Findings Of Fact Petitioner took the examination for licensure as a laboratory supervisor in 1981, 1982, 1984 and 1985. In the fall of 1984 he passed that portion of the examination covering Immunohistology but failed the portion covering Supervision and Administration. His score on the Immunohemotology portion was 32 with 31 required for a passing grade. On the Supervision and Administration portion his score was 47 with 48 required to pass. On June 6, 1985, the rules affecting laboratory personnel licensing was changed to require candidates for the examination for which Petitioner applied to hold a bachelor's degree. Petitioner does not hold a bachelor's degree and acknowledged that he does not meet the current academic requirements to sit for the examination. Although the required procedures for making rule changes were followed by Respondent, Petitioner contends that he was not advised of the proposed changes, and, had he been so advised, he would have applied to retake the examination in Supervision and Administration before the rule changes became effective and would have qualified to sit for the examination. Respondent's witness presented Petitioner's record. This record shows that Petitioner, in October 1984 passed the Immunohistology portion of the examination and failed the Supervision and Administration portion by one point. This record also revealed that Petitioner applied to retake the examination in Supervision and Administration in January 1985 and sat for this examination in April 1985. On the examination his test score was 39 with 48 required to pass.
The Issue The issues are as follows: (a) whether Petitioner attempted to obtain a license by misrepresenting or concealing material facts at any time during any phase of the licensing process in violation of Section 458.331(1)(gg), Florida Statutes; (b) whether Petitioner meets the training requirements pursuant to Section 458.331(1)(f), Florida Statutes; (c) whether Petitioner has had a license to practice medicine acted against by the licensing authority of another jurisdiction in violation of Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statues; and (d) whether Petitioner was convicted or found guilty or entered a plea of nolo contendere to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction that directly relates to the practice of medicine in violation of Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a medical doctor. He is currently licensed to practice medicine in Mississippi. Petitioner attended the University of Lagos, College of Medicine, in Lagos, Nigeria. While he was in medical school, Petitioner failed a pathology class. He did not have to repeat the entire class, but he was required to retake the examination in order to get credit for the course. In 1972, Petitioner graduated from the University of Lagos, College of Medicine, which is an allopathic foreign medical school. However, the medical school has not been recognized and approved by an accrediting agency recognized by the United States Office of Education (U.S.O.E.). Additionally, Petitioner's medical school is not located within a territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The U.S.O.E. has designated the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME) as the approved accrediting organization. Pursuant to this designation, LCME only has authority to accredit medical schools in the United States and Canada. Foreign medical schools are not accredited by anyone in the United States. The U.S.O.E. has not designated an accrediting organization for foreign medical schools other than those located in Canada. Each foreign medical school (excluding Canada) is accredited by its own country. Therefore, Petitioner is not eligible for licensure pursuant to Section 458.311(f)1., Florida Statutes. The World Health Organization does not approve/accredit medical schools. Additionally, Respondent has never certified a foreign medical school pursuant to Section 458.314, Florida Statutes. Therefore, Petitioner is not eligible for licensure pursuant to Section 458.311(f)2., Florida Statutes. Graduates of foreign medical schools, which have not been certified pursuant to Section 458.314, Florida Statutes, must meet the requirements of Section 458.311(f)3., Florida Statutes. Petitioner meets these requirements in part because his medical credentials have been evaluated by the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG). He holds an active, valid certificate issued by ECFMG and has passed the examination utilized by that commission. Since October 1, 1992, graduates of foreign medical schools like Petitioner must complete an approved residency or fellowship of at least two years in one specialty area. The training must count toward regular or subspecialty certification by a board recognized and certified by the American Board of Medical Specialties. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Member Education (ACGME) is the body that certifies training programs in the United States. Petitioner has not completed an ACGME-approved residency or fellowship of at least two years in one specialty area. From October 1975 to September 1976, Petitioner completed one year of residency training in the Meharry Medical College Family Practice program at George W. Hubbard Hospital, in Nashville, Tennessee. He has not completed any other residency or fellowship training. Therefore, Petitioner is not eligible for licensure pursuant to Section 458.311(f)3., Florida Statutes. In late 1984 or early 1985, Petitioner had a private medical practice in Holly Springs, Mississippi. He lived across the state border in Tennessee where he maintained a business office. Petitioner also advertised his medical practice in a Tennessee newspaper. On or about September 3, 1985, Petitioner pled no contest to a criminal charge that he had met with and talked to four separate ladies about family planning in his Memphis, Tennessee, office. The Criminal Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, found Petitioner guilty of operating an ambulatory surgery treatment center without a license. Petitioner was required to pay a fine in the amount of $2,000.00. In August of 1989, the Mississippi Division of Medicaid initiated sanction proceedings against Petitioner for performing excessive routine laboratory tests in his private practice. In November 1990, the Medicaid and Medicare programs in Mississippi suspended Petitioner as a provider for three years. On or about July 26, 1991, the Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure issued an order revoking Petitioner's Mississippi medical license. The order was affirmed on appeal. The Mississippi Board of Medical Licensure reinstated Petitioner's Mississippi medical license with conditions in August 1997. In September 1999, the Mississippi Board of Medical Licensure removed the restrictions/limitations from Petitioner's medical license. In February 2001, Petitioner had privileges at Hardy Wilson Memorial Hospital in Hazlehurst, Mississippi. Petitioner made the decision that he could no longer afford medical malpractice insurance. Because the hospital required physicians to have malpractice insurance, the hospital reduced Petitioner's clinical privileges. Although the timing of these events is not clear, Petitioner voluntarily resigned his privileges at the hospital. In April 2003, Petitioner signed an application form for medical licensure by endorsement in Florida. Petitioner filed the application with Respondent in June 2003. The April 2003 application contained the following affidavit, signed by Petitioner on April 6, 2003: I have carefully read the questions in the foregoing application and have answered them completely, without reservations of any kind, and I declare under penalty of perjury that my answers and all statements made by me herein are true and correct. Should I furnish any false information in this application, I hereby agree that such act shall constitute cause for denial, suspension or revocation of my license to practice Medicine in the State of Florida. Question 12b on the April 2003 application inquired whether Petitioner had been required to repeat any of his medical education. The question states that if the answer is "yes," the applicant should explain on a separate sheet providing accurate details. Petitioner answered Question 12b on the April 2003 application in the negative. His answer was misleading and inaccurate because it did not disclose that he had to retake an examination in order to pass a pathology course. Question 18 on the April 2003 application asked several questions, three of which are relevant here. First, the application inquired whether Petitioner currently held staff privileges in any hospital, health institution, clinic or medical facility. Petitioner answered "yes" to this question. Second, Question 18 instructed Petitioner to list any hospital/health institution/clinic or medical facility where he held staff privileges. Petitioner listed Jefferson County Hospital, Emergency Room Privileges. Third, Question 18 inquired whether Petitioner had ever had any staff privileges denied, suspended, revoked, modified, restricted, placed on probation, asked to resign or asked to take a temporary leave of absence or otherwise acted against by any facility. Petitioner answered this question negatively. Question 23 on the April 2003 application inquired whether Petitioner had ever been convicted or found guilty, regardless of adjudication, resolution, or expungement, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to a criminal misdemeanor or felony in any jurisdiction. Petitioner answered this question in the negative. Question 24 on the April 2003 application inquired whether, regardless of adjudication, Petitioner had ever been convicted of a violation of, or pled nolo contendere to, any federal, state, or local