Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert E. Hough, holds Florida Teacher's Certificate Number 313219, which is a Rank III certificate covering the area of substitute teaching. From September, 1975, until his dismissal on May 20, 1982, the Respondent had been employed with the Duval County School System as a substitute teacher. He was never employed in a full-time position. During the times relevant to this proceeding, the Respondent was employed with First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Jacksonville, as a manager of the Mandarin Branch, until his termination on May 29, 1981. While the Respondent was employed with First Federal Savings and Loan, one of his associates was Mr. Frazier Dughi. Mr. Dughi was employed with First Federal Savings and Loan as an officer in the Real Estate Department until he left that employment in August, 1980. On or about October 29, 1981, Mr. Dughi secured a loan in the amount of $4,500 from First Federal Savings and Loan, and assigned a certificate of deposit he held with First Federal Savings and Loan as collateral. This loan was obtained for the purpose of purchasing an automobile which Mr. Dughi had negotiated to buy from a private individual. After Mr. Dughi had inspected the automobile and decided that it was not to his liking, he met the Respondent on his way home. He had known the Respondent through their employment and had developed a friendship with him. The Respondent went to Mr. Dughi's home where Mr. Dughi informed him what had occurred regarding the automobile purchase. In an effort to avoid any interest expense on the loan, Mr. Dughi gave to the Respondent the $4,500 check from First Federal Savings and Loan, which represented the loan proceeds, and asked the Respondent to deposit it as repayment of the loan through the Respondent's Mandarin Branch office. Mr. Dughi first became aware that his loan had not been repaid approximately 18 months later when he received a notice from First Federal Savings and Loan that he must pay $1,000 in interest in order to renew the loan. In response to this notice, Mr. Dughi contacted Don Perry, a vice-president of First Federal Savings and Loan, and requested the matter be investigated. Mr. Perry testified and produced the original documents involving the transaction between Mr. Dughi and First Federal Savings and Loan. The check initially payable to Mr. Dughi in the amount of $4,500 shows that part of the initial endorsement was removed from the check and subsequently signed and endorsed by the Respondent, as follows: "Pay to the Order of Robert E. Hough". The check was deposited at the Respondent's Mandarin Branch office, into the Respondent's personal account. Subsequently, a check was drawn on the Respondent's account in the amount of $4,200 and deposited in an account with the American National Bank which was owned by the Respondent. At no time did Mr. Dughi authorize the Respondent to deposit his funds or to convert the funds to his personal use. Hazel M. Smith is an individual who maintained a savings account with the Mandarin Branch of the First Federal Savings and Loan Association. On or about November 15, 1979, the Respondent entered into a transaction with Mrs. Smith in which he obtained $10,000 from her account on his representation to her that a special program was being offered to certain preferred customers of First Federal Savings and Loan. However, the money from Mrs. Smith's account was immediately deposited into the personal account of the Respondent. He then obtained a loan in the amount of $10,000 from First Federal Savings and Loan, using the deposit from Mrs. Smith's account as collateral. Thereafter, monthly payments in the amount of $132.16 drawn on the Respondent's account at the American National Bank were deposited in Mrs. Smith's account at First Federal Savings and Loan, in keeping with the terms of the agreement in which Mrs. Smith was to receive repayment over a ten-year period at a ten percent interest rate. As a result of this transaction between the Respondent and Hazel Smith, the Respondent was arrested, and by information filed on October 29, 1981, he was charged with grand theft in violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. On May 3, 1982, the Respondent pled guilty to this criminal charge. Thereafter, the Respondent was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to Florida State Prison for a period of 30 months. Mr. Perry testified regarding the investigation that had been conducted by First Federal Savings and Loan concerning a check "kiting" scheme involving the Respondent, going back to April 25, 1978. This scheme continued until the Respondent resigned from First Federal Savings and Loan in May, 1981, by which time it was determined that the Respondent had secured the sum of $20,100. The Respondent had "kited" checks through three financial institutions, First Federal Savings and Loan, Atlantic National Bank, and the American National Bank. The scheme was uncovered on May 27, 1981, when a check for $20,100 was returned because of insufficient funds. As a result of these transactions, the Respondent was arrested and an Information was filed by the Office of the State Attorney on October 29, 1981, charging the Respondent with grand theft in violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. On May 3, 1982, the Respondent pled guilty to these offenses; subsequently he was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to a five- year period of probation to be served consecutive to the prior 30-month sentence in the Florida State Prison. The Respondent's employment with the Duval County School System was terminated on May 20, 1982.
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Teaching Certificate Number 313219 held by the Respondent, Robert Edwin Hough, be REVOKED permanently. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 25th day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: L. Haldane Taylor, Esquire 1902 Independence Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Mr. Robert E. Hough Post Office Box 229 Lawtey, Florida Donald L. Greisheimer Director Education Practices Commission 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether respondent acted as a mortgage lender within the meaning of Section 494.001(3), Florida Statutes, and thus is subject to Division licensure requirements.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Division), is a state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the Florida Mortgage Brokerage and Lending Act which is codified in Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Among other things, the Division regulates mortgage lenders and requires such persons or entities to secure a license. Respondent, White Pine Resouces, Inc. (WPR), is a Florida corporation formed in March 1986. Its sole shareholder is John R. Grass, a Pensacola attorney. Although the corporation was originally formed for a number of purposes, its primary activity is the real estate investment business. It holds no licenses issued by, or registrations with, the Division. WPR's current business address is 358-C West Nine Mile Road, Pensacola, Florida. WPR's principal source of money is Grass, or his professional association, who loan money to the corporation. In some cases, the money is used to acquire parcels of property for resale, make necessary repairs or improvements, and then provide owner financing to the buyer. In other cases, WPR loans money to persons needing to make improvements to their homes or rental property and takes back a second mortgage from the borrower. These types of transactions, which occurred during the years 1992-95, are found in documents offered in evidence as petitioner's exhibits 1-5. Respondent has also stipulated that several other transactions of this nature occurred during that same period of time. In every case, WPR was investing its own money or that of its principal. In 1992, a Division examiner analyst noted the following listing in the Yellow Pages section of the Pensacola telephone directory under the heading of "Mortgages": White Pine Resources Having Trouble With Financing Residential & Land Fast Service on 1st Mortgages The advertisement also contained respondent's street address and telephone number. In the 1993-94 telephone directory, WPR carried the following advertisement under the "Mortgages" section of the Yellow Pages: White Pine Resources Specialists! Bad Credit - We Can Help Vacant Land Loans In the 1995-96 telephone directory, WPR placed the following advertisement in the "Mortgages" section of the Yellow Pages: White Pines Resources A Private Investor Not a Mortgage Broker Specialists! We Can Help Vacant Land Loans Although the Division first noted one of WPR's Yellow Page advertisements in 1992, for some reason it did not conduct a formal investigation of respondent's activities until February 28, 1994. On that day, an examiner analyst made an unannounced visit to respondent's office for the purpose of inspecting its records to determine if WPR was acting as a mortgage lender. However, WPR's principal, John R. Grass, was not in the office, and the analyst simply left his business card and a message for Grass to contact him. The next morning, Grass telephoned the analyst's supervisor and advised him that since WPR was merely a private investor, and not a mortgage lender, it was not subject to the Division's regulation, and hence it would not provide copies of its records. A subpoena duces tecum was then issued by the Division, records were produced pursuant to the subpoena, and this controversy ensued. The parties agree, however, that this action was not prompted by complaints from consumers or other persons having dealings with WPR. The record indicates that a mortgage lender differs from a private investor in several material respects. An important distinction is that a private investor uses its own funds rather than those of another party. Also, a private investor does not buy or sell paper, does not escrow taxes, does not split or