The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents, The Fourth Bayshore Condominium Association, Inc. (“Bayshore”), Karl Stemmler (“Stemmler”), and/or Richard Grove (“Grove”), discriminated against Petitioner, Robert Pagano (“Pagano"), on the basis of his physical handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Pagano is a Caucasian male who is handicapped by virtue of medical complications which resulted in the amputation of his left leg in March 2008. He has been confined to a wheelchair since that time. At all times relevant hereto, Pagano was renting a condominium unit at Bayshore. In January 2012, Pagano saw another unit at Bayshore advertised for rent. He called Grove, listed as the owner of the unit, and inquired about renting the property. Grove told Pagano that a key to the unit would be left under a mat between the screen door and front door on January 19, 2012. On that day, Pagano went to inspect the unit, accompanied by a friend, Philip Saglimebene. Upon arrival at the unit, Pagano and his friend began looking for the hidden key, but could not find it. They apparently made some noise while searching for the key, because they were confronted by Stemmler. According to Pagano, Stemmler began asking them in unfriendly terms who they were and what they were doing at the unit. The friend then told Stemmler they were looking for a key so they could go in and inspect the unit as Pagano was interested in renting it from Grove. Stemmler, supposedly identifying himself as a “building representative,” said there was no key to be found. He also reputedly told Pagano and his friend that they would not need a key anyway, “because you are not moving in.” When the friend explained that the unit was for Pagano, not him, Stemmler allegedly said that Pagano was not moving in either because he was an “undesirable.” When asked to explain that comment, Stemmler purportedly said, “He just is; that’s all you need to know.” (None of Stemmler’s comments were verified by competent evidence and, without verification or support, cannot be relied upon to make a finding of fact in this case.) Pagano believes Stemmler’s purported comments were based on the fact that he (Pagano) has long hair and a beard and does not fit into the conventional norm at Bayshore. He also believes that his handicap served as a basis for Stemmler’s alleged comments. There was no credible evidence presented at final hearing to substantiate Pagano’s suppositions. Grove had put his condominium unit up for rent at the beginning of the year. When Pagano called to inquire about it, Grove – who lives out-of-state – notified a friend to leave a key under the mat, as described above. That friend simply forgot to leave a key at the unit on the designated date. Grove knew nothing about Pagano’s interaction with Stemmler. Grove had not spoken to Stemmler prior to the day he and Pagano had their interaction. Stemmler had no authority to speak for Grove or to make a decision concerning to whom Grove would rent his condominium unit. Subsequent to the day Pagano visited the unit, Grove took the unit off the rental market because his wife decided to use the unit to house family and friends rather than renting it out to someone else. It took several weeks for the rental advertisement for the unit to be removed from a locked bulletin board at Bayshore. Grove said that if the unit ever went back on the market, he would call Pagano first about renting it, i.e., Grove had no opposition whatsoever to Pagano’s being a tenant. Van Buren, president of Bayshore, explained that the condominium association utilizes the support of voluntary building representatives to assist with security and minor maintenance at Bayshore. The volunteers, who are generally seasonal residents at Bayshore, do not hold keys to individual units and have no authority to grant or deny an applicant’s request to rent a unit. Stemmler is one of many building representatives who resides part-time at Bayshore. Pagano does not know of any non-handicapped individual who was allowed to rent a unit at Bayshore to the exclusion of himself or any other handicapped person. In fact, Pagano currently resides in another unit at Bayshore; he is already a resident there.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Robert Pagano in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2012.
The Issue Whether Rule 61B-23.003(9), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Petitioner, Michael Gertinisan, is a unit owner and member of the Bay Hills Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Association). The Association is responsible for the operation of the Bay Hills Village Condominium. Petitioner purchased his unit in December, 1992. Prior to December, 1992, the Petitioner had leased the unit for a number of years. The Bay Hills Village Condominium is a mobile home park condominium where each unit is comprised of a parcel of vacant land upon which is placed a mobile home. Transfer of control of the Association from the developer to the unit owners, other than the developer, pursuant to Section 718.301, Florida Statutes, has not occurred. However, unit owners, other than the developer, are entitled to elect a representative to the board of administration of the Association in an upcoming election. The declaration of condominium for Bay Hills Village Condominium was recorded in the public records in 1985. A number of units were sold to purchasers in 1985. At the time Bay Hill Village Condominium was created and the declaration of condominium recorded in the public records in 1985, the controlling statute, Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, contained no maximum period of time during which the developer was entitled to control the operation of the Association through its ability to elect a majority of the board of administration. The developer of a condominium is statutorily entitled to control the affairs of the condominium association for a period set forth in the statutes. This right to control the affairs of the condominium association for the period set forth in the statutes is a substantive vested right. With the right to control the condominium association, comes the attendant rights, including but not limited to, the right to: (a) adopt a budget meeting the marketing needs of the developer; (b) enter in to contracts with related entities providing for maintenance and management of the condominiums; (c) control ingress and egress on and over the condominium property to move construction equipment; (d) adopt board policies relating to the renting of units in the condominium; (e) adopt board policies regarding placement of "For Sale" signs on the condominium property and to model its units; (f) maintain the property in accordance with the developer's need to conduct an ongoing sales program; and (g) change the size and configuration of units in the condominium to meet the needs of the developer's marketing campaign. In those situations where the developer still exercises control over the condominium association, the aforestated rights of the developer would be substantively impaired by a retroactive application of Section 718.301(1)(e), Florida Statutes, as created by Chapter 91-103, Section 12, Laws of Florida, to condominiums in existence prior to the affective date of the Chapter 91-103, Section 12, Laws of Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly, ORDERED that the Petitioner failed to establish that Rule 61B-23.003(9), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority and the relief sought by the Petitioner is DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of January, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1994. APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER, CASE NO. 93-6214RX The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: The Petitioner elected to not file any proposed findings of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Proposed findings of fact 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, respectively. Proposed finding of fact is unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Gertinisan 10506 Bay Hills Circle Thonotosassa, Florida 33592 Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner, Christa Bartok, on the basis of her disability, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA).
