The Issue Whether Respondent employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice (discrimination under Section 760.10, Florida Statutes) against Petitioner on the basis of his race (Black/African-American), handicap, or retaliation, and if so, what is the remedy? Although cases arising under the federal Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) may be instructive for interpreting and applying the handicap provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, Petitioner's claim under ADA and any allegations of libel and slander are not within the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lawrence James, Jr., is a Black/African- American. Respondent, The Alachua County Department of Criminal Justice Service, is an "employer" within the definition in Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Respondent operates the Alachua County Jail. Respondent maintains a paramilitary command, advancement, and ranking system for its employees. Petitioner began his employment with Respondent as a Correctional Officer and rose to the rank of Sergeant. On March 2, 1994, an inmate escaped from the Alachua County Jail during the evening shift. As a result of the inmate's escape, several correctional officers were disciplined. Petitioner was disciplined by a reduction in rank April 26, 1994. (P-37) There were allegations that harsher discipline had been meted out to the Black/African-American officers, and the matter was arbitrated, pursuant to the union collective bargaining contract. As a result of the arbitration, in the summer of 1994, it was recommended that Petitioner be returned to his position at the Jail with restoration of rank, but without any back pay. However, at the time of that recommendation, Petitioner already had been terminated for "a non-related infraction of county policy." (P-37) The "non-related infraction of county policy" reason for Petitioner's 1994 termination was not established on this record, but neither was any discriminatory reason proven.2 After Petitioner's 1994 termination, further proceedings ensued, and Petitioner was ultimately restored to his rank and position at the Jail. As part of this restoration, it was agreed the Respondent employer would conduct training and re-orientation sessions for Petitioner, since he had not actively been performing his duties at the Jail for approximately two years. The present case only addresses the discrimination Petitioner allegedly suffered due to race, handicap, or retaliation concerning his leave requests in 1996, and his 1997 termination for unauthorized absence. After his second successful arbitration(s) and/or grievance procedure, Petitioner was eligible to return to work on February 19, 1996. He did not return on that date. Respondent ordered Petitioner back to work on March 13, 1996, at which time Petitioner requested, and was granted, leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). It is not clear if Petitioner ever made Respondent aware that he suffered from high blood pressure, but from the evidence as a whole, it is found that Petitioner notified Respondent in March 1996, that he was suffering from a prior on- the-job injury to his back, diabetes, and depression. Diabetes, as experienced by Petitioner, is a "handicap" within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Clinical depression, as experienced by Petitioner, is a "handicap" within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner contended at hearing that his clinical depression in 1996 was due to his 1994 demotion and termination and the procedures to get his job back and also due to the hostile work environment he anticipated he would face if he returned to work daily in 1996 with people whom he perceived as having lied about him and who had tried to terminate him. It should be noted that Petitioner did not clearly include "hostile work environment" in either his 1998, Charge of Discrimination or his 2000, Petition for Relief. The Florida Commission on Human Relations only considered and referred the instant case upon allegations of discrimination on the basis of race, handicap, and retaliation. From Petitioner's description of his back ailment, it is found that condition also constituted a "handicap" within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. From Petitioner's description of how his back injury affected his daily life and job performance, it is very doubtful that Petitioner was able to physically fulfill the requirements of being a jailor at any time in 1996 until he was terminated in 1997. No evidence was presented with regard to the workers' compensation consequences of this situation. By an April 1, 1996, letter, Respondent's Interim Director of Criminal Justice Service, Richard Tarbox, informed Petitioner that he had exhausted his sick leave credits as of the pay period ending March 31, 1996; that based on Respondent's records, Petitioner would exhaust the balance of his accrued sick leave at the rate of forty hours per week during the pay period ending May 12, 1996; that he was expected to know his available accrued leave credits and to contact his immediate supervisor at least one week prior to the expiration of the current leave period to request leave without pay if he anticipated not returning to work; and that he had been placed on FMLA leave for an indefinite period, not to exceed twelve weeks, which would expire on June 6, 1996. (R-30) The April 1, 1996, letter specifically informed Petitioner that failure to come to work or contact Respondent could be considered abandonment of his position. (R-30) The foregoing instructions concerning "abandonment of position" parallel Alachua County's Personnel Regulations and Disciplinary Policy, hereafter sometimes referred to collectively as "personnel regulations." (P-1). Chapter XIX. 3. OFFENSES AND PENALTIES; c. Group III Offenses No. 8, at pages 5-6, of the personnel regulations had existed prior to Petitioner's 1994 termination, and was in effect at all times material. It provided, Absence of three consecutive work days without proper authorization at which time the employee is considered to have abandoned the position and resigned from the County's employ. The personnel regulations also provided in Chapter XIX. 3. OFFENSES AND PENALTIES; a. Group I Offenses No. 8, at pages 3-4, that the following offense would subject an employee to progressive discipline: Absence without authorization or failure to notify appropriate supervisory personnel on the first day of absence. (Emphasis supplied). This regulation also had remained unchanged since Petitioner's last employment with Respondent in 1994, and was in effect at all times material. Progressive discipline for the first such offense was written instruction, counseling and/or one-day suspension. For the second occurrence, one to five days' suspension was specified. For the third occurrence, up to five days' suspension or discharge was specified. These provisions also had remained unchanged since Petitioner's last employment with Respondent in 1994 and were in effect at all times material. Petitioner was also familiar with the long-standing progressive discipline system of Respondent's personnel regulations. Basically, this system required that discipline first be proposed in writing by a superior. The proposed discipline would go into effect and become actual discipline if the employee did not appear at a hearing to dispute the charges or the proposed discipline. If the employee prevailed at the hearing, the proposed discipline would be rescinded or altered. If the employee did not prevail, the proposed discipline would be reduced to writing in another document, and the employee then had the option of filing a grievance pursuant to the union collective bargaining agreement or of appealing through the personnel system to a citizens' board. While Petitioner had been absent in 1994-1996, a new requirement had been added to the personnel regulations, under Chapter A-299, which required that employees who planned to be absent, must notify their immediate supervisor no later than 30 minutes from the time they are scheduled to report for work. (Emphasis supplied) The "immediate supervisor" or "appropriate supervisory personnel" in Petitioner's situation would have been the lieutenant on his shift. However, Petitioner and Lt. Little, who became his supervisor, concurred that the custom at the Jail always had been to require that employees contact the shift sergeant on the shift preceding an emergency absence, or if that were not possible, to contact the employee's own shift sergeant or anyone else on that shift. Jail custom also provided that the employee who was going to be absent could rely on any person on his shift to deliver his oral message to the employee's supervising lieutenant and that approval or disapproval paperwork would be handled by that lieutenant after notification. On June 6, 1996, Petitioner still had not returned to work. Instead, he requested leave without pay until June 15, 1996. Respondent granted Petitioner's request. This constituted an accommodation of Petitioner's handicap(s) in that he had no remaining earned leave or entitlement to FMLA leave, yet his employer held his position open for his return. On or about June 10, 1996, Anthony F. Greene, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist at Vista Pavilion, a free-standing psychiatric facility, released Petitioner to return to work. He wrote to Respondent's Risk Manager that Petitioner continued to have problems with depression, which might prove "volatile" in a work environment with superiors Petitioner believed had harassed him by terminating and blaming him for the 1994 escape. At approximately the same time, Richard Greer, M.D., medical specialty unexplained, also released Petitioner to return to work, upon the conditions that Petitioner continue to see Dr. Greene on a weekly basis and continue to take his prescriptive medications. By a July 17, 1996, letter (P-4), Interim Director Richard Tarbox notified Petitioner to report for work at the Jail on the evening shift of July 22, 1996. The letter required Petitioner to continue his sessions with Dr. Greene; to continue to take his prescriptive medications; and to take the re- training and re-orientation specified as a result of the resolution of his 1994 termination and return to work. (See Finding of Fact 7.) The July 17, 1996, letter also included the sentence, We are in the process of contacting Dr. Greene to establish a procedure to verify that you continue your sessions with him. Petitioner interpreted this sentence as the employer's promise "[T]o get all my leave slips, find out when I was going to the doctor, my mental condition, and also my medical condition." (TR-Vol.II, pages 175-176) Petitioner's interpretation of this sentence was unreasonable in light of its express language, the context of the remainder of the July 17, 1996, letter, the instructions of the April 1, 1996, letter (See Findings of Fact 16-17), and what Petitioner already knew of the County's personnel regulations and/or the Jail custom requiring him to call in and/or apply for leave to be subsequently approved or disapproved by his supervisor. Nothing in the July 17, 1996, letter altered the requirements of the personnel regulations or the April 1, 1996, letter. Petitioner bore the responsibility to ask for medical leave sufficiently in advance of his absences. On July 22, 1996, Petitioner reported for work at the Jail as instructed and was assigned to an evening shift supervised by Lt. Stover. According to Sgt. Babula, Petitioner also worked under Shift Sgt. Withey at some point in July 1996. However, by July 1996, Petitioner was an insulin- dependent diabetic. He needed to self-administer a shot of insulin each morning and night. To ensure ideal spacing of these two shots, Petitioner almost immediately requested to work the day shift. Respondent accommodated this request concerning Petitioner's handicaps and assigned him to the day shift under Lt. Little and Sgt. Babula, as shift sergeant. Petitioner claimed his handicaps were not accommodated by Respondent, but in addition to approving leave for him from February 19, 1996, to July 22, 1996, not replacing him during that period, and the change of shift made in July 1996, at Petitioner's request, Sgt. Babula testified to approving special shoes for Petitioner due to his diabetes. By September 1996, Petitioner again had used up all of his accrued leave. Accordingly, he had to ask for leave without pay to visit his various doctors, including Dr. Greene. On September 9, 1996, during a therapy session, Petitioner told Dr. Greene that he had been threatened on the job and that he was pursuing resolution of the incident through appropriate channels. The same day, Dr. Greene wrote to Lt. Little, telling him of the threat. The nature of this alleged threat or who made it was not stated in Dr. Greene's letter or at hearing. The letter cleared Petitioner to return to work September 12, 1996. This out-of-court statement to his psychotherapist at that time does not establish the truth of the statement or that Petitioner's superiors made the alleged threat. Also, the