broker commissions, and does not close its own loans. In all of these respects, WPR had the attributes of a private investor. When mortgage brokerage firms are involved in transactions with private investors, they must supply the private investor with certain documents that are not provided to an institutional investor. Among others, they include a disclosure agreement, receipt of recorded instruments, an appraisal or waiver of the same, and title insurance. In addition, Division rules require that a mortgage brokerage firm record its transactions with private investors in a log journal known as DBF-MB-888. The evidence shows that for transactions between WPR and at least two mortgage brokerage firms during the years in question, the two firms recorded those transactions on DBF-MB-888. They also provided WPR with documents typically given to private investors. The Division has adopted Rule 3D-40.290(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides that a person is deemed to be holding himself out to the public as being in the mortgage lending business if he advertises in a manner "which would lead the reader to believe the person was in the business of buying, making or selling mortgage loans." The rule has not been challenged and, for purposes of resolving this controversy, is presumed to be valid. In view of the representations that WPR provided "Fast Service on 1st Mortgages" and "Vacant Land Loans," it is fair to infer that the Yellow Page advertisements made by WPR would reasonably lead the reader to believe that WPR was in the business of buying, making or selling mortgage loans. Therefore, by virtue of advertising in the Yellow Pages, WPR is deemed to be holding itself out to the public as being in the mortgage lending business. During the years 1993-95, the Division routinely sent WPR questionnaires regarding various WPR transactions with licensed lenders. The transmittal letter accompanying the questionnaire noted that the Division was conducting "a routine examination" of the licensed lender (and not WPR), and WPR's comments would "be of material assistance to (the Division) in determining compliance with the Florida Mortgage Brokerage Act." By way of an estoppel defense, WPR has essentially contended that the questionnaires constituted a representation by the Division that WPR was merely a private lender. It further contends that, to its detriment, it relied upon that representation. But there is nothing in the documents that states that the Division considered WPR to be a private lender. Nor is there any evidence that the Division made any other oral or written representations to WPR that it did not need to secure a license. Finally, assuming arguendo that such a representation occurred, there was no showing that WPR relied to its detriment on such an alleged "misstatement of fact." WPR also raises the defense of laches arguing that it was severely prejudiced by the Division's delay in prosecuting this action. Except for testimony that respondent was forced to secure the services of an attorney to defend against this action, and its principal was required to attend a hearing, there was no showing of prejudice on the part of WPR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order requiring respondent to cease and desist from engaging in the mortgage lending business without a license. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-0290 Petitioner: Because petitioner's post-hearing filing is more in the nature of a memorandum of law containing argument rather than proposed findings of fact, specific rulings have not been made. Respondent: Because respondent's post-hearing filing is more in the nature of a memorandum of law containing argument rather than proposed findings of fact, specific rulings have not been made. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry L. Hooper, III, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Clyde C. Caillouet, Jr., Esquire 4900 Bayou Boulevard, Suite 103 Pensacola, Florida 32503 John T. Reading, Jr., Esquire 358-C West Nine Mile Road Pensacola, Florida 32534-1818
Findings Of Fact During 1984 Philip Dennis on his own behalf and on behalf of Medi Fund Inc. negotiated in Florida with William Kickliter for the purpose of arranging a mortgage loan. During those negotiations Respondent Dennis represented to Kickliter that both he and Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., were mortgage brokers licensed by the State of Florida. In his stated capacity as a mortgage broker, Respondent Dennis drafted and entered into an agreement with Kickliter whereby Kickliter would obtain a mortgage loan from Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., for financing an ongoing business. Respondent Dennis signed the agreement between Kickliter and Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., pursuant to which Kickliter gave to Respondent Dennis a refundable advance fee of $1,500 by check made payable to Respondent Medi Fund, Inc. No mortgage loan was ever consummated. When Kickliter made demand on Respondent Dennis for the return of his monies, Respondent Dennis sent to Kickliter a post-dated check for only $850 with a notation on that check that it was allegedly for full payment of the refundable advance fee. When Kickliter deposited that check, the check "bounced." Respondent Dennis then stopped payment on the check. Kickliter's refundable advance fee has never been refunded to him by either Respondent Dennis or Respondent Medi Fund, Inc. In 1983 Respondent Dennis negotiated in Florida with Robert N. Goldstein to secure financing so that Goldstein's company Hospitality Consultants, Inc., could acquire a hotel. Respondent Dennis drafted and presented to Goldstein and Goldstein's partner Thomas Palumbo an agreement between Respondent Dennis and Hospitality Consultants, Inc., whereby Respondent Dennis would seek mortgage funding for the corporation. In that agreement Respondent Dennis designated himself as "the broker", a designation which matched his oral representations to Goldstein that he was a mortgage broker licensed in the State of Florida. Respondent Dennis executed that agreement on March 11, 1983, on his own behalf. In 1985 Respondent Dennis negotiated in Florida with Bryan Miller of Deco Redevelopment Corp. to secure real estate mortgage loan financing for hotels located in Miami Beach. Respondent Dennis on behalf of Respondent Medi Funds Inc., drafted an agreement whereby Respondent Medi Funds Inc. would secure financing for real estate renovation and new construction of a hotel complex to be built in Miami Beach. Respondent Dennis entered into that agreement on behalf of Respondent Medi Fund Inc. Pursuant to, that agreement, Miller paid to Respondent Dennis on behalf of Respondent Medi Funds Inc., the sum of $5,000 as a refundable advance fee. Neither Respondent Dennis nor Respondent Medi Funds Inc. has arranged any mortgage loan to Deco Redevelopment Corp. Furthers the $5,090 Refundable advance fee paid to Respondents Dennis and Medi Fund Inc. has never been refunded. In 1985 Respondent Dennis while in Florida negotiated with Millie Bulkeley of Arizona for mortgage loan financing for a mobile home park in Arizona. Thereafter Respondent Dennis drafted and entered into an agreement with Bulkeley whereby Respondent Medi Fund Inc., would secure real estate financing for her. Pursuant to that agreement Bulkeley deposited into Respondent Dennis's bank account in New York $20,000 as a refundable advance fee. No financing was ever secured for the project by Respondent Dennis or Respondent Medi Fund Inc. and the refundable advance fee has never been refunded. During 1983, 1984, and 1985 Respondent Dennis represented himself as being an officer of Respondent Medi Fund Inc. and misrepresented to persons both orally and in writing that both Respondent Dennis and Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., were mortgage brokers licensed by the State of Florida. During the time period of December 1982 up to and including May 2, 1986, neither Respondent Dennis nor Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., has been a licensed mortgage broker. By Order entered April 16, 1986, in this cause Petitioner was awarded certain costs against Respondent Medi Funds Inc., as a result of Medi Fund, Inc.'s, refusal to engage in discovery. Those reasonable costs are $45 for the attendance of the court reporter, $318.10 for the travel expense incurred by Petitioner's attorney, and $1,275 as an attorney's fee for Petitioner's attorney. The Order of April 16, 1986, also required Respondent Medi Funds Inc. to return to Petitioner the witness fee and mileage fee paid to it before its non-appearance at its scheduled deposition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents Philip Dennis and Medi Fund, Inc., guilty of the allegations contained within the Cease and Desist Order filed herein ordering Respondents Dennis and Medi Fund, Inc. to forthwith and immediately cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, requiring Medi Funds Inc. to return to the State of Florida the witness fee and mileage paid to it pursuant to the April 16, 1986 Order entered herein and requiring Respondent Medi Funds Inc. to pay to the State of Florida the sum of $1,638.10, as further required by the April 16, 1986 Order entered herein. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of August 1986 at Tallahassee Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Lewis, Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Deborah Hoffman, Esquire Thomas E. Glick Esquire Office of Comptroller 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite 870 Miami Florida 33128 Philip Dennis 2124 Northeast 167 Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33160 Medi Funds Inc., a Florida Corporation c/o Philip Dennis 2124 Northeast 167 Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33160