Findings Of Fact Based on evidence offered at hearing and testimony of witnesses, as well as the facts agreed upon in the Pre-hearing Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are found: Bayou Breeze is a residential condominium association in Pensacola, Florida. Ms. Bartok was a prospective buyer of a condominium unit from its owner, a Bayou Breeze resident. The address of the unit was 300 Bayou Boulevard, Unit 106, Pensacola, Florida. Ms. Bartok is a person with a non-visible disability, which she described as anxiety, emotional distress disorder, and an autoimmune disease. Ms. Bartok was also the owner of a dog named Moni, weighing more than 40 pounds. She identified Moni as her emotional support dog. At all times material to this matter, Ms. Bartok was represented by Simone Sands, a real estate broker. The seller of Unit 106 was represented by Greg Thomas, also a realtor. The communication regarding all aspects of the sale of the property was through the two realtors. At the time of executing the contract, Bayou Breeze3 Bylaws provided, in pertinent part, Pets. Pets shall be kept or maintained in and about the condominium property only if unit owner is granted a conditional license to maintain one pet by the Association. Such a license will be granted subject to the following conditions and reservations: A. Acceptable Pets. The only pets to be maintained on condominium property shall be dogs under twenty (20) pounds when fully grown, cats and small birds. In addition, the Declaration of Condominium Paragraph XVI provided, in pertinent part, Approval of Purchasers, Lessees and Transferees No unit owner shall sell, lease or otherwise convey a unit, nor shall any sale, lease, conveyance or transfer of a unit other than by foreclosure or by devise or operation of law on account of the death of the unit owner, be effective unless the board of directors of the Association shall have approved the identity of the proposed purchaser, lessee or transferee in writing. Application of a proposed purchaser, lessee or transferee shall be in writing and on a form to be provided by the Association and shall be accompanied by two letters of recommendation. Any such application not rejected within 10 days after receipt by the Association or an officer thereof shall be deemed to have been approved. The costs for the submission of an application shall not exceed $100. … 3 The association name changed from Pensacola Executive House Condominium Association, Inc. to its current name. Right of First Refusal Should an Owner wish to sell or transfer his Unit, he shall deliver to the Association an Owner’s written notice containing a copy of the executed purchase agreement between buyer and seller, which agreement shall be executed subject to the Associations [sic] waiver of its right of first refusal and consent to the sale or transfer. The Owner shall also submit to the Association, within five (5) days from receipt of any request from the Association, any supplemental information as may be required by the Association. Ms. Bartok received the declarations and bylaws. However, a list of items to be submitted to the Association for sale of a property was provided to the owner, which included: letter of intent to sell, application for sale/transfer, two letters of recommendation, background check, and contract for sale. The list of items provided to the owner was not provided to Ms. Bartok. On June 20, 2020, Ms. Bartok executed a residential contract for purchase of Unit 106. A term that Ms. Bartok included in the contract provided, in pertinent part: “contingent upon buyer receiving HOA approval for her emotional support dog which is over condo weight restrictions but meets Fair Housing Act requirements for HOA waiver.”4 Ms. Bartok also provided a letter with her contract dated June 15, 2020, from her treating physician, Timothy Tuel, M.D., of Baptist Health Care. The letter stated: Dear Christa, I do believe you have several medical conditions that would benefit from a properly trained emotional support animal. Please contact me if you have other questions. 4 Ms. Bartok executed a counteroffer for the property on June 24, 2020, which did not change the term regarding approval of her ESA. Although, the letter does not specifically identify Ms. Bartok’s disability, it references her “medical conditions,” and that she could benefit from having an ESA. In addition to the contract and letter from Dr. Tuel, Ms. Bartok provided a completed application, two letters of recommendation, and a receipt for training for her dog.5 Ms. Bartok did not provide a completed background check because Mr. Thomas had advised Ms. Sands that the “HOA manager does it.” In addition, on June 30, 2020, in response to Ms. Sands’ text of, “good morning any reply from HOA,” Mr. Thomas indicated, “[n]o, not yet they’re doing background check.” Thus, Ms. Bartok had a reasonable belief that she could rely upon Mr. Thomas’ statement that the HOA was facilitating the background check and there was no need to provide the information at that time. Ms. Trimaur, the property manager for the Association, has managed Bayou Breeze condominiums for more than 11 years, and generally, receives all applications for sale or transfers of units at Bayou Breeze. She received the application materials Ms. Bartok submitted for the sale of Unit 106, which included the sales contract, letter from Dr. Tuel, reference letters, and the receipt for pet training sessions. Although Ms. Trimaur stated that it was difficult to read the digital copy of the letter from Dr. Tuel, she recalled that there was reference to Ms. Bartok’s “medical condition.” Ms. Trimaur also testified that Mr. Thomas told her that Ms. Bartok requested a waiver of the pet policy. Ms. Trimaur did not receive the financial or criminal background information with Ms. Bartok’s application packet. Ms. Trimaur submitted the application materials to Mr. Cross for review. She testified that she also had verbal discussions about the dog with Mr. Cross. 