Findings Of Fact Petitioners and Respondent have stipulated to the following facts: The three petitioners are inmates at Union Correctional Institution, Raiford, Florida, in the custody of the Department of Corrections. All three of the petitioners have had their PPRD's established by the respondent-commission as follows: In June of 1982, Mr. Piccirillo's PPRD was established by the commission to be September 30, 1986. In January of 1982, Mr. Adams' PPRD was established by the commission to be November 11, 1991. In December of 1982, petitioner Hemming's PPRD was established by the commission to be September 29, 1993. Subsequent to the commission having established their PPRD's, all three of the petitioners have been transferred from one Florida penal institution to another state institution as follows: Mr. Piccirillo was transferred from Polk Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on August 18, 1982. Mr. Adams was transferred from Polk Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on August 18, 1932. Mr. Hemming was transferred from Avon Park Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on February 16, 1983. The petitioners were not transferred to Union Correctional Institution because of any unsatisfactory institutional conduct at their former institutions. Petitioners are currently scheduled by the commission for biennial interviews to review their established PPRD's as follows: Mr. Piccirillo is scheduled for a biennial interview in March of 1984. Mr. Adams is scheduled for a biennial interview in October of 1983. Mr. Hemming is scheduled for a biennial interview in September of 1984. The following additional findings are made from evidence presented at the hearing: The respondent-commission has not made a finding that any of the petitioner's institutional conduct has been unsatisfactory under the challenged rule nor has respondent extended their PPRD's or refused to authorize their EPRD's. In applying the challenged rule, the fact that an inmate has been transferred to a higher custody or higher level institution is only considered to be unsatisfactory institutional conduct where the commission receives documentation evidencing institutional misconduct as the basis for the transfer. Petitioners transfers from other institutions to Union Correctional Institution would not be considered unsatisfactory institutional conduct under the challenged rule because there is no documentation of institutional misconduct which led to these institutional transfers.
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as required by Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be used?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was certified as a correctional officer by the Commission, having been issued Correctional Officer Certificate number 144670. On or about January 14, 2009, Respondent was employed by Tomoka Correctional Facility (Tomoka). He had been employed by the Department of Corrections (DOC) for approximately 15 years. At some point during the day, Inmate William Cash became disorderly and disruptive in his cell, and a psychological emergency was called. Officer James Hinds and Respondent came to Cash's cell to transport him to a holding cell where he could be seen by a psychologist. In preparing for the transfer, Respondent and Officer Hinds restrained Inmate Cash using handcuffs, leg irons, a waist chain, and a black box which secured Cash's handcuffs. After restraints were applied, Inmate Cash was transported to a holding cell, with Captain Darlene Taman observing the transfer. Consistent with DOC protocols, the transfer of Inmate Cash from his cell to a holding cell was videotaped. Once they arrived at the holding cell, Respondent had Inmate Cash sit down on a bench in the cell. Inmate Cash attempted to twist and pull away from Respondent's grasp. In response, Respondent reasserted his grip and raised one arm, placing his hand against Inmate Cash's neck. The inmate continued pulling away from Respondent until he was lying down on his side. Respondent did not report the incident to his Captain or complete any type of incident report regarding the events occurring in connection with the transport. Captain Taman did not actually see the interaction between Respondent and Inmate Cash, because she was attempting to monitor several situations simultaneously. Consistent with DOC procedure, the warden at Tomoka reviewed the videotape of the transfer. After reviewing the videotape, the warden filed a complaint with John Joiner, Senior Prison Inspector with the DOC Office of Inspector General to investigate whether there was excessive use of force with respect to the interaction between Respondent and Inmate Cash. A use of force occurs when a correctional officer touches an inmate who is offering resistance, applying force to overcome the inmate's resistance. Touching alone does not constitute use of force. It is the application of force to overcome resistance that is key to determining whether a use of force has occurred. When a use of force occurs, a correctional officer is required to report the use of force to his or her commanding officer; to complete a Use of Force report; and to complete an incident report on the use of force. Use of Force reports are to completed within 24 hours. Correctional officers are trained regarding use of force and the required reporting of use of force on an annual basis. Respondent did not report the incident to his supervisor and did not complete a use of force report. In his view, no use of force occurred because Inmate Cash was pulling away from him and he was not applying force to overcome Inmate Cash's resistance. According to Respondent, he attempted to get a better grip on Inmate Cash and then allowed him to lie down on his side on the bench where he was sitting. He described the event as follows: MR. DONOVAN: . . . Use of force, because you place your hands on an inmate, it does not necessarily incur a use of force. It is the resistance to that, me overcoming his resistance is what determines if there is or is not a use of force. The inmate initially pulled away from me. I reasserted my grasp and put my arm up to defend myself. Like I indicated in my interview, that is why my arm went up. He sat back down on his own and he pulled away and started leaning down on the bench to lay down. And after he got down on the bench, after the whole thing was over is when I gave him more orders to stop pulling away, because he continued to pull away from me. I knew he was restrained -- completely restrained, i.e., leg irons, black box, the waist chain and the -- the handcuffs, which is why I didn't use the force. I just wanted to be sure that I had control of the situation, that I had control of him, so that I didn't get hurt or he didn't get hurt. I have been kicked by inmates. I have been spit on and head-butted by inmates, who were completely restrained, such as Mr. Cash was restrained that day. And I know through my training, that just because you touch an inmate, it's not use of force; that you have to -- you have to overcome the resistance that he's presenting to you in order for it to be a use of force. I did not do that. I did not force him to sit down. As he tugged away, he sat down on his own. And then after I reasserted my grasp to make sure that I had ahold of him and was in control of the situation, he laid down on his own. I do not know why; if it was just an attempt to continue to try to get away from me. However, he did all of that on his own. I did not push him down. The video of the incident was observed by both Captain Taman, Respondent's supervisor, and by Inspector Joiner. Both believed, as did Officer Hinds, that the exchange between Respondent and Inmate Cash involved a use of force. It is found that there was a use of force, but that the force used was not excessive. Inspector Joiner interviewed Respondent as a part of the investigation of the incident on January 19, 2010. His response during the interview was consistent with his testimony at hearing: that he did not file a report on use of force because he did not believe a use of force occurred and that, in his view, there was nothing to report. Respondent's testimony was candid, credible and sincere. He believed what he said in the interview and at hearing. However, his ultimate conclusion regarding the use of force was in error.