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BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. GLENN R. JOHNSTON, 83-000356 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000356 Latest Update: May 08, 1990

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Glenn R. Johnston, is a medical doctor, holding license number ME0018091. His address is 201 North Lakemont Avenue, Winter Park, Florida 32759. The Respondent obtained his Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Florida in 1966, and his medical degree from Bowman Gray School of Medicine in 1970. He served his internship and a two-year general family practice residency at Jacksonville Naval Hospital while serving in the Navy, and became board certified in family practice in 1973. Subsequently, the Respondent served for four years as Chief of the Family Practice Department at the Naval Regional Medical Center in Orlando. In approximately 1976 the Respondent entered private practice in Orlando with a group of doctors, and began his own medical practice in 1977. The Respondent has been married for sixteen years, and has two children, ages 11 and 13. The Respondent performs his family practice in a responsible manner, utilizing the prescription of narcotics and narcotic pain medications at an overall very low rate. The Respondent has never before been the subject of an investigation by the Department of Professional Regulation, and this is the first proceeding against him and his medical license. Between the dates of approximately July 1, 1980, and June 30, 1981, the Respondent prescribed Dilaudid (4 mg.) hydromorphone hydrdchloride for his patient, Robert Hicks in the quantity of 4499. Between the dates of July 3, 1980, and July 3, 1981, the Respondent prescribed Dilaudid (4 mg.) hydromorphone hydrochloride for his patient, James Everett, in the quantity of 4320. Between the dates of approximately July 3, 1980, and June 10, 1981, the Respondent prescribed Dilaudid (4 mg.) hydromorphone hydrochloride for his patient, Harold Stacy, in the quantity of 2550. Between the dates of approximately October 2, 1980, and November 20, 1981, the Respondent prescribed Dilaudid (4 mg.) hydromorphone hydrochloride, Percodan, and Tylox to his patient, Billy Carr, in the quantities of 1620, 30 and 30, respectively. Dilaudid, Percodan, and Tylox are Schedule II controlled substances pursuant to Chapter 593, Florida Statutes. The Physicians Desk Reference (PDR) states the following relative to Dilaudid: Description: DILAUDID (hydromorphone hydrochloride) (WARNING: May be habit forming), a hydrogenated keton of morphine, is a narcotic analgesic . . . * * * DRUG ABUSE AND DEPENDENCE: DILAUDID is a Schedule II narcotic. Psychic dependence, physical dependence, and tolerance may develop upon repeated administration of narcotics; therefore, DILAUDID should be prescribed and administered with caution. However, psychic dependence is unlikely to develop when DILAUDID is used for a short time for the treatment of pain. Physical dependence, the condition in which continued administration of the drug is required to prevent the appearance of a withdrawal syndrome, assumes clinically significant proportions only after several weeks of continued narcotic use, although some mild degree of physical dependency may develop after a few days of narcotic therapy. Tolerance, in which increasingly large doses are required in order to produce the same degree of analgesia, is manifested initially by shortened duration of analgesic effect, and subsequently by decreases in the intensity of analgesia. The rate of development of tolerance varies among patients. * * * Oral: The usual oral dose is 2mg. every 4 to 6 hours as necessary. The dose must be individually adjusted according to severity of pain, patient response and patient size. More severe pain may require 4mg. or more every 4 to 6 hours. If the pain increases in severity, analgesia is not adequate or tolerance occurs, a gradual increase in dosage may be required. If pain is exceedingly severe, or if prompt response is desired, parenteral DILAUDID should be used initially in adequate amounts to control the pain. The Respondent prescribed Dilaudid to patient Robert Hicks for severe chronic pain associated with multiple medical problems, primarily related to his severe degenerative rheumatoid arthritis. Mr. Hicks, 49 years of age, had a long history of multiple joint pains, degeneration of his normal