threat, if one existed, could not have related to Petitioner's written leave requests, because Petitioner's earliest dispute about leave did not occur until September 13, 1996. (See Finding of Fact 41). The September 9, 1996, date was not related by testimony to any oral or written request for leave or any disciplinary matter in evidence. Petitioner testified to having been threatened on the job sometime prior to September 9, 1996, but he never testified what the threat was, why the threat was made, or by whom the threat was made. Petitioner's witness, Alfred Dickerson, also is African-American. He testified generally that it was "pure hell" at the Jail for anyone who, like himself and Petitioner, had been disciplined due to the 1994 escape and who had prevailed in the resultant grievance activities, but he could not remember any specific incidents involving Petitioner. Moreover, Mr. Dickerson was out of the Jail, on workers' compensation leave, from May 1996 to October 1997, the whole of the material time frame for this case.3 On September 16, 1996, Petitioner submitted an "after the fact" request for leave without pay to Lt. Little, his supervisor, for the previous dates of September 13 and 15, stating thereon that he had been ill those days and that the request was being made because his request to work his days off to make up for the 16 hours of leave he had used on September 13 and 15 had been denied. The request does not specifically mention "flex time." (P-6) "Flex time," as described by both Petitioner and Lt. Little, would have permitted Petitioner to work his days off, instead of taking time off without pay to make up time used to go to his doctors on days he was scheduled to work. However, if an employee asked to use flex time in this way, another employee had to trade days with him, and the exchange would be worked out by the supervising lieutenant. On October 1, 1996, Petitioner was given a "Letter of Warning" by Lt. Little. The Warning reflected that Petitioner's advising a sergeant other than his immediate supervisor, Lt. Little, on September 24, 1996, that he was not coming to work until some personal matters were taken care of, was insufficient notice and was being treated as "absence without authorization" in violation of the personnel regulations. It also stated, It has been standard practice and understood that you must notify your immediate supervisor . . . please be advised that any further violations of this nature may result in docked pay and progressive disciplinary action . . . Attached to this document was a Notice of Disciplinary Action, also prepared October 1, 1996, stating, Disciplinary action taken as a result of the Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action dated blank not filled in. (Except for WARNING) WARNING (Reasons for warning): Violation of Alachua County Personnnel Regulations, Chapter XIX, Section 3, a., Group I, Offense No. 8 'Absence without authorization'. (P-8) The same document notified Petitioner that he had a right to appeal the Warning pursuant to either the personnel regulations or the grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement, as appropriate. Petitioner did not acknowledge receipt of this latter document until October 7, 1996. (P-8/R-19) Also on October 1, 1996, Petitioner submitted an "after the fact" request for leave without pay for September 23- 26 and for September 29-30, to Captain King. The reason for Petitioner's absence September 23-26 was not stated on the formal request, but Petitioner did again state thereon that his request to "flex" his days off had been denied, presumably by Lt. Little. The time for September 29-30 was requested for "personal business and emergency family leave without pay" due to his mother's seeing a doctor about her detached retinas. (P-7) Respondent is not obligated under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, to accommodate Petitioner's family's handicaps.4 On October 21, 1996, a "Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action" was issued by Lt. Little, apparently covering the same date, September 24, 1996, as his October 1, Warning, and adding other dates. The reasons for the proposed discipline given in this October 21, 1996, Notice differ slightly from the content of the October 1, Warning. The October 21, 1996, Notice related that on September 23, Petitioner had spoken to Captain King and Lt. Little, and because his request for leave had been made in advance, Petitioner had been granted the day off; that on September 24, Petitioner had failed to report to work and failed to request an extension of leave, and he was therefore considered to be "absent without authorization" for September 24, 1996. The October 21, Notice further stated that on September 25, Petitioner had called Captain King, requesting leave without pay for September 25 and 26, and because Petitioner had requested leave in advance, Captain King had granted the request covering those two days, but that on his October 1, leave request (see Finding of Fact 44) Petitioner had included two more days, September 29 and 30, which had not been previously authorized. Finally, the October 21, Notice indicated that on September 30, Petitioner had called Lt. Stover to say that he would be reporting to work as soon as he was through testifying to the Grand Jury that afternoon, and that his failure to request leave in advance was being treated as "absence without authorization and failure to request leave without pay in advance." As of this October 21, 1996, Notice, the proposed disciplinary action became suspending Petitioner without pay. Petitioner was offered an opportunity to contest the proposed disciplinary action at a hearing on November 19, 1996. Petitioner acknowledged receipt of this document on October 24, 1996. (R-21) On October 22, 1996, Petitioner wrote to the Interim Director of the Jail, Richard Tarbox. In his letter, Petitioner complained that he had not yet received the agreed re- orientation and re-training. He also discussed his medical problems, including problems with recent changes in his medications and his five-year-old back injury. He requested flex time and related that his life had been threatened by employees on the job (see Findings of Fact 37-40), and that Lt. Little had been informed of the threats and flex time request, but the letter again did not indicate by whom Petitioner was threatened or why. (P-10) Despite Petitioner's after-the-fact written requests for flex time, Lt. Little had no recollection of Respondent ever asking him for flex time. There is no evidence that Lt. Little, Mr. Tarbox, or any other representative of Respondent contacted Petitioner concerning the alleged threat against him or specifically addressed the issues of re-orientation/re-training or flex time. On October 25, 1996, Dr. Greene also wrote Mr. Tarbox. He described Petitioner as cooperative and not evidencing any inappropriate behavior. He reported that Petitioner had voiced no homicidal or vengeance ideation to him. He felt that Petitioner's supervisors' requirement that Petitioner use leave to attend the mandatory therapy sessions with him constituted a paradox and a stressor for Petitioner. He felt that other stressors were the employer's failure to offer re-orientation/ re-training to Petitioner and the employer's failure to contact him, Dr. Greene, to verify treatment purposes and schedules. Dr. Greene requested that Mr. Tarbox clarify Petitioner's treatment and work status to both him and to Petitioner in a timely manner because not doing so was exacerbating Petitioner's physical condition, headaches, and diabetes. He further stated that he could release Petitioner for work without further psychological treatment and that further psychological treatment was not necessary to ensure Petitioner's fitness for work or to prevent his being a risk to others, but that Petitioner would continue in therapy for other purposes. (P-11) Neither Mr. Tarbox nor any other representative of Respondent specifically replied to Dr. Greene's October 25, 1996, letter. However, all leave disputes pending on that date were addressed in a November 22, 1996, letter to Petitioner from Captain King. (See Findings of Fact 57-59.) On October 31, 1996, Petitioner submitted an "after the fact" request for eight hours leave without pay for leave he had taken on October 30, 1996, for "emergency dr. app't for work related injury, and lab work for diebetic [sic] condition." (P-14) At some point, a leave form for eight hours leave without pay on November 9, 1996, was prepared. It indicates that Petitoner was "unavailable to sign." This form was disapproved by Lt. Little and by Mr. Tarbox on November 12, 1996. Apparently Petitioner only signed the request on November 26, 1996. (P-21) On November 14, 1996, Petitioner submitted a request for two hours leave without pay for November 15, 1996, for "work related condition, Dr. Greene." (P-15) On November 19, 1996, Petitioner submitted a request for two hours leave without pay for November 22, 1996. The request was approved by a supervisor on November 19, 1996. (P-17) On November 22, 1996, Captain King issued a "Letter of Warning" to Petitioner. It stated that on November 19, 1996, a disciplinary hearing had been held (see Finding of Fact 47) regarding the October 21, Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action, addressing Petitioner's absences on September 29-30, 1996, and that because Petitioner had proven that he had attempted to contact his supervisor in advance of his absence, the September 29 violation was being withdrawn. With regard to the September 30 violation charged, it was found that Petitioner had contacted Lt. Stover and informed him that Petitioner would return to work after testifying before The Grand Jury, and since Petitioner had not returned to work on that day after testifying, he was being found guilty as charged for violation of Alachua County Personnel Regulations, Chapter XIX, Section 3. a. Group I, Offense No. 8, "Absence without authorization and failure to request leave without pay in advance." The November 22, 1996, letter went on to warn Petitioner that future violations would be more carefully scrutinized for strict adherence to the policy of notification and that failures on Petitioner's part might result in progressive disciplinary action being taken. (P-20) Because prior discipline had been overturned or rescinded, the November 22, 1996, Letter of Warning was technically Petitioner's first violation/discipline. Also on November 22, 1996, Petitioner submitted to Lt. Little a leave request form, dated the same day, labelled "FOR INFO.," with supporting documentation, including Dr. Hunt's certificate showing Petitioner had been treated on November 4, and November 22, 1996, had office management of HTN/NIDDM hematuria, a pending IVP and urology consult, and would need to be seen again by Dr. Hunt in 4-6 weeks. The language of one attachment showed Petitioner "is under Dr. Hunt's continual care," but nothing specified any period of time Petitioner intended to take off from work for the pending consultation or any other purpose. (P-19) Petitioner testified that his November 22, 1996, leave request was not intended to request any leave at all when he submitted it, but that it should have alerted his supervisors that Petitioner had a growth between his legs that was potentially malignant and that he needed an operation sometime in the future. A reasonable person would not have concluded this from the four corners of the November 22, 1996, written request with attachments dated for past medical appointments. Petitioner also testified that by submitting the November 22, 1996, leave request "in blank" and explaining orally to Lt. Little what he intended to do was his effort to comply with the requirement that he ask for leave in advance of taking it. This testimony shows that Petitioner at this point understood the employer's prior instructions to request leave in advance. Apparently, Petitioner envisioned only having to phone in to get any member of his shift to fill in the blanks on his November 22, 1996, request form, but he admitted he had never before used a blank leave request in this way. Petitioner further testified that he had told Mr. Tarbox and other supervisors at a meeting (probably one of his disciplinary hearings) before Christmas 1996, that he "did not know how long he could work." While this representation of Petitioner is credible and it may be reasonably inferred that Mr. Tarbox understood Petitioner was debilitated to some degree by the growth and might need an operation sometime in the near future, it does not logically follow that all those hearing Petitioner at that time understood that his oral statement related to the November 22 blank leave request which had attached to it only information about past doctors' appointments and potential, undated, future consultations. Petitioner's vague statement at the meeting/hearing did not comply with the letter of the personnel regulations nor the custom at the Jail for requesting leave. The blank November 22, 1996, leave request marked "FOR INFO" also did not comply with the letter of the personnel regulations nor