statute, regulation, or ordinance, or entered into any plea, negotiated plea, bargain, or settlement relating to a misdemeanor or felony, or ever had an adjudication, resolution or expungement. Petitioner answered this question in the negative. In a letter dated July 31, 2004, Respondent advised Petitioner that his application was incomplete. Among other things, Respondent stated that it was waiting for a response to an inquiry directed to Jefferson County Hospital, verifying Petitioner's staff privileges and good standing. Respondent also requested Petitioner to complete and file an current/updated application form. In August 2003, Petitioner filed the updated application with Respondent. In response to Question 16 on the updated application, Petitioner once again denied that he was required to repeat any of his medical education? In response to Questions 27 and 28 on the updated application, Petitioner continued to maintain that he currently held privileges at Jefferson County Hospital in Fayette, Mississippi. In response to Question 29 on the updated application, Petitioner, continued to assert that he had never had any facility staff privileges denied, suspended, revoked, modified, restricted, placed on probation, or asked to resign. Petitioner appeared before Respondent's Credentialing Committee in November 2003. The committee was obligated to review Petitioner's entire application file, including the April 2003 application and the August 2003 application. Petitioner failed to disclose his Tennessee criminal conviction on the April 2003 application. The conviction is related to practice of medicine because it involved Petitioner talking to patients from a Tennessee office. During the hearing, Petitioner identified the following two letters of recommendation: (a) Willie L. McArthur, M.D., on Jefferson County Family Medicine Center letterhead; and (b) Bernadette E. Sherman, M.D. on Jefferson Comprehensive Health Center, Inc. letterhead. Neither of the letters refers to Petitioner's privileges at Jefferson County Hospital. Petitioner testified that he answered Question 18 on the April 2003 application and Questions 27 and 28 on the updated application correctly, affirming that he held privileges at Jefferson County Hospital. There is no evidence to the contrary. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner's reduction of clinical privileges at Hardy Wilson Memorial Hospital was due to his decisions not to secure malpractice insurance and to voluntarily resign his privileges. Therefore, he did not answer Question 18 on the April 2003 application and/or Question 29 on the updated application incorrectly.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a medical license by endorsement. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Rosanna M. Catalano, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Olufemi Okunoren, M.D. Post Office Box 1992 Madison, Mississippi 39130 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed an application for certification as a physician assistant pursuant to Section 458.347(7)(b), Florida Statutes, a special avenue of certification as a physician assistant for graduates of foreign medical schools. In furtherance of that application, he appeared before the Physician Assistant Committee of the Board of Medicine. Subsequent to his appearance before that Committee, on August 13, 1992, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: This is to advise that your application for issuance of a temporary certification with the requirement that prior to issuance of temporary certificate you submit within 30 days of date of appearance, a new corrected and complete application to be reviewed by the Board staff. Please complete the enclosed application. You will be required, as a condition to take the examination, 2 new personalized letters of recommendation, specifically recommending you as a physician assistant. The letter did not enclose an application form for Petitioner to complete. Respondent admits that the information in the letter was incorrect because it confused temporary certification with the requirements for examination. It is apparent that the letter is also incorrect because it fails to advise Petitioner if his application was being granted or denied; moreover, the wording of the letter makes no sense. By Order dated August 26, 1992, the Board of Medicine notified Petitioner that his application for temporary certification as a physician assistant was denied pursuant to the Committee's August 1 determination and the Board's August 9 determination that the length of time since Petitioner had last worked in the field of medicine or received significant medical education or training precluded him from being able to establish that he could practice as a physician assistant with reasonable skill and safety to the public. That Order further advised Petitioner, however, that the Board had granted Petitioner's application to sit for the certification examination pursuant to Section 458.347(7)(b), Florida Statutes, because Petitioner was eligible to take the examination to become certified as a physician assistant and that passage of the examination would serve to establish Petitioner's qualifications for practice. The Order specifically provided that the Board's permission for Petitioner to sit for the certification examination was "contingent upon and subsequent to receipt within 30 days" of Petitioner's appearance before the Physician Assistant Committee of (1) a complete and correct application and (2) two more letters of recommendation which specifically recommend Petitioner as a physician assistant. It would have been difficult for Petitioner to timely comply with the Order entered August 26 requiring him to file documents within 30 days of his August 1 appearance before the Committee. By letter dated August 31, 1992, Petitioner requested an extension of one week by which to obtain the second letter of recommendation due to the devastation produced by Hurricane Andrew and Petitioner's inability to communicate with the doctor who would sign it. Petitioner did, however, submit another application which was postmarked August 31, 1992, and received by Respondent early in September. At hearing, Respondent advised that it was waiving the 30-day deadline contained in the August 26, 1992, Order due to the intervention of Hurricane Andrew and because Respondent had not strictly enforced such deadlines as to other applicants. Rather, Respondent simply required that Petitioner comply with its Order within a reasonable period of time. By letter dated December 21, 1992, Respondent advised Petitioner that his application was incomplete because the Board had only received Petitioner's new application, one letter of recommendation, and Petitioner's request for an extension of time for submittal of the second letter. The letter further advised that the Board's staff's review of Petitioner's recent application had revealed some discrepancies requiring an explanation by Petitioner. The letter, therefore, advised Petitioner to submit one more recommendation letter, provide an explanation for six specified areas, and submit pages 8 and 9 of the application regarding Petitioner's clerkships. The letter further advised Petitioner that all information must be received by the Board no later than December 31, 1992. On January 20, 1993, Respondent received an undated letter from Petitioner referencing Respondent's December 21, 1992, letter which was received by Petitioner on December 30. Petitioner's letter enclosed the additional letter of recommendation requested by the Board, responded specifically to the six areas of inquiry, and enclosed pages 8 and 9 of the Board's application form. On January 20, 1993, the Board received a letter from Dr. Jose M. Bermudez, recommending Petitioner as a physician assistant. On January 28, 1993, the Board sent Petitioner a letter advising him that the Board had received the letter of recommendation from Dr. Bermudez and pages 8 and 9 of the application. That letter further provided as follows: However, the Physician Assistant Committee required you to submit a new complete and accurate application, and two (2) additional letters of recommendation which specifically recommend you as a physician assistant. Enclosed you will find a complete physician assistant application. Please fill the application out in its entirety and submit it to the Board of Medicine as soon as possible. In compliance with that request, Petitioner submitted yet another application for certification as a physician assistant, which was received by the Board on February 8, 1993. On February 24, 1993, the Board of Medicine entered its Order denying Petitioner's application for certification as a physician assistant. The Order recited that the denial was based upon the determination made by the Physician Assistant Committee on January 8 and by the Board on January 13 because Petitioner "failed to submit a new and complete and accurate application and one new personalized letter of recommendation within the time frame allotted by the Board." That Order does not mention Petitioner's application to sit for the certification examination, the issue pending before the Board, since the Board had already denied Petitioner's application for certification by Order entered August 26, 1992. That February Order also advised Petitioner of his right to request an administrative hearing regarding the Board's determination. On February 26, 1993, the Board's staff sent Petitioner a letter advising him that he had been certified by the Board to take the examination for licensure as a physician assistant to be administered in September, 1993. On March 10, 1993, the staff sent Petitioner a letter acknowledging Petitioner's "request for a hearing on the denial of your application for certification as a physician assistant," and advising