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DIXIE GROWERS, INC. vs VEG SERVICE, INC., AND WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 96-003994 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Aug. 26, 1996 Number: 96-003994 Latest Update: Mar. 10, 1997

The Issue Whether Respondents Veg Service, Inc., and Western Surety Company are justly indebted to Dixie Growers, Inc., for Florida- grown agricultural products which Dixie Growers, as the agent for the producers of the products; sold to Veg Service?

Findings Of Fact The Parties Dixie Growers, located in Plant City, Florida, is a producer, packer, and seller of Florida-grown agricultural products. It also acts as a sales agent for growers of Florida agricultural products, and in that capacity is a producer of agricultural products. Ms. Linda T. Lawton is the Vice President/Secretary for Dixie Growers, Inc. Mr. George Locklear is a salesman for the company. It is the practice of Dixie Growers, Inc., to pay the growers who provide it with agricultural products to be sold on the open market within 10 to 14 days of shipment unless the broker or purchaser to whom the products are sold notifies Dixie of a problem. This practice was made known to Veg Service before the incidents which led to these proceedings. Whenever Dixie receives notice of a problem with the shipment prior to payment of the grower, Dixie places a "trouble" memorandum on the top of the file. In such a case, Dixie does not usually pay the grower until the problem has been resolved with the broker and then only in an amount that does not exceed what Dixie receives from the broker or purchaser. Veg Services, Inc., is a negotiating broker of Florida agricultural products, some of which it has purchased from Dixie Growers. In this capacity Veg Services is a dealer in agricultural products. The company is located in Pompano Beach, Florida. Western Surety Company is the issuer of bonds to Veg Services, Inc., in amounts sufficient to cover the disputes involved in this proceeding. Case No. 96-3995A On June 1, 1996, Dixie Growers sold 260 boxes, (1 and 1/9th bushels each), of fancy eggplant to Veg Services. The price was $8.00 per box for a price of $2,080 for the entire shipment. On June 5, 1996, the U. S. Department of Agriculture, at a cost of $278, conducted an inspection of the 260 boxes of eggplant in Providence, Rhode Island at the premises of Tourtellot and Company, Inc. Under the section marked "Grade" in the inspection certificate, the eggplant was found to fail "to grade U.S. No. 1." On the same day as the inspection, Dixie Growers received by fax a copy of the inspection, Inspection Certificate K-195345-4. In accord with its customary practice, Dixie Growers placed a "trouble" memorandum in its file so that it would not pay the grower of the eggplant until the trouble was resolved. On June 17, 1996, Dixie Growers received a fax of the invoice from Veg Services marked, "OK." Interpreting the "OK," to mean that payment would be in full, George Locklear called Veg Service to double-check. He talked with Martin Shield and Marcie, a member of the office staff. First Marcie and then Mr. Shield stated that the invoice would be paid in full. Before the growers were paid on the strength of the representations of the two Veg Service employees made June 17, however, Deborah Lawton, Dixie's bookkeeper asked Mr. Locklear to inquire as to whether the cost of the inspection ($278,) would be deducted from the payment. Marcie told Mr. Locklear that payment would be in full with nothing deducted for the inspection. With the understanding that payment would be made in full with nothing deducted for the cost of the inspection, Dixie Growers paid the growers of the eggplant in full. On July 1, 1996, after payment had been made by Dixie Growers to the growers of the eggplant, it received a fax from Veg Services that it would be paid only $1.60 per box instead of the full $8.00 per box. When Mr. Locklear called to inquire about the fax, Marcie told him that Veg Services had made a mistake when it said that payment would be in full. Dixie Growers received payment in the amount of $416.00 leaving $1,664.00 still due. Case No. 96-3996A On April 27, 1996, Dixie Growers sold 65 boxes of medium squash, 200 boxes of select cucumber and 60 boxes of cabbages to Veg Service. No trouble with the produce was ever reported by Veg Service to Dixie Growers. Nor was there ever made a federal inspection of the produce. The total bill for the sale was $2610.00. On May 9, 1996, another sale was made by Dixie Growers to Veg Service: 154 boxes of medium zucchini, 72 boxes of small squash, 72 boxes of medium squash, 50 boxes of choice cucanelle and 120 boxes of large cucumbers. No trouble with any of the produce was ever reported by Veg Service to Dixie Growers. Nor was there a federal inspection conducted. The bill for the sale was $4,360.00. On June 12, 1996, payment was received for the April 27 sale in the amount of $1,280 leaving a balance of $1,330. The same day payment was received for the May 9 sale in the amount of $2,259.50 leaving a balance due of $2,100.50. Invoices showing the balances due for the two sales were mailed by certified mail to Veg Service. Following phone calls by Dixie Growers, at the request of Veg Service staff, the invoices were later faxed twice to Veg Service. The two balances, totalling $3,430.50, had not been paid as of final hearing. Had any trouble with either sale been communicated to Dixie Growers prior to the payment it made to the growers of the produce, then Dixie Growers would not have paid the growers until the problem was resolved. Since Veg Service did not communicate any problem with either sale in any way, Dixie Growers paid the growers. Case No. 4727A On June 6, 1996, Dixie Growers sold Veg Service 500 boxes of fancy eggplant, 200 boxes of choice eggplant, 600 boxes of large bell peppers, 200 boxes of extra large bell peppers and 50 boxes of long hot peppers. The invoice for the sale shows $14,200 due for the produce and a charge of $23.50 listed for "Temp.Recrd," for a total invoiced amount of $14,223.50. On July 17, 1996, Dixie Growers received a check from Veg Services for $10,262.50 for the June 6 sale leaving a balance of $3,961.00. When George Locklear of Dixie Growers inquired of Veg Service as to why the invoiced amount had not been fully paid, he was told that a federal inspection had shown that the peppers were smaller than as represented by Dixie Growers. This was the first time that Dixie Growers had received any notice from Veg Service that there was any trouble with the June 6 sale. The inspection was faxed to Dixie Growers on July 31, 1996, long after Dixie Growers had paid the growers of the produce. The fee for the inspection by the U.S. Department of Agriculture was $111.00. That fee had been deducted by Veg Service when it paid the invoice amount so that the amount claimed due by Dixie Growers in this case ($3,961) is the sum of the inspection fee ($111) and a balance not paid on the produce sold, ($3,850).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order adjudicating Veg Service, Inc., to be indebted to Dixie Growers, Inc., in the amount of $9,055.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Charles E. Lawton, President Dixie Growers, Inc. Post Office Box 1686 Plant City, Florida 33564-1686 Herbert Shield, President Veg Service, Inc. 150 SW 12th Avenue, Suite 370 Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Western Surety Company Legal Department 101 South Phillips Avenue Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57102

Florida Laws (3) 120.57604.15604.21
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INGRAM GROVE SERVICE, INC. vs MARK FETZER, INC., AND U. S. FIDELITY AND GUARANTEE COMPANY, 94-005402 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Sep. 26, 1994 Number: 94-005402 Latest Update: Jun. 01, 2009

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Ingram Grove Services, Inc., (Ingram), was a commercial grower of citrus fruit and a licensed citrus fruit dealer in Florida. Mark Fetzer, Inc. (Fetzer), was also a grower and a licensed citrus fruit dealer in Florida. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company was an insurance company authorized to write surety bonds in this state during the 1991-1992 citrus shipping season and was the underwriter of Fetzer's bond for the transaction in issue herein. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company was an insurance company authorized to write surety bonds in this state during the 1991-1992 citrus shipping season and was the underwriter of Ingram's bond for the transaction herein. By contract number 518, dated January 14, 1992, and drafted on the letterhead of Mark Fetzer, Inc., Ingram, the grower, sold and conveyed to Fetzer, the buyer, approximately 20,000 boxes of valencia oranges at a price of $10.50 per box, with a moving date of April 30, 1992. This description was intended to cover all valencia oranges grown by Ingram and contained in Suncrest #11 field in Sebring, Florida and included transportation to Polk County. Ingram was authorized to, and did, request a deposit of $1.00 per box, and by check dated April 27, 1992, Fetzer paid Ingram the sum of $20,000. The oranges were to be delivered by Ingram to the Commercial Carriers Cold Storage, (CCCS), facility in Auburndale, Florida. The entire crop of fruit covered by this contract was to be paid for within 30 days of delivery to CCCS. The contract did not prohibit Fetzer from re-selling the fruit covered thereby. Ingram and Fetzer had done business together for several years, since 1985. In every case, each had paid what was owed to the other, but it is admitted that on occasion, such payment was delayed for a short time. Neither had ever failed to ultimately pay what was owed the other, however. Sometime after delivery of the fruit to CCCS by Ingram, Fetzer sold 3,000 of the boxes to Vero Beach Groves, Inc., (VB), a producer of commercial orange juice for commercial sales. At that time, and at all times pertinent to the issues herein, VB was having financial difficulties. Evidence of record indicates that at the time, VB owed approximately $32,000 to Fetzer, somewhat more than $60,000 to Ingram, and over $600,000 to Florida Growers, another entity not pertinent to the issues herein. The terms of Fetzer's sale to VB called for a payment of $13.65 per box. This included $11.65 per box for the oranges then delivered, including 15 brokerage, and $2.00 per box to satisfy VB's antecedent debt to Fetzer. If all the Ingram fruit were resold by Fetzer to VB, this procedure would have paid off VB's debt to Fetzer before all the Ingram fruit was pulled out of storage. When the antecedent debt was liquidated, the price per box would have been reduced to $11.65. Fetzer had not allowed VB's debt to it to grow very large, and the above practice, which had been followed for several years, had to this point, been successful. There was no dispute under the terms of the contract between Ingram and Fetzer until sometime in mid-May, 1992 when, prior to the delivery of any fruit, Mr. Ingram called Mr. Fetzer and asked for a meeting. At that meeting, Mr. Ingram told Mr. Fetzer that unless an agreement was made to get him, Ingram, a debt reduction procedure similar to Fetzer's, he would not make available to Fetzer the fruit called for under the contract. Mr. Ingram indicated at the hearing that when he heard Fetzer had contracted with VB, in light of VB's tenuous financial condition, he was concerned about being able to get paid and this caused him to seek the meeting with Fetzer. However, he did not communicate this to Fetzer nor did he ask Fetzer for payment in advance or some security for the obligation. In fact, according to Fetzer, he had the money available, in cash, to pay the entire amount owed Ingram if necessary. In addition, Fetzer told Ingram that even if VB could not take the fruit, there were at least 3 -5 other "juicers" to whom he could sell the fruit and pay Ingram. In point of fact, the fruit was subsequently sold, by Ingram, to other juice processors at a per box price which varied from $12.50 to $13.35. Nonetheless, Fetzer tried to work the situation out for all concerned with no consideration given him for any purported change to the contract. Faced with the potential for not being able to get the fruit for sale to VB, the contract with whom was worth in excess of $200,000 to him, Fetzer met with a representative of VB and reached an agreement with it whereby VB would pay an additional $3.35 over the $13.65 so that Ingram could be paid. At this meeting he was told by Mr. Kordick, VB's vice president, that VB would work something out with Ingram for the remaining fruit. Thereafter, VB agreed with Ingram to make additional payments to Ingram. It appears, however, that this agreement to pay the extra on Ingram's antecedent debt was more acquiescence to coercion than voluntary agreement. Fetzer then released the first shipment of oranges to VB. VB paid for the shipment of oranges when it came in.It also issued four checks in the amount of $1,680.00 each fdor payment on VB's antecedent debt to Ingram which were made payable to Ingram or Fetzer. These four checks were cashed by Fetzer and were dishonored. They were ultimately redeemed by VB after several weeks, but none of the funds were transmitted by Fetzer to Ingram. Fetzer kept them as compensation for the amount of profit he lost because of Ingram's refusal to release any more oranges after the first shipment. In addition, Fetzer did not pay Ingram for the first 3,000 box shipment. After the first shipment was delivered to VB, Mr. Fetzer was contacted by VB's representative, Mr. Kordick, who advised VB could not pay the amount asked for the fruit which included the "surcharge" to reimburse Ingram because the processed juice would not bring enough to cover it. Admittedly, Mr. Fetzer did not ask Mr. Ingram to rescind the requirement for the "surcharge" payment. Had he done so and had Ingram agreed, it is most likely that VB could have purchased all the oranges from the entire contract and paid for it. All Fetzer did was tell Ingram he should not place the extra burden on VB, and as it was, VB went out of business. Mr. Fetzer knew of the arrangements for the "surcharge" that Ingram wanted before the delivery of the one shipment to VB and requested that shipment knowing what was required. He decided to go along with Ingram to see what would happen even though he felt by then that Ingram had breached the contract. However, he did not put this in writing to Ingram. He felt he had no choice due to Mr. Ingram's representation to him at their May meeting that it would be Ingram's way or not at all. Fetzer went along with it because he saw it as the only way to potentially get the money owed him by VB. Considering the net amount paid by Fetzer as deposit, ($20,000 - $3,000 = $17,000); the amount of antecedent debt unrecoverable due to Ingram's actions, ($26,000) and the anticipated profit lost of the remaining boxes un- delivered by Ingram, ($14,950), Ingram owes Fetzer a gross total of $57,590. From this must be deducted the $6,720 which Fetzer collected from VB on Ingram's behalf but which was not delivered to Ingram, and the $31,500 unpaid for the 3,000 boxes delivered, leaving Ingram's net obligation to Fetzer as $19,730.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that A Final Order be issued by the Commissioner of Agriculture awarding the sum of $19730 to Mark Fetzer, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR FETZER: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of the law. Not a Finding of Fact but a Conclusion of Law. Accepted as a restatement of the case history. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except that the debt of VB to Ingram was approximately $60,000. Accepted that no tripartite agreement was reached. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. Not a Finding of fact but a restatement of testimony. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted that Ingram resold to others the fruit not released to Fetzer. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of law. Accepted and incorporated herein with amount stated. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR INGRAM: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected in so far as it indicates a tri-party agreement. VB's participation was more a matter of acquiescence than agreement. Second sentence accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected. Fetzer did not decline to take fruit as called for in the original contract. Second sentence accepted as it notes the sale to third parties but not "as a result" of Fetzer's failure to take the fruit. Not a Finding of Fact but a Conclusion of law. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Rejected. Not a proper Finding of Fact but more a comment on the state of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas A. Lockwood, III, Esquire Peterson, Myers, Craig, Crews, Brandon & Puterbaugh, P.A. P.O. Drawer 7608 Lake Region Plaza, Suite 300 141 5th Street, N.W. Winter Haven, Florida 33883-7608 C. Kennon Hendrix, Esquire Hendrix & Brennan P.O. Box 520- 2043 14th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32961-0520 Chester C. Payne Financial Examiner Analyst Office of Citrus Bond and License Division of Marketing Development Department of Agriculture P.O. Box 1072 500 Third Street, N.W. Winter Haven, Florida 33882-1072 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (7) 120.57120.68601.03601.61601.64601.65601.66
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ROY AMERSON, INC. vs. BRUCE B. BENWAY & KATHY E. BENWAY D/B/A K & B, 80-001613 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001613 Latest Update: Dec. 02, 1980