the custom at the Jail. There is no requirement that Respondent grant Petitioner an open-ended request for leave or one that specifies no time period at all. Petitioner's November 22, 1996, blank leave request was never approved. On November 26, 1996, Petitioner also acknowledged receipt of a "Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action," by which Lt. Little and Mr. Tarbox recommended that Petitioner be suspended without pay.5 Petitioner was again offered an opportunity to contest this proposed disciplinary action at a hearing on December 3, 1996. (P-18) The record is silent as to whether a disciplinary hearing was actually held on December 3, 1996. Petitioner submitted a leave form on December 6, 1996, for 2.5 hours "vacation" leave without pay on December 3, 1996, for a "Conference with doctor to try an [sic] stop continued disciplinary action because of illness doctor approved." (P-23) On December 3, 1996, Petitioner had telephoned Lt. Little to ask if his message had been received. He then reported to work at 10:00 a.m. Respondent's business records (P-22) show the following: Petitioner worked December 4-5, some of December 6, and all of December 7, 1996. He was not required to be at work on December 8-9. He called in sick on December 10-11. On December 12, he reported for work and attended five hours of drug policy training. Then he left for medical reasons and later called in to say he was too sick to return to work. On Friday, December 13, Petitioner called in sick, saying he was going to the doctor for a cut foot. He later called in again and was told that he needed to do his timesheet and it was agreed he would do it and have it in the following Monday. Petitioner was absent on Saturday, December 14. He was not required to be at work on December 15-16, 1996. On Monday, December 17, Petitioner did not phone or appear for work. On December 18, Petitioner phoned in, saying he had to wear bedroom slippers and had domestic problems. On December 19, Petitioner called in late and left a voice message on the Jail phone. On Friday, December 20, Petitioner called in on time but said he would not be in until Tuesday of the following week. He gave no reason. He was not required to be at work on December 22-23. On December 24, 1996, Petitioner did not come to work or call in. On Christmas Day, Petitioner called in before shift and stated he would not be in that day or the following day, December 26, 1996, until 10:00 a.m. On December 26, December 27, and December 28, Petitioner did not report for work or call in. Petitioner was not required to work December 29 or 30, 1996. On December 31, Petitioner called and said that he would not be in that day but would call back to talk to the shift lieutenant. He did not do so. Also, Petitioner did not report for work or call in for January 1 through 4, 1997. Most of this business record was substantiated by the direct testimony of Sgt. Babula and Lt. Little who observed the events and wrote most of the business record. The matters that were not confirmed in their direct testimony were supported by the type of hearsay that explains or supplements direct evidence and is admissible in this type of proceeding. Petitioner acknowledged that the business record was essentially correct as to days he was absent in December 1996, and January 1997. Petitioner's testimony only varies the foregoing business record to the effect that on December 10, 1996, not December 13, 1996, Petitioner called and spoke with Sgt. Withey, stating that he would not "be back [to work] until [he had] seen and heard from [his] doctors," and related to Withey that he had some problem with his foot. Petitioner assumed that his superiors would get this message and would understand that he meant he was exercising the blank November 22, 1996, leave request. (See Findings of Fact 60-66). His superiors did not infer from this message what Petitioner had hoped they would. A reasonable person would not infer all that from the information Petitioner says he provided Sgt. Withey. It is uncontested that Petitioner did have an injury to his foot at this time and that such injuries can be particularly hazardous to persons who, like Petitioner, suffer from diabetes. From December 4, 1996, onward, Petitioner did not speak directly with his lieutenant, although he had been repeatedly instructed to do so in order to request advance leave. Petitioner did not return to work after December 7, 1996. Despite the personnel rules, custom at the Jail, and prior direct orders by warning and disciplinary action letters, Petitioner submitted no leave slips directly to his superiors after December 6, 1996. Instead, he submitted them to his union shop steward and to a County Commissioner, although he had no reason to believe the Commissioner had any authority over Jail personnel matters. Respondent never authorized leave for Petitioner after December 13, 1996. Petitioner's extended absence without authorization was in violation of Respondent employer's long-standing "three day abandonment rule." There had been no word from Petitioner since December 31, 1996, so between January 17 and January 24, 1997, a "Notice of Disciplinary Action" was issued against Petitioner for [V]iolation of Alachua County Personnel Rules and Regulations, Chapter XIX, Section 3, c., Group III, Offense No. 8 'Absence of three (3) consecutive work days without proper authorization at which time the employee is considered to have abandoned the position and resigned from the County's employ.' The proposed discipline was termination, and again, Petitioner was offered the opportunity to contest the proposed final agency action at a hearing to be convened on February 18, 1997. (P-25) Sometime in January 1997, Petitioner saw a Master of Social Work, because Dr. Greene was on educational leave. Petitioner was so upset that the social worker advised him to focus on his medical problems. Apparently, Petitioner leapt to the conclusion that meant his doctors would handle all his leave-related problems. Sometime in January 1997, Petitioner had successful surgery on the growth between his legs. On January 27, 1997, Dr. Greene saw Petitioner in therapy and notified Mr. Tarbox in writing that, Mr. Lawrence James was seen for an appointment today in my office. He is apparently unable to continue working in what is perceived to be a hostile work environment at the jail. Compounded by his medical problems and what seems to be a lack of responsivity and accommodation by the administration, Mr. James' level of emotional distress has considerably increased since our last communication. It is strongly recommended that he take a leave of absence from the workplace until his condition is improved. He is scheduled to return next week for continued intervention. Thank you for your time and attention. (Emphasis supplied) (P-26) Dr. Greene testified that it was Petitioner's combined mental and physical circumstances which caused him to recommend the leave of absence. The January 24, 1997, Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action was mailed to the last address Petitioner had given Respondent. On January 30, 1997, Petitioner's mother signed the certified mail receipt for the January 24, 1997, Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action. Sometime thereafter, she delivered the Notice to Petitioner, who no longer lived with her. He refused to deal with it. Dr. Brient removed a suture from Petitioner's leg on February 4, 1997. This seems to have related to Petitioner's post-surgery release after removal of the growth between his legs. Petitioner did not then return to work. Because Respondent's principals had not recognized Petitioner's mother's name on the certified mail receipt, they caused the January 24, 1997, Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action to be served on Petitioner by a Deputy Sheriff. Petitioner received this personal service on February 5, 1997, and told the Deputy that he would not deal with the Notice of Disciplinary Action, but his doctors would. Having been released as a result of his operation, there was no physical reason Petitioner could not have appeared for the February 18, 1997, hearing to present any opposition to his proposed termination based on "the three day abandonment rule." He did not appear. On February 21, 1997, Petitioner was mailed a "Notice of Dismissal," effective that date and signed by Harry Sands, a new Interim Director, for abandoning his position, in violation of the personnel regulations. The Notice of Dismissal gave Petitioner the option of appealing his termination through the employee appeal system or the collective bargaining grievance procedure. Petitioner did not take either appeal route. However, Petitioner did suggest to another Jail officer that those who had done this to him might need to get a pine box, i.e. coffin. The threat was not deemed worthy of prosecution by the State Attorney's Office. Petitioner testified, without corroboration, that he never received the promised re-orientation or re-training associated with re-instatement to his job. No witness gave any clear indication of what the re- orientation and re-training, as contemplated by the re- instatement agreement (see Finding of Fact 7) or as contemplated by Mr. Tarbox's July 17, 1996, letter (see Finding of Fact 29), was supposed to include. Lt. Stover did not remember any specific training he gave Petitioner, nor did Lt. Little, but Lt. Little testified that he was present when, before Petitioner first arrived on Lt. Stover's shift in July 1996, the Captain had ordered them both to "bring [Petitioner] up to speed." Petitioner suggested that failure to re-orient and retrain him evidenced Respondent's discrimination against him. His post-hearing proposal also asserts that due to Respondent's failure to train him in "new" personnel regulations, combined with Respondent's requirement that he adhere to those regulations which Jail custom did not normally follow, constituted disparate treatment and/or discrimination against him on the basis of his race or due to retaliation, and/or failure to accommodate his handicap. This perception is unpersuasive in light of the employer's repeated correspondence urging him to take the training, whatever that training might have been. Despite Mr. Tarbox's failure to reply to Petitioner's October 22, 1996, inquiry about training (See Finding of Fact 48), Petitioner's perception of discrimination was not established as fact. From the evidence as a whole, it is more probable that any failure to train Petitioner was the result of his request to change shifts, and thus, lieutenant-supervisors in July or his frequent absences. The record does not make clear whether the re-orientation/re-training requirement was unique to Respondent, who returned in 1996, or applied to all four of the returning African-American officers restored in 1994, but Petitioner did not demonstrate that any White/Caucasian or non-handicapped employee ever got any more re-orientation/re-training than he did. He did not establish that any White/Caucasian or non-handicapped employee ever got any more re-orientation/re-training than the other restored African-American officers, handicapped or otherwise. He also did not establish that any other restored African-American officer, handicapped or otherwise, received more re- orientation/re-training than he did. Moreover, contrary to Petitioner's testimony, Sergeant Babula testified credibly that he had at least instructed Petitioner with regard to the new payroll forms when Petitioner changed shifts in July 1996. Payroll forms include calculating hours worked and monies owed. Testimony and business records also show Petitioner had five hours of drug policy training. (See Finding of fact 72). Also, Respondent did not discipline Petitioner for his failure to request leave of specific personnel as required by the only new personnel regulation, until after Petitioner had been instructed in writing to do so. These written instructions may not have constituted complete "re-orientation" or "re- training," but they were direct orders sufficient to instruct Petitioner what was expected of him. (See Findings of Fact 16, 29, 43, 46-47, 57-59). Lastly, based on Petitioner's testimony that even if he had known he was required by a new regulation to request leave from his lieutenant-supervisor he would not have followed that regulation but instead would have considered himself bound by his union contract and by the custom of asking for leave of anyone on his shift at the Jail, it appears that any failure of Respondent to specifically "train" Petitioner concerning new personnel regulations had no effect on his subsequent failure to comply with the employer's expectations concerning its leave policy. Petitioner had admitted in evidence a certified copy of a "Second Superceding Indictment" issued by a federal Grand Jury on February 27, 2001. It was not established that this was the same Grand Jury before which Petitioner testified in 1996. (See Finding of Fact 47). The indictment (which is only a charging document, not a conviction) named Nate Caldwell, Respondent's former Director; Samuel Krider, Respondent's former Assistant Director; Garry M. Brown, a former Captain with Respondent; and Charles Scott Simmons, a former Lieutenant with Respondent, for conspiracy to obstruct justice by violating 18 USC Section 1503, by hindering the court and jury in a federal civil rights action brought by Mr. Dickerson against the Alachua County Board of County Commissioners. Mr. Dickerson's federal case arose out of Mr. Dickerson's demotion in rank with Petitioner in connection with the 1994 escape. It was not established that any of the indicted officials held office during the time material to Petitioner's instant case, 1996- 1997, or that any of them had anything to do with Petitioner's 1996 leave disputes or 1997 termination. Indeed, it was established that Sands or Tarbox was Interim Director at all times material. The indictment mentions Petitioner and Captain King, a superior of Petitioner at all times material, but neither Petitioner nor Captain King were indicted. Despite the lack of clarity of Petitioner's and Mr. Dickerson's testimony, the undersigned infers from their testimony and the indictment that Petitioner testified concerning the same matters before the Grand Jury in 1996 and that prior to 1996 Petitioner had been a witness in Mr. Dickerson's federal discrimination case against the County Commissioners. However, Petitioner testified that his retaliation allegation herein is not based on his 1996 testimony before the Grand Jury. Rather, Petitioner asserted at hearing that he believed he had been retaliated against by his superiors in 1996-1997 for speaking at 1993 meetings of the County Commission concerning structural and staffing problems at the Jail, and otherwise he did not know why he had been retaliated against. (TR-Vol. I pp. 229-233).
