The Issue Whether petitioner is disqualified to hold a real estate salesman's license in Florida on account of the alleged revocation of a Virginia real estate license?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Eugene Frank Steffey was at one time licensed as a real estate broker in Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia. The seventy- year-old father of four, he has had significant experience in real estate transactions. Petitioner filed an application for licensure as a real estate salesman in Florida which respondent received on November 1, 1983. Joint Exhibit No. 2. By his answer to a question on the form, he advised respondent of a problem he had had in Virginia with the licensing authorities there. At hearing, he elaborated.*(See end) He was "a pivotal person" (T. 14) in syndicates holding land around Dulles Airport aggregating some $10,000,000 in value "as of 1970 prices," (T. 13) when somebody filed a complaint about him with the Virginia Real Estate Commission. [W]hen they investigated me, the only thing they could find was wrong was what's in this consent order. (T. 13) Petitioner signed the consent order without advice of counsel. He testified that "there is just no way I would have signed this if I had had an attorney (T. 13) but that he "couldn't get an attorney and at the same time protect the interests of these numerous other parties." (T.14) The consent order, No. 75-76-8, dated June 7, 1976, revokes Mr. Steffey's Virginia broker's license and denies him the "right to hold a license as a real estate broker or salesman in Virginia," and recites allegations, which are neither admitted nor denied in the document, that On or about March 16, 1970 Eugene F. Steffey, as Trustee and non-concurring beneficiary, entered into a "Land Trust Agreement" on the letterhead of "E. F. Steffey & Sons, Inc." with Gilbert F. Pascal arid other beneficiaries whereby the beneficiaries agreed to convey to Steffey two parcels of real property located in Loudoun County, Virginia; Parcel A containing approximately seventy five (75) acres, and Parcel B. containing approximately ninety nine (99) acres, all known as the "Route 15 Property." The purpose of the Trust was to acquire and hold the property for investment, including the incidental power to maintain and conserve the property and to collect and distribute any income therefrom. The agreement provided for Steffey to receive an annual management fee of $100. On Parcel A the Trust assumed a First Deed of Trust of $25,000 due and payable December 16, 1971. Without the knowledge of the other trustees, Steffey executed promissory notes in the aggregate amount of $25,000 secured by a Deed of Trust encumbering Parcel A, dated April 20, 1971, and with the proceeds from said notes satisfied the approximately $12,500 due on the Deed of Trust assumed on Parcel A and converted the remaining $12,500 to his own use. On or about April 1, 1975, without the knowledge of the other beneficiaries, Steffey leased Parcels A and B to Virginia Beef Corporation for an annual rent of $1,000. By check dated March 28, 1975 Virginia Beef Corporation paid to Steffey $1,000 which Steffey converted to his own use. Joint Exhibit No. 3. Mr. Steffey testified, without contradiction, that "nobody lost money and there was no other involvements." (T. 14)
Findings Of Fact Respondent Pinkerton has been a registered real estate broker since May 19, 1976, before which he was a real estate salesman registered with Strout Realty, Inc. On October 29, 1975, respondent entered into an agreement with Transamerica Homes Company (Transamerica) to sell at auction five mobile homes belonging to Transamerica. On November 15, 1975, respondent acted as auctioneer at an auction at which all five mobile homes were sold. After receiving some of the proceeds of the sale, Transamerica's agents asked respondent to remit an additional seven thousand six hundred eighty dollars ($7,680.00). Respondent told Robert P. Wold, Transamerica's authorized representative in Florida, that he did not have that much money because he had borne expenses in connection with the auction that Transamerica should have paid. After telling Transamerica's agents that he did not have sufficient funds to cover such a check, respondent nonetheless drew and mailed a check in the amount of seven thousand six hundred eighty dollars ($7,680.00), in the belief that Mr. Wold wanted him to write the check even though the funds to cover it were not on deposit. When the check was presented to the American Bank of Lakeland, on which it was drawn, petitioner had four thousand nine hundred fifty-three dollars and fifty-three cents ($4,953.53) on deposit, and the bank dishonored the check. After the check was returned for insufficient funds, Mr. William S. Hagar telephoned respondent on behalf of Transamerica to discuss the matter. Respondent said he would send another check in the amount of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) within a week, which he did. Another week passed; another telephone call transpired between Mr. Hagar and respondent; and respondent sent a second check in the amount of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00). Both of the checks respondent had drawn for two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) were paid upon presentment. On March 13, 1976, respondent wrote Mr. Hagar a letter in which he stated: At this point, due to the many problems involved in the Auction of the Mobile Homes on the 15th of November, 1975 at Skyview Waters in Lakeland, I feel I am entitled to additional compensation. First of all, it is almost unheard of in an auction of this kind for less than 20 percent commission. I was assured [sic] by Mr. Robert Wold of his assistance in preparing the sale. He and Mr. Paul Harris were supposed to provide the arrangements for financing. They did absolutely nothing. They were supposed to assist prospects in locating lots and people to handle moving, setups, driveways and other improvements. By our agreement my only obligation was to be to supervise and provide auctioneer voice. I think you are quite aware that the entire operation was left for me to do at about 1/4 the commission I should have been paid plus the fact that I was forced to split the meager commission I earned with two other people. So, I ended up with less than $1000 gross commission on a sale that should have netted me at least $10,000. On March 16, 1976, Mr. Hagar replied, sending a copy of his letter to the Florida Real Estate Commission: This letter acknowledges receipt of your truly [sic] amazing letter of March 12, 1976. I have reviewed the Auction Agreement which you executed, a copy attached for your information and edification. The language is clear, unambiguous and the obligations of both parties are stated plainly. We have honored our obligations completely and we expect you to honor yours. Paragraph 2) stated you will be ". . . solely responsible in setting up and conducting the auction sale without interference from anyone. . ." Paragraph 3) states you ". . . shall retain Four percent of the bid price received, as commission . . ." for your services. Lastly, Paragraph 6) states there are ". . . no oral representations, agreements or understandings between either of the parties. . . ". * * * We have been patient and forbearing in allowing you the opportunity to make restitution without resorting to the full remedies available under the law to us . . . I assure you that unless we receive your certified check in the amount of $2,680 by March 24, 1976, we shall exercise each and every remedy so available. On March 26, 1976, Mr. Hagar, not having heard from respondent, engaged Florida counsel who eventually succeeded in obtaining a default judgment against respondent in the amount of two thousand six hundred eighty dollars ($2,680.00) plus costs. This judgment had not been satisfied at the time of the hearing in the present proceeding. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which is attached as an appendix to the recommended order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 904/488-9675 APPENDIX Paragraph one of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant, except that the evidence did not establish when respondent became associated with Strout Realty, Inc. Respondent's letter of March 12, 1976, to Mr. Hagar was written on Strout Realty, Inc. stationery, however. Paragraph two of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant, except that the check was for only a part of Transamerica's claimed share of the sale proceeds. Respondent did in fact know that he had insufficient funds to cover the check, a fact of which he made no secret. Paragraph three of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. Paragraph four of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire 400 West Robinson Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Mr. George W. Pinkerton 2833 East Highway 92 Lakeland, Florida 33801 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-2292 GEORGE W. PINKERTON, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether Carleen Chalk Lund, an active broker in Lund Realty, Inc. , a licensed corporate broker, failed to account or deliver to Daisy and Kenneth Parnell money in the form of a deposit which had come into her hands and which was not her property or which she was not in law or equity entitled to retain, under the circumstances, and at the time which was agreed upon or which was required by law or, in the absence of an agreed upon time, upon demand of the Parnells, who were entitled to such an accounting or delivery.
