Findings Of Fact Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. was a subcontractor in the construction of the regional juvenile detention center located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The contracting authority for this facility was the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Contract for the construction let by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is in excess of $5,000.00 and pursuant to the provisions of Section 215.19(1)(b), the Division of Labor established a prevailing wage to be paid different crafts and occupations in construction of said project. The prevailing wage established for plumbers on this project was $10.07 per hour. During the course of this project, Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. acknowledged by affidavit that all persons in its employ were being paid the prevailing wage as required by law. Between July 17, 1977 and January 1, 1978, John W. Culp was employed by Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. on this project as a plumber. During this period of time, Culp was paid at the rate of $7.00 per hour for regular time and $10.50 per hour for overtime. From January 1, 1978 until April 30, 1978, John W. Culp was employed as a plumber at the rate of $7.50 per hour for regular time and $11.25 per hour for overtime. While making $7.00 per hour, Culp was paid $3.07 per hour less than the prevailing wage for regular time hours worked and $4.60 less than the prevailing wage for overtime hours worked. During the period January 1, 1978 until April 30, 1978, Culp received $2.57 less than the prevailing wage for regular time hours worked and $3.95 less than the prevailing wage for overtime hours worked. The figures presented by the Respondent and those of the Petitioner do not agree concerning the number of hours worked. Exhibit 7 reflects that Culp worked a total of 856 hours at $7.00 per hour and 8 hours of overtime at $10.50 per hour. Exhibit 7 further reflects the Culp worked 683 hours at $7.50 per hour and 47.5 hours at $11.25 per hour. The amount Culp was underpaid prior to January 1 is equal to the sum of the regular hours worked times $3.07 and the overtime hours worked times $4.60 per hour. The amount Culp was underpaid subsequent to January 1, 1978, is equal to the sum of the number of regular hours worked times $2.57 and the number of overtime hours worked times $3.95. The amount that Culp was underpaid prior to January 1 is $2,664.72 and subsequent to January 1, $1,942.94 for a total of $4,607.66. The Petitioner has complied with the provisions of Section 215.19(3)(a)1 and 2 by filing an affidavit with the contracting authority stating the number of hours worked and the amount of money paid for said hours. This affidavit was filed within the time prescribed by statute. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 215.19(3)(b), Florida Statutes, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is currently withholding $4,779.74 from Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. while awaiting the decision of this administrative hearing.
Conclusions Petitioner has established that he was hired by and worked for Acco, Inc. as a plumber and that he was paid $7.00 per hour from July 17, 1977 until January 1, 1978 and that he was paid $7.50 per hour from January 1, 1978 until April 30, 1978. The prevailing wage for plumbers on the Juvenile Detention Center project was $10.07 per hour. Petitioner John W. Culp is entitled to the difference between what he was paid and the prevailing wage for the total number of hours worked by Petitioner at less than the, prevailing wage. The Hearing Officer, in his Recommended Order, addressed the difference in pay between the regular time worked and overtime worked. However, Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, is void of any statutory language concerning overtime. The statute only requires that the employer be paid "not less than the prevailing wage". Absent a legislative directive in Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, concerning overtime, the employee is only entitled to the difference between what he was paid and what he should have been paid at the prevailing wage rate for the total number of hours worked at a rate less than the prevailing wage. Therefore, the Petitioner is entitled to $4,383.23. Respondent's argument that the Division of Labor failed to properly adopt prevailing wage rates has been considered by the First District Court of Appeals of Florida in Vernon Neff, et al. vs. Biltmore Construction Company, Inc., 362 So.2d 442, (1st DCA Fla. 1978) and State of Florida Department of Commerce, Division of Labor vs. Matthews Corporation, 358 So.2d 256 (1st DCA Fla. 1978). The Court, in both cases, upheld the process by which the wage rates are adopted. Respondent argues that additional insurance benefits should be included in the wage rate, but such benefits are not "wages". The amount paid by the employer to provide insurance benefits should not be included in Petitioner's wage nor deducted from the amount owed to the Petitioner based upon this claim. It is, therefore, hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the contracting authority, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, pay to the Petitioner, from the amount it is withholding in this claim, the amount of $4,383.23 and that the remaining amount held by the contracting authority, pursuant to this claim, be paid to Acco, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of December 1978 at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEVEN H. CAMPORA, Director Division of Labor Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 200 - Ashley Building 1321 Executive Center Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Telephone No.: (904) 488-7396 COPIES FURNISHED: Dewey H. Varner, Jr., Esquire Attorney for Petitioner 3003 South Congress Avenue Palm Springs, Florida 33461 L. Byrd Booth, Jr., Esquire Attorney for Respondent O'Neal and Booth, P.A. Post Office Drawer 11088 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339 Luther J. Moore, Administrator of Prevailing Wage Division of Labor 1321 Executive Center Drive, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas A. Koval, Esquire Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security 401 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer Department of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Division of Labor enter is order directing the contracting authority to pay the employee the sum of $4,607.66 and the remaining amount held by the contracting authority pursuant to this claim be paid to Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of November, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Dewey H. Varner, Jr., Esquire Culp and Fisher 3003 South Congress Avenue Palm Springs, Florida 33461 L. Byrd Booth, Jr. Esquire Post Office Drawer 11089 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION OF LABOR JOHN W. CULP, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-1281 ACCO, INC., Respondent. / FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER Upon due notice to all parties in the above-styled cause, an administrative hearing was held on September 15, 1978, in West Palm Beach, Florida before Stephen F. Dean, the assigned hearing officer. STATEMENT OF CLAIM: This cause was presented on a claim filed by John W. Culp against Acco, Inc. alleging that he had been hired by Acco, Inc. in the capacity of a plumber and that Acco, Inc. had failed to pay him the prevailing wage for plumbers as required by Section 215.19, Florida Statutes. The question presented in this case is how many hours the Petitioner, John Culp, worked, the wage paid the Petitioner, and what, if any, difference exists between the wage paid the Petitioner and the prevailing wage. FINDINGS OF FACT: Acco, Inc. was a subcontractor in the construction of the regional juvenile detention center located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The contracting authority for this facility was the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The contract for the construction let by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is in excess of $5,000.00 and, pursuant to Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, the Division of Labor established a prevailing wage to be paid different crafts and occupations in construction of said project. The prevailing wage established for plumbers on this project was $10.07 per hour. During the course of this project, Acco, Inc. acknowledged by affidavit that all persons in its employ were being paid the prevailing wage as required by law. Between July 17, 1977 and January 1, 1978, John W. Culp was employed by Acco, Inc. on this project as a plumber. During this period of time, Culp was paid at the rate of $7.00 per hour. From January 1, 1978 until April 30, 1978, Petitioner was employed as a plumber at the rate of $7.50 per hour. Exhibit No. 7, the Weekly Time Reports of John W. Culp, establish that Culp worked a total of 856 hours at the rate of $7.00 per hour and 8 hours at $10.50 per hour. Furthermore, the Reports establish that Culp worked 683 hours at the rate of $7.50 per hour and 47.5 hours at $11.25 per hour. Prior to January 1, 1978, the difference between what Petitioner was paid end the prevailing wage was $3.07. After January 1, 1978, the difference was $2.57. The total difference between what Petitioner was paid and the prevailing wage for the time Culp was employed by Acco, Inc. is equal to 856 hours multiplied by $3.07, plus 683 hours multiplied by $2.57. The total difference is $4,383.23. Petitioner has complied with the provision of Section 215.19(3)(a) 1 and 2, Florida Statutes, by filing an affidavit with the contracting authority stating the number of hours worked and the amount of money paid. This affidavit was timely filed. Pursuant to Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is withholding $4,779.74 from Acco, Inc. pending the outcome of this claim.
The Issue Whether the suspension of Petitioner was authorized by statutes and rules and was for "good cause shown."
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mary Futch, has been employed as a Resident Life Assistant by the Sunland Center in Orlando, Florida, for six (6) years. She has attained permanent status in that classification. Mary Futch was suspended without pay from 2:45 P.M., Friday, January 21, to 11:15 P.M., Thursday, February 3, 1977, for confining a resident to a hazardous area resulting in injury to the resident. The letter of suspension was by certified mail, dated January 21, 1977, and signed by Noel Windsor, Superintendent. Delores Holmes has been a resident of the Sunland Center at Orlando since 1974. She is a well-developed white female weighing approximately 110 pounds. She is a "self-abuser" in that she violently abuses herself. When she is abusing herself, injuring herself, it is difficult to control her actions. On the evening of January 12, 1977, Delores Holmes was violently abusing herself. In the course of self-abuse, Miss Holmes was injured by breaking a window. The Petitioner, Mrs. Futch, had placed the resident, Miss Holmes, in a corner of the ward in order to keep her calm and quiet. She placed a floor mat in front of the resident to try to prevent her movement and to keep her in a quiet corner. One side of the corner of the room was a wall; the other side of the corner in which Miss Holmes was placed was a large window area. Some time after Miss Holmes had been placed in the corner, she screamed and broke the glass in the window. Petitioner heard the scream and the breaking of glass and rushed to her aid and called two others. The three tried to hold Miss Holmes and to put cold compresses on the wounds, but a doctor was needed to treat the injuries. The Petitioner, Mrs. Futch, had a good relationship with the resident, Delores Holmes. She had taught her to be affectionate, to dress herself, among other simple tasks. Prior to being placed in Mrs. Futch's care, she was unable or unwilling to perform these acts. The mat which was placed across the corner of the room in which Miss Holmes had been placed was a floor pad which measures approximately 5 feet by 6 feet and is made of a lightweight material. The mat was placed in front of Miss Holmes to prevent her from abusing herself or leaving the corner. However, it was not such a barrier that would have confined Miss Holmes had she chosen to leave. 7 . The room in which the residents lived had three large windows, including the window that was located in the corner in which the Petitioner had plated the resident, Delores Holmes. The area in which the Petitioner, Mrs. Futch, had placed Miss Holmes was no more hazardous than the other areas at the room. Obviously the room was not intended as a place in which retarded residents would live, but had not been considered as a hazardous area.