5 The receipt for training referenced “Beginner Training-for Moni” and was scheduled to begin on July 25, 2020. Mr. Cross, the president of the association, reviewed a copy of the application materials. He testified that Ms. Trimaur bypassed normal approval process by submitting the packet without the background checks due to COVID-19. As the Association president, Mr. Cross is required to review all application materials to determine whether the Association elects to exercise its right of first refusal. Mr. Cross testified that he reviewed the contract. However, he testified that he did not recall reading Ms. Bartok’s term that the acceptance was contingent upon approval of her emotional support dog. Mr. Cross did not state that there were pages missing or that there was anything that would prevent him reviewing the contract in its entirety. Mr. Cross testified that he reviewed the recommendation letters,6 which noted the size of Petitioner’s dog. He also spoke to Ms. Trimaur about the dog. After review of the application materials that Ms. Bartok submitted, Mr. Cross sent a letter to Anai, the owner of Unit 106, on July 2, 2021. The letter stated: Dear Anai, The association is in receipt of your request to sell your condominium unit 106 Bayou Breeze Condominiums, 300 Bayou Breeze, Pensacola, Fla. As you know there are specific requirements a potential new purchaser of a condominium must meet, according to the Bayou Breeze Declaration of Condominiums, Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws and Rules and Regulations, before they will be eligible to purchase a Condominium at the said premises. Section X of the By-Laws states the following: Pets. Pets shall be kept or maintained in and about the 6 The recommendations were not offered into evidence in this case. condominium property only if a unit owner is granted a conditional license to maintain one pet by the association. Such a license will be granted subject to the following conditions and reservations: Section A clearly states that a dog weighting [sic] 20 pounds or less that was fully grown could qualify. Section D. states that the dog must be carried in the arms when taken in and out of the building. The information that you have submitted so far is primarily the request for the Association to waive its pet restrictions in accordance to the By-Laws, section X of the Condominium Governing Laws. Unfortunately, that is something that we cannot do. Don’t get me wrong, I love dogs. I, at one time lived at Bayou Breeze but had to move because I wanted a dog. I have been the president of this association for 29 years. Over the years the association has had many requests much like your potential buyer’s request to waive our rules. We are well aware of the HUD laws as well as the American Disability Act. We have, unfortunately been to court several times on this issue. We have never waived the pet requirements. Even though we have not received all of the background information and detailed documentation that is necessary for the Association to approve a purchase of this unit, I am notifying you that the Association cannot except [sic] this application, because of the current situation that you have presented. Sincerely Charles D. Cross President, Bayou Breeze Condominium Association 300 Bayou Breeze, Pensacola, Fl. 32501 Mr. Cross acknowledged in his written position statement that Ms. Bartok submitted a request for waiver for an ESA. He testified that he did not deny the request for an ESA because it was not clear to him that the request was for an ESA. Both Mr. Cross and Ms. Trimaur testified that Ms. Bartok’s request for an ESA was not accepted because the materials provided were incomplete, i.e. that the application did not include the financial and criminal background check. Both Ms. Trimaur and Mr. Cross testified that other tenants of Bayou Breeze have been approved for ESAs. The letter from Mr. Cross to Anai is inconsistent with Mr. Cross’ testimony. First, the letter signed by Mr. Cross clearly states that he is aware of the request for a “pet waiver” and stated that he is “well aware of the HUD laws as well as the American Disability Act. … We have never waived the pet requirements.” Second, the letter states that “Even though we have not received the background information, … the Association cannot except [sic] the application, because of the current situation that you have presented.” At hearing, Mr. Cross testified that he expected to receive more information. If the application packet was incomplete and Mr. Cross expected to receive additional information, it would follow that Mr. Cross would specify in writing to Anai the items that were needed to complete the application. That did not happen in this case. The letter makes no reference that additional information could be provided or what information was necessary. Last, Mr. Cross claimed the letter to Anai was not a denial letter. However, it clearly stated that the request to waive the pet restriction was something the Association could not do and has never done, even when involving the ADA. The undersigned finds that the statements in the letter