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BOARD OF NURSING vs. NANCY E. REDFERN, 85-000754 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000754 Latest Update: Jan. 14, 1986

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as charged in Counts I and II of the administrative complaint except as to paragraphs 15 and 16 which should be dismissed. It is further recommended that respondent's two nursing licenses be suspended for one year. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert H. Newell, Jr., Esquire 200 South Monroe Street, Suite B Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James J. Boczar, Esquire 3100 South Tamiami Trail Sarasota, Florida 33579 Ms. Nancy E. Redfern 155 Magnolia Street Atlantic Beach, Florida 32233 APPENDIX PETITIONER Partially covered in the background. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 2. Partially covered in the finding of fact 14. Partially covered in the background. Rejected as being unnecessary. Covered in findings of fact 4-6. Covered in finding of fact 6. Partially covered in the background. Covered in finding of fact 7. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 7. Covered in finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 9. Rejected as being unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 8. Covered in finding of fact 10. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 10. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 9. Rejected as being unnecessary. Rejected as being unnecessary.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57464.018
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BOARD OF NURSING vs. MARK HEGEDUS, 78-002058 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-002058 Latest Update: Jul. 26, 1979

Findings Of Fact Mark Hegedus, Respondent, is registered with the Florida State Board of Nursing and holds license No. 85729-2. He worked at the Sarasota Memorial Hospital (SMH) for approximately three years immediately preceding May 15, 1978. During the period between April 1, 1978 and May 15, 1978 Respondent was working on the cancer ward at SMH and was Charge Team Leader at the hospital. An audit conducted of the narcotics and barbiturates administration records at SMH for the period 1 April through 15 May 1978 disclosed that of 14 patients records selected who had been administered Demerol by Respondent, evidence of irregularity was discovered in 30 entries on 9 of the 14 patient medical records audited. These errors included signing out for 50 mg ampules of Demerol 11 times, for 75 mg ampules 11 times, and for 100 mg ampules 8 times in the narcotic record with no entry made on the Nurses Notes or on Medication and Treatment record. These errors involved patients Daryl C. Iverson, Edna Jurgenson, Clinton Jelmberg, John Lally, Genevieve Belt, Arleigh Updike, Michael Wujtowicz, Joan Slater, and Arda Miller. Hospital procedures and accepted nursing practice require the nurse administering narcotics to sign for the narcotic when it is removed from the narcotics locker and then make an entry in the Nurse Notes and patient Medication and Treatment record when the narcotic is administered to the patient. Medication and Treatment records are used by the doctors to see how frequently patients need narcotics prescribed on an as needed basis, whether the drugs prescribed have been administered, and by other medical personnel to ascertain when the patient last received and how much medication so as to preclude giving the patient an overdose. Respondent was discharged from his position at the hospital on 15 May 1978 because of the narcotics irregularities. At the time of his discharge, Respondent acknowledged that he had taken Demerol and had disposed of the ampules but that he did not use them himself or sell them. The audit disclosed a few errors in charting narcotics were committed by other nurses as well as Respondent. During the three years Respondent worked at SMH and, up until about 1 April 1978, he was a capable and competent registered nurse, well-liked by both patients and co-workers. He was promoted to First Team Leader after about one year at SMH and to Charge Team Leader approximately one year thereafter. These promotions were more rapid than the time required by the average nurse. All witnesses who had worked with Respondent spoke highly of his qualifications and dedication as a registered nurse.

Florida Laws (1) 92.05
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BOARD OF NURSING vs. AUDREY E. TUCKER, 81-001795 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001795 Latest Update: Mar. 11, 1982

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a registered nurse who began her employment at South Lake Memorial Hospital on August 29, 1977, and was terminated on April 23, 1980. During her employment, the Respondent received four poor evaluations and/or warnings for her nursing practice. The first warning occurred on August 1, 1979. This warning involved allegations of poor nursing performance by the Respondent. These allegations included the Respondent leaving her unit, failing to properly organize her work, failing to properly restrain a patient, wasting time by running too many EGG strips instead of performing her assigned functions, failing to take vital signs timely when coming onto shift, becoming hostile with the Director of Nursing, and failing to obey the direct order of the Director of Nursing to leave the hospital and go home after an argument on July 12, 1979. Although there was no direct evidence as to most of the allegations, the Respondent admitted to late charting, failing to timely take vital signs, spending time working with ECG strips, and failing to obey a direct order to-go home given by the Director of Nursing. The next evaluation occurred on November 26, 1979. The deficiencies in Respondent's practice as alleged by the Director of Nursing were that the Respondent gave a patient whole blood instead of packed cells as ordered by the physician, failed to verify an error in transcription by the ward clerk which resulted in a patient's x-rays being delayed for a day, and improperly charting when the Respondent noted on the nursing notes that at 9:00 p.m. there was no significant change in a patient's condition, when in fact the patient had left the hospital at 8:30 p.m. The lack of direct evidence of these allegations was compensated for by the Respondent's admissions as she testified concerning the circumstances surrounding why the incidents occurred. The third warning occurred on March 19, 1980. The allegations in the warning concerned the Respondent having shouted at a supervisor, abandoning her patients, allowing two I.V.s to run dry, failing to carry out a doctor's orders, and failing to chart. Again, there was no direct evidence of the allegations, however, the Respondent admitted that she left her duty station because of sickness prior to relief arriving in the unit, failed to properly follow doctor's orders, and failed to chart for the time she was present in the unit prior to her reporting to the emergency room. The fourth and final warning, which resulted in termination, occurred on April 23, 1980. The allegations by the Director of Nursing were that the Respondent hung one-fourth percent normal saline solution rather than the one- half percent normal saline solution ordered by the physician, and that the Respondent failed to administer the 5:00 p.m. medication. Again, the allegations were admitted by the Respondent as she attempted to explain why they occurred. The Director of Nursing testified that during each of these warnings, the Respondent's attitude was that she had done nothing wrong and, therefore, could not improve on her performance. The testimony of the Department's nurse investigator was to the effect that the Respondent's actions failed to meet the minimal standard of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice. The investigator also testified that, in her opinion, a nurse with Respondent's poor attitude could be extremely dangerous in a hospital setting. After many years of difficult and stressful work, many nurses suffer from what is commonly referred to as "burn out" and are no longer useful, and can be dangerous in