Findings Of Fact In August 1986, petitioner was employed as a Detention Care Worker I at the Manatee Regional Juvenile Detention Center. On August 6, 1986, petitioner received a copy of HRS Pamphlet 60-1, entitled "Employee Handbook." The HRS policy concerning absences is set forth in the handbook as follows: If you expect to be absent from work for any reason, you must request leave from your supervisor as much in advance as possible, so that suitable disposition of your work may be made to avoid undue hardship on fellow employees and clients. As soon as you know you will be late or absent from work you must notify your supervisor. Absence without approved leave is cause for disciplinary action. If you are absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned. On May 4, 1987, petitioner received a written reprimand for an absence without authorized leave which occurred on April 9, 1987. Petitioner was reminded that he had to call his immediate supervisor for approved leave prior to the beginning of his shift. On May 4, 1987, petitioner also received an oral reprimand for his excessive absences. By May 28, 1987, petitioner had accumulated 41 hours of leave without pay that were due to absences from work that were not approved in advance. Ms. Clark, petitioner's Shift Supervisor, held a conference with petitioner to discuss the problems he was having. As a result of the discussion with petitioner, Ms. Clark decided to retroactively grant petitioner leave with pay, or annual leave, for all of the hours of absences for which he had annual leave available. After using all of petitioner's accumulated annual leave, petitioner still had eight hours of "short time," which was treated as leave without pay. On May 29, 1987, petitioner was advised by written memorandum from John Simpson, the Assistant Superintendent of the facility, that petitioner had to personally call his shift supervisor for any future leave requested. He was also advised that such request might not be approved and that he should be prepared to report to his assigned shift. On June 12, 1987, petitioner did not go to work. He did not request leave, but his wife called to say that he would not be at work. The Manatee Juvenile Detention Center is a secured facility. Detention care workers must be present at the facility at all times and work in shifts. Due to the nature of the work, it is vital that a detention care worker notify his supervisor in advance of any proposed absence so that arrangements can be made for a substitute to take his shift. Petitioner appeared for work as scheduled at 11:00 p.m. on June 18, 1987, and worked until 7:00 a.m., June 19, 1987. He was scheduled to work again at 11:00 p.m. on June 19, 1987. He did not call, and he did not report for work. He also was scheduled to work the night of June 20th. At about 6:00 p.m. on June 20, he stopped by the facility to say that his wife was having a baby. He did not report to work that night. On June 21, petitioner called Ms. Clark at home at about 9:50 p.m. He said that he was at the hospital with his wife and baby. He indicated that his wife and baby were fine, although the baby was about five weeks premature. Petitioner testified that he asked Ms. Clark for five days off and that Ms. Clark agreed. Ms. Clark testified that petitioner asked that he be given leave for the night of June 21. Since petitioner did not have annual leave accumulated, the leave had to be without pay. A shift supervisor is not authorized to grant over one day of leave without pay. Ms. Clark was a credible witness, she clearly recalled the conversation she had with the petitioner, and her testimony is accepted. It is therefore found that petitioner was granted leave for the shift beginning at 11:00 p.m. on June 21 and ending at 7:00 a.m. on June 22, 1987. No additional leave was authorized. Petitioner was scheduled to work the shift beginning at 11:00 p.m. on June 22, 1987. He did not appear for work and did not call. Petitioner was not scheduled to work the nights of June 23 or June 24, 1987. On Thursday, June 25, 1987, petitioner was scheduled to work the 11:00 p.m. shift. He did not call and did not report to work. On Friday night, June 26, 1987, petitioner was scheduled to work. He did not call and did not report to work. On June 27, at about 5:30 p.m., petitioner called Ms. Clark to inform her that he was returning to work. Ms. Clark told petitioner that he needed to talk to Mr. Simpson. Mr. Simpson went to the facility to meet with petitioner. Petitioner did not report to work. On June 28, 1987, petitioner went to work. He was told that he had to see Mr. Simpson. Mr. Simpson gave petitioner the termination letter which advised petitioner that he had been absent from work on June 22, 25 and 26, 1987, without authorization, and that he was deemed to have resigned from his position as Detention Care Worker I effective 7:00 a.m. on June 27, 1987.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered sustaining the action of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and finding that Calvin Sloan abandoned his position as Detention Care Worker I and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Calvin Sloan 1207-25th Street East Palmetto, Florida 33561 Frederick Wilk, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District VI 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Room 520 Tampa, Florida 33614 Adis M. Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Pamela Miles, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 R. S. Power, Esquire Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in these consolidated cases is whether the Department of Juvenile Justice (the "Department") assessed Petitioners and Intervenor counties for secure juvenile detention care for fiscal year 2008-2009 in a manner consistent with the provisions of section 985.686, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 63G-1.001 through 63G-1.009.1/
Findings Of Fact Parties The Department is the state agency responsible for administering the cost-sharing requirements of section 985.686, Florida Statutes, regarding secure detention care provided for juveniles. With the exception of Intervenor Florida Association of Counties, Inc., the Petitioners and Intervenors (collectively referenced herein as the "Counties") are political subdivisions of the State of Florida. The specific counties that have petitioned or intervened in these proceedings are not "fiscally constrained" as that term is defined in section 985.686(2)(b), Florida Statutes. Each county is required by section 985.686 to contribute its actual costs for predisposition secure detention services for juveniles within its jurisdiction. The Counties are substantially affected by the Department's determinations of the number of secure detention days that are predisposition, and by the Department's allocation of those days among the Counties, an allocation that further determines each county's share of the cost for pre-disposition secure detention. The Counties are further substantially affected by the allocation method itself, which they assert is not authorized by section 985.686. Statutory and rule framework Section 985.686(1), Florida Statutes, provides that the "state and counties have a joint obligation, as provided in this section, to contribute to the financial support of the detention care provided for juveniles." Section 985.686(2)(a), defines "detention care," for purposes of this section, to mean "secure detention."2/ Section 985.03(18)(a), defines "secure detention" to mean "temporary custody of the child while the child is under the physical restriction of a detention center or facility pending adjudication, disposition, or placement." Section 985.686(3), provides in relevant part that each county "shall pay the costs of providing detention care . . . for juveniles for the period of time prior to final court disposition. The department shall develop an accounts payable system to allocate costs that are payable by the counties." In summary, section 985.686 requires each non-fiscally restrained county to pay the costs associated with secure detention during predisposition care, and the Department to pay the costs of secure detention during post-disposition care.3/ The Department is charged with developing an accounts payable system to allocate costs payable by the counties. Section 985.686(5), sets forth the general mechanism for this allocation process: Each county shall incorporate into its annual county budget sufficient funds to pay its costs of detention care for juveniles who reside in that county for the period of time prior to final court disposition. This amount shall be based upon the prior use of secure detention for juveniles who are residents of that county, as calculated by the department. Each county shall pay the estimated costs at the beginning of each month. Any difference between the estimated costs and actual costs4/ shall be reconciled at the end of the state fiscal year. Section 985.686(10), provides that the Department "may adopt rules to administer this section." Pursuant to this grant of authority, the Department promulgated Florida Administrative Code Rules 63G-1.001 through 63G-1.009, effective July 16, 2006. Rule 63G-1.004 provides the detailed method by which the Department is to calculate the counties' estimated costs: Each county's share of predisposition detention costs is based upon usage during the previous fiscal year, with the first year's estimates based upon usage during fiscal year 2004-05. Estimates will be calculated as follows: All youth served in secure detention during the relevant fiscal year as reflected in the Juvenile Justice Information System will be identified; Each placement record will be matched to the appropriate referral based upon the referral identification code. Placements associated with administrative handling, such as pick-up orders and violations of probation, will be matched to a disposition date for their corresponding statutory charge; The number of service days in secure detention is computed by including all days up to and including the date of final disposition for the subject referral. Each county will receive a percentage computed by dividing the number of days used during the previous year by the total number of days used by all counties. The resulting percentage, when multiplied by the cost of detention care as fixed by the legislature, constitutes the county's estimated annual cost. The estimated cost will be billed to the counties in monthly installments. Invoices are to be mailed on the first day of the month prior to the service period, so that an invoice for the August service period will be mailed on July 1. Rule 63G-1.008 provides the method by which the Department is to reconcile the estimated payments with the actual costs of predisposition secure detention: On or before January 31 of each year, the Department shall provide a reconciliation statement to each paying county. The statement shall reflect the difference between the estimated costs paid by the county during the past fiscal year and the actual cost of the county's usage during that period. If a county's actual usage is found to have exceeded the amount paid during the fiscal year, the county will be invoiced for the excess usage. The invoice will accompany the reconciliation statement, and shall be payable on or before April 1. If a county's actual usage was less than the estimated amounts paid during the fiscal year, the county will be credited for its excess payments. Credit will be reflected in the April billing, which is mailed on March 1, and will carry forward as necessary. Under the quoted rules, the Department determines an estimate for each county's share of predisposition secure detention costs. This estimate is provided to the counties prior to the start of the fiscal year in order to allow each county to "incorporate into its annual county budget sufficient funds" to pay for the costs of predisposition secure detention care for juveniles who reside in that county. To prepare this estimate, the Department utilizes the county's actual usage of secure detention facilities for the most recently completed fiscal year.5/ The amount of this usage is shown as that county's percentage of the total usage of predisposition secure detention care by all counties. The resulting percentage for each county is then multiplied by the "cost of detention care as fixed by the legislature" to arrive at the estimated amount due for each county. Rule 63G-1.002(1) defines "cost of detention care" as "the cost of providing detention care as determined by the General Appropriations Act." The term "cost of detention care" is used in rule 63G- 1.004, which sets forth the method of calculating estimnated costs. The term is not used in rule 63G-1.008, which addresses the annual reconcilation by which the Department purports to arrive at the "actual cost of the county's usage" for the fiscal year. The definition of "cost of detention care" references the Legislature's annual General Appropriations Act, which appropriates revenues for the operation of various state functions. An "appropriation" is "a legal authorization to make expenditures for specific purposes within the amounts authorized by law." § 216.011(1)(b), Fla. Stat. The General Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2008-2009 was House Bill 5001, codified as chapter 2008-152, Laws of Florida. Within chapter 2008-152, Specific Appropriations 1073 through 1083 set forth the appropriations for the juvenile detention program. These items included the cost of operating the secure detention centers and identified specific funding sources for the program. These funding sources were the General Revenue Fund ("General Revenue"), the Federal Grants Trust Fund, the Grants and Donations Trust Fund, and an amount identified under the Shared County/State Juvenile Detention Trust Fund ("Shared Trust Fund"). Section 985.6015(2), states that the Shared Trust Fund "is established for use as a depository for funds to be used for the costs of predisposition juvenile detention. Moneys credited to the trust fund shall consist of funds from the counties' share of the costs for predisposition juvenile detention." A total of $30,310,534 was appropriated from General Revenue to the Department for the operation of secure detention centers. This amount was intended to cover the Department's costs in providing post-disposition secure detention services, including the state's payment of the costs for detention care in fiscally constrained counties. See § 985.686(2)(b) & (4), Fla. Stat. A total of $99,583,854 was set forth as the appropriation for the Shared Trust Fund. This amount was not an "appropriation" as that term is defined by statute because it did not authorize a state agency to make expenditures for specific purposes. Rather, this number constituted the amount to be used in the preparation of the preliminary estimates that the Department provides to the counties for the purpose of budgeting their anticipated contributions toward the secure detention costs for the upcoming fiscal year. As will be discussed at length below, a refined version of this number was also improperly used by the Department as a substitute for calculating the counties' actual cost at the time of the annual reconciliation described in rule 63G-1.008. As set forth in rule 63G-1.004, the Department determines the estimate, then it notifies the counties of the estimated amount. The counties make their payments in monthly installments. Rule 63G-1.007 requires the Department to prepare a quarterly report for each county setting forth the extent of each county's actual usage. The counties receive their reports 45 days after the end of each quarter. Subsection (1) of the rule provides that the quarterly report "is to assist counties in fiscal planning and budgeting, and is not a substitute for the annual reconciliation or grounds for adjusting or withholding payment." At the end of the fiscal year, and no later than January 31, the Department must prepare an annual reconciliation statement for each county, to reconcile the difference, if any, between the estimated costs paid monthly by the county and the actual cost of the county's usage during that period. If the county's actual cost is more or less than the estimated payments made during the fiscal year, the county will be credited or debited for the difference. Fla. Admin. Code R. 63G-1.008. Because a county is billed prior to the start of the fiscal year, the Department's initial estimate obviously cannot be based on actual costs for that fiscal year. However, the amount ultimately owed by each county following the annual reconciliation should assess the county's actual costs for predisposition secure detention care during that year, in accordance with section 985.686(5). Prior DOAH litigation The Department's manner of assessing the counties for predisposition secured detention services has been the subject of five prior DOAH cases, all of them involving Hillsborough County. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Dep't of Juv. Just., Case No. 07- 4398 (Fla. DOAH Mar. 7, 2008; Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just. June 4, 2008)("Hillsborough I") dealt with the methodology used by the Department to determine the amount that Hillsborough County owed for predisposition secure detention services for fiscal year 2007-2008. Administrative Law Judge Daniel Manry found that the Department's practice of calculating a per diem rate for service days in secure detention was inconsistent with the Department's rule 63G-1.004(2). Instead of limiting Hillsborough County's contribution to a percentage of the amount "appropriated"6/ by the Legislature to the Shared Trust Fund, the Department was including its own General Revenue appropriation in the calculation, which inflated the county's assessment. Hillsborough I at ¶ 24. Judge Manry's findings led the Department to conclude, in its Final Order, that the calculation of a "per diem" rate for the counties should be abandoned as inconsistent with rule 63G-1.004. In a companion case to Hillsborough I, Hillsborough Cnty. v. Dep't of Juv. Just., Case No. 07-4432 (Fla. DOAH Mar. 10, 2008; Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just. June 4, 2008)("Hillsborough II"), Judge Manry dealt with Hillsborough County's challenge to the Department's determination of utilization days allocated to the county for predisposition care. In this case, Judge Manry found that the Department had failed to comply with the requirements of section 985.686(6), which provides: Each county shall pay to the department for deposit into the Shared County/State Juvenile Detention Trust Fund its share of the county's total costs for juvenile detention, based upon calculations published by the department with input from the counties. (Emphasis added). The Department had allocated 47,714 predisposition utilization days to Hillsborough County, which was reduced to 47,214 after the reconciliation process. The county argued that the correct number of predisposition days was 31,008. The Department identified 16,206 challenged days under nine categories: contempt of court; detention orders; interstate compacts; pick up orders; prosecution previously deferred; transfer from another county awaiting commitment beds; violation of after care; violation of community control; and violation of probation. Hillsborough II, ¶¶ 25-27. Judge Manry found that the Department had allowed input from the counties during the rulemaking workshops for chapter 63G-1, but had "thwarted virtually any input from the County during the annual processes of calculating assessments and reconciliation." Id. at ¶ 28. The data provided by the Department to the county each year did not include final disposition dates, making it virtually impossible for the county to audit or challenge the Department's assessments. Judge Manry also found that the absence of disposition dates deprived the trier-of-fact of a basis for resolving the dispute over the nine categories of utilization days that the Department had categorized as "predisposition." Id. at ¶ 30. Judge Manry rejected the Department's contention that the county's allegation of misclassification was a challenge to agency policy. He found that the issue of the correct disposition date was a disputed issue of fact not infused with agency policy or expertise that could be determined through conventional means of proof, including public records. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32. The Department failed to explicate "any intelligible standards that guide the exercise of agency discretion in classifying the nine challenged categories of utilization days as predisposition days." Id. at ¶ 34. Judge Manry made the following findings of significance to the instant proceeding: The trier-of-fact construes the reference to placement in Subsection 985.03(18)(a) to mean residential placement. Secure detention includes custody in a detention center for both predisposition and post-disposition care. Predisposition care occurs prior to adjudication or final disposition. Post-disposition care occurs after adjudication or disposition but prior to residential placement. Post-disposition care also includes custody in a detention center after final disposition but prior to release. Although this type of post-disposition care comprises a small proportion of total post-disposition care, references to post-disposition care in this Recommended Order include care after final disposition for: juveniles waiting for residential placement and juveniles waiting for release. (Emphasis added). Judge Manry found that "secure detention after final disposition, but before residential placement for the charge adjudicated, is post-dispositional care." Id. at ¶ 36. He recommended that the Department enter a final order assessing the county for the costs of predisposition care within the county "in accordance with this Recommended Order and meaningful input from the County." The Department adopted Judge Manry's recommendation. In Hillsborough Cnty. v. Dep't of Juv. Just., Case No. 09-1396 (Fla. DOAH June 30, 2009; Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just. Sept. 17, 2009) ("Hillsborough III"), the dispute between Hillsborough County and the Department centered on 9,258 detention days that the Department had assigned to the county for which no disposition dates were available. Hillsborough III at ¶ 2. The Department took the position that it could identify disposition dates for all juveniles who had been transferred to its care and supervision, and that the "no date" cases indicated that those juveniles had not been transferred to the Department and were therefore the responsibility of the county. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. Hillsborough County contended that any court order in a juvenile detention case is a dispositional order, after which the Department becomes responsible for the expenses related to retaining the juvenile. Id. at ¶ 5. Administrative Law Judge William F. Quattlebaum found that neither section 985.686 nor previous Final Orders suggest that fiscal responsibility for a juvenile is transferred to the Department upon the issuance of any court order. Id. at ¶ 6. He concluded that it is . . . reasonable to presume that the [Department] would have disposition information about juveniles who had been committed to [its] custody, and it is likewise reasonable to believe that, absent such information, the juveniles were not committed to the [Department's] custody. The [Department] has no responsibility for the expenses of detention related to juveniles who were not committed to the [Department]'s care and supervision. Id. at ¶ 13. However, the evidence also indicated that in some of the "no date" cases, the Department's records identified addresses of record that were facilities wherein the Department maintained offices. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. Judge Quattlebaum recommended that the Department amend the annual reconciliation to give the Department responsibility for the disputed cases which lacked disposition dates but included Department addresses, and to give Hillsborough County responsibility for those cases with no disposition dates and no Department addresses. In its Final Order, the Department accepted the recommendation to the extent that cases lacking disposition dates were properly assigned to Hillsborough County. However, the Department concluded that "there is no legal authority to assign responsibility for detention stays based upon proximity to a Department office location," and therefore declined to amend the annual reconciliation as recommended by Judge Quattlebaum. In Hillsborough Cnty. v. Dep't of Juv. Just., Case No. 09-4340 (Fla. DOAH Dec. 18, 2009; Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just. Jan. 20, 2010) ("Hillsborough IV"), the issue was the Department's authority to issue multiple annual reconciliations. On January 30, 2009, the Department issued an annual reconciliation to Hillsborough County along with an invoice for a sizable credit due the county for having made estimated payments in excess of its actual costs for fiscal year 2007- 2008. The county did not object to this reconciliation statement. Hillsborough IV at ¶ 8. On February 24, 2009, the Department issued a second annual reconciliation that increased the county's assigned predisposition days and decreased the county's credit. Id. at ¶ 9. On March 18, 2009, the county sent a letter to the Department requesting clarification as to the two annual reconciliations. The Department did not respond to the letter. Id. at ¶ 10. On May 1, 2009, the county sent a second letter to the Department disputing a portion of the assigned utilization days. The Department did not respond to the letter. However, on May 14, 2009, the Department issued a third annual reconciliation to the county that again increased its assigned predisposition days and reduced its credit. Id. at ¶ 11. On June 4, 2009, the Department issued a fourth annual reconciliation. This reconciliation decreased the county's assigned predisposition days but nonetheless again reduced the county's credit. Id. at ¶ 12. On July 17, 2009, the Department finally responded to the county's May 1, 2009, letter by advising the county to file an administrative challenge to the allocation of predisposition days. Id. at ¶ 13. With these facts before him, Judge Quattlebaum reviewed section 985.686 and the Department's rules and then arrived at the following conclusions: There is no authority in either statute or rule that provides the [Department] with the authority to issue multiple annual reconciliation statements to a county. The [Department] is required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 63G-1.008 to issue an annual reconciliation statement on or before January 31 of each year. The rule clearly requires that March bills (payable in April) reflect any excess payment credit due to a county and that any additional assessment related to excess usage must be paid by a county on or before the following April 1. Absent any evidence to the contrary, the annual reconciliation statement issued pursuant to the rule is final unless successfully challenged in an administrative proceeding.... * * * 28. At the hearing, the parties suggested that the issuance of multiple annual reconciliation statements is the result of the resolution of objections filed by counties in response to the annual reconciliation statement. The resolution of such objections can result in additional costs allocated to another county. There was no evidence that counties potentially affected by resolution of another county's objections receive any notice of the objections or the potential resolution. The county whose allocated costs increase through the resolution of another county's objections apparently receives no notice until the [Department] issues another annual reconciliation statement for the same fiscal period as a previous reconciliation statement. * * * 30. Perhaps the most efficient resolution of the situation would be for the [Department] to require, as set forth at Section 120.569, Florida Statutes (2009), that protests to quarterly reports and annual reconciliations be filed with the agency. Such protests could be forwarded, where appropriate, to DOAH. Related protests could be consolidated pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.108. Where the resolution of the proceedings could affect the interests of a county not a party to the proceeding, the county could be provided an opportunity to participate in the proceeding (and be precluded from later objection) pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.109. As is apparent from the lengthy inset quotation, Hillsborough IV touched upon the subject of the Department's "tethering" of the counties, explained at Findings of Fact 50- 53, infra, though the validity of the practice was not directly at issue. Judge Quattlebaum addressed the due process concerns in counties' having no notice of administrative proceedings that could result in the allocation of additional costs to those counties, but did not address the underlying issue of the Department's authority to reallocate costs in the manner described. Judge Quattlebaum recommended that the Department issue a Final Order adopting the January 30, 2009, annual reconciliation for fiscal year 2007-2008. The Department adopted the recommendation and directed that "all successive reconciliations for that fiscal year shall be disregarded and expunged." In Hillsborough Cnty. v. Dep't of Juv. Just., Case No. 09-3546 (Fla. DOAH Feb. 26, 2010; Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just. Mar. 23, 2010) ("Hillsborough V"), the main issue was Hillsborough County's contention that the Department had unilaterally and without authority increased the counties' per diem rate for detention care. The undersigned found that the Department had abandoned the calculation of a per diem rate in light of the findings in Hillsborough I, and that the increased "per diem" rate alleged by the county was simply the result of the Department's recalculation of the counties' estimated costs in accordance with its own rule.7/ Fiscal year 2008-2009 assessments and reconciliation By letter dated June 3, 2008, the Department issued its calculation of the amounts due from each county for their estimated share of the predispositional detention costs for fiscal year 2008-2009, which would run from July 1, 2008, through June 30, 2009. As noted at Finding of Fact 19, supra, the predispositional budget was estimated at $99,583,854. The estimate was based on county utilization during the most recently completed fiscal year, 2006-2007, and the amount identified in the chapter 2008-152, Laws of Florida. The Department made the following estimates for the Counties' shares of predispositional days and costs: Days Percentage of Days Estimated Cost Miami-Dade 47,450 8.56% $8,522,140 Santa Rosa 5,213 0.94% $936,268 Alachua 10,957 1.98% $1,967,905 Orange 43,330 7.81% $7,782,177 Pinellas 32,627 5.88% $5,859,892 Escambia 15,044 2.71% $2,701,940 Hernando 2,978 0.54% $534,856 Broward 38,490 6.94% $6,912,901 City of Jacksonville8/ 28,957 5.22% $5,200,750 Bay 5,409 0.98% $971,470 Brevard 13,760 2.48% $2,471,331 Seminole 12,857 2.32% $2,309,150 Okaloosa 4,612 0.83% $828,327 Hillsborough 44,577 8.04% $8,006,142 43. The Counties incorporated the Department's estimate into their budgets and made monthly payments to the Department. By letter dated December 7, 2009, the Department issued its annual reconciliation for fiscal year 2008-2009. As noted above, the purpose of the annual reconcilation is to "reflect the difference between the estimated costs paid by the county during the past fiscal year and the actual cost of the county's usage during that period." The annual reconcilation set forth the following as the "Actual Predispositional Days" and the "Share of Trust Fund Expenditures" for the Counties, along with the "Difference Debit/(Credit)" between the estimated sums already paid by the Counties and the amount set forth in the annual reconciliation. Those amounts were as Days follows: Percentage of Days Share of Trust Fund Miami-Dade 38,925 11.45% $10,926,117 Santa Rosa 2,555 0.75% $717,180 Alachua 5,511 1.62% $1,546,919 Orange 25,286 7.44% $7,097,695 Pinellas 19,218 5.65% $5,394,428 Escambia 6,734 1.98% $1,890,211 Hernando 1,383 0.41% $388,203 Broward 31,339 9.22% $8,796,752 City of Jacksonville 21,246 6.25% $5,963,681 Bay 3,824 1.13% $1,073,384 Brevard 10,598 3.12% $2,974,823 Seminole 8,944 2.63% $2,510,551 Okaloosa 3,613 1.06% $1,014,157 Hillsborough 27,120 7.98% $7,612,493 The Department's letter advised the counties as follows, in relevant part: . . . Any counties that have a debit amount owed will find enclosed with this correspondence an invoice for that amount. This amount is due by March 1, 2010. A credit amount . . . means the county overpaid based on their utilization and a credit invoice is enclosed with this correspondence. (If the credit amount is larger than the amount currently being paid by the county, the credit will be applied to future invoices until the credit is applied in total.) It is critical that all credits be taken prior to June 30, 2010. . . . (emphasis added). In comparing the estimated costs with the "Share of Trust Fund Expenditures," an untutored observer might