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel W. Donovan Kerra A. Smith, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Department of Corrections (“DOC” or the “Department”), engaged in discriminatory practices against Petitioner, Patrick Quercioli, on the basis of his disability; and, if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 53-year-old Caucasian male. From approximately November 19, 2004, until August 4, 2016, Petitioner was employed by the Department as a Correctional Officer. He was promoted to the rank of Correctional Officer Sergeant on July 28, 2006. At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was working at the Annex section of the Lowell Correctional Institution (“Lowell”) located in Marion County. Lowell is a maximum security prison for female inmates; it has an average daily count of approximately 2,800 prisoners. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida, created pursuant to section 20.315, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for, inter alia, hiring and monitoring all employees engaged in operations at a state prison. Petitioner was separated from his employment with DOC due to the fact that he could not “perform the essential functions of his job.” That determination was based on a report from Petitioner’s therapist, Mrs. Robinson, and her opinion that Petitioner could not effectively perform his duties in the presence of inmates. Inasmuch as all Correctional Officer Sergeant positions require contact with inmates, DOC terminated Petitioner’s employment. The facts leading to the ultimate termination of Petitioner’s employment are anything other than ordinary. A discussion of those facts follows. In October 2014, a female inmate at Lowell was found dead in her cell. Petitioner was named as a suspect in the death, despite the fact that at the time of death he was on vacation with his family, i.e., he was not working at the prison. Local and national news outlets began reporting about the death, and Petitioner was named numerous times as a suspect and possible participant. Apparently, Petitioner’s name had been provided to the inmate’s family prior to her death as someone who had been harassing her. Nonetheless, Petitioner’s character and reputation were impugned by the news stories. Petitioner was placed on administrative leave pending further review by the Department. Meanwhile, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) commenced its own extensive investigation into the death of the inmate. The investigation focused quite heavily on Petitioner and one other correctional officer, but FDLE ultimately concluded that there was no evidence to prove either of the men had taken part in the inmate’s death. The inmate’s death, in fact, was ruled to be from natural causes.1/ The FDLE investigation was concluded on January 21, 2015. The Department did not issue a particular statement concerning Petitioner’s vindication, nor did it publish a notice about the FDLE findings. Petitioner takes great umbrage at this perceived failure by DOC, but cited to no requirement that the Department do so. The Department acknowledges that it did not make any effort to make public the findings of the FDLE investigation. During the FDLE investigation and while Petitioner’s alleged involvement in the incident was being broadcast by the news services, Petitioner began receiving threats against his life and the lives of his family members. Who made such threats or why such threats may have been made was not made clear at final hearing. Whether it was family and friends of the inmate, concerned citizens who perceived Petitioner as some kind of monster, or someone else making the threats, Petitioner was concerned for his safety. He was especially worried for his daughter, who had been living part-time with Petitioner on a split schedule with his ex-wife. When the news stories began to appear, the ex-wife refused to allow the daughter to visit with Petitioner. While he wanted to see his child, Petitioner knew that it was better for her to stay away from him until the situation improved. As a result of the publicity, the threats, and the stress on him and his family, Petitioner developed PTSD. The Department approved Petitioner for participation in EAP on March 6, 2015. EAP paid for counseling sessions with Petitioner’s chosen therapist, Mrs. Robinson. Petitioner had about 12 sessions with Mrs. Robinson while he was covered by EAP. After his EAP coverage expired, Petitioner met with Mrs. Robinson for two more sessions paid for as part of his FMLA leave. Mrs. Robinson identified Petitioner’s condition at the beginning of their sessions as quite extreme. He suffered from nightmares, crippling fear, paranoia, and unwillingness to leave his home. He had dark circles under his eyes and was obviously distraught. Mrs. Robinson began to work with Petitioner to help him view his fears and concerns differently. She taught him to utilize mindfulness meditation techniques. He was shown how to perform activities of daily life without being reminded of the trauma he had experienced. The number of sessions he spent with Mrs. Robinson was not sufficient for her to fully address his needs, however. She was able to diagnose his PTSD and began treatment for that condition, but their relationship ended before she could do much for him. By the time her treatment of Petitioner was concluded, they were working toward Petitioner’s acceptance of some inmates in his workplace, as long as they were not “general population inmates.” Ms. Robinson reiterated that Petitioner should not work within the prison compound, i.e., within the perimeter, at this time. She believed that with further assistance, Petitioner may one day be able to do so. By letter dated March 13, 2015, Mrs. Robinson notified the Department that, concerning Petitioner, “It is recommended that he does not return to work until further notice due to the hostility he has faced from the public, his co-workers and other inmates that he would be responsible for which could trigger further de-compensation and contribute to greater emotional disturbance. Mr. Quercioli is open to learning positive coping skills for improved feelings management as well as the treatments necessary for recovering from PTSD.” For about three months, the Department attempted to determine whether Petitioner would be able to return to work as a Correctional Officer Sergeant. On June 9, 2015, DOC notified Petitioner that his FMLA leave had been exhausted and he needed to talk to his supervisor, Major Patterson, about when he could come back to work. Mr. Patterson contacted Petitioner and basically said he would need to come back to