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TODD T. CATLETTE vs. OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER, 88-001161 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001161 Latest Update: Jun. 24, 1988

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Todd T. Catlette, applied for full registration as a general securities representative. Mr. Catlette is not licensed to call or offer to sell securities in the State of Florida. The Department of Banking and Finance denied the application by letter dated January 22, 1988. Ex. 3 The application was denied based upon the following facts: On May 3, 1988, the Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a third degree felony, filing a false and fraudulent insurance claim, in violation of Section 817.234(1)(a), Fla. Stat., and pleaded nolo contendere to a second degree felony, second degree grand theft, in violation of Section 812.014(2)(b), Fla. Stat. He was placed on probation for one year and ordered to make restitution to the insurance company in the amount of $2,148.00. Upon failing to make restitution, his probation was extended three years. He was discharged from probation on April 28, 1987. On August 3, 1979, the Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to sale and delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver, both second degree felonies, in violation of Section 893.03(2)(a)4, Fla. Stat. He was sentenced to two years in state prison. On November 22, 1976, the Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to possession of less then five grams of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, a first degree misdemeanor; and was placed on three months probation. After serving his sentences in state prison, the Petitioner obtained a college education. The Petitioner testified that he was innocent of the possession of marijuana offense in 1976 and innocent of the fraudulent insurance claim and theft offenses in 1985. He presented a deposition of a detective involved in the fraudulent insurance claim case which was admitted as hearsay evidence to support his assertion of innocence. It appears from the deposition and the testimony of Mr. Cutlette that the detective relied solely upon the testimony of one witness as support for the charges of false insurance claim and theft. The foregoing evidence is not sufficiently credible to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner was innocent of the fraudulent insurance claim and grand theft offense. When presented with an opportunity for a trail, the Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere.

Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the Respondent issue its final order denying the application of Todd T. Catlette for full registration as a general securities representative. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 1988. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1161 The following are rulings upon proposed findings of fact which have either been rejected or which have been adopted by reference. The numbers used are the numbers used by parties. Findings of Fact proposed by the Petitioner: None Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: 1. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 3.-4., 10. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. COPIES FURNISHED: Todd T. Catlette 3450 Palencia Drive, No. 1317 Tampa, Florida 22618 Reginald R. Garcia, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32388-0350 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts, Esquire General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Florida Laws (4) 517.12517.161812.014817.234
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ALAN D. JIMENEZ vs WHOLE FOODS MARKET, 07-001114 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Mar. 08, 2007 Number: 07-001114 Latest Update: Aug. 22, 2007

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed employment discrimination against Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Peruvian South American Indian and Hispanic. He is also a Spanish speaker, although he speaks English fluently. Respondent owns and operates a chain of grocery stores. Petitioner worked at Respondent's store in Fort Lauderdale from December 1992 until he was terminated in August 2005. Petitioner started as a produce clerk and, at the time of his termination, he had worked his way up to produce manager. He had been employed as a produce manager of the Fort Lauderdale store since April 2002. Petitioner enjoyed a good reputation among his coworkers. He was fair and a good manager. He enjoyed good rapport with customers and employees. Petitioner's employment record was unblemished except for one incident prior to the subject incident. On February 17, 2005, Petitioner received an Unsatisfactory Work Warning for misuse of Respondent's email system and inappropriate communication. Petitioner was one of several employees disciplined at this time for this offense. Under well-established and uniformly enforced rules, Respondent maintained a policy of