a high stress area of nursing. Respondent testified in her own behalf and offered an explanation for each allegation presented by Petitioner. Respondent testified that relative to the first warning, even though she only had two patients, she did not have adequate time to do her charting during her shift and, therefore, had to stay two hours late. Respondent further testified that on one occasion she had not timely taken her vital signs because the Director of Nursing had delayed her with a needless confrontation. Respondent testified that she did not leave the facility as ordered on August 12, 1979, because she was afraid that she would be abandoning her patients, and could lose her vacation and sick leave benefits. With respect to the November 26, 1979 evaluation, the Respondent testified that she gave whole blood instead of packed cells because the whole blood was incorrectly labeled as packed cells. Respondent further testified that she became aware of the error after the solution had infused, and that had she looked at the solution earlier she would have been able to see that it was an incorrect blood product, and would have been able to correct the problem. As to the incorrect transcription resulting in a patient's x-rays being delayed, the Respondent stated that it was the ward clerk's responsibility, not hers, to transcribe the doctor's orders. With respect to the 9:00 p.m. nursing notes when the patient had left the facility at 8:30 p.m., the Respondent's response was that she had been aware that the patient was gone, but was summarizing the patient's condition during the entire shift up to the point the patient left. Respondent acknowledge that the nursing notes may have been misleading. As to thee warning of termination on March 19, 1980, the Respondent admitted leaving her unit prior to relief arriving. Her explanation gas that she had been attempting for one hour to get assistance, to no avail. Upon questioning, she admitted that she was-only "a little dizzy" and had diarrhea. On that day she did not chart any nursing care given by her while on duty. The Respondent was caring for twelve patients at that time. With respect to the April 23, 1980 termination, Respondent admitted that she hung the incorrect percentage saline solution, but that she did so because a prior nurse obtained the incorrect solution from a supply room. The Respondent then also admitted failing to give out the 5:00 p.m. medication as ordered, but stated the reason for her failure to administer the medication was her inability to obtain help from her supervisor which was necessary because she was overworked. Respondent also testified that during this time period, she went on rounds with a doctor, and also went to dinner. The Respondent testified that she felt she was a good and qualified nurse. Respondent also testified that she had been fired previously from Leesburg General Hospital. The Respondent believes her attitude to be good and indicated that the hospital was overreacting to a few isolated incidents.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent's license to practice nursing in the State of Florida, license number 39108-2, be suspended indefinitely. If the Respondent seeks reinstatement, it will be her responsibility to undergo counseling with a psychologist or psychiatrist, for an in-depth evaluation and treatment, the results of which shall be submitted to the Board of Nursing if and when the Respondent wishes to apply for reinstatement of her nursing license. If the Respondent applies for reinstatement of her license, it shall be her responsibility to demonstrate to the Board that she is able to engage in the practice of nursing in a safe, professional, proficient and legal manner. This demonstration shall include but not be limited to a report by her psychologist or psychiatrist, along with a recommendation from him that she be reinstated to the practice of nursing. 1/ DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1982.

Florida Laws (1) 464.018
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CAROLLE LYNN BAYA vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 86-002585 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-002585 Latest Update: Sep. 16, 1986

Findings Of Fact Carolle Lynn Baya is a licensed midwife holding license #8341-31 issued by Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. She was so licensed at all times relevant to the charges in the Administrative Complaint. Having received a complaint from a physician, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services caused an investigation to be conducted by investigators from the Department of Professional Regulation. A review of the records provided by Baya revealed that Baya had treated Dianne Williams as a patient. Ms. Williams' records maintained by Baya did not have a copy of a physician's physical; did not reflect that an emergency plan had been developed; and did not reflect referral of Williams to a physician when she failed to develop an alternative obstetrical plan. Ms. Williams was first seen by Baya in the 12th week of her second pregnancy. Ms. Williams was referred to an obstetrician in her 38th week of pregnancy because the fetus was in frank breech position.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services fine Respondent $100 and that she receive a letter of reprimand. DONE AND ORDERED this 16th day of September 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick J. Simpson, Esquire HRS District IV Legal Counsel 5920 Arlington Expressway Jacksonville, Florida 32231 Carolle Lynn Baya Stork Flight Inc. 7816 Southside Blvd. #110 Jacksonville, Florida 32216

Florida Laws (2) 120.57467.203
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BOARD OF NURSING vs SUZANNE R. FERGUSON COOKE, 91-000642 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 28, 1991 Number: 91-000642 Latest Update: Feb. 03, 1992

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses described in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her?

Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent began her nursing career in the State of Indiana in 1968. She is now, and has been since July 14, 1972, licensed as a registered nurse in the State of Florida. She currently holds license number RN 60839-2, which expires April 30, 1993. In July, 1990, Respondent was employed by the All-Star Nursing Agency, an agency used by Larkin General Hospital (Larkin), a small community hospital located in Dade County, Florida. The chain of command for nursing personnel at Larkin is as follows: nurse; charge nurse; head nurse; nursing supervisor; nursing director; and administrator. During a four-day period concluding on July 17, 1990, Respondent was assigned to the intensive care/coronary unit (ICU) at Larkin. She worked the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. Among the patients in Larkin's ICU during the period of Respondent's assignment was a 16-year old, critically ill girl. The girl's condition, which had deteriorated during her stay at the hospital, was a major concern of the nurses assigned to the unit. Respondent and the other nurses on her shift, including the charge nurse, discussed the plight of this young patient. The consensus of opinion was that the patient would be better off in a facility, such as Miami Children's Hospital or Jackson Memorial Hospital, that offered specialized pediatric services not available at Larkin. 