Petitioner that the February letter advising him that he had been certified to take the examination for licensure as a physician assistant had been sent to Petitioner in error. A "corrected" letter was enclosed. That "corrected" letter dated March 10 advised Petitioner that the Board had preliminarily denied him certification to take the examination for licensure as a physician assistant. By letter dated March 18, 1993, the Board's staff sent an additional letter to Petitioner advising Petitioner as to the correct dates for the examination. In applying for temporary certification as a physician assistant and/or to sit for the certification examination, Petitioner has filed an additional application each time he has been instructed to do so by the Board or by the Board's staff and has submitted a letter explaining the information given in his applications each time that the Board's staff has requested that he do so. Petitioner has filed at least three such applications and has responded by letter to inquiries regarding the contents of his applications at least three times. Additionally, Petitioner has personally appeared before the Physician Assistant Committee on August 1, 1992, to be questioned regarding his qualifications. The Board has discovered some "discrepancies" or omissions in analyzing those various documents. Petitioner's August application states that the ending date for medical school, assumedly the date he received his degree, was February 25, 1965. That date appears in three places. Further, the copy of his diploma submitted to the Board reflects that date. Yet, the December 21, 1992, form from the Board to Petitioner advises him that he must explain his ending date for medical school. In response to that indication that he must provide different information, Petitioner's letter received by the Board on January 20, 1993, states that the ending date for medical school was February 29, 1962. At hearing, Petitioner explained that he attempted to differentiate between the date he completed classes and the date he completed all requirements, including internships, in order to receive his diploma. The information contained in Petitioner's application is correct. The August application contains an answer in the negative to question numbered 9 asking Petitioner if he is or has ever been emotionally or mentally ill. Although Petitioner's subsequent February 1993 application contains no answer to that question, the Board did not have before it the February application when it decided in January to deny Petitioner's application. Even so, Petitioner had no intention to be incomplete or inaccurate when he failed to answer that question on the February application. In his August application Petitioner does not list the completion of any social service work in either section inquiring about post-graduate training or practice employment. In an application that Petitioner filed in 1985 requesting licensure as a physician, Petitioner had specifically detailed the social service work performed by him as part of his medical school training. In that application he listed the dates as January 1, 1963 to December 31, 1963. The letter Petitioner wrote to the Board in response to its December 1992 request for a better explanation states that his social service work was done between March 1, 1963 and September 30, 1963. There is no dispute regarding whether Petitioner did in fact complete his social service work requirement as part of his education in order to receive his diploma, and it is clear that such work was done in 1963. Although there is a discrepancy regarding which months during 1963 he did his social work, the discrepancy as to the months during which Petitioner did something 30 years ago does not make his application inaccurate. In fact, the August application may be more accurate than the 1985 application form. The August application required Petitioner to list in chronological order from the date of graduation to the present all practice experience and/or employment. Petitioner advised that from February 28, 1970, to April 30, 1976, he was in private practice in Nicaragua. The Board's December 1992 letter asked for clarification because a prior application indicated additional activity. Petitioner's response letter advised that he was also in pediatric practice at the General Hospital of Managua from 1970 to 1972. His 1985 application did not mention the pediatric practice at General Hospital. At final hearing, Petitioner explained that he was in private practice at the same time that he practiced at the clinic in the hospital. Petitioner's 1985 and February 1993 applications, although not the subject of this proceeding, also contained some minor discrepancies regarding Petitioner's employment experience. For example, one shows Petitioner beginning his employment with the Nicaraguan Red Cross on May 1, 1976, and the other shows Petitioner's employment beginning on May 31, 1976. The parties do not dispute that Petitioner in fact practiced with the Nicaraguan Red Cross during that time period. In further response to the question requiring Petitioner to list all of his practice experience or employment, Petitioner did not list his activities from September 10, 1984, and thereafter. The Board's December 21, 1992, letter to him requested that he account for all his activities for the time period of January 1, 1984, and thereafter. In his response he did not identify those activities except to say that during that time period he was living in Miami. The detailed information had been provided to the Board in response to a letter to Petitioner from the Board dated March 8, 1992, in conjunction with his original application for certification as a physician assistant, although he did not again provide that information when he was ordered by the Board to file a new application. In Petitioner's August application, he listed no ending date regarding his private practice begun on January 1, 1984 in Managua, Nicaragua. Petitioner's 1985 physician license application showed that that employment ended September 10, 1984, whereas his February application showed that practice to have ended on September 15, 1984. Such a discrepancy is not material to Petitioner's application or eligibility. The application form contains a section regarding clerkships and requests that each clerkship be specified. In the August application Petitioner did not specify his four individual clerkships. After being asked pursuant to the Board's staff's December 1992 letter to resubmit pages 8 and 9 as to his clerkships, Petitioner did so by referring to them as a group rather than breaking them down individually. He did the same in the February 1993 application. The parties do not dispute that Petitioner performed the required clerkships. It is unclear how many letters recommending him as a physician assistant Petitioner has submitted to the Board. Petitioner referenced his submittal of photocopies of the "last two" letters of recommendation, the originals of which had previously been submitted to the Board, in a letter that Petitioner sent the Board in March of 1992. In correspondence from the Board to Petitioner in May of 1992 reference is made to the requirement that Petitioner submit another letter of recommendation because the Board did not have the original of that letter in its file. When the Board's staff instructed Petitioner to appear before the Physician Assistant Committee on August 1, 1992, the absence of necessary letters of recommendation was not one of the reasons given. The Board's August 26, 1992, Order requests "two more letters", which indicates that letters had been previously submitted. The staff's December 21, 1992, communication to Petitioner acknowledges receipt of one additional letter but requests another, which request was complied with at least by the submittal of the letter from Dr. Bermudez received by the Board on January 20, 1993. Petitioner applied to be certified as a physician assistant and the Board determined that he was eligible to take the examination. Thereafter, through a series of mistakes and correct acts, the Board's staff requested Petitioner on a number of occasions to file additional applications which he did. When the Board's staff asked for clarification he responded in writing and by telephone call, and the Board agrees that it has telephone slips in Petitioner's file. Each time the Board's staff asked for different information than had been given in Petitioner's previous application(s), Petitioner provided more and/or different information. There is no suggestion that Petitioner attempted to provide inaccurate or false information, and it is found that Petitioner provided correct and complete information to the best of his ability. Petitioner's mistakes are certainly no greater than the mistakes made by the Board's staff in sending Petitioner conflicting instructions, conflicting correspondence, and one letter that did not make any sense.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered permitting Petitioner to sit for the physician assistant examination to be administered during September of 1993. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 93-1550 Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-10 have been adopted in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 11 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Catherine Lannon, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Enrique Rueda Arguello 9409 Fountainbleau Boulevard, Apt. #101 Miami, Florida 33172 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact This cause was scheduled for formal hearing to commence at 9:30 a.m. on August 19, 1996, by Notice of Hearing entered June 7, 1996. Although Respondent appeared for the formal hearing, Petitioner did not and no one appeared on Petitioner's behalf. The hearing was adjourned at 10:25 a.m. To date, Petitioner has made no contact and has filed no document or other pleading regarding Petitioner's failure to appear. As a result of Petitioner's failure to respond to Respondent's Request for Admissions, the following statements, inter alia, have been deemed admitted: Petitioner did not graduate from high school and does not have a graduation equivalency diploma (GED). Petitioner has not completed a Board- approved school-based ABHES program, a Board-approved laboratory-based training program with 400 hours in the specialty for which Petitioner seeks licensure plus a completed Board-approved general clinical laboratory course, or a medical licensed technician program accredited by CAHEA or CAAHEP or NAACLS. Petitioner has not completed coursework on HIV/AIDS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a clinical laboratory technician. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1996, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Diane Orcutt, Executive Director Agency for Health Care Administration Board of Clinical Laboratory Personnel 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Mr. Jose N. Gonzalez 12820 Southwest 43rd Drive Apartment 232D Miami, Florida 33175 Michael Mone, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Shelly Gans, graduated from high school in June, 1973. She attended Broward Community College during terms 1 and 3 of the 1973-74 academic year, where she earned fifteen (15) credits. She does not have two years of academic study as required by Rule 10D-41.069(5). She then attended Sheridan Vocational Technical Center from February, 1974 to February, 1975. She was thereafter employed by Dr. Stephen Katzman from March, 1975 through August, 1979 as a technologist doing laboratory testing including phlebotomy. She was thereafter employed at Florida Medical Center as a technologist doing blood banking, hematology, chemistry and part time phlebotomy. Ms. Gans passed the October, 1983 proficiency examination for clinical laboratory technologists given by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control. After passing the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services examination, Ms. Gans was licensed as a clinical laboratory technician by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Office of Licensure and Certification, Laboratory Personnel Licensure, through June 30, 1986. In October, 1984, Ms. Gans was examined by HRS for licensure as a clinical laboratory technologist in the specialties of clinical chemistry, hematology and immuno- hematology. She passed the immunohematology examination but failed the hematology and clinical chemistry examinations. She re-applied and took those examinations in April, 1985 when she passed the hematology examination but failed the chemistry examination a second time. Under Rule 10D- 41.071(9), Florida Administrative Code, Ms. Gans was required to take continuing education before she could re-apply to sit for the chemical chemistry examination a third time. Ms. Gans enrolled in Broward Community College in the second term of the 1985-1986 school year and took three hours in general chemistry. That course ended after January 1, 1986. She re-applied for examination as a technologist in the specialty of clinical chemistry on July 14, 1986. Her application for that examination was denied on August 14, 1986 because she did not have sixty (60) semesters of college credits which the Department believed was required under Section 10D-41.C69(5), Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Shelly Gans be permitted to sit for the technologist examination in clinical chemistry when it is next given because she meets the requirements of Rule 10D- 41.069(6), as currently written and has taken retraining in clinical chemistry after she twice failed the examination, as is required by Rule 10D-41.071(9), Florid Administrative Code. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3670 The following constitute my rulings on proposed findings of fact pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, (1985). Rulings on Proposed Findings by Petitioner The proposals by the Petitioner are generally in the form of argument rather than proposed findings of fact. Relevant proposed factual findings have been made in the Recommended Order. Rulings on Proposed Findings by Respondent Covered in Finding of Fact 4. Covered in Finding of Fact 4. Covered in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as an improper reading of Rule 10D-41.069(6). Rejected because the issue is not when notice of the rule was given, but what the rule says. Rejected as based on hearsay. Moreover, even if it was the intention of Centers of Disease Control that the Department of Health and Human Services examination not be a permanent means of credentialing in lieu of education and experience requirements, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has not implemented that intent in the rule which it enacted. Rejected as unnecessary. That Ms. Gans' application was received after January 1, 1986 is covered in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael O. Mathis Staff Attorney HRS Office of Licensure & Certification 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Shelly Gans 4163 Southwest 67th Avenue Apartment 104C Davie, Florida 33314 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure by endorsement. Specific to the grounds for denial are the issues of whether Petitioner is of good moral character and whether he is able to practice with skill and safety.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the testimony of the witnesses, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: The Petitioner, Norman M. Phillips, M.D., is a graduate of St. George's University School of Medicine, Grenada, West Indies, a foreign medical school. Petitioner holds a certificate from the Educational Commission on Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) and has passed the ECFMG examination. Petitioner obtained a passing score on the licensing examination of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc. (FLEX). Petitioner is licensed to practice medicine in New Jersey. Petitioner is over 21 years of age. Petitioner has completed at least one year of an approved residency. The Petitioner has not committed any act or offense in any jurisdiction which would constitute the basis for disciplining a physician, pursuant to Section 458.331(1) or (2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner applied for licensure by endorsement as a physician in Florida. On March 26, 1988, Petitioner appeared before the Credentials Committee of the Board regarding his application for licensure. The Credentials Committee recommended to the Board that Petitioner's application be denied. The basis for this recommendation was Petitioner's alleged inability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety due to a mental condition and his prior performance during his medical training. The recommendation also claimed Petitioner was not of good moral character. The Board adopted the recommendation of the Credentials Committee and issued an Order stating its intent to deny the Petitioner's application. Thereafter, Petitioner timely filed for an administrative review of the denial. After graduation from medical school, Petitioner was accepted into a residency program at St. Peter's Medical Center, New Brunswick, New Jersey. This program was in internal medicine and was to cover three years of postgraduate work. After the first year, Petitioner was evaluated and offered a contract for the second year of the program. Dr. Andrew L. Hahn was the program director of the internal medicine residency program. Dr. Hahn is an expert in the matter of residency training of medical students. Dr. Hahn evaluated Petitioner's performance as satisfactory. During the second year of the residency, Petitioner received an unfavorable evaluation which placed him on notice of a need to improve in order to receive a contract for the third year of the program. Petitioner ably made necessary corrections, improved his work performance, and, consequently, received a contract for the third year. After Petitioner had received notice of his contract for the third year, he was required to perform a rotation in radiology. This rotation was selected as it was the only available course given in the time period. While Petitioner would have preferred another topic, he accepted the assignment and agreed to the rotation. The rotation consisted of approximately three weeks of classroom lectures given at a location away from Petitioner's hospital assignments. After attending a few early sessions, Petitioner determined that he had already studied the subject matter of the course in medical school and that further attendance would not benefit him. Petitioner erroneously concluded attendance was not required. Instead of attending the rotation course lectures, Petitioner remained home studying other materials, performed his hospital duties, and made applications relating to future work. Petitioner's patients did not suffer as a result of the missed classroom sessions. Petitioner attended the clinic he was assigned to during the rotation period. When Petitioner's superiors were informed of the failure to attend the classroom sessions, they approached Petitioner for a satisfactory explanation which he was unable to provide. Since they (including Dr. Hahn) considered the failure to attend a serious breach of his professional responsibility, Petitioner was given the choice of either resigning his third year placement or being terminated. Petitioner agreed to resign his third year and was given a certificate for the two years he completed. At the time of his resignation Petitioner offered to repeat the classroom work but that option was rejected by Dr. Hahn. After