terminating any employee who received any discipline within six months after receipt of an Unsatisfactory Work Warning. On August 3, 2005--which is within six months of February 17, 2005--Petitioner was approached by an employee whom he supervised. The employee asked Petitioner for an evaluation. Petitioner complied, informing the employee that his work merited a raise, but no money was available at the time for raises. The employee took his request to Petitioner's supervisor, who conducted a meeting with the employee and Petitioner. During the meeting, she explained Respondent's policy about raises, correcting the mistaken understanding of Petitioner that raises were not presently available. She approved the employee for a raise. The meeting was amicable and ended in this fashion. Later in the day of the meeting, Petitioner approached the employee, playfully tapped him with a small bundle of wire wraps used to bind produce, and asked him, jokingly, why he was trying to get Petitioner into trouble. The employee felt intimidated about the incident and reported it to Respondent's supervisor. Respondent has no tolerance for workplace behavior that may be perceived as intimidating to its employees. Based on this policy, Respondent determined that it was necessary to discipline Petitioner for the incident with the employee. But for the prior incident involving the company email system, Respondent would not have terminated Petitioner. However, because the second incident occurred within six months of the earlier warning, Respondent, consistent with its policy, terminated Petitioner. There is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent terminated Petitioner due to his race or national origin. Although the reason for terminating him does not withstand much scrutiny, it is abundantly clear that the cited reason for termination does not mask an unlawful basis for termination.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Alan D. Jimenez 820 Northeast 19th Terrace Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jennifer L. Price, Esquire Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A. 200 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 2100 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

Florida Laws (3) 120.569760.10760.11
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BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. JEROME E. SCORZELLI, 78-000327 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-000327 Latest Update: May 30, 1978

Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying and the entire record filed herein, the following relevant facts are found. Respondent, Jerome E. Scorzelli, is licensed by the Board to practice osteopathic medicine and is the holder of license no. 3203. Documentary evidence introduced by a final order of the Board issued October 24, 1977 made findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that Respondent issued approximately 14 prescriptions for demerol and obtained said drug without good faith and not in the course of his professional practice within the months of August - November, 1976. That order found as a matter of law that Respondent unlawfully distributed and dispensed controlled substances as described in Chapter 893.03, F.S., and performed acts prohibited by Section 893.05, Florida Statutes, and as such violated Chapter 459.14(2)(m) and (n), Florida Statutes. In that order the Board ordered a suspension of the Respondent's license to practice osteopathic medicine in the state and all rights and privileges granted thereunder for a period of five years commencing October 15, 1977. However, the Board ruled that if Respondent satisfied five enumerated conditions the Board would hold the imposition of the suspension in abeyance as long as such conditions continued to be satisfied. If during the five year period of suspension the Board in its discretion determined that any or all such conditions stated in the order were not fully met and complied with, imposition of such suspension would immediately and automatically be imposed for the duration of the five year period of suspension. (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit no. 2). Thereafter, on February 8, 1978, the Board issued the subject administrative complaint alleging that on November 19, 1977, in Broward County, Florida, Respondent unlawfully aided, abetted, counselled, hired, or otherwise procurred the commission of a criminal offense against the State of Florida to wit: uttering a forged or fraudulent prescription, said criminal offense being committed by Mitchell Paulson in that Mitchell Paulson did acquire or obtain or attempt to acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance, to wit: Pethidinex (moperidine), commercially known as demerol, by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge, in that the said Mitchell Paulson, at the direction of Dr. Scorzelli and with Dr. Scorzelli's assistance did knowingly utter to Melvin S. Silver, a false or forged prescription contrary to Chapters 893.03(2)(b)14, 893.13(3)(a)(1) and (b), and 777.011, Florida Statutes. /1 Melvin S. Silver, a pharmacist registered in this state for approximately 16 years and the owner of Baron's Pharmacy in Broward County, testified that on November 19, 1977, a customer tendered him a prescription for two vials of demerol. Messr. Silver became suspicious of the prescription in that it appeared to be over correct since doctors usually do not write out in longhand, the drugs requested on prescriptions. For this reason, Messr. Silver checked with his delivery boy who confirmed that the address noted on the prescription was an incorrect address. The combination of these factors prompted Messr. Silver to call the doctor who he did not know and reached an answering service. He requested the answering service to contact the Respondent such that he could verify whether the prescription was issued by him. The answering service assured Messr. Silver that she would check with the doctor and have him to return the call. Within a few minutes Messr. Silver received a call from a person identifying himself as Dr. Scorzelli and advised that it was o.k. to fill the "Verdi" prescription. Messr. Silver, still not satisfied that the prescription was legitimate, again called the answering service and was assured by the person he spoke to that the service had contacted Dr. Scorzelli. Messr. Silver testified that suspicion still remained in his mind inasmuch as the person who called identifying himself as Dr. Scorzelli voice sounded young and was slurred. He called the Broward County Police and gave the description of that person who later turned out to be Mitchell Paulson who had given him the prescription. Paulson left out the side entrance and while so doing, detectives William Mattingly and James Harn, special detectives working in the organized crime and drug enforcement unit, apprehended Paulson in front of Baron's Drugs. At about the same time, they noted Dr. Scorzelli sitting outside in a Lincoln Continental who identified himself as Dr. Scorzelli. Detective Mattingly testified that, as is customary in these cases, the department attempts to verify the authenticity of such prescriptions by obtaining statements from the doctor that either his prescription pad was stolen or that the prescription was otherwise forged. Dr. Scorzelli refused to provide such a statement however he did appear with his attorney approximately three days later and signed a statement to the effect that the prescription was not authored by him. Detectives Mattingly and Harn obtained authorization from the State Attorney's office to receive the tolls for Dr. Scorzelli's mobile phone in his automobile which reveals that two calls were made from his mobile phone to his answering service and Baron's Drugs during the time frame in which Paulson was attempting to pass the prescription in Baron's Drugs. The Respondent gave a statement as to the ordeal he has undergone within the past six months and that he was in the process of filing bankruptcy since he had been unable to practice medicine for approximately six months. He testified that there were no malpractice suits filed against him and he is not a danger to the public. He confirmed that he is presently undergoing psychiatric counseling as he is obliged pursuant to the Board's final order of October 24, 1977.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I hereby recommend that the Respondent's license to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida be suspended for a period of 5 years. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of May, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675

Florida Laws (7) 120.54120.57120.60777.011893.03893.05893.13
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs LEONARD LEON LYNN, D/B/A FIVE STAR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 92-000593 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jan. 31, 1992 Number: 92-000593 Latest Update: May 24, 1993

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged, in conjunction with the Construction Industry Licensing Board, with the responsibility to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to Chapters 489, 455, and 120, F.S. and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. At all times material to the Administrative Complaints, Respondent, Leonard Leon Lynn, was licensed as a certified residential contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CR C048007, and was registered to do business as Five Star Construction. He was first licensed in 1989. [DOAH Case No. 92-0593] In March, 1990, the Respondent contracted with Andrew Gudzak (Gudzak) to insulate the roof of, install a roof on, and install vinyl windows on Gudzak's screen porch. The contract price was $2,900.00. The Respondent performed the Gudzak job and was paid in full per a $1,000.00 deposit on March 23, 1990 and a $1,900.00 final payment on April 12, 1990. The Respondent stipulated that he failed to obtain the required permit for the Gudzak job in violation of the local building code, with the proviso that he was confused