expect a correlation between the absolute number of predisposition days and the money assessed by the Department. However, it is apparent that no such correlation was present in the Department's calculations. Dade County, for example, had 8,525 fewer actual predisposition days than the Department estimated at the outset of fiscal year 2008-2009, yet was assessed $2,403,976.89 in the annual reconciliation over and above the $8,522,140 in estimated payments that the county had already made over the course of the year. (For all 67 counties, the Department had estimated 538,836 predispositional days for the fiscal year. The actual number of predispositional days was 339,885.) The correlation, rather, was between a county's percentage of the total number of predispositional days and the money assessed. Though its actual number of days was less than estimated, Dade County's percentage of predispositional days was 2.89% higher than its estmated percentage. Therefore, the Department presented Dade County with an annual reconcilation assessment of $2.4 million. The correlation between percentage of days and the final assessment was caused by the Department's practice of treating the Shared Trust Fund appropriation of $95,404,5799/ as an amount that the Department was mandated to raise from the counties regardless of whether the counties' actual predisposition days bore any relation to the estimate made before the start of the fiscal year. At the final hearing, the Department's representatives made it clear that the Department believed that the Legislature required it to collect the full Shared Trust Fund appropriation from the counties. Reductions in actual usage by the counties would have no bearing on the amount of money to be collected by the Department. The Department views its duty as allocating costs among the counties, the "actual cost" being the Legislature's appropriation to the Shared Trust Fund. Beth Davis, the Department's Director of the Office of Program Accountability, testified that if all the counties together only had one predispositional secure detention day for the entire year, that day would cost the county in question $95 million.10/ In practice, the Department treated the Shared Trust Fund "appropriation" as an account payable by the counties. In this view, the appropriation is the Department's mandate for collecting the stated amount from the counties by the end of fiscal year 2008-2009, even while acknowledging that the Shared Trust Fund number in the General Appropriations Act was no more than an estimate based on the actual usage for the most recently completed fiscal year, which in this case was 2006-2007. Because the Department felt itself bound to collect from the counties the full amount of the Shared Trust Fund appropriation, any adjustment to one county's assessment would necessarily affect the assessments for some or all of the other counties. A downward adjustment in Orange County's assessment would not effect a reduction in the absolute number of dollars collected by the Department but would shift Orange County's reduced burden proportionally onto other counties. The Department has "tethered" the counties together with the collective responsibility to pay $95,404,579 for fiscal year 2008-2009. Richard Herring is an attorney and longtime legislative employee, including 16 years as a deputy staff director to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and was accepted as an expert in the appropriations process. Mr. Herring was knowledgeable and persuasive as to the appropriations process and the circumstances surrounding the passage of the legislation at issue in this proceeding. Mr. Herring testified as to a "disconnect" in the way the Department treats the Shared Trust Fund program. The Shared Trust Fund appropriation is not an amount of money; rather, it is an authorization to spend money from that trust fund. Mr. Herring found that the Department mistakenly "treats appropriations almost as though it were a revenue-raising requirement." Mr. Herring could not think of any other example in which a state legislative appropriation mandates that another governmental entity such a county spend its own funds.11/ The Department allocates 100% of the Shared Trust Fund appropriation to the counties and collects that amount, even though section 985.686(5) limits the Department's collections to "actual costs." Mr. Herring clearly and correctly opined that the Appropriations Act cannot amend a substantive law on any subject other than appropriations. Therefore, the Department cannot rely on the appropriation made in chapter 2008-152, Laws of Florida, as authority for substituting the appropriated amount for the "actual costs" that the substantive statutory provision allows the Department to collect. Mr. Herring found that it is "a huge stretch to say an appropriation means that I will, no matter what, collect that amount of money." He concluded: [O]ther than this program, I'm not aware of any place in the budget where somebody takes an appropriated amount, where it's not another State agency involved, and tries to true up at the end of the year to make sure that every penny of that . . . authorization to expend, that the cash has come in to match the authorization. * * * Again, an appropriation is not an authorization to levy taxes, fees, fines. It's not an authorization to raise revenues, to collect revenues. It may provide, where there are double budgets between two agencies or within an agency, it may be authority to move money from one pot within the State treasury . . . to another. But to go out and extract money from someone who's not a State agency, who's not subject to receiving appropriation, I don't know any place else that we do that. And I can't come up with another example. Fiscal year 2008-2009 challenges In a letter to the counties dated January 26, 2010, Ms. Davis wrote as follows, in relevant part: I am writing this letter to ensure everyone understands the proper procedure for handling any challenges to the annual reconciliation data sent to you in December 2009 for FY 2008-09 and any future year's reconciliation. As a result of the State of Florida, division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) challenge in case no. 09-4340 between Hillsborough County (Petitioner) and the Department of Juvenile Justice (Respondent), the reconciliation completed for FY 2008-09 is considered "final" and adjustments can only be made to the reconciliation using the following steps. Counties have 21 days from receipt of the reconciliation to file their challenges to the reconciliation with the Department. The Department will review the challenges and determine if any adjustments need to be made and which counties will be affected by those potential changes. All affected counties will be notified of the potential adjustments even if those counties did not submit a challenge. If challenges to the reconciliation cannot be resolved with the concurrence of all affected counties, the Department will file a request for a hearing with DOAH. Affected counties will be able to present their case regarding the adjustments at the hearing. . . . Florida Administrative Code Rule 63G-1.009 set forth the Department's dispute resolution process. It provided that the quarterly report "marks the point at which a county may take issue with the charges referenced in the report," but that such an objection was not a basis for withholding payment. All adjustments based on a county's objections to quarterly reports would be made in the annual reconciliation. Fla. Admin. Code R. 63G-1.009(1). Though the rule was silent as to counties' ability to file challenges or disputes to the annual reconciliation, the Department interpreted the rule as allowing such challenges. Twelve counties, Pasco, Sarasota, Brevard, Lee, Polk, Broward, Santa Rosa, Pinellas, St. Johns, Hillsborough, Hernando, and Miami-Dade, filed disputes using the form prescribed by the Department, providing specific reference to the disputed charges and setting forth specific charges for the Department to reconsider. The remaining counties did not file challenges to the annual reconciliation. At least some of these counties, including Orange, Alachua and Escambia, had already accepted their overpayment credit in the manner required by the Department's December 7, 2009 letter. See Finding of Fact 46, supra. The record contains letters that Ms. Davis sent to Broward, Hernando, Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Santa Rosa Counties on different dates in January and February 2010, but containing substantially the same text. The letter sent to the deputy director of Broward County's human resources department, dated February 19, 2010, is representative: The Department has received challenges to the 2008-2009 reconciliation from 12 counties, including your challenge. In keeping with the Final Order from DOAH case no. 09-4340 [Hillsborough IV] the Department is evaluating all of the challenged assessments. If the Department determines there are any adjustments that need to be made, we will attempt to reach agreement with all of the counties affected by the changes. However, if we cannot reach agreement, the Department will combine all of the challenges and request an administrative hearing from the DOAH at which all of the issues can be resolved. Because of the number of challenges involved, and time constraints in working on next year's budget, we anticipate the review process taking about 30 days. This time period exceeds the general requirement for referring challenges to DOAH for those counties that have requested an administrative review. We are asking that the counties seeking administrative review will allow the Department additional time. If after the review it is necessary to proceed with an administrative hearing, we will notify all potentially affected counties so that one final resolution can be reached in a timely manner. The Department reviewed the disputes filed by eleven of the twelve counties. In reviewing the disputes, the Department looked only at challenges to specific cases and did not consider broader policy disputes raised by the counties. Ms. Davis testified that Miami-Dade's dispute was not reviewed because Miami-Dade failed to include specific individual records. Ms. Davis stated that Miami-Dade was making a conceptual challenge not contemplated by rule 63G-1.009. Barbara Campbell, the Department's data integrity officer, testified that she reviewed every record that was disputed by a county. Ms. Campbell stated that her review for Hillsborough County alone took about a month. Hillsborough County disputed 50,528 days in 6,963 entries for the following reasons: adults in juvenile status (493 days), charges not disposed (22,495 days), invalid disposition end date (5 days), non-adjudicatory charges (2,987 days), extended period of detention (763 days), invalid zip code (352 days), invalid address (63 days), out of county (88 days), institutional address (1,560 days), escape after disposition (78 days), guardian (21,552 days), transfer after adjudication (45 days), no criminal charge (13 days), and duplicated entry (34 days). Ms. Campbell concluded that Hillsborough County should remain responsible for 45,873 of the rejected 50,528 days. Despite Ms. Campbell's conclusion, the annual reconciliation assessed Hillsborough County for only 27,120 days. This discrepancy was not explained at the hearing. Ms. Campbell testified that one of the corrections she made for Hillsborough County related to the waiting list for placement of juveniles in committed status. At that time, the waiting list was used to determine the commitment date for billing purposes, but Ms. Campbell found that the list contained commitment dates that were several days after the actual commitment dates. This error resulted in a substantial number of extra days being billed to Hillsborough County.12/ Ms. Campbell testified that this sizable error as to Hillsborough County did not prompt a review of the records of all counties to determine if the error was across the board. The Department lacked the time and manpower to perform such a review for all counties. The Department was already stretched thin in reviewing the specific challenges made by the counties. In a letter to the counties dated March 23, 2010, Ms. Davis wrote as follows, in pertinent part: The Department has concluded it [sic] analysis of challenges submitted by counties for the 2008-09 final reconciliation for detention utilization. A total of twelve counties submitted challenges. After reviewing all the data, resulting adjustments affect a total of 45 counties, ten of which are fiscally constrained. Enclosed with this letter is a document outlining the specifics regarding adjustments as they pertain to your county. For counties that filed a challenge with the Department, each type of dispute category is addressed. Counties subsequently affected by the original twelve counties' challenges are impacted by either address corrections and/or as a result of their percentage of the total utilization being changed by adjustments made. An adjustment to a county's percentage of utilization occurs when days challenged are subsequently found to be the responsibility of the State or another county. Changes made based on address corrections are listed on the enclosed disc, if applicable to your county. Each county is asked to review the adjustments and respond back to the Department indicating agreement or disagreement with the findings. If a county has issue with the proposed adjustments they will need to file a petition with the Department to initiate proceedings with the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to 28-106-201 [sic] Florida Administrative Code. For the few counties that have already filed a petition with the Department, still complete the attached form and return to the Department but an additional petition is not required. Responses from the counties must be postmarked by April 9, 2010. . . . Ms. Davis' March 23, 2010, letter was the first notice given to non-disputing counties by the Department that twelve counties had filed disputes to the annual reconciliation. Thus, counties that believed they had closed their ledgers on fiscal year 2008-2009 were forced to reopen their books to deal with the Department's "adjustments" to the amounts of their final annual reconciliations. Attached to the letter was a spreadsheet containing the "08-09 Pending Challenge Adjustments" containing the following information for the Counties: Adjusted Adjusted Days Percentage Share of Trust Fund Miami-Dade 38,944 11.77% $11,229,123 Santa Rosa 1,980 0.60% $570,914 Alachua 5,581 1.67% $1,589,043 Orange 27,048 8.17% $7,799,027 Pinellas 15,523 4.69% $4,475,906 Escambia 6,734 2.04% $1,941,683 Hernando 1,327 0.40% $382,628 Broward 31,231 9.44% $9,005,154 City of Jacksonville 21,300 6.44% $6,141,647 Bay 3,830 1.16% $1,104,343 Brevard 8,816 2.66% $2,542,008 Seminole 8,965 2.71% $2,584,970 Okaloosa 3,613 1.09% $1,041,773 Hillsborough 22,465 6.79% $6,477,564 72. In addition to making adjustments to the accounts of the challenging counties, the Department modified the amounts set forth in the annual reconciliation for all 38 non-fiscally constrained counties.13/ A total of 9,010 days were reclassified as post-dispositional and therefore shifted from the counties' to the Department's side of the ledger. This shift did nothing to lessen the overall burden on the counties in terms of absolute dollars because the overall amount the Department intended to collect remained $95,404,579. Of the twelve counties that challenged the annual reconciliation, five did not contest the Department's adjustment and are not parties to this proceeding: Pasco, Sarasota, Lee, Polk, and St. Johns. The record does not indicate whether these counties notified the Department that they accepted the adjustment. Four counties that challenged the annual reconciliation, and are parties to this proceeding, notified the Department that they accepted the adjustment: Pinellas, Brevard, Hillsborough, and Santa Rosa. However, because all affected counties did not accept the adjustments, the Department did not refund monies to the counties that were awarded a credit by the adjustment. In correspondence with Pinellas County's Timothy Burns, Ms. Davis stated that the credit set forth in the adjustment would not be applied to the county's account "until the final decisions from the DOAH hearing." At the hearing, Ms. Davis explained the Department's action as follows: Each county's utilization is considered a percentage of the total utilization and that percentage is multiplied by the expenditures. So if you change one number in that mathematical calculation, it has a