The Issue In this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, Petitioner Dave Taylor (“Taylor) alleges that various purported “statements” which he attributes to Respondent Department of Banking and Finance (the “Department”) constitute rules-by-definition that were not adopted under, and therefore violate, Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The evidence adduced at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Department of Banking and Finance is the state agency charged with the administration of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, titled “Mortgage Brokerage and Mortgage Lending.” As such, it is responsible for regulating all persons, including mortgage brokers and lenders, licensed under that chapter. Taylor is licensed under Chapter 494 as a mortgage broker and as a “continuing education school.” His firm, Florida Compliance Specialists, Inc., provides consulting services to Chapter 494 licensees. The present dispute stems from amendments to Chapter 494 that the legislature enacted during the 2001 regular session. See Ch. 2001-228, Laws of Florida. These amendments were contained in a bill (CS/HB 455) approved by the governor on June 13, 2001, and became effective on October 1, 2001; they created a new position called “principal representative.” As defined by the legislature, the term “principal representative” means “an individual who operates the business operations of a licensee under part III.” Section 494.001(29), Florida Statutes (2001) (emphasis added).4 This statutory definition is amplified in a mandate that requires all licensees (and applicants) to designate a “principal representative who exercises control of the licensee’s business[.]” Sections 494.0061(8) and 494.0062(11), Florida Statutes. (Emphasis added). Notably, the terms “operates” and “exercises control of” are not defined. As mentioned, the statute requires all licensees and applicants to designate a PR. Although PRs do not engage in a licensed occupation (i.e. there is no PR license), an individual appointed to the post of PR after October 1, 2001, must satisfy certain educational and testing requirements (the details of which are not important here), and the designating lender must submit documents showing that its PRD has complied with those requirements.5 After the governor signed CS/HB 455 into law but before the amended statutes took effect, the Department began making rules to implement the new provisions. Before long, proposed rules were published in the August 31, 2001, issue of Florida Administrative Weekly. One provision of these proposed rules instructed that “[a]n individual can only be a principal representative for one [lender].” This “one lender to a PR” proposal did not implement an explicit statutory directive but arose from the Department’s then-prevailing interpretation of the statutory description of a PR as one who “operates” and “exercises control of” the lender’s business. Further illuminating the Department’s understanding of these terms were the Designation forms that it proposed to adopt, wherein the PRD was required to acknowledge that he or she would be “in full charge, control, and supervision of the [lender’s] business.” A person, the Department reasoned, could be “in full charge,” etc., of but one company at a time. In the course of rulemaking, however, the Department receded from its original interpretation. As a result, revised proposed rules——from which the bright line, “one lender to a PR” directive had been deleted——were published in the October 5, 2001, Florida Administrative Weekly.6 An amended Designation, which unlike earlier versions lacked language requiring a PRD to confirm (with his or her signature) having “full charge, control, and supervision” of the applicant’s or licensee’s business, was proposed as well.7 By the end of January 2002, the Department’s proposed rules relating to PRs had been adopted and, at the time of this Final Order, were among the agency’s duly promulgated, existing rules. See Rule 3D-40.242, Florida Administrative Code. Although the Department does not presently have a bright line rule or policy that flatly forbids an individual from serving simultaneously as PR to more than one licensee, the Department continues to be skeptical that a dual designee can effectively perform, for more than one lender at a time, the responsibilities that it believes inhere in the office of PR. Accordingly, whenever a lender or applicant nominates an XPR for PR, the Department without exception subjects that lender’s Designation to stricter scrutiny than would be given if its PRD were not an XPR. (Indeed, if the PRD is not an XPR, then the Department presumes that he or she will be able to carry out the duties of a PR and hence makes no inquiry as to how the PRD will function as PR.) The first outward manifestations of the Department’s internal decision to scrutinize any Designation in which an applicant’s PRD is an XPR emerged in late November 2001 after the agency had received four separate applications naming Taylor as PR.8 As the Department had discovered upon review of these four applications, Taylor was already serving as PR to an existing licensee. This situation had given rise to a dilemma for which the Department was not fully prepared, as evidenced by a November 26, 2001, e-mail message from an agency attorney to the responsible policy makers in which she (the attorney) had advised that: There are two pending applications in which there are no deficiencies and we need to decide how will [sic] we will proceed since we took out the language in the rule that specifically stated an individual could only be a PR for one company at a time. Let me know what times you would be available [for a meeting to decide what to do]. The Department quickly decided what to do. Between November 27 and November 29, 2001, the Department issued four nearly identical letters, one sent by certified mail to each applicant who had chosen Taylor as its PR, which provided, in pertinent part: We are in receipt of your company’s application to become licensed as a mortgage lender in the State of Florida. A review of the application materials indicates that [applicant’s name] has designated Dave Taylor at [address] as the company’s Principal Representative. [The next four paragraphs quote Sections 494.001(29); 494.0062(11); 494.0062(1)(f); and 494.0062(12), Florida Statutes, which pertain to PRs.] Sections 494.0072(1) and (2)(c), Florida Statutes, provide as follows: Whenever the department finds a person in violation of an act specified in subsection (2), it may enter an order imposing one or more of the following penalties against that person: Revocation of a license or registration. Suspension of a license or registration, subject to reinstatement upon satisfying all reasonable conditions that the department specifies. Placement of the licensee or applicant on probation for a period of time and subject to all reasonable conditions that the department specifies. Issuance of a reprimand. Imposition of a fine in an amount not exceeding $5,000 for each count or separate offense. Denial of a license or registration. Each of the following acts constitutes a ground for which the disciplinary actions specified in subsection (1) may be taken: (c) A material misstatement of fact on an initial or renewal application.[9] Dave Taylor has already been designated as a principal representative for another licensed lender under part III of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Please advise in detail how Mr. Taylor will operate and exercise control over your business.[10] We request that your response be submitted to the Department within 10 days of the date of this letter. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call me at [phone number]. On or about November 30, 2001, the Department created a new deficiency code, DF 416, the description of which is “principal representative is designated to more than one entity.” This is an active deficiency code and is used consistently as a “red flag” on all applications to which it applies. When an application is tagged with a DF 416, the applicant is sent a letter in the form of the letters quoted in the preceding paragraph. This letter will hereafter be referred to as the “DF 416 Inquiry Letter.”11 It is important to emphasize that all applicants whose PRD is an XPR are sent the DF 416 Inquiry Letter, without exception.12 It is undisputed that Taylor has met all of the educational and testing requirements necessary to serve as a PR, and that the Department has no objection, based on facts and circumstances unique to Taylor, to Taylor’s being a lender’s PR. (In fact, he is presently a PR to one lender,13 under a designation to which the Department, consistent with its policy and practice of making no inquiry concerning PRDs who are not XPRs, raised no objection.) The Department’s concern about Taylor’s having been designated a PR by more than one company is indistinguishable from the concern that it expresses regarding all dual designees. This is why, although the contents of the DF 416 Inquiry Letter were developed to resolve a problem that specifically involved Taylor and his clients, the Department decided (and was able) to implement its Taylor-made solution on a generally applicable basis by sending the DF 416 Inquiry Letter to all applicants whose PRD is a dual designee. Each of the four applicants that had designated Taylor as its PR declined the Department’s November 2001 invitation to submit detailed information regarding the manner in which Taylor would operate and control the licensed business. Each applicant chose, instead, to designate someone else as PR. Thus, whatever advantages or considerations Taylor expected to receive in exchange for serving as these lenders’ PR were lost; the Department’s letters (the letters that became the form for the DF 416 Inquiry Letter) were the proximate cause of that loss, in that but for the letters, the lenders would not summarily have severed their respective business relationships with Taylor. After deciding how to deal with applicants whose PRDs are XPRs, the Department turned its attention to the dual designees of existing