Findings Of Fact K & B Enterprises, Respondent, purchased plants from Roy Amerson, Inc., Petitioner, and they were delivered to Respondent on February 19, 1980. Respondent had ordered Bottlebrush and Cuban laurel (Ficus Nitida) packaged in wire baskets to protect root ball in shipment. Upon arrival Respondent noted that the wires were mangled and some root balls appeared separated from the roots. Before the trees were unloaded Mrs. Benway telephoned the salesman for Petitioner and told him about the condition of the trees. The salesman advised her to accept the trees, water them, and they (Amerson) would make an allowance for the damage. This, he said, would be better and cause less damage to the trees than if they were sent back on the truck that brought them. The driver was requested by Mr. Benway to note the condition of the trees on the invoice accompanying the shipment (Exhibit 1). No such notation was made. The driver did note the date of delivery. Respondent Benway acknowledged receipt of the merchandise by signing Exhibit 1 below the following statement printed near the bottom of Exhibit 1: STOCK MAY BE REFUSED AT TIME OF DELIVERY FOR A DEFINITE REASON, BUT ONCE SIGNED FOR CUSTOMER ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR TOTAL AMOUNT OF INVOICE. OPEN ACCOUNTS PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF THE MONTH. 1 1/2 PERCENT CHARGE ADDED IF NOT PAID BY THE 25TH WHICH IS ANNUAL RATE OF 18 PERCENT. Respondent is a plant retailer and landscape contractor. After accepting the February 19, 1980 delivery the Cuban laurel was planted as were the other plants. Attempts to settle the dispute with Petitioner's salesman were unsuccessful. Nine of the Bottlebrush died but all of the Cuban laurel have survived. At the instruction of the salesman these plants were watered but not trimmed or fertilized. Respondent paid for the other plants received on this invoice and for the damaged plants as they have been sold. As of the date of the hearing the balance owed on the stock delivered on Exhibit 1 was $1,494.90.

Florida Laws (4) 672.201672.202672.607672.608
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JOYCE C. HALLOWELL vs SEARS MERCHANDISE GROUP, 95-002039 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Apr. 27, 1995 Number: 95-002039 Latest Update: Jul. 03, 1997

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner, Joyce C. Hallowell, was employed by Respondent as a part- time commission sales associate in the electronics department of Brand Central during the relevant period of time including June 1993. Petitioner worked for Respondent on-and-off for a period of 20 years in various sales positions and both in a full and part-time capacity. Petitioner is an American woman, born: October 14, 1948, who was 44 years of age during the relevant time and a member of a protected class. William Henley became the Store General Manager of the Melbourne, Florida Sears store in May 1993. Accordingly, Henley was, during the relevant time period, the Store General Manager of the Melbourne, Florida Sears store. As Store General Manager, William Henley has responsibility for, inter alia, making employment decisions, including hiring, firing, transferring and promotion decisions. Herman Payne became the Brand Central Manager of the Melbourne, Florida Sears store in 1993. Accordingly, Payne was, during the relevant time period, the Brand Central Manager of the Melbourne, Florida Sears store. As Brand Central Manager, Payne supervised all four departments in Brand Central. He has responsibility for, inter alia, making employment decisions, including hiring, firing, transferring and promotion decisions for personnel in his department. Payne was 41 years old during the relevant time period. Frances Pagan Cusick is the Human Resources Manager for the Sears Melbourne, Florida store. As Human Resources Manager Cusick has responsibility for, inter alia, administering the hiring, equal-employment, and compensation policies of Sears. Cusick was 43 years old during the relevant time period. Brand Central consists of four departments: computers, electronics, small appliances and home appliances. Sales associates work in each of the four Branch Central Departments. Both full-time and part-time sales associates work in Brand Central. Each of the sales associates in Brand Central are paid on the basis of commissions earned from sales. As a consequence, each sales associate's earnings are dependent on the number of sales made. At the time of Henley's and Payne's arrival at the Melbourne, Florida Sears store in May, 1993 and June, 1993, respectively, the store, including Brand Central, was in need of numerous changes and improvements, including improvements in appearance and presentation. In June, 1993, Henley and Payne initiated a cleanup "campaign" throughout the store, including Brand Central, in an effort to make the store more presentable to the public. As part of the clean-up "campaign" in Brand Central, Payne recruited the assistance of all Brand Central employees. Petitioner was uncooperative and refused or was reluctant to assist in various efforts to improve the appearance of Brand Central. She also complained to management about others in her department and their lack of diligence in the clean-up campaign. Hallowell's attitude problems were a serious concern to the management of the Melbourne, Florida Sears store. The management of the Melbourne, Florida Sears store counselled her and documented Petitioner's attitude problems. In June, 1993, a need arose for additional part-time help within the appliance department of Brand Central. A transfer from one section of Brand Central to another is not considered a promotion; rather, it is simply a transfer from one department to another. Henley and Payne ultimately decided who would be transferred to the appliance department of Brand Central. The criteria utilized by Respondent in determining who would be transferred to the appliance department included: (i) satisfactory job performance; (ii) satisfactory customer service; and (iii) a positive attitude. Given the nature of Respondent's business, it is important for Respondent's employees to maintain satisfactory job performance, customer service, and to exhibit a positive attitude. The criteria utilized by Respondent in determining who would be transferred to the appliance department were essential to building a highly motivated team of sales associates. Seniority was not a factor utilized by Respondent in determining who would be transferred to the appliance department. Age was not a factor utilized by Respondent in determining who would be transferred to the appliance department. In June 1993, Petitioner expressed to Herman Payne a desire to transfer from the electronics department to the appliance department of Brand Central. Three individuals were considered for the available, part-time position in the appliance department of Brand Central, to wit: Barbara Gehrlein, Terry Giordano and Petitioner. The transfer which Petitioner sought to the appliance department of Brand Central was not a promotion. However, Petitioner felt that she could earn a higher commission in that department over time. Barbara Gehrlein, who was over fifty at the time, elected not to be considered for the transfer to the appliance department of Brand Central because she was not interested in a part-time position. Gehrlein's preference was to remain in a full-time position. Terry Giordana, who was under forty years of age at the time, was selected for the transfer to the appliance department of Brand Central. Henley and Payne decided that she exhibited a positive attitude and satisfied the other qualification criteria utilized by Respondent. Petitioner was not chosen for the part-time position in the appliance department of Brand Central because of the poor attitude she exhibited during the clean-up campaign. After the selection of Terry Giordano for the part-time position in the appliance department of Brand Central, Petitioner continued to exhibit a poor attitude. Prior to the selection by Respondent of the individual to be transferred to the appliance department of Brand Central, Petitioner admitted to her supervisor, that she had been uncooperative and that she had a "chip on her shoulder." Respondent maintains an Affirmative Action Policy. Sears' Affirmative Action Policy provides, inter alia, that: Sears is proud to reaffirm its commitment of the principles of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action. It is our policy to provide equal employment opportunity in all areas of our employment practices and to assure that there will be no discrimination against any associate or applicant on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, ancestry/ethnicity, citizenship, sexual orien- tation, disability, veteran status, marital status, or any other reason prohibited by law. This policy extends to all of the Sears employment practices including recruitment and hiring, job assignments, education and development, promotions, compensation and benefits, use of company facilities, and all other privileges, terms, conditions of employment. It is further the goal of Sears to provide an atmosphere where all our associates can grow and optimize their performance in an environment free of intimidation and harassment of any form. No direct evidence exists supporting Petitioner's contention that she was denied a "promotion" because of her age. Respondent did not fail to "promote" Petitioner. Respondent did not fail to "promote" Petitioner because of her age and Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of her age. With respect to targeted earnings, studies showed that an employee in the appliance department would earn less than an employee in the electronics department, given certain assumptions. Assuming a total store sales volume of $3 million, it is expected that an employee in the appliance department would earn $10.38 per hour, while an employee in the electronics department would receive $10.43 per hour. With respect to targeted earnings, studies showed that an employee in the appliance department would earn slightly more than an employee in the electronics department, given certain other assumptions. Assuming a total store sales volume of $3-6 million, it is expected that an employee in the electronic's department would earn $11.50 per hour, while an employee in the appliance department would receive $11.67 per hour. During the relevant time period, of the 13 individuals who worked in the appliance department of Brand Central, eight of them (or 61.5 percent) were at least 40 years old. During the relevant time period, of the 23 individuals who worked in all of Brand Central, 13 of them (or 56.5 percent) were at least 40 years old. During the relevant time period, of the 20 sales associates who were promoted at the Melbourne, Florida Sears store, five of them (or 25 percent) were at least 40 years old. During the relevant time period, of the 213 sales associates who were working at the Melbourne, Florida Sears store, 85 of them (or 39.9 percent) were at least 40 years old.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitute my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3 (in part), 4, 5, 6 (in part), 7, 8, 9 (in part), 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, and 53. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or subsumed: paragraphs 3 (in part), 6 (in part), 9 (in part), 31, 32, and 41. COPIES FURNISHED: Joyce C. Hallowell 1498 Beche Street, S.E. Palm Bay, Florida 32909 Carlos J. Burruezo, Esquire 390 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1285 Post Office Box 3389 Orlando, Florida 32802-3389 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