rippling effect and will affect the other-- in this case it's 45 counties. So all of the counties had to accept those changes and agree to the modifications, those pending adjustments, if we were going to modify the reconciliation, the agency's final action. To restate, the following are the estimates, the annual reconciliation each County: amounts, and the adjustment amounts for Miami-Dade: 47,450 8.56% $8,522,140 38,925 11.45% $10,926,117 38,944 11.77% $11,229,123 Santa Rosa: 5,213 0.94% $936,268 2,555 0.75% $717,180 1,980 0.60% $570,914 Alachua: 10,957 1.98% $1,967,905 5,511 1.62% $1,546,919 5,581 1.67% $1,589,043 Orange 43,330 7.81% $7,782,177 25,286 7.44% $7,097,695 27,048 8.17% $7,799,027 Pinellas 32,627 5.88% $5,859,892 19,218 5.65% $5,394,428 15,523 4.69% $4,475,906 Escambia 15,044 2.71% $2,701,940 6,734 1.98% $1,890,211 6,734 2.04% $1,941,683 Hernando 2,978 0.54% $534,856 1,383 0.41% $388,203 1,327 0.40% $382,628 Broward 38,490 6.94% $6,912,901 31,339 9.22% $8,796,752 31,231 9.44% $9,005,154 City of Jacksonville 28,957 5.22% $5,200,750 21,246 6.25% $5,963,681 21,300 6.44% $6,141,647 Bay 5,409 0.98% $971,470 3,824 1.13% $1,073,384 3,830 1.16% $1,104,343 Brevard 13,760 2.48% $2,471,331 10,598 3.12% $2,974,823 8,816 2.66% $2,542,008 Seminole 12,857 2.32% $2,309,150 8,944 2.63% $2,510,551 8,965 2.71% $2,584,970 Okaloosa 4,612 0.83% $828,327 3,613 1.06% $1,014,157 3,613 1.09% $1,041,773 Hillsborough 44,577 8.04% $8,006,142 27,120 7.98% $7,612,493 22,465 77. Overall, the 6.79% Department $6,477,564 had estimated there would be 538,836 predisposition utilization days for all counties. The actual number of predisposition days indicated in the annual reconciliation was 339,885, some 198,951 fewer days than estimated. The number of actual days was further decreased to 330,875 in the Department's March 23, 2010, adjustment. Nonetheless, the absolute number of dollars assessed by the Department against the counties remained unchanged because the only variable in the Department's formula for ascertaining a county's "actual costs" was the county's percentage of the total number of predisposition days. The $95 million set forth in the General Appropriations Act for the Shared Trust Fund remained unchanged. Thus, even if a county's actual number of predisposition days was several thousand fewer than the Department originally estimated, the county's assessment could be higher than the estimate because that lesser number of days constituted a higher percentage of the overall number of predisposition days. The City of Jacksonville, for example, was found by the adjustment to owe $940,897 more than the original estimate despite having actual usage that was 7,657 days fewer than the original estimate. The Counties forcefully argue that Department's use of the General Appropriations Act as a substitute for calculating the counties' actual costs results in a gross disparity between the amounts per day paid by the state and those paid by the Counties for the same services at the same facilities, echoing the argument made by Hillsborough County in Hillsborough V. Robert M. Dunn, the Department's director of policy development for detention services, testified as follows: Q. But in terms of the actual cost of detention, there's no difference in the cost of a predisposition detention day and a post-disposition detention day? A. None. They receive the same services: food, clothing, supervision, mental health, medical, all of those issues. Every youth receives the same services in detention. Ms. Davis testified that the General Appropriations Act provided the Department with General Revenue sufficient to cover roughly 20% of the cost of all secure detention.14/ Ms. Davis conceded that approximately 38% of the secure detention utilization days were post-disposition days that were the Department's responsibility. She further conceded that through the Shared Trust Fund the counties are paying the 18% difference for the state's portion of secure detention. Evidence introduced at the hearing established a downward trend in the use of predisposition detention utilization since fiscal year 2005-2006, but no corresponding decrease in the amount that the counties pay for detention services. Mr. Herring, the appropriations expert, testified that as a result of the manner in which the Department allocates costs, counties pay approximately $284 per day for detention services, whereas the state pays only $127 per day. Mr. Burns, bureau director of Pinellas County's Department of Justice and Consumer Services, calculated that an average per diem rate for all detention days, predisposition and post-disposition, would be $229.56. Ms. Davis testified that if the utilization ratio and the budget ratio were the same--in other words, if the Legislature fully funded the state's share of detention services--then the per diem rates for the counties and the Department would be almost the same. Despite the fact that the counties were partially subsidizing the state's share of secure detention for juveniles, the Department nonetheless reverted $9,975,999 of unspent General Revenue funds back to the state's general revenue in fiscal year 2008-2009. Of that amount, approximately $874,000 had been appropriated for secure detention. Section 985.686(3) requires the counties to pay the costs of providing detention care for juveniles prior to final court disposition, "exclusive of the costs of any pre- adjudicatory nonmedical educational or therapeutic services and $2.5 million provided for additional medical and mental health care at the detention centers." (Emphasis added). The underscored language was added to the statute by section 11, chapter 2007-73, Laws of Florida, the appropriations implementing bill for fiscal year 2007-2008. Vickie Joan Harris, the Department's budget director, testified that the Legislature appropriated an additional $2.5 million for medical and mental health care in 2007-2008, but that no additional money has been appropriated for those services since that fiscal year. For fiscal year 2008-2009, the counties shared these costs with the Department. The Counties are correct in pointing out that the cost of a utilization "day" is the same whether it occurs predisposition or post-disposition, and their desire for a per diem basis of accounting is understandable from a fiscal planning perspective. If the Department announced a per diem rate at the start of the fiscal year, then a county could roughly calculate its year-end assessment for itself without the sticker shock that appears to accompany the annual reconciliation. However, there are two obstacles to such an accounting method, one practical, one the product of the Department's purported understanding of the term "actual cost" as used in section 985.686(5). The practical objection is that the actual cost of maintaining and operating the Department's secure detention system is not strictly related to the number of days that juveniles spend in detention facilities. Robert M. Dunn, the Department's director of policy development for detention services, testified as follows: For whatever reasons, detention population has decreased significantly over the last few years. However, we have to maintain the capability of providing adequate and proper services for 2,007 beds. In our system, we do not staff centers based on the number of beds or the number of youth who are in the center. We typically follow a critical post staffing process. We know that within center, there are certain posts that have to be manned 24/7, such as intake. We have to be able to provide staff to perform intake duty should a youth be delivered to the center for detention. We have to provide someone in our master control unit 24/7. Those people are responsible for outside communications, directing staff to where they are needed within the center, answering the phones inside the center for requests for assistance, monitoring the camera system to provide assistance. So that position, that post has to be staffed 24/7, whether we have one kid in the center or 100 kids. It's irrelevant. Mr. Dunn went on to describe many other fixed costs of operating a secure detention facility for juveniles. He also discussed the Department's ongoing efforts to identify redundant facilities and streamline the program in light of falling usage, but the point remains that the Department's actual costs do not fluctuate significantly due to usage. Simply keeping the doors open carries certain costs whether one child or 100 children come into the facility, and a pure per diem assessment approach might not cover those costs. While the evidence establishes that there is a significant degree of county subsidization of the state's share of juvenile detention costs, there is a lack of credible evidence that a pure per diem approach would capture a given county's "actual costs" in keeping with the mandate of section 985.686.15/ It is apparent that the Counties have seized on the per diem concept not merely because it was the measure used by the Department prior to Hillsborough I, but because the system used for fiscal year 2008-2009 gave the Counties no way to even roughly predict their annual expenses for predisposition secure juvenile detention. At the start of the fiscal year, a non-fiscally constrained county received an estimate of its predisposition days and its estimated portion of the Shared Trust Fund. The county made monthly payments based on those estimates. As the year progressed, it became apparent to the county that its actual usage was proving to be far less than the estimate. The annual reconciliation confirmed that the county had fewer predisposition days than the Department had estimated, which led the county to expect a refund. In defiance of that expectation, the county was presented with a bill for additional assessments. In the case of Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, the additional bill was for millions of dollars despite the fact that their actual usage was several thousand days fewer than the Department's estimate. The Counties were, not unreasonably, perplexed by this turn of events. This perceived anomaly points to the second obstacle to the Counties' proposed per diem accounting method: the Department's working definition of "actual costs" is unrelated to anything like a common understanding of the term "actual costs." It is a fiction that renders nugatory any effort by the Counties to limit their assessed contributions to the Shared Trust Fund to the money that was actually spent during the fiscal year. As to fiscal year 2008-2009, the Department simply made no effort to ascertain the counties' actual costs or, if it did, it failed to disclose them to the counties. "One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that the courts give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the Legislature." City of Venice v. Van Dyke, 46 So. 3d 115, 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), citing Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 312 (Fla. 2004). The Legislature did not define the term "actual cost" in section 985.686. "Actual cost" is not a term of art.16/ The Florida Statutes are replete with uses of the term "actual cost" that rely on the common meaning of the words and do not attempt further definition.17/ Those few sections that do provide definitions of "actual cost" indicate that the Legislature is capable of limiting that common term when appropriate to its purposes.18/ Nothing in Section 985.686 gives any indication that the Legislature intended the words "actual costs" to carry anything other than their plain and ordinary meaning. By statute, the Department is obligated to reconcile "any difference between the estimated costs and actual costs . . . at the end of the state fiscal year." § 985.686(5), Fla. Stat. By rule, this reconciliation is to be performed on a county by county basis: On or before January 31 of each year, the Department shall provide a reconciliation statement to each paying county. The statement shall reflect the difference between the estimated costs paid by the county during the past fiscal year and the actual cost of the county's usage during that period. Fla. Admin. Code R. 63G-1.008(1). Nothing in the statute or the implementing rules authorizes the Department to base its annual reconciliation on the anything other than actual costs. Section 985.686(5) speaks in terms of the individual county, not in terms of "counties" as a collective entity. Rule 63G-1.008(1) states that the Department will provide a reconciliation statement to "each paying county." That statement must reflect the difference between the estmated costs "paid by the county during the past fiscal year and the actual cost of the county's usage during that period." Like the statute, the rule speaks in terms of the individual county; the rule does not purport to authorize the Department to treat the 67 counties as a collective entity. Neither the statute nor the rule supports the rationale that the Shared Trust Fund liability of one county should in any way depend upon the costs incurred by any other county. At the end of the fiscal year, the amount collected in the Shared Trust Fund should be no more or less than the amounts of the counties' actual costs. Nothing in the statute or the implementing rules authorizes the Department to tether the counties together with the collective responsibility to pay $95,404,579 for fiscal year 2008-2009, as opposed to paying a reconciled amount based on each county's actual costs of providing predisposition secure detention services for juveniles within its jurisdiction.19/ Nothing in the statute or the implementing rules has changed in such a way as to vitiate Judge Quattlebaum's conclusion in Hillsborough IV that "the annual reconciliation statement issued pursuant to the rule is final unless successfully challenged in an administrative proceeding" pursuant to section 120.569, Florida Statutes. See Finding of Fact 37, supra. Therefore, the December 7, 2009, annual reconciliation constituted final agency action as to all counties that did not contest the reconciliation in accordance with the Department's January 26, 2010, letter. The Department did not have the statutory authority to recalculate the amounts set forth in that annual reconciliation for the 55 counties that did not file challenges.20/ As regards the parties to this proceeding, the following Counties did not contest the December 7, 2009, annual reconciliation: Alachua, Orange, Escambia, City of Jacksonville, Bay, Seminole, and Okaloosa. As to these Counties, the annual reconciliation should have constituted final agency action and spared them further involvement in litigation. The amounts set forth for these Counties in the annual reconciliation should be reinstated and their accounts reconciled on that basis, as follows: Reconciled Share of Trust Fund Alachua $1,546,919 Orange $7,097,695 Escambia $1,890,211 City of Jacksonville $5,963,681 Bay $1,073,384 Seminole $2,510,551 Okaloosa $1,014,157 105. The following Counties did contest the reconcilation pursuant to the Department's January 26, 2010, letter: Brevard, Broward, Santa Rosa, Pinellas, Hillsborough, Hernando, and Miami-Dade. By letter dated March 23, 2010, the Department informed all 67 counties that it had completed its analysis of the challenges21/ submitted by 12 counties and was instituting adjustments to the accounts of 45 counties, including 10 that were fiscally constrained. For the reasons stated above, the March 23, 2010, adjustment was effective only as to the 12 counties that challenged the annual reconciliation. Of those 12, seven are parties to this litigation. Of the seven Counties, four accepted the adjustment announced by the March 23, 2010, letter: Pinellas, Brevard, Hillsborough, and Santa Rosa.22/ As to these four Counties, the Department's March 23, 2010, adjustment letter should have ripened into final agency action without need for further litigation.23/ The amounts set forth for these counties in the adjustment letter should be reinstated and their accounts reconciled on that basis, as follows:24/ Share of Trust Fund Santa Rosa $570,914 Pinellas $4,475,906 Brevard $2,542,008 Hillsborough $6,477,564 To this point, the resolution of the amounts owed has been based on the simple principle of administrative finality as to 10 of the Counties that are parties to this proceeding: proposed agency action that is accepted, affirmatively or tacitly, by a party becomes final agency action as to that party and as to the agency upon the expiration of the time for requesting an administrative hearing. However, there remain three Counties that challenged the annual reconciliation, contested the later adjustment, and continue to assert