licensees. This was, in a sense, a bigger problem because, in their respective Designations, more than 50 licensees had selected an individual for PR who was a dual designee. Beginning around December 12, 2001, the Department sent all these lenders a letter similar to the DF 416 Inquiry Letter. This letter stated: We are in receipt of the principal representative designation forms for the following companies: [lender’s names]. A review of the principal representative forms indicates that [PRD’s name and address] has been designated the Principal Representative for both companies. [The next two paragraphs quote statutory provisions pertaining to PRs.] Sections 494.0072(1) and (2)(p) state as follows: Whenever the department finds a person in violation of an act specified in subsection (2), it may enter an order imposing one or more of the following penalties against that person: Revocation of a license or registration. Suspension of a license or registration, subject to reinstatement upon satisfying all reasonable conditions that the department specifies. Placement of the licensee or applicant on probation for a period of time and subject to all reasonable conditions that the department specifies. Issuance of a reprimand. Imposition of a fine in an amount not exceeding $5,000 for each count or separate offense. Denial of a license or registration. Each of the following acts constitutes a ground for which the disciplinary actions specified in subsection (1) may be taken: (p) Failure to comply with, or violations of, any other provision of ss. 494.001-494.0077. Please advise in detail how you will operate and exercise control over both of the above- mentioned businesses. We request that your response be submitted to the Department within 14 days of the date of this letter. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call me at [phone number]. This form letter will be referred to as the “Compliance Inquiry Letter.” The evidence is unequivocal that the Department has sent, and plans to send, the Compliance Inquiry Letter to all licensees whose Designation names a person determined to be a dual designee, without exception.14 Taylor’s Description of the Alleged Rules-by-Definition In his petition, as required by Section 120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes, Taylor described the alleged rules-by- definition. Here, in his words, are the Department’s alleged statements: Only one person can realistically “operate the business operations” of a licensee and “exercise control over the licensee’s business.” Therefore, only one individual shall prima facie be designated as principal representative for only one mortgage lender. The above rule shall not apply, however, to mortgage lenders which the Department deems to be “grand-fathered” i.e., such companies who designated their principal representative on or prior to October 1, 2001, the effective date of the statutory amendments. In such instances, an individual will be permitted multiple designations without further departmental scrutiny or inquiry as to how that individual will “operate” or “exercise control over each business.”[Footnote omitted]. Except for “grand-fathered” companies, if an individual once designated principal representative by a mortgage lender is similarly designated principal representative by a separate mortgage lender, the Department based upon the agency statement recited in (a) above, will require the subsequent mortgage lender(s) (i.e., the lender(s) other than the one first designating that individual) to provide in writing a detailed explanation to the Department, subject to potential sanctions, describing how that individual will operate and exercise control over that second mortgage lender. The Department considers as a “licensing deficiency” any mortgage lender application or principal representative designation submitted to the Department where the individual designated as the mortgage lender’s principal representative has previously been and continues to be designated principal representative by another mortgage lender. The Department, based upon this “deficiency,” shall not deem the application(s) “complete” for purposes of section 120.60, Florida Statutes. Such application(s) shall be subjected to the licensing procedures set forth in paragraphs (e) and (f) hereafter. In conformity with the agency statement set forth in (a) above, the Department will not undertake an inquiry of the principal representative designation submitted by the mortgage lender who first designated the individual as its’ principal representative. The Department will require mortgage lenders to provide the information referred to in section c above, through the use of a form, [i.e., the form letters attached as EXHIBITS “14”, “15”, & “16”, to this Petition]. Further, this form created for the purpose of soliciting information [not specifically required by statute or an existing rule] will require mortgage lenders to provide a response, specifically subject to announced sanctions, of details not otherwise required under the applicable statutes or rules. The Department, though requiring mortgage lenders to comply with the agency statements through the threat of announced sanctions, shall not provide to mortgage lenders or their designated principal representatives any clarifying or defining circumstances or criteria the Department will deem as acceptable——contractual or otherwise——for a person to be designated as principal representative for more than one mortgage lender. Any responses provided by such mortgage lenders in response to the Department’s written form shall be submitted by the applicant “at their peril.” Ultimate Factual Determinations In his just-quoted statements “a,” “c,” “d,” and “e,” Taylor described, with reasonable particularity, the essence of policies that, in fact, fall within the statutory definition of the term “rule.” Statement “a” describes (albeit somewhat imprecisely) a Departmental mindset, the view that a person is likely to have difficulty simultaneously serving more than one master as a PR; the last sentence of statement “d” accurately describes the Department’s related policy of not inquiring as to how a PRD who is not a dual designee will operate and control the lender’s business (because the agency presumes that a person will probably have no difficulty serving as PR to one lender at a time). Taken together, these views, in fact, constitute the Department’s interpretation of the PR statutes.15 Taylor’s statement “c” and the third sentence of “d” (all of which, of course, he attributes to the Department) correctly describe, for the most part,16 the Department’s policy of requiring additional information from all licensees and applicants whose Designations nominate an XPR for the position of PR. This policy is plainly driven by the Department’s interpretation of the PR statutes, and it leads, in turn, directly to statement “e.” Restated to conform to the evidence, statement “e” holds that the Department will send either the DF 416 Inquiry Letter or the Compliance Inquiry Letter, whichever is applicable, to any lender whose PRD is an XPR. It is the form letters——the DF 416 Inquiry Letter and the Compliance Inquiry Letter——that have emerged as the most visible, most readily identifiable unadopted rules of the Department, for they solicit information not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule. By the end of December 2001 at the latest, rulemaking was both feasible and practicable with regard to the above- described statements, but no effort was made to adopt them as rules. Thus, the Department failed timely to commence rulemaking with regard to these statements in accordance with Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.17
Conclusions For Petitioner: H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire Law Office of H. Richard Bisbee 124 Salem Court, Suite A Tallahassee, Florida 32301-2810 For Respondent: Cynthia K. Maynard, Esquire James H. Harris, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Fletcher Building, Suite 526 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
Findings Of Fact Having heard the testimony and considered the evidence presented at the hearing, the undersigned finds as follows: At all relevant times, respondent was a licensed mortgage broker, holding license number 3256. (Exhibit A) On November 26, 1974, Carl Sciacca and George Williams, the general partners of a limited partnership known as University Professional Plaza Ltd., entered into a written contract with respondent to procure a mortgage loan commitment. Mr. Sciacca first went to respondent because respondent had been highly recommended to him. The amount of the mortgage was to be $2,450,000.00 and the commitment was to be procured "on or before 21 days from date all required exhibits are presented...". The agreement further provided that University would pay to respondent a brokerage fee in the amount of $24,500.00 upon funding of the loan. (Exhibit B) On the same date, November 26, 1974, University delivered to respondent a check in the amount of $7,500.00. This check bears the notation "For partial brokerage commission to be held in escrow." (Exhibit C) On November 27, 1975, respondent used said check to purchase a cashier's check and the money was never placed in escrow by respondent. While some correspondence from someone denoting an interest in the loan did transpire, the loan was never consummated. Sometime after the expiration of 21 days from November 26, 1974, Mr. Sciacca requested respondent to refund the deposit. A dispute arose between respondent and University regarding whether or not respondent had received from University all the required documents pertaining to the procurement of the loan. Respondent stated that University had not acted in good faith and thus was not entitled to a refund of the deposit. When attorneys were brought into the picture, it was learned that respondent no longer had all the deposit money. Respondent still has not refunded the $7,500.00 to University, however, respondent and University have now entered into an agreement whereby respondent and his wife executed a mortgage note to University in the amount of $9,000.00 secured by a second mortgage on their condominium apartment. This arrangement is satisfactory to University and represents complete settlement of the $7,500.00 owed to University, along with attorney There is some dispute in the evidence as to the parties' understanding of both the disposition to be made of the $7,500.00 deposit when the check was delivered to respondent and the actual terms of the mortgage loan commitment agreement. It was Sciacca's and William's opinion that all necessary documents for the procurement of the loan had been delivered to respondent and that if a loan were not procured within 21 days, the deposit was to be returned to University. It was respondent's opinion that the 21 days was to run from the date of receipt. of all necessary documents and that respondent had never received from University an accurate financial statement. Respondent further testified that he informed Mr. Sciacca of some problems involved with procuring the loan and that he would need some of the $7,500.00 to straighten out those problems. It was respondent's testimony that, despite the notation on the check "to be held in escrow", Sciacca told respondent to use whatever he needed to procure a loan.