work at the Lowell Annex, i.e., return to his old job. Meanwhile, the Department, by letter dated June 16, 2015, asked Mrs. Robinson for her opinion regarding whether Petitioner could work as a Correctional Officer Sergeant. The parties to this matter characterize the tone of that letter quite differently. It is therefore quoted here in its entirety for the purpose of objectivity: Dear Mrs. Robinson: The above employee [Petitioner] is a Correctional Office Sergeant with the Florida Department of Corrections at Lowell Correctional Institution. Your opinion regarding Mr. Quercioli’s medical status while working in a potentially dangerous environment will assist management in their decision to retain Mr. Quercioli in his current position. In order for us to determine whether or not Mr. Quercioli can safely perform his duties as a Correctional Officer Sergeant, we request that you complete this questionnaire as to his ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of a Correctional Officer Sergeant to full capacity. Please bear in mind that Correctional Officer Sergeants must be able to work split, rotating or fixed shifts, weekends, holidays and overtime possibly without notice as required. Overtime may include double shifts and working on off duty days. In order to assist you in making this determination, I am enclosing a position description and a list of essential functions for the Correctional Officer Sergeant position held by Mr. Quercioli. Also, please bear in mind that Mr. Quercioli’s job does require that he be able to possess a firearm. Furthermore, he could at any time be placed in a situation where the use of physical force, including deadly force may be necessary, to control violent inmates or prevent imminent threat to life. We ask that you provide information regarding how Mr. Quercioli can treat and control his condition in a correctional environment. In addition, we need to know what precautionary measures are required to ensure his physical condition is not exacerbated when he is involved in a highly dangerous situation with inmates or volatile situations with supervisors and/or co-workers. In rendering your opinion, if you determine Mr. Quercioli can perform some duties but not others, please specify which duties cannot be performed and the reason why. Additionally, if there is anything that can be done to allow him to perform these duties, please provide this information. In the letter making this request, the Department included a job description and a brief questionnaire to be filled out by the therapist. The questionnaire asked, “After reviewing the position description of Correctional Officer Sergeant, can Mr. Quercioli perform the duties of a Correctional Officer Sergeant with no restrictions?” The questionnaire went on to ask for any reasons that the question was answered in the negative. Mrs. Robinson replied that “No,” Petitioner could not perform the duties without restrictions. She went on to say that, “With 100% supervision of inmates as his primary duties and his constellation of PTSD symptoms, Mr. Quercioli would be at risk of decompensation. A job with no inmate contact may be possible in the future.” Mrs. Robinson had previously, in response to a Medical Certification request from FCHR, listed a few alternative jobs that Petitioner may be able to do, including: “administration away from inmates; staff security away from general population inmates; key keeper or arsenal maintenance away from general population inmates.” The evidence is unclear as to whether the Department was aware of her suggestions regarding those potential jobs for Petitioner. At final hearing, Ms. Robison reiterated her concern about Petitioner being asked to work in an area where general population inmates might be present. Her testimony, in part, was as follows: Q: “[W]ould he have been able to perform the required functions of his employment position based on what you read in his personnel description, the essential functions of his position, had the department considered or approved any request for accommodations Mr. Quercioli made on the department? A: The current job description, position description for a sergeant as a correctional officer, he couldn’t do that job. Q: Could he do others? A: He could do other jobs and we were working towards limited, you know, his acceptance and, you know, with the cognitive behavioral therapy helps you think different about things and he was opening up to the idea that yes, there will be inmates around but they’re at a lower level of risk, and so he was open to that and for trying to work in a different position. * * * Q: So, earlier or a few moments ago when you said he couldn’t perform under [sic] the position of a correctional sergeant, that’s not a hundred percent accurate, correct? A: Right, that was the job description, that is what he was doing in general population, supervising inmates. He can’t supervise inmates and that has a hundred percent by it, supervision of male or female inmates. That what he -- the part of his job that he couldn’t do. Q: Uh-huh, but with an accommodation, he could do that? A: Yes. In another job, other than supervising his primary one hundred percent duties of supervising male or female inmates. Tr., pp. 48-50. Exactly what duties Petitioner could perform without difficulty is unclear. It is certain he could not supervise inmates 100 percent of the time. Whether he could work around inmates in an environment separated from the prison compound is not certain. Whether he could respond to an emergency situation inside the compound is extremely doubtful.2/ Petitioner’s attorney submitted a letter to DOC dated June 26, 2015. The letter requested accommodations that might make it possible for Petitioner to perform one or more jobs at Lowell. The letter suggested part-time or modified work schedules, job restructuring, and other possibilities. The letter also stated, in part, “Instead of requiring Sergeant Quercioli to once again re-live the nightmares arising from his previous duty in the Lowell Annex, the Department could instead assign him to a less stressful desk job.” DOC responded that a less stressful desk job is not a feasible accommodation because a person in that position would not be able to perform the essential duties of a Correctional Officer Sergeant. The attorney responded to the Department that his previous request for an accommodation was not meant to be limited to a “desk job” only; he meant to include any reasonable accommodations. Though the two conversants used different terminology, it is obvious they were both addressing alternative jobs that did not require Petitioner to work within the prison compound, whether that meant literally sitting at a desk or not. Petitioner intimated, but did not conclusively prove, that there were certain jobs in the administration offices, i.e., outside the compound, that he might be capable of filling. No evidence was presented concerning the exact nature of those jobs, the responsibilities attached thereto, or Petitioner’s qualifications to fill them. Following the exchange of letters between DOC and Petitioner (through his attorney), the Department notified Petitioner via letter dated July 9, 2015, that a “personnel action” was being contemplated by DOC which could result in his dismissal from employment. The basis for a personnel action was that Petitioner’s therapist said he was “currently unable to perform the duties of . . . a Correctional Officer Sergeant.” Petitioner was given the opportunity to