1/ Respondent was led to believe during these discussions that the patient could not be transferred to such a facility because no beds were available. At no time was Respondent assigned the primary care of this 16-year old patient; however, at around 3:00 a.m. on July 17, 1990, after the patient had suffered a grand mal seizure, the assigned nurse asked Respondent for her assistance. For the remainder of her shift that day, pursuant to the assigned nurse's request, Respondent assisted in caring for the patient. It is not uncommon for a nurse to render such assistance at the request of a colleague. Following the completion of her shift on July 17, 1990, Respondent went home. Although she was off-duty, her thoughts centered around the young patient she had helped care for earlier that morning. After getting some sleep, Respondent made a couple of telephone calls from her home. First, she telephoned Miami Children's Hospital and, without giving her name or the name of the patient, asked if there were any vacant beds in its pediatric intensive care unit. The person to whom she spoke advised her that no such beds were available. Respondent then called a friend who was a resident at Jackson Memorial Hospital (Jackson). Respondent asked the friend what procedure needed to be followed in order for a patient to be transferred to Jackson. After the friend explained the procedure to her, Respondent thanked him and hung up. Shortly thereafter, the friend called back to ask Respondent if she needed a bed at Jackson for one of her patients. Respondent indicated that she was "not able to comment on that" and the conversation ended. Later that same day, Respondent telephoned Larkin and spoke with Randy Dickson, the nursing supervisor on duty, and inquired about the young patient's condition. Dickson responded that there had not been any significant change in the condition of the patient. During her conversation with Dickson, Respondent expressed her view that the patient should be transferred from Larkin to another hospital. After speaking with Dickson, Respondent telephoned Dr. Ira Bloomfield, the patient's attending physician at Larkin. Respondent asked Bloomfield if he had been advised that his patient had suffered a grand mal seizure earlier that day. Bloomfield answered in the affirmative and told Respondent that the matter was under control. Respondent then raised the issue of the patient's transfer to another hospital. She told Bloomfield that she and the other nurses thought that such a transfer would be in the best interests of the patient. Furthermore, she offered to do what she could, including speaking with the Dade County State Attorney, Janet Reno, to assist Bloomfield in effectuating such a transfer if he needed such assistance. Later that same day, Respondent had another telephone conversation with Bloomfield. During this second telephone conversation, Respondent told Bloomfield that she had contacted Janet Reno and that he could do the same if he had a problem finding a suitable facility with an available bed for his patient. At no time did Respondent tell Dickson or Bloomfield that she had made arrangements to have the patient transferred. In fact, she had made no such arrangements. Respondent fully recognized that she was without authority to initiate the transfer of the patient and that a physician's order from Bloomfield was necessary for such a transfer to occur. Her purpose in speaking with Bloomfield was to provide him with information that he would be able to use in deciding whether to issue such a transfer order. 2/ Respondent believed that it was important for Bloomfield to know that, if he wanted to transfer the patient to a facility like Jackson, a bed could be made available for that purpose. She therefore took it upon herself to convey this information to Bloomfield. Although Respondent was attempting to be helpful, her efforts were not appreciated by Bloomfield. It was his belief that Respondent's intervention in the matter was inappropriate. Accordingly, he contacted Lynda Plummer, Larkin's Director of Nursing, to complain about Respondent. Plummer responded to Bloomfield's complaint by contacting Respondent's nursing agency and requesting that Respondent not be assigned to work at Larkin anymore. The agency complied with Plummer's request. Respondent did not work at Larkin after the end of her shift on July 17, 1990. Nonetheless, Respondent remained interested in the patient's progress. She called Larkin on various occasions subsequent to July 17, 1990, to find out about the patient's condition. She expected to obtain such information from the switchboard operator at the hospital, who usually answers such inquiries. Respondent's calls, however, were routed either to an ICU staff member or to Plummer or another supervisor, notwithstanding that Respondent did not ask to speak with anyone other than the switchboard operator. On at least one occasion, when Respondent's call was transferred to Plummer, Respondent sought to engage Plummer in a discussion regarding the care the patient was receiving. Plummer declined to partake in such a discussion. During a subsequent telephone conversation with Respondent, Plummer, who had been informed by her staff of the previous phone calls that Respondent had made to the hospital, told Respondent that her phone calls were disruptive to patient care and that they should therefore stop. Plummer instructed her nursing staff, if they received a telephone call from Respondent, to tell Respondent that she should not make any further inquiries regarding the patient. Bloomfield never ordered the transfer of the patient. The patient therefore remained at Larkin.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Board of Nursing enter a final order (1) finding the evidence insufficient to establish that Respondent engaged in "unprofessional conduct," within the meaning of Section 464.018(1)(h), Florida Statutes, as charged in the instant Administrative Complaint, and (2) dismissing said Administrative Complaint in its entirety. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of September, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1991.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68464.018
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INDIAN RIVER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 97-004794 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Vero Beach, Florida Oct. 15, 1997 Number: 97-004794 Latest Update: Feb. 07, 1999

The Issue Whether Respondent should recoup Medicaid payments made to Petitioner for health care services provided to eight patients.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., (Hospital), has contracted with Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), to provide services to Medicaid patients. The parties have agreed that there is a dispute for Medicaid reimbursement for goods and services provided to eight patients: S.G., J.D., R.J., C.A., G.M., S.S., M.P., and C.T. The Agency has paid the Hospital for the services rendered to these eight patients and seeks to recoup the payment based on a retrospective review by a peer review organization, Keystone Peer Review Organization (KePro). The Agency claims that either the admission or a portion of the length-of-stay for the eight patients was medically unnecessary. Services were provided to C.T. in 1994 and to the remainder of the patients at issue in 1995. Payment for Medicaid services is on a per diem basis. The rate for 1994 is $473.22 per day, and the rate for 1995 is $752.14. The Agency contracted with KePro to do a review of the Medicaid payments to the Hospital. KePro employs nurses to review the patient files based on criteria on discharge screens. If the services meet the criteria, there is no further review and the payment is approved. If the nurse determines that the services do not meet the criteria on the discharge screens, the patient's files are reviewed by a board certified physician, who in this case would be a psychiatrist. If the physician determines that the services are not medically necessary, a letter is sent to the Medicaid provider, giving the provider an opportunity to submit additional information. Additional information submitted by the provider is reviewed by a board certified physician. If the doctor concludes that the services are still medically unnecessary, the provider is notified that that services do not qualify for reimbursement and the provider may ask for a reconsideration of the denial. If the provider seeks reconsideration, the file is reviewed by a physician, and the provider has an opportunity to be present during the review. If the physician determines that the services are medically unnecessary, KePro sends a letter to the Agency stating the reasons for denial. The denial letters that KePro sends to the Agency are reviewed by the Medical Director of KePro, who is not a psychiatrist. Dr. John Sullenberger, the Agency's Medicaid physician, reviews the KePro denial letters sent to the Agency, and 99.9 percent of the