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth herein, it is recommended that: Respondent be found not guilty of violations of F.S. Section 494.05(1)(a) , (b) , or (c) or Section 494.05(2); Respondent be found guilty of violations of F.S. Section 494.05(1)(e) , (f) , and (g) and F.A.C. Rule 3-3.06(7) recognizing that the latter two statutes and the Rule involve the same offense - the failure to place the deposit in a trust fund or escrow account; and The Division of Finance issue, in such manner as it deems appropriate, a public reprimand or censure regarding respondent's violations as set forth above. Respectfully submitted and entered this 31st day of October, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph M. Ehrlich, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Division of Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Barry Chapnick, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Legal Annex Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Attorney for Division of Finance Steve E. Moody, Esquire MOODY & JONES 207 E. Broward Boulevard Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Jack E. London, Esquire 2134 Hollywood Boulevard Hollywood, Florida 33020 Attorney for Carl Sciacca and George Williams, members of the general public
The Issue The threshold issue is whether, as a prerequisite to the operation of their foreclosure-related rescue business, Respondents were required to be licensed as mortgage brokers and as loan originators pursuant to chapter 494, Florida Statutes (2017).1/ A secondary issue is whether Respondents solicited, charged, received, or attempted to collect or secure payment for loan modification services without the borrower receiving a material benefit prior to being charged for services.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, other evidence presented at the final hearing, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact2/ are made: Background Pursuant to sections 494.0011 and 494.0012, Petitioner is the state agency charged with the regulation and enforcement of chapter 494, relating to mortgage brokering, mortgage lending, and loan origination. Respondents are charged by administrative complaint with: (a) offering loan modification services for compensation without a license, in violation of chapter 494; (b) charging up- front fees from consumers for loan modification services before completing or performing all services included in the agreement for loan modification services, in violation of chapter 494; (c) failing to obey a final order of OFR; and (d) failure to pay a fine imposed by OFR. Respondent National was originally named Save Your Home Law Center, Inc., when organized in 2009. Respondent R. Jason de Groot served as corporate president and a director of National until February 2, 2016. Respondent Carey Clements served as secretary and a director of National, supervised the employees, and generally managed National throughout National’s corporate existence. Carey Clements has not held a loan originator license pursuant to chapter 494, since December 31, 2010. At no time has National held a mortgage broker or mortgage lender license. As explained by Edward Traylor, National was formed at the height of the national housing market crisis in order to assist persons whose homes were in default and at risk of foreclosure. National operated as a “foreclosure-rescue consultant” and provided “foreclosure-related rescue services” to persons who had defaulted on their mortgage payments and whose homes were in the foreclosure process. Section 501.1377(2)(b), Florida Statutes, defines a foreclosure-rescue consultant as “a person who directly or indirectly makes a solicitation, representation, or offer to a homeowner to provide or perform, in return for payment of money or other valuable consideration, foreclosure-related rescue services. The statutory definition expressly excludes: A licensed mortgage broker or mortgage lender that provides mortgage counseling or advice regarding residential real property in foreclosure, which counseling or advice is within the scope of services set forth in chapter 494 and is provided without payment of money or other consideration other than a loan origination fee. “Foreclosure-related rescue services” is defined by section 501.1377(2)(c) as follows: (c) “Foreclosure-related rescue services” means any good or service related to, or promising assistance in connection with: Stopping, avoiding, or delaying foreclosure proceedings concerning residential real property; or Curing or otherwise addressing a default or failure to timely pay with respect to a residential mortgage loan obligation. The Mortgage Rescue Process Edward Traylor, an owner of National, described the steps his company took when approached by a client seeking foreclosure-related rescue services. According to Mr. Traylor, the initial step was to meet face-to-face with the client and obtain authorization for National to talk directly to the client’s lender. Next, National would contact the lender to confirm that the client was in default on his or her mortgage. National would only accept clients whose mortgage loans were in default. Upon confirming that the client was in default, National would determine whether the matter had been referred to the lender’s loss mitigation department, foreclosure department, or assigned to an attorney. Loans in default would be assigned to the loss mitigation department, and if the default was not cured, then to the foreclosure department (or attorney). Once National determined which of the lender’s departments had been assigned the matter, that department was contacted by National to determine the following: current term and interest rate of the loan; type of loan (conventional? FHA? Fannie Mae? Freddie Mac? Home equity line of credit?). Has the loan been approved for a home retention program trial? Has the loan been in a home retention program previously? Is the lender currently evaluating the loan for a retention workout program? Is the home in foreclosure? If so, has a sale date been set? If so, is it possible to postpone the sale date? If a sale date has been set and postponement is possible, what is required from the borrower to postpone the sale? What is the deadline for the borrower to meet those requirements? Does the lender require a current financial package from the borrower in order to consider whether to offer a “workout plan?” If the lender was willing to consider offering the borrower a workout plan, but required updated financial information from the borrower, that information was gathered by National and provided to the lender. However, not all lenders required updated financial information from borrowers as a prerequisite to offering a workout plan. The majority of the borrowers assisted by National had obtained their mortgages through sub-prime lending practices with minimal loan qualifications required. These mortgages were then sold to investors as “mortgage backed securities,” usually in blocks of a billion dollars each. With the national collapse of the housing market in 2007 and 2008, tens of thousands of borrowers in Florida defaulted on their mortgages, resulting in their homes going into foreclosure. Since many of these homes were bundled as mortgage backed securities, the investors in those securities retained banks and other institutions as servicers of those defaulted loans. Those servicers included Wells Fargo, Beneficial Finance, Merrill Lynch, and Bank of America, among others. Each servicer established its own criteria for offering workout plans to lenders. Depending upon the servicer, the workout plan might include a reduction in interest rate, reduction of principal owed, and/or waiver of fees and penalties. The terms of the workout plans offered by the lenders/servicers were nonnegotiable. National did not have the ability to counteroffer the terms of a workout plan. In other words, if the lender’s workout plan was a two-percent reduction in the interest rate, National could not negotiate a higher percentage reduction. In essence, the workout plan was a “take it or leave it” offer to the borrower. However, some lenders/servicers did include several options that the borrower could choose from to incorporate into the workout plan. Those options might include a reduction in the interest rate, term, or principal deferment, or reduction to the current principal balance. In those instances where the lender/servicer was willing to offer options to avoid foreclosure, including a workout plan, National would communicate those options to the borrower, along with a recommendation as to the terms of the workout plan. That recommendation would