attend a pre- determination conference with DOC personnel to provide oral or written statements in regards to the personnel action. A conference was held on July 23, 2015. The Department was represented by Warden Gordon and Colonel Edith Pride. A teamster representative, Michael Riley, accompanied Petitioner to the conference. Petitioner’s attorney, Mr. Bisbee, attended the conference via telephone. Petitioner did not bring his therapist, Ms. Robinson, to the meeting because “it never crossed my mind” that she should attend. At the conference, Petitioner reiterated his desire to return to work, but stated he would rather not interact with inmates, even though he believed he might be able do so. His belief was inconsistent with his therapist’s determination and contrary to his attorney’s representations. It is unclear whether DOC could have assigned Petitioner to a position that did not involve some contact with inmates. There were a few jobs mentioned that take place in the prison’s administration building, outside the perimeter. Some of the “trustee” type inmates working within the administration building may have been much less threatening to Petitioner than general population inmates. But because every Correctional Officer Sergeant is deemed to be on call to attend to disturbances within the prison compound, regardless of their job or workplace, Petitioner could be subject to having close contact with the general population inmates. Petitioner identified one specific job in administration that he thought he might be able to handle despite some inmate contact. That job, in the area of training, was filled by another Correctional Officer Sergeant. Petitioner did not ever formally apply for the job. Subsequent to the predetermination conference, the Department issued a letter to Petitioner advising him that “You will be dismissed from your position as a Correctional Officer Sergeant effective August 4, 2015.” The letter gave Petitioner the right to grieve the action or to appeal it to the Public Employees Relations Commission. Petitioner did not avail himself of either of those options. Instead, he filed a claim with FCHR, resulting ultimately in the present action. DOC based its decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment on the fact that his own therapist had opined that he could not perform the essential functions of a Correctional Officer Sergeant. That is because persons in that position–-no matter what duties they were performing--must be able at a moment’s notice to react personally to any emergency situation that may arise within the inmate population. A correctional officer working in the motor pool, for example, may have to drop what he is doing, pick up a firearm, and rush into the compound to quell a disturbance. A sergeant who is performing training for other officers may have to cease her training and immediately report to duty inside the compound to respond to inmate unrest. There is no job under the Correctional Officer Sergeant umbrella that is immune from contact with inmates at any given time. There was, in short, no reasonable accommodation the Department could offer Petitioner. Two pertinent quotes from the record explain concisely the basis of the Department’s position in this case: As a general rule, we don’t “accommodate” correctional officers because the accommodations requested generally include exemption from the essential functions. We provide alternate duty for those officers who are temporarily unable to perform the duties of their position because of a work related injury. However, while on alternate duty, they do not wear a uniform, nor do they perform the duties of a [Correctional Officer]. * * * Quercioli’s therapist, Beth Robinson, stated he was not able to perform the duties of his position, although a job with no inmate contact may be possible in the future. There are no correctional officer positions, regardless of rank, whose essential functions do not include dealing with inmates. Exhibit 4 to Petitioner Exhibit 1, email from Patricia Linn, human resources analyst. It is not unusual for employees to request so-called “accommodations” from DOC relating to their duties as correctional officers. Such requests may include exceptions to the dress code, a need for ergonomic chairs, leave extensions, parking space changes, alternate work schedules, and the like. Each request is reviewed on its own merits and some are granted, some are denied. In fact, Petitioner alluded to the fact that after the inmate death incident, he had been reassigned to alternate duties not having to do with inmate monitoring. His duties were related to assisting applicants for jobs at Lowell to fill out their applications. Petitioner intimated that he did not enjoy that position. Petitioner asserts that DOC made no effort to contact him to discuss possible accommodations. He did not cite to any existing policy or rule which would require the Department to do so, however. Further, Petitioner admitted that he did not attempt to initiate such conversations with the Department, either. Since losing his job at Lowell, Petitioner has been unable to obtain gainful employment. Of the scores of internet applications for employment (and one in-person interview), not a single position came to fruition. As a result, Petitioner cashed out his state retirement plan, using the money to pay bills and provide for his daughter’s needs. Petitioner presented no evidence in this case that persons with disabilities were treated any differently by the Department when they requested accommodations.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that the Department of Corrections had legitimate cause for the dismissal of employment of Petitioner, Patrick Quercioli, and that there is no evidence of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Donald Eugene Halpin, has been an inmate at DeSoto Correctional Institution since February, 1991. He is serving a sentence to life in prison. Sometime in March, 1991 he received a letter from a female friend through the prison mail system. Enclosed with the letter were several photographs of this female friend who was in the nude. They were of the sender only and did not show either her sexual organs or any sexual activity. She had sent him similar photos while he was confined at Marion Correctional Institute and he has received others over the past 16 years he has been incarcerated in one or another institution within the Department system. At all other institutions where he has been held, he was permitted to retain these or similar photographs. At DeSoto he was not. The photographs were never given to the Petitioner by the DeSoto officials but were returned to the sender. This action was justified to him by Institution officials on the basis that other inmates could get into his locker where the photos would be kept and this could result in difficulty or disagreement between or among the inmates. The denial was justified on the language contained on the back of the institutions mail form which reads: Mail containing obscene items, language, or references made in a suggestive manner (which would not be acceptable from a moral standpoint) shall not be permitted. Mail received which does not comply with regulations shall be returned to the sender. The Department's rule in issue has been in effect for a considerable time and has system-wide application. The current Assistant Superintendent at DeSoto, Mr. Cornell, uses it at the facility about 4 -5 times a month. It is justified under the