their statutory right to be assessed only the "actual costs" associated with predisposition secure detention: Hernando, Miami-Dade, and Broward. During the course of this litigation, some of the parties asked the Department to perform an alternative calculation of the fiscal year 2008-2009 reconciled amounts. In an email dated January 12, 2011, the Department transmitted to the Counties a speadsheet that the Department titled "2008/2009 Secure Detention Cost Sharing Data Analysis," taking care to point out that the document was "not an amended or revised reconciliation."25/ Several Counties, including the three whose contributions to the Shared Trust Fund remain unresolved, have urged this tribunal to adopt this most recent analysis as the most accurate available measure of their pre-disposition detention days and actual costs of detention. In its Proposed Recommended Order, the Department also argues that it should be allowed to employ this "more accurate methodology" to amend the annual reconciliation as to all counties. Ms. Campbell, the Department's data integrity officer, testified as to several changes in programming that are reflected in the results of the January 12 analysis. The dispositive change for purposes of this order is that the analysis was performed in accordance with the Department's new rule 63G-1.011(2), which provides: "Commitment" means the final court disposition of a juvenile delinquency charge through an order placing a youth in the custody of the department for placement in a residential or non-residential program. Commitment to the department is in lieu of a disposition of probation. Ms. Campbell stated that in previous reconciliations and adjustments, the Department stopped billing the counties at the point a final disposition was given by the court. Under the new rule, the Department would continue billing the counties if the disposition did not result in the child's commitment to the Department. Florida Administrative Code Rule 63G-1.011 became effective on July 6, 2010, well after the close of fiscal year 2008-2009 and well after the Department's annual reconciliation and adjustments for that fiscal year were performed. Aside from the increased accuracy claimed by the Department, no ground has been cited for its retroactive application in this case. Further, rule 63G-1.011 has recently been found an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the precise ground that its narrow definition of "commitment" is in conflict with section 985.686(5), Florida Statutes, which limits the counties' responsibility to "the period of time prior to final court disposition." Okaloosa Cnty. et al. v. Dep't of Juv. Just., Case No. 12-0891RX (Fla. DOAH July 17, 2012).26/ In other words, the Department's prior practice was more in keeping with its statutory mandate than was the "correction" enacted by rule 63G-1.011. In fairness to the Department, it should be noted that its revised definition of commitment was at least partly an outcome of Hillsborough III. In that decision, Judge Quattlebaum concluded, "The [Department] has no responsibility for the expenses of detention related to juveniles who were not committed to the [Department]'s care and supervision. Nothing in the statute or the previous Final Orders indicates otherwise." Hillsborough III at ¶ 13. On this point, however, Hillsborough III adopts the position of the Department that was not seriously challenged.27/ However, section 985.686(3) requires the county to pay "the costs of providing detention care... for the period of time prior to final court disposition." The statute does not state that "final court disposition" is equivalent to "commitment to the Department."28/ Okaloosa County provides a more comprehensive analysis statute: the Department is responsible for the expenses of all post-disposition detention, not merely detention of juveniles who are committed to the Department. The evidence in the instant case made it clear that probation is another post- disposition outcome that may result in detention, and that the Department has made a practice of charging the counties for detentions related to this disposition. Judge Anthony H. Johnson, the Circuit Administrative Judge of the Juvenile Division, Ninth Judicial Circuit, testified as to the procedures that a circuit court follows after the arrest of a juvenile charged with delinquency: Okay, we'll begin by the arrest of the juvenile. And the juvenile is then taken to the JAC, the Joint Assessment Center, where a decision is made whether to keep the juvenile in detention or to release the juvenile. That decision is based upon something called the DRAI, the Detention Risk Assessment Instrument. How that works probably is not important for the purpose of this except to know that some juveniles are released, and some remain detained. The juveniles that are . . . detained will appear the following day or within 24 hours before a circuit judge, and it would be the duty judge, the emergency duty judge on the weekends, or a juvenile delinquency judge if it's regular court day. At that time the judge will determine whether the juvenile should be released or continue to be retained. That's also based upon the DRAI. If the juvenile is detained, he or she will remain for up to 21 days pending their adjudicatory hearing. Everything in juvenile has a different name. We would call that a trial in any other circumstance. Now the 21 days is a statutory time limit: however, it's possible in some cases that that 21 days would be extended. If there is a continuance by any party, and for good cause shown, the judge can decide to keep the juvenile detained past the 21 days. That's relatively unusual. It's usually resolved, one way or the other, in 21 days. After the trial is conducted, if the juvenile is found not guilty, of course he or she is released. If they're found guilty, then a decision is made about whether or not they should remain detained pending the disposition in the case. The disposition—- there needs to be time between the adjudication and the disposition so that a pre-disposition report can be prepared. It's really the Department of Juvenile Justice that decides whether or not the child will be committed. We pretend that it's the judge, but it's not really.29/ And that decision is made—- is announced in the pre-disposition report. If the child is committed at the disposition hearing, the judge will order the child committed to the Department. Now, one or two things will happen then. Well, maybe one of three things. If the child scores detention-- let me not say scores. If it's a level eight or above, then the child will remain detained. If it's not that, the child will be released and told to go home on home detention awaiting placement. Here's where things get, I think, probably for your purposes, a bit complex. Let's say at the disposition, the child-- the recommendation of the Department is not that the child be committed, but that the child be placed on probation. Then the child goes into the community. The disposition has then been held, and the child's on probation. If the child violates probation, then the child comes back into the system, and then you sort of start this process again, on the violation of probation. If the child is found to have violated his or her probation, then you go back to the process where the Department makes a recommendation. Could be commitment, it could be something else. The child may be detained during that time period. Often what will happen is the misconduct of the child will be handled in a more informal manner by the court. The court may decide instead of going through the VOP hearing, violation of probation, I'm going to handle this by holding the child in contempt for disobeying the court's order to go to school, to not use drugs, or whatever the violation was. In that case, the child may be detained for contempt, for a period of 5 days for the first offense, or 15 days for a subsequent offense. Judge Johnson testified that "by definition, anything after the disposition hearing would be post-disposition." He went on to explain: You know, the problem here, I think, is we have a couple of different dispositions. We have one disposition that's the initial disposition. And if the child is put on probation, and then violates the probation, then you have a whole other hearing as to whether or not there was a violation of probation. And, if so, you have a whole new disposition hearing as to what the sanction ought to be for violation of probation. The probation issue was a key point of contention between the Counties and the Department. The Department does not consider itself responsible for detentions of juveniles who been given a disposition of probation. Thus, when a juvenile is picked up for a violation of probation, the Department considers that detention to be "pre-disposition" and chargeable to the county. The Counties contend, more consistently with section 985.686(3), that probation is a consequence of "final court disposition," and any subsequent detentions arising from violation of probation should be considered post-disposition and paid by the Department. Aside from the legal barriers, there are practical considerations that render the January 12, 2011, analysis unsuitable as a measure of the Counties' actual costs. Ms. Davis testified that the analysis is "a little deceiving because it only includes an analysis based on commitment." She noted that the analysis did not take into account the adjustments that had been made in light of the twelve counties' challenges to the annual reconciliation. Ms. Davis stated: "We simply ran an analysis per the request of the counties as to what the days would be based on commitment only, using our new programming that we do today. . . [W]e couldn’t submit it as a reconciliation because it's not correct. There are some address errors. We didn't fix those." Ms. Davis testified that the Department never had any intention that the January 12 analysis should be considered a reconciliation. The programming and the data set had changed since the annual reconciliation. The information in the analysis was not the same information that was analyzed in the reconciliation. Comparing the reconciliation to this analysis would be "apples to oranges" in many respects, according to Ms. Davis. Based on the foregoing, it is found that the January 12, 2011, analysis does not establish the "actual costs" of the remaining counties and is not an accurate basis for settling their final accounts for fiscal year 2008-2009. It is further found that, because the Department has never attempted to ascertain the Counties' actual costs and provided no such data to this tribunal, the record of this proceeding offers insufficient evidence to establish the actual costs for secure juvenile detention care for fiscal year 2008- 2009 for Hernando, Miami-Dade, and Broward Counties. The Department conceded that its annual reconciliation and the adjustment thereto were based on inaccurate data and included significant errors. The January 12, 2011, analysis was based on a definition of "commitment" that has since been found in derogation of section 985.686(5), Florida Statutes. None of the analyses performed by the Department went beyond the calculation of the number of detention days to the calculation of any county's actual costs of providing detention care. The Department bears the burden of providing a reconciliation to each of these three counties that reflects their actual costs of providing secure juvenile detention care. Hernando, Miami-Dade, and Broward Counties are each entitled to an accounting of their actual costs without regard to the costs of any other county.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order that: Reinstates the amounts set forth in the Department's December 7, 2009, annual reconciliation letter for the following Counties: Alachua, Orange, Escambia, City of Jacksonville, Bay, Seminole, and Okaloosa; Reinstates the amounts set forth in the Department's March 23, 2010, adjustment letter for the following Counties: Pinellas, Brevard, Hillsborough, and Santa Rosa; and Provides that the Department will, without undue delay, provide a revised assessment that states the actual costs of providing predisposition secure juvenile detention care for fiscal year 2008-2009 for the following Counties: Hernando, Miami-Dade, and Broward. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2012.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner abandoned his position and thereby resigned his career service at the Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Oscar T. Brown was a career service employee at the Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center. Mr. Brown was a DCWI and was assigned to the C- shift. On May 4, 1987, Petitioner requested annual leave for the period from June 30, 1987, through July 8, 1987. The purpose of this request was to afford Petitioner with time off. Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Margaret Ann Wilks, approved the leave request. However, the assistant superintendent, Ron Fryer, disapproved the leave request. Petitioner was notified that the leave had been disapproved prior to June 26, 1987. On June 26, 1987, Ms. Wilks asked Mr. Fryer to reconsider his decision to disapprove Petitioner's leave request. Mr. Fryer did not approve the leave request and did not advise Ms. Wilks that the leave could be taken. Petitioner elected to take leave solely on the approval offered by Ms. Wilks. Petitioner did not report to work, as scheduled, for the period he had requested leave. Petitioner did not call in during the time he had requested leave. Neither a DCS III or DCS I approved Petitioner's leave request. Such approval is required prior to annual leave being taken. The Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center houses minors in a totally supervised environment including lockups and hourly review of detainees' security. During the period Petitioner requested leave, the facility held from 140 to 180 minors. Mr. Fryer denied Petitioner's leave request because the facility was overcrowded and due to manpower and staffing problems.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order affirming the decision that Petitioner had abandoned his position and thereby resigned from the Career Service. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Harvey Swickle, Esquire 1031 North Miami Beach Boulevard North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Larry Kranert, Esquire District Legal Counsel 201 West Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Juvenile Justice (Respondent) properly calculated secure juvenile detention center expenses for which Hillsborough County (Petitioner) is responsible under state law.
Findings Of Fact As required by law, the Respondent prospectively assessed the Petitioner for juvenile detention costs for the 2006-2007 fiscal year. The Petitioner timely filed objections to the Respondent's assessment. The Respondent generally denied the objections, although the evidence indicated that representatives of both parties attempted to address objections through the exchange of relevant information, a practice that was continuing immediately prior to commencement of the administrative hearing. According to the testimony presented at the hearing, the parties remained in disagreement regarding 9,258 instances where "disposition dates" were unavailable (the "no date" cases). The relevant statute requires that the Petitioner bear the costs of detention prior to "final court disposition," a phrase which is otherwise undefined by the statute. Although the parties agreed that Final Orders issued by the Respondent based upon prior litigation between the parties identified a definition of "final court disposition," the parties apparently disagreed on the application of the definition. At the hearing, the Respondent offered testimony that the agency's records would identify disposition dates for juveniles transferred to the care and supervision of the Respondent. The Respondent's records were reviewed to confirm that there were no disposition dates identified therein for the "no date" cases. The Petitioner presented no evidence to establish that such disposition dates were available. The Petitioner's witness essentially asserted that any court order in a juvenile detention case is a dispositional order upon which the Respondent becomes responsible for the expenses related to detaining the juvenile. The Respondent asserted that unless and until a juvenile is committed to the care and supervision of the Respondent, such expenses remain the responsibility of the Petitioner. Neither the statute nor the previous Final Orders suggest that fiscal responsibility for a juvenile is transferred to the Respondent upon the issuance of any court order, regardless of whether the order assigns responsibility for care and supervision of the juvenile to the Respondent. The Petitioner also asserted that some of the "no date" cases listed addresses for the juveniles that were the Respondent's offices, indicating that the Respondent had assumed responsibility for care and supervision (and costs) for such juveniles at some point. After the hearing, and without objection by the Petitioner, the Respondent submitted a notarized affidavit from an individual identified as Norman Campbell, chief probation officer for Hillsborough County, wherein the affiant stated that the facilities at the identified addresses were offices of providers providing contract services to juveniles through the Department of Children and Family Services, and further stated that the Respondent has offices within some of the facilities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent issue a final order amending the annual reconciliation as follows: Responsibility for disputed cases which lack disposition dates but include addresses of the Respondent's office locations are assigned to the Respondent; and Responsibility for disputed cases which lack disposition dates and do not include addresses of the Respondent's office locations are assigned to the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian Berkowitz, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building, Room 312V 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Stephen M. Todd, Esquire Hillsborough County Attorney’s Office Post Office Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