joints, chronic pain in his joints, swelling and abnormal laboratory tests. He had been diagnosed as having rheumatoid arthritis since 1976 by a neurosurgeon, confirmed by blood tests and x-rays. He was classified as 100 percent disabled in 1977 by the Veterans Administration because of the chronic joint pains of rheumatoid arthritis. He had been seen by numerous doctors and treated with various pain medications including Dilaudid, which was the only drug that allowed him to function. The pains, discomfort and disability that Mr. Hicks suffered were located in most of the joints of his body, especially in his lumbosacral spine, with involvement in the left hip, shoulder areas, both knees and elbows, with swelling and deformity in the hands. Practically every joint in his body was involved. Mr. Hicks frequently used a cane for walking, and occasionally used crutches. He had difficulty in standing from a sitting position and on occasion he used a wheelchair. The Respondent tried several different medications to treat his rheumatoid arthritis, in addition to physical therapy, and used various pain medications, but Dilaudid proved to be the best when used in conjunction with treatment medications that would allow Mr. Hicks sufficient relief to work and function in a reasonably normal life-style. The Respondent prescribed 4 mg. Dilaudid tablets to Mr. Hicks, to be taken in doses within the limits recommended by the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR) in that the overall quantity prescribed for him did not exceed the maximum limit recommended by the PDR. Mr. Hicks also had other medical problems appropriately treated by the Respondent, such as subdeltoid bursitis, lateral ankylosing spondylitis, spondylolisthesis, Reiter's Syndrome, cervical spondylosis and diabetes. The Respondent prescribed Dilaudid in quantities of two pills of 4 mgs. every four hours as needed for pain, to patient James Everett for chronic severe pain stemming primarily from the lower chest wall and left upper abdominal chest wall which followed a transthoracic hiatal hernia repair performed in 1965. Mr. Everett also had angina with a history of one or two myocardial infarctions in 1970; he was on medication for the angina. The hiatal hernia repair left a surgical scar across his entire left chest, extending from the midportion of the back all the way across his chest and ending right above the stomach, at the lower part of the anterior chest wall, with another scar extending from his epigastric region down the mid-rib and into the lower midline area. During the surgical repair, Mr. Everett suffered a collapsed lung and suffered a great deal of scar tissue visible in his chest x-rays in the area where most of the pain is reported. Most of his pain resulted from the surgical scar tissue rather than the angina, as confirmed by a cardiologist. Mr. Everett was a very debilitated, elderly person, older looking than his 60 years, obese, very pale, with a slow gait; he perspired quite a bit and appeared to be a patient with chronic medical problems. Mr. Everett had been taking Dilaudid on prescription from his previous physician when he became the Respondent's patient. The quantity of Dilaudid prescribed for Mr. Everett did not exceed the maximum recommended dosage. The Respondent tried other medications and therapies to relieve the patient's chronic severe pain, with limited success, and used other methods of treatment for the patient's problems, which included diabetes and high blood pressure. Mr. Everett had been classified 100 percent disabled by the Veterans Administration because of his chronic severe pain. The Respondent concluded that Dilaudid was the only pain medication that would give the patient sufficient relief from pain to enable him to continue his employment and to function in his daily life. The Respondent prescribed Dilaudid in quantities of 2 tablets of 4 mgs. every 4 hours as needed for pain, to patient Harold Stacy for chronic severe pain relating to acute possibly pinched, nerve, lumbosacral low back pain with radiation into the left leg and degenerative arthritis, possible spinal cord tumor, early hypertrophic osteoarthritis, and possible hernitated disc. At age 49, Mr. Stacy was semi-crippled, always requiring a cane while walking and always in a great deal of pain. The hypertrophic arthritis was confirmed by calcium deposits visible on x-ray films. Mr. Stacy was never able to function