about where the controlling county line was located in relation to Gudzak's residence. The roof the Respondent installed on Gudzak's porch began leaking following completion. Gudzak contacted the Respondent concerning the leakage and improper closure of the windows installed by the Respondent, on approximately thirty-five days from the 25th of April to late August of 1990. The Respondent attempted to correct the leakage and windows numerous times without success. Gudzak retained an attorney who contacted the Respondent by letter on May 22, 1990. The Respondent last attempted to correct the leakage on July 16, 1990. Thereafter, Respondent refused to respond to Gudzak's requests. The leakage was never corrected. The Department of Professional Regulation has accumulated $58.00 in investigation costs, $1,142.00 in legal costs, and $9.00 in current year expenses associated with Case No. 92-0593 as of the date of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order. [DOAH Case No. 92-1494] In September, 1990, the Respondent contracted with Paul Rommel (Rommel) to construct a screened porch, with roof and skylights, on an existing patio. The contract price was $2,950.00. The Respondent substantially performed the Rommel job by September 21, 1990 and was paid in full per checks for $1,180.00 and $1,770.00. The Respondent stipulated that he failed to obtain the required permit for the Rommel job in violation of the local building code. After completion of the Rommel porch, the porch roof began to leak severely, and Rommel contacted the Respondent. The Respondent attempted to correct the leaks on several occasions without success. Eventually, the Respondent quit responding to Rommel's requests to correct the severe leakage. On December 4, 1990, the Respondent received a certified letter from Rommel requesting the Respondent address the problems with the roof. The Respondent did not respond to Rommel's written request. On December 17, 1990, an attorney representing Rommel sent the Respondent a certified letter requesting a refund of the contract amount. The Respondent did not respond thereto, and a judgment was entered against the Respondent on July 30, 1991 for $2,500.00. The Respondent was present at the civil action. As of the date of formal hearing, the Respondent had neither paid the aforementioned judgment nor corrected Rommel's porch. The Department of Professional Regulation has accumulated $134.60 in investigation costs, $1,037.80 in legal costs, $443.26 in current year expenses and $102.00 in prior accumulated costs associated with Case No. 92-1494 as of the date of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a Final Order. That finds Respondent guilty of violating Sections 489.129(1)(n) and 489.129(1)(m) F.S., penalizes Respondent by a fine of $1,000, and assesses $1,200.00 in investigation and prosecution costs in DOAH Case No. 92-0593; That finds Respondent guilty of violating Sections 489.129(1)(n) and 489.129(1)(m) F.S., penalizes Respondent by a fine of $1,000, and assesses $1,172.40 in investigation and prosecution costs in DOAH Case No. 92-1494; and That, in consideration of the cumulative nature of the two cases, revokes Respondent's license. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of February, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 92-0593, 92-1494 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59 (2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF) Petitioner PFOF: 1-8 Accepted (Gudzak, DOAH Case No. 92-0593). 9-16 Accepted (Rommel, DOAH Case No. 92-1494). Respondent PFOF: Respondent has apparently confused the case numbers herein, since he refers to "Rommel" in his submittal numbered 92-0593 and "Gudzak" in his submittal numbered 92-1494. The undersigned has assumed that Respondent intended that the specific name was intended over the DOAH Case No. and has ruled upon the two proposals in that manner. Respondent also failed to number his proposals, so they have been ruled upon by paragraph as indicated. Gudzak proposals Paragraph 1 Rejected as introductory. Paragraphs 2-4 Not proven nor supported by the competent credible record evidence. The remainder is rejected as legal argument only. Rommel proposals Paragraph 1 Rejected as introductory. Next sentence Accepted. Next sentence Not proven or supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Even if proven, would not relieve Respondent of the responsibility to pull the permit. Remainder Rejected as mere legal argument except for the admission that Respondent acquiescence to the agency's affidavit of fees for both cases. That acquiescence has been accepted but modified pursuant to the conclusions of law stated. COPIES FURNISHED: G. W. Harrell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Leonard Leon Lynn 6121 Sundew Court Jacksonville, FL 32244 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Daniel O'Brien Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202

Florida Laws (3) 120.57489.117489.129