USC (1) 42 USC 2000e Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60Y-4.016
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DIVISION OF FINANCE vs BARAT COMPANY, 92-005620 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 16, 1992 Number: 92-005620 Latest Update: Mar. 17, 1993

The Issue The issue in this case concerns whether the Petitioner should issue a cease and desist order and/or impose sanctions against the Respondent on the basis of allegations that the Respondent, by failing to have its books, accounts, and documents available for examination and by refusing to permit an inspection of its books and records in an investigation and examination, has violated Sections 520.995(1)(a), (f), and (g), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Sometime during the month of February of 1991, Ms. Jennifer Chirolis, a Financial Investigator from the Department of Banking and Finance, visited the offices of the Barat Company. She spoke with Mr. Roque Barat and determined that the Barat Company was conducting retail installment sales without being licensed to do so under Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. Mr. Chirolis advised Mr. Roque Barat that he needed a license and asked him to cease operations until he obtained the necessary license. The Barat Company thereafter obtained the necessary license and was still licensed as of the time of the formal hearing. Thereafter, the Department received a complaint about the Barat Company from a customer. The customer's complaint was to the effect that the Barat Company had made misrepresentations concerning the fee paid by the customer. The Department initiated an "investigation" of the customer's complaint and also decided to conduct an "examination" of the Barat Company. On April 22, 1992, a Department Examiner, Mr. Lee Winters, went to the office of the Barat Company to conduct the "examination" and "investigation". The Barat Company is operated out of a small office with two employees and a few filing cabinets. When Mr. Winters arrived, employees of the Barat Company were conducting business with two customers. Mr. Winters identified himself to the employees and informed them that he had been assigned to conduct an "examination" and "investigation" of the Barat Company. A Barat Company employee, Mr. Fred Vivar, said that he could not produce the company's records without express authorization from Mr. Roque Barat, that Mr. Roque Barat was out of the country, that he could not get in touch with Mr. Roque Barat at that moment, but that when he did get in touch with him, he would advise Mr. Roque Barat of Mr. Winter's desire to examine the company's books and records. Following a number of telephone calls over a period of several days, on May 1, 1992, Mr. Vivar advised Mr. Winters that he had received authorization from Mr. Roque Barat for the Department to inspect the books and records of the Barat Company. An appointment was made for the Department to inspect the books and records on May 6, 1992, beginning at 10:00 a.m. On May 5, 1992, a letter from an attorney representing the Barat Company was hand delivered to Mr. Winters. The letter included the following paragraph: It is my understanding that you have requested the opportunity to view the records of the above-referenced company, said inspection to take place on May 6, 1992. Please be advised that if this "inspection" is purportedly being done by your agency's authority, pursuant to F.S. 520.996, that no records will be produced absent compliance by your department with F.S. 520.994 including, but not limited to, the Barat Company exercising its right to challenge said subpoena. The Department concluded from the letter of May 5, 1992, that the Barat Company not only refused to produce records without a subpoena, but that, even if served with a subpoena, the Barat Company would resist compliance with the subpoena unless and until ordered to comply by a court. For that reason the Department did not pursue the issuance of a subpoena. Mr. Winters has been involved in over one hundred "examinations" under Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. In the course of those "examinations" there have been only two licensees that did not produce their records. Those two licensees were the Barat Company and another company known as Phase One Credit. Mr. Roque Barat is an officer and director of both Phase One Credit and the Barat Company. The license of Phase One Credit was revoked for its failure to produce its books and records. The refusal to produce the books and records of the Barat Company was occasioned by an effort on the part of Mr. Roque Barat to avoid payment of "examination" fees authorized by Section 520.996, Florida Statutes. In the summer of 1992, the Barat Company filed for bankruptcy, closed down its business operations, and is currently winding up the business.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the charge that the Barat Company has violated Section 520.995(1)(a), Florida Statutes; Concluding that the Barat Company has violated Sections 520.995(1)(f) and (g), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; Imposing a penalty consisting of: (a) an administra-tive fine in the amount of one thousand dollars, and (b) revocation of the Barat Company's license; and Ordering the Barat Company to cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5620 The following are my specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance, with the exception of the last five words. The last five words are rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case and as, in any event, not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 8: First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inaccurate description of letter. (The relevant text of the letter is included in the findings of fact.) Last sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary evidentiary details. Paragraph 9: Rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 10: First two sentences rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Last two sentences accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 13: Accepted. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: As noted in the Preliminary Statement portion of this Recommended Order, the Respondent's proposed recommended order was filed late. The Respondent's proposed recommended order also fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code, in that it fails to contain citations to the portions of the record that support its proposed findings of fact. A party's statutory right to a specific ruling on each proposed finding submitted by the party is limited to those circumstances when the proposed findings are submitted within the established deadlines and in conformity with applicable rules. See Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, and Forrester v. Career Service Commission, 361 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), in which the court held, inter alia, that a party is not entitled to more than a reasonable period of time within which to submit its proposals. Because the Respondent submitted its proposals late and because those proposals fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is not statutorily entitled to a specific ruling on each of its proposed findings and no such specific findings have been made. (As noted in the Preliminary Statement, the Respondent's proposed recommended order has been read and considered.) COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Brenner, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue Suite 708-N Miami, Florida 33128 Louis J. Terminello, Esquire 950 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 Michael H. Tarkoff, Esquire 2601 South Bayshore Drive Suite 1400 Coconut Grove, Florida 33133 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Copies furnished continued: William G. Reeves, General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Florida Laws (6) 112.061120.57520.994520.995520.996520.997
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WILLIE J. WOODS vs GROWERS MARKETING SERVICE, INC., AND PREFERRED NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 92-001032 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Brooksville, Florida Feb. 18, 1992 Number: 92-001032 Latest Update: May 31, 1994