normally, and could not maintain employment without the pain relief the Dilaudid provided. The Respondent used other medications in an attempt to relieve the pain, but found that Dilaudid was the only medication which would allow Mr. Stacy to work and function in as reasonable a fashion as possible. The Respondent treated Mr. Stacy's physical and health problems with an appropriate variety of treatment methods and medications. The quantity of Dilaudid prescribed for Mr. Stacy did not exceed the PDR recommended dosage. The Respondent prescribed Dilaudid, in dosages of 1-2 tablets of 4 mgs. every 4 hours, to patient Billy Carr for relief of chronic severe low back pain, related to chronic lumbosacral spine strain, chronic prostatitis and spondylolisthesis. Mr. Carr, at age 49, walked with a severe limp, had pain in his perineal area, had difficulty in sitting, and had a deformity in one of his legs due to a pseudoarthritis resulting from a malunion of a fracture of his femur. The Respondent tried several different pain medications and treatment methods, but found that Dilaudid was the only medication which would relieve the pain to allow Mr. Carr to work and enjoy as reasonable a life-style as possible. The quantity of Dilaudid prescribed for Mr. Carr did not exceed the maximum PDR recommended dosage. The Respondent is a board certified family practitioner. The Petitioner's expert witness, Dr. Robert Johnson, is a general practitioner who is not board certified. The Respondent's expert witnesses, Drs. Charles Grant, James Louttit and Clarence Bailey, are board certified in family practice and testified as such. All four expert witnesses testified, and it is so found, that a medically justifiable purpose in treating a patient is determined by the treating physician, and means a treatment which enhances the well-being of a patient and enhances the quality of a patient's life, in a manner the physician feels qualified to render. Reasonable physicians differ in the manner of treating the same condition. Reasonable physicians differ in the manner of treating pain. A person's pain is not measurable. A person's pain threshold is not measurable. One method of determining the level of medication needed to relieve a person's pain is by titration, that is, adjusting the quantity and type of medication to the patient's symptoms. Dilaudid is approved by the Federal Drug Administration for the treatment of pain. The Physician Desk Reference (PDR) does not place a cap on the quantity of Dilaudid to be prescribed for a patient in chronic moderate to severe pain. The analgesic effect of Dilaudid shortens with continued use. Some patients require a greater amount of Dilaudid to relieve pain than other patients. It is a medically justifiable purpose to prescribe Dilaudid to a patient for the relief of moderate to severe pain. It is a medically justifiable purpose to continue to prescribe Dilaudid to a patient for chronic moderate to severe pain. It is ethical, and medically justifiable, for a physician to treat a patient who is already habituated or tolerant to Dilaudid, and who has chronic moderate to severe pain, for the purpose of relieving this pain, since the patient should be given relief from the pain. There is no evidence that any of the four patients treated by the Respondent were drug abusers. It was medically justifiable for the Respondent to prescribe Dilaudid to each of his four patients during the time periods alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The quantities of Dilaudid prescribed by the Respondent to each of the four patients during the time period alleged in the Administrative Complaint were neither excessive nor inappropriate. The evidence is not sufficient to support a finding of fact that the Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonable and prudent physician as being acceptable, under the circumstances alleged in the Administrative Complaint. There is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the Respondent engaged in repeated malpractice in the treatment of the four subject patients. Dr. Robert B. Johnson, testifying on behalf of the Petitioner as an expert general practitioner, did not feel that it was medically justifiable for the Respondent to prescribe Dilaudid in the quantities alleged, to each of the four patients, and he testified that such quantities were excessive. However, Dr. Johnson neither saw nor examined the patients, and he was