be based, at least in part, on National’s evaluation of the borrower’s financial condition and ability as reported to National. In the same letter containing National’s workout plan recommendation, the borrower was also informed of the necessity to enter into an Enrollment Agreement with National if the borrower wished to continue receiving services from National. That Enrollment Agreement set forth the scope of services to be provided to the borrower by National, which included four phases of work, identified as Parts I through IV in the agreement: PART 1: SYHHC has conducted the first interview with the Client, prepared a Client Information Form and received authorization to speak to the Lender/Servicer and/or their counsel. SYHHC has made initial contact with the Lender/Servicer to determine if the above loan qualifies for a workout program which will avoid foreclosure and if the Lender will accept a workout offer from the Client. SYHHC has conducted a second interview to compile financial information to help Client determine if they can qualify and what kind of offer they can make. Based upon preliminary information obtained from the Lender/Servicer and Client, SYHHC has prepared a preliminary proposal/offer which Client believes to be reasonable for the Lender/Servicer to consider. SYHHC conducted a third interview with the Client and went over the proposal offer to make sure the Client wishes to proceed with this offer. Client was advised that they could present the offer themselves and no monies were due SYHHC. PART II: SYHHC will collect and verify all information from Client to prepare a reasonable workout plan for Client to present to the Lender/Servicer to avoid foreclosure. SYHHC will contact Client and review the proposed workout with Client. Client may reject any proposed workout option prepared by Save Your Home Help Center and decide not to proceed and cancel this Enrollment Agreement and any monies that have been paid for services rendered as outlined in Part I shall not be refunded and this agreement is cancelled. If Client agrees and accepts in writing the proposed workout offer a payment of $700.00 is due and payable for services rendered. SYHHC shall submit Client’s file to the Lender/Servicer no later than 30 days after receipt of said payment. PART III: Submit Client’s formal workout offer/proposal to Lender/Servicer within 30 days. Weekly contact or as needed with the Lender/Servicer updating file per Lender/Servicer request. Weekly contact or as needed with Client. When Client’s workout/offer is received and processed by Lender/Servicer and is in review for consideration and advises SYHHC that all requested documents have been received a fee of $795.00 is due. Client understands once file is submitted to Lender/Servicer and the above payment is not received within (5) five days following the request for payment the file shall be withdrawn from the Lender/Servicer. PART IV: Continue to update file as requested from Lender/Servicer. Continue providing foreclosure related services until an offer to avoid foreclosure has been provided to Client. SYHHC will review any offer/option provided by Lender/Servicer/Counsel with Client and at the sole discretion of SYHHC may resubmit any counter proposal on behalf of Client until a final offer is presented to Client. If Client’s [sic] declines the latest offer from Lender/Servicer/Counsel and Client’s circumstances have not changed SYHHC reserves the right not to resubmit. If Client receives an offer from Lender/Servicer including a trial period which avoids foreclosure it is agreed that SYHHC has completed this Agreement. No payment was due from borrower to National until after the completion of each of the four phases of work. Was National Providing Unlicensed Loan Modification Services? Count 1 of the Complaint charges Respondents with offering loan modification services for compensation without a license, in violation of section 494.00255(1)(p). Specifically, the Count alleges that “Respondents offered loan modification services, which is acting as a loan originator, mortgage broker, or mortgage lender, and which therefore requires a license from the Office.” The referenced statutory provision prohibits “[a]cting as a loan originator, mortgage broker, or mortgage lender without a current license issued under part II or part III of this chapter.” Section 494.001(15) defines “loan modification” to mean a modification to an existing loan, and specifically does not include a refinancing transaction. OFR conducted a review of National’s operations from the period of January 16, 2013, through February 9, 2016, consisting of 26 sample files, and based upon that review concluded that National was providing loan modification services. OFR’s conclusion that National was offering loan modification services was primarily based upon several of the “best options” letters (Petitioner’s Ex. 7A) referenced above that were sent by National to borrowers. As noted, those letters included recommendations as to the best options offered by lenders/servicers for incorporation in a workout plan. OFR also based its conclusion on a series of communications from National to lenders/servicers proposing a “loan modification or workout option” in order for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. (Petitioner’s Ex. 7B). While on their face, National’s letters to lenders/servicers proposing new terms to the defaulted loans would appear to constitute offers to modify the loans, it is more likely the letters simply identify the options of the workout plan offered by the lender/servicer that were acceptable to the borrower. This inference is consistent with the finding that the terms of the workout plans offered by lenders/servicers were nonnegotiable. In other words, while a loan originator or broker would have the ability to negotiate the terms and conditions of a loan, National, as a rescue consultant could not, since the parameters of the workout plan were established solely by the lenders/servicers. Competent substantial evidence of record established that Respondents were not offering loan modification services and were not acting as loan originators or brokers. Collection of Advance Fees for Loan Modification Services Count II of the Complaint alleges that Respondents solicited, received, or attempted to collect one or more payments, directly or indirectly, for loan modification services before completing or performing all services included in the agreement for loan modification services. Section 494.00296 provides as follows: (1) PROHIBITED ACTS.--When offering or providing loan modification services, a loan originator, mortgage broker, or mortgage lender may not: * * * (c) Solicit, charge, receive, or attempt to collect or secure payment, directly or indirectly, for loan modification services before completing or performing all services included in the agreement for loan modification services. A fee may be charged only if the loan modification results in a material benefit to the borrower. The commission may adopt rules to provide guidance on what constitutes a material benefit to the borrower. Upon qualifying the borrower, Respondents provided a contract to the borrower for services. The contract included a standard fee of $2,495 to complete the entire process. Only part of the total fee was collected from the borrower at the time Respondents were retained. Contemporaneous with signing the contract, Respondents provided an invoice to the borrower, which showed a total due at the bottom of the page for those future services that were to be rendered through conclusion of the Enrollment Agreement. As noted, the first step in the process was to contact the lender; the next step was to gather documents and information required by the lender; the third step was to submit the information as a package to the lender; the final step was to assist the customer with obtaining approval from the lender. The fees to be charged for the above services were $500, which was due at the time the Enrollment Agreement was executed. The remaining fees were $700, to be paid when the proposed workout offer is agreed to and accepted by the borrower; and $795, for preparing the file, updating the file, reviewing the file with the borrower and obtaining signatures, and submitting the file to the lender. Given the finding that Respondents were not providing loan modification services, and were not acting as loan originators, mortgage brokers, or mortgage lenders, section 494.00296 is inapplicable. However, even if this provision applied, borrowers received a material benefit from the services provided by National in Part 1 of the Enrollment Agreement, since they were advised of the options available to them to avoid foreclosure. While section 494.00296 does not apply to the foreclosure-related rescue services being provided by Respondents, section 501.1377 does apply. That section sets forth very detailed requirements and language that must be included in all written agreements for foreclosure-related rescue services. There is no evidence of record that the Enrollment Agreement used by National did not comply with those requirements. Section 501.1377 also identifies practices that are prohibited. The pertinent section provides: Prohibited acts.