Findings Of Fact Carleen Chalk Lund and Norman Wayne Lund are registered real estate brokers holding current registration from the Florida Real Estate Commission and are active brokers in Lund Realty, Inc., a corporate broker registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission. On or about January 4, 1975, Daisy and Kenneth Parnell, the buyers, signed an offer to purchase the following real property from David and Wilma Hammer: East 184.5 ft. of NW 1/4 of SW 1/4 of Sec 6, Twp. 26 S, Range 29 E, N Osceola County. Said offer was accepted by the sellers. Subsequently, the buyers sent a telegraphic money order in the amount of $2,200 to Lund Realty, Inc. Therefore said money was deposited in the escrow account of Lund Realty, Inc. $2,000 as deposit on the Hammer's property and $200 to be used for closing costs. The following provisions of the Contract for Purchase between the buyers and the sellers are specifically noted and referenced: In accordance with provisions of paragraph 4, the contract was to be closed and the deed delivered on or before January 31, 1975. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6, the seller was to convey title to the aforesaid property to the buyer by agreement for deed. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7, the costs, if any, of preparation of closing documents and closing fee shall be borne equally by the seller and buyer. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 9, all closing costs were to be divided equally between the buyer and seller including title insurance. In accordance with paragraph G of said standards, if the buyer failed to perform any of the covenants of the contract within the time specified, the deposit paid by the buyer might be retained by or for the account of the seller as consideration for the execution of the contract and in full settlement of any claims for camages and all parties would be relieved of all obligations under the contract and each party would execute a separate release of the other at that time. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph P of the standards, in the event that the buyer failed to perform and the aforesaid deposit was retained, the amount of the deposit was to have been divided equally between the realtor and the seller provided that the amount to be retained and received by the realtor would not exceed the full amount of the commission and that any excess would be paid to the seller. In accordance with the provisions of the paragraph "Commission to Realtor", the seller acknowledged the employment of Lund Realty, Inc. and agreed to pay Lund Realty a commission in accordance with the commission agreement. On January 25, 1975, copies of the articles of agreement, closing statement, and title insurance cost disclosure were sent by Chelsea Title and Guaranty Company to Mrs. Daisy Parnell at 88 North Pasack Road, Spring Valley, New York, 10977. The letter accompanying the aforementioned documents indicated that the sellers had executed the closing papers on that date. Said letter further indicated that as soon as the papers were signed by the recipient, that Dee A Burttram, manager of Chelsea Title and Guaranty Company, would record the articles of agreement and insure title to property. These papers were net signed and returned to Chelsea Title, and on February 14, 1975 a subsequent letter was addressed from Dee A. Burttram to airs. Daisy Parnell at the aforestated address indicating that Chelsea Title had not received the documents forwarded to Mrs. Parnell and offering further information if they had not been completed. See Composite Exhibit 10. Between January 25 and February 28, 1975 efforts were made by Lund Realty, Inc. to contact airs. Daisy Parnell without success. On February 28, 1975 it was determined that Frank Townsend, Attorney at Law practicing in Kissimmee, had been engaged by Sidney Schwartz, Attorney at Law practicing in New York, to review the contract entered into by Mrs. Daisy Parnell. According to his testimony, Frank Townsend recommended to Schwartz that Mrs. Parnell not go through with the contract until certain discrepancies in the contract were clarified. The discrepancies involved were the conflict between the provision of paragraph 2 stating that $8,000 purchase money note and mortgage to the seller while paragraph 6 indicated that the seller would convey title by an agreement for deed; the lack of a scribner's statement note on the papers to be filed with the Court; and a discrepancy between the amount of monthly payment as stated in the Contract for Sale and Purchase and the Agreement for Deed. However, by his letter of March 5, 1975 to Mrs. Daisy Parnell, Townsend refers only to problems involving the use of the Agreement for Deed which he concluded was not a problem if the sellers insisted on that form of conveyance, and the fact that the Agreement for Deed is unacceptable because it is unrecordable (an apparent reference to the fact that a scribner's notation was not made on the Agreement for Deed). By his letter of April 3, 1975 to Mr. Sidney Schwartz, Mr. Townsend indicates that he had completed all back ground work on the transaction and had advised Mr. Murray W. Over street, attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Hammer three weeks prior that he (Townsend) was ready to provide a note and mortgage in exchange for a Warranty Deed and had requested that Overstreet arrange a closing date. Mr. Townsend closes indicating that he had again contacted Mr. Overstreet reminding him that the Parnells wished to close. Several things are apparent from Townsend's letters of March 5 and April 3, 1975. It is apparent from the letter to Mrs. Parnell from Townsend dated March 5, 1975 that substantial concern existed on the part of Schwartz that the use of an Agreement for Deed in the transaction would provide to Mrs. Parnell less protection than she would have in a situation in which a note and mortgage was used. However, as stated above, Townsend pointed out that the use of an Agreement for Deed under the Florida Law would afford Mrs. Parnell the same protection as a mortgage. It is also clear from the April 3 letter that all problems related to the Parnell-Hammer transaction had been resolved, that they were ready to close but insisted upon a note and mortgage in exchange for a warranty deed, and their position had bean communicated to counsel for the Hammers. The demand for the use of a note and mortgage by the Parnells is contrary to the provisions of the Contract for Sale and Purchase between these parties entered into on January 4, 1975 and as of April 3, 1975 was the only reason for the Parnell's refusing to close. On April 3, 1975, Mr. Murray Overstreet attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Hammer, advised Frank N. Townsend, attorney for Mrs. Parnell, that the Hammers considered their Contract for Sale and Purchase with Mrs. Parnell to be null and void because the transaction was to be closed on or before January 31, 1975 and that as of April 3, 1975 the matter had not been completed. Mr. Overstreet further advised that his clients made no claim on the deposit made to Lund Realty and that said deposit might be returned to the buyers. A copy of this letter was sent to Lund Realty, Inc. Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph G of the Contract for Sale and Purchase referenced above, upon default of the buyer, the deposit paid by the buyer could be retained by or for the account of the sellers as consideration for the execution of the contract and in full settlement of any claims for damage. Under the provisions of paragraph P of said contract, said deposit would be divided equally between the realtor and seller; provided, however, that the amount retained or received by the realtor was not to exceed the full amount of the commission, in this instance $600. On April 4, 1975 in response to the copy of the letter from Overstreet to Townsend in which the Hammers declared the Contract for Purchase and Sale null and void, Lund Realty, Inc. wrote Frank Townsend advising him that the expenses for sales commission, cancellation fee, and termite inspection should be considered before any escrow funds were disbursed and requesting that Lund Realty be advised as to how Mrs. Parnell would like to handle the charges. Clearly, Lund Realty considered the Parnells to be in default and asserted a claim for commission. No evidence was received regarding any response from Townsend to the letter of Lund Realty, Inc. dated April 4, 1975. On May 14, 1975 Lund Realty wrote Mrs. Daisy Parnell sending her a check in the amount of $1,466, the amount of her deposit less expenses incurred by her for sales commission, cancellation fee, termite inspection, and insurance. The amounts of each of the expenses and copies of statements were enclosed. Although the check in question was retained by Mrs. Parnell, Lund Realty received a letter from Sidney Schwartz dated May 23, 1975 which states in pertinent part as follows: "I am led to believe that the seller in the proposed transaction did not perfect title and waived and/or released its interest in the contract. If this be so, the entire down pay ment of Mrs. Parnell must be returned to her imme- diately. Please inquire into this matter. You no doubt are aware that Mrs. Parnell has retained Florida counsel, namely, Frank N. Townsend, Esquire, Post Office Box 847, Kissimmee, Florida. This is further to advise that in the event there has been a wrongful retention of any of Mrs. Parnell's funds, complaints shall be lodged with all appropriate authorities including licen- sing authorities in the State of Florida." The next contact between the parties was a letter to Lund Realty from Frank Townsend dated June 19, 1975. In that letter, Mr. Townsend stated as follows: "This confirms our request in accordance with Mr. Overstreet's letter wherein no demand is made for any funds on behalf of the Hammers, the return of all funds deposited with you by the Parnells is specifically requested." A second follow-up letter was addressed to Lund Realty on July 14,1975 requesting a response to the aforementioned letter of June 19, 1975. It is clear that the basis for demand of return of the deposit receipt in its entirety was based on the statements in Overstreet's letter to Townsend dated April 3, 1975, that the Hammers made no claim to the deposit to Lund Realty, Inc. This position of the Hammers was subsequently clarified by Mr. Hammer in his letter of August 12 (Exhibit 7) and by Mr. Overstreet, who at the hearing, testified that the Hammers never intended to waive the amount of the commission and the cost. Lund Realty was entitled to its commission and the Hammers would have had a cause of action against the Parnells under the contract for the entire amount of the deposit. However, the existence of a dispute over claims to all or portions of the escrow funds developed slowly, and was based on whether the Hammers waived their rights to all or any portion of the escrow funds. In September 1975 Lund Realty requested an advisory opinion of the Florida Real Estate Commission regarding its duties. The conclusion of that advisory opinion was that disbursement should be made to the Parnells, and that the claims that Lund, Chelsea Title and any other individuals should be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The advisory opinion was silent, however, on Hammer's subsequent claim for the commission and cost from the deposit. As of the date of hearing, the $2,200 was on deposit in the escrow account of Lund Realty, Inc.
Recommendation The position and actions of the various individuals should also be considered in this case in arriving at a penalty because none of the parties have completely "clean hands." The Parnells precipitated the breach by insistence on a note and mortgage; the Hammers have made no attempt to clarify the situation by paying the commission and cost; and the attorneys kept Lund Realty completely in the dark about what was transpiring. The Lunds are the only ones involved in the transaction who have tried to carry out their obligation. Further, they also are the only ones who stand to lose financially without seeking judicial relief. While they have held the money, it has remained in escrow since the dispute arose. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and other factors bearing on the case, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Florida Real Estate Commission place Carleen Chalk Lund on probation for one year. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of January 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Carleen Chalk Lund 612 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 32741
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is, and at all times material to this matter has been, registered with the Real Estate Commission as a real estate broker. The Respondent has been the broker in charge of Lynn Real Estate Company. From approximately January 6, 1976 until February 14, 1977, Jacqueline McNabb was associated as an independent contractor with Lynn Real Estate and with the Respondent. McNabb was at that time registered with the Real Estate Commission as a real estate salesman. She is now registered as a broker. McNabb's relationship with the Respondent is set out in a contract which was received in evidence at the hearing as Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Paragraph 6 of the contract provides: The fees usually and customarily charged by the broker shall be charged for any service performed hereunder, unless broker shall advise the salesman of any special contract relating to any particular transaction he undertakes to handle. When the salesman shall perform any service hereunder, whereby a fee is earned, said fee shall, when collected, be divided between the broker and the salesman, in which division the salesman shall receive sixty percent and the broker shall receive the balance. In the event that two or more salesmen participate in such a service, or claim to have done so, the amount of the fee over that accruing to the broker shall be divided between the participating salesmen according to agreement between them, or by arbitration. In no case shall the broker be liable to the salesman for any fee unless the same shall have been collected from the party for whom the service was per- formed. Paragraph 8 of the contract provides: This contract, and the association created hereby, may be terminated by either party hereto, at any time upon notice given to the other; but the rights of the parties to any fee, which accrued prior to said notice, shall not be divested by the termination of this contract. On February 14, 1977, the Respondent duly terminated the contract with Ms. McNabb, as the result of a conflict which is not relevant to this proceeding. The Respondent immediately wrote to the Real Estate Commission advising that McNabb was no longer associated with him. Ms. McNabb testified at the hearing that the contract was terminated on February 15, but it is clear from the evidence that she was mistaken. While she was under contract with the Respondent, McNabb obtained a listing for the Respondent for the sale of property owned by a Mr. Davidson. The property was listed on a Multiple Listing Service. No contract for the sale of the property had been obtained prior to the time that McNabb's contract with the Respondent was terminated. On February 16, 1977, Ms. Jean Krueger, a registered real estate salesman employed by Tamarac Realty obtained a contract for purchase of the property. The contract was written at approximately 4:45 P.M. on February 15, and she immediately called the Respondent's office so that they would wait for her to get there with the contract before the office was closed for the day. Ms. Krueger delivered the contract to the Respondent, Mr. Davidson accepted it, and the transaction ultimately closed. Ms. McNabb learned that a contract had been obtained on the Davidson property approximately 3 days after the contract was signed. She made both written and oral demand upon the Respondent for a share of the commission. The Respondent, after consulting representatives of the Real Estate Commission, representatives of the St. Petersburg Board of Realtors, and legal counsel, declined to give McNabb any share of the commission. The Respondent did not know at the time that he terminated his contract with McNabb that a contract would be obtained for sale of the Davidson property. Ms. Krueger, the salesman who obtained the contract had never met the Respondent prior to taking the contract for sale to him, the day after McNabb's contract was terminated. During the course of this proceeding the Respondent has been cooperative in providing copies of documents to Ms. McNabb. The Respondent has no history of complaints being made against him to the Florida Real Estate Commission, and it does not appear that he has in the past refused to pay any salesman a commission to which the salesman was entitled.