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RICHARD CORCORAN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs ERINN MORIARTY, 19-003635PL (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 08, 2019 Number: 19-003635PL Latest Update: Dec. 27, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs RICHARD SPOONER, 99-002737 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jun. 21, 1999 Number: 99-002737 Latest Update: Jan. 18, 2000

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 326.006(2)(e)1, 3, and 6 and 326.005, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this action, Respondent, Richard Spooner (Spooner), was licensed by the Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Department), as a yacht salesperson. In June 1998, Spooner worked for C & S Marine, Inc., (C & S), located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Chris Saumsiegle, the owner of C & S, was Spooner's employing broker. In June 1998, Chris Saumsiegle was working with Angelo Dieguez, a client from South Carolina, to locate a yacht for Mr. Dieguez to purchase. Mr. Saumsiegle negotiated the purchase of a yacht for Mr. Dieguez; however, the deal was not consummated. After Mr. Saumsiegle's attempt to negotiate the purchase of the yacht for Mr. Dieguez failed, Mr. Saumsiegle put Spooner, as a salesperson for C & S, in touch with Mr. Dieguez to find him a yacht to purchase. Spooner and Mr. Dieguez discussed the purchase of a 1995, 33-foot Sea Ray yacht, and Mr. Dieguez became interested in buying the vessel. Mr. Dieguez was advised by Spooner that he was working at home while his wife recovered from surgery. Spooner drafted a Purchase Agreement, which was a C & S form agreement containing the title "C & S Marine Brokerage Purchase Agreement." Spooner crossed out the telephone and fax numbers for C & S on the form, wrote in his home fax number, and faxed the document to Mr. Dieguez for execution. The purchaser agreement contained the following paragraph: The purchase price of the Vessel is Eighty- Seven Thousand Dollars ($87,000.--) Upon signing this agreement by the PURCHASER, a deposit of Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($8,700.--) shall be paid by the PURCHASER to (hereinafter called the BROKER) and shall be held in Escrow by the BROKER. This offer is withdrawn if not accepted by June 12, 1998. Mr. Dieguez executed the purchase agreement and returned it to Spooner by fax for Spooner to make an $87,000 offer on the yacht. The terms of the purchase agreement required Mr. Dieguez to send ten percent of the purchase price as earnest money. Pursuant to the purchase agreement, the seller had only one day to respond to the offer after Mr. Dieguez faxed the purchase agreement to Spooner. Thus, Mr. Dieguez asked Spooner where to electronic funds transfer (EFT) his earnest money. Spooner faxed Mr. Dieguez instructions to make his check out to the Boating Center of Fort Lauderdale (Boating Center), the seller's agent or the seller, and to send the funds to Boating Center. In Mr. Dieguez' previous attempt to purchase a yacht through C & S, he had been given instructions to send his deposit by EFT to C & S's escrow account. Mr. Dieguez contacted Mr. Saumsiegle and asked why he was supposed to send a check to Boating Center. Mr. Saumsiegle was unaware that Spooner was trying to sell Mr. Dieguez a boat through Boating Center and that he had directed Mr. Diequez to send a check to Boating Center. Ultimately, Mr. Dieguez did not send a deposit and did not purchase the yacht. Mr. Saumsiegle terminated Spooner's relationship with C & S Marine in July 1998. Boating Center is not a licensed yacht brokerage.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Richard Spooner violated Subsections 326.006(2)(e)1, 3, and 6, Florida Statutes; suspending his salesperson's license for two years; and imposing an administrative fine of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 William Oglo, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Richard J. Zaden, Esquire Zaden & Wardell, P.A. 1749 Northeast 26th Street, Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33305

Florida Laws (2) 120.57326.005
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. LINDA ABRAHAM, 84-004145 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-004145 Latest Update: Sep. 27, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Respondent, Linda H. Abraham, was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate broker under license number 0323486. During the months of February and March 1983 Martha L. Tew owned a parcel of waterfront property located in Panama City Beach which was identified as being for sale by a sign on the property reflecting her husband's real estate company. Her husband was Ronald Eugene Tew and Mrs. Tew also held a salesman's license. Mr. Tew was contacted by Gregory A. Peaden, a contractor and developer in the Panama City Beach area on several occasions prior to March 1983 with offers to purchase the Tew property. The contacts with Mr. Peaden subsequently culminated in a contract dated March 8, 1983, between Greg Peaden, Inc., and the Tews in the amount