.C.S. represented as being 41.7 feet by 97.9 feet. His measurement, subtracting the thickness of the concrete block of the wall, the air space and the thickness of the sheet rock, reflected the interior width of the building to be 40.5 feet. Because he could not get into the building to measure, Mr. Taylor accepted D.C.S.’s length measurement of 97.0 feet. These two measurements reflected an interior square footage of 4,009 square feet or less, if the 97.9 foot length also were to be reduced by 9 inches. This would result in less than the minimum 4,013 square foot area required. Notwithstanding Mr. Taylor’s calculations, so much of this procurement file as related to the square footage of the property was forwarded for evaluation to Randall Baker, general services manager in the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Real Property Management. Mr. Baker reviewed the floor plan submitted with the proposal, and based on the plan, accepting the given dimensions, arrived at an area of 4102 square feet. He could not say whether the dimensions he used were the inside or the outside dimensions. According to Mr. Baker, a bid can be deemed unresponsive at or after bid opening. Square footage is an item which could render a bid non-responsive. From his review of the file, the plans submitted, Baker cannot tell if the dimensions given by D.C.S. are correct. However, when the Department withdrew its RFP on this procurement, the issue of square footage at this point became moot. Mr. Baker also looked at the requirements for rest rooms contained in the request for proposals and concluded the documentation was unclear as to what the current landlord had to do regarding bathrooms. The Request for Proposal, at page 28 of the proposal package, states that if the current landlord is awarded the bid, he must provide private restrooms inside the office. The restroom requirements found in paragraph 16 of the request for proposal on page 21 thereof, are silent on the location of the facilities. Mr. Baker was of the opinion that if the page 28 requirements were pertinent to the current landlord, D.C.S., and the page 21 requirements applied to all other bidders, it would give an unfair advantage to the existing landlord. An independent review of those provisions results in the conclusion that the page 21 requirements are not at all clear as to their application. In any case, after Mr. Baker reviewed the request for proposal, he concluded that it was not clear and he recommended that in the absence of a clarification, the Department reject all bids and re-bid the lease.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a Final Order rejecting all proposals and that the Department thereafter re-advertise this procurement utilizing clear and unambiguous requirements. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Theriaque, Esquire 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 R. Beth Atchison, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Appellant acquired the residence located at 1549 Levern Street approximately three years ago. The house was constructed some 30 years age and its outside dimensions have not been altered since construction. The house abuts the front setback line which is 25 feet from the front property line. The area is zoned RS-50, which is single family homes with up to 8.7 dwelling units per net acre. Minimum lot size for RS-50 is 5,000 square feet. Appellant resides in the home with his wife, and they are the only permanent occupants. He proposes to extend the front wall of his living room eight feet into the setback area the width of the living room which is 18 feet. This will increase the size of the living room by this amount. The existing living room is quite narrow and inadequate for Appellant's wife to comfortably entertain her church group. None of Appellant's neighbors oppose the variance of eight feet into the front setback requested by Appellant, and some support this request. Most of the other homes in the vicinity of Appellant's property are in conformity with the setback requirements of the building and zoning code. Appellant's lot is not unique or unusual but is similar to other lots in this section of the city. Some inference was made that when this home was constructed setback lines had not been established in this area and that, had the original owner so desired, the house could have been constructed closer to the front lot line than the 25 feet now prescribed by the zoning regulations. Even if this is assumed to be true, it is not relevant to the request for variance here under consideration.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Dale K. Niemann and Janet R. Niemann, own property on Devon Drive, in Clearwater, Florida, which is approximately two houses down the street from the Respondent, John Blakely. On or about May 25, 1990, Mr. Blakely requested two variances from the Development Code Adjustment Board of the City of Clearwater. It was his intention to seek the variances in order to extend his present dock approximately twenty-five feet (to a length of eighty-nine feet) and to allow the dock to be positioned 8 feet from an extended side property line. The Petitioners oppose the requests and argue that the extension is not necessary to make reasonable use of Respondent's dock. Further, they claim that, if allowed, the dock extension, together with the boat lift the Respondent proposes, will interfere with their view of the water. The proposed dock extension will not obstruct navigational activities. The natural shoaling process has resulted in the accretion of sand and silt along the Respondent's