rationale that nude photographs of an inmate's family member are dangerous to have. Inmate living areas are not air-conditioned and when temperatures are high, tempers often flare. Even though most inmates claim there is no animosity among them, such feelings exist, especially if the subject of this type of photograph comes to visit. In prison especially, lewd or derogatory comments about an inmate's family are not well tolerated and may result in an altercation. Mr. Cornell can remember one case in which it did, and he feels this constitutes a risk to the security of the institution. DeSoto's assault rate is lower than that of other close security installations because, he believes, of this rule and how it is applied. Magazines containing photographs of a similar nature are allowed as a part of the approved reading for inmates in Department facilities. Such magazines as Oui, Penthouse, Playboy, and Playgirl Magazine are contained on the approved periodical list attached to and made of part of the Department's Policy and Procedure Directive 4.10.50 dealing with admissible reading material, issued on May 10, 1979 and revised on May 25, 1982. These magazines are justified on the basis that the photo subjects are not known to or related to inmates, and the photographs may not be cut out of the magazines and posted in inmate living areas. Consequently, it is felt, these magazines pose no threat. The pictures allowed to inmates do not have to be of individuals on the inmate's visiting list. The test of whether a photo will be approved is not the subject of the photo but the nature of the pose. When mail for inmates is received at the institution, it is reviewed by several people in the chain of command overseeing the particular inmate. A Corrections Officer I is the mail room person who first opens the inmate mail. It is then screened by a Sergeant and a Lieutenant as well as the Major in charge of each of the institution's major units. Another inmate, Henry Ross, received nude photos of family members and girlfriends which were confiscated. When he filed a grievance, the pictures were returned to him but he was advised he would not be allowed any more. Mr. Cornell indicated he was not aware of those photos but, having viewed them at the hearing, would have denied them entrance if he had. Parenthetically, the day of this hearing, after Ross had testified on behalf of Petitioner and had shown his photos to the Hearing Officer, he was called in and advised a ruling had been made that his photos were not proper and he was required to get rid of them. He has also, however, received other photos of this type over the nine years he has been incarcerated and has been allowed to keep them. He has also had access to the magazines described above. Inmate Jackson, who has been at prisons in the Department system for more than 14 years, has not received any nude photos from outside but personally knows of inmates who have while at other institutions. In all his years of incarceration, he has no knowledge of any violence among inmates as a result of nude photos even though lockers have been broken into. Jackson claims that neither he nor Ross would ever engage in violence as a result of a derogatory remark regarding any pictures they might have nor would they take such action if their lockers were broken into. The inmates see DeSoto's implementation of the rule as arbitrary and unjustified. In this case, when Halpin's pictures were returned without being given to him, he first filed an informal grievance which was denied. He then filed a formal grievance which was also denied, and an appeal of that denial to the Department Secretary who denied it as well.
Findings Of Fact Douglas L. Adams is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution. On August 26, 1985, he was awakened early in the morning and brought before a disciplinary hearing for an alleged violation of institutional rules and regulations. Prior to the hearing, he was advised by a correctional officer to pack up all his personal property and to bring it with him to the hearing. Mr. Adams took with him as much as he could which included his clothing and other personal effects, but he was unable to carry all he owned with him at one time. He did not ask for either help in carrying his property or a cart to carry it in prior to leaving his cell area to go to the hearing. When he arrived at the movement center where the hearing was to be held, he advised the authorities there that he did not have all his property with him. At that point, he asked for help or the use of a cart to go get the rest of his property but he was refused because no cart was there. As a result, he went to the hearing leaving some of his property in his cell area and while in the hearing, contends he was required to leave his property in the control center. This property was secured in a storage room behind the control center which, while not locked, was not available for access to other inmates unless they were accompanied by a corrections officer. When the hearing was over and Mr. Adams, who had been directed to administrative confinement requested to go back to his former cell area to get the rest of his property, his request was refused. His property was inventoried by UCI personnel at that time, but because in his opinion the inventory was not complete, Mr. Adams refused to sign the form. When he was released from administrative confinement he claims he did not get all his property back. He relates that he was told he had forfeited whatever property he had not brought to the hearing. As a result, he filed a complaint on September 16, 1985, which was subsequently denied. Petitioner has been incarcerated in 7 or 8 institutions within the Department of Corrections including Florida State Prison, River Junction Correctional Institution, Baker Correctional Institution, Polk Correctional Institution, Old Unit, the Reception and Medical Center, and DeSoto Correctional Institution. At each one of these institutions a rule similar to this one was in existence. At Baker Correctional Institution, the inmate was required to bring his mattress as well. Robert Craig has been in prison for a total of 27 years and has been incarcerated in almost every major penal institution in the State of Florida that was built prior to the last five years. At Avon Park Correctional Institution he underwent a disciplinary hearing and was told at the time to bring all his personal property with him to the hearing. While in the hearing, he was required to leave all his property outside in the hall. At Cross City Correctional Institution the guards took him to the hearing without his property, bringing his property along afterwards. In essence, at all the institutions where he was incarcerated, there was some variation of the same procedure regarding his personal property. He either had to bring it to the hearing or it was packed up prior to the hearing. At no institution was his property inventoried prior to the hearing. As a result, he has lost personal property including a calculator for which he was subsequently reimbursed by the institution. According to Mr. Craig, if the inmate does not bring his personal property with him he either is given a deficiency report or is precluded from going back to get it when the hearing is over. Sgt. Denmark has worked for approximately 8 1/2 years with the Department of Corrections, all at UCI, where he formerly worked at the movement center. One of the functions he performed there was to handle prisoners