of, initially, $180,000.00. During the negotiations for the property, Mr. Peaden had introduced the Respondent to the Tews as his broker. When, at the time of Use contract, Mr. Peaden advised the Tews he wanted Respondent to get a commission for the sale, Mr. Tew refused to pay any commission indicating that Respondent had performed no service for him; that he, Tew, was a broker himself; and that he had no intention of paying any commission to the Respondent or to anyone, for that matter. After some further negotiation, a second contract was prepared and agreed upon wherein the contract price was raised to $189,000.00 and the Respondent's commission was to be paid with the additional money from Mr. Peaden. The contract in question executed by the parties on March 8, 1983, reflected that the sum of $5,000.00 deposit was paid to Linda Abraham, Inc., by check. Mr. Tew contends that at this point he was led to believe that Respondent had the $5,000.00 check and, he contends, he would not have signed the contract if he had known that the check had not been delivered and placed in Respondent's escrow account. The actual signing of the contract took place in Respondent's office, a mobile home which she shared with Mr. Peaden's business. This trailer home was described as having Mr. Peaden's office on one end, and Respondent's on the other, with the living-kitchen area in the middle used as a reception area for both businesses. Mr. Peaden contends that once the contract was signed by the Tews, he gave a check drawn on one of his business accounts, that of Peaden and Guerino, a property management company he owned, to his secretary, Judy White, to deposit in Respondent's escrow account and thereafter promptly forgot about the matter until the date scheduled for closing, two months in the future. Ms. white, on the other hand, contends that Mr. Peaden at no time gave her a check for $5,000.00 to deposit to Respondent's escrow account. It is her contention that when she received the contract after it was signed, she, on her own, inserted the receipt portion on the bottom of the second page and signed as having received it merely to complete the contract. At the time, she contends, she did not know if the deposit was received from Peaden or not. She has never signed a contract like this before without a deposit and cannot give any other reason why she did it on this occasion. She is certain, however, that at no time did Mr. Peaden ever give her a $5,000.00 check or tell her to draw one for his signature on March 8, 1983, or, for that matter, at any time thereafter. What is more, neither Mr. Peaden nor the Respondent, at any time after the signing of the contract and prior to her departure under less than friendly circumstances approximately a week or so later, ever asked her whether she had made the escrow deposit or discussed it with her at all. Ms. white contends that she left Mr. Peaden's employ because he expected her to perform certain functions she was unwilling to do. When she left his employ, she did not feel there was any unfinished business that needed her immediate attention. To the best of her recollection, there were no sales contracts or deposits left in or on her desk - only bills. According to Respondent, the $5,000.00 deposit by Mr. Peaden was to stay in her escrow account. She understood Mr. Peaden was going to arrange with the bank to borrow the entire cash payment called for under the contract, including the deposit, and when that was done, it was her intention to give him back his $5,000.00 check. Under these circumstances, the amount in escrow would never be paid to the sellers but would be returned to Mr. Peaden and the Tews would receive the entire cash amount called for by the contract from the proceeds of the bank loan. Respondent also indicated that this procedure had been followed at least once, in a prior transaction. Under the circumstances, it is clear that no deposit was ever received from Mr. Peaden nor was it placed in Respondent's escrow account. Therefore, the contract, dated on March 8, 1983, was false in that it represented a $5,000.00 deposit had been received. The check for $5,000.00 dated March 8, 1983, payable to Linda Abraham, Inc. and drawn by Mr. Peaden on the Peaden and Guerino account with the stub admitted to show the date of issuance, does not establish that it was written on March 8, 1983, as contended. This check, number 1349, comes after two other checks, 1347 and 1348, which bear dates of April 4 and September 7, 1983 respectively. Mr. Peaden's explanation that the checks were drafted out of sequence is non-persuasive. Of greater probative value is the fact that neither Mr. Peaden nor Respondent bothered to review their bank statements on a regular basis. The check in question was drawn on an account not related to the construction and development business of Greg Peaden, Inc. Further, examination of Respondent's escrow account reflects that there were approximately eleven transactions over a three year period even though, according to her, she handled numerous other closings as