Recommendation Reverse the suspension of Petitioner, Mary B. Futch. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Douglas Whitney, Esquire 1350 North Orange Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire 1215 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was a lead operator on the first shift of the data entry section of Respondent company. Mr. John Goolsby was also a lead operator but on the second shift in the data entry section. Petitioner was discharged due to elimination of the position of lead operator and Mr. Goolsby was not. During the period encompassing the elimination of Petitioner's job, Respondent reduced its staff from 73 to 57 people and the data entry staff was reduced from 12 to less than 8 people. The decision as to which lead operator in the data entry section would be released from employment was based upon a decision to keep the most productive employee on the basis of quality and quantity of work. Although both the Petitioner and Mr. Goolsby were satisfactory employees, the most productive individual was identified through a series of evaluations by interviewing management personnel to Mr. Christman, Respondent's Executive Vice-President. Probably the most significant- input in the decision-making process was from Sandra Howell, immediate supervisor of both Petitioner and Goolsby, and the tabulations and comparisons of data were done by Walter E. Wilfong, Operations Manager. They all identified John Goolsby as the most productive individual and the decision to release Petitioner was made by Mr. Christman. At the time she was released, the company had no alternative position to offer Petitioner. She has since been offered reemployment in a different position. Petitioner was unable to establish that in making their recommendations to Mr. Christman either of the middle managers gave special or undue consideration to Mr. Goolsby's school schedule. Petitioner never received any written complaints or warnings or reprimands about her work performance and it was unrebutted that her job performance was satisfactory. Petitioner testified that the comparison of production between herself and Mr. Goolsby was invalid because Mr. Goolsby worked the night shift and Petitioner worked the day shift. Witnesses for the Respondent conceded that the night shift was generally not as productive as the day shift. However, the immediate supervisor of both the Petitioner and Mr. Goolsby both before and Mr. Goolsby after Petitioner's termination testified that Mr. Goolsby's work quality and quantity was superior to that of the Petitioner. This testimony was unrebutted. In addition, it was unrebutted that Mr. Goolsby had been nominated for company-wide awards for his quality as an employee on several occasions both before and after the Petitioner's termination and the Petitioner had never been nominated. Although there is some indication in Mr. Wilfong's testimony that Mr. Goolsby had the "edge" with him because Wilfong wanted someone who could communicate with Wilfong for liaison between various shifts, the evidence falls short of establishing this consideration was a deciding factor or that any edge was given Goolsby in the evaluation reports. Further, Wilfong attempted to compensate for Goolsby's showing greater productivity due to the "less people- more work" element of the night shift by reviewing Petitioner's productivity records from then she had previously been on the night shift, which did not compare favorably with Goolsby's for quantity. There is no competent evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner on the basis of her gender, female, by the ruse of eliminating her position. Further, at the date of formal hearing, Mr. Goolsby's supervisor remained female (Sandra Howell) and there are 6 female/6 male supervisors and a higher female to male ratio of the total 57 retained employees.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Human Relations Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition/Complaint herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-2866 All of the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are accepted. All are adopted, as modified to conform more closely to the record in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Terri Tibble 3040 Aloma Avenue, Apt. J-9 Winter Park, Florida 32791 Thomas R. Pepplar, Esquire Graham, Clark, Pohl & Jones 369 New York Avenue Post Office Drawer 1690 Winter Park, Florida 32790 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32299-1570
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner, a black male, was hired by Respondent on February 11, 1985. Petitioner was employed as a wet mill laborer at Respondent's Florida Plant located in Bradford County, Florida. Petitioner's primary duties consisted of washing spirals and performing general housekeeping. Petitioner, like all newly hired employees, was hired subject to a ninety (90) day probationary period. Petitioner was provided an orientation period, given training, and was informed verbally during his employment about the importance of good job performance during his probation period. Petitioner was terminated by Respondent on April 1, 1985 during Petitioner's probationary period. Petitioner reported to four (4) first-line supervisors during his short period of employment which was the result of Petitioner being primarily on the day shift while the supervisors worked on a rotating shift basis. Petitioner's supervisors and the dates under each supervisor are as follows: C. A. Baldree during the weeks ending February 17, 1985 and March 17, 1985; J. W. Sherrill during the weeks ending February 24, 1985 and March 31, 1985; D. W. Baldree during the weeks ending March 3, 1985 and March 24, 1985 and; W. J. Frick during the week ending March 10, 1985. Although Petitioner's testimony conflicted with all three (3) first- line supervisors who testified concerning the fact surrounding the incidents which eventually gave rise to Petitioner's termination, the more credible evidence shows: During the week ending March 17, 1985, Supervisor C. A. Baldree instructed Petitioner and another employee to clean handrails in a specific area where a management visitation group would be observing. Petitioner proceeded to clean handrails in an area other than the one specified by the supervisor and when the supervisor attempted to advise Petitioner of his failure to follow instructions, Petitioner became abusive toward the supervisor and argued that he was following instructions. The Area Supervisor Gilberto Valazquez observed the incident and tried to resolve the matter with a meeting between Petitioner and Supervisor C. A. Baldree but Petitioner declined, commenting that he was afraid of losing his job. During the week ending March 24, 1985, Supervisor D. W. Baldree assigned Petitioner and another employee to wash some spirals in a specific area where visiting management would be observing. Again, Petitioner took it upon himself to clean spirals in a different area and when the supervisor attempted to advise Petitioner of his failure to follow instructions, Petitioner responded that he felt that where he had started was as good as any place to start, notwithstanding that Petitioner was aware of the reason for starting where the supervisor had instructed him to start cleaning. Also, during the week ending March 24, 1985, Supervisor D. W. Baldree repeatedly instructed Petitioner concerning the replacement of hoses and cutters that may be disconnected during the washing of the spirals. However, on several occasions Petitioner failed to replace the hoses and cutters that were disconnected during the washing process as instructed. During the week ending March 31, 1985, Supervisor J. W. Sherrill instructed Petitioner to clean out a tail box that was plugged with sand and adversely affecting production. When the supervisor returned in approximately 20-30 minutes he found the tail box still plugged. When the supervisor attempted to inform Petitioner of his failure to unplug the tail box, Petitioner became argumentative and pointed out that he had unplugged the tail box and that it was only water from a clear water hose that was dripping, notwithstanding the fact that a large amount of sand had accumulated and that muddy water rather than clean water was running from the tail box. At the end of the work week ending March 31, 1985, Supervisor Valazquez met with Petitioner and Supervisor Sherrill concerning an alleged promise made by Supervisor Sherrill to allow Petitioner to leave work early which Petitioner felt Supervisor Sherrill had reneged on, notwithstanding that supervisor had explained to Petitioner why he could not leave early. During the course of the discussion, Petitioner became very belligerent towards Supervisor Sherrill which prompted Supervisor Valazquez to review Petitioner's overall employment record to determine whether Petitioner should continue in the employment of Respondent. Supervisor Valazquez, in investigating Petitioner's overall performance, discussed Petitioner's employment record with all of Petitioner's first-line supervisors and also asked each of them for written comments. Based upon his own observations of Petitioner's job performance and his attitude toward supervision, the supervisors' comments, and the fact that as a short service probationary employee Petitioner was making no effort to improve his job performance or his attitude toward supervision, Supervisor Valazquez felt that Petitioner may not be salvageable as an employee and questioned Petitioner's continued employment with Respondent. Supervisor Valazquez reviewed Petitioner's performance record with his superiors and the site's Employee Relations Supervisor L. H. Wood, who was the site's Affirmative Action Officer. Wood found no evidence of discriminatory motivation. Valazquez's superiors concurred in the discharge recommendation. On April 1, 1985, Valazquez met with Petitioner to discuss the potential discharge action but approached the meeting with the view that should Petitioner show a change in his attitude in regard to his job performance and in accepting supervision, then Valazquez would change his mind and give the Petitioner another chance. When Valazquez attempted to review Petitioner's poor job performance and attitude problems with Petitioner, Petitioner again became very defensive and argumentative. As a result of Petitioner's attitude in this meeting, Valazquez proceeded with the discharge action that had been approved by management. Although the record reflects that Petitioner did not receive any written or verbal warnings from any of his shift- supervisors that his performance was so unsatisfactory that if improvement was not made he would be terminated, Petitioner was made aware, by his shift-supervisors and area supervisor that poor job performance was a basis for termination, particularly during his probationary