coming for a disciplinary hearing. The rule as explained to him regarding the inmates' personal property is that the inmate is required to bring all of it with him to the hearing. Once the property is brought with the inmate to the hearing, the inmate is free to either take it into the hearing with him or to leave it in the storage room in back of the movement center during the hearing. If the inmate is sentenced to disciplinary confinement as a result of the hearing, in that case, and at that point, the inmate's property is inventoried. If the inmate is not sentenced to disciplinary confinement, the property is returned to the prisoner who is returned to his area. In the instant case, Mr. Denmark heard the Petitioner tell Sgt. Howe, when he arrived at the movement center, that he had left some of his property in his cell. However, when Adams went into his hearing, he neither took his property with him nor requested that it be secured. According to Mr. Cunningham, the Chief Classification Supervisor, the Union Correctional Institution Policy, (85-52.9 B1) requires inmates to bring all their property to disciplinary hearings. It is an old policy, and the reason for it is to protect the property from theft. In a disciplinary hearing, there is a chance that an inmate might not get back to his old cell to retrieve his property after the hearing. For security reasons, institution officials prefer not to take a prisoner back to his old cell after a hearing because, at that point, he is often angry as a result of the hearing and disruptive. All Department of Corrections' institutions in the region incorporating UCI, except Florida State Prison, have a similar policy. Inquiry of corrections personnel at the agency headquarters in Tallahassee reveals that most major DOC facilities have a similar policy. There are a total of 33 other facilities which hold less than 100 inmates each. These smaller institutions do not, generally, have a similar policy and Florida State Prison has a different situation because of the different security problems. It is the needs of the institution, however, which determine the use of the policy. Mr. Cunnningham is aware of Mr. Adams' hearing and the complaint filed as a result thereof. Upon inquiry it was determined that Mr. Adams had failed to establish a loss and the complaint was denied. Mr. Cunningham does not know whether there was an investigation into the loss of the property left in the cell. It is Mr. Cunningham's understanding that if the witness cannot carry all his property at one time, normally, if the inmate asks for permission to do so, he will be allowed to go back and get the balance before the hearing. This is not in the procedure approved by DOC, however, nor in the IOP at UCI. Corrections Officer Howe is also aware of the fact that Mr. Adams had a hearing on August 26, 1985. He, in fact, was called to the movement center to escort several prisoners, including Adams, to the confinement barracks after the hearings. A part of this duty involves inventorying the prisoners property. Howe told Adams to get his property and bring it in for inventory. At this point, after the hearing Adams said he did not have all his property with him and asked to be taken back to his old cell to get the rest. Howe declined to do this and explained the security reasons for his decision to Adams. He did advise Adams, however, that he would call down to Adams' old cell area and have his property packed which, in fact, he did. It is standard practice at UCI, according to Howe, that if an inmate has a large amount of property, he can request the use of a cart or wheelbarrow which is assigned to each housing area for carrying this excess property. This cart will be returned by a runner who can also help carry the excess. To his knowledge, inmates are not denied the use of these carts. Howe declined to return Adams to his old cell area after the hearing because, at the time, Adams was belligerent and unstable and presented a security risk in his opinion and also, because Adams had previously been advised to bring all his property with him and had failed to do this even though there was a way for him to accomplish it.
Findings Of Fact Incorporated in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as a Conclusion of Law and not a Finding of Fact. 3-4. Incorporated in Finding of Facts 2-4. Incorporated in Finding of Facts 9-10. Incorporated in Finding of Facts 5-6. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 7. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 11. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as argument and not a Finding of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Stanley Blanding, #036207 Liz Cloud, Chief Mark Dingle, #073356 Bureau of Administrative Code William Roberts, #908378 1802 The Capitol Virgil Page, #073743 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Union Correctional Institution P. O. Box 221 Raiford, Florida 32803 William Joel Keel, #060263 Carroll Webb, Exec. Director Union Correctional Institution Administrative Procedures P. O. Box 221 Committee Raiford, Florida 32083 120 Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Julia Forrester, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis A. Vargas, Esquire General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louie Wainwright Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application for certification as a correctional officer should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: On or about January 1, 1989, Petitioner was employed as a probationary employee with the Dade Correctional Institute (DCI) in Miami, Florida. The DCI is a twenty-five acre compound which houses approximately 944 inmates. The compound is comprised of eight dormitories, vocational shops, an educational building, two dining hall satellites, and a main dining hall. For each work shift, correctional officers are stationed within each dormitory, along the perimeter area, inside the radio control room, and throughout the grounds. The minimum number of correctional officers required for each shift is Because of the limited number of officers on-duty during a given shift, their responsibilities, and security considerations, it is imperative that correctional officers maintain a level of detachment from inmates. Petitioner was aware of this mandate at the time of her employment with the DCI. On or about January 19, 1989, Corrections Officer Garnett instructed the Petitioner to perform an inventory with an inmate, DeMarco, to verify state property numbers. Later in the day, when Officer Garnett questioned DeMarco regarding the inventory sheet, she was told that Petitioner had directed another inmate, Williams, to perform the inventory. Since this was contrary to the original instructions, Officer Garnett contacted the Petitioner by radio to determine the location of the inventory sheet. At that time Petitioner informed Officer Garnett that the inventory was complete and that the sheet was in her pocket. When confronted in person and directed to produce the inventory sheet, Petitioner admitted she had given the inventory work to inmate Williams, that the inventory was not completed and that she had misrepresented the matter. Subsequently, the inventory was retrieved from Williams. Inmates are not normally allowed access to the DCI clothing room. Officer Garnett had authorized inmate DeMarco to assist Petitioner with work in the clothing room. Inmate Williams was not authorized to work the clothing room. Petitioner