property. As a result, during low tides it is difficult to utilize the existing dock and would be impossible to use it for the proposed boat lift. Also, there is a grass flat landward of the proposed boat lift site upon which the Respondent's construction will not infringe. The construction of the lift at the terminus of the existing dock might disrupt that grass bed. The Respondent will not financially gain from the granting of the requested variances. The approval of the variances will not impair an adequate supply of light or ventilation to the adjacent properties, nor substantially diminish or impair the value of the surrounding property. The approval of the variances will not adversely affect the public health, safety, order, convenience or general welfare of the community. The approval of the variances will not violate the general spirit and intent of the Development Code. While the approval of the variances may alter the Petitioners' view from the side window of their residence, such alteration should not materially detract or injure their property or the property or improvements of others in the neighborhood. Other structures which Respondent could construct without the approval of variances could be more detrimental to the neighborhood.
Findings Of Fact Bennie Mae Rutledge, Petitioner, owns property located at 422 Madison Avenue, Clearwater, Florida which is the northwest corner of the intersection of South Madison Avenue and Brown Street. The legal description of the property is Lot 12, Block 1, Moase and Harrison Subdivision. The property is zoned commercial general. David Legault has a contract with Petitioner to purchase the subject property which is conditioned upon the granting of the variance which Petitioner is seeking. Legault's primary objective in this proceeding is to enhance business opportunities available to him through the purchase and use of Petitioner's property, if the variance sought herein is granted. On or about July 24, 1956 an application for a variance of the side property setback line requirement was submitted on behalf of Petitioner. This variance would permit the construction of an indoor storage or warehouse building 3.6 feet from the side property line, rather than ten feet. This is a variance of 6.4 feet. On August 14, 1986 the Development Code Adjustment Board denied this variance, and a timely appeal was taken on behalf of Petitioner. Prior to submission of this variance request, the Petitioner had sought four variances which were also denied. At that time, a 2,500 square foot building was proposed for the property which has now been reduced to a 2,000 square foot building, 100 feet long and 20 feet deep. The subject property is 136 feet long and 48.6 feet deep. Given the dimensions of the lot, and considering the requirements for parking, green space, and other setbacks, the variance sought herein is the minimum necessary to use this property for a warehouse or indoor storage. Without this variance, the building could only be 13 feet deep, and this would not be functional. Therefore, the particular size and shape of the subject property will result in an unnecessary hardship upon the Petitioner if the provisions of the Clearwater Land Development Code are strictly applied since the maximum depth of a commercial warehouse constructed on the lot could only be 13 feet. According to John Richter, development code administrator, there are several commercial warehouses in the area of the subject property, and in his opinion the approval of this variance would neither have an adverse impact on the neighborhood, nor would it be a benefit.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner’s single-family residence is an “eligible structure” for purposes of receiving housing assistance under the Rebuild Florida Housing Repair and Replacement Program.
Findings Of Fact DEO is the state administrative agency responsible for disbursing federal funds allocated to Florida for disaster recovery pursuant to a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) block grant. In June 2018, HUD approved the state’s Action Plan for rebuilding those areas in Florida which were most impacted by Hurricane Irma, agreeing to fund the Rebuild Florida Housing Repair and Replacement Program (the “Program”). The Program provides financial assistance to Florida homeowners for fixing hurricane-damaged residential structures, using federal funds appropriated to the Community Development Block Grant Program under the Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act of 2017.1 To administer the Program, DEO developed a detailed policy manual called the Single Family Owner-Occupied Housing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”). The Guidelines are approved by HUD and may not be modified without HUD’s consent. As relevant, the Guidelines enumerate both “eligible structures” and “ineligible structures.” To receive assistance under the Program, an owner or occupant’s housing must be an “eligible structure.” Challancin owns and occupies a housing “structure” in Okeechobee, Florida, which he purchased in 2012 and has lived in ever since. Challancin considers his dwelling to be a “mobile home,” whereas DEO deems it a “camper trailer.” This disagreement is at the heart of the instant dispute because, under the Guidelines, mobile homes are among the “eligible structures,” while camper trailers are on the list of “ineligible structures.” What is not disputed, however, is that whatever its type, the subject structure is Challancin’s permanent residence (the “Residence”). It is hereby found, as stated in Department of Economic