time he agrees with the findings of KePro regarding whether the services were medically necessary. Dr. Sullenberger does not review the patient's charts when he does this review. The Agency sends a recoupment letter to the Medicaid provider requesting repayment for services provided. Patient S.G., a 12 year-old boy, was being treated pursuant to the Baker Act. He was admitted to the Hospital on March 8, 1995, and discharged on March 25, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and the entire length-of-stay for S.G. based on KePro's determination that it was not medically necessary for the services to S.G. to be rendered in an acute care setting because the patient was neither suicidal nor homicidal. Three to five days prior to his admission to the Hospital, S.G. had attempted to stab his father. He also had further violent episodes, including jumping his father from behind and choking him and pulling knives on his parents. S.G. had a history of attention deficit and hyperactive disorder. He had been using multiple substances, such as alcohol, LSD, cocaine, and marijuana, prior to his admission. His behavior was a clear reference that he was suffering from a psychosis. A psychosis is a significant inability to understand what is reality, including delusions of false beliefs, hallucinations, hearing and seeing things which do not exist, and ways of thinking that are bizarre. Psychosis is a reason to admit a patient, particularly combined with substance abuse. S.G.'s treating psychiatrist noted that S.G. had tangentiality, which means that his thoughts did not stay together. He did not have a connection between thoughts, which is a sign of a psychosis. The chart demonstrated that S.G. had disorder thinking, which includes the possibility of a psychosis. There was also a reference in the charts to organic mental disturbance which could infer brain damage as the cause for the mental disturbance. Two days after admission, there was an issue of possible drug withdrawal because S.G. was agitated and anxious and showed other symptoms. Drug withdrawal, psychosis, and a demonstration of overt violence require a stay in an acute care facility. There was some indication that S.G. was suicidal. While in the Hospital he was placed under close observation, which is a schedule of 15-minute checks to determine if the patient was physically out of harm's way. S.G. was started on an antidepressant, Wellbutrin, because the treating physician thought S.G. was becoming increasingly depressed and was having trouble organizing his thoughts. Antidepressants, as contrasted to a medication such as an antibiotic, may take a minimum of two to three weeks before the patient will benefit from the full effect of the drug. It is difficult to stabilize the dosage for an antidepressant on an outpatient basis. S.G. was taking Ritalin, which is commonly used for children with attention deficit, hyperactivity disorders. During his stay at the Hospital, S.G. was engaging in strange behavior, including absence seizures. On March 16, 1995, he was still lunging and threatening harm. On March 20, 1995, he was still unstable and at risk. The dosage of Wellbutrin was increased. On March 21 and 22, 1995, S.G. was still threatening and confused. S.G. was discharged on March 25, 1995. The admission and length-of-stay for S.G. were medically necessary. Patient J.D. was a 16 year-old boy who was admitted to the Hospital on March 7, 1995, and discharged on March 14, 1995. The Agency denied the admission and entire length-of-stay based on KePro's determination that the patient was not actively suicidal or psychotic and services could have been rendered in a less acute setting. J.D. was admitted from a partial hospitalization program pursuant to the Baker Act because he was observed by a health care professional banging his head against the wall and throwing himself on the floor. He had a history of depression and out-of-control behavior, including being a danger to himself and running away. At the time of his admission, he was taking Prozac. Banging his head against the wall can mean that the patient is psychotic, can cause brain damage, and can be dangerous if the cause of the behavior is unknown. Admission to the Hospital was justified because the patient was extremely agitated and self abusive, requiring restraints and medication to decrease his agitation and self abusiveness. One of the tests administered during his hospital stay indicated that J.D. was a moderate risk for suicidal behavior. During his hospital stay, it was discovered that J.D. had threatened to kill himself while at school. He had been in a partial treatment program during the day, but that environment was not working. There was violence in the home, and J.D. was becoming overtly depressed. During his stay at the Hospital, J.D. was placed on close observation with 15-minute checks. His dosage of Prozac was increased. The admission and length-of-stay for J.D. were medically necessary. R.J., a 10 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on January 1, 1995, and discharged on February 9, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement based on a determination by KePro that the treatment in an acute care facility was not medically necessary because R.J. was not psychotic, not suicidal, and not a threat to others; thus treatment could have been provided in an alternate setting. R.J. had been referred by a health care professional at Horizon Center, an outpatient center, because of progressive deterioration over the previous fourteen months despite outpatient treatment. His deterioration included anger with temper outbursts, uncontrollable behavior at school, failing grades, sadness, depressed mood, extreme anxiety, extensive worrying and a fear of his grandmother. R.J. also suffered from encopresis, a bowel incontinence. He was agitated, lacked energy, neglected his hygiene, experienced crying spells, and had difficulty concentrating. R.J. needed to be admitted for an evaluation to rule out a paranoid psychosis. It was necessary to do a 24-hour EEG as opposed to a 45-minute EEG. In order to do a 24-hour EEG, the patient is typically placed in an acute care facility. The EEG showed abnormal discharge in the brain, which could be contributing to a psychiatric illness. At school R.J. had smeared feces on the walls, behavior that could be seen in psychotic persons. There was evidence that he had been hitting and throwing his stepbrother and 3 year-old brother. He was fearful of his grandmother and, based on his family history, there was reason to fear her. R.J. was placed on Buspar, a medication which generally takes two weeks to take effect. Contrary to the Agency's determination, R.J. was disorganized. He was also violent in terms of threatening danger and extreme anger. The admission and length-of-stay for R.J. at the Hospital were medically necessary. Patient C.A., a 9 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on June 1, 1995, and discharged on June 12, 1995. The Agency disallowed one day of the length-of-stay based on a determination by KePro that the services provided on June 11, 1995, could have been provided in a less restrictive setting. C.A. was admitted for violent and disruptive behavior. He also had an attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder and was taking Lithium and Depakote. These medications are used for patients who experience serious mood swings and abrupt changes in mood, going from depression to anger to euphoria. To be effective, medicating with Lithium and Depakote requires that the blood levels of the patient be monitored and the dosage titrated according to blood level. C.A. also was given Wellbutrin during his hospital stay. On June 11, 1995, C.A. was given an eight-hour pass to leave the hospital in the care of his mother. The physician's orders indicated that the pass was to determine how well C.A. did in a less restrictive setting. He returned to the Hospital without incident. He was discharged the next day to his mother. The treatment on June 11, 1995, could have been provided in an environment other than an acute facility; thus the stay on June 11, 1995, was not medically necessary for Medicaid reimbursement purposes. Patient G.M., an 11 