Findings Of Fact Willie J. Woods is a farmer. He entered into an agreement with W. R. Ward, Jr., President of Growers Marketing Service, Inc. (GMS) concerning the disposition of watermelons which he had grown. The testimony of Woods and Ward concerning the nature of the agreement is conflicting. In the absence of a written contract, the nature of the agreement must be determined from the other documents surrounding their transactions. From these documents, it is determined that the agreement between the parties was not for the purchase of Woods' watermelons by GMS. The documentation surrounding the transactions by GMS, show that GMS was acting as a broker or middle man in introducing Woods' watermelons into the stream of commerce. According to Mr. Ward's records, each shipment was assigned a transaction number, and each sale from a lot of watermelons was also assigned a transaction number. The record of each of these transactions was examined in detail. Below each of these transactions is discussed, and where portions of the record are particularly pertinent, they have been copied and attached to this order for ease of reference. In some instances, the settlement statement has been reproduced and corrected to reflect what the actual charges should have been based upon the underlying record. A handwritten explanation of the adjusting entries has been added to these statements. Transaction number 1439: On June 4, 1991, Woods delivered 43,750 pounds of watermelons to GMS The documentation surrounding this transaction shows that GMS, sold the load of watermelons FOB Brooksville, Florida for a price of 14 cents per pound.The purchaser's driver transported the load from Brooksville to Canada where the purchaser "rejected" the load because the melons were immature. By purchasing the watermelons FOB Brooksville, the purchaser waived any right to reject the melons upon their arrival at their destination. Further, the only evidence of immaturity is an inspection report which states that the inspection was limited and may not reflect the condition of the whole load. The inspection report itself is hearsay. The dollar value of this load as stated in the Bill of Lading/Customs Declaration was $6,125.00. The cost of freight was not shown in the file because it was delivered FOB Brooksville and the costs were borne by the purchaser. The GMS's handling fee was 1 cent per pound or $438.00. GMS owed Woods $5,687.00 on transaction number 1439. GMS paid Woods $2,879 on this transaction. GMS still owes Woods $2,808 on this transaction. Transaction number 1424: On June 4th, GMS sold in behalf of Woods $4,320 pounds of watermelons for 20.25 cents per pound. W. R. Ward stated that the price was reduced from 15 to 5 cents per pound, and was a bookkeeping error. The file reflects the sales price for the 46,320 pounds of watermelons was $9,380. The file reflects that transportation on this load of watermelons was $1,683.00, and GMS, was entitled to 2.5 cents per pound for packing and 1 cent handling for a total of $1,621. The total expenses were $3,304.00 for transaction number 1424. GMS owed Woods $6,077.00 for transaction 1424, but only paid him $1,844. GMS still owes Woods $4,233 on this transaction. Transaction number 3534: On June 4th, GMS, handled a load of yellow meat watermelons weighing 4,071 pounds for Willie J. Woods. Subsequently, GMS sold portions of this load of watermelons in transactions number 1565, 1507, 1461, 1403, and 1476. On June the 6th, GMS sold 13,337 pounds of watermelons at 17 cents a pound for a total sales price of $2,267.29 in transaction 1461. On June 6th, Growers Marketing Service sold 18,909 pounds at 14 cents a pound for a total of $2,647.26 in transaction number 403. On June 7th, Growers Marketing Service sold 1,945 pounds at 22 cents a pound for a total of $427.90 in transaction 1476. On June 14th, Growers Marketing Service sold 5,347 pounds on transaction 1565 which were subsequently rejected because of severe decay. See, Dump Report dated July 5 in Transaction 1565. Growers Marketing Service showed no income nor expense to the grower on transaction 1565. Because these melons were not sold until June 14, it is possible that they decayed. GMS's treatment of the transaction on the settlement statement is contrary to the notes on transaction 1565 which treat is as a wash with no income or expense to Woods. The assessment of freight and handling charges was not inappropriate under the circumstances, and are disallowed. See, Corrected Invoice 3534 attached to this Order. The total revenue from the remaining transactions was $6,142. The expenses on the various loads total $2,285. GMS owed Woods $3,857 on this load, but only paid him $1152. GMS still owes Woods $2705 on this transaction. Transaction number 3541: On June 7, 1991, Growers Marketing Service handled 9,997 pounds of watermelons for Willie J. Woods on transaction number 1565. This load was sold to Castellini Produce on transaction 1565, discussed above, where it was rejected for excessive decay. The assessment of the freight charges and handling charges on this load which was handled 10 days after it was picked was inappropriate, and is disallowed. It is treated also as a wash in this transaction just as it was in 3534, and just as GMS treated it in transaction 1565. Transaction number 3546: On June 11th, Growers Marketing Service received 4,949 pounds of yellow meat watermelons from Woods. It subsequently sold these watermelons for Woods in transactions 1589, 1607, and 1613. Regarding transaction 1589, the Growers Marketing Service's settlement statement to Woods reflects that this transaction is subject to PACA Audit; however, GMS included the 14,121 pounds of watermelons in its settlement at a expense to Woods of 5 cents per pound on a sales price of 1.67 cents per pound. Because this transaction is still subject to audit, it was inappropriate to settle with the farmer. For purposes of this accounting, 1589 is not considered. In transaction 1607, GMS sold 16,775 pounds of yellow meat watermelons received from Woods on transaction 3546. Transaction 1607 and the funds received from the transaction are discussed in full below with regard to transaction 3548; therefore, it is not discussed or accounted for as part of transaction 3546. In transaction 1613, Growers Marketing Service sold 10,053 pounds of watermelons at 11.6 cents per pound for a total of $1,069.00. Expenses attributable to transaction 1613 were $554.00. Woods was entitled to $614.00 on transaction 1613; however, he was paid nothing on this transaction; GMS owes Woods $614 on this transaction. Transaction 1475: On June 11th, Growers Marketing Service received 45,050 pounds of watermelons from Woods. Growers Marketing Service asserts that the original price of these watermelons was dropped from 15 cents to 12 cents; however, the checkstub attached to the invoice shows a total payment to GMS of $7,298.10 at the original purchase price of 17.2 cents per pound. Growers Marketing Service's costs in this transaction were $2,358. Because this transaction clearly shows the original price was paid, it reflects adversely on creditability of the witnesses for Growers Marketing Service with regard to their testimony in other transactions that the original price was reduced due to fall in the market. Growers Marketing Service owed Woods $4,940 on transaction 1475, and paid him $4,484. GMS still owes Woods $456 on this transaction. Transaction number 1508: On June 11, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 46,000 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods. Growers Marketing Service sold these melons at a price of 10.25 cents per pound. Growers Marketing Service received $4,715.00 on transaction 1508 and had expenses in the amount of $2,259.00. Growers Marketing Service owed Woods $2,456.00 on transaction 1508, and paid Woods $2,284. GMS still owes Woods $172 on this transaction. Transaction number 1497: On June 11, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 45,340 pounds of watermelons in this transaction. Growers Marketing Service sold these watermelons at 16.35 cents per pound and deducted freight of 4.35 cents per pound, showing a net sales price of 12 cents per pound. This resulted in sales revenue of $5,441 from which GMS deducted its 1 cent handling charge and an additional $4,750 listed as a harvesting advance. GMS paid Woods $204. GMS introduced no proof of a harvesting loan; however, Woods' complaint admits this loan. Nothing is owed to Woods on this transaction. Transaction number 3548: On June 12, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 41,132 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods. Subsequently, Growers Marketing Service sold watermelons received from Woods on this transaction in its transaction numbered 1613, 1607 and 1627. Growers Marketing Service asserts that 24,457 pounds of watermelons were rejected and destroyed on transaction 1607. The records regarding transaction 1607 show handwritten notation on the invoice that Growers Marketing Service received a total after expenses of sale of $3,286.00 on transaction 1607. In transaction 1613, Growers Marketing Service sold 10,032 pounds of watermelons at 11 cents a pound and in transaction 1627 Growers Marketing Service sold 7,899 pounds of watermelons at 7 cents a pound. The original settlement statement reflected incorrectly that Woods owed GMS $810. A corrected settlement statement on transaction 3548 is attached to this Order and reflects that Willie J. Woods was owed the amount of $1,019.00 in transaction 1607, $624.00 in transaction 1613, and $1,019.00 in transaction 1627. GMS paid Woods no money on this transaction, and owes Woods a total of $1,873. Transaction number 1527: On June 12, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 50,080 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods. Growers Marketing Service sold these watermelons for 17.35 cents per pound receiving a total of $8,689.00 less expenses of $2,441.00. GMS owed Willie J. Woods $6,248.00 on transaction 1527, and paid Woods $247. GMS owes Woods $6,001. Transaction number 1536: On June 12, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 41,320 pounds watermelons from Willie J. Woods. Growers Marketing Service consigned these watermelons and received $2,078.00 less expenses of $1,473.00. Woods owed $605.00 from Growers Marketing Service on transaction 1536, and paid Woods $307. GMS still owes Woods $298. Transaction number 1535: On June 12, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 43,240 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods in this transaction. Growers Marketing Service subsequently sold these watermelons at 16.45 cents per pound receiving a total of $7,113.00 less expenses of $2,357.00. Growers Marketing Service owed Willie J. Woods $4,856.00 on transaction 1535, and paid Woods $2,802. GMS still owes Woods $2,054. Transaction number 1505: On June 13, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 44,950 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods on this transaction. Subsequently, Growers Marketing Service sold these watermelons for a total of $6,967.00 to a dealer in Canada. The dealer in Canada rejected the watermelons upon their receipt serving that they were overripe on June 15, 1991, when they were received. A Canadian agricultural inspection was ordered and conducted on June 21, 1991, which revealed that 28% of the melons showed decay. However, the inspection was not timely and the report is hearsay. GMS failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining a prompt inspection and seeking recovery in behalf of Woods. Therefore, after absorbing expenses of $2,747.00, Growers Marketing Service owed Woods $4,220.00 for his loss in this transaction. GMS paid Woods $1,250 salvage on the load; however, it still owes him $2,970. Transaction number 1520: On June 13, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 45,940 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods in this transaction. The front of the folder shows that Growers Marketing Service sold this load of watermelons to Winn Dixie in South Carolina for 12 cents per pound, or $5,513. Upon receiving the watermelons on June 15 1991, Winn Dixie rejected the melons because they were "cutting white, green fresh." See copy of front of file. Growers Marketing Service asked another broker to move the load, and that broker and Growers Marketing Service arranged to have the load inspected at its next destination, Staunton, Virginia. The truck broke down in route to Staunton, Virginia and did not arrive until June 18, 1991. The other broker described the melons as looking "cooked" on arrival. Growers Marketing Service charged Woods with freight on this load. Because Growers Marketing Service had a legitimate freight claim against the trucking company, yet charged the loss and freight charges to the grower, GMS owes Woods $5,940 less the salvage, freight and expenses totaling $2,125. GMS owes Woods $3,816. Transaction number 3553: On June 13, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 29,478 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods on transaction 3553. Subsequently, Growers Marketing Service sold these melons to various concerns realizing $3,450.76 on these sales. GMS's settlement statement with Woods on this transaction reflects a deficit on transaction 1505 of $822.50. According to the records reviewed by the Hearing Officer there was no deficit in transaction 1505; therefore, the deduction of $822.50 was inappropriate. Adding this money back into the amount due Woods, Woods should have received $1,615.74 on transaction number 3553. GMS paid Woods $675, and still owes Woods $941. Transaction number 3552: On June 13, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 32,769 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods on this transaction. A review of the records reflects that Growers Marketing Service subsequently sold 10,403 pounds of these melons at three cents a pound, realizing $312.09. Growers Marketing Service also sold 19 bins of these melons weighing 22,366 pounds for nine cents a pound for a total of $2,012.94. Growers Marketing Service's settlement statement reflects a packing charge of two and a half cents per pound for 22,366 pounds of melons that were in bins. This is excluded as an expense because the adjustment for packing charges was included in the Hearing Officer's recomputation of the price of nine cents per pound. Similarly, the price adjustment of one and a half cents per pound was included in the recomputation of the price and is therefore excluded. The settlement statement which is attached to this Order reflects total receipts of $2,325 and total expenses of $750. Growers Marketing Services owed Willie J. Woods $1,575 on transaction number 3552, and paid Woods $1,551. GMS owes Woods $24 on this transaction. Transaction number 3549: On June 13, 1991, Growers Marketing Service received 32,564 pounds of watermelon from Willie J. Woods on this transaction. Subsequently, Growers Marketing Service sold 4,008 pounds of watermelons at three cents a pound on transaction 1669, realizing $120.24 on the sale. Growers Marketing Service sold seven bins of watermelons weighing 8,400 pounds at $217.66 for each bin, realizing a total of $1,523.66 on transaction 1532. Growers Marketing Service sold 1,346 pounds of watermelon at eight cents a pound, realizing $107.68 on transaction 1678. Growers Marketing Services sold 18,810 pounds of watermelons at sixteen and a half cents a pound, realizing $3,104 on transaction 1530. The Growers Marketing Services' settlement statement on transaction 3549, corrected as indicated above, shows that Growers Marketing Services received a total of $4,855 on this transaction. Growers Marketing Services' statement reflects packing charges of four cents per pound for 24,164 pounds. This packing charge was not applicable because the melons are indicated to have been in bins, not in cartons. Further, the price adjustment of one and a half cents per pound on 18,810 pounds was included in the Hearing Officer recomputation of the price per pound. Taking into account these corrections, total revenue was $4,855, and the total expenses of Growers Marketing Services were $1,613. Growers Marketing Services owed Woods $3,242 on transaction 3549, and paid him $1,690. GMS still owes Woods $1,552. Transaction 3556: On June 13, 1991, Growers Marketing Services received 32,898 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods on this transaction. Subsequently, Growers Marketing Services sold 2,086 pounds of these watermelons for 12 cents a pound on transaction 1622. Growers Marketing Services sold 2,096 pounds of these watermelons at 10 cents a pound realizing $210 on transaction 1575. Growers Marketing Services sold 1,983 pounds of these watermelons at 10 cents a pound realizing $198 in transaction 1647. Growers Marketing Services' settlement for transaction 3556 is attached to this Order and reflects an original price for these melons of 4 cents per pound; however, Growers Marketing Services sold 1,029 of these watermelons at 11.6 cents a pound in transaction 1613. The settlement statement, a copy of which is attached, is corrected to reflect the sales price of 11.6 cents a pound, and the resulting change in the monies received from $41.16 to $119. GMS sold 2086 pounds of melon for 12 cents per pound realizing $250 on transaction 1622. GMS sold 3,841 pounds of watermelons for 10 cents per pound realizing $384 on transaction 1707. Growers Marketing Services sold 21,862 of these watermelons at 7 cents a pound realizing $1,530 on transaction 1627. The total received by Growers Marketing Services was $2,691 less expenses of $1,952. Growers Marketing Services owed Willie J. Woods $739, and paid him $662 on transaction 3556. GMS still owes Woods $77. Transaction number 3557: On June 14, 1991, Growers Marketing Services received 20,013 pounds of watermelons from Willie J. Woods on this transactions. Subsequently, Growers Marketing Services sold 9,214 watermelons at 12 cents a pound on transaction 1616. Growers Marketing Services 3,418 pounds of watermelons at 3 cents a pound in transaction 1669. Growers Marketing Services sold three bins of watermelons weighing 3,525 pounds at 16.5 cents a pound and an additional 3,852 pounds of watermelons at 16.5 cents a pound in transaction 1530. This is a total of 16,162 pounds of watermelons. The Growers Marketing Service's settlement statement, which is attached, is corrected to show the correct number of pounds sold and the correct amounts of money received by Growers Marketing Service. Growers Marketing Service received a total of $3,301.50 for the sell of these watermelons. Concerning the expenses shown by Growers Marketing Service, the number of pounds handled is adjusted to show that 16,162 pounds was handled. In addition, the 4 cent packing charge for 16,484 pounds of watermelons is deleted since these melons were not packed in cartons but in bins. In addition, the 1.5 cent price adjustment for 3,525 pounds of watermelons handled in transaction 1530 is in the recomputation of the price. The corrected expense total is $254. Growers Marketing Service owes Willie J. Woods $3,048 on transaction 3557. GMS paid Woods $643; however, it still owes Woods $2,405. The total of the sums still owed Mr. Woods by GMS is $32,999.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the parties be notified of these findings, and GMS permitted the opportunity to pay to Willie J. Woods $32,999 within 30 days, and if GMS fails to settle with Mr. Woods, Mr. Woods should be permitted to obtain settlement from the Respondent's bond in the amount of $32,999, or to the limits of the bond. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Willie J. Woods 1022 Piercewood Point Brooksville, Florida 34602 W. R. Ward, Jr., President Growers Marketing Srevice, Inc. Post Office Box 2595 Lakeland, Florida 33806 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture Division of Marketing, Bureau of Licensure and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68604.21604.2290.803
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GENERAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER (PEC) vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 93-002219CVL (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 19, 1993 Number: 93-002219CVL Latest Update: Jul. 29, 1993

The Issue The issue for consideration herein is whether the Petitioners, MISSCO, GENERAL, AND INTERSTATE should be placed on the convicted vendor list pursuant to Section 287.133 Florida Statutes (1991).