well as this. Her explanation is that in most cases the attorney handling the closing served as escrow agent even though she was the sales broker. Her explanation is not credible. This appears to be a classic situation of movement of accounts to satisfy a particular end. The contract called for closing of the sale to be held on or before May 8, 1983, in the office of Panama Title Company. May 8, 1983, fell on a Sunday. As a result, the closing would not have been held that day, but it was not held the following day, Monday, May 9, 1983 either. Mr. Peaden admits that he had not checked with Panama Title prior to May 9 to see if everything was prepared for the closing. Instead, he contacted the title company for the first time at approximately noon on May 9. Apparently he received disquieting information because he thereafter called his attorney, Mr. Hutto, and asked him to check with the title company to see if and when the closing would be held. Mr. Hutto's inquiry reflected that the title insurance binder was ready but the closing statement and the package were not because the title company required a copy of the contract. At this point Mr. Peaden immediately had a copy of the contract delivered to the title company but later that day was advised that the closing still could not be held because of the failure to provide a survey. Mr. Hutto indicates that the reason given was that the release clauses called for in the contract required the survey to be furnished though he did not necessarily agree with that. In any event, closing was not held on May 9. At this time both Mr. Peaden and Respondent allegedly became concerned about the $5,000.00 deposit. Admittedly, neither had concerned themselves with it from the time of the signing of the contract. At this point, Mr. Peaden indicates that he examined his bank records which failed to show the deposit being made and his subsequent search of Ms. White's desk finally revealed the check, undeposited, still there. On May 11, 1983, a $5,000.00 deposit was made to the account on which the deposit check was drawn and on the same day, May 11, 1983 check number 1349, in the amount of $5,000.00 was presented against the account. When on May 10, 1983, Mr. Peaden and Respondent went to Mr. Hutto's office the primary reason for the visit was because Mr. Peaden had heard that the Tews were planning to sell the property in question to someone else at a price much higher than that agreed upon for the sale to Peaden. At this point Mr. Hutto indicated that if Peaden so desired, Hutto could "fix up the contract to jam up the works" until he could do something about it. His examination of the contract revealed that it was not recorded or acknowledged and under the laws of Florida, acknowledgment is required in order for a contract to be recorded. Hutto asked the Respondent if she had seen the parties sign the contract and when she said that she had, he had his secretary prepare a jurat. Unfortunately, his secretary prepared an affidavit type notary jurat rather than an acknowledgment and Hutto quickly admits that he did not look at it when it was given back to him. He says that if he had, he would have had it changed but in any event, without looking at what was given him, he gave it to the Respondent with the implication, at least, that she should notarize it and have the contract recorded. According to Hutto, Peaden, and the Respondent, the sole purpose for notarization and recordation was to preserve the status quo to protect Mr. Peaden's interest in the property so that the matter could be adjudicated in a lawsuit which was soon to be filed. Respondent contends she never intended any misconduct throughout this transaction nor did she do any of the things alleged in the Administrative Complaint. She contends she never saw the check which Mr. Peaden allegedly gave to his secretary for deposit to her escrow account. She merely assumed that it was given and never checked to insure that it had been placed in her account. She does not know why Mr. Peaden did not give her the check. When she took the contract to the Tews, she was operating under the assumption that the check had been received but did not verify this to insure that it had. She contends that since she represented the buyer, her duties were limited to insuring that he performed and this made it simple. She did not check on him because she had had so much experience with him, him being by far her largest account, if he said something, she believed him and when the contract was executed, she merely instructed the secretary, Judy White, to make the file and did not check on it again. As to the recordation and the notarization after the fact, she acted upon the advice of counsel, she states, and did what was suggested to her by Mr. Hutto. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Hutto did not represent her but instead represented Mr. Peaden and while because of her long-standing relationship with him and Mr. Hutto, she may have felt safe in relying on his advice, the fact remains that Hutto was not her attorney.

Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's license as a registered real estate broker in Florida be suspended for six months and that she pay an administrative fine of $2,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur Shell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 John D. O'Brien, Esquire P. O. Box 1218 Panama City, Florida 32402 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 475.25475.42696.01
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JOENATHAN HARRIS, JR. vs. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 84-004096 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-004096 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact On October 12, 1981, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the felony charge of unemployment compensation fraud, adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was placed on probation for one year (Exhibit 2). The probation was terminated by Order Dismissing Warrant entered October 27, 1982 (Exhibit 3). The unemployment compensation fraud resulted from Petitioner's continuing to receive unemployment compensation following his discharge from the armed services after he had obtained full-time employment. The Information charged Petitioner with failure to disclose a material fact, to wit: he reported that he was unemployed while he was in fact working and receiving wages from Pacific Packing Company (Exhibit 2). In Application For Filing for Examination as an Ordinary Life, Including Health, agent dated March 16, 1984, Petitioner, in response to question 11(a) on this application asking if he had ever been charged with a felony, answered, "no." He gave the same answer to question 11(b) which asked if he had ever been convicted of a felony. Petitioner testified that he discussed the completion of this application with a fellow employee of an insurance agency at which he was working; and, since he had, on a earlier application for temporary employment, furnished the information regarding his unemployment compensation fraud conviction to the Department of Insurance, he did not deem it necessary to again report this offense. The fellow employee confirmed that he had discussed this answer with Petitioner and had suggested Petitioner answer the question as he did. Neither petitioner nor this witness satisfactorily answered the Hearing Officer's question how Petitioner could answer no to question 11 and then swear that all answers given on the application are true and correct. Petitioner's minister testified that Petitioner is a deacon in his church and he has found Petitioner to be truthful, honest, and capable of making mistakes and admitting them. As a temporary employee of A. L. Williams Company, a distributor of insurance products, Petitioner was deemed to be truthful, honest, and upright.

Florida Laws (1) 626.621
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. JERALNE C. BURT, 79-001386 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001386 Latest Update: Dec. 13, 1979

Findings Of Fact Jeralne C. Burt is registered with the Florida Board of Real Estate as a salesperson and was so registered at all times here involved. In the fall of 1977, Barbara Rogers came to Respondent's home seeking to purchase residential real estate and was shown several houses by Respondent. One of these houses she agreed to purchase. When asked how she wanted the contract made out, Barbara Rogers said make the contract in the name of Louise Rogers, her sister. The contract to purchase was prepared and given to Barbara Rogers to have executed. When this contract (Exhibit 1) was returned to Respondent it was signed Louise Rogers as the buyer, but the signature was not witnessed. After being assured that Louise had signed the contract to purchase, Respondent signed as a witness to the previously unwitnessed signature of Louise Rogers. At the time this offer was executed by the buyer, Respondent understood that Barbara Rogers was putting up the money for the cash required over the mortgage. Thereafter, Louise Rogers proceeded to the bank where the necessary documents were executed to qualify for an FHA morgage on the property. At the designated closing date Respondent drove to Barbara Rogers' house where Barbara was picked up and they went to the place Louise worked to pick her up. Louise came out to the car and told Respondent that she couldn't get off work and that Barbara could sign the papers for her. When Respondent said she thought Louise should come to the closing to sign, Louise replied that she and her sister signed each other's names all the time and that it was all riht for Barbara to execute the papers. Respondent and Barbara Rogers proceeded to the closing. No one inquired if Barbara Rogers was Louise Rogers, nor was she ever introduced as Louise Rogers. At the closing Barbara Rogers signed Louise Rogers' name on the various documents presented for signature. Due to the house requiring some repairs the closing was kept in escrow for approximately one week to ten days. During this escrow period the mortgage processor at the Barnett Bank, who had processed the application of Louise Rogers, received a phone call from a woman identifying herself as Louise Rogers inquiring when the closing on the house was to take place. When Louise Rogers said she had not executed any papers for the closing the bank officials quickly re-assembled the parties and this time all documents were executed by the real Louise Rogers. Although Respondent realized Louise Rogers should have signed the documents at closing, because of Louise's insistence that Barbara could sign for her and Respondent's previous experience of signing her grandmother's name for her the past two years of her grandmother's life, Respondent assumed the authorization for Barbara to sign Louise's name had been given.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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