The Issue This is a rule challenge brought pursuant to section 120.56, Florida Statutes,1/ to the Proposed Rules of the Department of Juvenile Justice (“Department” or “DJJ”) 63G- 1.011, 63G-1.013, 63G-1.016, and 63G-1.017 (the “Proposed Rules”). The main issue in this case is whether the Proposed Rules are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in that the Proposed Rules enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented, section 985.686, Florida Statutes; are vague; and/or are arbitrary and capricious. Petitioners also argue that the Proposed Rules impose regulatory costs that could be addressed by the adoption of a less costly alternative. Finally, Petitioners assert that the Proposed Rules apply an invalid interpretation of the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”) for Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2014-15 by interpreting the GAA as a modification to substantive law, contrary to the Constitution of the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the state agency responsible for administering the cost-sharing requirements in section 985.686, Florida Statutes, for juvenile detention care. The challenging counties are political subdivisions of the State of Florida and are non-fiscally constrained counties subject to the cost-sharing requirements of section 985.686. The challenging counties are substantially affected by the application of Florida Administrative Code Rules 63G-1.010 through 63G-1.018, including the Proposed Rules. It was stipulated that the challenging counties’ alleged substantial interests are of the type these proceedings are designed to protect. Petitioner, Florida Association of Counties (“FAC”), is a statewide association and not-for-profit corporation organized and existing under chapter 617, Florida Statutes, for the purpose of representing county government in Florida and protecting, promoting, and improving the mutual interests of all counties in Florida. All of the 67 counties in Florida are members of FAC, and the Proposed Rules regarding Detention Cost Share affect all counties. Of the 67 counties in Florida, 35 are considered non- fiscally constrained, and are billed by the Department for their respective costs of secure detention care, as determined by the Department; 27 of these counties are participating alongside FAC in these proceedings. The subject matter of these proceedings is clearly within FAC’s scope of interest and activity, and a substantial number of FAC’s members are adversely affected by the Proposed Rules. The challenging counties, and FAC, participated in the various rulemaking proceedings held by the Department related to the Proposed Rules, including rule hearings held on June 6, 2014, and August 5, 2014. Rule Making The initial version of the Proposed Rules was issued, and a Rule Development Workshop was held on March 28, 2014. Numerous challenging counties submitted comments on the Proposed Rules either prior to, or at the Rule Development Workshop. On May 15, 2014, the Department published Proposed Rules 63G-1.011, 1.013, 1.016, and 1.017 in the Florida Administrative Register. In that Notice, the Department scheduled a hearing on the Proposed Rules for June 6, 2014. On June 6, 2014, a rulemaking hearing was held on the Proposed Rules. Numerous challenging counties submitted comments to the Proposed Rules either prior to, or at the hearing. A supplemental rulemaking hearing was held on August 5, 2014. Again, numerous challenging counties submitted comments regarding the Proposed Rules either prior to, or at the supplemental rulemaking hearing. On September 5, 2014, the Department advertised its Notice of Change as to the Proposed Rules. Thereafter, all parties to this proceeding timely filed petitions challenging the Proposed Rules. A statement of estimated regulatory costs (“SERC”) was not originally prepared by the Department. In the rulemaking proceedings before the Department, Bay County submitted a good faith written proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative. In its proposal, Bay County asserted that the Department’s own stipulations signed by the agency are competent substantial evidence that the agency has a “less costly alternative” to the approach taken in the Proposed Rules, by assessing the costs of all detention days for juveniles on probation status to the state, and not the counties.2/ As Bay County noted in the proposal, the Department previously had agreed to assume all of the cost of detention days occurring after a disposition of probation. Following the June 6, 2014, hearing, the Department issued a SERC for the Proposed Rules. Ultimately, the Department rejected the lower cost regulatory alternative proposed by the counties “because it is inconsistent with the relevant statute (section 985.686, F.S.), fails to substantially accomplish the statutory objective, and would render the Department unable to continue to operate secure detention.” The Implemented Statute The Proposed Rules purport to implement section 985.686, which provides that each county is responsible for paying the costs of providing detention care “for juveniles for the period of time prior to final court disposition.” § 985.686(3), Fla. Stat. The statute establishes a cost-sharing system whereby each non-fiscally constrained county is required to be individually provided with an estimate of “its costs of detention care for juveniles who reside in that county for the period of time prior to final court disposition,” based on “the prior use of secure detention for juveniles who are residents of that county, as calculated by the department.” § 985.686(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Each county must pay the estimated costs at the beginning of each month. At the end of the state fiscal year, “[a]ny difference between the estimated costs and actual costs shall be reconciled.” Id. The Department is responsible for administering the cost-sharing requirements and is authorized to adopt rules as set forth in section 985.686(11). In general, the Proposed Rules provide definitions including for pre and postdisposition, provide for calculating the estimated costs, for monthly reporting, and for annual reconciliation. Specific changes will be discussed in detail below. The complete text of the Challenged Rules, showing the proposed amendments (in strike-through and underlined format) is attached hereto as Appendix A. The Prior Rule Challenge On July 16, 2006, the Department promulgated Florida Administrative Code Rules 63G-1.002, 63G-1.004, 63G-1.007, and 63G-1.008, among others, setting forth the definitions and procedures for calculating the costs as between the state and the various counties. These rules were repealed as of July 6, 2010, and in their place, the Department adopted rules 63G- 1.011, 63G-1.013, 63G-1.016, and 63G-1.017. Although the previous rules defined “final court disposition,” for purposes of determining the counties’ responsibility for providing the costs of secure detention, the 2010 rules replaced this with a definition of “commitment,” so that the state was only responsible for days occurring after a disposition of commitment. This had the effect of transferring the responsibility for tens of thousands of days of detention from the state to the counties. In addition, the 2010 rules failed to provide a process by which the counties were only charged their respective actual costs of secure detention. In 2012, several counties challenged rules 63G-1.011, 63G-1.013, 63G-1.016, and 63G-1.017 as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because these rules replaced the statutory dividing line for the costs of secure detention with “commitment,” and because the rules resulted in the overcharging of counties for their respective actual costs of secure detention. On July 17, 2012, a Final Order was issued by the undersigned which agreed with the counties and found that the rules were an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Okaloosa Cnty., et al. v. Dep’t of Juv. Just., DOAH Case No. 12-0891RX (Fla. DOAH July 17, 2012). On June 5, 2013, this ruling was affirmed on appeal. Dep’t of Juv. Just. v. Okaloosa Cnty., 113 So. 3d 1074 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“2012 Rule Challenge”). The Department’s Response to the 2012 Rule Challenge No changes to the Department’s practices were made after the Rule Challenge Final Order was released in 2012. Rather, changes were not made until after the Rule Challenge decision was affirmed on appeal in June 2013. Shortly after the opinion was released by the First District Court of Appeal, the Department modified its policies and practices to conform with its interpretation of the requirements of that opinion, and informed the counties that “all days for youth in detention with a current placement of probation or commitment belong to the state.” At this time, the Department determined that “by their nature all VOPs [violations of probation] are attached to charges that have a qualified disposition and thus are a state pay.” In response to the appellate court decision, the Department implemented and published to the counties its interpretation that the counties were only responsible for detention days occurring prior to a final court disposition, and were not responsible for detention days occurring after a juvenile has been sentenced to commitment or probation, or is waiting for release after a dismissal of the charge. A statement to this effect was developed by the Department with input from multiple staff, and was to be a “clear bright line” setting “clear parameters” and a “final determination” that the Department could share with those outside the agency. However, no rules were developed by the Department at this time. In July 2013, the Department revised its estimate to the counties for Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2013-14 from what had been issued (previously). This revised estimate incorporated the Department’s analysis that included in the state’s responsibility any detention days for youth in detention with a current placement of probation or commitment, or where the charges against the youth had been dismissed. The revised estimate also excluded these days from the collective responsibility of the counties, including detention days resulting from a new law violation of probation. At the time of the 2012 Rule Challenge, several counties had pending administrative challenges to the Department’s reconciliations for FYs 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011-12. In September 2013, the Department issued recalculations of its final reconciliation statements to the counties for FYs 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011-12. The recalculations were based upon the Department’s revised policies and practices and included in the state’s responsibility any detention days for youths in detention with a current placement of probation or commitment, or where the charges against the youth had been dismissed, and similarly excluded detention days resulting from a new law violation of probation. This resulted in large overpayments from the non-fiscally constrained counties to the state for these fiscal years. These recalculations were not merely an internal exercise, but rather were intended to notify the counties what they had overpaid for the fiscal years at issue, and were published and made available to the counties and public at large on the Department’s website. In December 2013, the Department entered into stipulations of facts and procedure to resolve three separate administrative proceedings related to final reconciliation amounts for FYs 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011-12. Those stipulations of facts and procedure included the following definitions: The parties agree that “Final Court Disposition” as contained in section 985.686, Florida Statutes, and based on the decision of the First District Court of Appeal, means a disposition order entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, including an order sentencing a juvenile to commitment to the Department, or other private or public institution as allowed by law, placing the juvenile on probation, or dismissing the charge. The parties further agree that a “Pre- dispositional Day” means any secure detention day occurring prior to the day on which a Final Court Disposition is entered. A pre- dispositional day does not include any secure detention day after a juvenile has been sentenced to commitment or placed on probation, or is waiting for release after dismissal of a charge. (Petitioner’s Ex. 26) In addition to the above stipulations, the Department also stipulated to its recalculated amounts for each of these years, resulting in large overpayments from the counties. However, the Department refused to provide credits for these overpayment amounts. In November and December 2013, the Department issued a final reconciliation statement and revised final reconciliation statement to the counties for FY 2012-13, which included in the state’s responsibility any detention days for youth in detention with a current placement of probation or commitment, or where the charges against the youth had been dismissed, and likewise excluded these days from the collective responsibility of the counties, including detention days resulting from a new law violation of probation. Under the Department’s reconciliation statement for FY 2012-13, the counties were collectively funding approximately thirty-two percent (32%) of the costs of secure juvenile detention. The Department also submitted its legislative budget request for FY 2014-15 in October 2013. This legislative budget request was based on the Department’s independent judgment as required by sections 216.011 and 216.023, Florida Statutes,3/ and excluded from the counties’ collective responsibility all detention days relating to a violation of probation, including for a new substantive law violation. The request provided that “the department may only bill the counties for youth whose cases have not had a disposition either to commitment or probation.” The request also notes a shift in the counties’ collective obligations from 73 percent of the total costs to 32 percent of these costs “in order to bring the budget split in line with the June 2013 ruling by the First District Court of Appeal.” Under this interpretation, the Department projected a $35.5 million deficiency in its budget for FY 13-14 and requested an $18.4 million appropriation for detention costs from the Legislature. This request was funded in the General Appropriations Act for 2014-15. The Department did not ask for additional funding for past years that had been challenged by the counties. At this same time, a projection for the deficit for FY 2014-15 was developed by the Department staff based on the same interpretation of the state’s responsibility for detention days. There was no objection from the Department’s Secretary or the Governor’s Office to this interpretation of the state’s responsibility. Change