period. There was at least one (1) occasion, the incident which occurred during the week ending February 17, 1985 with C. A. Baldree, where Petitioner commented about the possibility of losing his job and Valazquez advised him that he would not lose his job so long as he performed properly and showed respect for his supervisors. On three (3) other occasions, his supervisors made the Petitioner aware of his poor job performance and poor attitude. Petitioner was not advised of any written memorandums concerning his job performance or possible termination had been prepared until April 1, 1985, the date Petitioner had a conference with Valazquez and, due to his defensive and argumentative attitude, was not allowed further opportunity to improve his job performance or his attitude and was terminated. No formal employee/supervisor conferences were held with Petitioner until April 1, 985, the date Petitioner was terminated. On the same date that Petitioner was hired, Robert McGee, a white male, was hired by Respondent as a laborer. McGee was assigned to a field laborer position, reporting almost exclusively to one (1) supervisor, Doris Cole. Field laborers work in an area separate and apart from the wet mill and report to different first-line supervisors than the wet mill laborers. On April 25, 1985, within McGee's probationary period, McGee received a formal employee/supervisor conference concerning his unsatisfactory job performance and his damaging of company equipment, warned that definite improvement in his job performance was expected or probation or possibly termination could be expected. On July 3, 1985, McGee received another employee/supervisor conference which involved McGee, Doris Cole and Valazquez and McGee was informed that his performance had improved slightly but significant improvement was expected in the next two (2) weeks or he could expect termination. McGee was placed on probation at this time. On August 2, 1985, another formal employee/supervisor conference was held with McGee wherein it was noted that McGee had demonstrated that- he could perform at a satisfactory level but that continued improvement was expected and that McGee would remain on probation until October 3, 1985. The final employee/supervisor conference record dated October 4, 1985 concluded that McGee could not consistently perform satisfactorily, therefore termination was recommended. McGee did not attend this conference but resigned by telephone on that date in lieu of being terminated. McGee reviewed each of the employee/supervisor conference reports with the exception of the one on October 4, 1985 and each of the reports were included in his personnel file, including the one for October 4, 1985. McGee was a marginal employee who tried to perform his job properly and was receptive to constructive criticism; however, he was unable to improve his performance to a point that was acceptable to Respondent's management. McGee worked on the wet mill for brief periods without incident. McGee had no history of refusing to follow instructions of his supervisor or of being argumentative with the supervisors. The Respondent had no stated policy that required written warnings of poor job performance to employees by their respective supervisors. It was the general policy of the -shift supervisors that during the probationary period, especially during the early part of the probationary period, warnings of poor job performance were given verbally to the employee and that a formal employee/supervisor conference was reserved for more severe matters such as violation of safety rules. However, the manner in which a supervisor handled a particular warning of poor job performance during an employee's probationary period was left to the discretion of the individual supervisor. The record reflects only two (2) other incidents where an employee/supervisor conference was held with an employee during the employee's initial probationary period: Kathy D. Sanders, a black female, on June 5, 1985 and; Bernard Brown, a black male, on March 27, 1984. C. A. Baldree, D. W. Baldree and J. W. Sherrill, three (3) of Petitioner's shift supervisors, were all white as were the supervisors of McGee. Respondent has, and had during Petitioner's employment, an aggressive Affirmative Action program which applied to all aspects of the employment environment. Respondent has in the past received national and local recognition for its Affirmative Action efforts. Respondent's employment of minorities has exceeded the availability of minorities in the labor supply area. Although the local availability of minorities was fifteen percent (15 percent), twenty to twenty-one percent (20-21 percent) of employees at the site were minorities. Of the forty three (43) individuals hired, closely related in time to Petitioner's dates of employment, ten (10) or twenty-three percent (23 percent) were black. Although at the time of Petitioner's initial employment, Respondent had some misgivings about Petitioner's failure to disclose certain information on his employment application, Respondent decided to hire Petitioner anyway because of its Affirmative Action efforts and Petitioner's tests results. The clear weight of the evidence shows that Respondent's reasons for discharging Petitioner was his poor job performance and his argumentative and abusive behavior towards the supervisors when instructed to correct a situation where Petitioner had failed to follow instructions, either intentionally or because he had misunderstood the instructions. The clear weight of the evidence establishes that Petitioner was treated in a dissimilar manner from the white employee, but the disparity of treatment resulted from a dissimilar attitude toward job performance and supervision rather than racial motivation. Area Supervisor Valazquez, the supervisor primarily involved in the decision to discharge Petitioner, is Hispanic.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that the Petitioner, Milton Baker, was not discharged due to his race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1985), and that the Petition for Relief be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 16th day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3623 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1-3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. The first sentence adopted in Finding of Fact 4. The second sentence rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 6.(a-c) Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 (a-d) but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10 but clarified. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 through 9 and 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent in the record. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 13, 14 and 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 18. Adopted in Findings of Fact 16 and 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Respondent had no Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5(a) but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5(b) but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5(c) but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5(d) but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6 but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7 but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8 but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Facts 17 and 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10, 11 and 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 14, 15 and 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25 but clarified. COPIES FURNISHED: John F. MacLennan, Esquire Kattman, Eshelman & MacLennan 1920 San Marco Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Jerry H. Brenner, Esquire Legal Department E. I. du Point de Nemours and Company 100 West 10th Street Wilmington, DE 19898 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of race or handicap in discharging him from employment on February 25, 1992; and whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner and other black employees in pay for similar jobs.
Findings Of Fact During the summer of 1988, Larry Jelks, a black male, approached Jerry Sikes, the Director of Public Works of Suwannee Country, seeking employment. Petitioner, Jelks, explained and Sikes was aware that Petitioner had significant experience as a welder. Several weeks later, Sikes contacted Jelks and offered him a job as a laborer. The Petitioner began work of August 16, 1988 with a starting pay of $5.00/hour in the position of laborer, an entry level, unskilled job classification. The Petitioner received a copy of the employer's regulations. On August 24, 1988, the Petitioner was promoted to Serviceman, and his pay increased to $6.00/hour. On October 12, 1988, Sikes hired Mr. Praley, a white male, as a welder, although his expertise was as a mechanic and Praley was subsequently assigned duties as a mechanic by Sikes. Praley was paid a starting salary of $6.50/hour. The welder/mechanic position was open when Jelks was hired. On November 24, 1988, Petitioner completed his 100 day probation and given his annual 5 percent raise, increasing his pay to $6.30/hour. Other black employees also had their pay raises delayed until after their probation was completed. White employees, including Praley, received their annual raises in the year of their initial employment, notwithstanding their probationary status. This discrepancy in treatment of employees was not explained by the County. On September 30, 1989, the Petitioner laterally transferred to the position of truck driver for the refuse collection service because he did not enjoy the work of a serviceman. One October 1, 1989, Petitioner received an annual raise of 4 percent, to $6.56/hour. Subsequently, the axle in Petitioner's truck broke, and when he was questioned about it, he asked for a transfer. On March 3, 1990, the Petitioner was transferred to a shop position in which he repaired rusted or damaged garbage bins (dumpsters), by welding new sides and bottoms on them. The sheets of steel which Petitioner welded on the bins were 6 feet by 12 feet in size and 1/16" thick, and weighed approximately 180 pounds. These sheets were generally cut into smaller pieces prior to being moved from the stack in which they were stored. These pieces of material had to be moved into position to be cut and welded. The bins were moved using backhoes and forklifts. The Petitioner was responsible for moving the pieces of sheet steel and using the equipment to move the bins. On March 17, 1990, the Petitioner received a 5 percent pay increase to $6.89/hour. On April 28, 1990, the Petitioner received a 5 percent raise to $7.24/hour. On October 1, 1990, the Petitioner was given a 5 percent raise to $7.61/hour. In early 1991, the Petitioner's child became critically ill, and the