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Petitioner has not proven discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2001.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner should be treated as having abandoned his employment with the Respondent?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was a Career Service employee with the Respondent. The Petitioner received a copy of an Employee Handbook upon his employment with the Respondent. The Handbook informed the Petitioner of the rules governing absences from work, including the rule providing that an employee will be treated as having abandoned his position if absent for 3 days without authorized leave. The Petitioner was employed as an Investigator in the Child Support Enforcement Office of the Respondent in Inverness, Florida. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Shirley Barker. In June, 1986, the Petitioner suffered a seizure. The Petitioner subsequently underwent surgery for the removal of a brain tumor in June, 1986. The Petitioner returned to work following his surgery on approximately September 15, 1986. Ms. Barker determined that the Petitioner's performance was not up to standard and discussed the need for additional leave with the Petitioner. The Petitioner's physician agreed that it would be beneficial for the Petitioner to have additional time to recover from his surgery and recommended an additional six months leave of absence. The Petitioner signed a Report of Personnel Action indicating that he was going to take leave without pay. The Petitioner's leave was effective October 13, 1986, "for a period of 6 months with return pending medical reevaluation." This leave of absence ended on April 13, 1987. During the Petitioner's 6 months leave of absence he was given a monthly medical evaluation by his physician. In December, 1986, the Petitioner met with Ms. Barker and told her that he planned on returning to his position with the Respondent when his physician approved his return. The Petitioner did not, however, tell Ms. Barker when he would return or request an extension of his 6 months leave of absence. In March, 1987, the Petitioner met with Barbara Jordan, a supervisor in the Child Support Enforcement Office of the Respondent. This was the Petitioner's only meeting during 1987 with any employee of the Respondent. During this meeting the Petitioner did not indicate when he would return to work or request an extension of his 6 months leave of absence. By letter dated April 16, 1987, Herbert R. Hildreth, Sr., Human Services Program Manager, and Ms. Barker's supervisor, informed the Petitioner that his 6 months leave of absence had expired. The Petitioner was also informed that he should advise the Respondent by April 26, 1987, of his intentions concerning his employment with the Respondent. Mr. Hildreth's letter of April 16, 1987, was received by the Respondent on April 21, 1987. The Petitioner did not respond to Mr. Hildreth's letter of April 16, 1987, prior to April 26, 1987. By letter dated April 30, 1987, Judith Mesot, Deputy District Administrator of the Respondent, informed the Petitioner that the Respondent considered the Petitioner to have abandoned his Career Service position with the Respondent because the Petitioner had been on unauthorized leave since April 10, 1987. By letter dated May 27, 1987, the Petitioner informed the Respondent that his physician had informed him during a May 20, 1987, appointment that he could return to work on a part-time basis. At no time between October 13, 1986, and April 13, 1987, did the Petitioner inform the Respondent when he intended to return to work or request an extension of his 6 months leave of absence. The first time that the Petitioner informed the Respondent that he was ready to return to work was in his May 27, 1987, letter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued concluding that the Petitioner, John Blackford, has abandoned his position with the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. DONE AND ORDERED this 15th day of January, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2617 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 2. 3 and 4 To the extent that these proposed facts were proved by the evidence, see finding of fact number 3. 5 and 6 4. 7 5. 8 Hereby accepted. 9 and 10 6. 11 7. 12 Although the Petitioner testified that he met with Ms. Barker within one day after his monthly examina- tions, the weight of the evidence failed to support this testimony. See 8. Even if the Petitioner had met with Ms. Barker as often as the Petitioner indicated, the Petitioner still did not return to work or obtain approval of his absence after April 13, 1987. 13 and 14 To the extent that these proposed facts were proved by the evidence and are relevant, see finding of fact number 9. Most of these proposed findings of fact are not relevant, however. 15 10 and 12. 16 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 1. 2 6. 3 10 and 11. 4 Hereby accepted. 5 11. 6 12. 7 13. COPIES FURNISHED: Don Royston, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District III Building H 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32609 John Blackford 3199 East Quail Court Inverness, Florida 32652 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Agustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner received a salary overpayment from Respondent for leave usage to which he was not entitled, as set forth in correspondence dated April 26, 2013; and, if so, whether Respondent is entitled to a repayment for the salary overpayment made to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bruce Deterding, was an employee of the Department of Health, having served as an executive director of a medical practice board, making him a Select Exempt Service (SES) employee. Petitioner entered into a settlement agreement with the Department on December 19, 2012. The agreement required Petitioner to resign his position with the Department effective February 28, 2013, and included the following conditions: Petitioner's last day in the office would be December 18, 2012, one day preceding the signed settlement agreement; and Petitioner was required to utilize 384 hours of accrued annual leave beginning on December 19, 2012, and ending on February 27, 2013. Petitioner did not participate in the preparation of the settlement agreement, but agreed to its terms by his signature. The agreement was signed by the Division of Medical Quality Assurance Director Lucy C. Gee on behalf of the Department. From December 19, 2012, through February 28, 2013, Petitioner performed as obligated under the agreement. The Department paid Petitioner for the 384 hours of leave as required by the agreement. Petitioner relied on the Department's representations that he would be able to purchase his former military service time from the State Retirement System and retire with 30 years of state service on the resignation date set forth in the agreement. Petitioner demonstrated through a screen shot of his personnel records in the "PeopleFirst" system that he had an available balance of 428 hours of annual leave at the time he entered into the settlement agreement with the Department. The Department's employee verified through PeopleFirst that sufficient hours of leave were available prior to presenting the settlement agreement offering to pay 384 hours of leave to Petitioner. The Department notified Petitioner by a letter dated April 26, 2013, that he had received salary overpayments. Specifically, the letter stated that two payments in the amounts of $1,262.48 and $1,717.56, dated February 22, 2013, and March 8, 2013, respectively, had been erroneously made to him. Petitioner, as an SES employee, received 176 hours of annual leave on his leave accrual anniversary date of July 1 each year. In 2010, Petitioner received an annual leave accrual of 176 hours on June 18, 2010, and a second annual leave accrual on July 1, 2010. On April 26, 2013, Petitioner had a telephone conversation with Meshelle Bradford, one of the Department's payroll employees, concerning potential salary overpayments. During that conversation, Petitioner acknowledged he had received the two salary accruals totaling 352 hours on June 18 and July 1, 2010. Petitioner testified that he assumed he was the beneficiary of an "extraordinarily good hire date" which entitled him to receive leave on his former (from his previous state employment) and new leave accrual dates. The Department conducted a payroll and leave audit after the date of Petitioner's resignation and separation from the agency. The audit revealed that Petitioner had been overpaid for annual leave hours that he had accrued in 2010 by mistake. Petitioner had been paid for annual leave he used in February 2013, when he had exhausted all of his accrued leave. During the two-week pay period of February 1 through 14, 2013, Petitioner received pay for 58.5 hours of leave he did not have available, and for the two-week pay period of February 15 through 28, 2013, Petitioner received pay for 80 hours of leave he did not have available, resulting from the double accrual of leave in June and July 2010. The Department's position is that Petitioner should have been in leave without pay status for the 58.5 and 80 hours of leave for which he was paid in February 2013. The calculated overpayment for the unavailable leave is $2,980.04. The Department seeks reimbursement from Petitioner for that amount. Petitioner disputes that he owes any amount due to the fact he entered into a settlement agreement that delineated the payments to be made by the Department to him as a condition of his resignation. The Department's Agency Attendance and Leave Policy, in section VI.D.3, states: "It is the employee's responsibility to maintain an accurate accounting of their leave balances."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Health requiring Petitioner to repay the overpayment of salary in the amount of $2,980.04. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark John Henderson, Esquire Department of Health 2585 Merchants Row, Room 110J Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Bruce Milton Deterding 4841 Old Bainbridge Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Althea Gaines, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Jennifer A. Tschetter, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 John H. Armstrong, M.D., F.A.C.S. State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact From July 1946 until his retirement from the state career service system on June 30, 1983, Petitioner was an employee of the Department of Labor and Employment Security or its predecessor agencies (the Florida Industrial Commission, the Department of Commerce, and the War Manpower Commission), hereinafter collectively referred to as the Department. The Department, at the time of Petitioner's initial employment, established and administered its own leave policies. Subsequently, the Florida Merit System was expanded to cover all state agencies, including the Department, and uniform personnel policies and practices, including the accumulation of annual leave, were established. Effective July 1, 1957 the accumulation of annual leave for employees of the Department, as with employees of all state agencies, was limited to 240 hours. Initially, Merit System leave regulations provided that leave accumulated by employees of agencies with existing leave regulations, such as the Department, would be credited to their accounts as of July 1, 1957, but any accumulated leave in excess of 240 hours would become void after December 31, 1959. At the behest of the Department, the deadline within which excess accumulated leave had to be utilized was extended to December 31, 1961. Essentially employees were afforded four and one-half years within which to utilize their excess accumulated annual leave or forfeit it. Upon his retirement June 30, 1983, Petitioner was paid for, and had computed as part of his Average Final compensation; the annual leave he had accumulated up to a maximum of 240 hours in accordance with Rule 22A-8.10, F.A.C. That rule, or its predecessor, has contained the same 240-hour limitation since December 31, 1961. Petitioner asserts that he had accumulated leave in excess of 240 hours on December 31, 1961. While the evidence does establish Petitioner had excess leave on that date, there was no competent evidence presented from which his actual leave balance could be established. The actual amount of Petitioner's excess leave is not, however, significant since any annual leave he had in excess of 240 hours was void after December 31, 1961. Notwithstanding the voiding of his excess annual leave, Petitioner asserts that his entitlement to such leave still exists because of certain assurances he received from his supervisors. According to Petitioner, he was unable to utilize his excess leave between July 1, 1957 and December 31, 1961, because he was on "special assignments" for the Department which precluded his absence from work. Consequently, Petitioner says, `his supervisors "assured" him that they would see to it that he "got his excess leave." It is worthy of note that the supervisors who purportedly gave such assurances have been dead for over a decade, that there exists no corroborating evidence of Petitioner's assertions, and that at no time during the ensuing 23 years did Petitioner raise any issue concerning, or attempt to use, the leave which had been forfeited. It is further worthy of note that while purportedly assured he would "get his excess leave," Petitioner received no assurance he would be paid for it upon retirement. It is unnecessary to decide whether such assurances were in fact given. The evidence is clear that the supervisors in question had no authority, real or apparent, to bind the State by such assurances. Further, any reliance Petitioner may have placed on such assurances would not have been reasonable, since such assurances were contrary to existing regulations.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed a unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on an alleged disability in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent initially hired Petitioner as a legal secretary in 1997. At that time, Petitioner worked in Respondent's office in Chipley, Florida. Petitioner suffered no continuing medical problems in 1997. In a memorandum dated April 17, 2001, Respondent's staff advised Petitioner that employees using more leave than they had earned would have to be place on "leave without pay" for the time used in excess of time earned. In a letter dated May 14, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent that she intended to resign her position as a legal secretary effective May 25, 2001. Petitioner wrote the letter because she was moving to Apalachicola, Florida. Instead of accepting Petitioner's resignation, Respondent offered and Petitioner accepted a transfer as a legal secretary in Respondent's office in Port St. Joe, Florida. Petitioner was able to continue working for Respondent without a break in service. In the summer of 2002, Petitioner began to suffer from an unexplained shortness of breath. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent knew the cause for the symptoms Petitioner was experiencing. By letter dated October 9, 2002, Respondent once again advised Petitioner that she could not use more leave time than the amount she earned. On at least one occasion, Petitioner's excessive time-off caused a reduction in her salary for "leave without pay." In a memorandum dated October 11, 2002, Respondent's staff documented concerns about Petitioner's attendance and performance. One of the concerns was Petitioner's chronic failure to file reports in a timely manner. Petitioner was late in filing the reports even though Respondent allowed her to prepare them at home and send them to Respondent by facsimile transmission from her husband's place of business. In February 2003, Petitioner still did not have a medical diagnosis to explain why she was sick and unable to work. On or about February 13, 2003, Petitioner and her supervisor agreed that Petitioner would take leave without pay pending an excuse from a doctor that she was unable to work. Petitioner's testimony that Respondent offered to let Petitioner have an indefinite leave of absence is not persuasive. On March 12, 2003, Petitioner provided Respondent medical documentation, excusing her from work due to unspecified illness through March 17, 2003. On or about March 14, 2003, Petitioner was admitted to the hospital. Subsequent medical tests revealed blood clots in Petitioner's lungs. Petitioner was eventually released from the hospital with prescriptions for blood thinning medication and oxygen. On or about March 20, 2003, Petitioner sent Respondent a doctor's excuse by facsimile transmission. The doctor's note, dated March 18, 2003, excused Petitioner from work for two weeks. On or about April 2, 2003, Petitioner sent Respondent a doctor's excuse by facsimile transmission. The doctor stated that Petitioner had been hospitalized with a serious condition called pulmonary embolus and that she continued to have significant symptoms of shortness of breath and fatigue. The doctor's note stated that Petitioner would not be able to work for six weeks. On May 5, 2003, Jackie Pooser, Respondent's Administrative Director, talked to Petitioner by telephone. Ms. Pooser advised Petitioner that she needed to provide another doctor's excuse by May 8, 2003, if she was still under a doctor's care and unable to return to work. Otherwise, Respondent expected Petitioner to resume her duties in Respondent's office in Port St. Joe, Florida. Petitioner was Respondent's only secretary in Port St. Joe, Florida. That office was in dire need of a performing secretary. However, apart from her illness, Petitioner was not anxious to return to work in the Port St. Joe office because she had a personality conflict with the only full-time attorney who worked there. During the May 5, 2003, telephone conversation, Petitioner did not tell Ms. Pooser that she was disabled or request any on-the-job accommodation. Instead, she led Ms. Pooser to believe that she intended to return to her job when authorized to do so by her doctor, hopefully in June 2003. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that she never requested that Respondent provide her with any type of accommodation. In a letter dated May 6, 2003, Ms. Pooser confirmed the May 5, 2003, phone conversation. In the letter, Ms. Pooser further reminded Petitioner that her medical excuse expired on May 8, 2003. The letter referred to the Public Defender Classification & Pay Plan requirements for a doctor's excuse without which an employee is considered to have abandoned his or her employment position. Petitioner's medical excuse expired on May 8, 2003. Petitioner did not return to work or provide Respondent with further medical documentation. On May 16, 2003, Respondent verbally terminated Petitioner by telephone. A follow-up letter dated May 19, 2003, stated that Petitioner's work performance had not been satisfactory for some period of time. The letter also stated that Petitioner had abandoned her position by failing to provide Respondent with a doctor's excuse. Petitioner's testimony that she requested her physician to send the medical excuse directly to Respondent by facsimile transmission is not persuasive. Petitioner did not call Respondent to inquire whether Respondent received the excuse or to offer any other explanation for failing to send medical documentation to Respondent. Petitioner's doctor subsequently released her to return to work. Petitioner received unemployment compensation for at least one month. In August 2003, Petitioner began working for a real estate company, checking guests into resort rentals. She resigned that job after working for one month. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that she was not disabled when she worked for Respondent. According to Petitioner, she was diagnosed as being disabled in October 2003, after experiencing further medical problems. However, Petitioner has provided no competent (non-hearsay) evidence of that diagnosis. Respondent's attendance and leave policy states as follows in relevant part: STATEMENTS OF POLICY * * * The granting of any leave of absence with or without pay shall be in writing and shall be approved by the proper authority within the Public Defender Office. An employee who is granted leave of absence with or without pay shall be an employee of the Public Defender while on such leave and shall be returned to the same position or a different position in the same class and same work location upon termination of the approved leave of absence, unless the Public Defender and the employee agree in writing to other conditions and terms under which such leave is to be granted. Any leave of absence with or without pay shall be approved prior to the leave being taken except in the case of an emergency where the employee must be absent prior to receiving approval from the proper authority for the absence. * * * (b) If an employee's request for leave of absence is disapproved and the employee takes unauthorized leave, the Public Defender may place the employee on leave without pay and after an unauthorized leave of absence for 3 consecutive workdays may consider the employee to have abandoned the position and resigned from the Public Defender's Office. * * * 3.14 FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE In accordance with the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) regulated by the U.S. Department of Labor, eligible employees can receive up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave during any 12-month period for the following reasons: . . . taking care of one's own serious health condition. Employees are not required to take all 12 weeks at once. The employee may request a few days or weeks off at a time (referred to as intermittent leave) or continue to work on a part-time basis (reduced leave). Unless written medical justification deems it necessary, the Public Defender is not required to grant intermittent or reduced leave. * * * (4) Employees must provide reasonable notice (30 days if possible) and make an effort to schedule their leave so as not to unduly disrupt agency operations. The Public Defender may request progress reports from the employees regarding leave status. * * * (7) The Public Defender may require certification from a healthcare provider regarding the need for medical leave, as well as certification of an employee's fitness to return to work. From August 1, 2002, through May 16, 2003, Respondent approved 518 hours or 12 weeks and 38 hours of leave without pay. During the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that she received the leave without pay. Her testimony that she was not familiar with the above-referenced policies is not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Florida, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Herman D. Laramore, Esquire Public Defender, Fourteenth Circuit Jackson County Courthouse Post Office Box 636 Marianna, Florida 32447 Christian C. Griggs 130 25th Avenue Apalachicola, Florida 32320