Opportunity’s Proposed Recommended Order (“DEO-PRO”), that the Residence “is used as a residence and [is] recognizable as such.” DEO-PRO at 8. The Residence suffered damage due to Hurricane Irma. In May 2019, Challancin applied to DEO seeking assistance under the Program. In his application, when asked to describe the “structure type” of his housing, Challancin identified the Residence as a “mobile home.” In fact, the 1 The Community Development Block Grant Program comes under DEO’s jurisdiction pursuant to section 20.60(5)(b)2., Florida Statutes. Residence incorporates a 32-foot 1984 Corsair trailer (the “Corsair”) as a structural element of the building envelope, and, at all times relevant, the Corsair has been registered as a mobile home with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. Yet, although the Corsair is an identifiable and distinct part of the Residence, the Residence indisputably comprises other structural elements as well, including a common roof, several walls, and a ceiling, which elements together form a unified single building that exists as a separate creation, at once integrated with—and more than—the Corsair. The undersigned adopts, as accurate, the following description of the Residence, by DEO: [The Residence] consists of [the Corsair], to which additional rooms have been attached on one side, all capped with a single roof which extends over a carport/patio on the other side. The carport/patio is met by a driveway. A sidewalk runs from the driveway to an external door to one of the attached rooms. DEO-PRO at 5. Further, as DEO correctly states, the Residence “is affixed directly to one or more contiguous, concrete slabs and is attached to utilities and an external HVAC unit.” Id. at 6. The Residence is a unique structure, and for that reason photographs might be more helpful than words in depicting this atypical dwelling. Figure 1, below, shows the front of the Residence. Figure 1 The Corsair is in the center, with the covered patio to the right, and the “additional rooms” to the left. Hurricane damage to the roof can also be seen in the picture. Figure 2 is a photograph of the back of the Residence. The Corsair (outlined in yellow highlighter) is located to the left of the “additional rooms.” It is, noticeably, less than half the width of those attached rooms. The central HVAC unit mentioned above is on the ground, adjacent to the Corsair. Look closely, and, in the circle above the HVAC, the Corsair’s license plate is visible. Figure 2 The covered patio is shown in Figure 3, as is the Corsair, which forms the outer wall of the Residence on this side of the building. Figure 3 The other side of the Residence, opposite the patio, is shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 The total area of the Residence is 568.90 square feet, which means that the combined width of the Corsair plus the additional rooms is approximately 17.78 feet (since the length of the Corsair is 32 feet). The enclosed “floor area” within the building envelope (i.e., the portion “under air”) is 514.90 square feet. Although the record lacks specific measurements, a back-of-the-envelope calculation, based on the observation that the Corsair appears to be roughly 40% as wide as the entire building (see Figure 2), reveals that the Corsair contributes approximately 206 square feet to the Residence, while the “additional rooms” afford approximately 309 square feet of living space. To be clear, these are admittedly not precise numbers. What the rough numbers drive home, however, is that the Residence is not just the Corsair; indeed, the Corsair is not even most of the Residence. In arguing over whether the Corsair is a mobile home or a camper trailer, the parties have misidentified the ultimate issue as being whether the Corsair is an eligible structure. The real issue, which the parties have overlooked, is whether the Residence is an eligible structure. As discussed above, the Residence and the Corsair are two different things. It is found that, regardless of whether the Corsair is considered to be a mobile home or a camper trailer, the Residence, as a matter of fact, is neither a mobile home nor a camper trailer. The Residence, rather, is an integrated structure of which the Corsair is a connected and contiguous component, which forms a single, unified building envelope under a common roof. Because the Residence is not a camper trailer, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Residence is not an “ineligible structure” for the reason advanced by DEO. At the same time, because the Residence is not, in fact, a mobile home, it cannot be considered an “eligible structure” qua mobile home. This is not fatal to Challancin’s application for assistance, however, because, while all mobile homes are eligible structures pursuant to the Guidelines, not all eligible structures are mobile homes. Because there is no basis in law or fact for deeming the Residence as anything other than a physically unified, structurally integrated, single- family residential dwelling, it is determined, as an ultimate fact, that the Residence is an “eligible structure” for purposes of receiving housing assistance under the Program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity enter a final order determining that James Challancin’s Residence is an “eligible structure” for purposes of receiving housing assistance under the Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: James Challancin Lot 48 8761 Highway 78, West Okeechobee, Florida 34974 S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2020. Brandon W. White, Esquire James