Findings Of Fact On November 29, 1983 Petitioner filed with Respondent an application for licensure as a real estate salesman. By letter dated February 28, 1984 Respondent denied Petitioner's application as follows: The reason for the Commission's action is based on your answer to Questions 6, 7, 14 and 15 of the licensing application and/or your criminal record and disciplinary actions, and on your having unlawfully acted as a real estate salesman or real estate broker in the State of Florida. Specifically, your denial is based upon your May 1975 arrests and convictions for five counts of the sale of unregistered securities five counts of fraudulent sale of securities, five counts of grand larceny, petty larceny, ten counts of conspiracy to commit a felony, and also on disciplinary actions involving your Insurance License, Mortgage Brokers License and Securities License. In 1970 or 1971 Petitioner started Summit Investments, a conpany engaged in selling contracts for deed for developers to investors at a discount. The State of Florida determined that these contracts were mortgages and not securities, and, therefore, all persons selling them must be licensed mortgage brokers. Petitioner accordingly obtained a mortgage broker's license. In 1972 eight mortgage brokers formed S.E.I., Inc., and Petitioner became the president. Everyone selling contracts for deed for that company was licensed under the Mortgage Brokerage Act. Clinton E. Taylor, an investigator for the State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities, as part of his regular job duties, frequented Petitioner's offices at S.E.I., Inc. to check the advertising and sales pitches being used by the persons selling what the State had classified as mortgages. Taylor monitored Petitioner's operation at Summit Investments and at S.E.I., Inc. for a number of years without receiving any consumer complaint and without finding any basis for any enforcement action against Petitioner. In 1974, a recession year, five persons to whom S.E.I. had made sales did not receive their interest income and therefore filed complaints with the State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance. In May 1975 state criminal charges were filed against Petitioner as president of S.E.I., against the developer, and against the selling broker, basically alleging that what had previously been classified as mortgages were in fact unregistered securities. After trial, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of five counts of sale of unregistered securities; five counts of fraudulent sale of securities; five counts of petty larceny; five counts of conspiracy to commit a felony, to-wit: fraudulent sale of securities; and five counts of conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor, to-wit: petty larceny. Petitioner was initially sentenced to a total of ten years of incarceration, $20,000.00 in fines, and 15 years of probation. In 1976 Petitioner plead no contest to a federal charge of mail fraud in Tampa, Florida in order to obtain a sentence which would run concurrent with that arising out of his state conviction. In 1977 Petitioner plead no contest to a charge in Palm Beach County of selling unregistered securities. Both of these charges were related to the same incidents forming the basis for the 1975 criminal charges. Based upon the conviction of Petitioner in the 1975 state case, his mortgage broker's license, his securities license, and his insurance license were revoked. By the time of the final hearing in this cause Petitioner had served 16 months in the State prison system and had been released; restitution had been made to the five people who caused the criminal charges to be filed from payment by Petitioner of the fines assessed against him; Petitioner had finished serving his amended probation period; and Petitioner's civil rights had been restored by the State of Florida. From September 1980 to November 1983 Petitioner earned his livelihood selling businesses. Be applied for a real estate license in both 1982 and 1983 and was denied both times. Petitioner seeks a real estate license in order that he can return to selling businesses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered approving Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman, subject to successful completion of the licensure examination. RECOMMENDED and ORDERED this 6th day of November, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. David R. Edstrom 5748 Northeast 16th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33334 Lawrence S. Gendzier, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Suite 212 Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Talbott and Drake, Inc. is and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker corporation. William F. Talbott is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker and active firm member of Talbott and Drake, Inc. Paul P. Drake is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker and active firm member of Talbott and Drake, Inc. Helen C. Drake is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker and active firm member of Talbott and Drake, Inc. On or about January 18, 1977, William F. Talbott, on behalf of Talbott and Drake, Inc., negotiated a contract for sale and purchase between the High Ridge Water Company -- John H. McGeary, Jr., sellers, and William Montaltos and Genevieve L. Montaltos, his wife, buyers, for the purchase of lot in a new housing area known as River Forest in the Boca Raton area, Palm Beach County. A copy of said contract, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, is received into the record pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Said contract, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, was subject to the declarations of restrictions filed by High Ridge Water Company as seller on June 28, 1976, wherein, in Paragraph 7, the developer retained the right to approve or disapprove the plans and specifications for the construction of any structure, building, fence, wall or sign in the River Forest area. A copy of said declarations of restrictions is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 2, pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. As a part of the restrictions and provisions of the contract, the purchasers, Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos, were required to use a builder selected from a list of designated builders, approved and designated by Talbott and Drake, Inc. and the High Ridge Water Company. Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos decided to build on the subject property and contacted numerous builders designated by Talbott and Drake, Inc. to submit the bids for the construction of a home on the property. On or about June 9, 1976, the McGeary partnership, as developer of the River Forest area, entered into a joint venture agreement with Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc., whereby Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc. purchased lots in the River Forest area and agreed to pay Talbott and Drake, Inc. a five-percent commission on all homes constructed on said lots by Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc. in the River Forest area. A copy of said joint venture agreement is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 3 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 recites on the first page of said agreement as follows: WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, by that certain Purchase Agreement intended to be executed this date, BUILDER (Group Six Collaborative, Inc.) is agreeing to purchase certain real property as set forth herein, a copy of which Purchase Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1; . . . (emphasis added) WHEREAS, the parties hereto are desirous of forming a joint venture for the purpose of finan- cing, constructing and selling single family residences upon the property described in Exhibit 1; NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the pro- mises and of the mutual covenants of the parties hereto, and for other good and valuable considera- tion, the parties agree as follows: 9. BROKER. The parties agree that TALBOTT AND DRAKE, INC., a Florida real estate brokerage corporation, shall have an exclusive listing agree- ment with BUILDER, as owner and joint venturer, for the sale of residences to be constructed pursuant to this Agreement, a copy of which Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. As a commission for their services, which shall include but not be limited to, advertising, manning model houses, showing receiving of deposits, qualifying prospects, assisting in obtaining financing for purchasers, they shall receive five percent (5 percent) of the pur- chase price, according to the provisions contained in Exhibit 2. The joint venture agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, is clearly limited to houses to be constructed on the lots purchased from the McGeary partnership. The agreement does not constitute an agreement to pay Talbott and Drake, Inc. a fee of five percent of the construction cost of any custom home built by one of the designated builders on a lot purchased by an individual. When Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos received the bid statement from Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc. there was noted thereon: "Add Real Estate Commission as per Talbott and Drake contract." A copy of said bid statement is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 4 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Although Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos were informed that Talbott and Drake, Inc. was to be paid a ten-percent commission by the seller on the sale of the property to Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos, they were at no time informed directly by the Respondents that the builders on the "approved list" were required to pay a five-percent commission to Talbott and Drake, Inc., nor that the said five- percent commission would be passed on to Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos when they contracted with an "approved" builder to construct a home on the subject property. On or about February 4, 1977, William F. Talbott, on behalf of Talbott and Drake, Inc., negotiated the contract for sale and purchase between High Ridge Water Company, as seller, and Donald James Kostuch and Mary Louise Kostuch, his wife, buyers, for purchase of a lot in the River Forest area of Palm Beach County. A copy of said contract is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 5 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Mr. and Mrs. Kostuch were required by the contract to select a builder from an approved list of designated builders approved and supplied by Talbott and Drake, Inc. and seller, High Ridge Water Company. Mr. and Mrs. Kostuch selected Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. from the list supplied by Talbott and Drake, Inc. Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. had an agreement with the McGeary partnership and Talbott and Drake, Inc. similar to that outlined in the joint venture agreement between the McGeary partnership in Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc., Petitioner's Exhibit 3, whereby Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. agreed to pay Talbott and Drake, Inc. a five-percent commission on any residence that Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. built in the River Forest area. The bid supplied by Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. on March 7, 1977, to Talbott and Drake, Inc. contained a listing of real estate commission to Talbott and Drake, Inc. in the amount of $3,652. A copy of said bid statement is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 6 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. The Kostuchs were advised of a five-percent fee to be paid by the builder by a salesman working for another broker who first introduced the Kostuchs to the real property in River Forest. The salesman advised the Kostuchs prior to their entry into the contract for the purchase of the lot in River Forest in which they agreed to limit their choice of builder to one approved by the McGeary partnership and Talbott and Drake, Inc. This disclosure would be sufficient to comply with the provisions of Rule 21V-10.13, Florida Administrative Code, because the fee was revealed by a salesperson involved in the transaction prior to the execution of the contract under which the favor, if any, was granted. Talbott and Drake, Inc., in addition to performing services as listing agent for the sale of homes in River Forest, also functioned as the prime developer in this project pursuant to an agreement with High Ridge Water Company and the McGeary partnership. Regarding the Montaltos' transaction, the limitation of the owners to the use of one of the approved builders constitutes the granting or placement of favor, because it narrows the competition to one of five builders out of all the builders available in the Fort Lauderdale area. The affidavits introduced indicate that, notwithstanding the absence of a written agreement, the designated builders had agreed to pay to Talbott and Drake, Inc. a fee of five percent of the cost of construction of any custom home as compensation for the efforts of Talbott and Drake, Inc. in developing the property. While compensation for these services is reasonable, it still constitutes a fee to be paid Talbott and Drake, Inc. from one of the five designated builders who would benefit from the contract. The potential adverse effect of this arrangement was to transfer a cost generally allocated to the cost of the lot to the cost of the house. Therefore, people shopping for a lot could be misled in the comparison of similar lots in different subdivisions in the absence of being advised of the fee to be paid by the builders to Talbott and Drake, Inc. However, the evidence shows no attempt to keep this fee a secret and thereby mislead buyers. The existence of such a fee is referred to in sales literature prepared by Talbott and Drake, Inc. The Kostuchs were advised of the fee by a participating salesman for another real estate company. The builders set out the fee as a separate cost item as opposed to absorbing it in general costs within their bids. While the Respondents could not produce evidence that the Montaltos' had been advised of the existence of the fee, and the Montaltos' testified that they had not been advised, this appears to be an isolated incident as opposed to a course of conduct. Notwithstanding proof of the above, no evidence is presented that the Montaltos' contracted with a designated builder to build their house, and that a designated builder paid a fee to Talbott and Drake, Inc. To the contrary, the testimony of William Talbott was that the Montaltos' had breached the terms of their contract regarding the use of a designated builder.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a letter of reprimand to Talbott and Drake, Inc. which, in fairness to the Respondents, should set out the specifics of the violation and to further apprise other registrants of the potential dangers of such fee arrangement. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Charles M. Holcomb, Esquire 653 Brevard Avenue Post Office Box 1657 Cocoa, Florida 32922
The Issue Whether Respondent Garrison's license as a real estate broker and Respondent Arbree's license as a broker-salesman should be suspended or revoked, or the licensees otherwise disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 475, F.S., as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, dated December 22, 1980. This proceeding commenced with the filing of an Administrative Complaint by the Department of Professional Regulation on December 22, 1980 alleging that Respondents Gary D. Garrison and Joseph M. Arbree had violated Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes in connection with a 1977 real estate transaction wherein Respondents allegedly failed to disclose to the seller that purchaser Respondent Arbree was a licensed broker-salesman and that Respondent Garrison had, or would have a financial interest in the property upon its purchase. The Respondents requested an administrative hearing on the charge and filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that Petitioner lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the cause in that there had been no lawful compliance with the provisions of Section establishment of any fiduciary relationship between the Respondents and the seller of the property in question, and that Petitioner had not complied with the motion was reserved until argument was presented at the final hearing. At that time, the motion was denied for reasons which will be set forth in the Petitioner forwarded the Request for Hearings to this Division on July 1, 1981 and hearing was set for September 17, 1981. On August 27, 1981, Petitioner Oklahoma on September 9, 1981. Respondent filed objections to the said notice, together with a Motion For Protective Order, claiming that the notice period was depositions outside the State for use at trial. Respondent sought either to have the notice "stricken" or that a protective order be entered to require deposition or, alternatively, that the deposition testimony not be allowed in evidence at final hearing. The motion was denied by the Hearing Officer on At final hearing on September 17, 1981, Petitioner announced that the deposition of McNickle, an indispensable witness, had not yet been received. deposition as a late-filed exhibit, a continuance was granted until November 23, 1981, to permit receipt of the deposition and to afford Respondents an its taking in Oklahoma. Although the parties were afforded the opportunity to file Proposed herein, no post-hearing submissions have been filed.
Findings Of Fact times material to the complaint was registered as a real estate salesman with Investment Equity Corporation, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. Respondent Joseph he was associated with Investment Equity Corporation during the times material to the allegations in the Complaint. (Testimony of Respondents) acre unimproved lots in a development called Palm Beach Country Estates located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The purchase price of each lot was telephoned Respondent Garrison and they thereafter had several telephone conversations which led to the sale of the three lots to Respondent Arbree. The found that Respondent Garrison's version is more credible. In the initial conversation, McNickle advised Garrison of his ownership of the three lots and to inspect the lots and advise him as to the distance to electrical power, the type of roads adjacent to the lots, and whether the lots were corner lots. and that he was interested in trying to get his money back from the company. There was no mention of the value of the lots or of listing the property for sale. Garrison inspected the lots and, in a subsequent telephone conversation with McNickle, informed him that the nearest electrical power was approximately 1-3/4 miles from the lot locations, that they were on a dirt road, and that none were corner lots. He also informed him that the lots were approximately fifty percent under water during the rainy season. During this conversation, Garrison told McNickle that he had an "associate" with Investment Equity who sometimes purchased such lots. McNickle asked him to see if he could obtain an offer on the lots. Garrison then asked Respondent Arbree if he desired to purchase the lots, and the latter agreed if he could obtain financing for the purchase. Arbree asked Garrison if there was a listing on the property and Garrison told him that there was not. The reason for this inquiry was that Arbree had in the past frequently made personal purchases of real estate and had disclosed his status as a real estate salesman on such contracts when the property was listed with a broker. A question had arisen in his office as to when licensed real estate personnel should disclose their status to sellers when buying on their own account. Arbree had resolved this question in his mind some time previously by telephoning the legal office of the Florida Real Estate Commission and receiving information from someone there that it was not necessary to make such disclosure if the property was not listed with a real estate office. (Testimony of Respondents, McNickle (Deposition-Petitioner's Exhibit 3), Petitioner's Exhibit 4-1, Respondents' Exhibits 1-4) On February 28, 1977, Respondent Arbree executed a deposit receipt contract whereby he agreed to pay McNickle $15,000.00 for the three lots. The