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent should be suspended and dismissed from employment, as a Microsystems Technician, with Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact No dispute exists that, at all times material hereto, the School Board was a constitutional entity charged with the duty to operate, control and supervise the public schools within the school district of Miami-Dade County, Florida. In November 2001, Mr. Li was employed with the School Board as a Microsystems Technician. No dispute exists that, as a Microsystems Technician, Mr. Li is an educational support employee, and his employment is governed by the collective bargaining agreement between the School Board and AFSCME, hereinafter the AFSCME Contract. In April 2004, Mr. Li was assigned to two worksites, Cypress Creek Elementary School, hereinafter Cypress Creek, and Blue Lakes Elementary School, hereinafter Blue Lakes. At both schools, his responsibilities included installing computers, running the network, maintaining the software for the computers, and training students and teachers on how to use the software. At Cypress Creek, Mr. Li was assigned to work ten (10) days per month. He experienced problems with his attendance immediately at Cypress Creek, resulting in the principal, Faye Haynes, issuing an “Absence From Worksite Directive,” hereinafter AWS Directive, on May 27, 2004, to Mr. Li. The AWS Directive included, among other things, in detail his leave without pay, authorized (LWOA), and leave without pay, unauthorized (LWOU). Further, the AWS Directive advised Mr. Li, among other things, that his absence from his duties adversely impacted the educational and work environment; and directed him, among other things, to be in regular attendance at the school and on time, to report his intent to be absent directly to the principal or assistant principal, and to provide to the principal or assistant principal written documentation, by way of a written medical note from the treating physician, of absences for illness. Additionally, Mr. Li was advised that future absences would be considered LWOU unless and until the documentation was provided. Mr. Li signed the AWS Directive. However, his attendance failed to improve. A second AWS Directive was issued by Principal Haynes to Mr. Li on September 7, 2004, as a result of his being absent on September 2, 2004. Mr. Li signed the second AWS Directive on the same date. The second AWS Directive included the same matters of which he was previously advised and the same directives. Moreover, Mr. Li was advised that his non- compliance with the directives would be considered a violation of professional responsibilities or insubordination. Mr. Li’s absences failed to improve, and his absences adversely affected the worksite at Cypress Creek. Both teachers and students were suffering from the lack of timely computer- associated activities that were dependent upon Mr. Li timely performing his responsibilities. Mr. Li’s attendance was complicated even more on October 26, 2006. He was arrested for burglary, involving a vehicle, and battery. At the time of his arrest, Principal Haynes was not aware that the reason for Mr. Li’s immediate absence was that he was in jail; she was only aware that he had not reported to work at Cypress Creek. Mr. Li testified at hearing that, while he was in jail, he was given one (1) telephone call and that he called his wife. He explained to his wife what had happened and requested her to call Cypress Creek. Further, Mr. Li testified that his wife called Cypress Creek and indicated that he had been arrested. No testimony was presented contradicting the testimony that Mr. Li’s wife had contacted Cypress Creek. His testimony is found to be credible. On November 1, 2006, Principal Haynes issued and mailed to Mr. Li an Employment Intention Memorandum, hereinafter EI Memorandum. The EI Memorandum indicated, among other things, the dates of Mr. Li’s absences; that the absences were unauthorized and warranted dismissal on the grounds of job abandonment; that several options were available (indicating the options); and that an immediate response was requested to any of the options. Principal Haynes was concerned that Mr. Li was in danger of losing his job due to the number of unauthorized absences and, as a result, she included, as one of the options, a form requesting a leave of absence without pay. Mr. Li testified that he did not doubt that Principal Haynes was attempting to help him. On November 3, 2006, after serving ten (10) days, Mr. Li was released from jail. He had missed seven (7) consecutive workdays. Mr. Li reported to work at Blue Lakes, where he was also the Microsystems Technician. However, he was informed by the principal at Blue Lakes that he was required to report to Regional Center V, as an alternate location, a consequence of his arrest. Being at Regional Center V, Mr. Li was not able to perform any duties and responsibilities at either Cypress Creek or Blue Lakes. Regarding the EI Memorandum, Mr. Li testified at hearing that he received the EI Memorandum after he was released from jail, but did not complete the form requesting a leave of absence without pay because he was unsure as to whether he should complete and return it. He was not sure as to whether completing the form would benefit or harm him, so he did not complete it. His testimony is found to be credible. The evidence is clear and convincing that Mr. Li intentionally did not complete the form requesting a leave of absence without pay. Not having the services of Mr. Li adversely impacted Cypress Creek. Principal Haynes needed the computer services for her school, and, to provide the needed services, she was forced to hire another school employee, a Microsystems Technician, on an hourly basis to work in the evenings to perform Mr. Li’s responsibilities. In order to pay for the needed services being provided by another Microsystems Technician, Principal Haynes had to redirect funds from other programs. As a condition of his alternate placement, on November 3, 2006, Mr. Li executed a Terms and Conditions of Administrative Placement at Alternate Location, hereinafter Terms and Conditions, form. Included in the Terms and Conditions was a requirement that he report to his work assignment during his regular duty hours, which were 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Monday through Friday; that he report his attendance by signing-in as directed; that, if he was to take leave due to illness or personal reasons, he must notify the person to whom he reports his attendance in the mornings, who was the administrative director, Melanie Fox, Ph.D., or, according to Dr. Fox, to an administrative secretary; and that he must complete and return work assignments in a timely manner. Mr. Li had attendance problems immediately at Regional Center V, and Dr. Fox advised and reminded him that he was able to apply for leave for a medical condition, if he had such a situation. Due to Mr. Li’s absences, while he was assigned to the Regional Center, on January 19, 2007, Dr. Fox issued him a second EI Memorandum, which was his second EI Memorandum in less than three months. The EI Memorandum indicated that Mr. Li was absent from his worksite 34 times, beginning with September 15, 2006, and ending with January 18, 2007. Furthermore, Dr. Fox indicated, among other things, in the EI Memorandum that the absences were unauthorized and warranted dismissal on grounds of abandonment; that he had four options to which she requested his immediate reply, including notifying her of his need for leave and his intended date of return, requesting leave or resigning, using the forms provided; that he had three days in which to reply; that his absences were considered unauthorized until he communicated directly with her; and that his failure to respond would result in termination due to abandonment. Included with the EI Memorandum, per the School Board’s policy, was a Request for Leave for Absence Without Pay form and a Letter of Resignation form, as options for Mr. Li. He did not complete either form. To determine whether Mr. Li’s absences were authorized or unauthorized, Dr. Fox was guided by the terms of the AFSCME Contract. No dispute exists that the AFSCME Contract was applicable and controlling. Dr. Fox determined that, according to the AFSCME Contract, after the covered employee’s sick leave is expended, any subsequent absence becomes unauthorized unless the employee provides a note from an attending physician. As a result, Mr. Li had expended his sick leave and, therefore, his absences were leave without pay, unauthorized, but, when he provided notes from an attending physician, the absences were changed in the payroll reporting system to leave without pay, authorized. Mr. Li returned to work. However, his absences did not cease. As to Mr. Li’s arrest for burglary, involving a vehicle, and battery, on March 6, 2007, he pled nolo contendere to battery; adjudication was withheld; and his sentence included one-year probation, performing community service, and participating in an anger management program. Mr. Li testified at hearing that no burglary was involved, only a fight. His testimony is found to be credible. On May 16, 2007, a conference-for-the-record, hereinafter CFR, was held to address Mr. Li’s attendance problems; violation of School Board Rule 6Gx13-4E1.01, Absences and Leaves; abandonment of position; insubordination; a review of his record; and his future employment status with the School Board. He did not attend the CFR due to being ill, i.e., passing kidney stones and experiencing great pain. A written Summary of the CFR was prepared, and Mr. Li was provided a copy of it. He does not deny that he received a copy of the Summary of the CFR. Included in the Summary of the CFR were Mr. Li’s absences for the 2005-2006 school year and from July 1, 2006 through May 3, 2007. For the 2005-2006 school year, he was absent six (6) sick days, six (6) personal days, nine (9) days LWOA, and one (1) day LWOU, totaling 22 days, excluding vacation days. From July 1, 2006 through May 3, 2007, he was absent two (2) sick days, three (3) personal days, 68 days LWOU, and 37 days LWOA, totaling 110 days, excluding vacation days. A copy of School Board Rules 6Gx13-4E1.01, Absences and Leaves, and 6Gx13-4A-1.21, Responsibilities and Duties, were attached to the Summary of the CFR. Also, included in the Summary of the CFR were directives to Mr. Li concerning his absences, which was his third time he was being issued directives. The directives included being in regular attendance and on time at the worksite; communicating directly with Dr. Fox when he intended to be absent; documenting absences for illness through a written medical note from his treating physicians presented to Dr. Fox upon his return to the worksite, with a failure to do so resulting in the absences being recorded as LWOU; and adhering to School Board rules, in particular 6Gx13-4E-1.01, Absences and Leaves, and 6Gx13-4A-1.21, Responsibilities and Duties. Furthermore, in the Summary of the CFR, Mr. Li was advised, among other things, that the number of absences were deemed excessive; that his absence from work had adversely impacted the educational program and the effective operation of the work unit; that, if he had attended, he would have been provided an opportunity to respond with reasons for his excessive unauthorized absences and insubordination; that noncompliance with the directives would necessitate a review by the Office of Professional Standards, hereinafter OPS; and that a legal review by the School Board attorneys might result in recommended action or disciplinary measures, including dismissal. Even after receiving the Summary of the CFR, Mr. Li’s problem with absences continued. As of June 13, 2007, he accumulated an additional 29 unauthorized absences. Subsequent to the CFR, Principal Haynes recommended the termination of Mr. Li because she determined that she could not depend upon him and that she needed a dependable Microsystems Technician at Cypress Creek. The Regional Superintendent for Region Center V concurred in her recommendation. OPS concurred in the recommendation because it considered Mr. Li’s conduct to violate the AFSCME Contract and the School Board’s rules regarding Responsibilities and Duties, Code of Ethics, and Absences and Leaves. As to the unauthorized absences, Mr. Li’s deposition was taken by the School Board, and, during the deposition, he presented documents purporting to excuse some of the unauthorized absences. Further, at hearing, he presented additional such documents. Mr. Li testified that his personnel file should have contained all of the documents that he had presented; that he requested his physicians to provide the documents to Cypress Creek; that his physicians informed him that they were not required to indicate the specific nature of the illness for which they were treating him but required only to indicate that they were treating him on the dates indicated; and that his physicians forwarded the documents to Cypress Creek, some by fax. The School Board agreed to accept the documents as demonstrating that the absences indicated on the documents should be excused and changed to authorized absences. Even with the changing of the documented absences from unauthorized to authorized, the School Board asserts that the total number of unauthorized absences is 74. The 74 unauthorized absences include 12 days that Mr. Li was in jail and appeared in court, which were brought to the attention of the School Board by Mr. Li. No dispute exists that Mr. Li had exhausted all of his sick and personal leave. Mr. Li does not contest that the total number of unauthorized absences is 74. The evidence demonstrates that Mr. Li had 74 unauthorized absences. However, at hearing, Mr. Li testified that he wants the reason known as to the medical reason for his absence from the worksite. He testified that the reason for the unauthorized absences, excluding the aforementioned 12 days, was that he was suffering from depression, which caused his immune system to weaken, which lead to other health problems, such as being susceptible to viruses and infections. Also, he testified that he was being seen by a psychiatrist. Furthermore, Mr. Li testified that, prior to his arrest, he was participating in the Employee Assistance Program, hereinafter EAP, due to his depression, and was being seen by a counselor; and that he continued in the EAP until his termination. Additionally, Mr. Li