M. Jordan, Esquire Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street, Mail Stop 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Janay Lovett, Agency Clerk Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street, Mail Stop 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Dane Eagle, Executive Director Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed) Mark Buckles, Interim General Counsel Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building, Mail Stop 110 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Walter J. Zawada, is the owner of Lot 43 in College Hill Estates located at 731 Oberlin Drive, Clearwater, Florida. A residential home is situated on the lot. The property is currently zoned RS-75 (Single-Family Residence District) and was created primarily for single-family residential development. A large oak tree sits in the front yard of Zawada's property. In order to avoid cutting down the tree, the house was constructed approximately seven feet closer to the rear property line. Consequently, the back yard is smaller in size than other property owners in the neighborhood. Petitioner has constructed a 15' x 30' swimming pool in his back yard. He has also placed a concrete deck around the pool. A six foot-wooden privacy fence has been erected on the rear and side property lines. Because of the small back yard, a distance of only eight feet, nine inches lies between the edge of the pool and the north side property line. The concrete deck is only two feet from the line. Petitioner wishes to construct an aluminum enclosure on the north side of the pool. An enclosure is required to shield the pool from oak tree leaves that have clogged the pool filter. Existing zoning regulations dictate that the minimum setback from the side property line for swimming pool enclosures be no less than six feet. Under the plans submitted by Petitioner, the enclosure would be erected two feet from the side property line, thereby requiring a four-foot variance from existing regulations. Petitioner contends the variance is necessary because, if none were granted, the enclosure would have to be constructed on top of the concrete decking. This in turn would leave only two feet, seven inches of space between the edge or lip of the pool and the inside of the enclosure. Petitioner estimates that at least three feet of space is necessary in order to safely permit construction of the enclosure. He also points out that the home is unique to other property owners because a large oak tree in the front yard resulted in a smaller back yard in which to place a swimming pool. The City opposes the application on the ground Petitioner created a self-imposed hardship. It reasons that he constructed the pool and deck too close to the property line and gave no consideration to the space that would be required should an enclosure be constructed at a future date. Therefore, it contends Petitioner does not qualify for a variance.
The Issue At issue was whether Petitioner should be granted a permit from the Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation, to excavate material in front of the Petitioner's seawall in Naples Bay, Collier County, Florida. The Petitioner owns a residential homesite lot in the Royal Harbor Subdivision in Naples, Florida. Royal Harbor is a waterfront oriented residential community devoted to single family residences; each residence either has waterfront' on Naples Bay or through a network of interior canals which provide navigational access to Naples Bay. All lots are bordered by concrete seawalls. The Concrete seawall bordering the Petitioner's property does not Immediately abut the water, but has an amounts of earth between the seawall and the water's edge, somewhat resembling a beach. It is this earth the Petitioner wishes to remove so that he may have his seawall abut the water which would facilitate the launching of a vessel from his property. Presently, it does not appear that the Petitioner could keep a boat at his property without building a lengthy dock from his seawall into Naples Bay. The Department of Environmental Regulation opposes the application in that it claims the excavation of this material would destroy an oyster bar which exists in front of the Petitioner's property and would eliminate an ecologically significant area. From the exhibits presented at the hearing and after consideration of the testimony, it appears that in the entire Royal Harbor development only the Petitioner's property lacks having the bay waters abut the seawall. The Petitioner's property is approximately one quarter mile from the channel in Naples Bay which is a low energy water body. That is to say, wave action does not become extremely forceful in this area because of the protected nature of the waterway. The Department of Environmental Regulation in part opposes the permit because they state to remove the berm from in front of the seawall would expose the seawall to direct wave energy which would cause turbidity within the waters. No direct evidence was presented that wee the seawalls in Naples Bay are in direct contact with the water that this ill fact does cause increased turbidity and therefore this testimony is rejected by this Hearing Officer as being merely speculative. On the other hand, the Petitioner made no showing that the project would actually be in the public interest except to show that the area in question was a relatively small area. Witnesses for the Department of Environmental Regulation stated that were this berm removed and the area converted to a shallow submerged bay bottom, oysters and marine vegetation would eventually