contract originally provided for a $500.00 deposit evidenced by Arbree's promissory note to be held in trust by the Investment Equity Corporation, but this was later deleted by the parties at the request of McNickle, and a $500.00 check as deposit was placed in the Investment Equity Corporation Trust Account on March 10, 1977. The check was drawn on the account of J. V. Company and signed by both Respondents. J. V. Company was simply a bank account established by Arbree and Garrison sometime prior to the McNickle transaction to serve as a depository for funds which were generated through sales for their private account. Both signatures were required for issuance of checks. Originally, the funds in the account were exclusively those of Arbree and these were the funds used for the deposit and subsequent mortgage payments to McNickle. (Testimony of Respondents, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 4-5, 4-9, 5) The deposit receipt contract was executed by Melvin F. McNickle and his wife on March 10, 1977. The contract provided that "The buyer hereby recognizes Investment Equity Corporation by separate agreement as the broker in this transaction". This provision made reference to the fact that in cases where associates of Investment Equity Corporation purchased property in their own name which was not listed with the firm, the firm broker did not require payment of any commission. On the other hand, if an associate sold his own property, whether or not listed with Investment Equity Corporation, office policy required that he pay the firm a three percent commission for overhead, escrow maintenance, and the like. The commission was payable directly to the company and not shared with any of the associates. McNickle did not enter into a listing contract with the firm nor did he pay a real estate commission on the sale. The real estate transaction closed on August 1, 1977. Warranty deeds, dated July 26, 1977, for each of the three lots were issued by McNickle to Arbree. (Testimony of Respondents, Brown, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 4-3, 4-4, 4- 5) Garden lots and is familiar with the selling price places the top value on choice lots of $8,000.00 in 1977, and $4,000.00 to $5,000.00 if fill was Shortly after Arbree had contracted with McNickle for the sale of the lots, Arbree told Garrison that if the lots could be resold at a profit, he McNickle contract had been entered into, another associate at Investment Equity Corporation told Garrison that he had a prospect looking for vacant land, and prospect, Carl Doty, was contacted by Garrison and, on March 17, 1977, a contract for sale and purchase was entered into between Arbree and Doty for the Investment Equity Corporation as the broker and agreed to pay a commission of three percent of the gross sales price to the firm. This was in accordance with minimum commission for processing a sale of property owned by the associate. Garrison did not receive a commission on the sale, but did receive one half of Arbree. Warranty deeds were issued to Doty by Arbree on August 24, 1977. The proceeds of the sale were placed in the J. V. Company bank account. (Testimony This case was originally docketed in the Florida Real Estate Commission in September, 1978, but was not investigated until December, 1979. A prior to comply with the notice provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. (Testimony of Stephens) Petitioner's proposed disciplinary action against both Respondents is predicated upon their alleged failure to disclose to the seller of the lots in Petitioner, and that Respondent Garrison had or would have a financial interest in the said property upon its purchase. The said nondisclosure is alleged to trick or device, breach of trust", and that thereby each Respondent "has aided, assisted or conspired with another in furtherance thereof, all in violation of subsequently reenacted and renumbered (Subsection 475.25(1)(b), F.S. (1981)), the provisions of the cited ground for disciplinary action have remained the penalties. The evidence in this case falls short of the standard required under (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), i.e., that in a proceeding which "may result in the loss of a valuable business or professional license, the critical matters at issue must Here, the fact that the real property in question was not the subject of a listing contract with Respondents' firm, Investment Equity Corporation, raises commission was paid to Respondent Garrison or to the firm by the seller, nor was any expected. Respondents and their broker treated the transaction as a private Respondents misled McNickle in any respect. Garrison made it clear at the outset that Arbree was his associate in the firm and was acting in his own behalf. The circumstances demonstrate that Garrison was acting as a gratuitous "middle man" for the benefit of both parties. The offer of Arbree, which was accepted by McNickle, was not unreasonable in the light of the location of the lots and other relevant considerations bearing on market value. The evidence shows that the McNickle lots were purchased solely with Arbree's funds, even though the checks issued for the deposit and several mortgage payments were drawn on the "J. V. Company" account which had been used in a limited fashion in the past by both Respondents in real estate ventures. No competent evidence was presented to show that Respondent Garrison had acquired a financial interest in the Arbree-McNickle transaction. On the contrary, the evidence establishes that subsequent purchaser Doty was made known to Garrison as a prospective purchaser of the lots only after the purchase contract between Arbree and McNickle had been executed, and that Respondents had not agreed to split any profits in a resale until that time. It is undoubtedly true that if Investment Equity Corporation had had a broker-principal fiduciary relationship with McNickle, the duties resulting therefrom would have also been imposed upon Garrison as a salesman, and he would have been obliged to disclose to McNickle the circumstances concerning his subsequent interest in the resale to Doty. This was not the case, however, and no such duty can be found in the light of the existing circumstances. Although it is recognized that a registrant can violate Subsection 475.25(1)(a), F.S. (1977) for dishonest conduct in a business transaction for his own account, as well as for such conduct in which his only interest is as a broker (or salesman) Sellars v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 380 So.2d, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), the evidence here is insufficient to so characterize Respondents' conduct. It is therefore concluded that Petitioner has failed to establish that Respondents violated Section 475.25(1)(a), F.S. as alleged. Although the foregoing conclusion renders it unnecessary to deal with Respondents' various claims concerning Petitioner's failure to accord them procedural rights in the prehearing process, it is considered that the amendment to Section 120.60(6), F.S. by Chapter 81-180, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1981, renders any defense based on the prior Section 120.60(6)(1979) no longer available. Additionally, Respondents' contentions that this proceeding is barred by the statute of limitations applicable to criminal prosecutions or by statutory laches are not well founded. Finally, Respondents did not establish any failure of Petitioner to comply with the applicable provisions of Chapter 455, Florida Statutes, in processing this case.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Board of Real Estate dismiss the allegations against Respondents Gary D. Garrison and Joseph M. Arbree. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1982. Harold M. Braxton, Esquire 45 Southwest 36th Court Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 611 North Pine Hills Road Orlando, Florida 32808 Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Executive Director Florida Board of Real Estate Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondents, or either of them, for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent Eglin Realty, Inc., holds a real estate broker's license, No. M14 0024352, last renewed before the hearing on April 1, 1986. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. A Florida corporation, Eglin was originally licensed in 1971, (T. 47) or, at least, has been "in business since 1971." (T. 22) Seventy-two years old at the time of hearing, Eglin's president, Leon F. Bishop, has never held a real estate license but he has developed several subdivisions (T. 50) and "was buying and selling land all of [his] life." (T. 51) In 1982, Mr. Bishop, his wife and daughter owned stock in Eglin. Of 50 shares authorized and outstanding, he owned one share; his wife owned ten; and his daughter owned the remaining 39. In July of 1982 and for some time before, respondent Jerry L. Armstrong, himself in the real estate business for 25 years, believed he was registered as the "active broker" (T. 231), for Eglin Realty, Inc., and as a qualifying real estate broker for Armstrong and Associates, Inc.; and, he was "fairly certain . . . [that he] had an individual license at that time also." (T. 234) Arguably, nobody was registered as Eglin's "active broker" in July of 1982, because Eglin's real estate broker's license expired, at least by its own terms, on March 31, 1982. Apparently through oversight, Eglin had not renewed the license. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. For four or five (T. 24) years before, however, Mr. Armstrong had indeed been registered as Eglin's qualifying broker. On December 10, 1982, Mr. Armstrong, who is now a "broker-salesman with Coldwell-Banker Deep South Realty Corporation," (T. 230) resigned as "vice president director and active real estate broker for Eglin Realty, Inc., effective December 19, 1982," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which resignation Mr. Bishop and his wife Dorothy, then Eglin's other two officers and directors, duly accepted. Id. Only the following August, after Eglin chose Joan A. Ritteman to succeed Mr. Armstrong, did Eglin learn that its license was to have expired in March of the preceding year. On October 13, 1983, Eglin made application for "late renewal," tendering a $15 late fee in addition to the $40 renewal fee. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. With the grant of this application, Eglin has been registered with DPR as a real estate broker, Ms. Ritteman being the firm's sole qualifying broker since then. King's Lake Property When Mr. Bishop met Dr. and Mrs. William D. Permenter at a land auction in Walton County in early 1982, he gave them a business card like the one that came in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 10. (T. 93) "Eglin Realty, Inc." appears in the center of the card above the phrase "Land and Farm Broker." The upper right corner bears the Realtor logo under the words "Reg. Real Estate Broker." The lower left corner reads "Leon Bishop President." The upper left corner has telephone numbers, and the remaining corner gives a mailing address. The Permenters mistook Mr. Bishop for a registered real estate broker, when he introduced himself. Some days after the auction, Mr. Bishop arranged to show one or both of the Permenters a large tract he owned, but failed to interest them in it. It occurred to him that they might be willing to invest instead in the 1,527-acre parcel that Hubert Alberton Bell and C. J. King, Jr. of Defuniak Springs owned jointly in Walton County, property which the owners had listed for sale with Angus Guinness Douglass, Jr. of Douglass Realty, Inc. Mr. Bishop may have learned of this parcel's availability from Mr. Douglass at the very auction at which he met the Permenters. Under the terms of the listing agreement, Douglass Realty was entitled to a ten percent commission if a sale of the whole parcel could be arranged, at $1,000 per acre, within 100 days of May 3, 1982. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Before showing the Permenters the land Messrs. Bell and King hoped to sell (the King's Lake property), Mr. Bishop approached Mr. Douglass, and proposed that Douglass Realty, Inc. share with Eglin any commission arising from a sale of the King's Lake property to buyers Mr. Bishop or Eglin might procure. In a letter dated July 4, 1982, and signed by respondent Armstrong, Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 3 and 11, Eglin's share of the anticipated commission was specified. The letter concluded: The undersigned [Jerry L. Armstrong] agrees by this letter to authorize Leon Bishop, as president of Eglin Realty, Inc., to personally deliver this agreement and to accept on my behalf, as the active licensed Florida real estate broker. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Mr. Douglass felt free to deal with Mr. Bishop with regard to the commission both because of Mr. Armstrong's letter and because he knew of no "real estate law that said [he] had to ask, or say, let me see his license before I talk to him." (T. 209) At no time did Mr. Douglass speak to Mr. Armstrong about the transaction. (T. 211) Agreement as to the commission split having been reached, Mr. Bishop showed the Permenters the King's Lake property, and, in early July, Dr. Permenter offered to buy it. After "Mr. Bishop told [Dr. Permenter that his offer] had been accepted," (T. 97) the transaction closed on July 28, 1982, in a lawyer's office in Defuniak Springs. Present were the lawyer, Mr. Bishop, Mr. Douglass, Mrs. Douglass, Mrs. Permenter and the principals. In exchange for a deed in favor of Dr. William Permenter and assigns, the vendors received a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $1,275,000, together with the balance of the $1,425,000 sales price, less various transaction costs, notably a $25,000 initial payment toward a brokerage commission totalling $118,587. Eglin's Exhibit No. 3. At no time before the final hearing in the present case did Dr. Permenter ever see Mr. Armstrong. (T. 97) In accordance with a revised commission agreement dated July 6, 1982, and executed by Messrs. King, Bell, Douglass and (on behalf of Eglin) Bishop, Eglin's Exhibit No. 2, and consistently with the earlier agreement between Eglin and Douglass, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11, Mr. Douglass drew a $10,000 commission check in favor of Eglin, keeping $15,000 as Douglas Realty, Inc.'s share of the initial commission payment. (T. 212) Also in keeping with Eglin's Exhibit No. 2, Messrs. King and Bell each executed a promissory note in favor of Eglin in the amount of $21,682, bearing interest at ten percent, payable in three annual installments. Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 8 and 9. These notes represented the remainder of the commission owed Eglin. (The vendors also made and delivered notes payable to Douglass for unpaid commission owed Douglas Realty, Inc.) Sharing The Commission Mr. Bishop was Eglin's only salaried employee, (T. 50) and also sometimes borrowed money from the corporation. Although a monthly salary of $1,000 was authorized "[i]n the minutes," (T. 57) "[t]here was never no set amount of salary that [Mr. Bishop] would get," Id. from Eglin in 1982. Sometimes he drew no "money for a few months, and then . . . would get a large sum." (T. 57) "Whenever [he] wanted to get money from the corporation, [he] asked for it, and . . . got it." (T. 58) He "didn't make a request to Mr. Armstrong." (T. 61) His wife had authority to write checks against the Eglin account into which the $10,000 commission check delivered at the King's Lake property closing was deposited. (T. 62) After the deposit, Mr. Bishop asked his wife or daughter for some of the money, and Mrs. Bishop drew a check in her husband's favor for $5,000 or thereabouts on the Eglin account. The totality of the evidence makes it clear that this payment, whether characterized as salary or not, was compensation for his procuring Dr. Permenter as a buyer and otherwise facilitating the sale of the King's Lake property. For one thing, "[t]he only transaction [Eglin] had during that period of time was the King's Lake [property]." (T. 254) Mr. Bishop and Mr. Armstrong "had an agreement from the start that anything [Bishop] bought and sold would go through [E]glin Realty, due to the fact that there would be a commission there, and [Armstrong] would be entitled to some of the commission." (T. 250) Mr. Armstrong professed to believe that Mr. Bishop "was operating as an owner" (T. 236) when Messrs. King and Bell sold the King's Lake property. Mr. Armstrong also testified, falsely but under oath, that he, not Mr. Bishop, negotiated the commission sharing arrangement with Mr. Douglass, the implication being that he thereby earned a portion of the commission Eglin received. In any event, Mr. Armstrong believed himself entitled to a share of the King's Lake property commission. He directed that his share be applied against outstanding loans totaling $3,500 to $4,000 which Eglin had made to him. (T. 248) Ten Percent Dr. Permenter, who has abandoned the practice of medicine in order to devote more time to real estate development, acquired the King's Lake property planning to subdivide it and sell lots. First, he caused the property to be divided into several large tracts, some of which he conveyed into trust. One tract, dubbed King Lake Estates, was conveyed to a partnership Dr. and Mrs. Permenter entered into with each other. Much, if not all of this tract, was subdivided into lots. At some point, Mr. Bishop agreed to sell the lots, and to assist development in other ways. To that end, he and his daughter spent time in a trailer on the property. The Permenters agreed to pay Mr. Bishop ten percent of the sales price of any lot he sold. In keeping with this agreement, Mrs. Permenter wrote him several checks on behalf of the partnership. On August 29, 1983, Mr. Bishop and the Permenters executed a written agreement memorializing their arrangement, reciting that some 83 lots had already been sold under it, and conveying to Mr. Bishop "a $2500.00 life interest" in the Kings Lake Estates tract. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. A purpose of this agreement was to create a legally enforceable right in Mr. Bishop to the ten percent share of sales proceeds the Permenters were then regularly paying him as lots were sold. Mr. Bishop never had any ownership interest of any kind in any portion of the King's Lake property other than the King Lake Estates tract. When Dr. Permenter sold a Kings Lake Estates lot himself, Mr. Bishop did not receive ten percent of the proceeds. (T. 100) Notes Discounted After he began selling lots for the King Lake Estates partnership, Mr. Bishop told the Permenters he needed money, and asked if they would take the notes Messrs. King and Bell had given Eglin for the remainder of the commission, in exchange for undertaking monthly payments to Eglin. Some time remained before the next annual payments called for in the notes which King and Bell had executed in favor of Eglin when they sold the King's Lake property. The Permenters were agreeable, what with the substantial sums Dr. Permenter still owed the notes' makers. In order to transform annual payments into monthly payments, Mr. Bishop, on behalf of Eglin, endorsed the notes Messrs. King and Bell had given Eglin, in favor of Dr. and Mrs. Permenter. In return, Dr. and Mrs. Permenter executed a promissory note with specified amounts payable monthly to Eglin. It was after this had been accomplished that an investigator from the Division of Land Sales of the Florida Department of Business Regulation advised the Permenters that they were required to register their subdivision with the Department. He also informed them that Mr. Bishop was not licensed as a real estate broker, which came as a surprise to them. Apparently on the theory that the promissory notes they had received in exchange for theirs represented legally unenforceable obligations to pay real estate commissions to an unlicensed entity, Dr. and Mrs. Permenter stopped making payments on their promissory note to Eglin. When Eglin sued on the note, the Permenters filed a counter-complaint alleging that "on July 27, 1983, . . . [Eglin] was not a registered real estate broker and was not entitled to be paid fees." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. The litigation eventuated in an amended final judgment awarding Eglin the unpaid balance of the note. Eglin Realty, Inc. vs. William D. Permenter and Elizabeth A. Permenter, No. 85-718-CA (Fla. 1st Cir.; Mar. 30, 1987). An appeal was pending at the time of final hearing in these proceedings.