testified that he failed to complete the Request for Leave of Absence Without Pay form provided by Dr. Fox on January 19, 2007, because he was unsure as what might happen if he completed it since Dr. Fox had indicated to him that she did not believe that he was ill. Moreover, Mr. Li testified that he was not attempting to dispute the 74 unauthorized absences and to have the unauthorized absences changed to authorized absences, but that he was attempting to demonstrate that he was not a “bad person,” that he was not faking his illness, that the absences were not on purpose, and that he was not insubordinate. The undersigned finds Mr. Li’s testimony to be credible. The undersigned provided Mr. Li with the opportunity to continue the hearing in order for him to have his psychiatrist and counselor testify in this matter; however, Mr. Li decided not to take advantage of a continuance but to proceed with the hearing without the psychiatrist and counselor as witnesses. Even though the undersigned finds Mr. Li’s testimony regarding his depression credible, in particular, as to the effect of his depression on his physical well-being, and even though depression undoubtedly affects one’s mental well- being, including one’s thinking process, no testimony was presented as to what extent Mr. Li’s depression affected his thinking process. The evidence demonstrates that Mr. Li was physically ill during the absences, except for the 12 absences he was in jail and appeared in court. The evidence demonstrates that Mr. Li was not in regular attendance and on time at his worksite. As to the unauthorized absences, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Li failed to provide documentation, regarding his illness, through the production of written medical notes from his treating physicians. The evidence demonstrates that Mr. Li failed to communicate his unauthorized absences to Principal Hayes or Dr. Fox and that he intentionally failed to communicate his unauthorized absences to them. The evidence fails to demonstrate that Mr. Li refused to request a leave of absence. The evidence demonstrates that he did not request a leave of absence because he was unsure as to whether such a request would benefit or harm him, especially when Dr. Fox informed him that she did not believe that he was ill, but at the same time, providing him with the request. An inference is drawn and a finding of fact is made that Mr. Li’s failure to request a leave of absence was reasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Miami-Dade County School Board enter a final order suspending and dismissing Jorge Li from employment with it. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of January 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Janeen L. Richard, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Jorge Li 11458 Southwest 109th Road, Apt. X Miami, Florida 33176 Dr. Rudolph F. Crew, Superintendent Miami-Dade County School District 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, No. 912 Miami, Florida 33132-1394 Dr. Eric J. Smith, Commissioner Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether the Respondent's layoff of Petitioner was in compliance with Chapter 11, Florida Statutes and Chapters 22A-10 Florida Administrative Code. Whether the Respondent's layoff of Petitioner should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Vernon K. Yon, was laid off by Florida State University on June 12, 1975 and has subsequently been unemployed. The layoff of Petitioner came as the direct result of the elimination of Petitioner's position, Stores Manager, Legislative Position Number 20156, from the working capital account of Respondent. The deletion of Petitioner's position and the layoff of Petitioner was approved by the Respondent's personnel director, the Chancellor of the State University System and the State Personnel Director. Petitioner was the only employee within the classification of Stores Manager in the Respondent Agency. The Agency reported to the State Personnel Director the name of Petitioner and Petitioner was placed on the appropriate State Layoff Register. The Agency's funded vacant positions do not include the position of Stores Manager and the Agency has taken no action to recreate such a position or to interview or employ any individual in the position since its elimination on June 12, 1975. The State Personnel Information Vacant Position Report dated January 5, 1976 showed Position Classification 0625, Stores Manager, Pay Grade 22, at Florida State University vacant. The Position Classification of Stores Manager was removed from the working capital account of the Agency but was retained in the University Auxiliary Reserve Account in the University Budget Office. Thus, the Position is subject to being re-established, and should such position be re- established, Petitioner Yon would have had first right of recall to that position if such position had been established within twelve (12) months from the date of layoff. Two positions were abolished at the time that Petitioner's position was abolished - the position of Stores Manager and the Storekeeper position. There were twenty-two (22) layoffs at the time of the reorganization, some of whom went to other positions with Respondent Agency but all left the Maintenance Section in which Petitioner was employed. Petitioner contends: That his position has not been abolished as required by Chapter 110, Florida Statutes; that the Respondent Agency continues to hold the Position in its Auxiliary Reserve Account; that the Department of Administration Division of Personnel Procedures of Florida Statutes 110, do not support the procedure of holding abolished positions in a Reserve Position status. The position is shown on the personnel records to be vacant. That the evidence does not show that there was a shortage of funds or a material change in the organization of the agency. That the Petitioner was not granted fully re-employment rights as to demotion or reassignment in lieu of layoff. Respondent Agency contends: That the listing of Petitioner's position as "vacant" is through an error not of the Respondent Agency's making, but is a list kept by the State Personnel Director in the Department of Administration. That Respondent's prior position "Stores Manager" is not a funded position and the retention of such a position as an Auxiliary Position is a mere method or device so that a position of similar or different classification could be established in the future when working capital funds might become available to the Agency. That the Respondent Agency has deleted its sole position of Stores Manager, the position occupied by the Petitioner; that there is no intent to re-establish the position; that no funds are available for re-establishing the position and that Petitioner's layoff came as direct result of the elimination of Petitioner's position through a reorganization caused by a shortage of University funds; that a reallocation of the workload and a reassignment of the responsibilities to a different unit is a more efficient use of University funds. That the action of Respondent Agency is not an action based upon dismissal for cause. That all the procedural requirements were followed and the layoff is valid. The Hearing Officer further finds: That the layoff of Petitioner was a direct result of a shortage of Agency funds and a reorganization brought about as a result of an attempt to conserve Agency funds. That the layoff of Petitioner is not a disciplinary action. That the Respondent Agency has abolished the position of Stores Manager held by Petitioner. That the Respondent Agency has properly followed the requirements of the Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated thereunder.
Recommendation Dismiss the appeal. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Vernon K. Yon 4105 Arklow Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Robert D. Bickel, Esquire Suite 309 Westcott Building Florida State University Tallahassee, Florida 32306 Ronald A. Mowrey, Esquire Post Office Box 3021 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner became an employee of an FRS employer within a calendar month after completing his participation in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) in violation of Subsection 121.091(13)(c)5.d., Florida Statutes (2006)1; whether Respondent's interpretation of relevant statutes is an unadopted rule; and whether Respondent's interpretation of relevant statutes is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to several facts in this proceeding. Respondent is the state agency responsible for administering the FRS. Petitioner was employed as an equipment operator (street sweeper) by the City of Venice, Florida (the City), for more than 35 years until he completed his participation in DROP on January 11, 2007. At that time Petitioner was earning approximately $38,000.00 annually. The City revoked its participation in the FRS effective January 1, 1996, and established a new City retirement plan. The new City retirement plan applies to all employees hired after January 1, 1996. However, the City continued its participation in the FRS for all employees who were members of the FRS prior to January 1, 1996. Petitioner elected to participate in DROP on March 31, 2002. At the conclusion of DROP, Petitioner received a lump-sum payment of approximately $84,279.00 and received monthly benefits until Respondent ceased paying benefits in accordance with the proposed agency action. Petitioner's efforts at reemployment were unsuccessful. On January 31, 2007, the City employed Petitioner to perform the same work he previously performed at a base salary as a "new hire."2 The City assured Petitioner that reemployment would not adversely affect Petitioner's FRS retirement benefits because the City does not consider itself an FRS employer. A member of the City's human resources department contacted a representative for Respondent to verify the City's statutory interpretation. The conversation eventually led to this proceeding. Petitioner was not employed by an employer under the FRS during the next calendar month after completing his participation in DROP on January 11, 2007. Judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law hold that the issue of whether Petitioner is an employee of an FRS employer is a factual finding. When Petitioner began employment with the City on January 31, 2007, Petitioner was not a member of the FRS within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(12). He was not an employee covered under the FRS because he was hired after January 1, 1996, when the City revoked its participation in FRS. On January 31, 2007, Petitioner was not an employee within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(11). Petitioner was not employed in a covered group within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(34). Petitioner did not become a member under Chapter 121, and the City was not a "city for which coverage under this chapter" was applied for and approved for Petitioner. On January 11, 2007, Petitioner ceased all employment relationships with "employers under this system" within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(39). When Petitioner resumed employment on January 31, 2007, Petitioner did not fail to terminate employment with an employer under the FRS system. Petitioner's new employer was not an employer under the FRS system and had not been such an employer after January 1, 1996. After January 1, 1996, the City was not a covered employer for any employees employed after that date, including Petitioner. On January 31, 2007, Petitioner was not an employee of an employer within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(10). The City did not participate in the FRS system for the benefit of Petitioner. The employment of Petitioner by the City on January 31, 2007, had no financial impact on the FRS, and Petitioner did not begin to accrue new benefits with the FRS. Respondent did not demonstrate in the record why the agency's proposed statutory interpretation requires special agency insight or expertise and did not articulate in the record any underlying technical reasons for deference to agency expertise. Nor did the agency explain in the record or its PRO why the issue of whether Petitioner is an employee of an FRS employer is not an issue of fact that is within the exclusive province of the fact-finder. Respondent proposes a literal interpretation of selected statutory terms without explaining legislative intent for the prohibition against reemployment within the next calendar month.3 Respondent's proposed statutory interpretation also fails to distinguish the economic impact in situations involving what may be fairly characterized as a dual-purpose employer; that is one like the City which is part covered employer and part non-covered employer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order reinstating Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits, paying all past due amounts to Petitioner, with interest, and dismissing its request for reimbursement of past FRS benefits from Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2008.