resigning, Petitioner told his superiors that he had worked in a pharmacy (he is a licensed pharmacist) during the time he was supposed to have been in the radiology classes. He indicated he had done this because he needed money. Petitioner had not worked in a pharmacy, however, and had fabricated the story in a lame effort to excuse his nonattendance. Subsequently, Petitioner was interviewed by Dr. Bernard Sandler for a residency program in physical medicine and rehabilitation at the Robert Wood Johnson, Jr. Rehabilitation Institute of the John F. Kennedy Medical Center in Edison, New Jersey. Petitioner was accepted into the program and fell under the supervision of Dr. Thomas Edmund Strax. Petitioner successfully completed this program in December, 1987. Petitioner did not disclose the underlying facts of his resignation from the internal medicine program to either Dr. Sandler or Dr. Strax, however, neither physician questioned him at length about it either. Petitioner did not misrepresent any pertinent history; he simply did not volunteer embarrassing information. During his residency in rehabilitation, Petitioner was observed by Drs. Sandler, Harold Arlen, and Fazal Panezai. All of these physicians found Petitioner to be able to practice medicine with skill and safety. Petitioner did not exhibit any problem related to malfeasance or incompetence. Petitioner got along with staff and worked well with others. As a resident in the rehabilitation program, Petitioner was evaluated by Dr. Strax who determined that Petitioner would require improvement in order to meet the high standards Dr. Strax maintained for his course of study. Petitioner was able to make the necessary improvements and satisfactorily met Dr. Strax's objectives. Dr. Strax is an expert in the matter of residency training of medical students. Dr. Strax had an opportunity to review Petitioner's work on numerous occasions. Dr. Strax recommended Petitioner for licensure and - found him to be qualified and competent. Petitioner is presently employed as a physician at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in Miami, Florida. Petitioner is not required to be licensed in his present employment since such position is exempt from licensure. Petitioner's present supervisor is Dr. Dorothea Glass, Chief of Rehabilitation Services. Dr. Glass interviewed Petitioner and reviewed references Petitioner had given to her. Dr. Glass knows Dr. Strax who recommended Petitioner for the position which he currently holds. While Dr. Strax advised Dr. Glass to "keep an eye on him," Dr. Glass has done as she would with all young doctors. Dr. Glass has worked with Petitioner on a daily basis since February, 1988, and believes he is competent, hardworking and honest. Petitioner is able to practice medicine with skill and safety. Petitioner is of good moral character. Petitioner did not misrepresent material information when he appeared before the credentials committee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Medicine enter a final order approving the application for licensure by endorsement for the Petitioner, Norman M. Phillips, M.D. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 1989. APPENDIX RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1 through 9 are accepted. To the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraphs 11-16, paragraphs 10 through 32 are accepted. Paragraphs 33 through 36, are accepted but are irrelevant to the issues of this case. Paragraph 37 is accepted. Paragraph 38 is rejected as speculation or argument. Paragraph 39 is accepted. Paragraphs 40 through 51 are accepted. Paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 53 through 63 are accepted. To the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraph 21, paragraphs 64 through 68 are accepted. Paragraphs 69 through 71 are accepted. Paragraphs 72 through 73 are rejected as immaterial, recitation, or argument. Paragraphs 74 through 76 are rejected as recitation of testimony or argument. See findings of fact paragraph 20. Paragraph 77 is rejected as argument. RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1 through 10 are accepted. Paragraph 11 is rejected as irrelevant to the extent that it refers to Petitioner's performance as "marginal." Petitioner was rated satisfactory and was permitted to continue. There were areas in which he required improvement, which he was able to correct. Paragraph 12 is accepted with the clarification that the radiology rotation was selected because it was the only one available to Petitioner at the given time. That portion of paragraph 12 which relates a fourth week work in the emergency room is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. With regard to paragraph 13, that portion which states Petitioner did not attend the classroom radiology rotation is accepted, the remainder is rejected as either unsupported by the record, contrary to the weight of the evidence, or irrelevant. To the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraphs 11-16, paragraphs 14 through 16 are accepted otherwise rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. It should be noted that any reference to emergency work deficiencies have not been credited nor are they supported by this record. Paragraph 17 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 18 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence or argument. Paragraph 19 is rejected as argument, irrelevant, or immaterial to the issues of this case. Paragraph 20 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 21 is rejected as unsupported by the weight of credible evidence or argument. Paragraph 22 is accepted to the extent addressed In findings of fact paragraph 17; otherwise rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. To the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraph 19, paragraph 23 is accepted. Paragraph 24 is accepted. Paragraph 25 is rejected as recitation of testimony, argument, or irrelevant. Paragraph 26 is accepted. Paragraph 27 is rejected as unsupported by the weight of the credible evidence, irrelevant, or argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert S. Turk VALDES-FAULI, COBB, PETREY & BISCHOFF, P.A. Suite 3400-One Biscayne Tower Two S. Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Allen R. Grossman Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Suite 1603, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner made application to the Board and its physician assistant committee for certification as a physician assistant, pursuant to Section 458.347(7)(b), Florida Statutes. After three appearances before the committee, the committee recommended and the Board voted to deny his application by order of February 9, 1993. That order indicated that the Petitioner had failed to demonstrate to the committee's satisfaction that he had received a medical education, as the term is defined and employed in Chapter 458, Florida Statutes (specific citations omitted). The Petitioner timely sought a formal proceeding to contest that denial, which resulted in the matter being referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and the undersigned Hearing Officer for conduct of that proceeding. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged, in pertinent part, with administering the provisions of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, and related rules involved in regulating entry and licensing of persons entering the physician assistant professional field. Among other duties, the Respondent agency is charged with ascertaining whether an applicant for certification has completed an appropriate medical education so as to be entitled under the relevant statutes for admission to the certification examination. Such a determination was made in this case, which resulted in the denial of the application and this formal proceeding. In addition to finding in its order of February 9, 1993 that, in effect, the medical education of the Petitioner was deficient under the relevant statutes, the Board also determined that there were discrepancies in the applications on file with the Board and in the supporting documentation and testimony before the Physician Assistant Committee (Committee). The Board also determined that due to the extended length of time since the Petitioner last worked in the field of clinical medicine and because of the length of time since any significant medical education or training had taken place, the Petitioner had not established that he was currently able to practice as a physician assistant with reasonable skill and safety to the public, as envisioned by Sections 458.331(4) and 458.301, Florida Statutes (1991). Prior to the hearing, the Hearing Officer granted a motion to amend the denial order to add as a basis for denial the Petitioner's alleged ineligibility to sit for the examination for certification because of failure to pay the required fee. See Section 458.347(7)(b), Florida Statutes. A passing score on the certification examination is a prerequisite to being certified as a physician assistant. There are certain discrepancies between the applications that the Petitioner filed with the Board, as well as with regard to documentation submitted to the Committee and to the Board. The Petitioner filed three applications with the Board. On each, he, in essence, swore that he had carefully read the questions on the application, had answered them completely without reservation, and that all statements were true and correct. On all of the applications, the questions required the applicant Petitioner to be specific as to the medical schools attended, to account for each year, and to list all universities and colleges attended where medical training was received. On the first application, the Petitioner stated, in response to the question to list all universities or colleges attended or where medical