not able to tell from reviewing the patient records how much pain any of the four patients were experiencing. Dr. Johnson also testified that, in his opinion, it is a gross departure from acceptable medical practice to prescribe the quantities of Dilaudid in question to a patient with any history other than terminal cancer, and that it would even be a questionable practice for this purpose; that three months would be the maximum length of time Dilaudid should be prescribed to a patient; and that it is not proper for a physician to continue to treat a patient for chronic moderate to severe pain by prescription of Dilaudid in the quantities and over the time periods alleged in the complaint; yet Dr. Johnson could find no physical harm to any of the four patients resulting from the Respondent's treatment. On the basis of the records reviewed, Dr. Johnson could not testify that the Respondent prescribed the Dilaudid in question other than in the course of his medical practice. The opinions of Dr. Johnson, however, were contradicted by the expert opinions of the Respondent's medical witnesses, Drs. Hailey, Grant and Louttit, except for their agreement that the Respondent's patients suffered no physical harm from their treatment by the Respondent, and that the Respondent prescribed Dilaudid to the four subject patients in the course of his medical practice. Where the expert medical opinions are in conflict, the testimony of Dr. Johnson is rejected as less credible than the opinions of Drs. Bailey, Grant and Louttit.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medical Examiners enter a Final Order finding the Respondent, Glenn R. Johnston, M.D., not guilty of Counts I, IV, VII, X and XIII in the Administrative Complaint, and that the Board dismiss the Administrative Complaint with prejudice. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 30th day of September, 1983. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Spiro T. Kypreos, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire 1114 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 83-356 GLENN R. JOHNSTON, M.D., License No. 12142 Respondent. /

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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STEVEN AND MEGAN WHITE, ON BEHALF OF AND AS PARENTS AND NATURAL GUARDIANS OF JACKSON WHITE, A MINOR vs FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, 18-003020N (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Jun. 11, 2018 Number: 18-003020N Latest Update: Oct. 22, 2019

The Issue Whether Jackson White (Jackson) suffered a birth-related neurological injury, as defined by section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes; and, if so, how much compensation, if any, is awardable pursuant to section 766.31.

Findings Of Fact Jackson was born on August 1, 2014, at Bayfront, in St. Petersburg, Florida. Jackson was a single gestation, weighing over 2,500 grams at birth. Jose Prieto, M.D., was the physician who provided obstetric services at Jackson’s birth. Jackson’s mother, Megan White (Mrs. White), was admitted to Bayfront and her labor was thereafter induced with Pitocin. Her membranes were artificially ruptured 15 hours prior to delivery, with clear fluid present. Delivery was initially attempted vaginally; however, delivery was altered to Cesarean section due to late decelerations and failure to descend and dilate. The records reflect that fetal heart rate decelerations may also have been present. Jackson was delivered in a vertex presentation. Upon delivery, out of a possible score of 10, his Apgar scores were 5, 7, and 8 at one, five, and ten minutes, respectively. Of concern was that his score for “color” was 0 for the first five minutes of life. He was not pink, but rather blue or pale. Additionally, he was not actively responding, but merely grimacing, at the first minute of life. The medical records document that Jackson was experiencing respiratory distress with desaturation. Accordingly, he initially received bulb suctioning, drying, stimulation, and whiffs of oxygen. As he continued to have poor color and perfusion, with grunting and retractions, continuous positive airway pressure by mask was applied. While there was improvement in the oxygen saturation after doing so, Jackson continued to have respiratory distress. Within two hours of birth, Jackson was transferred and admitted to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit at All Children’s Hospital (All Children’s) for further management. Upon admission to All Children’s, it was documented that his oxygen saturations ranged from 96 percent to 100 percent while utilizing a Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) system. His physical examination revealed that he was alert, active, responsive and pink in color. Jackson’s neurologic evaluation upon admission to All Children’s revealed that he was alert, active and responsive with good tone for age; there was symmetrical movement of all four extremities; his reflexes were intact; and that his “[n]eurological examination is appropriate for the baby’s gestational age.” At All Children’s, several chest X-rays were obtained from August 1 through August 3, 2014. Ultimately, the scans revealed that Jackson had a left pneumothorax. Accordingly, the CPAP was discontinued and an “oxyhood was initiated for nitrogen wash out which was discontinued after 22 hours.” Concerned with possible sepsis, Jackson also received seven days of antibiotics. Jackson was discharged home on August 8, 2014. Jackson failed his newborn hearing screen and subsequently underwent repeated testing where he was found to have mild-to-moderate sensorineural hearing loss bilaterally. Jackson has been wearing hearing aids since six months of age. Respondent retained Donald Willis, M.D., who is board- certified in obstetrics, gynecology, and maternal-fetal medicine, to review the available medical records of Jackson and his mother, and opine as to whether there was an injury to Jackson’s brain or spinal cord that occurred in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period due to oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury. In his report, dated July 26, 2018, Dr. Willis set forth the following, in pertinent part: The mother was admitted for induction of labor at term. Amniotic membranes were ruptured with clear fluid. Fetal heart rate (FHR) monitor tracing was not available for review. Cesarean section delivery was apparently done for failure to decent [sic], but NICU notes suggest fetal heart decelerations were also present. Birth weight was 3,630 grams. Apgar scores were 5/7/8. Respiratory distress was present after birth with poor color, grunting and retractions. Bag and Mask ventilation was required and the baby transferred to All Children’s Hospital for respiratory distress. Grunting and retractions continued at All Children’s Hospital. Chest X-Ray identified a left pneumothorax. 100% hood oxygen was started. Intubation was not required. Cultures were obtained to r/o sepsis and antibiotics given for 7 days. Bacterial and viral (HSV) cultures were negative. The newborn hearing screen was failed. No seizures occurred during the hospital stay. Head imaging studies were not done during the newborn hospital course. The baby was discharged home on DOL 8. Hearing evaluation subsequently diagnosed a sensorineural hearing loss. Genetic testing was negative for familial deafness genes. Developmental delay became a concern at about 10 months of age. Genetic evaluation, including microarray, Fragile-X and metabolic work/up was negative. MRI showed delayed myelination. Etiology was uncertain, but a statement indicated “a very subtle degree of remote insult could be considered.” Follow up MRI at 2 1/2 years of age found similar findings. Neurology evaluation gave a diagnosis of chronic static encephalopathy. MRI of the lumbar spine was normal. In summary, the baby had respiratory distress after Cesarean section delivery. Chest X-Ray identified a pneumothorax. Oxygen was given for respiratory distress, but the baby did not require intubation. No head imaging studies were done during the newborn hospital stay. There were no seizures. Sensorineural hearing loss was diagnosed. MRI for developmental delay showed only some delay in myelination. There was no apparent obstetrical event that resulted in oxygen deprivation or mechanical trauma to the brain or spinal cord during labor, delivery and the immediate post- delivery period. After authoring the initial report, Dr. Willis received a copy of the fetal heart rate monitoring strips. After reviewing the same, on August 30, 2018, he authored an addendum to his report, which provides, in full, as follows: The fetal heart rate (FHR) monitor tracing during labor was reviewed. The tracing begins at about 05:17 on 08/01/2014. The baseline FHR was normal at 130 bpm. Uterine contractions