together with the term in the contract seeking a waiver and Ms. Bartok’s letter from her physician demonstrates that Respondents had notice of Ms. Bartok’s request for a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the ADA. The undersigned also finds that Respondent’s letter of July 2, 2020, was a denial of Ms. Bartok’s application for purchase of Unit 106 based on her request for a reasonable accommodation, a waiver for her ESA. Ms. Bartok testified that she believed the July 2, 2020, letter was a denial of her application. Believing she could not purchase the property, she canceled the contract on the same date. After Ms. Bartok canceled the contract, believing that the Association improperly denied her request for a “pet waiver” for her ESA, she submitted a letter dated July 8, 2020, requesting a reasonable accommodation for her disability. That letter included another letter from Dr. Tuel, to the Association, which stated, in pertinent part: Dear Housing Association: Christa Bartok is my patient and has been under my care since April 7, 2020. I am intimately familiar with her history and with the functional limitations imposed by her disability. She meets the definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Due to [intentionally omitted] illness, Christa Bartok has certain limitations regarding performing some life activities. [Intentionally omitted] can be a direct effect of a chronic illness. In order to help alleviate these difficulties, and to enhance his/her ability to live independently and to fully use and enjoy the dwelling unit you own and/or administer, I am prescribing an emotional support animal that will assist Christa Bartok in coping with his/her disability. Her dog Monroe (Moni) qualifies as an emotional support animal under the guidelines put forth by the Fair Housing Act and The American’s [sic] with Disabilities Act. … Ms. Bartok credibly testified that she submitted the letter with attachments to Mr. Cross’ email address. She submitted a second request for reconsideration of the Association’s decision on July 10, 2021. Ms. Bartok did not receive a response to her letters. Although Mr. Cross confirmed his email at the final hearing, he denied receiving Ms. Bartok’s emailed requests for reasonable accommodation. The undersigned credits Ms. Bartok’s testimony on the issue of whether the emails were sent to Mr. Cross. Ms. Bartok testified that after she canceled the contract, she purchased another home. She asserts that she incurred costs for the difference in the amount of the mortgage she has paid since the denial letter was issued, the difference in costs for HOA dues, and the loss associated with extending her rental agreement prior to purchasing her new home. Ms. Bartok did not provide any supporting documents to demonstrate her loss that she asserts she incurred as a result of Respondent’s discriminatory actions. Ultimate Findings of Fact The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Bartok established that she suffers from anxiety, emotional distress disorder, and an autoimmune disease, and therefore, she has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she is disabled within the meaning of the FHA. Ms. Bartok’s additional term included in her application for sale and the request for accommodation submitted following rejection of her application, was sufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was on notice that Ms. Bartok sought the “pet waiver” as a reasonable accommodation for her ESA. The undersigned finds the preponderance of evidence supports a finding that approving Ms. Bartok’s dog as an ESA was a reasonable accommodation that would assist Ms. Bartok by providing emotional support; and Respondents refused the requested accommodation. There is not sufficient evidence to establish that the Association has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for withholding approval of Ms. Bartok’s ESA. Therefore, Ms. Bartok established by a preponderance of evidence that Respondents discriminated against her based on her disability, by failing to approve a request for a reasonable accommodation (approving Ms. Bartok’s ESA) in violation of the FHA.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Christa N. Bartok, pro se 203 Southeast Syrcle Drive Pensacola, Florida 32507 For Respondent: Sharon D. Regan, Esquire Post Office Box 13404 Pensacola, Florida 32591
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order granting Christa Bartok’s Petition for Relief, in part, as follows: finding that Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice based on Ms. Bartok’s disability, by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation to Ms. Bartok in the form of an ESA; and (b) ordering Respondents to prohibit the practice of denying reasonable accommodations to individuals and potential buyers who request a reasonable accommodation on the basis of their disability. Ms. Bartok, having failed to prove she suffered any quantifiable damages as a result of her purchase of a different home, she is not entitled to damages or other financial relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 2021. Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Sharon D. Regan, Esquire Post Office Box 13404 Pensacola, Florida 32591 Christa N. Bartok 203 Southeast Syrcle Drive Pensacola, Florida 32507 Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, within the meaning of and in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2005), by requiring Petitioners to submit a second application for the approval of a condominium purchase.