training was received, that he attended Universidad Central De Este (UCE) from November 1977 to August 1980, and that he attended CETEC University from August 1980 to June 1982. When he appeared before the Committee, he acknowledged also attending classes or receiving training at Ross University (formerly known as the University of Dominica). After that appearance before the Committee, he filed a second application and in response to the same question concerning his medical education, he responded that he had attended UCE from November 29, 1977 to August 24, 1980; that he attended the University of Dominica (Ross) from August 24, 1980 to August 7, 1981; and that he attended CETEC University from August 24, 1980 to June 12, 1982. Thus, he claimed that his attendance at Ross and CETEC actually overlapped. Documentation submitted, contained in Petitioner's exhibit 17 and in the Respondent's composite exhibit, reveals that he was not accepted as a student at CETEC until August 7, 1981, however. Subsequently, he filed a third application. On this application, he, in response to that same question, as pertinent to this issue, listed attendance at UCE from November 29, 1977 to August 24, 1980; at University of Dominica from August 24, 1980 to August 6, 1981; at CETEC from August 7, 1981 to June 12, 1982; at CJ Institute from April 26, 1982 to June 8, 1982; at Adelphi University from April 4, 1981 to June 12, 1981; and CETEC (graduation) on June 12, 1982. The Petitioner, at the hearing, admitted that he had not completed an application listing Ross University until after the Committee already knew he had attended Ross. When asked at the hearing why he omitted Ross from his first application, he testified that he did not put it on the application because he did not consider that he had attended Ross. This response as to why he had made a misrepresentation on his initial application is lacking in credibility. His own testimony and evidence established that he took examinations at Ross on August 24 and 25, 1980, but he paid $9,000.00 in entrance fees to Ross in the fall of 1980, that Ross arranged a psychiatry clerkship, that he took a course in physical diagnosis specifically because Ross informed him that he needed to do so in order to take future medical clerkships; that he paid $75.00 in the spring of 1981 for malpractice coverage for those clerkships under the alleged auspices of Ross and that he was still considered a student at Ross when he began his pediatric clerkship. If he did all of this educational effort supposedly in connection with Ross University, according to his own testimony and other evidence, it is unbelievable that he could not have considered that he had attended Ross University when he filled out the subject application. His own sworn affidavit submitted to the Board explaining why he did not list Ross on the applications stated that he did not list Ross University because he did not think that there were any transcripts to indicate that he had attended Ross. He testified and stated on affidavits to the Board that the reason he transferred from Ross to CETEC was because of a sudden demand by Ross for an additional $24,000.00 in order for him to continue his education there, in excess of the amount the initial agreement had provided for. Even if that is the case, it does not change the fact that, by his own testimony, he knew that he had attended Ross University and did, in fact, attend it. Thus, under all of these circumstances, it is apparent that, for whatever reason, he intentionally misrepresented this portion of his educational history. Another discrepancy or area of misrepresentation occurred on the three applications concerning the medical clerkships which the Petitioner supposedly completed. On all three applications, he was requested to specifically describe and account for each clerkship, giving specific dates, type of rotation, the name and location of the hospital, institution or individual where or with whom the clerkship was performed or supervised. He was required to list all affiliated universities or colleges. In responding to this question, he listed on his first application the following: Psychiatry October 13, 1980 to January 1, 1981. Pediatrics July 13, 1981 to December 4, 1981. Internal medicine September 7, 1981 to October 5, 1981. Internal medicine October 5, 1981 to February 1, 1982. Surgery February 1, 1982 to April 30, 1982. OB/GYN May 1, 1982 to June 6, 1982. On the second application, he added a third internal medicine clerkship stating that it took place from October 3, 1981 to February 28, 1982. It thus overlapped his surgery clerkship. On his fourth application, he added a clerkship for radiology, showing that that clerkship had taken place from February 1, 1982 to April 30, 1982. During parts of February 1982, the Petitioner was taking clerkships in three subject areas at the same time, internal medicine, surgery, and radiology, if the disclosures on his third application are true. In discussing the radiology clerkship on cross- examination, the Petitioner acknowledged that it was somewhat of a combined surgery and obstetrics and gynecology clerkship as part of the same program. The Petitioner received an M.D. degree from CETEC. He began his medical education at UCE. He attended this university as a resident student on its campus. His transcript from UCE shows a lack of a passing score on nine courses. Ross University wrote a letter to him dated June 16, 1981, which he, in turn, provided to the Board, to the effect that he needed transcripts from UCE showing passing scores in histology, biochemistry, neuroanatomy, micro- biology, or that he would otherwise receive F's in those courses. However, the later CETEC transcript shows that CETEC "convalidated" those four courses, even though there was no evidence that he passed them. Convalidation means that the courses were accepted as having been taken and passed at another school. In fact, the accuracy and sufficiency of his medical education is complicated by the fact that his CETEC transcript credits him with courses as having actually been taken at CETEC that even the Petitioner acknowledges were not actually taken at CETEC, such as: community health III and IV, human behavior III, physiopathology, and family medicine. His speculation as to what courses he took at UCE must have counted at CETEC misses the point that CETEC does not "count" them as convalidated, but as taken at CETEC. These discrepancies bring into question the validity of his CETEC education and the documentation submitted regarding it. Whether the inaccuracy is the Petitioner's or attributable to the fault of CETEC is of no moment in determining whether the Petitioner actually received the medical education claimed or the medical education actually "documented". The Petitioner called into question Ross University's record-keeping accuracy, blamed Ross for changing its requirements, for losing his records, and allegedly reneging on certain promises, such as counting courses he supposedly previously took at UCE. However, the Petitioner has not shown any explanation of the CETEC record-keeping "errors" which give him credit for completion of courses at CETEC which he did not even take at CETEC, for his completion of courses at UCE which UCE documents as incomplete, nor for his completion of courses or credits at Ross for which there is no documentation either. It is also noted that he "attended Ross" without ever going to its campus and attended "CETEC" by only appearing on campus for his graduation. Additionally, besides the discrepancies in the academic courses established, there were a number of discrepancies related to the clerkships and preparation for the clerkships. The first of these was that he stated that he had to take a course in physical diagnosis before he could take a pediatrics clerkship through Ross. He therefore obtained an old family friend, Dr. Fleisher, to teach him physical diagnosis. Additionally, he took two nursing courses in physical diagnosis at Adelphi University. Dr. Fleisher is not an M.D., however, but rather is a podiatrist. Dr. Winchester, testifying as an expert in the medical field at hearing, established that a podiatrist cannot teach a physical diagnosis course sufficiently detailed and thorough for a medical student seeking an M.D. degree because a podiatrist is trained, experienced and qualified only to practice at or below the knee. When podiatrists are on hospital staffs in Florida, they may admit patients for surgery, but they must have an M.D. perform the history and the physical examination because of their limited expertise. See, Section 461.003(3), Florida Statutes. A medical student cannot obtain the appropriate education and physical diagnosis by taking a nursing course. In fact, physical diagnosis is an integral part of any quality medical education program and, although it may not be taught as a separate course in all of the accredited medical schools in the United States, it is taught as part of the ongoing education by the faculty of the medical school itself. Students are not sent off to find their own tutors or to attempt to obtain physical diagnosis training from taking nursing school courses in medical schools or medical education programs which are deemed in Florida to be programs or schools which have furnished their successful graduates an adequate medical education. It is thus found, based upon Dr. Winchester's testimony, that the Petitioner's education under the auspices of Ross or CETEC, whichever it was, did not constitute a medical education with regard to the physical diagnosis education. The clerkships were not taught by faculty members of medical schools or in teaching hospitals. In fact, the Petitioner began the pediatrics clerkship under the auspices of one school and finished under the auspices of another school. As