allowed inmate Williams access to the clothing room. Initially, Petitioner denied having done so, but later recanted and admitted that she had allowed inmate Williams to assist her in the clothing room. Personal relationships between correctional officers and DCI inmates are prohibited. Petitioner was counseled on numerous occasions about the rules and procedures which prohibit discussions of a personal nature with inmates. Fraternization is considered a serious security breach for which an officer may be terminated from employment. On or about January 23, 1989, Petitioner admitted she had had personal discussions with inmates (including inmate Williams) but assured Major Thompson that she would refrain from such conduct in the future. Petitioner continued to have personal conversations with inmates after the counseling session of January 23, 1989. Specifically, Mr. Callahan witnessed a personal conversation between Petitioner and inmate Williams which took place within a dormitory that inmate Williams was not assigned to be in. Later, Petitioner wrote a love note to inmate Strausser which was found at her duty post. A search of inmate Strausser's cell revealed he had possession of Petitioner's home telephone number. Petitioner initially denied her relationship with inmate Strausser but later told Major Thompson that they are engaged to be married. Petitioner's employment with DCI was terminated in June of 1989. Contrary to Petitioner's belief, she is not certified as a correctional officer. Petitioner has, however, completed all - educational/training requirements to become certified.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for certification as a correctional officer. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-6684 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY PETITIONER: None submitted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT: Paragraphs 1 through 5 are accepted. With the date being corrected to January 19, 1989, paragraph 6 is accepted. Paragraphs 7 through 19 are accepted. Paragraphs 20 and 21 are rejected as hearsay or irrelevant. To the extent that Petitioner admitted having inmate Williams in the clothing room to, Major Thompson, paragraph 22 is accepted. Paragraphs 23 through 25 are accepted. Paragraph 26 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 27 through 28 are rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 29 through 37 are accepted. Paragraph 38 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 39 through 54 are accepted. Paragraph 55 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 56 is accepted. Paragraphs 57 through 59 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Isabel Machin 9411 S.W. 4th Street Apartment 201 Miami, Florida 33174 Elsa Lopez Whitehurst Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Luis A. Pacheco, Joel Estremera, Felipe Pichardo and Owen D. Denson, are inmates in the custody and control of the Department. The Department is a state agency. On December 26, 1991, the Petitioners filed a Petition for Determination of the Invalidity of an Existing Rule against the First Respondents. The Petition was filed against "John T. Shaw, Superintendent, Glades Correctional Institution, et. al." In the Petition, the Petitioners challenged the validity of "the revision of Glades Correctional Operating Procedure 91-07, sec. 7.09" pursuant to Sections 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petition failed to challenge a rule or an alleged rule of any "agency" as that term is defined in Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes. On January 10, 1992, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend and Cancelling Formal Hearing was entered granting a Motion to Dismiss filed by the First Respondents and giving the Petitioners an opportunity to file an amended petition on or before January 21, 1992. No amended petition was filed by the Petitioners on or before January 21, 1992. Therefore, on January 29, 1992, an Order Concerning Proposed Final Orders was entered informing the parties that they could file proposed final orders on or before February 24, 1992, and that this Final Order would be entered on or before March 16, 1992. On February 7, 1992, the Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Determination of Invalidity of An Existing Rule and requested that it be accepted. On February 25, 1992, an Order Concerning Amended Petition was entered accepting the Amended Petition and informing the parties that this case would be disposed of by a summary final order. In the Amended Petition the Department was named as the Respondent. Although the amended petition indicates that the Petitioners are challenging Rule 33-5.01, Florida Administrative Code, pursuant to Sections 120.52, 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes, in fact the Petitioners are challenging a memorandum issued at Glades Correctional Institution changing Policy and Procedure Directive 3.04.12 (hereinafter referred to as the "Policy and Procedure Directive"). In the Amended Petition the Petitioners allege, in part, the following: Respondent through his designee, John T. Shaw, has adopted exhibit " A " as a rule, which governs petitioners [sic] visitors to select from, " Saturday or Sunday as their regular visiting day. Petitioners are therefore substantially " affected " and this case includes an invalid exercise of delagated [sic] authority because the department of corrections failed to promulgate it's Policy and Procedure Directive number 3.04.12 as a rule, contrary to the requirements of section 944.09, Florida Statutes. The Amended Petition fails to challenge a rule or an alleged rule of any "agency" as that term is defined is Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether James K. Shepherd is entitled to special risk equivalent credit for his employment at the Bartow Road Prison from September 16, 1960, through January, 1971, and at the LaBelle Road Prison from January, 1971, through June, 1972, and from December, 1973, through October, 1976?
Findings Of Fact Mr. Shepherd filed an Application for Employment dated September 12, 1960, seeking employment in the position of Equipment Operator I (Prison) with the Florida State Road Department, the predecessor of the Florida Department of Transportation. Mr. Shepherd began his employment with the Florida State Road Department on September 16, 1960. Mr. Shepherd completed and submitted an Application for Employment as a Relief Guard on September 19, 1960. Mr. Shepherd began his employment on September 16, 1960, with the State of Florida as an Equipment Operator I (Prison). He was assigned to the Bartow Road Prison. During the time that Mr. Shepherd was employed at the Bartow Road Prison, it was a multi-custody facility housing minimum, medium and maximum custody prison inmates. The inmates at the prison were employed in the maintenance of the roads. Inmates were escorted from the prison to job sites. If the inmate crew was made up of maximum custody inmates, the crew was accompanied by an armed guard. Generally, a maximum custody crew also included a truck driver (an Equipment Operator I) and a Road Foreman. If the inmate crew was made up of minimum or medium custody inmates, the crew was not accompanied by an armed guard. The crew was accompanied by a truck driver and, if available, a Road Foreman. The Road Foremen were responsible for supervising the work of the crew. Truck drivers (Equipment Operators) were responsible for operating the truck used to transport the crew and its tools. On April 15, 1964, Mr. Shepherd signed a Florida Merit System, Request for Classification Approval form which included the following description of Mr. Shepherd's duties while employed at the Bartow Road Prison: I am an equipment operator I. The duties of this job consist of: 90% A. Drive Dump truck. 