Findings Of Fact It is undisputed that Petitioner, Allan Kangas, has no handicap and is not a disabled person. At the conclusion of Petitioners' case-in-chief, Mr. Kangas testified that he has no handicap. The undersigned, sua sponte, entered an ore tenus order on the record dismissing the case brought by Mr. Kangas. Petitioner, Anna Kangas, is an elderly female and the mother of Mr. Allan Kangas and Mr. Sheldon Kangas, the latter being the representative in this proceeding for the named Petitioners. It is undisputed that Mr. Sheldon Kangas is not handicapped, but that Mrs. Kangas is handicapped, within the meaning of Section 760.22(7), Florida Statutes (2005), because of Alzheimer's disease. Respondent is a condominium association lawfully incorporated as a Florida corporation (Association). Respondent must operate in accordance with the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, and Declaration of Condominium (condominium documents). The condominium documents require the Association to approve each purchase of a condominium. On December 8, 2005, Mr. Sheldon Kangas and Mrs. Anna Kangas contracted with Ms. Mary Cox to purchase condominium unit 15, located at 23 Hatchett Creek Road. Ms. Cox is a real estate agent and a co-owner of unit 15. Ms. Cox notified Ms. Pat Williamson, Association Secretary, of the prospective purchase. For the reasons stated herein, Respondent did not discriminate against the prospective purchasers, but approved the purchase of condominium unit 18 in a timely manner after the purchasers changed their purchase contract from unit 15 to unit 18. The prospective purchasers completed an application for approval of the purchase of unit 15 sometime between December 8 and 10, 2005. The Association conducted a meeting to approve the proposed purchase on December 10, 2005. During the meeting on December 10, 2005, the purchasers informed the Association that they wished to purchase unit 18, located at 29 Hatchett Creek Road, rather than unit 15. Unit 18 was owned by Mr. Brian Isaac. Ms. Cox did not object to releasing the purchasers from the contract for the purchase of unit 15. The Association informed the purchasers that a new application for unit 18 would be required. The purchasers completed a new application under protest. At a meeting conducted on January 3, 2006, the Association approved the application for the purchase of unit 18. The purchase of unit 18 closed on January 25, 2006. The purchasers seek reimbursement of living expenses incurred for hotel rooms and meals during the delay caused by the requirement for a second application. The purchasers are not entitled to reimbursement. The purchase of unit 18 was the first time the Association had required a second application. However, it was also the first time a purchaser had changed his or her choice of units after submitting an application. The Association did not discriminate against Mrs. Kangas because of her handicap. The record evidence contains no justifiable issue of law or fact to support the alleged discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of January 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David G. Muller, Esquire Becker & Poliakoff, P.A. 630 South Orange Avenue, Third Floor Sarasota, Florida 34236 Shelden Kangas Allan Kangas 4578 Manor Drive Sarasota, Florida 34233
Findings Of Fact Barkwood Square Condominium was developed by Mr. John Nell (Respondent). The declaration of condominium was filed on May 23, 1980, and transfer of control from Respondent to the condominium association took place at a meeting held on June 30, 1981. At the time of turnover, Bieder Management Company was Respondent's agent for the operation, maintenance and management of Barkwood Square. Bieder was accepted as the association's agent at turnover and continued in this capacity until February, 1982. No documents were produced at the transfer meeting, and all records and accounts then in existence remained in the hands of Bieder. In February, 1982, the condominium association became dissatisfied with Bieder and replaced it with Hotz Management Company. The records turned over to Hotz by Bieder at that time were incomplete, and the association then sought the assistance of Petitioner to obtain complete records and a financial accounting. Through its investigation in 1982, Petitioner and the condominium association obtained all records available. The testimony of Petitioner's investigator and two of the unit owners (who are also condominium association directors) established that no review of the financial records of the association had ever been conducted by an independent certified public accountant (CPA). The testimony of the unit owners-directors established that Respondent had not delivered any of the following items to the association within 60 days of turnover: Original or certified copy of the declaration of condominium. A certified copy of the articles of incorporation of the association. A copy of the bylaws. Minutes of association meetings. Resignation of officers and directors resulting from change of control. The investigation revealed that Respondent owes $4,138.32 in contributions to the condominium association. Respondent concedes that he owes this amount, which is based on common expenses incurred in excess of assessments to unit owners between July and October, 1980. Respondent paid certain association expenses with personal funds and was later reimbursed. Respondent concedes this procedure was not in keeping with good accounting practices. Respondent also failed to keep or turn over to the association the financial records pertaining to the period when he did not employ a management agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order directing Respondent to take the corrective action discussed herein as authorized by Subsection 718.501(1)(d)(2), F.S., and assessing a civil fine in the amount of $1,500 as authorized by Subsection 718.501(1)(d)4, F.S. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Helen C. Ellis, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 N. Staten Bitting, Jr., Esquire 3835 Central Avenue Post Office Box 15339 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 E. James Kearney, Director Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary R. Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following Findings of Fact: The Respondent, Ocean Dunes Development Corporation, is the developer of a residential condominium known as Ocean Dunes, located in Highland Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida. Count One The first closing on a unit in Ocean Dunes occurred on April 30, 1982. The Respondent controlled the operation of the condominium association from the incorporation of the association up to February 4, 1986, when unit owners other than the developer elected a majority of the members of the board of administration of the condominium association. Pursuant to the Articles of Incorporation of the condominium association, the board of directors is composed of three members. According to the by-laws of the association, unit owners other than the developer are entitled to elect at least one-third of the members of the board when they own fifteen per cent of the units in the condominium. The by-laws further provide that within sixty days after unit owners other than the developer are entitled to elect a member of the board, the association shall call and give not less than thirty days notice of a meeting of the unit owners for this purpose. on July 15, 1982, unit owners other than the developer owned fifteen per cent of the total number of units in the condominium. The first association unit owner meeting after July 15, 1982, occurred in April of 1983. Present at the meeting were several unit owners and Mr. Philip Connor, president of both the association and the developer corporation. According to the association by-laws, a quorum is achieved by a majority of the votes of the entire membership. In April of 1983 there were 48 units in the condominium, 17 units were owned by someone other than the developer. Therefore, the developer's unit votes were absolutely necessary to achieve a quorum. At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Connor, the president of the developer corporation, stated that he was not authorized to utilize the developer's unit votes through proxy or otherwise. Mr. Connor stated: First item, obviously is to determine whether we have a quorum in order to properly conduct business. I am not voting on behalf of the developing company this evening. Mr. Hubert (the general counsel of the developer) as far as I know we do not have a quorum. Therefore, the meeting is officially adjourned. But, Mr. Connor went on to add: However, I would like to spend some time with you this evening to go over and formulate any questions or problems, et cetra. Unit owners other than the developer did not elect a member of the board of administration of the association until April 17, 1984. Count Two While operating the condominium association, the Respondent used condominium association common funds to pay for certain carpentry expenses in the amount of $1,836. The carpentry expenses were the responsibility of the Respondent as developer. During the initial phases of the investigation of this case by the Department of Business Regulation, the Respondent agreed that the carpentry expenses were the developer's responsibility and reimbursed $1,836 to the association on August 29, 1984. Count Three An "election period" is a mechanism by which the developer, as the owner of units, is excused from the payments of assessments against those units for a certain period of time. See Section 718.116(8)(a)(1), Florida Statutes. During an election period, the developer does not pay assessments on developer-owned units, but instead pays the difference between the common expenses of the association and monies received from other unit owners in the form of assessments during that period of time. In other words, if assessments collected from other unit owners are insufficient to meet common expenses, the developer is required to pay the deficiency. The election period must terminate no later than the first day of the fourth calendar month following the month in which the first closing of a unit in a condominium occurs. See Section 718.116(8)(a)(1), Florida Statutes. The first closing on the first unit in Ocean Dunes Condominium occurred on April 30, 1982. During the election period, the developer periodically funded the association and made available to it funds to pay required bills on a current, "as-due" basis. Thus, the Respondent attempted to satisfy its election period payment requirements on a cash accounting basis. The developer did not perform an election period calculation on the condominium's books and records to determine the difference between expenses incurred during the election period and assessments collected form other unit owners. Mr. Larsen, a certified public accountant and the Petitioner's expert witness, reviewed the condominium's financial records and calculated an election period deficit of $45,077.88. Mr. Larsen arrived at the figure of $45,077.88 by calculating that assessment revenues from non-developer unit owners amounted to $5,393.92 and that common expenses during the period amounted to $50,471.40, the difference being $45,077.88. The $45,077.88 figure arrived at by Larsen was composed in part of unfunded reserves during the election period, certain association bills which were left unpaid during the election period but had balances which came due later and certain prepaid assessments from other unit owners paid in advance, but which would have come due after the expiration of the election period. In arriving at the election period deficit of $45,077.88, Larsen completed a review or compilation of the financial records of the association using generally accepted principles of accounting for a review or compilation of financial statements. Count Four Unit owners other than the developer remitted their assessments on a quarterly basis. In contrast, the Respondent developer provided some funds to the association on a monthly, "as-needed" basis. Typically, when the association funds became inadequate to pay outstanding bills, the developer would contribute its assessments. At the end of each calendar year, the developer calculated an outstanding assessment liability on its inventory units and recognized that liability on the association's books. The Declaration of Condominium at Article 6.2, provided that assessments not paid on a timely basis would bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date when due until paid. Although unit owners were paying their assessments on a quarterly basis, neither the Declaration of Condominium nor the by-laws established a date when assessments were due. Count Five The percentage of ownership interest of each individual unit owner in the common elements of Ocean Dunes Condominium is set forth in Exhibit B to the Declaration of Condominium. The percentage of common elements per unit ranged from a minimum of .01959 to a maximum of .02170. The quarterly assessments to unit owners were not based on the percentages of their ownership of the common elements as outlined in the recorded Declaration. Prior to the formal hearing, the Respondent acknowledged that the proper percentages were not being assessed, and adjustments were made for all unit owners' assessments. Count Six A condominium association's annual budget must include a reserve account (unless specifically waived by the association) for capital expenditures and deferred maintenance. The reserve account of the association is set aside for long term items such as roof replacement, building painting and pavement resurfacing. See Section 718.112(2)(f), Florida Statutes. Ocean Dunes Condominium Association established a budgeted annual reserve figure of $6,000 per year (reserves were not waived). On December 31, 1984, the reserve account, if fully funded, would have contained $16,569.86. While in control of the condominium association, the Respondent did not maintain a separate, funded reserve account. Rather, the Respondent showed the reserve account as a liability in its accounting statements. The listing of a reserve account as a liability on a financial statement would not violate, nor be contrary to, generally accepted principles of accounting. The Respondent believed in good faith that it was allowed to carry reserves as liability in the association's financial books. Count Seven The Respondent employed the accounting firm of