established by Dr. Winchester at hearing, this would be unheard of in an accredited medical school in the United States. Since the clerkships are supervised by faculty of the medical school, a student would not transfer medical schools without having to change from one school's clerkship program to another. In addition, the clerkships are characterized by physicians writing letters of verification as to their clerkships or observerships. An observership is an educational experience in which a student only observes what is going on with regard to a particular procedure and does not actually participate. Finally, the testimony revealed that the Petitioner received clinical credit for taking an examination preparation course. This, too, would be unacceptable in a legitimate medical education setting, as shown by Dr. Winchester. Additionally, it is noted that three of the clerkships, internal medicine, surgery, and radiology all overlapped in some point in time, with all three being taken during February of 1982. A clerkship is essentially a full- time experience. A medical education, as that term is used in Florida, does not contemplate taking multiple clerkships at the same time. It is expected that a medical student will give full attention to the area of study and to the patients to which the student is assigned during the clerkship. This cannot be done if three clerkships are being performed at the same time. That this might be perceived as inadequate, even by the Petitioner, is evident in his letter of November 11, 1992 to the Board in which he stated that he had not mentioned his radiology clerkship previously because it overlapped his surgery clerkship. In summary, as to the clerkships, it is determined that they were not of the quality required to be considered a medical education in the State of Florida. This finding is based upon the testimony of Dr. Winchester, which is accepted over that of the Petitioner. Ability to Practice with Reasonable Skill and Safety The testimony and evidence of record does not indicate that the Petitioner has had an adequate medical education. In addition to the inadequacies in his medical education described in the above Findings of Fact, he has not practiced medicine since his graduation from medical school in 1982 nor has he had employment or practice experience related to the field of medicine. He has not worked in a hospital, doctor's office, clinical laboratory, or any other setting in which he might keep his medical knowledge current. He has taken a large number of continuing medical education courses of late, since he filed his initial application. The concept of continuing medical education, however, is that a person should be continually building on an actual basic medical education. The Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is currently able to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety because of this lack of continuing medical experience and education when added to the basic inadequacy of his underlying medical education, as proven by the evidence in this record. Examination Fee Section 458.347(7)(b)1., Florida Statutes, requires that an applicant pay the application fee and the examination fee. This statutory provision specifically provides that the applicant must pay the fee for the examination and if he is later deemed ineligible to take the examination, then the fee will be refunded. The Petitioner admits that he never paid the examination fee. He insists that he should not have to pay the fee until after he is declared eligible for the examination. While one can understand the applicant feeling that he should not have to pay the fee until after being ruled eligible, the legislature decided otherwise and directed that the fee be paid in order for an applicant to be considered eligible for the examination on a threshold basis. Ms. Faircloth testified that the names of students who were to take the examination have to be sent to the Bureau of Examination Services prior to the examination so that expense and other arrangements can be made for the correct number of examination booklets and proctors for the practical examination. This is a practical policy reason underlying the passage of the statute providing for the advance payment of the fee and for the manner in which the agency interprets that statute. Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates Examination. The Petitioner submitted evidence that he had obtained a score of 65 on the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates Examination (ECFMGE). He thus maintained at hearing that he was eligible for certification as a physician assistant simply because he had received a score of 65. This evidence was presented and admitted over objection by the Respondent on the grounds that the Respondent had not been placed on notice of such issue because it was not raised in the petition. Be that as it may, the Petitioner has failed to establish eligibility for examination under that provision for the reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law below.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Board of Medicine denying the Petitioner's application for certification as a physician assistant. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1310 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-5. Accepted. 6. Rejected, as not in itself dispositive of the issue presented. 7-15. Accepted. 16. Rejected, as unnecessary and immaterial. 17-23. Accepted. 24. Accepted, but not itself dispositive of material issues. 25-30. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and to some degree not supported by the preponderant evidence of record. 31-33. Rejected, as immaterial. 34-35. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter, although the fact that he took a physical diagnosis course from Dr. Fleischer is accepted. Rejected, as not itself materially dispositive of the relevant issues. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not in itself dispositive of material issues. 39-43. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not in themselves materially dispositive findings of fact. 44. Rejected, as not supported by the preponderant evidence of record. 45-46. Accepted, but not in themselves materially dispositive. 47. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 48-50. Accepted, but not in themselves materially dispositive findings of fact. 51-60. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely in accord with the preponderant evidence of record. 61-73. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not in their entirety materially dispositive. Rejected, as not entirely in accord with the preponderant evidence of record and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not itself material, and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive. 77-84. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not in themselves materially dispositive. 85. Accepted. 86-98. Accepted, but not in themselves materially dispositive, and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 99-101. Accepted, but not in themselves material. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-31. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Boyd, Esquire BOND & BOYD 411 East College Avenue Post Office Box 26 Tallahassee, FL 32302 M. Catherine Lannon, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Ms. Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Respondent properly denied the Petitioner’s request to be a “recognizing agency” within the parameters of Rule 59R-11.001, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Chelation therapy is the introduction of a man-made amino acid into a patient’s vein. It has been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and is used for the treatment of heavy medal toxicity and the removal of lead. American Board of Chelation Therapy (ABCT) is an autonomous organization that provides education and certification to any physician who wishes to become knowledgeable in Chelation therapy. ABCT was established in 1982 for the purpose of establishing the criteria necessary for certification in the area of Chelation therapy. The Board of Medicine is a statutory entity, established by Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, as the primary regulatory authority for the practice of allopathic medicine in the State of Florida. Pursuant to section 458.301, Florida Statutes, the legislature recognizes that the practice of medicine is potentially dangerous to the public if conducted by unsafe and incompetent practitioners. The section further provides that the primary legislative purpose in enacting the medical practices act is to “ensure that every physician practicing in this state meets minimum requirements for safe practice.” In keeping with the legislative mandate to ensure that purpose of the medical practices act, the legislature created the Board of Medicine and authorized the Board to create administrative rules for the purpose of implementing chapter 458. Rule 59R-11.001, Florida Administrative Code, is the advertising rule of the Board of Medicine.3 The rule codifies provisions of section 458.331(1)(d), Florida Statutes, and provides criteria for identifying false, deceptive, or misleading advertising. In particular, the rule governs advertising on physician letterhead and limits the use of the term “specialist” unless the specialty is recognized by (1) a specialty board of the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) or (2) a board that meets the requirements of Rule 59R-11.001, Florida Administrative Code. For those specialties recognized by organizations that do not meet the requirements of the rule, the physicians may still advertise their specialty so long as they provide a disclaimer. By rule the disclaimer must state the following “The Specialty recognition