propagate here, particularly if the bottom was excavated with a smooth contour. It is difficult to imagine after listening to all the testimony in this case how the granting of this permit would have a measurable environmental Impact. It would appear to this Hearing Officer that there could be some benefit to water quality from the granting of this permit by somewhat restoring Naples Bay to its original condition. Testimony was received that the entire Royal Harbor development was man-made and the removal of this fill would, in some slight degree, remove fill material that had been previously placed within the waters of Naples Bay. Testimony was also received from Mr. Thomas Provenzano, District Supervisor of the Department of Environmental Regulation, that in his opinion it would be environmentally acceptable for the Petitioner to excavate this berm from within five (5) feet of the concrete seawall. This appears to be a reasonable disposition of this dispute. Whatever destructive force the waves of Naples Bay might have on an exposed vertical seawall would be minimized by leaving a five (5) foot berm seaward of that wall and would in no way interfere with the Petitioner's intended use of his land; reasonable navigational access to Naples Bay. It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: The application be granted with the proviso that the Petitioner leave a five (5) foot berm between Naples Bay and his vertical seawall. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. KENNETH G. OERTEL, Director Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Carole Haughey, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2552 Executive Center Circle, E. Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald T. Frank, Esquire Suite A, U.S. Home Building 3174 E. Tamiami Trail Naples, Florida 33940 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LYNN A. LUNDSTROM, Petitioner, vs. DOAH CASE NO. 76-1555 STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact On November 19, 1987, Plymouth, by and through its representative, Todd Pressman, filed an application for a variance of 1'4" in the parking standards of the Clearwater Land Development Code to permit some double row 90-degree parking with an aisle in between having an overall width of 60'8" in Plymouth's parking garage located at 2590 U.S. 19 North, Clearwater, Florida 33575. The variance would reduce the size of 28 out of 500-520 parking spaces in the garage from 19' to 17'8". On February 11, 1988, a public hearing on Appellant's application was held before the DCAB. Minutes of the hearing were kept and a tape recording of the hearing was made. The tape recording and minutes of the February 11, 1988, hearing reveal that the DCAB heard the testimony of John Richter, the Clearwater Land Development Code Administrator; Todd Pressman, representing the Applicant; and Keith Crawford, the Director of Traffic Engineering. The Building Department Official did not comment on the variance application. No letters were introduced in support of the application and no letters were introduced in opposition. At the conclusion of said public hearing, DCAB unanimously voted to deny Plymouth's application for the requested variance. The parking garage in question, the only totally private parking garage in Clearwater, was designed and approved as part of plans to build two office buildings. During planning, Plymouth's New Jersey architect made a mistake which resulted in some 28 parking spaces being substandard. Large columns supporting the structure were designed to be placed in the end of parking stalls along the wall, reducing the useful length of these parking stalls by 1'4". The City Traffic Engineer brought the matter to Plymouth's attention. Plymouth asked to be allowed to designate the 28 spaces for compact cars only but was informed that Clearwater's code did not recognize compact car parking spaces. Plymouth proceeded with full knowledge that the parking garage would be built with 28 substandard spaces. Plymouth compromised and agreed with the City of Clearwater during construction of its twin-tower office buildings and parking garage to preserve green space on the property, to provide a park-like effect around the three structures, and to preserve the green space and park-like effect of the property fronting on U.S. Highway 19. The parking garage, even without the 28 spaces, can accommodate the entire parking needs of the two buildings that already have been approved. So far, only one has been built, and only 25 percent-30 percent of it is occupied. As a result, roughly 85 percent of the usable parking spaces (i.e., excluding the 28 substandard spaces) are not being used at this time. Plymouth's primary concern is not for the parking needs of the existing building, or even for the needs of the second building which has been approved but not built, but for yet a third building which a prospective customer is interested in having Plymouth build. Without the 28 spaces, some land planned to be kept as open space might have to be used for additional parking. Plymouth is concerned that complications involving parking might cause it to lose the prospective lessee. On-site covered parking has been a selling point for Plymouth and is particularly important in Plymouth's north Clearwater/Dunedin market. A parking garage co-owned by the City on Park Street has columns in some parking stalls which the City is using as parking spaces without a variance. But the columns are in the corners of the affected parking stalls and do not reduce the effective length of the stalls in the judgment of the City Engineer.