year-old male with a history of being physically and sexually abused by his parents, was admitted to the Hospital on March 21, 1995, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for inpatient hospital treatment from March 28 to April 3, 1995, based on KePro's determination that the length of hospital stay exceeded health care needs at an inpatient level and could have been provided in a less acute setting. At the time of admission, G.M. had suicidal ideation. His school had reported that G.M. had mutilated himself with a pencil, banged himself on the knuckles, and told the school nurse that he wanted to die. Prior to admission, G.M. had been taking Ritalin. His treating physician took G.M. off the Ritalin so that she could assess his condition and start another medication after a base-line period. The doctor prescribed Clonidine for G.M. Clonidine is a drug used in children to control reckless, agressive and angry behavior. Clonidine must be titrated in order to establish the correct dosage for the patient. During his hospital stay, G.M. was yelling and threatening staff. He was placed in locked seclusion, where he began hitting the wall. G.M. was put in a papoose, which is similar to a straitjacket. The papoose is used when there is no other way to control the patient. The patient cannot use his arms or legs while in a papoose. This type of behavior and confinement was occurring as late as March 31, 1995. G.M. was given a pass to go to his grandparents on April 2, 1995. He did well during his pass, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. Treatment in an acute facility was medically necessary through April 1, 1995. Treatment on April 2, 1995, could have been provided in a less acute setting. Patient S.S., a 5 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on March 9, 1995, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and entire length of his hospital stay based on a determination by KePro that S.S. was not psychotic or an immediate danger to himself or others and the evaluation and treatment could have been rendered in a less acute setting. Prior to admission to the Hospital, S.S. was threatening suicide, ran into a chalk board at school, scratched his arms until they bled, and showed aggressive intent toward his sister, saying that he would kill her with a saw. S.S.'s condition had been deteriorating for approximately three months before his admission. At the time of admission, he had been suicidal, hyperactive, restless, and experiencing hallucinations. The hallucinations imply a psychosis. S.S. was put on Trofanil, an antidepressant which needs to be titrated. The patient's blood level had to be monitored while taking this drug. During his hospital stay, S.S. was on close observation. All objects which he could use to harm himself were removed from his possession. After he ate his meals, the hospital staff would immediately remove all eating utensils. On March 28, 1995, S.S. threatened to kill himself and became self-abusive. His blood level on March 31, 1995, was sub-therapeutic, and his medication dosage was increased. On April 1, 1995, S.S. had a temper tantrum. The admission and length-of-stay for the treatment of S.S. were medically necessary. Patient M.P., a 10 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on April 27, 1995, and was discharged on May 6, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and entire length-of-stay based on a determination by KePro that the patient functions on an eighteen to twenty-four month level but is not psychotic and the treatment could have been provided in a less acute setting. M.P.'s IQ is between 44 and 51. He was diagnosed with a pervasive development disorder, which is a serious lack of development attributed to significant brain damage. His condition had deteriorated in the six months prior to his admission. He had episodes of inappropriate laughter, fits of anger, hit his head, hit windows, and put his arm in contact with the broken glass through the window. At the time of his admission, he had a seizure disorder. An EEG and an MRI needed to be performed on M.P. in order to evaluate his condition. M.P. had to have a regular EEG, a 24-hour EEG, and a neurological examination. The patient was aggressive, restless, and uncooperative. In order for the MRI to be performed, M.P. had to be anesthetized. The admission and length-of-stay for M.P. were medically necessary. Patient C.T., a 34 year-old female, was admitted to the Hospital on November 11, 1994, and was discharged on November 26, 1994. The Agency denied the treatment from November 17, 1994, to November 26, 1994, based on a determination by a peer review organization that the patient was stable by November 17, 1994, and psychiatric follow-up could have been performed in an outpatient setting. C.T. was admitted for kidney stones. She did pass the kidney stones but continued to have severe pain. Her doctor asked for a psychiatric consult. The psychiatrist diagnosed C.T. as having a personality disorder, chronic psychogenic pain disorder, and an eating disorder. Her depressive disorder exacerbated pain. C.T. had been given narcotics for the pain associated with the kidney stones. In order to assess her mental status, the physicians needed to taper the dosage of Demerol which she had been receiving. She was started on Sinequan, which is an anti-depressant given to alleviate the psychological condition and to help with the physical complaints. C.T. was later put on Vicodin, an oral narcotic, which seemed to bring the pain under control. The drugs used could cause a drop in blood pressure; therefore, they had to be titrated slowly. Her treating physician was trying to find an appropriate anti-depressant, while weaning the patient from intramuscular narcotics. On November 17, 1994, C.T. left her room and went to the hospital lobby, where she was found by nursing staff. C.T. was crying and saying that she was in pain and wanted to die. During her hospital stay, C.T. was in much distress; she would scream out that she was in pain. On November 18, 1994, she was found crying on the floor of the hospital chapel and had to be returned to her room. It was the opinion of Dr. Bernard Frankel, an expert retained by the Hospital, that C.T. probably could have been discharged a day earlier. The hospital stay for C.T. from November 17, 1994, to November 25, 1994, was medically necessary. The last day of her stay was not medically necessary.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., to pay to the Agency $752.14 for one day of service provided to G.M., $752.14 for one day of service provided to C.A., and $473.22 for one day of service provided to C.T. and finding that the Hospital is not liable for payment for any of the other services at issue in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Falkinburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Williams, P.A. 117 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Florida Laws (2) 120.57409.913 Florida Administrative Code (1) 59G-1.010
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs MATTHEW J. KACHINAS, M.D., 09-004678PL (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Aug. 26, 2009 Number: 09-004678PL Latest Update: May 07, 2010