were about every 5 minutes. The FHR tracing at about one hour prior to delivery is somewhat difficult to interpret due to attempt to place a fetal scalp electrode (FSE). FHR tracing ends at about 21:18 with delivery about 30 minutes after monitor is discontinued. The FHR tracing just prior to removal of the monitor does not suggest fetal distress. Review of the FHR tracing does not change the opinions stated in the letter above, dated 7/26/2014. There was no apparent obstetrical event that would have resulted in oxygen deprivation sufficient to cause brain injury. Dr. Willis was deposed on May 20, 2019. At his deposition, Dr. Willis affirmed the factual findings and medical opinions in the above noted report. In support of his opinion that Jackson did not sustain an injury to his brain or spinal cord in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period due to oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury, Dr. Willis credibly testified that: 1) Mrs. White’s amniotic membranes were ruptured with clear fluid; 2) the fetal heart rate tracing did not suggest fetal distress; 3) the Apgar scores, although initially low, quickly improved and were inconsistent with an infant that sustained oxygen deprivation or acidosis; 4) Jackson did not exhibit any seizure activity; 5) aside from failing his hearing screen, Jackson did not experience any other organ system failures; and 6) the available MRI reports are inconsistent with Jackson suffering a brain injury at the time of labor and delivery. On May 12, 2017, Jackson presented to Himali Renuka Jayakody, M.D., for a neurological examination. Dr. Jayakody’s office note documents that, “[d]evelopmentally, he had initial normal development but starting around 10 months when he started standing, he appeared very clumsy and was falling over a lot.” After conducting the examination, Dr. Jayakody’s assessment was that Jackson had developmental delay, sensorineural hearing loss, and chronic static encephalopathy. His note further documented that, “[a]part from signal abnormality suggestive of hypomyelination mostly affecting the posterior white matter on MRI, we have not identified any other abnormalities. Clinically, he does not seem to have a progressive disease and has always made improvement over time suggestive of static encephalopathy/cerebral palsy.” NICA also retained Laufey Y. Sigurdardottir, M.D., a pediatric neurologist, to review Jackson’s medical records, conduct an Independent Medical Examination (IME), and opine as to whether he suffers from a permanent and substantial mental and physical impairment as a result of a birth-related neurological injury. Dr. Sigurdardottir reviewed the available medical records, obtained a full historical account from Mrs. White, and conducted and IME on Jackson on August 24, 2018. In her IME report, Dr. Sigurdardottir set forth her factual findings and opinions, which have to be admitted in this matter as part of the stipulated evidentiary record. Her summary findings and opinions are as follows: Summary: Patient is a 4 year old with history of being born via stat C-section due to fetal distress. No clear evidence was present of a neonatal hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy but he has since been diagnosed with cerebral palsy with corresponding MRI findings. His delays are mild in nature. Result as to question 1: Jackson is not found to have substantial delays in motor and mental abilities. Result as to question 2: In review of available documents, there is evidence of fetal distress but no neonatal encephalopathy consistent with a neurologic injury to the brain or spinal cord acquired due to oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury is reported in neonatal period apart from failing newborn hearing screen. Result as to question 3: The prognosis for full motor and mental recovery is good and the life expectancy is full. In light of evidence presented, I believe Jackson does not fulfill criteria of a substantial mental and physical impairment at this time. Petitioner neither testified nor presented any testimony to refute the findings and opinions of Drs. Willis and Sigurdardottir. Their findings and opinions are credited.

Conclusions This cause came before the undersigned upon the parties’ Joint Motion to Submit Stipulated Factual Record in Lieu of a Contested Hearing (Joint Motion), which was granted on May 22, 2019, and the parties’ proposed final orders.