Coopers and Lybrand to handle the financial books and records of the condominium association. Coopers and Lybrand has offices in both Broward and Palm Beach Counties. Although the Respondent maintained the corporate books and records of the association at the Royal Palm Beach Bank in Palm Beach County, portions of the accounting records were routinely transferred between Coopers and Lybrand's offices in Palm Beach and Broward Counties. Count Eight On February 4, 1986, unit owners other than the developer assumed control of the condominium association. After turnover, the Respondent provided the association with the annual audits performed by the accounting firm of Coopers and Lybrand. The annual audits did not cover the election period and the period early in 1986 which the audit for the year 1985 did not cover. After turnover of counsel of the association, the annual audits were the only review of the association's financial records provided to the association by the developer. After turnover, the association at all times made the corporate books and records available to the developer. Upon turnover, the Respondent offered to the association 9 pages of separate plans and specifications utilized in the construction of the condominium. Although the plans contained the certificate of a surveyor, only one of the nine plans contained a signed affidavit that the plans were authentic.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is. RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Requiring the Respondent pay to the association $45,077.88 (representing the deficit which existed during the developer election period) no later than 45 days from the date of the Final Order; Requiring that Respondent obtain, and provide to the association, no later than 60 days from the date of the Final Order, a turnover review of the financial records of the association prepared in strict compliance with Section 718.301(4)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 7D-23.03, Florida Administrative Code; Requiring that Respondent obtain and deliver to the association no later than 60 days from the date of the Final order, a copy of the construction plans of the condominium with a certificate in affidavit form prepared in strict compliance with Section 318.301(4)(f), Florida Statutes; and Assessing a civil penalty of $5,000. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Philip R. Connor, Jr., President Ocean Dunes Development Corporation Suite 205 2929 East Commercial Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33308 James Kearney, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Thomas A. Bell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Richard Coats, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner: Addressed in Procedural Background section. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5 and 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6, 7 and 8. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10 and 11. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Rejected as misleading as stated, but adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 18. Rejected as misleading as stated, but adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19, 20 and 21. The last sentence of Paragraph 19 is rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 23. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Matters note contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 29. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 32. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Matters not contained therein are rejected as argument and/or subordinate. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 33. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 35. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent: Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 Matters not contained therein are rejected as Subordinate and/or a recitation of testimony. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence of this paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. Matters contained in Paragraph 3 which are inconsistent with the Findings of Fact previously mentioned are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence and/or subordinate. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 20 and 21. Matters not contained therein are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence and/or subordinate. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 24, 25, 26 and 27. Matters not contained therein are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 29. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence and/or a recitation of testimony.
Findings Of Fact Respondent A.R.M. Limited, Inc., is the developer of the residential condominium known as Trails at Royal Palm Beach, a phase condominium containing a total number of 230 units when completed, located in Royal Palm Beach, Florida. During 1981 Respondent submitted to Petitioner all documents required to properly register the condominium, including the Declaration of Condominium and the Contract for Sale. By letter dated June 16, 1981, Petitioner notified Respondent that the documents it had received were in acceptable form and that Respondent would soon be advised as to the results of the Petitioner's "content examination". By letter dated July 14, 1981, Petitioner notified Respondent that it had completed its examination, and the condominium documents were proper. On April 27, 1982, Respondent recorded the Declaration of Condominium for Phases I and II in the public records in Palm Beach County. The Offering Circular, the Declaration of Condominium, and the Contract for Sale contained a developer's guarantee of common expenses for a two-year period commencing with the recording of the Declaration of Condominium and guaranteeing that the unit owners' monthly assessment would not exceed $75 a month for the period of the guarantee. Accordingly, the initial guarantee period terminated April 27, 1984. Thereafter, the guarantee period was extended by the developer until April 27, 1985, and again until December 31, 1985. No evidence was offered to show that any unit owner objected to the extension of the guarantee period. However, no vote of the unit owners was taken regarding either of the two extensions, and no written agreement was obtained. During the period of time between the initial guarantee period and January 1, 1986, Respondent did not pay assessments on a regular basis but instead paid the difference between the association's expenses and income. In other words, the developer did fund all shortfalls through December 31, 1985. The Offering Circular approved by Petitioner in 1981 contained a copy of the Contract for Sale which was to be used, and in fact has been used, for the condominiums units. That Contract specifically provides for purchasers to pay an initial contribution to working capital in the amount of "$300 . . . which may be used by the Association for start-up expenses as well as ordinary expenses . . . " Pursuant to that contract, Respondent utilized start-up funds to off set common expenses of the condominium arising from the sale of 28 units between April 27, 1984 and April 27, 1985. Fourteen of those units were sold between April 27, 1984 and October 