The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2002), in DOAH Case No. 09-4678PL; Subsections 456.072(1)(l), 458.331(1)(m), and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2003), in DOAH Case No. 09-4679PL; and Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005), in DOAH Case No. 09-4680PL, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times relating to the three Administrative Complaints at issue, Dr. Kachinas was a licensed medical doctor within the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 65595. He is board-certified by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. DOAH CASE NO. 09-4678PL In 2002, Dr. Kachinas was working at several clinics that were owned by the same individual. He received payment from Sarasota Women’s Health Center and Tampa Women’s Health Center. His primary office was located in Sarasota, but he rotated through the offices located in Clearwater and Tampa. He was advised that he would be attending a patient in the Tampa office. One of the medications that he used in his method of sedating patients, Propofol, was not available in the Tampa office. He took a vial of the Propofol and took it to the Tampa office, holding the vial in his hand. While at the Tampa office, Dr. Kachinas drew the Propofol into a syringe. He did not have to use the Propofol for the patient. He placed the syringe filled with Propofol inside the sock that he was wearing. Dr. Kachinas transported the syringe back to the Tampa office. He used this method of transport so that the office manager in the Tampa office would not know that he was transporting the drug. When he got back to the Tampa office, he placed the filled syringe in a secure place. Propofol must be used within 24 hours after being drawn into a syringe. The next day it was decided that the drug would not be used on another patient, and Dr. Kachinas wasted the syringe filled with Propofol. At the clinics where Dr. Kachinas worked, there were no logs to keep track of the drugs, except for the drug Fentanyl. Dr. Kachinas acknowledged in a letter dated January 30, 2007, to the Department of Health that his method of transporting Propofol was “unorthodox.” In the same letter, Dr. Kachinas acknowledged that “a reasonable and prudent doctor would not generally transport medication in that manner, but foolishness seemed reasonable in that aberrant environment.” DOAH CASE NO. 09-4679PL On March 26, 2004, B.S. presented to Premier Institute for Women’s Health (Premier) for an elective termination of pregnancy. Dr. Kachinas was the physician who handled the procedure. Dr. Kachinas maintained records relating to B.S. at Premier. In 2004, Petitioner subpoenaed B.S.’s records from Dr. Kachinas’ office. Petitioner received a packet of documents, which purported to be B.S.’s medical records. In July 2006, Lori Jacobs, an employee of Premier, sent Petitioner another copy of the documents sent in 2004. Neither the records provided in 2004 nor the records provided in 2006 contain progress notes for B.S.’s treatment on March 26, 2004, and March 27, 2004. For the first time on November 5, 2009, Dr. Kachinas produced a three-page document, which he claimed was part of B.S.’s medical records that had been misplaced in B.S.’s insurance file. Two of the pages purported to be progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004. The third page, which is also labeled as a progress note, is dated June 29, 2004, and appears to relate to insurance claims. The two pages relating to March 26 and 27 are on paper which is a different color from the progress note relating to insurance claims and the progress notes which were previously furnished in 2004 and 2006.1 Additionally, the progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, contain a break in each of the ruled lines on the sheets on both the right and left sides of the sheets. The insurance progress note and the progress notes furnished in 2004 and 2006 do not have such breaks in the ruled lines. Dr. Kachinas completed a Laminaria Insertion report documenting procedures done on March 26, 2004, and March 27, 2004. The March 26, 2004, report documents the insertion of Laminaria and administration of medications. The comment section of the report documents the removal of the Laminaria and administration of medications on March 27, 2004. The comment section continues to document the administration of medications and the taking of vital signs after the removal of the Laminaria and also the transfer of the patient to Doctors Hospital. The detail on the comment sections suggests that Dr. Kachinas was making his progress notes in the Laminaria Insertion report. The failure to produce the purported progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, until November 5, 2009; the difference in the color of the paper of the March 26 and 27, 2004, purported progress notes and the other progress notes in Dr. Kachinas’ records; the presence of breaks in the ruled lines on the March 26 and 27, 2004, purported progress reports, which do not appear on the other progress notes; and the detail of the comments on the Laminaria Insertion report support the conclusion that the progress notes submitted as Respondent’s Exhibit 1 were not done contemporaneously with the treatment given to B.S. on March 26 and 27, 2004, but were prepared for this proceeding. Thus, the progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, are not credited. Dr. Kachinas determined B.S.’s pregnancy to be at approximately 23½-to-24 weeks’ gestation, the last week of the second trimester. He confirmed by sonogram that the gestation period was 24 weeks. On March 26, 2004, Dr. Kachinas began the induction of labor ordering the insertion of ten Laminaria, which are osomotic cervical dilators which cause the cervix to open and allow easier emptying of the uterus. Dr. Kachinas’ records do not show that B.S.’s medical history was taken prior to the insertion of the Laminaria. However, Dr. Kachinas did take a medical history of B.S. at the time of her admission to Doctors Hospital, and the history is recorded in the medical records. Prior to the insertion of the Laminaria, Dr. Kachinas’ records do show that a limited physical examination of B.S. was done. The Laminaria Insertion report shows that B.S.’s baseline blood pressure, temperature, and pulse were taken and recorded. There was no expert testimony of what other physical examination should have been done. Dr. Kachinas injected the fetus with Digoxin, which is injected directly into the fetus to stop the fetal heartbeat, causing an Intrauterine Fetal Demise (IUFD). The injection of the Digoxin was not documented in B.S.’s medical records. B.S. was then released from Premier. On March 27, 2004, B.S. returned to Premier. Prior to removing the Laminaria, Dr. Kachinas did an ultrasound and determined that there was still fetal heart activity and fetal movements. Dr. Kachinas continued the labor induction procedure by removing the Laminaria and administering Cytotec and high dosages of Pitocin. When the Laminaria were removed, there was a rupture of membranes with a loss of essentially all the amniotic fluid. Sometime during the afternoon of March 27, 2004, Dr. Kachinas did another ultrasound and determined that there was no fetal heart activity. Based on the length of time from the Digoxin injection to the ultrasound showing no fetal heart activity, the loss of amniotic fluid, and the administering of medication to cause contractions, Dr. Kachinas determined that the Digoxin injection was not the cause of death. On March 27, 2004, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Dr. Kachinas transferred B.S. to Doctors Hospital and had her admitted to the hospital for failure to progress with the induction of labor procedure. While at the hospital, B.S. continued to experience pain. On March 28, 2004, Dr. Kachinas performed the following procedures on B.S.: mini-laparotomy, hysterotomy, removal of products of conception, and a modified Pomeroy bilateral tubal ligation. In his description of the procedures, he stated that the fetal demise was at least of 48 hours duration. However, Dr. Kachinas’ records do not reflect the time of the fetal demise. Jorge Gomez, M.D., Petitioner’s expert witness, credibly testified that a physician is required to document the time of the fetal demise. In the hospital records following B.S.’s surgery, Dr. Kachinas listed the post-operative diagnosis as a failure to induce labor, an intrauterine fetal demise, a thin umbilical cord, and asymmetric intrauterine growth retardation, a condition in which the fetus is smaller than expected for the number of weeks of pregnancy. An autopsy was performed on the fetus. A surgical pathology report was also issued. The pathology report showed mild infarcts on the maternal side. On the fetal death certificate, Dr. Kachinas listed the immediate causes for the IUFD as a possible cord incident and multiple placental infarctions. Dr. Kachinas did not document the elective termination or the Digoxin injection on the fetal death certificate. Dr. Gomez disagrees with the reasons for IUFD given on the death certificate. His credible reading of the pathology report does not indicate that the infarcts were severe enough to have