in Interpretation Re New Law Violation Fred Schuknecht, then - Chief of Staff of the Department, testified that in response to the opinion of the First District Court of Appeal in June 2013, the Department adopted a broad interpretation of the ruling that final court disposition meant commitment, and also included all secure detention days incurred by probationers as postdisposition days. This included detention days for youths already on probation who committed new offenses and were then detained as a result of the new offense or because of the violation of probation resulting from the commission of the new offense. During the budgeting process for the 2014-15 Fiscal Year, the Department altered its interpretation of the 2012 Rule Challenge decision, and its newly-established practice relating to payment for all detention days involving probationers. The Department now proposes, through the challenged rules, to shift to the counties the responsibility for detention days occurring after a final court disposition of probation where there is a new law violation. Although the challengers assert that the changed interpretation was driven by the budget proposal submitted by the Governor’s Office in January 2014 (which did not utilize the Department’s prior interpretation) the Department specifically contends that it did not change its official position on this interpretation until the adoption of the state budget by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) in June 2014. While the Department stated it made its initial broad interpretation because it was “under the gun” to issue its cost sharing billing for FY 2013-2014 within two weeks of the appellate opinion, the Department continued to assert that interpretation in September 2013, when it published recalculations for FYs 2009-2010, 2010-2011, 2011-2012. Further, Mr. Schuknecht conceded that this interpretation had not changed at the time the Department’s legislative budget request was submitted in October 2013, or in November and December 2013, when the Department issued the reconciliation and revised reconciliation for FY 2012-2013. Likewise, this interpretation formed the basis for the stipulations signed by the counties and Department in December 2013. At hearing, testimony established that the Department’s interpretation that the state was responsible for all days of detention for probationers was formed after frequent discussions on this topic and with input from multiple staff involved in cost sharing, including Mr. Schuknecht (Director of Administration at that time), Vickie Harris (Budget Director), Mark Greenwald (Director of Research and Planning), the Chief of Staff, Deputy Secretary, the legal team, as well as the Department’s Secretary. For FY 2014-15, the Executive Office of the Governor proposed a recommended budget which was contrary to the Department’s initial interpretation, and included within the counties’ collective responsibility those detention days for a youth on probation charged with a new substantive law violation. This recommended budget proposed that the counties would be responsible for fifty-seven percent (57%) of the shared costs of secure detention, and that the state would be responsible for forty-three percent (43%). This is in contrast to the thirty- two percent (32%) the counties were paying under the Department’s initial interpretation of the Rule Challenge Decision. The Governor’s Office then asked the Department to amend its earlier submitted legislative budget request, to reflect the Governor’s budget because it wanted the Department’s request to match. Although the GAA for FY 2014-15 incorporated a cost- sharing split similar to that included in the Governor’s proposal, it differed from the governor’s budget recommendation. It was not until June 2014, when the GAA was adopted into law, that the Department asserts it officially changed positions. As stipulated by the parties, there is no language in the GAA for FY 2014-15 setting forth the policy behind the budget split for secure detention. The Proposed Rules differ from the Department’s initial interpretation of the requirements of the Rule Challenge decision and its earlier established policies and procedures regarding the same as implemented in June 2013, through at least early 2014. The interpretation set forth in the Proposed Rules results in a lessened budgetary impact on the state by shifting more detention days to the counties. At hearing, Mr. Schuknecht testified as to the rationale for the Department’s changed interpretation regarding the counties’ responsibility for detention days for a youth on probation charged with a new substantive law violation: Q. If you would, Mr. Schuknecht, please kind of talk about the highlights of that rule, and especially in relationship to the Court’s ruling in the previous rule challenge. A. Basically how we got here is, in June of 2013, the First DCA ruled basically supporting the – DOAH’s hearing, the final court disposition prior to that. Basically we determined the final court decision meant commitment. They said it can’t be just commitment. So at that time we took the broadest interpretation as well will actually include all probationers as part of the final court disposition and they would be post-disposition days. Subsequent to that, in effect, through the Governor’s Office as well as the Legislature, as well as ourselves, we realized basically by doing that we are including probationers with new offenses as post-disposition cases which, in effect, makes no sense. It’s logical that they be pre- disposition cases because there is no disposition on those cases with new offenses. Plus probationers would only be in detention because they have new cases. They wouldn’t be there otherwise. So, in fact, that’s how we – so that’s the main change in the rule, in effect, defining what pre-disposition means. Mr. Schuknecht’s explanation for the Department’s changed interpretation is consistent with the explanation given by Jason Welty, the Department’s previous Chief of Staff, during the June 6, 2014, Workshop, that “the Department’s original interpretation was, quite frankly, in error.” Cost of Detention Days for Juveniles on Probation The Challengers contend that all days in detention served by a juvenile on probation are the responsibility of the state, and not the counties. Accordingly, the Challengers contest the Department’s Proposed Rules which assign responsibility for detention days of juveniles with new law violations to the counties, and not the state. Much of the testimony and argument at the hearing focused on the Department’s definitions for predisposition and postdisposition, and how these definitions apply as to youth on probation status with the Department. These definitions are crucial, as they relate to how the costs are split amongst the state and the counties. Only the costs of predisposition detention days may be billed to the counties under section 985.686. Final court disposition is specifically defined by the Proposed Rules as the “decision announced by the court at the disposition hearing” including “commitment, probation, and dismissal of charges.” “Predisposition” is further defined as the “period of time a youth is in detention care prior to entry of a final court disposition.” Proposed Rule 63G-1.011(14). “Postdisposition” on the other hand, means “the period of time a youth is in detention care after entry of a final court disposition.” Proposed Rule 63G-1.011(15). However, the definitions do not stop with this general language. Proposed Rule sections 63G-1.011(14)(b) and (15)(b) provide that it is the counties’ responsibility to fund the costs for days when a youth is on probation and is charged with a new law violation. These definitions are implemented through the Proposed Rules relating to the estimate and reconciliation processes. The Department argues that youth who are on probation and commit new offenses may be held in secure detention for the new offense but cannot be legally held in secure detention on the underlying violation of probation. However, the Department’s position would appear to be counter to the express language of several statutory provisions. Section 985.439(4) provides in relevant part: Upon the child’s admission, or if the court finds after a hearing that the child has violated the conditions of probation or postcommitment probation, the court shall enter an order revoking, modifying, or continuing probation or postcommitment probation. In each such case, the court shall enter a new disposition order and, in addition to the sanctions set forth in this section, may impose any sanction the court could have imposed at the original disposition hearing. If the child is found to have violated the conditions of probation or postcommitment probation, the court may: Place the child in a consequence unit in that judicial circuit, if available, for up to 5 days for a first violation and up to 15 days for a second or subsequent violation. Place the child in nonsecure detention with electronic monitoring. However, this sanction may be used only if a residential consequence unit is not available. If the violation of probation is technical in nature and not a new violation of law, place the child in an alternative consequence program designed to provide swift and appropriate consequences to any further violations of probation. Neither statute nor Department rules define what is meant by a “technical” violation of probation. However, retired juvenile court judge Frank A. Orlando, accepted as an expert in juvenile detention issues, explained at hearing that: A technical violation in my opinion is something that doesn’t involve a law violation. It is a condition of probation. It would be a curfew. It could be going to school. It could be staying away from a family, a victim, or staying away from a place. It could be not obeying the probation officer, him or herself. In that sense they are technical violations of probation, but they are both violation of probation. In addition, section 985.101(1) provides that a juvenile may be “taken into custody” under chapter 985 for, among others, “a delinquent act or violation of law, pursuant to Florida law pertaining to a lawful arrest,” and “[b]y a law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that the child is in violation of the conditions of the child’s probation, home detention, postcommitment probation, or conditional release supervision; has absconded from nonresidential commitment; or has escaped from residential commitment.” § 985.101(1)(b), (d), Fla. Stat. However, this provision also expressly provides that “[N]othing in this subsection shall be construed to allow the detention of a child who does not meet the detention criteria in part V.” Part V of the Act includes section 985.255, which sets forth the detention criteria, and provides in pertinent part: Subject to s. 985.25(1), a child taken into custody and placed into secure or nonsecure detention care shall be given a hearing within 24 hours after being taken into custody. At the hearing, the court may order continued detention if: The child is alleged to be an escapee from a residential commitment program; or an absconder from a nonresidential commitment program, a probation program, or conditional release supervision; or is alleged to have escaped while being lawfully transported to or from a residential commitment program. Thus, the undersigned is persuaded that sections 985.439(4), 985.101(1), and 985.255 all support a finding that a violation of probation, not associated with a new violation of law, may under some circumstances result in a new disposition of secure detention. However, pursuant to the Proposed Rules, under these circumstances the state would continue to be responsible for the cost of the secure detention. As explained at hearing, there is an idiosyncrasy in chapter 985 regarding secure detention for juveniles who have been charged with a violation of probation or violating a term of their conditional release. Under chapter 985, a child taken into custody for violating the terms of probation or conditional release supervision shall be held in a consequence unit. If a consequence unit is not available, the child is to be placed on home detention with electronic monitoring. § 985.255(1)(h), Fla. Stat. These consequence units have not been funded by the Florida Legislature for a number of years. However, the juvenile justice system has found a practical method to accommodate the nonexistence of these “consequence units.” For technical violations of probation, the courts often convert the violations of probation to a contempt of court, and will hold the juvenile in detention on this basis. This contempt of court procedure may also be used by the courts to detain a juvenile in secure detention for a violation of probation based on a new law violation. Pursuant to section 985.037, a juvenile who has been held in direct or indirect contempt may be placed in secure detention not to exceed five days for the first offense, and not to exceed 15 days for a second or subsequent offense. As noted by Judge Orlando and Seventh Judicial Circuit Judge Terrill J. LaRue, an order to show cause for indirect criminal contempt is the mechanism used to place a juvenile in secure detention for a violation of probation or conditional release. In addition, the probation is a significant factor that weighs heavily into the Department’s decision to securely detain the juvenile, and in large part determines whether the juvenile will be detained. For a youth who is on probation and is charged with a new substantive law offense, the Department, pursuant to its rules and policies, determines whether the youth will be detained in secure detention based on the Department’s Detention Risk Assessment Instrument (“DRAI”). § 985.245, Fla. Stat.; rule 63D-9.002. Under the DRAI, if the child scores 0-7 points, the child is not detained; 7-11 points, the child is detained on home detention; for 12 points or more, the child is detained on secure detention. For a youth who is on probation, the underlying charge for which that youth was placed on probation and/or the “legal status” of the youth itself will always be taken into account under the DRAI and will make secure detention significantly more likely than had the youth not been on probation on a number of fronts. This is also true for a youth on commitment status, in the case of conditional release. The highest scoring underlying charge may be used to assess the juvenile for probation if the new law violation does not score enough points for the juvenile to be securely detained. Therefore, there are days served in secure detention based on the scoring of the underlying charge for which the juvenile is on probation, and not the new law violation. In addition, there are a number of points resulting from the underlying charge for which the juvenile is on probation, regardless of whether the DRAI is scored on the new law violation or the underlying charge. A juvenile on probation will always get points purely for his or her legal status of probation. The number of points depends on the amount of time since the last adjudication or adjudication withheld. Six points is assigned for active probation cases with the last adjudication or adjudication withheld within 90 days. Two points are assigned if the last adjudication or adjudication withheld was more than 90 days ago. Similarly, the legal status of commitment, in the case of conditional release, also results in points towards secure detention. The prior adjudication or adjudication withheld which resulted in the probation or commitment status would also score points under the prior history section of the DRAI. In many cases, the underlying charge for which the youth is on probation will be the deciding factor regarding whether the youth is held in secure detention. Thus, the DRAI is significantly affected by a probationary status which adds additional points, and can trigger secure detention, regardless of the nature of the new law violation. In addition, a trial judge has the discretion to place a youth in secure detention on a violation of probation for committing a new law offense even when the score on the DRAI does not mandate secure detention. The Juvenile Justice Information System (“JJIS”) is an extensive database maintained by the Department, and utilized during the process of billing the counties for secure juvenile detention. The reason for the detention stay can be readily ascertained based on information entered into JJIS at the time a juvenile is assessed and detained. For instance, in the case of a violation of probation, there is always a referral for a violation of probation entered by the probation