1, 1984, and 14 of those units were sold between October 1, 1984 and April 27, 1985. In a phase condominium, since the total number of units within the condominium increases as phases are added, the number of unit owners paying assessments for common expenses increases and, consequently the percentage of ownership of the common elements and percentage of common expenses liability changes per unit. When Respondent registered the condominium with Petitioner in 1981 Respondent filed all documents necessary for the entire project (including all phases) but only paid the filing fee related to Phases I and II at that time. As Respondent continued developing the condominium and selling additional units in subsequently-constructed phases, appropriate amendments to the original Declaration were recorded in the public records. Respondent, however, failed to file copies of those recorded amendments with Petitioner. By cover letter dated March 3, 1986, Respondent filed with Petitioner a developer's filing statement for subsequent phases and enclosed a check in the amount of $940 to cover filing fee requirements. According to an attachment to that filing, Respondent was filing Phases 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300, 1400, 2000, 2100, 2200, 2400, and 2500, which in totality comprised 94 units. According to the same attachment, these Phases were added to the condominium through recordation of amendments to the original Declaration with such recordation occurring between 1983 and 1986. According to information submitted by Respondent to Petitioner, as of March 3, 1986, closings had taken place on 77 units in Phases 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300, 1400, 2100, 2400, and 2500 prior to Respondent's filing the subsequent phase documents with Petitioner. There is no allegation that the documents when filed were improper or that Respondent failed to provide them to the unit owners at the time they were executed. In January of 1988 unit owners other than the developer elected a majority of the board of administration of the condominium association, and turnover of control of the association from developer control to control by unit owners other than the developer occurred.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it Is'; RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent guilty of the allegation contained within count one; Finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained within counts two and three of the Notice to Show Cause; Requiring Respondent to effectuate the financial review discussed in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order and pay to the condominium association any amount of unpaid assessments for the time period in question; and Assessing a fine against Respondent in the amount of $1000. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of May, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 87-2917 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, the first sentence of 9, the third sentence of 15, and 16-20 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 8 has been rejected as being immaterial to the issues under consideration herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 4, 6, 9 except for the first sentence, 10-14, and 15 except for the third sentence have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel or recitations of the testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Van B. Poole, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 A.R.M. Limited, Inc. Trails at Royal Palm Beach Suite 315 1300 North Florida Mango Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Dennis Powers, Esquire Suite 315 1300 North Florida Mango Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33409
Findings Of Fact M. G., Incorporated, a real estate developer in Brevard County, Florida, caused to be constructed The Bello Rio Condominium complex at 255 South Tropical Trail, Merritt Island, Florida. On January 25, 1979, the Chief, Bureau of Condominiums, Department of Business Regulation, State of Florida, advised the attorney for the Developer that, pursuant to Rule 7D-17.05, Florida Administrative Code, the condominium documents submitted for approval for the project in question here had been reviewed and were considered proper for filing, and that the Developer could lawfully close sales contracts on units within the project. Units were sold; and on September 1, 1981, the project was "turned over" by the Developer to the association. At the meeting held for this purpose, several documents were delivered by the Developer to the association's Board of Administration (Board) in the person of Faye Shaffer, a resident of the development. These documents consisted of: Three (3) checks totaling $1,800; The association seal; The original recorded copy of the Declaration; The original copy of the Articles of Incorporation; A condominium insurance policy; A flood insurance renewal declaration; and Certificates of Occupancy for twelve (12) units. All plans and specifications in the hands of the Developer were released to the association's attorney sometime in that general time frame. Further, because there were no common areas covered by warranties, none were available to turn over. Either at the time of turnover or shortly thereafter, during the month of September, 1981, Mrs. Shaffer also received from the Developer five sheets of check ledger paper reflecting the following categories of entries: Date of check; Payee; Check number; Amount of check; Lawn maintenance; Utilities; Insurance; Garbage pickup; Bank service charge; Miscellaneous; and Management fee (10 percent). These ledger sheets were not certified as reviewed by a certified public accountant and constituted the only financial records turned over to the association by the Developer at any time. The accounting and bookkeeping functions for this project were accomplished initially in the offices of the Developer. Thereafter, the Developer retained Guest Realty, Inc., to manage the facility, including the collection of maintenance fees and making payments as required for utilities, etc. During the period of that company's stewardship, all accounting for funds and bank statement reconciliations were handled by Guest Realty, Inc. Any deficiencies resulting between fees collected and expenses paid during that period were made up by the Developer, and Guest Realty, Inc., received a fee of 10 percent of the maintenance fees received for its services. Any bills, receipts, cancelled checks, or other records kept during the period are now in storage; and Mr. Guest, on behalf of Respondent, M. G., Incorporated, will not make the effort to retrieve them unless required to do so by some competent authority.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be assessed a penalty of $500 under the provisions of Section 718.501(1)(d)4, Florida Statutes (1981) RECOMMENDED this 13th of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Helen C. Ellis, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William C. Irvin, Esquire Post Office Box 606 Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Mr. Gary R. Rutledge Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. E. James Kearney Director Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