Findings Of Fact I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation was at all times material to this proceeding a corporation registered as a real estate broker with the Commission, with its principal business address at 240 North Washington Boulevard, Sarasota, Florida, 33577. Irving Z. Mann was at all times material to this proceeding a real estate broker registered with the Commission, and the holder of two registration certificates: one as an individual broker with an office at 2197 Princeton Street, Sarasota, Florida 33577; and the other license as president and active broker of I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation. Stanley M. Robbins was at all times material to this proceeding a registered real estate salesman in the employ of I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation. At all times material to this proceeding Fritz K. Grolock was a registered real estate salesman, and from April 12, 1972, to February 2, 1976, he was registered with the Commission as a real estate salesman in the employ of I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation. From February 2, 1976, to November 29, 1976, Mr. Grolock was registered with the Commission as a real estate salesman in the employ of I.Z. Mann & Associates, Inc. At all times material to this proceeding Irving Z. Mann was president, and Stanley M. Robbins was vice president, assistant secretary, treasurer and general sales manager of I.Z. Mann & Associates, Inc., a Florida corporation which was the owner and developer of the Palma Sola Harbor condominium development in Sarasota County, Florida. On or before February 4, 1976, Mr. Grolock and Mr. Robbins had agreed that Mr. Grolock would receive for his services as a real estate salesman for I.Z. Mann & Associates, Inc. a three percent commission based upon the sales price of individual condominium units sold at Palma Sola Harbor. Commissions were to be paid to Mr.Grolock at the end of the month in which the sale of each such unit was consummated. Mr. Robbins explained to Mr. Grolock at the time of this agreement that I.Z. Mann & Associates, Inc. was short of cash, and that should Grolock make any sales, he might have to wait for some indefinite period of time to receive his commission. Mr. Grolock indicated his willingness at the time to proceed on that basis. No testimony was adduced, and no documentary evidence was offered to establish that Mr. Grolock was employed by I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc., at any time material to the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint. During the course of his employment as a real estate salesman with I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc. Mr. Grolock solicited and obtained a real property sales contract between Elmer C. Sutter and Ruth W. Sutter, as purchasers, and I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc., as seller, for a condominium unit in the Palma Sola Harbor project. The purchase price of the unit was $26,450, and the evidence established that Mr.Grolock is due, and has not been paid, a commission of $793.50 for that sale. During the course of his employment as a real estate salesman with I.Z. Mann & Associates, Inc., Mr. Grolock solicited and obtained a real property sales contract between Martin G. Tepatti and Dorothy L. Tepatti, as purchasers, and I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc., as seller, for a condominium unit in the Palma Sola Harbor project. The purchase price of the unit was $37,450, and the evidence established that Mr. Grolock is due, and has not been paid, a commission of $1,123.50 for that sale. During the course of his employment as a real estate salesman with I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc., Mr. Grolock solicited and obtained real property sales contract (Petitioner's Exhibit #1) dated April 29, 1976, between Donald F. Brown and Barbara S. Brown, as purchasers, and I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc. as seller, for a condominium unit in the Palma Sola Harbor project. The purchase price of the unit was $37,450, and the evidence established that Mr. Grolock is due, and has not been paid, a real estate commission of $1,123.50 for that sale. Mr. Grolock did not attend the closing of any of the three transactions referenced above and described in the Administrative Complaint. However, the only evidence of record establishes that these transactions resulted in "negative closings" that is, after deductions of amounts due on the pre-existing construction mortgage, charges for documentary stamp taxes, tax pro-rations and the like, no funds remained for disbursement to I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc. for payment to Mr. Grolock as a commission. Neither Mr. Mann, Mr. Robbins, I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, nor I.Z. Mann & Associates, Inc. received any funds at the closing of these transactions. Some time after the closings of the three transactions described in the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Grolock spoke with Mr. Robbins concerning non- payment of his commissions. Mr. Robbins explained t6hat the three transactions had resulted in "negative closings," but that if Mr. Grolock would be patient he would be paid his commissions in due course. Mr. Robbins discussed the commissions once or twice thereafter with Mr. Grolock, each time explaining that the company was short of money but that Mr. Grolock would be paid eventually. Because of poor market conditions in the condominium industry, I.Z. Mann Realty & Associates experienced financial problems which ultimately resulted in the company's insolvency. The company eventually voluntarily relinquished its assets to creditors, or had its interest in those assets foreclosed, and at the present time is no longer actively engaged in business. By letters to Mr. Robbins dated December 7, 1976, and January 19, 1977, (Petitioner's Exhibit #2) Mr. Grolock demanded that some arrangements be made for payment of his past due commissions. When he received no reply to these letters, Mr. Grolock sent a letter (Petitioner's Exhibit #2) to Mr. Mann dated April 25, 1977, listing the transactions which resulted in $3,040.50 being owed to him for real estate commissions. Shortly after receiving this letter, Mr. Mann telephoned Mr. Grolock, on May 5, 1977, and told him ". . . the company had been inactive for a long time, but that I would see to it that he would get paid eventually. Just give us a chance to get some money to do it." (Transcript, p. 63). Mr. Grolock agreed at that time to wait for payment of his commissions. Some time after his May 5, 1977, telephone conversation with Mr. Mann, Mr. Grolock filed a complaint with the Commission ". . . [b]ecause I found no other recourse. . . [t]o obtain my commission . . . ." (Transcript, p. 26).