Findings Of Fact The facts stated in the Joint Stipulations to the extent set forth below are hereby adopted as findings of fact: On April 9, 1993, DMS issued notices of intent pursuant to Section 187.133(3)(e)(1), Florida Statutes. Jt. Stips. Appen. at pp. 72-73. On April 13, 1993, MISSCO filed petitions with DMS for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to determine whether it is in the public interest for MISSCO, GENERAL, or INTERSTATE to be placed on the Florida Convicted Vendor List pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes. Jt. Stips. Appen. at p. 74-77. Subparagraph 287.133(3)(e)e., Florida Statutes, establishes factors which, if applicable to a convicted vendor, will mitigate against placement of that vendor upon the convicted vendor list. On April 5, 1991, General Equipment Manufacturers, Inc., (hereinafter "General"), a Mississippi corporation, and wholly owned subsidiary of MISSCO Corporation, was convicted of the commission of a public entity crime as defined within subsection 287.133(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Jr. Stips. p. 1, Appen. at pp. 41-43. A criminal information was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against General Equipment Manufacturers, Inc., alleging a violation of Section 1001, Title 18, United States Code and applicable Federal Acquisition Regulations which occurred on or about December 2, 1988. Jt. Stips. p. 1, Appen. at p. 40. The criminal information filed in the United States District Court, Southern District of Mississippi charged General with falsely representing on or about December 2, 1988 that the equipment schedule and price list submitted to the General Services Administration (hereinafter GSA) was General's established commercial price list. (Jt. Stips. p. 2, Appen. at p. 40. Upon entry of a plea of guilty, the Court entered a judgement against General which was filed April 5, 1991. The judgement required payment of a special assessment of $200, a fine in the amount of $10,000, without interest, and restitution in the amount of $28,000. Jt. Stips. p. 2, Appen. at pp. 40-48. The GSA issued Solicitation No. FCGS-X8-38010-N for FSC Group 66 Part II, Section P, Laboratory/Pharmacy Furniture. General submitted an offer dated August 18, 1988, and signed by Charles H. Wright, General Manager of General's SystaModules Division. In connection with its offer, General submitted its purported commercial price list dated January 31, 1987. Mr. Wright certified in Section M-FSS-330, M.3, Basis for Price Negotiation, Item (c), Certificate of Established Catalog or Market Price, that: The price(s) quoted in General's proposal is based on established catalog or market prices of commercial items, as defined in FAR 15.804-3(c), in effect on the date of the offer or on the dates of revisions submitted during the course of negotiations. Substantial quantities of the items have been sold to the general public at such prices. All of the data, including sales data, submitted with General's offer are accurate, complete, and current representations of actual transactions to the date when price negotiations are concluded. By letter dated December 2, 1988, Mr. Wright, in his capacity as General Manager of General's SystaModules Division, certified on behalf of General that: . . . all data submitted with General's offer pursuant to the discount schedule ad marketing data sheets and any other data submitted as as part of General's offer on Solicitation FGS-X8-38010-N are current, accurate, and complete a of the conclusion of negotiations, which occurred on December 2, 1988. Jt. Stips. p. 2-3, Appen. at pp. 51-53. On the basis of General's offer on Solicitation No. FGS-X8-38010-N, the GSA awarded General Contract No. GS-00F-06709 on December 13, 1988. The contract was for the period February 1, 1989, through January 31, 1992. Jt. Stips. p. 3-4, Appen. at p. 53. An investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation determined that General provided the GSA with fabricated price lists in connection with FGS-X8-38010-N. Jt. Stips. p. 4, Appen. at pp. 53-54. The details of the criminal information against General are discussed in the findings and determination made by the GSA Office of Acquisition Policy, dated May 18, 1992, which are incorporated herein by reference. Jt. Stips. Appen. at pp. 49-71). Particular findings are as follows: Federal debarment was imposed on General and its corporate officials Messrs. Wright and Majure. Jt. Stips. Appen. at p. 50. The debarments were effective throughout the Federal Executive Branch. The debarment precluded the award, renewal, or extension of federal contracts. Jt. Stips. Appen. at p. 50. Debarment proceedings were initiated by separate notices dated November 1, 1990 based on a referral from the Federal General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Inspector General (OIG). Jt. Stips. Appen. at p. 51. General bid on GSA Solicitation No. FGS-X3-36426-N and in connection with its offer General submitted a "dealer retail price list," and certified that: its prices were based on established catalog or market prices, substantial quantities of the items had been sold to the general public at said prices: and that all of the data submitted with its offer was accurate, complete and current representations of actual transactions up to the date when price negotiations were concluded. Jt. Stips. Appen. at p. 51. General's offer on the solicitation was accepted and it was awarded contract number GS-00F-70316 on April 19, 1984. Jt. Stips. Appen. at p. 52. On June 28, 1985 General made the same representations as to GSA Solicitation No. FGS-X8-38000-N for laboratory and pharmacy furniture. The award was made to General on December 9, 1985. Jt. Stips. Appen. at p. 52. Identical representations were made by General in response to GSA Solicitation No. FCGS-X8-38010-N issued on July 7, 1988. The solicitation was for laboratory and pharmacy furniture. The award was made to General on December 13, 1988. Jt. Stips. Appen. at p. 53. Criminal Information Number J90-00080(B) was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi on November 15, 1990. The information was based on the FBI investigation of General's submission of false commercial price lists to GSA. The criminal information charged General with violating Title 18, U.S.C. 1001 in connection with its offer on Solicitation No. FGS-X8-38010-N. It alleged that General knowingly, willfully, and falsely represented to GSA that the equipment schedule and price lists submitted with General's 1988 offer was General's established commercial price list. Jt. Stips. Appen. at p. 54. General pled guilty to Criminal Information No. J90-00080(B) on December 19, 1990 and was ordered to pay a fine of $10,000 and to make just restitution to the GSA in the amount of $28,000. The conviction was also used as the basis for the federal debarment of General. Jt. Stips. Appen. at p. 54. Mr. Wright and Mr. Majure were also debarred by virtue of their conduct in connection with the General conviction. Jt. Stips. Appen. at pp. 54- 59. General and MISSCO are affiliated companies. General is a wholly-owned subsidiary of MISSCO. MISSCO is directed and governed by its executive committee which acts in lieu of the board of directors. Mr. Majure was a director of MISSCO, a member of MISSCO'S executive committee, a senior vice president of MISSCO, and president, director, and general manager of General. Jt. Stips. Appen. at p. 59. Mr. Majure held a position of substantial responsibility in both MISSCO and General, and through MISSCO's control group is accountable for the circumstances of General's crime. Jt. Stips. Appen. at p. 60. A decision not to impose federal debarment on MISSCO was predicated on MISSCO management's decision to ensure that it did not supply the Federal government with the same goods and services formerly provided by General during the period of General's debarment: MISSCO management made a commitment to emphasize ethical business practices: the people responsible for General's crime were no longer employed by MISSCO: the GSA administrative record (with the exception of General) does not indicate a lack of business integrity or poor performance on federal contracts. Jt. Stips. Appen. at pp. 61-63. Federal debarment of General was predicated upon the following: conviction of the crime of making false statements posed a substantial risk to government business dealings: General submitted false information on solicitations over an extended period of time: General fabricated price lists and false certification son two prior solicitations: General's crime posed a substantial danger to the integrity of the Federal government's MAS program: the accountable individuals for the crime were high-ranking officials at General. Jt. Stips. Appen. at pp. 63-66. The federal debarment proceedings found mitigating factors in that: the parties pled guilty and cooperated with the Department of Justice throughout the investigation: the parties cooperated with GSA throughout the debarment proceedings: General was not charged with deliberate overcharges on its federal MAS contracts: General promptly paid its fine and restitution: General has made good faith efforts to undertake remedial action. Jt. Stips. Appen. at pp. 68-69. On April 9, 1993, Respondent issued Notices of Intent pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(e)1, Florida Statutes, which were received by the Petitioners. Jt. Stips. p. 5, Appen. at pp. 72-73. On April 13, 1993, Petitions filed petitions pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(e)2, Florida Statutes, and Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, requesting an order determining that it is not in the public interest for Petitioners to be placed on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List. Jt. Stips. p. 5, Appen. at pp. 74-75. MISSCO is a holding company which has a number of operating divisions and two wholly-owned subsidiary corporations, General Equipment Manufacturers (General) and MISSCO Exports Corporation (Exports). Jt. Stips. p. 2, Appen. at pp. 35-36. Interstate of Florida is a Division of MISSCO and is a dealer (re- seller) of General's products. Jt. Stips. p. 2. General and MISSCO are commercially distinguishable and they do not occupy the same facilities. MISSCO's primary lines of business are distribution of school equipment and supplies, office equipment and supplies, and commercial printing. Jt. Stips. p. 4. MISSCO Exports is an entity formed solely for accounting and tax purposes, has no employees, and does not engage in substantive commercial operations. Jt. Stips. p. 4. MISSCO has extensive dealings with the federal government, as supplier of goods manufactured by other entities. General is the only MISSCO entity that contracts with the government under the Multiple Awards Schedule (MAS) program. General's primary line of business is manufacturing institutional furniture. Jt. Stips. pp. 4-5. In compliance with paragraphs 287.133(3)(a) and (B), Florida Statutes, MISSCO made timely notification to the DMS and provided details of the conviction of General, by letter dated March 24, 1992 and provided copies of the criminal information, judgement and related correspondence. Jt. Stips. p. 5, Appen. at pp. 37048. Payment of the fine in the amount of $10,000 and restitution in the amount of $28,000 imposed by the conviction and judgement entered April 5, 1991 were promptly paid by General on April 15, 1991. Jt. Stips. pp. 5-6, Appen. at pp. 47-48. Subsequent to the criminal information filed in the United States District court, Southern District of Mississippi in November of 1990, General entered a plea of guilty to the charge, thus eliminating the necessity for further investigation and trial. Jt. Stips. p. 6. The GSA in its findings and determination dated May 18, 1992, cited mitigating factors favorable to General and MISSCO. The factors included, cooperation with the Department of Justice throughout its investigation; cooperation with the GSA throughout the debarment proceeding; constructive dealings by counsel for MISSCO and General with the GSA Office of General Counsel on issues relating to the restrictions on MISSCO and General's business relationship with the government and government prime contractors. Jt. Stips. p. 6, Appen. at pp. 68-69. MISSCO fully cooperated with the DMS in connection with its investigation initiated pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes. Jt. Stips. p. 6. MISSCO formally filed its disclosure pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(b), Florida Statutes with the DMS by letter dated March 24, 1992, together with exhibits attached thereto. The letter specifically referred to the criminal information filed against General and the judgement entered by the Federal District Court. A copy of the criminal information and judgement were enclosed with the letter, together with a copy of correspondence between MISSCO and the GSA. Jt. Stips. pp. 8-9, Appen. at pp. 37-39. In response to a request dated April 15, 1992 from the DMS for additional information, MISSCO promptly furnished all such information. Jt. Stips. p. 9. At its meeting held December 17, 1992, the Board of Directors of MISSCO was convened and all of the offices then held by Mr. James T. Majure, former President of General, were declared vacant and other persons were elected to those positions. Jt. Stips. p. 7, Appen. at pp. 2, 67, 70. Mr. Charles Wright was retired from General under a medical disability prior to 1990. Jt. Stips. p. 7. MISSCO Corporation fully cooperated with the GSA by proposing and implementing remedial measures including the presentation of an Ethics Seminar by Mr. Norman Roberts, past chairman of the American Bar Association's section on government contracting. Jt. Stips. p. 7. MISSCO revised its corporate Code of Ethics, revised its Employee Handbook, installed an 800 hotline telephone number permitting employees to communicate any concerns regarding business ethics, designated a Corporate Vice President as the Ethics Compliance Officer, appointed a committee of three corporate executives to monitor corporate business activities, and revised its internal audit procedures to insure that no cash is unaccounted for which might be used for the purpose of kickbacks. Jt. Stips. pp. 7-8, Appen. at pp. 28-33, 62-63. MISSCO's management undertook prompt and verifiable action to comply with the restrictions imposed on MISSCO's business dealings with the government after notices of proposed debarment. General promptly and voluntarily withdrew from the GSA contract that was tainted by the submission of a fabricated commercial price list during negotiations. Jt. Stips. p. 8. MISSCO had a code of business ethics in place when the circumstances leading to General's conviction arose. The code was amended following the initiation of debarment proceedings to specifically address the importance of truthful certifications and providing accurate information in connection with business transactions with the government. Jt. Stips. p. 8. MISSCO substantially expanded its corporate ethics compliance program and undertook extensive training in business ethics. A detailed "ethics audit" was undertaken by MISSCO, and the results of this audit were provided to the GSA. Jt. Stips. p. 8, Appen. at pp. 10-22, 28-34. General sells its products through a dealer network and not through factory direct sales. General has a dealer agreement with Interstate of Florida for the sale of its products in Florida to private and public entities. Jt. Stips. p. 9. Interstate of Florida, a division of MISSCO Corporation of Jackson, is a dealer (re-seller) of General's products. There are other dealers throughout the United States which also market and sell General's products. Interstate of Florida had gross sales of approximately $6.8 million in fiscal year 1990-91. Approximately 99 percent of those sales were to public entities. Jt. Stips. p. 9. Interstate of Florida is primarily an educational sales company which sells educational contract furnishings such as laboratory casework, auditorium seating, and folding bleachers. It has conducted business with almost every school district in Florida. The largest transactions have been conducted with the school districts of Dade and Orange Counties in Florida. The largest municipal transactions have been conducted with the City of Tallahassee. Jt. Stips. p. 10.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department not place the names of the Petitioners on the Florida Convicted Vendor List. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Susan B. Kirkland, Esquire Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 C. Graham Carothers, Esquire Ausley, McMullen, McGehee Carothers & Proctor Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, FL 32392 Terry A. Stepp, Esquire Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950

USC (1) 18 U.S.C 1001 Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68287.133
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TARGET CORPORATION vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, 20-000446 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 27, 2020 Number: 20-000446 Latest Update: Dec. 27, 2024

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Target Corporation ("Target"), is entitled to a consumption-on-premises alcoholic beverage license for its store at 1200 Linton Boulevard Delray Beach, Florida ("Target Delray").

Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following Findings of Fact based on the evidence presented, the reasonable inferences from the evidence, and the record as a whole. The Division is the state agency responsible for supervising the conduct, management and operation of the manufacturing, packaging, distribution and sale within the state of all alcoholic beverages. It is also responsible to enforce the provisions of the Beverage Laws, chapters 561 through 568, Florida Statutes. Target is a national retailer with more than 1800 locations in the United States, including approximately 126 locations in the state of Florida. Target's primary business is selling a variety of consumer goods and merchandise including electronics, groceries, health and beauty products, apparel, toys, sporting goods, and more. Target owns and operates a retail store located at 1200 Linton Boulevard, Delray Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, designated as Target Store T-0642. Target Delray has an existing beer-and-wine package store license ("2APS license"), beverage license No. 6013421, issued by the Division which is in "Current, Active" status. Target Delray also has an existing, but inactive, beer-wine-and-liquor package store license ("3PS license"), beverage license No. 6011410, issued by the Division which is in "Inactive, Automatic Waiver" status. The Application As noted, on October 10, 2019, Target submitted an application for a consumption-on-premises license ("4COP license") at Target Delray (the "Application"). Pet. Ex. 1. Prior to the Application, Target had never applied for a consumption- on-premises license in Florida. All of Target's locations in Florida are licensed by the Division as package stores for off-premises consumption of beer and wine, including three separate liquor stores that are walled off from the nearby main stores, and have separate entrances. First 14-Day Letter Upon reviewing the Application, a Division employee notified Target by email that the Application sketch appeared to show the entire retail store. Pet. Ex. 2. The Division employee inquired whether Target instead meant to license a separate liquor store with a separate entrance from the main store. In addition, she informed Target that a new license could not be issued to the entire store because the 2APS license already existed at Target Delray. Id. Before Target responded, the Division sent Target a formal letter giving Target 14 days to submit a new sketch in support of its Application (the "First 14-Day Letter"). Pet. Ex. 3. It also stated that the Application was incomplete because Target "failed to provide a complete sketch" of the premises sought to be licensed and that the "sketch submitted shows a license number, 6013421, at the licensed location." Id. Shortly thereafter, Target responded with a request to cancel its 2APS license at Target Delray when a permanent consumption-on-premises license was issued. Pet. Ex. 4. In addition, Target clarified that "[t]he licensed premises diagram is correct[;] it will be the department store and not a side liquor store." The Division employee then explained to Target that a consumption- on-premises license of this type "can't be in a grocery/retail store." Pet. Ex. 5. Target responded that the Division has "routinely issued" this type of license to various establishments "that sell food to the public for consumption on the premises along with other retail items … ." Draft Second 14-Day Letter On or about October 29, 2019, the Division drafted, but did not send, a second letter to Target identifying deficiencies in the Application sketch (the "Second 14-Day Letter"). It read, "[t]he submitted application is considered incomplete and/or unverifiable, as applicant has failed to provide a complete and detailed sketch of the premises sought to be licensed. Specifically, please identify counters, sales areas (including points of sale), bar locations, and other relevant areas associated with the sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption on or off the premises." Id. It requested a response within 14 days. The Division, however, never sent this Second 14-Day Letter to Target. The Inspections On November 8, 2019, as part of its normal practice in cases of this nature, a Division representative physically inspected the premises of Target Delray for purposes of evaluating the Application. During the inspection, Target Delray's assistant manager (or "Executive Team Lead") Scott Hoffman ("Hoffman") explained to the Division's inspector how Target Delray currently sells beer and wine. Hoffman did not know, however, how Target Delray would be selling liquor under the 4COP license it applied for.1 As a result, the assistant manager was not able to properly identify counters, sales areas (including points of sale), bar locations, and other relevant areas associated with Target's Application for a consumption-on- premises license. While inspecting Target Delray, the Division inspector took a variety of pictures of merchandise offered for sale throughout the store. The inspector also compared the Application sketch to the proposed licensed premises of the store. Division policy permits an inspector to make a sketch when appropriate. As a result, the Division inspector created a "clarification sketch" of Target Delray by marking and labeling on Target's Application sketch indicating the "current beer and wine sales area," the "wine and beer storage area," and the "Starbucks coffee shop" as well as other areas. The Division reviewed and considered the inspector's "clarification sketch" as part of the application process for Target. In his inspection report, the Division inspector concluded that the premises matched the Application sketch and "was clarified at inspection." Significantly, however, the inspector determined that non-authorized merchandise was being sold throughout the Target store. Pet. Ex. 8. He wrote that he "observed 100+ items being offered for sale that do not comply with [Florida Statutes, section] 565.045." Id. 1 Curiously, there was no persuasive evidence that Target's headquarters ever communicated with Target Delray about the 4COP license application prior to submitting it or prior to the inspection. The inspector gave Target Delray 14 days to comply with the statute, at which time a re-inspection would be conducted. The same Division inspector conducted the re-inspection of Target Delray on November 22, 2019. His second inspection report reached the same conclusion regarding the extensive merchandise for sale. Pet. Ex. 13. As a result of the same noncompliance, he advised Target Delray that it did not meet the requirements for a consumption-on-premises license. Id. Target Delray's assistant manager signed for both inspection reports. The Notice of Intent to Deny License On or about December 20, 2019, the Division issued its Denial Notice regarding the Target Delray Application. Pet. Ex. 18. The Denial Notice outlined two reasons for the Division's intent to deny the Application: REASON [1]: The submitted application is considered incomplete and/or unverifiable, as applicant has failed to provide a complete and detailed sketch of the premises sought to be licensed. Specifically, the application did not identify counters, sales areas (including points of sale), bar locations, and other relevant areas associated with the sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption on or off the premises, nor could the manager of the proposed licensed premises identify such areas upon inspection. Therefore, the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco was unable to fully investigate this application in accordance with Florida law, and the application is being recommended for denial. Pet. Ex. 18 (citing sections 561.01(11), 561.18 and 562.06, Florida Statutes). REASON [2]: The proposed licensed premises fails to meet the statutory regulations for consumption on the premises. Specifically, there shall not be sold at such places of business anything other than the beverages permitted, home bar and party supplies and equipment (including but not limited to glassware and party-type foods), cigarettes, and what is customarily sold in a restaurant. The location identified as the licensed premises offers a substantial, yet indeterminate, amount of items for sale that fall outside of the scope of the statute, including, but not limited to, the items listed in the Exhibit B to this notice. Pet. Ex. 18 (citing section 565.045, Florida Statutes). Exhibit B to the Denial Notice listed more than 150 items for sale at the Target Delray store which the Division determined to be unauthorized merchandise for a place of business seeking such a license. Pet. Ex. 18. These items were found in various departments and locations throughout the store and included, among other things: men's and women's clothing; automotive products; holiday items; furniture; household products; sporting goods; games and toys; tools; pharmaceutical items; health and beauty products; pet care products; electronics; and others. Id. Submitted Sketch & Clarification Sketch The sketch submitted by Target with its Application did not fully and adequately portray the current premises for licensing purposes. More specifically, Target Delray renovated and converted its Target Café into a Starbucks Café prior to the Application, but nevertheless submitted an outdated sketch showing the old Target Café. Likewise, the sketch submitted did not include the newer Starbucks Café. Pet. Exs. 37 and 38. In short, Target did not send the Division an updated and accurate sketch adequately identifying the current Starbucks Café. As submitted, the Application sketch also did not include any clear labeling or legible words to identify certain areas on the sketch. Pet. Ex. 1. Target's representative acknowledged this fact. For example, there were no sales or storage areas labeled or identified on the sketch. The only seats on the sketch were located in the renovated café area, but they were not labeled as such. The "bar" or "counter" on the sketch--which was also not labeled—is located where the Target Café used to be, but Target stated that the café's bar or counter was not capable of selling or serving alcoholic beverages. As a result, Target's Application sketch did not adequately identify counters, sales areas (including points of sale), bar locations, and other relevant areas that would be associated with the sale of alcoholic beverages. The lack of labels or proper identification to explain the layout of these relevant areas was the crux of the Division's reason for concluding that the sketch was insufficient. Explanatory labels and notations on the sketch were needed for the Division to properly investigate the application and understand how the applicant would comply with the applicable provisions of the Beverage Laws. Similarly, Target Delray's assistant manager for general merchandise, who worked on the premises of Target Delray on a day-to-day basis, had difficulty identifying or explaining areas of the store on the Application sketch. Although the Division inspector created a "clarification sketch" based on information he received during his inspection, the inspector was unable to indicate on the sketch how or where Target Delray would be selling liquor for consumption on or off the premises under the 4COP license for which it applied. Pet. Ex. 9. Regardless, this was ultimately the responsibility of the applicant--Target. Thus, neither the original Application sketch nor the inspector's "clarification sketch" adequately included the necessary information regarding Target Delray's proposed sale of beer, wine, or liquor under a consumption-on-premises license. The Inventory at Target Delray During these proceedings, Target did not dispute its broad inventory of consumer merchandise for sale. Similarly, Target conceded that all the items identified on Exhibit B of the Denial Notice were being sold in the Target Delray store, including windshield wipers, toilet seats, bicycles, batteries, screw drivers, shampoo, dog food, laptop computers, and more. Pet. Ex. 18. Adding to this, Target offered into evidence a lengthy and broad list of consumer merchandise sold at the Target Delray store. Pet. Ex. 43. Although the exact inventory of a Target store is subject to frequent changes, Target Delray regularly sells a comprehensive collection of consumer goods including, but not limited to, men's and women's clothing, automotive products, holiday items, furniture, household products, sporting goods, games, toys, tools, pharmaceutical items, health and beauty items, pet care items, electronics, books, magazines, and flags. Other items on Target Delray's inventory list include infant formula, dish detergent, napkins, frozen meat, barstools, lamp shades, candles, pillows, fireworks, and more. Pet. Ex. 43. These retail and grocery items at Target Delray are found throughout the store's premises. Resp. Ex. 16 at 11:5-15. Alcoholic beverages being currently sold are not found throughout the store's premises, but are limited to the grocery items section. Customers purchase all of the retail merchandise and grocery items at the same points of sale ("cash registers") where alcoholic beverages under a 4COP license would be purchased as well.2 2 There was no evidence offered to suggest that alcoholic beverages under a 4COP license would be purchased or paid for at any location other than the normal cash register used to check out other items of general merchandise. Target Delray's Food Service and Food Permit Target Delray sells a limited menu of ready-to eat food and non- alcoholic beverages from its Starbucks Café which operates from within its store, for consumption on the premises. As a result, Target Delray holds restaurant licenses from the City of Delray Beach ("City") and from Palm Beach County. Pet. Exs. 139 and 140. Target's representatives refer to the Starbucks Café as a "restaurant" within the larger Target Delray store. Resp. Exs. 9 and 10. In fact, according to Target, the only seats, tables, and counters associated with the regular sale and consumption of food or beverages are located within the Starbucks Café. Resp. Ex. 16 at 26:25-27:4. The City restaurant license identifies the restaurant size as 51-100 persons. The reasonable inference from this fact is that the City restaurant license does not encompass the entire premises of the Target Delray store, but is limited to the Starbucks Café area. Pet. Ex. 140. Despite allowing the operation of the Starbucks Café in a small portion of the store, Target Delray is not licensed by the Florida Division of Hotels and Restaurants. Instead, Target Delray has an annual food permit issued by the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. Pet. Exs. 39 and 45. This permit identifies the Target Delray store as a "food establishment." Id. More particularly, Target Delray is classified by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services as a "minor food outlet with significant food service and/or packaged ice." Purpose of the 4COP License for Target Delray Despite