identified herein has been received from a private organization not affiliated with or recognized by the Florida Board of Medicine.” ABMS is generally recognized in the United States as the agency that approves allopathic medical specialty boards and the Board of Medicine has historically relied upon ABMS and its standards and, as reflected in the current rule, continues to rely on ABMS and its standards for approving recognizing agencies. On July 17, 1995, the Petitioner, ABCT submitted an application to Florida Board of Medicine for the purpose of being certified as a “recognizing agency” pursuant to rule 59R-11.001. ABCT is not a specialty board of the ABMS. Because ABCT is not a member board of the ABMS, the Board of Medicine looked to the requirements of rule 59R- 11.001(2)(f) to determine whether ABCT met the criteria enunciated in the rule and whether it is therefore a “recognizing agency” capable of bestowing specialty status on a physician. Rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), Florida Administrative Code, provides that non-ABMS Boards may seek recognition as “recognizing agencies” if they meet the following criteria: The recognizing agency must be an independent body that certifies members as having advanced qualifications in a particular allopathic medical specialty through peer review demonstrations of competence in the specialty being recognized. Specialty recognition must require completion of an allopathic medical residency program approved by either the Accreditation Council of Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) or the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada that includes substantial and identifiable training in the allopathic specialty being recognized. Specialty recognition must require successful completion of a comprehensive examination administered by the recognizing agency pursuant to written procedures that ensure adequate security and appropriate grading standards. The recognizing agency, if it is not an ABMS board, must require as part of its certification requirement that each member receiving certification be currently certified by a specialty board of the ABMS. The recognizing agency must have been determined by the Internal Revenue Service of the United States to be a legitimate not for profit entity pursuant to Section 501 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code. The recognizing agency must have full time administrative staff, housed in dedicated office space which is appropriate for the agency’s program and sufficient for responding to consumer or regulatory inquiries. The recognizing agency must have written by-laws, and a code of ethics to guide the practice of its members and an internal review and control process including budgetary practices, to ensure effective utilization of resources. However, a physician may indicate the service offered and may state that practice is limited to one or more types of services when this is in fact the case; On April 15, 1996, the Board of Medicine issued an order denying the ABCT’s application for specialty status. As basis for the denial, the order stated that the application of the ABCT failed to establish compliance with the requirements for approval as set forth in Rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, the order stated: The requirements for diplomat status in ABCT do not require advanced qualifications in a particular allopathic medicine specialty; specialty recognition given by ABCT does not require completion of an allopathic medical residency program approved by the ACGME or the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada that include substantial and identifiable training in the allopathic specialty being recognized; specialty recognition provided by the ABCT does not require successful completion of a comprehensive examination pursuant to written procedures that ensure adequate security and appropriate grading standards in that ABCT requires only a score of 60% to pass the examination, the examination consists of true false questions and answers, and the examination is not a medically comprehensive examination; ABCT is not an ABMS board and does not require that each member it certifies be currently certified by an ABMS board; and ABCT has not provided evidence that it is a legitimate not-for-profit entity pursuant to Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code as determined by the Internal Revenue Service. Each of the requirements of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f) were addressed at the administrative hearing. With regard to criteria (1) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), advanced qualifications in a particular allopathic medical specialty through peer review, the ABCT does not require an advanced qualification in a particular allopathic medical specialty. Furthermore, ABCT admitted that it does not meet the requirement of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f)(1). Criteria (2) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f) provides that the specialty recognition must require completion of an allopathic medical residency program approved by either the Accreditation Council of Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) or the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada. The ACGME is generally recognized as the organization that sets criteria for graduate medical education in the United States. The Board of Medicine has incorporated that recognition in the rule by requiring that the advanced education component of the rule be ACGME approved. The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada is ACGME’s counterpart in Canada. With regard to criteria (2) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), ABCT does not require completion of an allopathic residency program approved by either the ACGME or the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada. In fact, ABCT has no requirement for a residency program. ABCT reasoned that a there is no need for a residency program for Chelation therapists because Chelation therapy does not require overnight hospital stay. The only requirement remotely relating to residency is an ABCT requirement that applicants for diplomat status administer a minimum of 1000 Chelation treatments. There is no requirement that these treatments be supervised and no requirement for verification that the minimum number of treatments were administered. With regard to criteria (3) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), requiring successful completion of a comprehensive examination, ABCT does not require all applicants for diplomat status to complete a written examination in order to obtain certification. Specifically, some candidates are grandfathered in without being required to complete the written examination. For those applicants that are required to submit to an examination, Dr. Arthur L. Koch testified that the examination is composed of approximately sixty percent true/false questions. In addition, Dr. Koch testified that another ten percent of the test is not medically oriented but rather addresses the history and politics of Chelation therapy in the United States. At the hearing, ABCT submitted its Spring 1994 examination as an exhibit. That examination contained a majority true/false questions and a few multiple choice questions. To pass the ABCT diplomat examination, the candidate is required to achieve a score of 62.5 percent. In contrast, the Board of Medicine generally requires a passing score of at least 75%. The Board of Medicine expressed concern about the low passing score accepted by ABCT on its certification examination. The Board of Medicine also expressed concern over the large number of true/false questions used in the example examination submitted by ABCT. Uncontroverted testimony was presented at the hearing to support a finding that an examination consisting of a majority of true/false questions is not a viable method of testing knowledge. With regard to criteria (4) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), requiring members of non-ABMS boards to also be certified by a specialty board of the ABMS, the ABCT does not require that each physician seeking diplomat status be currently certified by an ABMS specialty board. Furthermore, ABCT admitted that it does not meet the requirement of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f)(4). With regard to criteria (5) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), that the recognizing agency must be a legitimate not for profit entity under the Internal Revenue Code, evidence was presented to verify that ABCT is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization. With regard to criteria (6) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), requiring the recognizing agency to have full-time administrative staff sufficient to respond to consumer or regulatory inquiries, no evidence was presented at the hearing relating to this criteria. With regard to criteria (7) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), requiring the recognizing agency to have written by-laws and a code of ethics to guide the practice of its members, ABCT submitted its Constitution and Bylaws as adopted in March of 1982 and subsequently amended. The Constitution and bylaws, however, did not include a written code of ethics and therefore did not fully comply with the requirements of the rule.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that in Case No. 96-3173, the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order denying ABCT’s application for approval as a “recognizing agency” pursuant to Rule 59R-11.001, Florida Administrative Code.DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of June, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM A. BUZZETT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1997.