--In the course of offering or providing foreclosure-related rescue services, a foreclosure-rescue consultant may not: Engage in or initiate foreclosure- related rescue services without first executing a written agreement with the homeowner for foreclosure-related rescue services; or Solicit, charge, receive, or attempt to collect or secure payment, directly or indirectly, for foreclosure-related rescue services before completing or performing all services contained in the agreement for foreclosure-related rescue services. While it could be argued that National was in violation of section 501.1377(3)(b) for collecting payments before all services contained in the Enrollment Agreement were completed, this section was not cited in the Complaint, nor does OFR have jurisdiction to bring an enforcement action for violation of the above provision. Failure to Comply with Prior Final Order Count III alleges that Respondents continued to act as loan originators, mortgage brokers, or mortgage lenders without a license, and in violation of the OFR’s Final Order in OFR Case 2012-285 FOF entered on November 2, 2012. Count IV alleges that Respondents failed to pay the $25,000 fine imposed in the Final Order. The procedural history resulting in the entry of the prior Final Order reveals that the allegations contained in the underlying Administrative Complaint were never resolved on their merits. Rather, when Respondents failed to respond to discovery requests propounded on them by OFR, including 13 requests for admissions, those requests for admissions were deemed admitted by the ALJ, and OFR’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction, based upon the matters deemed admitted, was granted. The Final Order, upon which OFR grounds Count III and IV of the instant Complaint, was then entered. Respondents in the prior proceeding were represented by Attorney John Baum. According to Mr. Traylor’s unrebutted testimony, Respondents were advised by Mr. Baum that the matter had been settled or dismissed, and that Respondents had won the case. Respondents were not informed until early 2014 that, in fact, an adverse Final Order had been entered against them, when they received a letter from a collections agency seeking collection of the $25,000 fine. Mr. Baum was disbarred on July 15, 2013, for reasons not of record. The substantive allegations contained in the prior Administrative Complaint are indistinguishable from the allegations at bar. Both assert that Respondents were providing loan modification services without proper licensure, and that payments were received for loan modification services before all services had been provided. Given the findings herein that Respondents have not been improperly providing loan modification services, and lack of adjudication on the merits that Respondents ever improperly provided such services, OFR’s Final Order in OFR Case 2012-285 FOF may not form the basis of the new allegations set forth in Counts III and IV of the instant Complaint.3/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation enter a final order dismissing Administrative Complaint No. 69868. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's lottery prize is subject to an outstanding debt owed to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent applied for a student loan in the amount of $2,500 under the Florida Guaranteed Student Loan Program in an application dated August 8, 1986. Respondent needed the loan to pay the cost of her attendance at Roffler Hair Design College (school) for the period of September 1986 through January 1987. Petitioner guaranteed Respondent's loan. The loan number is 0000522112. Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association (Glendale) issued the loan proceeds in two equal disbursements. The first disbursement took place on or about September 26, 1986. The second disbursement took place on or about November 7, 1986. Glendale subsequently sold the loan to Student Loan Marketing Association/Student Loan Services (SLS). The loan accrues interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per year unless Respondent is in deferment status, i.e. attending school on a minimum part-time basis. In this case, Respondent dropped out of school for a period of time in 1987. On or about June 25, 1987, the school returned $632.52 of the Respondent's loan to the lender. This sum represented the unused portion of Respondent's loan. Respondent's account was credited accordingly. The last day that Respondent attended the school was May 27, 1988. By letter dated September 1, 1988, SLS notified Respondent of the repayment schedule for her loan. Her first payment was due on December 27, 1988. Respondent made no payments on the loan to Glendale or SLS. Accordingly, SLS declared Respondent's loan in default and filed a claim dated August 14, 1989, with Petitioner. On February 20, 1992, Petitioner, as guarantor of the loan, paid SLS for Respondent's defaulted student loan. On that date, the claim principal was $1,864.48 ($2,500 less the $635.52 credit) and the outstanding interest due was $469.95. After Petitioner acquired the loan, the outstanding interest was capitalized resulting in a balance of $2,334.43. This sum accrues interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per year. Respondent made no payment on her loan after Petitioner acquired it until a portion of her lottery winnings was applied to her account. By letter dated August 31, 1998, Petitioner notified the Department of Lottery about Respondent's outstanding defaulted loan in the amount of $3,561.89, including principal and interest. Petitioner requested the Department of the Lottery to transmit a portion of Respondent's prize money to be credited toward Respondent's debt. Thereafter, the Department of the Lottery transmitted $3,561.89 of Respondent's prize money to Petitioner. By letter dated September 14, 1998, Petitioner notified Respondent that it was in receipt of $3,561.89 of her $5,000 lottery prize. Petitioner applied Petitioner's winnings to her outstanding balance. Respondent has applied for and received at least one other loan which is held by the United States Department of Education (USDE) in the Federal Direct Consolidation Loan Program. The loan which is the subject of this proceeding is not the same loan which is held by USDE.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner was authorized to apply $3,561.89 of Respondent's lottery prize toward her outstanding debt for a student loan. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald E. Stowers, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dollie M. Tunsil 5813 Pompano Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact At the time of CMNI's application, Mr. Giunta was president of CMNI and, as such, exercised primary control over the day-to-day activities of CMNI (Tr.12). Mr. Giunta is also the president of Christian Investors Network, Inc. (CINI), and exercised similar control over the activities of that corporation (Tr. 11-12). Mr. Giunta, CMNI, and CINI have never been licensed as mortgage brokers by the Department (Tr. 12-13). CINI, with the knowledge and approval of Mr. Giunta, placed advertisements in the St. Petersburg Times (Tr. 13). One such advertisement appeared in St. Petersburg Times edition of April 20, 1986, under the heading "Loan Information." That advertisement stated "Major Real Estate Financing" and "Residential Real Estate." (Exhibit 1). Sometime in the middle of 1986, Paul Mark called Mr. Giunta in response to an advertisement in the St. Petersburg Times. Mr. Mark was seeking a mortgage loan or loans to build several houses on real estate he owned and so informed Mr. Giunta, who indicated to Mr. Mark that he could arrange a mortgage loan for Mr. Mark (Tr. 28-29). Messrs. Mark and Giunta met shortly after the telephone call. Mr. Mark handed Mr. Giunta a package of documents including a site plan, survey, credit information and a completed mortgage loan application. Mr. Giunta again stated that he would have no problem arranging a mortgage loan for Mr. Mark and requested a fee for such service in the amount of $300.00 (Tr. 30-31). After the meeting, Mr. Mark sent to Mr. Giunta a check made out to Mr. Giunta in the amount of $300.00, together with a letter dated July 16, 1986, confirming that Mr. Giunta would secure mortgage financing (Tr. 31-33); Exhibit 3). In October of 1986, Clifford Clark called Mr. Giunta in response to a newspaper advertisement, seeking a mortgage loan to refinance a certain parcel of property owned by Mr. Clark. Mr. Giunta stated that he could arrange mortgage financing for Mr. Clark at an interest rate of approximately ten percent (Tr. 48-49). After the telephone contact, Messrs. Clark and Giunta met and Mr. Giunta had Mr. Clark fill out a residential loan application (Exhibit 7). Mr. Clark provided Mr. Giunta with originals of his deed to the property and other real estate related documents. Mr. Giunta indicated that he could obtain mortgage financing for Mr. Clark and requested a fee of $250.00, whereupon Mr. Clark gave Mr. Giunta a check for that amount (Tr. 49-51). In early 1986, Robert Miraglia called Mr. Giunta in response to a newspaper advertisement, seeking a second mortgage. Mr. Giunta arranged to meet with Mr. Miraglia to discuss the requested loan. In August of 1986, Russell Foreman contacted Gerald Giunta in response to a newspaper advertisement, seeking a mortgage loan to refinance his home (Exhibit 5). On August 26, 1986, Mr. Foreman met with Mr. Giunta and at Mr. Giunta's request gave him copies of his deed, a survey of the lot, the mortgages to be satisfied and other real estate related documents. Mr. Giunta assured Mr. Foreman that there would be no problem in obtaining a mortgage loan and requested a fee of $200.00. Mr. Foreman wrote a check for that amount and gave it to Mr. Giunta (Exhibit 5). Mr. Giunta never informed Messrs. Mark, Clark, Miraglia and Foreman that he was not a licensed mortgage broker. In approximately April of 1986, Mr. Giunta met with Mr. Arthur M. James, Area Financial Manager for the Department's Tampa Regional Field Office. At that meeting, Mr. James explained to Mr. Giunta that he could not offer to arrange or negotiate mortgage loans on behalf of clients and collect a fee for such service without first becoming licensed by the Department as a mortgage broker (Tr. 84). At some point prior to May 8, 1986, Mr. Giunta was contacted by the Department and informed of the statutes and regulations applicable to advertising his services in the area of real estate financing (Exhibit 2; Tr. 23-24). At some point in 1987, CMNI, with the knowledge and approval of Giunta, listed "Christian Mortgage Network, Inc." in the yellow pages of a local telephone book under the heading of "Mortgages." (Exhibit 1; Tr. 15).