officer. This is true whether the violation is a new law violation or a technical violation of the terms of the probation. In addition, the Department can also ascertain from JJIS whether the juvenile was scored on the new law violation or, alternatively, the underlying charge which resulted in probation. The Department concedes that it can determine, in any given instance, why a juvenile has been detained. As acknowledged by the Department, the responsibility for days, whether predisposition or postdisposition, should be based on the reason for the detention. Probation is considered a postdisposition status. Likewise, detention days of juveniles on probation are postdispositional, and the financial responsibility of the State. Under the Proposed Rules, the only exception are those instances in which a youth is on probation and is detained because the youth is charged with a new violation of law, in which case the detention days prior to final court disposition on the new charge are the responsibility of the counties. This finding is further supported by the Department’s treatment of juveniles on conditional release, which is also a postdispositional status. When a youth is on conditional release with the Department, the youth is on supervision similar to probation supervision. Conditional release and probation contain the same standard conditions. The only essential difference between a youth on “conditional release” and a youth on probation is that a youth on conditional release has the status of commitment rather than probation. There is no real difference in how a probation officer treats a youth on conditional release or a youth on probation and the DRAI does not provide any distinction for the two legal statuses. The Department considers both probation and conditional release qualified postdispositional statuses. Under the Proposed Rules, the counties pay for detention days for youth on probation who commit a new law violation. This is true regardless of whether the youth would be placed in secure detention but for the probation. However, detention days incurred by the same youth who commits a technical violation of probation are deemed the responsibility of the state, since, under the Proposed Rules, the youth has not been charged with a new violation of law. Under the Proposed Rules, when a youth on conditional release commits either a new law violation or technical violation of conditional release and is placed in secure detention, those detention days are to be paid by the State. The Two Day Rule As part of the Notice of Change, the Department added a provision referred to as “the Two Day Rule” to the definitions for pre and postdisposition. The Two Day Rule provides that detention days where the youth is on probation are the responsibility of the state “unless the youth is charged with a new violation of law that has a referral date between zero and two days prior to the detention admission date, as determined by subtracting the referral date in JJIS from the detention admission date in JJIS.” Proposed Rule 63G-1.011(15)(b). Despite conceding that it knows why juveniles are being detained, the Department included the “Two Day Rule” in the Proposed Rule “[b]ecause it is difficult to determine the level of accuracy in the aggregate looking at thousands of cases at once.” Thus, the Two Day Rule captures when the Department receives a referral date for a new criminal charge and presumes that if a juvenile is put in secure detention within two days of that referral date, the detention is for that new charge. In some instances, detention days that should be treated as state days would in fact be treated as county days under the “Two Day Rule.” Mark Greenwald, Director of Research and Planning for the Department, testified: Q. Well, let’s see how factually this would work is that there is a referral for a charge, a new offense, and the youth is detained the next day on a contempt unrelated to that new charge. Isn’t that day going to now be--he is going to be detained because of a violation of the law because of your two-day rule? A. Under the rule, yes, the open charge would count. Q. But if he was a probationer and it was a contempt, that would not have been a county day. That would be a State day. A. Yes. Q. But now because of the two-day rule we will now treat that as a county responsibility and county responsibility for the cost? A. Yes. Other examples were cited in the testimony, such as where there was a pick-up order for a youth on probation who had absconded. Where there was also a new charge, the detention days would be billed to the county, even if the pick-up order was issued prior to the new law violation. Mr. Greenwald testified that when the Department decided to adopt the Two Day Rule, it had done no analysis to determine whether a One Day Rule or a Three Day Rule would more accurately identify probationary youths placed in detention due to a new law violation. Both Judges Orlando and LaRue expressed uncertainty regarding the applicability and utility of the Two Day Rule, noting that the Two Day Rule does not have any correlation or relationship to when or how juveniles are placed in secure detention for violations of probation. Judge LaRue further indicated that the term “referral date” as referenced in the Two Day Rule has no impact on what he does “whatsoever” and is a term: I’ve never heard before. I don’t use that term. I’ve never heard the term. This is something that, in reviewing this potential rule change here – or the rule change, I should say, that’s something I came across and scratched my head a little bit about exactly what it means. I think I know what it means. But it’s not a term that I use – it’s not a term of art, and it’s not a term that I use generally. The evidence adduced at hearing did not establish a rational basis for inclusion of the Two Day Rule provision in the definitions of pre and postdisposition. Notably absent was any credible evidence that use of the Two Day Rule would accurately identify detention days related to new law violations by probationers. To the contrary, the evidence established that use of a blanket metric, arbitrarily set at two days, would under several scenarios improperly shift responsibility for detention days to the counties. Moreover, given the capabilities of the JJIS, there is simply no reason to “assume” that a detention has resulted from a new law violation if within a given period of time from referral, when the Department has the ability to accurately determine the actual reason for the detention. Estimates, Reconciliation and Actual Costs At the start of the fiscal year, the Department provides an estimate to the counties of their respective costs of secure detention which is broken down into 12 installments that the counties pay on a monthly basis. At the end of the fiscal year, the Department performs a reconciliation of those costs based on the “actual costs” and sends a statement to each county showing under or overpayment, and providing for debits and credits as appropriate. The credits or debits would be applied to the current year billing, although they would relate to the previous fiscal year. Proposed Rule 63G-1.013 provides the process for calculating the estimate to each county at the beginning of the fiscal year. As part of this process, the Proposed Rule provides that the Department shall estimate “detention costs, using the current year actual expenditures projected through the end of the fiscal year, with necessary annualized adjustments for any new legislative appropriations within the detention budget entity.” The Department has modified its process in the Proposed Rules so that the estimate of costs is based, to a certain extent, on actual expenditures from the prior year, instead of the appropriation. However, the estimate process also takes into account the appropriation for the upcoming fiscal year, and a portion of the estimate of costs is still based on the appropriation. The Department concedes that there is a need for it to calculate the estimate as accurately as possible, and that there have been occasions in the past where the Department has not provided the counties credits owed as part of the reconciliation process. It is also clear from the record that credits for overpayments have not been provided by the Department to the counties for several fiscal years, beginning in FY 2009-10. Proposed Rule 63G-1.017 provides the annual reconciliation process at year end for determining each county’s actual costs for secure detention. This process includes the calculation of each county’s actual cost which is determined by the number of detention days and a calculation of the actual costs. The total “actual costs” for secure detention are divided by the “total number of service days” to produce an “actual per diem,” which is then applied to each county’s detention days to calculate each county’s share of the actual costs. Proposed Rule 63G-1.011 provides a definition for “actual costs” as follows: [T]he total detention expenditures as reported by the department after the certified forward period has ended, less $2.5 million provided for additional medical and mental health care per section 985.686(3). These costs include expenditures in all fund types and appropriations categories (Salaries & Benefits, Other Personal Services, Expenses, OCO, Food Products, Legislative Initiatives, Fiscally Constrained Counties, Contracted Service, G/A-Contracted Services, Risk Management Insurance, Lease or Lease- Purchase of Equipment, Human Resources Outsourcing, and FCO-Maintenance & Repair). The challengers assert that the proposed rules relating to the reconciliation process are vague, internally inconsistent, and inconsistent with statutory requirements contained in the law implemented. These include, but are not limited to: (1) the definition of actual costs fails to include an exclusion for “the costs of preadjudicatory nonmedical educational or therapeutic services” pursuant to section 985.686(3); (2) the definition of actual costs is over broad by including “expenditures in all fund types and appropriations categories;” and (3) the Proposed Rules fail to provide for input from the counties, as set forth in section 985.686(6). The Proposed Rules do not provide for input from the counties regarding the calculations the Department makes for detention cost share.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has presented clear and convincing evidence that he is of good moral character, and should be granted an exemption from employment disqualification, thereby allowing him to work in a position of special trust or responsibility pursuant to Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 25, 1995, the Orlando Police Department responded to an emergency call from Petitioner's residence. Petitioner was arrested and charged with domestic violence, aggravated assault and false imprisonment. The domestic violence and false imprisonment charges were subsequently dropped. Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the reduced misdemeanor charge of simple assault upon his wife, an act of domestic violence. On September 18, 1996, adjudication of guilt was withheld by the Orange County Circuit Court. Petitioner was given credit for 43 days time served in the Orange County Jail. He was also ordered to pay court costs. Petitioner was not placed on probation and was not ordered to attend domestic violence counseling. Petitioner disputes the narrative contained in the charging affidavit and claims that at no time did he threaten his wife, and that the firearm was present in the room only for cleaning, and was not displayed inappropriately. Petitioner's description of the events is not credible. Petitioner began work as a detention care worker at the Orange Regional Juvenile Detention Center in October 1995. The position required a level 2 background screening be conducted. On August 23, 1996, Petitioner submitted an affidavit of Good Moral Character which did not disclose his arrest or sentence. In August of 1996, a background screening request packet was submitted to the Background Screening Unit of Respondent's Inspector General's office. A preliminary FCIC/NCIC screening check conducted on Petitioner revealed that he had a disqualifying offense (assault on a spouse). His background screening received a rating of "Unfavorable Disqualifying." In a letter from Respondent dated August 7, 1997, Petitioner was notified that he had been disqualified and was, therefore, ineligible to work in a caretaker's position with Respondent. This disqualification was based upon the 1995 domestic assault charge. Petitioner is a 52-year-old Divinity School graduate and former church minister. Petitioner holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree from Bethune-Cookman College in Daytona Beach, and a Master of Divinity Degree from Morehouse School of Religion in Atlanta. Prior to commencing his employment with Respondent, Petitioner had successfully worked with juveniles for many years in a variety of capacities, to-wit: school teacher, counselor, youth group leader, civic leader, and minister. Petitioner received numerous awards and certificates documenting his involvement with and commitment to the welfare of his community and of juveniles in particular. After starting his work as a Detention Care Worker at the Orlando Regional Juvenile Detention Center, several Juvenile Detention Center workers in both supervisory and co-worker roles testified to the exceptional quality and caliber of Petitioner's work with juveniles. Since the alleged incident of domestic violence three years ago, no claim of any other alleged illegal conduct has been made against Petitioner.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust be GRANTED. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 1998, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Timothy Terry, Esquire 1407 East Robinson Street Post Office Box 536914 Orlando, Florida 32801 Lynne Winston, Esquire Inspector General's Office 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Janet Ferris, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner Ronald Winkfield was employed as a detention care worker with the Hillsborough Regional Juvenile Detention Center in February of 1982, and was assigned to work the midnight to 8:00 A.M. shift. On or about June 8, 1981, Mr. Winkfield was involved in an automobile accident, received injuries and returned to work on or about August 17, 1981. He claims that he still suffers severe headaches as a result of the accident and that his work with delinquents caused him mental strain. The logs of the Detention Center illustrate that Mr. Winkfield missed four days of work during the first week of February, and called in sick on the first two of those four days. On February 7, 8, 9 and 10, 1982, Mr. Winkfield again did not appear for duty and did not call in sick on any of those days. Employees of the Detention Center working the midnight to 8:00 A.M. shift were instructed to call in before 6:00 P.M. if they were not going to report for work that night. Petitioner admits that he did not report for work on February 7, 8, 9 or 10, 1982, and that he did not call in on those dates to report his absence. He explains that he did not call in because an employee told him during the first week of February that she would not accept his calls unless he brought in a doctor's certificate stating that he was unable to work. About 11:45 P.M. on February 10, 1982, Mr. Winkfield was seen at a doughnut shop getting out of a Tampa Tribune truck. Petitioner was employed by the Tampa Tribune to deliver papers in February of 1982. A week or two before February 7, 1982, a personnel officer discussed with Mr. Winkfield the procedure for obtaining time off without pay. Mr. Winkfield never formally applied for leave without pay. By letter dated February 12, 1982, the Assistant Supervisor of the Hillsborough Regional Juvenile Detention Center advised Mr. Winkfield that he was deemed to have abandoned his position and to have resigned from the Career Service because of his failure to report to work for four consecutive workdays without authorized leave.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered concluding that petitioner Ronald Winkfield has abandoned his position of employment and resigned from the Career Service. Respectfully submitted and entered this 7th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald Winkfield 5914 82nd Street Tampa, Florida 33619 Amelia M. Park, Esquire District VI Legal Counsel Department of HRS 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Tampa, Florida 33614 David Pingree, Secretary Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