Petitioner obtained leave to be with the child. In addition, Jerry Sikes approved flexibility in the Petitioner's scheduling to permit him be with the child conditioned upon Petitioner letting his supervisors know what he was doing and when he was going to be away from his job. Problems were encountered with Petitioner's attendance, and he was counseled about this and given a copy of the Country's leave policy. Generally, however, the Petitioner's performance was satisfactory, and he was considered a good and valued employee. On September 23, 1991, the Petitioner suffered a job- related injury, and was placed upon workers' compensation leave. The Petitioner received workers' compensation and disability benefits during his leave. During his absence the other employees performed his welding duties. While on leave, the Petitioner received a 3 percent pay increase to $7.84/hour. On November 25, 1991, Sikes wrote Petitioner a letter advising that he was required to submit doctor's notes concerning his absences while on workers compensation leave. On December 20, 1991, John B. Roberts, the County's workers' compensation (rehabilitation) consultant contacted Sikes and asked Sikes to identify an alternative position the duties of which the Petitioner could perform. Sikes advised Roberts that the County had no light duty jobs, but that driving a truck was one of the least physically demanding jobs in the County's maintenance department. He advised Roberts that he would assign the Petitioner to drive one of the light dump trucks if he returned to work. These trucks have an especially rough ride when operated off road, as these were. Roberts looked at the duties of the job, and determined that the Petitioner ought to be able to perform these duties. Roberts discussed returning to work and performing the duties of a truck driver with the Petitioner; however, the Petitioner advised Roberts that he wanted to talk with his attorney prior to returning to work. The Petitioner did not return and assume the duties of driving a truck in December as Roberts had arranged. On January 2, 1992, the Petitioner was sent a copy of a letter which was to Mr. Larry Sikes from Dr. Cason who had been treating Petitioner. The letter stated that the Petitioner was released from treatment to return to regular work activities as of January 2, 1992. On January 3, 1992, the Petitioner returned to work. He had a 4 percent permanent impairment, but his employer was not advised of this. His doctor advised the rehabilitation counselor that the Petitioner be placed on light duty because he would have to toughen up after returning to work. Sikes did not afford the Petitioner the opportunity to work back into the job. The Petitioner's work area was outside, behind the regular shop, exposed to the elements. It was very cold at the time the Petitioner returned to work. The Petitioner's production was low because he could not physically manhandle the large sheets of steel as he could prior to his injury. He asked that an inmate be assigned to work with him all the time, but assistance was denied to the Petitioner. The Petitioner asked for a backhoe, which he had previously modified, to move the bins and sheets around; however, this piece of equipment had been sent to the landfill. He was told to use a front end loader to do this work; however, he went to the landfill and retrieved the backhoe because he had difficulties climbing into the cab of the front end loader. His demands and getting the backhoe without permission created additional conflicts between the Petitioner and his supervisors. On January 8, 1992, Sikes issued the Petitioner a memo concerning his poor productivity and failure to follow the instructions of his supervisor. Prior to his injury, the Petitioner repaired approximately one bin per day. During the period after his return to work, he did approximately one bin every two to three days. When presented with the memorandum, the Petitioner advised that he was unable to do that which he had formerly done. The Petitioner was told that he was expected to do all his regular work. This motivated the Petitioner to return to the doctor and seek a clarification of what he could and could not do. In addition, Petitioner was also seeing a chiropractor regularly for treatment. Petitioner left work almost daily to see the doctor, and frequently did not return. He did not provide his employer with documentation of these visits. The Petitioner asked that an overhead chain hoist, similar to the one which was inside the shop area, be installed in his work area to move the sheets of steel to assist him. His direct supervisor, Mr. Horton, denied the request because it was expensive and required additional construction to support the mechanism. On January 13, 1992, the Petitioner received a second warning for being absent from work without notifying his supervisor. Sikes advised the Petitioner that he would have to comply with the County's personnel regulations which required prior notification and a note from the doctor. Although the Petitioner testified he was absent attending doctor's visits, he presented no other substantiation of these visits at the hearing. On January 22, 1992, the Petitioner submitted, as requested earlier, a report from Dr. James B. Slatery of Gainesville Orthopedic Group, advising that the Petitioner could return to work, but should avoid climbing and limit his lifting over 50 pounds to an occasional basis. A similar report was submitted by Dr. A. C. Bass. The metal sheets the Petitioner was lifting weighed over fifty pounds. The County failed to make accommodations for the Petitioner's physical problems upon his return to work in a manner it had for white employees. The county had placed recovering white employees in positions where they were flagmen, directed traffic, and in similar positions. The county placed the Petitioner back at his regular duties, stated it had no "light duty" positions, and demanded Petitioner perform all his duties to pre-injury standards of productivity. When the Petitioner asked for assistance in lifting the sheets of steel which were in excess of the weight allowance set by his doctor, the County told him to seek assistance from his coworkers, who were instructed to assist him. He had to wait until they finished with their immediate task, and they were less than happy about these interruptions, and going outside where the Petitioner worked. This slowed his production for which he received criticism from his supervisors. The conditions imposed by the employer were not so bad as to constitute a constructive discharge. However, had Petitioner filed an action at that time, he would have proven that he was treated differently than white employees who were accommodated for their physical problems when returning from workman's compensation leave. There was a verbal exchange between the Petitioner and one of his coworkers, Earnest Johns, arising out of their interactions in the shop. The Petitioner told Johns that he "would pass up a bus load of white girls, to make him (Johns) his bitch." Johns complained to Sikes about the Petitioner, and told Sikes, "he needed to do something about that Nigger." Sikes told Johns that he would take care of it and to calm down. Johns, who was very upset, subsequently apologized to Sikes for his confrontational manner in raising the matter with him. On January 25, 1992, Sikes sent the Petitioner another memo confirming a verbal warning about his poor work habits, wasting time, and absenteeism. On January 30, 1992, Sikes sent the Petitioner another memo regarding his poor work habits. In February, the Petitioner's wife, from whom he was separated, died, and he was granted three days bereavement leave for February 11-13, 1992. On February 18, 1992, the Petitioner called the shop and left word with a secretary that he would not be at work for the rest of that week. He did not submit a leave request for this period of time. Subsequently, the Petitioner was absent without permission from February 14 until February 24, 1992. The Petitioner did not obtain permission from his supervisors prior to taking this leave, did not request leave without pay, and did to explain his absence. Neither did his doctor, the rehabilitation counselor, his chiropractor, his attorney, or a member of his family or a friend report his absence and give any explanation. During this period, he appeared once at work to pick up his pay check on February 21, 1992. On this occasion the Petitioner did not address the matter of his absence with Sikes or Horton, although Horton advised he Petitioner that Sikes wanted to speak with him. The Petitioner had exhausted all of his sick and vacation leave prior to February 14, 1992. Under the County's rules, an employee had to request leave without pay after exhausting sick and annual leave, and the request had to be approved by the County Commission. The Petitioner did not make a request for leave without pay. Although the Petitioner asserts that he had not exhausted his sick leave because he was visiting the doctor during his absences which was covered by workers' compensation leave, he did not provide medical substantiation for the alleged treatments and doctors' visits as required by the employer's rules in order to obtain workers' compensation leave. On February 25, 1992, the Petitioner returned to work at starting time wearing work clothes. Horton stopped him on his way to his work area, and advised him that Sikes wanted to talk with him. Horton accompanied the Petitioner to Sikes office. Sikes asked the Petitioner were he had been, and the Petitioner answered that he had been attending to personal business. Sikes asked him for a more detailed explanation of his absence, and the Petitioner again told him that he had been tending to business and that Sikes should either fire him or get off his back. Sikes warned the Petitioner that unless he provided some explanation for his unauthorized absence, he would have to terminate him. The Petitioner refused to provide any additional explanation, but asked that his firing be put in writing. The Petitioner left the work place after the meeting, and did not return to work or attempt to explain his absences. Sikes viewed the Petitioner's absences and refusal to obey the personnel regulations as undermining his credibility as a supervisor. Several days after the confrontation on February 25, 1992, Sikes wrote a letter terminating the Petitioner for (1) continued or gross neglect of duty; (2) absence without leave; incompetence or unwillingness to render satisfactory service; insubordination; and (5) habitual absences, as provided in Parts X and XI of the County personnel regulations. Sikes extended special consideration to all employees of the department, who were permitted to take leave or be absent without applying for leave. The Petitioner was permitted to take leave without applying for it, and