contributed to the fetal demise. His credible reading of the pathology report does not indicate that there was any evidence of a cord incident. Dr. Gomez is of the opinion that the cause of death should have been listed as elective termination. Dr. Gomez’ opinion is credited. However, Dr. Gomez did not give an opinion on whether the fetal demise was caused by the injection of Digoxin. DOAH CASE NO. 09-4680PL On December 13, 2005, K.M. was seen by Walter J. Morales, M.D., at Florida Perinatal Associates, which specializes in internal fetal medicine. Dr. Morales performed an ultrasound on K.M., who was pregnant with twins as a result of in vitro fertilization. The ultrasound revealed that the twins were fraternal, meaning that each twin had a separate placenta and a separate sac. One of the twins, Twin A, had an anomaly called a cystic hygroma, which results from an obstruction, causing the lymphatic fluid, which normally drains into the juglar vein, to accumulate in the neck area. Approximately 50 percent of the fetuses which have this anomaly in the first trimester also have a chromosomal anomaly, such as Down syndrome. The decision was made to have K.M. return to Florida Perinatal Associates in three weeks for further evaluation. On January 3, 2006, Edgard Ramos-Santos, M.D., a partner of Dr. Morales, performed another ultrasound on K.M. Dr. Ramos-Santos found that Twin A, a male, had a cystic hydroma, a thickening of the nuchal fold2, and shortened femur and humerus. These findings are soft markers for abnormal chromosomes. The ultrasound also revealed a possible heart defect. At the time of the ultrasound, Twin A was cephalic bottom, meaning that Twin A was positioned lowest in the uterus. Dr. Ramos-Santos also performed an amniocentesis on Twin A on the same date as the ultrasound. The amniocentesis showed that Twin A had an abnormal chromosome pattern compatible with trisomy 21 or Down syndrome. Both ultrasounds showed that Twin B, a female, appeared to be normal. At the request of K.M., no amniocentesis was performed on Twin B on January 3, 2006. At the time of the ultrasound performed on January 3, 2006, the presentation of Twin B was cephalic right. The findings of the January 3, 2006, ultrasound were discussed with K.M. and her husband. On January 9, 2006, Dr. Ramos-Santos discussed the results of the amniocentesis with K.M.’s husband. It was decided that a selective feticide would be performed on Twin A. Selective feticide is a procedure in which a solution of potassium hydroxide is injected into the fetus’ heart to make the heart stop beating. K.M. was referred to Dr. Kachinas at Premier for the selective feticide. On January 10, 2006, Roberta Bruce, a nurse at Florida Perinatal Associates, sent to Premier by facsimile transmission the January 3, 2006, ultrasound report for K.M. and K.M.’s insurance information. The cover page for the facsimile transmission included a note from Ms. Bruce, which stated: “* FYI Fetus have different gender. The male is the affected one.” The standard of care as specified in Section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2005), requires a physician performing a selective feticide to correctly identify the affected fetus. Dr. Kachinas did not correctly identify Twin A prior to performing the selective feticide and performed the procedure on Twin B, the normal fetus. Dr. Kachinas performed an ultrasound on K.M., but failed to identify the correct position of Twin A in relation to K.M. The ultrasound done on January 3, 2006, by Dr. Ramos-Santos showed that Twin A was located at the bottom and Twin B was located to the right of K.M. In his progress notes, Dr. Kachinas placed Twin A on the right and Twin B on the left. Although it is possible for twins to shift positions, it is not probable that the twins shifted from left to right. Dr. Kachinas performed an ultrasound, but failed to identify that Twin A was the fetus with multiple anomalies. Although the standard of care required Dr. Kachinas to do a Level 2 ultrasound evaluation, a Level 1 ultrasound evaluation would have identified the cystic hygroma, the shortened long bones, and the sex of Twin A. Dr. Kachinas failed to perform an adequate ultrasound evaluation by failing to identify the anomalies and the gender of Twin A. Dr. Kachinas’ notes do not show whether Twin A or Twin B had anomalies. His notes did not identify the sex of each of the twins. His notes did not document the attempts that Dr. Kachinas made to identify the anomalies such as a recording of the length of the long bones or any examination made to identify the sex of each of the twins. On January 24, 2006, K.M. returned to Florida Perinatal Associates for another consultation. Dr. Morales performed another ultrasound, which revealed that Twin A, who had the anomalies, was still viable. The ultrasound revealed the continued presence of a cystic hygroma, the thickening of the nuchal fold, shortened extremities, and a congenital heart defect. The ultrasound also showed that the viable twin was male. The presentation of Twin A was shown by the ultrasound as cephalic bottom.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4678PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2002), by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances; finding that Dr. Kachinas did not violate Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2002); imposing an administrative fine of $2,500; and placing Dr. Kachinas on probation for one year. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4679PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas did not violate Subsections 456.072(1)(l) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2003); imposing an administrative fine of $1,000; and placing Dr. Kachinas on probation for one year. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4680PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005), by committing gross medical malpractice; finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2005); imposing an administrative fine of $2,000 and placing him on probation for one year for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2005); and revoking his license for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005). DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2010.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57456.072456.50458.331766.102
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs TAMMY JEANETTE HESS, R.N., 00-000818 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 22, 2000 Number: 00-000818 Latest Update: Jul. 05, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs RICHARD CARLTON FLEET, 02-002293PL (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jun. 10, 2002 Number: 02-002293PL Latest Update: Jan. 16, 2003

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since October 17, 1996, a Florida-licensed registered nurse. He holds license number 3109442. From September 11, 2000, to March 28, 2001, Respondent was employed as a registered nurse by the North Broward Hospital District and assigned to the emergency room at Imperial Point Medical Center (IPMC) in Broward County, Florida. IPMC is a division of the North Broward Hospital District. It serves as a designated Baker Act receiving facility where persons are "brought involuntary[ily] for psychiatric evaluation" and referral. Some of these persons are "dangerous and violent" and have "cause[ed] injuries to the staff of the emergency room." In early 2001, Respondent was involved in two separate incidents in which he mistreated a patient in the emergency room at IPMC. The first incident occurred on or about February 23, 2001. On that day, K. N., a 21-year-old female, was admitted to the emergency room suffering from "acute intoxication." Pursuant to emergency room policy, upon her admittance to the emergency room, K. N. was "completely undressed . . . to make sure that [she was] not hiding any drugs, contraband, weapons, [or other] things of that nature." K. N. was lying, "passed out" and completely naked, on a stretcher in an examining room with Respondent by her side, when one of the hospital's emergency room technicians, Robert Russo, walked into the room to assist Respondent. Respondent greeted Mr. Russo