Florida Laws (9) 766.301766.302766.303766.304766.305766.309766.31766.311766.316 DOAH Case (1) 18-3020N

Other Judicial Opinions Review of a final order of an administrative law judge shall be by appeal to the District Court of Appeal pursuant to section 766.311(1), Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original notice of administrative appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed, and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the appropriate District Court of Appeal. See § 766.311(1), Fla. Stat., and Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n v. Carreras, 598 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

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RICHARD W. MERRITT, D.C. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 04-001149RX (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 02, 2004 Number: 04-001149RX Latest Update: Feb. 16, 2006

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B-3.004(2) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Findings Of Fact In 1971, Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage was required to be included in automobile insurance policies and was required to be obtained by anyone operating a motor vehicle in Florida. In general, PIP coverage provides payment for medically necessary treatment, lost wages and funeral expenses incurred by persons involved in motor vehicle accidents. The reasons PIP insurance coverage was made mandatory were to provide for the speedy payment of medical expenses, lost wages and burial expenses that an individual might incur as a result of being injured in a motor vehicle accident and to reduce the amount of litigation involved in recovering such expenses. Responsibility for such speedy payment rested with the various insurance companies involved in writing motor vehicle insurance. Until 1980, the PIP system operated in a reasonably cost-efficient manner. However, fraud and paying for medically unnecessary medical tests or treatment were problems under the PIP system. In the past, at the option of a given insurance company, such unnecessary testing or treatment resulted in payment, denial of the claim, and perhaps litigation for the denied claim. By the mid-1980s, for a variety of reasons, the PIP system became less cost efficient. The average Florida PIP claim rose by 33 percent and the amount of premium per insured vehicle needed to cover PIP claims rose by 35 percent. Such increases led to higher premiums for the driving public, as well as larger numbers of motorists not carrying PIP coverage, estimated to be around 22 percent of Florida drivers. Indeed since 1999, State Farm Insurance Company, one of the largest insurers of motor vehicles, has experienced an average $100,000,000.00 loss per year. In 2001, the Legislature enacted a fee schedule for certain medical services and tests, including a fee for SEMG. The legislature did not limit the number of times a particular service or test could be used. The 2001 legislation did not solve the problems of continued claims and payment for tests or services that were not medically necessary or overutilized. The 2001 legislation also did not solve the problem of the cost ineffectiveness of companies litigating the issue of whether a particular test was medically necessary or overused. Consequently, during the 2003 legislative session, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 627.736(5)(b)6., Florida Statutes, which provides: The Department of Health, in consultation with the appropriate professional licensing boards, shall adopt, by rule, a list of diagnostic tests deemed not to be medically necessary for use in the treatment of persons sustaining bodily injury covered by personal injury protection benefits under this section. The initial list shall be adopted by January 1, 2004, and shall be revised from time to time as determined by the Department of Health, in consultation with the respective professional licensing boards. Inclusion of a test on the list of invalid diagnostic tests shall be based on lack of demonstrated medical value and a level of general acceptance by the relevant provider community and shall not be dependent for results entirely upon subjective patient response. Notwithstanding its inclusion on a fee schedule in this subsection, an insurer or insured is not required to pay any charges or reimburse claims for any invalid diagnostic test as determined by the Department of Health. The statute was intended to relieve an insurance company of the burden of paying for or litigating the medical necessity of diagnostic tests that the Department listed in a to-be- developed rule. There was no evidence suggesting that the Legislature intended the words used in the statute to have any meaning other than their ordinary meanings. In order to implement the statute, the Department commenced rulemaking pursuant to the legislative directive in Section 727.736(5)(b)6. Florida Statutes. As a starting point, the Department asked the insurance industry to provide a list of diagnostic tests that the insurance industry believed should be in the rule. The list contained four tests--Spinal Ultrasound, Nerve Conduction Velocity (NCV) Studies, Somatosensory Evoked Potential, and Dermatomal Evoked Potential. SEMG was not included on the insurance industry’s list. SEMG is a method of measuring the electrical output of muscles through the placement of electrical sensors on the skin. In general, a muscle at rest has a lower amount of electrical activity than a muscle that is being worked or contracted. Similarly, muscle spasms have more electrical activity associated with them than a muscle