that considerable latitude was extended to the Petitioner regarding his absences prior to his being discharged. A white male, who was not handicapped, was hired on May 28, 1992 to file the position from which the Petitioner was discharged. The Petitioner appealed his discharge under the County's rules, and after an evidentiary hearing in which the Petitioner was represented by counsel, the county's hearing officer found that the dismissal was for cause in a Final Order dated September 24, 1992. Discrimination in Promotion and Pay among Blacks. The population and labor market statistics offered by the Petitioner in support of his contention that Blacks were discriminated against in promotion fail to support the proposition for which they were offered. For example, the Petitioner limits the labor pool to those persons who are over 16 and worked in 1989. However, there are those persons who are over 16 and would like to work, but who have not been hired. If the Petitioner's contention is correct, one would expect that for every white employee hired, there was a black applicant who was not hired. Therefore, comparisons based upon persons actually hired understate the percentage of Blacks in the labor pool. The relevant labor market for this dispute is Suwannee County, Florida, and the relevant labor pool are those people over 16 years of age who are now seeking, or who have in the past sought employment. According to the 1990 census, 14.7 percent of the population of the County is black. Blacks constitute 13.8 percent of the County's employees. The work environment was not overtly racist, and while, as stated above, racially charged verbal barbs were occasionally exchanged, there is no evidence that this was common or tolerated by the employer. The best evidence of discrimination by the employer were the actual practices engaged in by the County. During the 12 years prior to the termination of the Petitioner, the County had never had a Black supervisor. From 1989 to September 23, 1992, the County hired one black employee of 30 employees who it hired. Its top 10 highest paid employees were all white. The highest paid black was the forty-first highest paid employee of the County. Kevin Praley was placed in a welder's position despite the fact he was a mechanic at $6.50/hour; and Petitioner, who was a professional welder, was hired as a laborer at $5.00/hour in 1988. At the time Praley was hired, the Petitioner was making $6.00/hour, so that the differential between their pay was $.50/hour in 1988. After four years, Praley, who was hired after the Petitioner, was paid $2.01/hour more than the Petitioner for work which Sikes and others said was similar. This reflects continuing discrimination in hiring and paying Blacks. Blacks were hired in the lowest paying, menial jobs within the county, and this was not on the basis of education. All of the county's custodial employees are black. Only one of the county's secretaries is black. Until very recently, there were no black supervisors in the county's maintenance department. Most of the County's increases in Black employment and promotions occurred after institution of this case. The Clerk of the Circuit Court/Clerk of the Board of County Commissioners has not published a salary discrimination review required by Section 28.34, Florida Statutes. Further, the County's Equal Opportunity Program of 1992 provided for annual assessment of its progress in equal opportunity. As of May 9,1994, the County and not compile an annual report pursuant to its plan. The County did not train Black employees to assume greater responsibility, and did not utilize them as heavy equipment operators until after the institution of this action. The county did not pay Jelks and other Black employees annual pay raises while they were on probation; however, it did pay white employees Praley, Hardin, Simmons, Mobley, Luanne Mixon, Tervola, and Brother annual pay raises while they were on probation. These white employees were all hired prior to or during the year the Petitioner was hired. Jelks received the raise at the end of his probation period on November 24, 1988. Helen Stoudermire, Mattie L. Weatherspoon, Tyrone Tillman, and Marvette Gwinn, all black employees of the Respondent, did not receive annual raises while in probationary status, contrary to the treatment afforded white employees. The amounts of their collective salary losses were not presented as a finding of fact. The county did discriminate against the Petitioner and other black employees in pay and promotion during the period 1989 until February 25, 1992.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission of Human Relations enter a Final Order directing that: The Petitioner's Petition for Relief relating to his discharge be dismissed; Black employees of the County be certified as a class for the period beginning August 1988 until the present; The County be ordered to cease and desist its discriminatory practices in pay and promotion against the class of black employees; The County's Clerk be ordered to file reports on salary differentials are required by statute; and Reasonable attorney's fees and costs be awarded to Petitioner's counsel. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1994. APPENDIX CASE NO. 93-5330 Both of the parties submitted proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 2 Rejected as contrary to more credible facts. See Paragraph 41. Paragraph 3 True, but part of statement of case. Paragraph 4 Paragraph 11. Paragraph 5 Paragraph 1. Paragraph 6 Subsumed in Paragraph 11. Paragraph 7 Subsumed in Paragraphs 11 and 17. Paragraphs 8,9,10 Paragraph 44. Paragraph 11 Conclusion of Law Paragraph 12 Paragraph 57. Paragraph 13 Contrary to facts. The Petitioner returned to duty. Paragraph 14 Irrelevant. Paragraph 15 Paragraph 48 Paragraphs 16,17,18 Paragraph 51 Paragraph 19,20 Contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 21 Subsumed in paragraph 54. Paragraph 22 Paragraph 56. Paragraphs 23,24,25 Paragraphs 2,3,4,58,60 Paragraph 26 Paragraph 26. Paragraphs 27,28 Paragraph 42. Paragraphs 29,30 Subsumed in 2,3,52,53. Paragraph 31 Rejected because Jelks received the raise at the end of his probation period on November 24, 1988. His reduction in pay was $.30/hour for October and November, or 8 weeks X 40 hours X .30 = $96.00. Paragraph 32 County's claims were rejected on this point. Paragraph 33 Paragraph 18 Paragraph 34 The statistical record is rejected for lack of credibility because it considers averages of both groups compared when there are findings which show whites held higher paying jobs. Paragraph 35 Subsumed in paragraph 32. Paragraph 36 Subsumed in paragraph 54. Paragraph 37 Rejected as contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 38 Subsumed in Paragraphs 26,27. Paragraph 39 Paragraphs 29,30. Paragraph 40 Is not addressed specifically because it violated the HO's directions that findings be kept short, and address specific factual matters, and is mostly argument. Paragraph 41 Subsumed in Paragraph 17. Paragraph 42 Paragraph 20. Paragraph 43 The County did accommodate some whites. Paragraph 44 Rejected as contrary to best evidence. Paragraph 45 Paragraph 50. Paragraph 46 Subsumed in Paragraph 55. Paragraph 47 Rejected. Welder and mechanic were the same job description. Paragraph 48 Irrelevant. Paragraph 49 Rejected because "handicap" relates to permanent conditions, and his permanent handicap was only 4 percent. It was his temporary condition which impacted his ability to perform the work. Paragraph 50 Irrelevant. Paragraph 51,52 The name calling by employees, to include Johns, occurred in the context of an angry exchange with Sikes, who cautioned Johns to calm down. Johns subsequently apologized to Sikes, and neither were aware that his comments had been overheard by Jelks. Paragraph 53 Paragraph 51. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-5 Paragraphs 1-6 Paragraph 6 Subsumed in part in 1-6, and rejected in part as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraphs 7,8 Paragraph 6 & rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 9 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 10,11 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 12,13,14 Paragraph 9,10 Paragraph 15 Paragraph 29 Paragraph 16 Paragraph 49 Paragraphs 17-23 Paragraphs 11-17 Paragraph 24 Paragraph 21 Paragraph 25 Paragraph 19. Paragraphs 26,27 Irrelevant. Paragraph 28 Paragraph 25 Paragraph 29 Paragraph 17 Paragraph 30 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 31 Paragraph 28. Paragraph 32 Irrelevant. Paragraph 33 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 34 Paragraph 20. Paragraphs 35,36 Paragraph 19 & rejected as contrary to best evidence. Paragraph 37 Paragraph 23. Paragraph 38 Paragraph 24. Paragraph 39 Paragraph 25. Paragraph 40 Paragraph 31. Paragraph 41 Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 42 Paragraph 33. Paragraphs 43,44 Paragraph 32. Paragraph 45 Paragraph 35. Paragraph 46 Paragraph 36. Paragraph 47 Irrelevant. Paragraph 48 Subsumed in paragraphs above. Paragraph 49 Subsumed in Paragraph 33. Paragraph 50 Paragraph 35, best evidence. Paragraph 51 Paragraph 32. Paragraph 52 True, but part of law. Paragraph 53 Paragraph 34. Paragraphs 54-58 Paragraphs 37,38,40,41 Paragraph 59 Irrelevant. Paragraph 60 Duplicative. Paragraphs 61,62 Irrelevant. Paragraph 63 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 64 Paragraph 48. Paragraph 65 Subsumed in Paragraph 41. Paragraph 66 Subsumed in Paragraph 48. Paragraph 67 Irrelevant. Paragraph 68 The wage disparity was the result of hiring Blacks in the lowest paying jobs. Paragraph 69 Subsumed in Paragraph 54. Paragraph 70 Paragraph 50. Paragraph 71 See comments to Paragraph 68. Paragraphs 72-83 Subsumed in Paragraphs 54, 55. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Mattimore, Esquire Kimberly L. King, Esquire Suite 305 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Toby Buel, Esquire Three Rivers Legal Services 817 West Duval Street Lake City, FL 32055 C. Dean Lewis, Esquire Post Office Box 8 Live Oak, FL 32060 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
Findings Of Fact On December 6, 7 and 8, 1988, petitioner Harold E. Solano was absent from his job at the Department of Transportation without leave.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a final order deeming petitioner to have abandoned his career service position with respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold E. Solano Route 1, Box 5 Elkton, Florida 32033 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S.-58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Andrew J. McMullian, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue Whether Kennie W. McKay should be deemed to have abandoned his position and to have resigned from the Career Service on account of his absence from work on March 10, 13, 14, and 15, 1987?