The Issue Whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner contrary to statute on the basis of Petitioner's disability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was diagnosed with cancer in December of 2002, and was on sick leave off and on from the time of her diagnosis until the first part of 2004. Later, after surgery, the Petitioner was on extended leave while she recovered from surgery and later from chemotherapy. In June of 2003, Petitioner was rapidly approaching the end of her available leave, but, more significantly, the end of the leave required to be granted under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). This situation resulted in correspondence between Petitioner and the Department about extension of her leave and her return to work. On June 17, 2003, Jeff Carr, Human Resources Manager for the Department, sent a letter to Petitioner in connection with her medical leave status. This letter advised Petitioner that an agreed-upon extension of leave would cover Petitioner until July 4, 2003. As the latest physician's statement submitted by Petitioner indicated that Petitioner was unable to perform the essential functions of her job, the letter from Mr. Carr advised Petitioner of options available to her: 1) a return to work on July 5, 2003, if she was released by her physician as able to perform the essential functions of her job; 2) resignation if she was unable to perform the essential functions of her job; 3) regular or disability retirement. If Petitioner did not choose one of the three options, she was advised she would be terminated. On June 23, 2003, Petitioner wrote to Beth Englander, District Administrator, requesting additional leave in accordance with her doctor's latest evaluation. A copy of a note from Petitioner's oncologist was attached which stated that Petitioner would need to be off at least six to eight weeks. In addition, Petitioner noted that following completion of chemotherapy she would need additional surgery and would need to make additional requests for leave. Petitioner e-mailed Ms. Englander on June 24, 2003, and Ms. Englander replied that same day. The reply again advised Petitioner of her three options to avoid termination for inability to perform her job. After having been twice advised of her options, Petitioner wrote Mr. Carr on June 27, 2003, advising that she would not finish her chemotherapy treatment until approximately September 1, 2003. However, no estimate was given for Petitioner's medical release to return to work following the additional surgery Petitioner said she would need in her letter to Ms. Englander of June 23, 2003. In her letter of June 27, 2003, Petitioner requested additional leave as what she claimed to be a reasonable accommodation under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Petitioner also said she wanted to work at home in lieu of leave. However, Petitioner provided no doctor's statement to contradict the one she submitted saying that she would be unable to work for six to eight weeks. On July 6, 203, Petitioner wrote Mr. Carr that she was accepting the alternative of retirement. In this letter, Petitioner again stated that she was not finished with treatment and would need additional time to complete the treatment. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted that she was unable to inspect daycare facilities to conduct the inspections required as an essential function of her position. In addition to the regular inspections, initial licensing and relicensing inspections, day care licensing counselors also have to make inspection in response to complaints received by the Department. Petitioner said that, as an accommodation, she wanted to be relieved from conducting inspections and be permitted to process the inspection reports prepared by other counselors and other paperwork. Although Petitioner contended at the hearing that she might have been able to work part-time, she admitted that after submitting the statement that she could not return to work for at least six to eight more weeks she had not gone back to her doctor to ask him to clear her for part-time work. Petitioner also speculated that she could have performed inspections on a part-time basis if she was provided with appropriate protective equipment and a mask. Petitioner stated her desire and request for more time off was because of fatigue. She did not request to work part-time, or protective devices as an accommodation at any time before she chose the option of retirement. Petitioner instituted an action before PERC contending that she was forced to either resign or retire in retaliation for her making of a complaint to Department's inspector general. That action resulted in a recommended order by the PERC hearing officer on April 21, 2004, that recommended that PERC dismiss Petitioner's claim. In that recommended order the hearing officer found as fact that: On June 23, 2003, Welch (Petitioner) sent a letter to District 13 Administrator Beth Englander, which included a doctor's note indicating she needed six to eight more weeks of leave. Englander responded to Welch and told her that, because her leave was exhausted and because of the operational needs of her unit, the Agency would not extend the leave. On June 27, Welch replied to Carr's June 17 letter and asked for accommodation under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The Agency did not specifically respond to this request. However, Welch was not entitled to ADA leave because she could not perform the essential functions of her job in June when she made her request. The full PERC in a final order of May 11, 2004, adopted the recommended order of the hearing officer, including this finding of fact. Petitioner had not been released by her doctor to return to work and perform her duties at the time she chose retirement in July 2003, and admitted that she was not able to come to work at that time.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Florida Commission on Human Relations enter its final order dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Melody Welch 34548 Oak Avenue Leesburg, Florida 34788 Carolyn Dudley, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 6, Room 123 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9070 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On July 8, 1986, Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, sent Petitioner, Shirley Johnson, a letter to confirm her separation from employment as a Human Services Worker II in Pierce Cottage, Unit II, Facility IV, at the Gulf Coast Center in Ft. Myers. At the time, Johnson was a permanent employee of HRS. Her job at Pierce Cottage was to help care for 29 severely profoundly mentally retarded persons. On or about May 6, 1986, HRS' Gulf Coast Center instituted new policies for applying for authorization for leave from work. /1 No longer would Petitioner and fellow employees be required to notify their immediate supervisor, Twila Bevins, of their absence or tardiness. Instead, the employees are responsible only to notify the group shift supervisor on duty at Pierce Cottage. The employee only advises the group shift supervisor of the employee's intent to apply for authorization for leave and the amount and time the leave would be taken. The group shift supervisor does not approve leave. Authorization for leave must be obtained directly from the immediate supervisor, Twila Bevins, by explaining the reasons for the leave request which would entitle the employee to authorization for leave. Application for authorization for leave can be made either before or after the group shift supervisor is notified. However, no leave can be authorized for an employee who did not personally give notification of anticipated absence unless the employee is incapacitated. Petitioner is a mother of six. She also cares for her father, who has heart disease, and for her mother, who is overweight and has limited mobility. After a separation she has been reconciled with her husband, who, after being out of work, is now employed and contributes to the support of the family. On July 2, 1986, Petitioner and her immediate supervisor agreed that Petitioner would have July 3 and 4 off, but would work from 6:30 A.M. to 2:30 P.M. on July 5. Petitioner also was scheduled to work on July 6, 7 and 8, 1986. During the early morning hours of Saturday, July 5, between approximately 1:00 A.M. and 4:30 A.M., Petitioner's father had a heart attack and Petitioner and her husband went with him to the hospital and stayed there while he was being cared for. When they returned home at approximately 4:30 A.M., they were told by Petitioner's mother that Petitioner's brother was in jail in Ocala and that she was very concerned about her son. At her mother's request, Petitioner and her husband agreed to drive to Ocala to bail her brother out of jail. When they arrived in Ocala, Petitioner's husband, who was driving when they arrived in Ocala, was arrested for driving with a license under suspension and was himself put in jail. Petitioner herself then had to drive back to Ft. Myers to get money to bail her husband out of jail, drive back to Ocala to bail him out, and drive her husband back to Ft. Myers, a drive of a total of approximately 600 miles. Petitioner did not work and did not call in to work on Saturday, July 5. She was absent without authorized leave. On Sunday, July 6, 1986, Petitioner called into work at 6:30 A.M. to explain to the shift supervisor why she had been absent the previous day, and to notify him that she would not be in until approximately 10:00 A.M. However, tired from her ordeal the previous day and developing a severe headache, Petitioner did not work on Sunday, July 6. She called in later in the morning and spoke to one of the women working in Pierce Cottage but did not speak to the group shift supervisor. She was again absent without authorized leave. On the following morning, Monday, July 7, 1986, Petitioner called in at 6:25 A.M. to tell the group shift supervisor she would be late getting in to work. However, her headache got worse, and the pain traveled down to her neck and down one side of her body. The pain was so severe that she was crying uncontrollably. Although she still told her husband that she wanted to go to work to avoid any disciplinary problems, he talked her into letting him telephone Pierce Cottage to say that she would not be able to work on July 7. At approximately 6:45 A.M., her husband telephoned the group shift supervisor and told him that Petitioner would not be at work at all that day because of her physical condition. On Tuesday, July 8, 1986, Petitioner still was in approximately the same physical condition. At approximately 7:00 A.M., her husband telephoned the group shift supervisor at Pierce Cottage, reported her physical condition, and reported that Petitioner would not be in to work on July 8. Petitioner's husband also reported that Petitioner would probably have to see a doctor that day. Petitioner did indeed go to the Lee County Health Department on July 8, 1986, to be seen for her physical condition. Petitioner went to the Lee County Health Department because she and her husband could not afford to pay a private doctor. When Petitioner arrived at the Health Department at approximately 2:00 P.M., there was no doctor available to see her. She left at approximately 3:00 P.M. with a note confirming the she had been at the Health Department between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M., and that she needed a follow-up appointment. Although Petitioner still was suffering from a severe headache on Wednesday, July 9, 1986, she went to work, turning in her note from the Health Department. However, upon arriving, she was advised of HRS' July 8 letter confirming her separation from her employment. After reciting the grounds upon which HRS had taken the position that Petitioner should be deemed to have abandoned her position, the letter stated: "In the event it was not your intention to resign from employment, you are instructed to immediately contact me and provide a reasonable and acceptable explanation for your unauthorized absence from your employment." Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on July 5 and 6, 1986. Petitioner was not incapacitated from telephoning her group shift supervisor on July 7 and July 8, 1986. However, under the circumstances, it was reasonable for her to have her husband telephone for her. She did not intend to abandon her position. As of July 2, 1986, Petitioner had 27 hours of annual leave and 8 hours of compensatory time in her accumulative leave records and available for use July 5 - 8, 1986. She also would earn an additional 5 hours of annual leave and 4 hours of sick leave by July 10, 1986. This would have been enough to cover her absences and permit her to be paid during her absences if authorized and approved.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact' and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order granting the petition in this case and ruling that the circumstances of this case do not constitute an abandonment of Petitioner's position. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1986.