The Issue Whether the license of Respondent should be suspended for violation of the Mortgage Brokerage Act, Chapter 494, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Irving Zimmerman holds Mortgage Brokerage Registration No. 90-3337. An Order of Emergency Suspension of License was issued by the Department of Banking and Finance dated March 24, 1975 and served on Respondent Irving Zimmerman by certified mail. Said Emergency Order is now in effect: Through his attorney, Milton R. Wasman, Respondent Zimmerman requested this formal administrative hearing. The attorney for Respondent, Mr. Milton R. Wasman, called the undersigned Hearing Officer on the day immediately preceding this hearing, that is June 23, 1975, requesting that the hearing be postponed because of a physical disability of said attorney. Said request was denied because of the late hour of request and because of grievous inconvenience to the parties and to the witnesses that had been subpoenaed. Said request was denied orally by telephone to Respondent's attorney whereupon said attorney requested that the transcript of the proceeding be made available. Said attorney was assured that he could view the transcript upon his request when it was available. Upon request of William Corbett, Counsel for the agency, authorization was given to take the deposition of witness Joseph M. Magill, a witness who could not attend the hearing. Said deposition is filed with this record. The attorney for Respondent Zimmerman, Mr. Wasman appeared in behalf of the Respondent at the taking of said deposition in Miami, Florida on July 18, 1975. The following instruments were made part of the record: Summons dated March 24, 1975; Order of Emergency Suspension of License filed March 24, 1975; Petition for Hearing filed by Respondent's attorney; Deposition of witness for the agency, Mr. Joseph M. Magill; Transcript of record of this hearing and also transcript of record at the taking of deposition. On or about July 10, 1974, Mr. Leonard G. Pardue issued a check in the amount of $7,500 payable to "State Farm Mortgage Co., escrow account" for the purpose of making a mortgage loan to Hans G. and Ann M. Widenhauser. Subsequently, after the Widenhausers decided not to make this loan, the Respondent contacted Mr. Pardue and attempted to negotiate a substitute loan to Alan and Marcia Hollet. After that loan did not close, Mr. Pardue, by his attorney, Mr. Roger G. Welcher, wrote several letters to Respondent which demanded a return of the $7,500 to his client. Mr. Pardue filed a civil suit against Respondent to recover said funds; however, as of the date of the hearing, the Respondent has failed or refused to return the money. Mr. Bernard Supworth made a mortgage loan to Robert E. and Madeline Pope in June of 1972, through the Respondent as broker. The monthly payments were made to Respondent who in turn was supposed to remit the funds to Mr. Supworth. Subsequently, on or about January 25, 1974, Respondent advised Mr. Supworth that the mortgage was being paid off and Mr. Supworth executed and delivered a Satisfaction thereof to Respondent. Later, Mr. Supworth learned that the Pope mortgage had been paid off in July, 1973, and that a check had been issued by Dade Federal and Savings & Loan Association on July 9, 1973, payable to State Farm Mortgage in the amount of $3,544.98. Notwithstanding such payment in full on the Pope mortgage in July, 1973, Respondent continued to remit monthly payments on it to Mr. Supworth. Mr. Supworth had not agreed to receive any monthly payments after the mortgage had been satisfied and to date has not received all of his money on the Pope transaction. Respondent Zimmerman negotiated another mortgage loan to Mr. Supworth to James and Phyllis Lowe, as borrowers in the amount of $4,600 to be paid in the amount of $97.74 per month. These payments were to be paid by the Lowes to the Respondent, who was to remit said payment to Mr. Supworth. Thereafter, on or about November 21, 1973, Respondent advised Mr. Supworth, by memorandum, that this mortgage must be paid off. Thereupon, Mr. Supworth executed and delivered a Satisfaction of Mortgage to Respondent. He continued to receive monthly payments from Respondent on the Lowe mortgage up until January, 1975. Mr. Supworth later learned that the Lowe mortgage had been paid in full to Respondent in October, 1973. Mr. Supworth had not agreed to this transaction. On or about August 15, 1973, Mrs. Judith Valenza made a mortgage loan at the Commercial Bank of Kendall. Later Mrs. Valenza negotiated a mortgage loan through Respondent, as broker, to pay off the existing mortgage to the Commercial Bank of Kendall. Pursuant to that transaction, Mrs. Valenza closed said loan through Respondent, as broker. Thereafter, a check was issued on "Irving Zimmerman Trust Account" in the amount of $3,510.78, and payable to the Commercial Bank of Kendall. The check was returned because of "insufficient funds". As of the date of the hearing, the Commercial Bank of Kendall had not received payment of said check from Respondent. On or about January 28, 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Joseph M. Magill executed a note and mortgage in the amount of $3,500 in favor or Helen R. Stahl, as trustee, at the offices of Respondent. Respondent failed to account for or deliver money to the person entitled thereto, on demand failed to disburse funds in accordance with the agreement, and failed to keep funds in a trust account.
Findings Of Fact On November 15, 1976, the Outrigger Club, Inc., a Florida corporation, through its president, Ervin Freeman, and its Secretary, Joan Dimon, executed a warranty deed conveying all right, title and interest, in and to certain property located at Northeast 135th Street and Biscayne Boulevard, North Miami, Florida, to Petitioner, Biscayne South, Inc. (hereafter Biscayne South), a Florida corporation. The warranty deed was recorded with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, on November 16, 1976. On November 22, 1976, Biscayne South executed a mortgage deed in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust, as a second mortgage on the same parcel of land to secure the payment of a promissory note in the principal sum of $1,500,000.00 which note was made by Outrigger Club, Inc., on the same date in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors. On November 22, 1976, Outrigger Club, Inc., as the "borrower" executed a future advance agreement with Fidelity Mortgage Investors as "lendor". The future advance agreement provides for the advancement of the sum of $1,500,000.00 to be secured by a prior mortgage dated October 27, 1972, executed by Outrigger Club, Inc., in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, which mortgage provided for future advances. On November 22, 1976, a construction loan and disbursement agreement was executed by the parties thereto which provided that the $1,500,000.00 advance be paid to Miami National Bank as disbursement agent for the benefit of Biscayne South. On November 23, 1976, the mortgage deed and the future advance agreement were recorded in the public records of Dade County, Florida, and on that same date, the warranty deed was rerecorded in the public records of Dade County, Florida. Because the 1.5 million dollars was paid to Miami National Bank to be disbursed for future construction work on a draw-down basis, Outrigger Club, Inc., the grantor, never received the 1.5 million dollars. The warranty deed provides in paragraph 9 thereof that the conveyance is subject to: a second mortgage wherein the Outrigger Club Inc., is mortgagor and the trustees of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust, is mortgagee, dated the day of November, 1976, which said mortgage is given as additional collateral for payment of certain sums as provided under a settlement and release agreement between the Outrigger Club, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Lawrence F. Lee, Jr., and others as trustees of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust dated the 16th day of January, 1976. Neither the Department of Revenue nor Biscayne South have introduced evidence to establish that such a mortgage in fact exists or if it did, the value of such mortgage. The only mortgage in evidence is Respondent, Department of Revenue's Exhibit 2, which shows Biscayne South as mortgagor rather than the Outrigger Club, Inc., as recited in the warranty deed. However, the future advance agreement introduced as Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, establishes the existence of a mortgage encumbering the subject property in which the Outrigger Club, Inc., is mortgagor and Fidelity Mortgage Investors is mortgagee. Such mortgage is dated October 27, 1972, and not dated with the month of November, 1976, as recited in paragraph 9 of the warranty deed. As recited in the future advance agreement, the mortgage of October 27, 1972, secured an indebtedness of $7,214,000.00. The mortgage provided that future advances could be made to Outrigger Club, Inc., not to exceed in the aggregate $16,500,000.00. The future advance agreement provides that an additional advance of $1,500,000.00 is to be made to Outrigger Club, Inc., thereby increasing the indebtedness represented by the October 27, 1972, mortgage to the aggregate sum of $8,715,000.00. In other words, the buyer of the property sought to borrow an additional 1.5 million dollars. The lender, in order to achieve priority of lien to secure its loan, treated the funding as an advance against a preexisting mortgage originally binding the seller, but then delivered the 1.5 million dollars directly to Miami National Bank for the benefit of the buyer. Accordingly, the seller never received the proceeds of the loan but rather participated in a "book transaction" for the benefit of the buyer and the lender.