by making the following comments about K. N.: "Look at those tits. Wouldn't you like to get a piece of that?" Mr. Russo left the room to get a hospital gown for Respondent to put on K. N., as Respondent was required to do, in accordance with hospital policy, so as "to preserve [K. N.'s] dignity." Mr. Russo returned with a gown and gave it to Respondent, but Respondent did not put it on K. N. or otherwise use it to try to cover K. N. Respondent, though, did continue making comments about K. N.'s body. Referring to K. N.'s genitals, he remarked to Mr. Russo, "That's sweet," or words to that effect. Feeling "uncomfortable," Mr. Russo left the room. By allowing K. N. to remain completely naked and by making the remarks he did to Mr. Russo about K. N.'s body, Respondent failed to conform to the minimal acceptable standards of prevailing nursing practice. The following month, Respondent was involved in another incident in which he acted inappropriately toward an IPMC emergency room patient. This second incident occurred on March 18, 2001. The patient Respondent mistreated on this day was F. L., a 17-year-old male with a history of drug abuse. F. L. was brought to the IPMC emergency room by the City of Pompano Beach Fire/Rescue at the request of F. L.'s mother, J. L., who accompanied him to the emergency room and remained there for the duration of F. L.'s stay. J. L. had "called 911" after F. L. had come home from a night of drinking and, in her presence, had had a seizure. By the time fire/rescue arrived at their home, F. L. was conscious, and he remained conscious during the ambulance ride to IPMC. J. L. wanted F. L. to be involuntarily committed under the Baker Act. She did not think she would be able to handle his coming back home because he "was on drugs at the time" and she thought that he would "go crazy" if he did not receive treatment. F. L. was aware of his mother's desire. In the past, he had attempted to "fight" (verbally, but not physically) efforts to have him "Baker Acted." F. L. was admitted to the IPMC emergency room at 3:49 a.m. on March 18, 2001. At the time of his admittance, F. L. was conscious, "somewhat calm," and able to stand up and walk "with a wobble" and to speak coherently (although his speech was slurred). He was asked to give a urine sample for a "urine screen," and with the help of his mother, who accompanied him to bathroom "[s]o he wouldn't fall or miss the cup," he complied. F. L. soon became upset and "verbally abusive to the staff" on duty, including Respondent. Respondent decided that F. L. needed to be restrained. With the help of others, including Mr. Russo, Respondent restrained F. L. "with Velcro restraints on the wrists and the ankles." Respondent then requested that F. L. give another urine sample. F. L., in turn, "asked for a urine bottle." Respondent refused F. L.'s request. Instead, he took out a Foley catheter. A Foley catheter is a thin, flexible rubber tube that is threaded through the urethra and into the bladder. It is used to drain urine from the bladder. It should be sterile and lubricated when inserted. F. L. went "totally beserk" when he saw the catheter, letting it be known in no uncertain terms that he did not want to be catherized and again requesting that he be given a "urine bottle." Respondent responded, inappropriately, by "hit[ting] [F. L.] in the face with the catheter numerous times," while telling F. L. two or three times, "I'm going to shove this hose down your dick." This caused F. L., understandably, to become even more loud and boisterous. Respondent enlisted the assistance of three or four others, including Mr. Russo and George Austin, a Wackenhut security officer on patrol at the hospital, to place F. L. in four-point leather restraints (one for each ankle and wrist) on a stretcher in Room 6. 1/ F. L. resisted, but was eventually subdued and restrained on the stretcher. Given F. L.'s out-of-control behavior, placing him in four-point restraints was warranted. After F. L. was restrained on the stretcher, Respondent, against F. L.'s will, inserted the Foley catheter (that he had used to hit F. L. and that was therefore not sterile) in F. L. 2/ Respondent did so in a rough and negligent manner, without using lubricating jelly or any other type of lubrication. Subsequently, while F. L. was still in four-point restraints on the stretcher, he became "more upset, more verbally abusive," and "tried to sit up." Respondent responded, inappropriately, by "grabb[ing] [F. L.] by the neck," "slapp[ing] him back down onto the stretcher," and "choking [F. L.] until [F. L.] was almost blue." Respondent "let go" of F. L. only after an observer intervened. After Respondent stopped choking him, F. L. "asked for his mother." 3/ Respondent responded, again inappropriately, by telling F. L. three times, "I got your mother right here," as he "grabbed his own testicles." 4/ As could be expected, this "further upset" F. L., and he again tried to sit up. Respondent's response was, again, an inappropriate one. He "climbed up on the stretcher," "put his right knee on [F. L.'s] chest," "cover[ed] F. L.'s face" with his left hand, and with his right hand "grabbed" F. L.'s penis and scrotum and "squeeze[d] and twist[ed]." Respondent, without any justification, "squeeze[d] and twist[ed]" F. L.'s penis and scrotum "two or three times" while F. L. was in four-point restraints on the stretcher. On one of these occasions, he told F. L. (as he was "squeeze[ing] and twist[ing]") "something like," "What are you going to do now?" During his encounter with F. L. on March 18, 2001, Respondent used more force against F. L. than was reasonably necessary to properly discharge his nursing duties and to protect himself and those around him. 5/ By physically, and also verbally, abusing F. L., Respondent failed to conform to the minimal acceptable standards of prevailing nursing practice. 6/ When J. L. was finally reunited with her son, she noticed that he had red marks on his face and "bruise[s]" on his extremities. The IPMC emergency room physician who evaluated F. L. determined that there was reason to believe that F. L. was "mentally ill as defined in Section 394.455(18), Florida Statutes" (based upon an "initial diagnosis" of "acute agitation"), and that F. L. otherwise met the "criteria for involuntary examination" under the Baker Act. At approximately 2:45 p.m. on March 18, 2001, F. L. was discharged from IPMC and transferred to Florida Medical Center. Sometime after the March 18, 2001, incident involving F. L., a security officer and nurse working at IPMC expressed to Beverly Gilberti, the nurse/manger of IPMC's emergency room, their "concerns" regarding Respondent's "practice." On March 26, 2001, Ms. Gilberti contacted Gayle Adams, IPMC's human resources specialist, and told her about the security officer's and nurse's "concerns." Ms. Adams began an investigation into the matter. Ms. Gilberti telephoned Respondent and advised him that he was being suspended pending the outcome of an investigation into alleged wrongdoing on his part. Respondent was given "very little information as to what type of complaint[s]" were being investigated. On March 28, 2001, before the investigation had been completed, Respondent telephoned Ms. Adams and "verbally resigned over the phone."

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board issue a final order in which it dismisses Count Three of the Amended Administrative Complaint, finds Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts One and Two of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, as punishment for having committed these violations, permanently revokes Respondent's license and requires him to pay a fine in the amount of $1,000.00, as well as the "costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case." 16/ DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2002.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57394.455456.072464.018
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THE NEMOURS FOUNDATION vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 06-002610CON (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 18, 2006 Number: 06-002610CON Latest Update: Jul. 05, 2024
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