Findings Of Fact Some 18 years ago, when petitioner Kennie W. McKay began working at the Dozier School in Marianna, he received a copy of the employee handbook the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) published at the time. A more recent edition, dated June 1, 1986, provides, in part: As soon as possible on the first day of absence, it is your responsibility to notify your supervisor that the absence is due to illness, injury, exposure to a contagious disease, or the illness or injury of a member of your immediate family. Your supervisor should also be given an estimate of the length of the absence. Medical certification may be requested. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, p. 19. It was not clear from the evidence either that this language appeared in the edition Mr. McKay was furnished when he began work, or that he had ever seen the edition which came into evidence without objection. On June 1, 1983, the Dozier School adopted "POLICY AND PROCEDURE #:035" requiring advance approval of leave, except when "illness or a bona fide emergency" occasions the absence. In that event, the policy specifies that the employee must contact his/her supervisor as soon as possible. If he/she is unable to contact his/her immediate supervisor, the employee must contact the next higher level supervisor or someone in his/her normal chain of command. Leaving messages with the switchboard, coworkers, or other uninvolved staff will not be considered adequate notice. The employee is to notify his/her supervisor and only in situations where the employee is unable to contact the supervisor himself/herself will a call/contact from another person be acceptable. * * * (6) Employees displaying a pattern of unplanned absences may be suspected of abusing their leave privileges and may be subject to appropriate corrective action in accordance with HRSP 60-1 State Personnel Rules (Chapter 22A-8 and HRSR 60-51). Respondent's Exhibit No. 5, pp. 1 and 2. HRS has not promulgated this "policy and procedure" as an administrative rule. Direct evidence did not establish to what extent, if at all, petitioner McKay was aware of its existence or its provisions. But his efforts to reach the man he thought to be his immediate supervisor, James R. Kersey, suggest he believed he was required to try to do so. In his letter of February 23, 1987, the Dozier School's superintendent, Roy C. McKay, no relation to petitioner, advised petitioner McKay that Mr. Kersey would become his immediate supervisor upon petitioner's demotion from carpenter to house parent. In part, the letter stated: This is official notification that you are being demoted from Carpenter, position number 01082, to Houseparent, position number 01188. You are to report to Friendship House on the 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift, effective Friday, February 27, 1987, or the first day you return back to work. 1/ Your immediate supervisor will be Mr. James Kersey, Houseparent Supervisor I; and your days off will be Wednesday and Thursday. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Like Mr. Kersey, Mr. James Pyles and Mr. Jethro Pittman were house parent supervisors I assigned to Friendship House. Each supervised a different shift. Houseparent supervisors I reported to Norman Harris, who reported to assistant superintendent Pate, who reported to superintendent McKay. On every shift, an administrative duty officer has campus-wide responsibility. The administrative duty officer is also in the chain of command. Petitioner McKay did not learn until after he was told he no longer had a job that Mr. Harris was to be in the chain of command, because he did not see Mr. Harris' memorandum of March 10, 1987, until after March 16, 1987. In this memorandum, Mr. Harris advised: YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR WILL BE JAMES PYLES, HOUSEPARENT SUPERVISOR I. YOUR NEXT HIGHER SUPERVISOR BILL BE ME, MR. NORMAN HARRIS. Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. Written communications addressed to petitioner McKay dated on and after March 10, 1987, were placed in "his box," but Superintendent McKay was aware that petitioner McKay did not see them on or before March 16, 1987. Before the superintendent's letter of February 23, 1987, gave "official notice" of the demotion, the two Messrs. McKay and others met in the Dozier School's conference room, on February 20, 1987. Petitioner McKay told those present that he had a doctor's appointment in Columbus, Georgia on March 10, 1987. As the superintendent understood it, the doctor had earlier warned against petitioner's overexerting himself, even against his walking too far. Everybody knew he was on leave on account of his medical condition at the time of the conference; he was, in fact, demoted because he was not physically able to discharge the duties of a carpenter. Evidently because he told the superintendent that he had a "sick slip through the ninth," the superintendent directed him to report on the tenth. Whoever drew the work schedule put him down as beginning his new assignment on March 9, 1987. As it happened, somebody in the doctor's office in Columbus called petitioner McKay's wife on March 9, 1987, and rescheduled the appointment for March 11, 1987. Deciding not to report for work before seeing the doctor, Kennie McKay telephoned the Dozier School on the tenth to let them know. Twice he reached Mr. Bridges, who was working the day shift as a house parent at Friendship House. He told Mr. Bridges he was not coming in to work that night. He asked each time to speak to Mr. Kersey. Each time Mr. Bridges told him Mr. Kersey was not there. Although Friendship House is the most secure cottage at the Dozier School and the locus of the school's "intensive supervision program," which is designed to calm boys down who are "in an uproar," the work on the night shift is not physically demanding. The boys are supposed to be asleep, and a house parent can call for reinforcements if problems arise. The houseparent can lock himself in a "crime cage" out of reach of the inmates, and could do his duty, which is mainly to observe, on crutches, if necessary. Nevertheless, when petitioner McKay visited the doctor in Columbus on March 11, 1987, he obtained a form from the doctor's office stating "out of work until next visit in 3 wks." Respondent's Exhibit No. 12. After he reached Marianna, he telephoned the Dozier School at 7:46 p.m. that evening. Charles Gardner, Jr., who was working as a house parent at Opportunity Cottage, took the telephone call. Mr. McKay told him he could not come to work that night, that he had been to see a doctor, that he had a doctor's excuse, and that he needed to talk to a night supervisor. While they were talking, Luther L. Spurlock, a house parent supervisor II in charge of a cluster that did not include Friendship House, entered the room, and took the phone from Mr. Gardner, who handed it to him. Petitioner McKay told Mr. Spurlock, "I'll be in tomorrow with a doctor's slip for Danny." After the phone call was over, Mr. Spurlock said to Mr. Gardner, "I'm not McKay's supervisor," or words to that effect. A form filled out toward the end of the shift stated: Kenny McKay called and said that he would be at the school tomorrow with a doctor slip to give Mr. Pate. Everything went well tonight no major problems. Respondent's Exhibit No. 10. Mr. Spurlock did not tell the petitioner that he ought to notify anybody else about his continuing absence. Kennie McKay had not been scheduled to work on March 11, 1987, in any event. His next scheduled work day was March 13, 1987. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. On March 13, 1987, he telephoned the superintendent's office but, when told he was in a meeting, asked to speak to Bruce Gambill, Dozier School's business manager , instead. Mr. Gambill answers directly to the superintendent. He told Mr. Gambill "that he had been to the doctor and had a sick slip to be out of work." Respondent's Exhibit No. 11. Mr. Gambill asked him to bring a copy of the slip to the business office for Workers Compensation purposes ... [and] instructed Mr. McKay to contact his supervisor concerning the sick slip and being out of work. [Petitioner] said he had tried to call, but there was no answer. [Mr. Gambill] told him he needed to let his supervisor know about the sick slip. Respondent's Exhibit No. 11. Petitioner had telephoned that morning at 10:24 from Marianna, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, but he had not reached Mr. Pittman, the supervisor, who testified he might have been on an errand then. Whether Petitioner tried again to reach a supervisor after speaking to Mr. Gambill is not clear. James Pyles, the man who, although petitioner did not know it at the time, became the latter's supervisor on March 10, 1987, asked superintendent Roy McKay's permission to use a state car about three o'clock that afternoon to find out if Kennie McKay was going to come to work. Mr. Pyles drove to Dothan, Alabama, where he found petitioner walking around without crutches in an establishment known as Shag's. He did not tell petitioner that he had been made his supervisor or suggest that, since he did not seem to need crutches, petitioner come to work. The following night, as well, Mr. Pyles saw Mr. McKay getting around without crutches. On that occasion, too, Mr. Pyles refrained from any discussion relating to work at Dozier School. When Kennie W. McKay brought the doctor's slip, Respondent's Exhibit No. 11, to Dozier School on March 17, 1987, he was informed he no longer had a job.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration rule that Kennie W. McKay has not abandoned his position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and has never lost his membership in the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1987.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the continuing contract of employment between the Petitioner, St. Petersburg Junior College (SPJC or the College), and the Respondent, Mary Tranquillo, should be terminated and, if so, whether the Respondent should be dismissed from her employment.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, St. Petersburg Junior College (SPJC or the College), has several campuses and approximately 60,000 students. The Respondent, Dr. Mary Tranquillo, who has 32 years of teaching experience, has been employed by the College for 24 years as an instructor in the area of business technologies, with an emphasis in fashion and marketing. The Respondent has been on a continuing contract with the College since 1974. There is no question as to her performance through approximately 1991. She was a competent, effective and valuable instructor during those years. In approximately January 1992, the Respondent began to complain of illness which she attributed to various factors in her work environment. Over the years since then, Tranquillo has blamed tar fumes from roofing work being done in the vicinity, as well as fumes and molds from various buildings and other sources on or near the campus. The Respondent not only called in sick, she also sometimes stayed away to avoid what she said were the environmental factors responsible for her illnesses. By her own reckoning, the Respondent was absent from work from January 15 through January 24, from February 19 through February 28, from March 27 through June 17, 1992 (for a total of 103 days during the 1991-92 school year.) During the 1992-93 school year, Tranquillo was absent from September 22 through September 24, on October 22, and from October 26 through October 29, 1992, and from February 5 through 10, on February 15, from February 25 through February 26, and from March 23 through May 7, 1993 (for a total of 63 days.) During the 1993-94 school year, Tranquillo was absent on November 8 and 9, 1993, from February 9 through 11, 1994, from June 14 through June 16, and from July 6 through July 14, 1994 (for a total of 17 days.) During the 1994-95 school year, Tranquillo was absent on October 14, 1994, and on March 2 and 3, 1995 (for a total of 3 days.) During the 1995-96 school year, Tranquillo was absent on September 21 and 22, from October 9 through 12, from October 16 through 