5% B. Shoulder work; filling up washouts, etc. 5% C. Washing, polishing, lubrication of truck. On April 21, 1964, Mr. Shepherd's supervisor signed a similar form containing the same description of Mr. Shepherd's duties while at the Bartow Road Prison. Mr. Shepherd's primary responsibilities and duties while employed at the Bartow Road Prison consisted of the driving of a truck transporting prisoners to and from work sites and keeping the truck and tools with the prisoner crew. In addition to Mr. Shepherd's primary responsibilities and duties, Mr. Shepherd also carried out the following functions on occasion while employed at the Bartow Road Prison: Assisting the crew guard in maintaining custody and control of the prisoners. On some of these occasions, Mr. Shepherd was given one of the guard's weapons; Carrying weapons issued by the prison; Maintaining the safety of prisoners in and outside the prison; Assisting in the search for and apprehension of prisoners who escaped from the prison. On these occasions, Mr. Shepherd was issued a weapon. Finally, in addition to the responsibilities and duties listed in findings of fact 8 and 9, while employed at the Bartow Road Prison Mr. Shepherd was also required to work every third night and every third weekend in the prison, twenty-four hours a day. During these periods, Mr. Shepherd assisted in guarding the prisoners in the prison from the guard towers around the perimeter of the prison and inside the prison dormitory in the evening until approximately 10:00 p.m. Mr. Shepherd was armed while manning the guard towers. Mr. Shepherd was not armed when he was in the prison dormitory but he did supervise and control inmates when necessary. Mr. Shepherd also participated in foot patrols outside the perimeter fence of the prison. During the month of October, 1970, while employed at the Bartow Road Prison, Mr. Shepherd was kidnapped and taken hostage by a prisoner from a crew of prisoners under Mr. Shepherd's supervision and control. Mr. Shepherd was not armed at the time. The prisoner attempted to escape, threatened Mr. Shepherd with death and severe injury and forced Mr. Shepherd to drive the prisoner during his attempted escape. The escape was subsequently prevented by the Polk County Sheriff's Department. There was an eight-month period of time during Mr. Shepherd's employment at the Bartow Road Prison that Mr. Shepherd continuously exercised supervision and control over prisoners. During this period Mr. Shepherd was issued a weapon and rode in the guard's cage at the back of the truck. Mr. Shepherd was issued a commission from the Division of Corrections. This commission authorized Mr. Shepherd to "exercise supervision or control over State prisoners ..." The commission did not constitute an assignment to a guard position but it was necessary in order for Mr. Shepherd to carry out some of his responsibilities and duties while employed at the Bartow Road Prison. From September 16, 1960, until November 30, 1970, Mr. Shepherd was a member of the State and County Officer's and Employees' Retirement System. Effective December 1, 1970, Mr. Shepherd became a member of the Florida Retirement System. In January, 1971, Mr. Shepherd was promoted to the position of Road Foreman. At this time Mr. Shepherd was also transferred from the Bartow Road Prison to the LaBelle Road Prison. While employed as a Road Foreman, Mr. Shepherd's primary responsibilities and duties consisted of directing the activities of prisoner crews in working on the roads and supervising equipment operators and prison guards who accompanied him. Mr. Shepherd's primary responsibility and duty did not include the custody and restraint of prisoners. While employed as a Road Foreman, Mr. Shepherd occasionally assisted the guard responsible for guarding the prisoners. During Mr. Shepherd's employment as a Road Foreman, he was not required to spend any days or weekends at the prison. In June, 1972, Mr. Shepherd transferred to the Division of Corrections as a Correctional Officer I. Mr. Shepherd moved to Apalachicola Correctional Institute, in Sneeds, Florida. In August, 1972, Mr. Shepherd transferred back to the Department of Transportation as an Equipment Operator. He was assigned to the maintenance facility in Marianna, Florida. Mr. Shepherd remained in Marianna until December, 1973. At that time Mr. Shepherd was promoted to Road Foreman and transferred back to the LaBelle Road Prison. Mr. Shepherd remained at LaBelle Road Prison until October, 1976. At that time he transferred to the Department of Corrections. Mr. Shepherd's primary responsibilities and duties while at LaBelle Road Prison from December, 1973, to October, 1976, were essentially the same as during his employment at LaBelle Road Prison from January, 1971 to June, 1972. Mr. Shepherd remained with the Department of Corrections until his retirement. Effective March 1, 1987, Mr. Shepherd retired as a member of the Florida Retirement System. On May 5, 1987, Mr. Shepherd signed an Application for Special Risk Equivalent Credit. In the Application Mr. Shepherd sought special risk equivalent credit for his employment at the Bartow Road Prison from September 16, 1960, through January, 1971, and his employment at the LaBelle Road Prison from January, 1971, through June, 1972, and from December, 1973, through October 1, 1976. By letter dated July 10, 1987, Mr. Shepherd was notified by the Department that the Application signed by him on May 5, 1987, was being denied. The positions of Equipment Operator I (Prison) and Road Foreman which Mr. Shepherd held were not certified in compliance with Section 943.1395, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that James K. Shepherd's Application for Special Risk Equivalent Credit for the periods of employment from September 16, 1960, through June, 1972, and December, 1973, through October, 1976, be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3823 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 2 & 4. 2 5. 3 8 & 9. 4 10. 5 15. 6 11. 7 12. 8 15. 9 16 & 17. 10 19. See also 1-18. 11 20 & 21. 12 22 & 24. 13 Hereby accepted. 14 26. 15 Not relevant to this proceeding. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Mr. Shepherd retired from the Florida Retirement System on March 1, 1987. 2-3 2 & 4. 4 1. 5 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The application for Relief Guard was not filed "contemporaneously with the application for Equipment Operator. See 3. 6-7 Irrelevant to this proceeding. 8 6. 9 5. 10 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 17. 11 9. 12 10. 13-14 8. 15 14. 16 Hereby accepted. 17 13. 18-21 Hereby accepted. 22 13. 23-25 Hereby accepted. 26-28 Taken into account in the weight given to the evidence. 29 8. 30 5. 31 8. 32 9. 33 8. 34 17 & 18. 35 8. 36 8 & 9. 37 28. 38 Hearsay. COPIES FURNISHED: Adis Vila Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 William A. Frieder Senior Attorney Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Charles Tindell, Esquire Charles Tindell, P.A. Post Office Box 5666 406 North Wild Olive Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32018 =================================================================