operating the Starbucks Café as a restaurant within its store, Target Delray offered no persuasive evidence to prove that Target submitted its Application for a consumption-on-premises license so that it could sell alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises. Rather, it was undisputed that Target sought a consumption-on- premises license with the intent, and for the purpose of, selling alcoholic beverages in sealed containers for consumption off the licensed premises. The more persuasive evidence, and a reasonable inference from the undisputed evidence, indicated that Target Delray intended to operate in a manner that would allow its customers to purchase liquor from various aisles of its main store or grocery areas, instead of purchasing it from a separate walled-off liquor store. When presented with this plan, the City expressed reservations about whether the Target Delray location is appropriate for a consumption-on- premises license, and deferred to the Division on the matter. More specifically, the City expressed that the city zoning district did not permit the sale of alcohol. It made "no determination" whether the location of the current floorplan was appropriate for a 4COP license. There was also no persuasive evidence presented to conclude that Target Delray would be selling alcoholic beverages by the drink from the Starbucks Café. In sum, the more credible and persuasive evidence indicated that Target Delray did not intend to allow consumption of alcoholic beverages on the premises if the 4COP license were to be approved. Rather, Target filed the Application and sought the 4COP license to operate a place of business where alcoholic beverages are sold in sealed containers for consumption off the premises. Non-Party Locations During discovery, Target identified 12 businesses in Florida that have been issued a consumption-on-premises license. It argues that these businesses "sell all of the same type [of] items sold at [Target's] proposed licensed location." The locations listed below, according to discovery responses from Target, represent a variety of establishments issued consumption-on-premises licenses by the Division. Id. Antonio's--Maitland, FL (BEV5800226) (Pet. Ex. 22) Biltmore Hotel--Coral Gables, FL (BEV2308001) (Pet. Ex. 90.) Buster's Beer and Bait--Panama City Beach, FL (BEV1303131) (Pet. Ex. 92.) CMX Cinemas Fallschase--Tallahassee, FL (BEV4704195) (Pet. Ex. 93.) Daytona Int'l Speedway--Daytona Beach, FL (BEV7402959) (Pet. Ex. 88.) Neiman Marcus--Coral Gables, FL (BEV2300131) (Pet. Ex. 99.) Nordstrom--Coral Gables, FL (BEV2329106) (Pet. Ex. 98) PGA National Resort--Palm Beach Gardens, FL (BEV6014275) (Pet. Ex. 91.) Ritz Carlton--Miami Beach, FL (BEV2326201) (Pet. Ex. 120.) Sophie's at Saks Fifth Avenue--Sarasota, FL (BEV6801712) (Pet. Ex. 95.) Slater's Goods & Provisions--Babcock Ranch, FL (BEV1801399) (Pet. Ex. 89.) xii. Trump National Doral--Miami, FL (BEV2331496) (Pet. Ex. 22) For three of these locations--Antonio's, Ritz Carlton, and Trump National Doral--Target offered no evidence at the hearing to prove or show that these licensees sell items similar to Target Delray. At the hearing, Target offered evidence; however, regarding three additional locations the Division has licensed for consumption on the premises which, according to Target, sell consumer merchandise similar to Target Delray: World Golf Village--St. Augustine, FL (BEV6501333) (Pet. Exs. 71 and 97.) Total Wine--Gainesville, FL (BEV1100722) (Pet. Exs. 71 and 96.) ABC Liquors--Gainesville, FL (BEV1100212) (Pet. Exs. 71 and 86.) Thus, as a part of the evidence, there were 12 licensed locations to which Target Delray likens itself and its inventory, for purposes of licensure (the "Non-Party Locations"). Target contends that Target Delray is similar to these Non-Party Locations because these licensees offer food and beverages for consumption on the premises while selling numerous items at retail. The thrust of Target's argument is that because these similar Non-Party Locations received 4COP licenses, it must receive the 4COP license as well. Target Delray also argued that it is being singled out because it is considered a "big store." Testimony of John Harris In support of its allegation of inconsistent treatment, when compared to other licensees, Target offered the testimony of John Harris ("Harris"). Harris is a former Director of the Division. He now does work for the law firm representing Target in this action. In his current position, Harris helps clients apply for liquor licenses. He assisted Target with the preparation of this Application. Harris also assisted the firm's representation of Target in its lobbying efforts to change package store restrictions. In 1994, when he was Division Director, Harris was heavily involved in drafting and adopting the Restaurant Rule (the "Rule"). The Rule states that "items customarily sold in a restaurant shall only include" ready-to-eat food and beverages. Pet. Ex. 55. (Emphasis added). Harris testified that he never intended for the Rule to be exclusive, despite the meaning of the restrictive words chosen. In addition, Harris now believes there is no limit to what is customarily sold in a restaurant. Harris created the list of Non-Party Locations with help from counsel representing Walmart and Target. His list included business locations he suspected were not in compliance with the Rule due to the items they sold. Harris then traveled the State of Florida to visit and inspect the Non-Party Locations in preparation for his testimony. As evidence, Harris took pictures and prepared a chart of the items he observed for sale at the Non-Party Locations. Pet. Ex. 71 and 85. Hotels and Resorts Visited Among the Non-Party Locations visited by Harris, the PGA National Resort in Palm Beach Gardens had a gift shop, beauty shop, woman's clothing store, golf pro shop, and a spa located in or near the resort's lobby area. These shops sold cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, men's and women's clothing, shoes, jewelry, handbags, and more. Pet. Ex. 71. Harris concluded that these shops, in addition to the spa and tennis shop, were within the licensed premises because they were included in the application sketches and shared the same address as the licensed premises. Pet. Ex. 113. He did not know, however, whether these shops were leased or controlled by a different person or entity than the liquor licensee. Harris did not observe alcoholic beverages being sold within the spa or any of the shops. In fact, he did not know where alcoholic beverages were sold, but he assumed such beverages were sold at the resort's restaurants. Harris also visited the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables and took photos of the resort's gift shops, spa, tennis shop, and golf pro shop. Pet. Ex. 74. He did not observe alcoholic beverages being sold in any of these areas. Alcoholic beverages were sold in a separate café or restaurant for consumption on the premises. The various gift shops at the Biltmore were accessible through the lobby or common hallway. These shops sold a variety of clothing, toys, health and beauty products, and more. Pet. Ex. 71. Harris did not know whether the gift shops were separately leased, or by whom. Harris also visited the World Golf Village resort near St. Augustine, Florida which had a separate gift shop, restaurant, and bar area. He did not observe any alcoholic beverages being sold. Department Stores Visited Harris testified that a Saks Fifth Avenue ("Saks") store in Sarasota has a consumption-on-premises license. Pet. Ex. 95. The Saks department store sells men's and women's clothing, accessories, handbags, jewelry, watches, coats, sweaters, scarves, shoes, and more. Pet. Ex. 71. However, the liquor license belongs to Fifth Dining Sarasota, LLC, doing business as Sophie's at Saks Fifth Avenue. Pet. Ex. 95. Harris acknowledged that a restaurant entrance with the name "Sophie's" separated the department store from the restaurant. Pet. Ex. 82. During his visit, alcoholic drinks were only being sold from the Sophie's restaurant and bar adjacent to the department store. There was no indication of retail items being purchased where the alcoholic beverages were sold. In addition, the food service plan application sketch for Fifth Sarasota Dining, LLC, only included the restaurant and bar area, not the department store. Based on his experience alone, and without any other supporting details, Harris concluded that the restaurant and department store are both within the licensed premises. This conclusion by him was not persuasive. Harris did not know whether the department store and the restaurant were under the dominion and control of the liquor licensee, Fifth Dining Services, LLC. Pet. Ex. 95; Resp. Exs. 14 and 15. In fact, he stated that the department store may be under the dominion and control of Saks Fifth Avenue, LLC. He also visited a Neiman Marcus location, which holds a consumption- on-premises license and sells a variety of retail items in its department store. He surmised that alcoholic beverages may be sold from an adjacent restaurant that was closed for renovation when he visited. However, Harris did not observe any alcoholic beverages being sold or consumed. Based solely on the existence of a liquor license issued at the same address as the department store, Harris concluded that both the closed restaurant and the department store were within the same licensed premises. This conclusion was not persuasive or supported by credible evidence. Harris did not know whether the restaurant in the Neiman Marcus store is leased or controlled by the same entity that controls the department store. In addition, the application sketch for the licensee at this Neiman Marcus did not include the department store; it only included the restaurant as the designated licensed premises. Pet. Exs. 109 and 110. Like the Saks Fifth Avenue and Neiman Marcus locations, a Nordstrom department store he visited holds a consumption-on-premises license. It sells alcoholic beverages from a restaurant on the periphery of the store. Pet. Exs. 80 and 98. The Nordstrom department store sells retail items of a quality similar to these two other department stores. Pet. Ex. 71. Harris did not observe any alcoholic beverages being sold or consumed within the Nordstrom department store itself, nor did he observe any customer purchase retail items from the restaurant area. Nevertheless, based on his experience, Harris concluded that the restaurant and department store at Nordstrom are both within the licensed premises. Pet. Ex. 111. Again, this conclusion by him was not sufficiently established by the evidence. As with the other locations, he did not know whether the restaurant and department store at Nordstrom were leased, operated, or controlled by the same entity. Grocery and Liquor Stores Visited Buster's Beer and Bait is a small liquor store and bar in Panama City Beach that has a consumption-on-premises license and sells alcoholic drinks for consumption on the premises. It also sells sealed beverages for consumption off the premises. Pet. Exs. 75 and 92. According to Harris, in addition to alcoholic beverages, Buster's sells cigars, assorted fishing gear, and frozen fish bait from the same area. Pet. Exs. 71 and 75. Slater's Goods & Provisions is a general store in Babcock Ranch with a consumption-on-premises license. Pet. Ex. 89. According to Harris, it sells groceries, wine, liquor, household items, and more--all from the same area. Pet. Ex. 71. There is also a café and an ice cream shop inside. Pet. Ex. 83. Harris concluded that these areas were within the same licensed premises because of the similar address and interconnectedness of the store.3 Harris also visited two liquor stores in Gainesville, Florida that hold consumption-on-premises licenses--ABC Liquors and Total Wine. Pet. Exs. 84 and 86. At these locations, Harris did not observe any sales of open alcoholic beverages being consumed on the premises, but he also did not attempt to consume a beverage on the premises. In addition to alcoholic beverages, he also observed cigars for sale at ABC Liquors. Target Delray does not sell cigars. Movie Theater Visited Harris visited a CMX Movie Theater in Tallahassee, Florida with a consumption-on-premises liquor license. Pet. Ex. 93. Alcoholic beverages were being sold for on-premises consumption from a bar area separate from the theater viewing areas. At a separate counter, movie tickets were being sold. Pet. Ex. 76. Target Delray does not sell movie tickets. 3 Both Slater's and Buster's are much smaller in floor area size than Target Delray and offered a more limited inventory of consumer items. Daytona International Speedway Harris also visited the well-known Daytona International Speedway racetrack complex which holds a consumption-on-premises liquor license. Pet. Ex. 88. The Daytona International Speedway also sells golf bags, tires, fenders, key chains, clothing, chairs, flagpoles, and race experience tickets. The retail items are sold from a gift shop that connects to a grill where draft beer is sold for consumption on the premises. Pet. Ex. 78. Harris did not know if the grill had separate cash registers from the gift shop. Race tickets are sold from a separate ticket counter. Harris concluded that all of these items are sold within the licensed premises, which he understood to include the whole raceway and concourse grounds based on the application sketches. Significantly however, he did not know if the gift shop is leased or controlled by the same entity that holds the liquor license. Walmart and Costco The Division recently denied license applications from a Walmart and a Costco store for the same consumption-on-premises license sought by Target Delray. The Division relied on the same statute--section 565.045, Florida Statutes--in denying those applications based on the wide variety of consumer items Walmart and Costco sell at retail. Pet. Ex. 149; Pet. Exs. 40 and 44. Walmart and Costco are more similar to Target in terms of the wide variety of consumer merchandise sold, than any of the Non-Party Locations visited by Harris.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a final order denying the application by Target Corporation at issue in this proceeding. Jurisdiction is and shall be retained for the limited purpose of determining entitlement to attorney's fees and costs related to several discovery disputes and the amount, upon proper application and proof. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: D. Ty Jackson, Esquire George T. Levesque, Esquire Ashley Hoffman Lukis, Esquire Jason L. Unger, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 11189 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Ross Marshman, Esquire Megan Kachur, Esquire John J. Knowles, Deputy Chief Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 (eServed) Halsey Beshears, Secretary Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 (eServed) General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Sterling Whisenhunt, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 (eServed)