20, and from November 9 through 16, 1995 (for a total of 18 days.) During the 1996-97 school year, Tranquillo was absent from September 27 through 29, from October 21 through 25, and on November 15, 1996, and from January 6 through 9, from February 10 through 13, 1997 (for a total of 17 days.) During the 1997-98 school year, Tranquillo was absent from October 9 through 17, 1997. Paid sick leave is accumulated by SPJC faculty at the rate of one day per month of service and is permitted to be carried over. Sick leave is credited at the beginning of each school year. There also is a sick leave pool available; members of the pool are assessed one day of leave in return for the ability to use up to 44 days of sick leave from the pool after their personal sick leave is exhausted. The Respondent exhausted her paid sick leave each year since 1992, except for the 1994-95 school year. In addition, the Respondent has used all 44 days of sick leave available to her as a member of the sick leave pool. The Respondent's absences clearly impaired the educational experience of students enrolled in her classes. The Respondent's classes were not impacted equally. As evidenced by the testimony of many students, the Respondent's students generally seem to have been able to obtain valuable educational experiences during times when the Respondent was not absent, or was absent less. On the other hand, as evidenced by the testimony of many other students, the students' educational experiences suffered during times when the Respondent was absent frequently. Despite efforts to focus attention on the former occasions, the Respondent herself admitted to the latter. When the Respondent was absent frequently, it was sometimes difficult to obtain and prepare substitutes. Sometimes, there was little or no notice. Sometimes, substitutes could not be found at all, and class had to be canceled. Sometimes, a substitute was found, but the substitute was not qualified to teach the Respondent's class. Sometimes, there was not enough time to prepare the substitute. The College did not prove that the problems with covering for the Respondent's absences were all the fault of the Respondent. Before June 1997, the Respondent generally seemed to try to prepare her substitutes, and the College did not prove that the Respondent failed to prepare lesson plans for substitutes prior to June 1997. But there sometimes was difficulty communicating instructions to substitutes or locating materials to be used by the substitutes. The Respondent sought to blame all difficulties in covering for her absences on the administration, office clerical staff, and the substitutes. The Respondent blamed the administration for having the clerical staff select substitutes and blamed the clerical staff for selecting substitutes who were not qualified. The Respondent also went so far as to suggest the existence of a conspiracy among members of the administration, clerical staff and substitutes to sabotage the Respondent's efforts to cover for her absences in order to trump up charges for her dismissal. It is found that there was no such conspiracy against the Respondent. It is true that, as time went on, some of those involved in covering for the Respondent's absences felt put upon. Some administration and clerical staff became frustrated and aggravated; so did some substitutes, some of whom refused to continue to respond to requests to substitute for the Respondent. But these individuals did not cause the Respondent's problems. Rather, the problems of trying to cover for the Respondent were caused by the sheer number of the Respondent's absences, together with their general unpredictability in time and length; these problems made it difficult and frustrating for those involved. The Respondent failed to appreciate, and instead minimized, the hardships on the College in trying to cover for the Respondent's many absences. Additional problems caused by the Respondent's absences included lack of continuity, failure of communication with the students, and student apprehension concerning grading. For some of the Respondent's classes, these problems were so severe that the administration considered giving all students an "A" just for putting up with all of the problems. The Respondent also tended to obsess on the environmental factors she thought was causing her absences. Sometimes, when the Respondent came to class, she spent excessive time discussing her grievances with the College regarding her illness and the factors she blamed for them. This also diminished the quality of the educational experience of many students. The students most impacted by these problems felt cheated and became frustrated and angry, as well as concerned about grades. Some initiated and signed petitions to the administration to attempt to get satisfaction. Contrary to the Respondent's suspicions, these petition drives and student grievances were not instigated by substitutes (who essentially told complaining students that they should make their complaints known to the administration), by administration, or by other faculty. They were not yet another part of an alleged conspiracy to get rid of the Respondent. Rather, they were expressions of honest and understandable concerns and grievances on the part of the students. Generally, instructors at the College are expected to not only teach classes but also attend faculty meetings, serve on committees, and be part of a professional group. It is clear that, due to her excessive absences, at times the Respondent was unavailable to participate in these kinds of extracurricular activities. Some of the extracurricular activities cited by the Respondent to demonstrate her level of participation actually were not extracurricular. For example, she cited the preparation of lesson plans and claimed that they were extracurricular. Similarly, she attempted to characterize the selection of a textbook for her class. Some extracurricular "activities" cited by the Respondent were not very active. The Respondent cited a plan that she had to promote courses in her area of instruction as extracurricular, but there was no evidence that she acted on the plan. The Respondent testified that she was a member of an "organization development network" that holds meetings, but on cross-examination she admitted that she actually never has attended a meeting of the group. The Respondent cited a letter she wrote encouraging students to attend a meeting, but it was revealed on cross-examination that the Respondent herself did not attend the meeting. The Respondent called a witness to testify to time the Respondent spent assisting with one particular extracurricular project, but the testimony was that, in that instance, the Respondent just compiled some materials for the witness, who could not say "how many minutes it took" the Respondent. The Respondent credits herself with time spent writing for publication. Indeed, there was evidence to support this claim. However, it appears that less time was spent writing for publication in the time period from 1992 through 1997, than earlier in the Respondent's career. For example, a book the Respondent claims to have been working on for the last five years still consists of only an outline. While able to cite weaknesses in the Respondent's demonstration of her level of participation in extracurricular activities, and while proving a general requirement to participate in extracurricular activities, the College did not prove precisely what is required of instructors in this regard. There was no evidence of any standards by which an instructor's level of participation can be quantified or measured. Without such standards, the College was unable to prove that the Respondent failed to meet the College's requirements. Beginning with the 1993-94 school year, the Respondent began receiving negative performance evaluations. Essentially, the College cited the problems caused by the Respondent's excessive absences, and the Respondent blamed them on illness allegedly caused by environmental factors on campus that were beyond her control. Although the College tried to accommodate the Respondent, the Respondent did not think the College was doing enough and blamed the College for being callous and uncooperative. Eventually, the College came to question the existence of the environmental factors to which the Respondent attributed her problems and began to believe that the Respondent's demands had become unreasonable. As a result, the working relationship between the Respondent and administration deteriorated, and the College began to give consideration to terminating the Respondent's continuing contract. By the end of the 1996-97 school year, the College decided to terminate the Respondent's continuing contract as of the end of the school year. On or about May 8, 1997, the College issued the President's Petition and Notice to Respondent of Hearing Rights. On the belief that it was improper or unnecessary after initiation of termination proceedings, the College never completed the Respondent's performance evaluation process for the 1996-97 school year. Due to the pendency of this proceeding, the Respondent has continued to teach during the 1997-98 school year. In June 1997, the Respondent began to take the position that, when she had to be out sick but had no more sick leave, she would not prepare lesson plans or otherwise do "work" at home to help prepare substitutes. When she invoked this new position, the College countered that it violated the requirement that instructors prepare lesson plans and prepare substitutes when necessary. Eventually, this dispute was resolved, and the Respondent receded from her position. It is not a continuing issue. In 1994, the Respondent filed a workers' compensation claim against the College alleging that she had multiple chemical sensitivity and related illnesses arising out of and in the course and scope of her employment. Both parties were represented by counsel in that proceeding, and they fully and fairly litigated the issue as to whether the Respondent was exposed to any chemical through her work environment at the College which caused, accelerated, or aggravated any physical or mental illness. On June 19, 1997, an Order was entered Judge of Compensation Claims ruling against the Respondent and in favor of the College on that issue and denying the claim. The Respondent presented no evidence at the hearing to support her claim that her absences were caused by genuine illness. No physician testified, and no medical evidence was introduced. Due to the long-standing problems beginning in January 1992, the evidence proved "good and sufficient reasons" to terminate the Respondent's continuing contract. Yet, the evidence also was that, when the Respondent is "on-the-job," physically and mentally, she can be a very effective instructor. Indeed, the evidence was that the Respondent's attendance at work and her work performance have been better since action was initiated to terminate her continuing contract. In January 1998, the Respondent was given an office and a classroom which she does not think affect her health adversely. (Ironically, they are the same office and classroom offered to the Respondent in 1994 and 1995; the Respondent believes that measures taken since then have ameliorated the environmental factors that allegedly were causing her health problems.)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of St. Petersburg Junior College enter a final order terminating the Respondent's continuing contract and returning her to an annual contract for another three years. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Board of Trustees St. Petersburg Junior College c/o Maria N. Sorolis, Esquire Allen Norton and Blue Hyde Park Plaza, Suite 350 324 South Hyde Park Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606 Maria N. Sorolis, Esquire Allen Norton and Blue Hyde Park Plaza, Suite 350 324 South Hyde Park Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606 John E. Tuthill, Esquire 3300 49th Street, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33710
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of insubordination for the use of excess leave and sleeping in his vehicle during working hours.
Findings Of Fact On or about April 21, 2004, Petitioner hired Respondent as a school custodian. Starting on December 11, 2007, Petitioner transferred Respondent to Toledo Blade Elementary School. One year later, Petitioner transferred Respondent to the Transportation Department, which is the building housing the transportation offices. As a custodian, Respondent is a "classified" employee. He is covered by the Classified Bargaining Unit Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Sarasota Classified/Teachers Association and Petitioner (the contract). Twice on the morning of April 25, 2008, during working hours and not while on a break, Respondent walked from his worksite to his vehicle, climbed into the vehicle, and nodded off to sleep. The first nap lasted for about one hour, and the second nap lasted about one and one-quarter hours. The second nap ended when Respondent's boss and the boss's boss walked out to the vehicle where they found Respondent, who had put the driver's seat down, laid out in the front driver's seat, with the radio on, sound asleep. They woke him and ordered him back to work. Respondent's defenses are: 1) he was not asleep; he was unconscious; and 2) he was suffering from extreme drowsiness due to medications that he was taking following his recovery from a three-month coma into which he had fallen two years earlier. Both of Respondent's defenses are makeshift. According to Webster's online dictionary, "sleep" is the "natural periodic suspension of consciousness during which the powers of the body are restored." (http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/sleep, as found on June 17, 2009) If he had suddenly lost consciousness at the worksite, no one would claim he was sleeping on the job. Instead, without reporting any difficulties to anyone, he walked out to his vehicle, made himself comfortable, and fell asleep. The problem was that his natural period of suspended consciousness coincided with time during which Petitioner was paying him. The requisite restorative effect is inferred. Nor is there any credence to the claim of a medical condition or effect of a medication that would leave Respondent unable to resist falling asleep while on duty. Although ample opportunity existed, Respondent failed, on the day in question, to bring to the attention of his supervisor any medical reason for sleeping on the job, which was exactly what he was doing. Article XXI of the contract authorizes discipline for "just cause." Sleeping while on duty, for over two hours prior to lunch, constitutes insubordination and just cause for discipline. The leave issue is more complicated. Petitioner is on a fiscal year starting July 1. For the entire year, classified, 12-month, hourly employees, such as Respondent, accrue six personal days on July 1. For sick days, these employees accrue one day at the end of July and three advance days. They then accrue a day at the end of each following month through March. Unused sick days rollover to the next year, but unused personal days do not. Personal days count against the sick days. In other words, if an employee has five sick days and six personal days and uses a personal day, he will then have four sick days and five personal days. Employees also earn vacation days. As explained by Petitioner's payroll supervisor, the payroll system facilitated recharacterizations between sick and personal days. However, the system did not incorporate vacation days in the same fashion. Thus, if an employee took off one day, without claiming sick leave, and lacked one day of personal time, the system would dock his pay, even though he might still have had sufficient vacation time to absorb the time that he had taken off. For the 2007-08 school year, Respondent used "personal leave charged to sick" as follows: September 12--8.0 hours; September 24--8.0 hours; December 20--8.0 hours; December 21-- 8.0 hours; January 30--0.5 hours; February 15--8.0 hours; and February 27--7.5 hours. On February 27, Respondent missed the entire day of work. Consistent with acceptable practices, on the next day, he submitted a form entitled, "Certificate of Absence." In it, Respondent requested approval for 8.0 hours of "personal leave charged to sick," rather than one of the other categories, such as sick leave or vacation leave. His supervisor signed the form. When the payroll supervisor checked his balances, she saw that he only had 7.5 hours of personal leave charged to sick, so, on May 2, 2008, Respondent had to sign a form entitled, "Request for Personal/Sick/Vacation Leave in Excess of Earned Leave." This form requested approval for the use of 0.5 hours of personal leave in excess of earned leave. The request was disapproved by the Director of Facilities Services with a signature bearing a date of March 13, 2008. The payroll department's practice was not to deduct personal leave charged as sick against vacation leave, if an employee consumed all of his personal leave charged as sick. On March 14, Respondent again requested 2.5 hours of personal leave charged to sick. His supervisor noted on the form that he "cautioned Tim to make sure he has the time available--Tim told me that he does. 3-14-08." By this time, it is unlikely that Respondent had received a new statement of leave balance reflecting the 0.5 hours that he had been short two weeks earlier. On May 2, 2008, Respondent signed another request for permission to use personal leave in excess of earned leave, and the Director of Facilities denied the request with a signature bearing a date of March 27, 2008. The same process took place again on April 11 for 8.0 hours on April 7. Petitioner notes that this request also violated policy regarding custodial leave on the day immediately after spring break, for which leave requests must be submitted well in advance of the leave sought. Article XVII of the contract requires a special procedure for leave on days immediately preceding and following a school holiday, but the emphasis in testimony was on the importance of adequate custodial staff on such days. However, the purpose of this policy is to address the needs of schools with respect to returning students. Because Respondent was not assigned to a school, nor had he been assigned to one temporarily for returning students, he was not undermining this policy by conforming to general policy, which allowed after-the-fact requests. In any event, as the payroll supervisor testified, it is possible that Respondent still had vacation time each time that Petitioner docked him for requesting personal leave charged as sick when he had already exhausted his personal leave. On these facts, Petitioner does not have just cause to discipline Respondent on the ground of insubordination or any other ground. There is no doubt that Respondent understood the interplay between personal leave charged to sick and sick leave, but there is considerable doubt as to, on the first two occasions on which he overdrew on his balance of personal leave charged to sick that he knew that he was doing so. Additionally, there is a reasonable possibility that he had available vacation leave, against which all of this time could have been charged; absent proof from Petitioner precluding this possibility, the entire dispute is reduced to the level of finding the proper account to debit these relatively few hours of missed work. This does not rise to insubordination, nor does it constitute just cause for discipline. Article XXI of the contract requires progressive discipline, which constitutes a verbal reprimand, written reprimand, suspension with or without pay, and dismissal. The next step in progressive discipline for Respondent is suspension with or without pay, not dismissal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Sarasota County, Florida, enter a final order dismissing the charge of excessive use of leave and finding Respondent guilty of the charge of sleeping while on duty and suspending him, without pay, for five working days. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Hunter W. Carroll, Esquire Matthews, Eastmoore, Hardy Crauwels & Garcia, P.A. 1777 Main Street, Suite 500 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Lisa J. Kleinberg, Esquire Law Offices of Kleinberg, Ingram & Murphy, P.L. 2189 Ringling Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 34237 Mrs. Lori White, Superintendent Sarasota County School Board 1960 Landings Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 34231-3365 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner: was employed by Respondent as a counselor at the Palm Beach Juvenile Detention Center. In an effort to break up a fight among teenagers while employed on April 14, 1986, Petitioner was pushed against a wall at the Detention Center and sustained an impact injury to the upper portion of his right shoulder and its superior aspect. When Petitioner commenced his employment with Respondent on July 18, 4983, he signed a statement acknowledging receipt of the Department's employee handbook and acknowledging his personal responsibility to review the contents thereof. (Respondent Exhibit 1). That handbook provided, in part, as follows: If you expect to be absent from work for any reasons, you must request leave from your supervisor as much in advance as possible, so that suitable disposition of your work may be made to avoid undue hardship on fellow employees and clients. As soon as you know you will be late or absent from work, you must notify your supervisor. Absence without approved leave is cause for disci- plinary action. If A you are absent for 3 consecutive work days without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned. Following the injury, Petitioner was referred for physical therapy consisting of, among other things, ultra sound and hot packs to the neck and back. Petitioner convalesced from the time of injury during April, 1986 through November 13, 1986 at which time he was released and authorized to return to work by his treating physician. Also, on November 13, 1986, Workers Compensation advised Petitioner that based on his release by his physician, he would not therefore receive further compensation benefits and was therefore to return to work. Petitioner was advised to report for work on November 14, 1986. Petitioner did not heed that directive and report for work. By certified letter dated November 25, 1906, Petitioner was again advised by Karen Christian, Assistant Detention Center Superintendent, that "if we do not hear from you within five (5) days after date of this letter, it will appear that you have abandoned your position". (Respondents Exhibit 3). Petitioner acknowledged receiving the referenced letter from Karen Christian. Petitioner did not return to work as directed and was terminated from employment on December 10, 1986 based on his failure to report to work and his failure to obtain authorized leave from his supervisor to be absent from work. Karen Christian would have offered Petitioner either reduced hours or sedentary duties to accommodate him if, as he contends, he was unable to stand for extended periods or to use his right upper extremity. Petitioner contends that he was unable to report to work inasmuch as the injury he sustained during April, 1986 left him without use of his right arm. Based on Petitioner's claimed loss of use of his right arm, he was referred to three physicians who conducted an extensive examination of Petitioner to determine evidence of any anatomical or physical impairment of Petitioner's upper extremity. All of the examining physicians found no anatomical defect consistent with Petitioner's clinical presentation. Petitioner offered no believable explanation for his failure to report to work on December 8, 9 and 10, 1986 or to otherwise obtain authorized leave for the above-referred three consecutive work days.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner abandoned his position of employment with Respondent and resigned from the career service. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Eddie Harris Post Office Box 9224 Riviera Beach, Florida 33419 K. C. Collette, Esquire Department of HRS 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Adis Villa, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