Florida Laws (14) 120.56120.569120.57120.60120.68561.01561.14561.17561.18561.19562.06565.02565.04565.045 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61A-1.006 DOAH Case (1) 20-0446
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TONY`S FISH MARKET, INC., AND TONY`S SWEET ENTER vs. DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, 75-001630 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001630 Latest Update: Feb. 24, 1977

Findings Of Fact At present Tony's Fish Market, Inc. t/a Tony's Fish Market, is the holder of license no. 23-1624-SRX, series 4-COP held with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage. Prior to September 1, 1974, Armand Cerami owned 50 shares of stock in Tony's Fish Market, Inc., which represented a 50 percent interest in that corporation. In addition, Armand Cerami held 50 shares of stock in Tony's Fish Market of Ft. Lauderdale, Inc., representing a 50 percent interest in that corporation and was the holder of 50 shares of Tony's Sweet Enterprises, Inc., which represented a 50 percent interest in that corporation. During the time period of September 1, 1974, Armand Cerami had been charged with violation of the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States, under a federal indictment no. 74-407-CR-JE, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. This charge was placed against Cerami for Internal Revenue Law Violations which allegedly took place on tax returns on the tax year 1968. In contemplation of a plea of guilty which Cerami intended to enter in the above cited case, he entered into a contract for purchase and sale of the corporate securities in the aforementioned corporations. Petitioner's Exhibit #2, admitted into evidence is a copy of the contract for purchase and sale of corporate securities, which was entered into between Armand Cerami and Pamela Ann Cerami, his wife, on September 1, 1974. The terms of the contract were that Pamela Ann Cerami would pay Armand Cerami $20,000 cash and would give to Armand Cerami a promissory note payable in the amount of $200,000, in ten equal installments of principal and interest at 6-1/2 percent payable on the anniversary date of the contract. On September 20, 1974, the Board of Directors of the three subject corporations accepted the resignation of Armand Cerami as the Secretary-Treasurer of those corporations, and elected Pamela Cerami as Secretary-Treasurer in Armand Cerami's stead. Those Board of Directors were Tony Sweet, Frank Sweet and Armand Cerami. Armand Cerami returned to federal court on October 18, 1974, and entered a plea of guilty to counts one and five of the aforementioned indictment, for which he was sentenced to three year on each count to run concurrently, but was given a split sentence of 6 months time in confinement, thereafter to be placed on a probationary period for 2-1/2 years. A copy of the judgement and commitment is Petitioner's Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence. They are felony offenses. Subsequent to his release from prison, Armand Cerami served as a co- manager and host of the licensed premises, Tony's Fish Market, located at 1900 N. Bay Causeway, North Bay Village, Florida, license no. 23-1624-SRX, series 4- COP and in the same capacity at Tony's Fish Market of Ft. Lauderdale, located at 1819 S.E. 17th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, license no. 16-1320-SRX, series 4-COP. He remained in this capacity until September 30, 1976, when a change in Section 562.13(3)(a), F.S. prohibited convicted felons from being managers of the licensed premises, licensed by the State of Florida, Division of Beverage. The change in the law took effect on October 1, 1976. At that point two separate individuals were hired as managers of the subject licensed premises. Armand Cerami remained in the position as host of those licensed premises, up to and including the date of the hearing. Although this title and this position was held by Armand Cerami, on December 16, 1976, while conducting a routine visit, beverage officer, William Valentine was told by Frank Sweet, a Director in the subject corporations, that Frank Sweet was in charge of the kitchen of the Tony's Fish Market of Ft. Lauderdale and that Armand Cerami was the real manager, ran the restaurant and was responsible for hiring and firing of employees. Pamela Ann Cerami was not shown to have any active interest in the management of the licensed premises. Pamela Ann Cerami as the Secretary-Treasurer in the three corporations which she purchased shares in, does not draw a salary from the operation of the two restaurants. Her background and financial involvement in the licensed premises, can be traced to certain trusts in her name and a certain gift from her husband, Armand Cerami. The joint composite exhibit #1, admitted into evidence in the hearing, shows that Pamela Ann Cerami, at one time Pamela Crumly, was a beneficiary of the estates of Gail Crumly and Mildred Crumly, her grandparents. Certain distributions of money were made to Pamela Ann Cerami from those estates. On April 3, 1970, she received $6,093.94; on July 3, 1970, she received $121.88; on October 5, 1970, she received $182.82; and on December 31, 1970, she received $925.65, which represented a partial distribution of her 1/2 interest in the Gail Crumly estate. As of April 1, 1970, she had been given $5,292.59 as a portion of the 1/3 distribution of her share in the estate of Mildred Crumly. The total value of her share in that estate being $16,157.02, and the conditions of her rights to the estate being set forth in the will of Mildred Crumly which is found in the joint composite exhibit #1. Pamela Ann Cerami had worked as an airline stewardess prior to her marriage to Armand Cerami and had certain funds from her employment in that capacity. Other funds of the marriage include a certificate of deposit in the Bank of Nova Scotia in Nassau, Bahamas in the amount of $18,000, at 8-1/4 percent interest, as deposited May 20, 1970 with a maturity of November 20, 1970. This certificate of deposit was in the name of Armand D. Cerami and/or Pamela Crumly now Pamela Ann Cerami. The interest received on that certificate of deposit was redeposited along with the principal and a second certificate of deposit was purchased on May 23, 1974 in the amount of $23,480.74, to become mature on November 25, 1974. This certificate was withdrawn on October 18, 1974 and the receipt of 10-1/4 percent interest was paid. The amount of interest thereby being $975.89. Copies of the above mentioned certificates of deposit may be found as part of the joint composite exhibit #1 admitted into evidence. Continuing an examination of the financial circumstances of Pamela Cerami and Armand Cerami, there is found a warranty deed from Willard H. Keland to Pamela Ann Cerami for certain real estate in Dade County, Florida, for which Pamela Ann Cerami paid Willard H. Keland the amount of $158,000. This deed is found as Petitioner's exhibit #4 admitted into evidence and was recorded on January 11, 1974. On that same date a closing was held on the property. Petitioner's Exhibit #5, admitted into evidence is a copy of the closing statement. Conditions of the closing was a cash deposit in the amount of $15,800 and $69,251.64 to close. A first mortgage in the amount of $67,500 and interest of $1,028.75 was given to the Miami Beach First National Bank. The $158,000 paid for this estate corresponds to a gift which was given by Armand Cerami to Pamela Ann Cerami in the amount of $158,000 as shown in the gift tax return, a copy of which is Petitioner's Exhibit #6, admitted into evidence. The effective date of the gift is established in the gift tax return as February, 1974. The federal income tax return filed by Armand Cerami for the year 1974, shows the sale of the stock of the three corporations. That income tax return would further show the $20,000 installment sale payment, a portion of which was treated as income to Armand Cerami. Finally, that return shows $13,000 of interest which was treated as income to Armand Cerami. On October 1, 1975, Pamela Ann Cerami gave a first mortgage on the property that she had paid $158,000 for, this mortgage being given to Bob Erra, as trustee. A copy of the mortgage deed is found a Petitioner's Exhibit #9, admitted into evidence. The amount of the mortgage was $40,000 and the proceeds of the mortgage amount were distributed as $7,000 to Pamela Cerami and $33,000 to Armand Cerami. These distributions were placed as time certificates of deposit with the Pan American Bank of West Dade, copies of which are found as Petitioner's composite exhibit #8. The amount of interest returnable on the time certificate of deposit held by Armand Cerami is shown in his 1975 federal income tax return. Tony's Fish Market, Inc. t/a Tony's Fish Market, made application with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage, to change Armand Cerami as Secretary-Treasurer of Tony's Fish Market Inc. and substitute Pamela Cerami as Secretary-Treasurer of that corporation and to transfer the stock for ownership in the licensee corporation from Armand Cerami to Pamela Cerami. This change of officer and transfer of stock ownership involves the license no. 23-1624-SRX, Series 4-COP. This application was denied by letter of June 16, 1975, from the Director of the Division of Beverage. Subsequent to the sale of the stock and the removal of Armand Cerami and the substitution of Pamela Cerami as the Secretary-Treasurer of the aforementioned corporations, an application was made with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage to transfer the ownership of the license of Tony's Fish Market, Inc. to Tony's Fish Market, Inc. and Tony's Sweet Enterprises, Inc. In addition application was made to chance the trade name of the restaurant from Tony's Fish Market to Tony's Fish Market Restaurant. This application involved the same license no. 23-1624-SRX, series 4-COP. This latter application for transfer of the license and the change of the trade name was denied by a letter of the Director of the Division of Beverage dated August 21, 1975. In fact, Armand Cerami had been convicted of a felony, and is interested in an indirect way in the licensed premises.

Recommendation It is recommended that the applications to change the officer, transfer the stock ownership, transfer the license, and change the trade name, in license no, 23-1624-SRX, series 4-COP, set forth in this hearing be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Hatch, Esquire Division of Beverage The Johns Building 725 Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Tobias Simon, Esquire 1492 S. Miami Avenue Suite 208 Miami, Florida 33130 Sy Chadroff, Esquire Suite 2806 120 Biscayne Boulevard North Miami, Florida 33132

Florida Laws (4) 157.02561.15561.17562.13
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GALAXY POWERSPORTS, LLC, D/B/A JCL INTERNATIONAL, LLC, AND WILD HOGS SCOOTERS AND MOTORSPORTS, LLC vs DAVID CATTAFI, D/B/A DIRECT CAPITAL MOTORS, 09-000545 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sanford, Florida Feb. 02, 2009 Number: 09-000545 Latest Update: Sep. 30, 2009

Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of a Recommended Order of Dismissal by Lawrence P. Stevenson, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Department hereby adopts the Recommended Order of Dismissal as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED and a license may be issued to Wild Hogs Scooters and Motorsports, LLC to sell motorcycles manufactured by Kaitong Motorcycle Manufacture Co. Ltd. (KAIT) at 3311 West Lake Mary Boulevard, Lake Mary (Seminole County), Florida 32746, upon compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. Filed September 30, 2009 3:29 PM Division of Administrative Hearings. DONE AND ORDERED this of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles ""-.r.• u this 9Pfh day of September, 2009. Naiini .Dulllr71cenie Admlnlltrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAF/vlg Copies furnished: Leo Su Galaxy Powersports, LLC d/b/a JCL International, LLC 2667 Northhaven Road Dallas, Texas 75229 2 Jason Rupp Wild Hogs Scooters and Motorsports, LLC 8181 Via Bonita Street Sanford, Florida 32771 David Cattafi David Cattafi d/b/a Direct Capital Motors 4107 South Orlando Drive, Suite C Sanford, Florida 32773 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room A432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lawrence P. Stevenson Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602 3

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