at rest. On the other hand, muscle contracture, which is the condition of a muscle at rest that has been permanently shortened and generally hardened through some process, has a different level of electrical activity associated with it than with muscle spasms. There are two types of SEMG, used for different purposes. Neither type of SEMG relies on subjective patient input. Static EMG uses a hand-held device with probes as an assessment (or muscle scanning) procedure to take a quick measure of muscle tension. Although in most cases hand palpation of a muscle gives a practitioner all the necessary information needed to diagnose a patient, SEMG can augment hand palpation when palpation is not determinative and help differentiate contraction from contracture. SEMG, also can assist in determining the need for the more comprehensive application of dynamic SEMG and generates a graphic, recorded reading of muscle tension. Dynamic SEMG is used to document and verify injury, to determine if the patient is injured, and, in concert with other diagnostic procedures, establish the level or the extent of injury. Once a treatment plan is developed and implemented, SEMG testing is used to monitor a patient's response to treatment. Dynamic SEMG provides an objective tool to evaluate the function of paraspinal muscles of injured persons, including those involved in motor vehicle accidents. On July 25, 2003, the Department published a notice for a workshop for proposed Rule 64B-3.004 in volume 29, no. 30 of the Florida Administrative Weekly. On August 29, 2003, the Department re-noticed the workshop in Volume 9, no. 35 of the Florida Administrative Weekly. The workshop was held on September 9, 2003. The draft rule presented at the workshop listed the four tests submitted by the insurance industry. The draft rule did not include SEMG. However, based on comments made during the workshop, some of which came from a chiropractic representative of the Florida Chiropractic Association, SEMG was included in the next iteration of the draft Rule. The next public iteration of the rule appeared in a Notice of Proposed Rule published on Friday, November 14, 2003, in Volume 29, No. 46 of the Florida Administrative Weekly. SEMG appeared for the first time in the November 14, 2003 notice. The proposed rule was, according to the Notice, based “[u]pon review of the testimony provided at the workshop, input received from the Boards, written opinions by members of the health care and insurance communities, and literature in support thereof.” The Notice also announced a public hearing for 9:00 a.m. on Tuesday, November 18, 2003. Additionally, the record for submitting information regarding the proposed rule was held open for 21 days after the November 14, 2003, publication date to give interested persons an opportunity to submit information. During the time the record was held open, the Department received some evidence and studies indicating that SEMG was not useful, or at a minimum, unnecessarily redundant in the diagnosis of the type of injuries often incurred in an automobile accident. However, the Department also received some evidence and studies that SEMG was useful in the treatment of such injuries, particularly when bio- feedback is being employed in treatment. Oddly, on December 2, 2003, prior to the official closure of the record, the final rule was transmitted to the Secretary of the Department for signature and approval for filing with the Secretary of State. In due course, the rule was filed with the Secretary of State and became effective on January 7, 2004. Rule 64B-3.004, as adopted by the Department states, in relevant part, as follows: 64B-3.004 Diagnostic Testing. For the purposes of Section 627.736(5)(b)6., F.S. (2003), the Department of Health, in consultation with the appropriate licensing boards, hereby adopts the following list of diagnostic tests based on their demonstrated medical value and level of general acceptance by the provider community: * * * (2) Surface EMG is deemed not to be medically necessary for use in the diagnosis of persons sustaining bodily injury covered by personal injury protection benefits. * * * Specific Authority 627.736(5) FS. Law Implemented 627.736(5) FS. History - New 1-7- 04. The rule only applies to SEMG when used for diagnostic purposes. The rule does not apply to SEMG when used in the treatment of PIP-covered automobile accident victims. Petitioner, Richard Merritt, is a Doctor of Chiropractic, licensed in Florida, Texas, and Alabama. Prior to the adoption of Rule 64B-3.004, Dr. Merritt billed $130,000 to $160,000 per year for SEMG tests. Dr. Merritt has used SEMG in his practice since the 1980s. Thirty-five percent of Dr. Merritt’s patients have been involved in motor-vehicle accidents. Curiously, Dr. Merritt performs SEMG on all of those patients for which PIP insurance generally pays. Again, curiously, only ten percent of his remaining patients have SEMG that may or may not be covered by other insurance. However, the evidence was not clear as to the differences between patients sustaining injuries in motor-vehicle accidents and other non-accident patients. Dr. Merritt suggested that motor-vehicle accident patients generally have more complicated or layered medical histories than patients who have not been involved in motor-vehicle accidents. No evidence was presented on this alleged difference which seems to be a very dubious distinction between patients. The Florida Insurance Council, Inc.; the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America; The American Insurance Association; The National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies; The Florida Automobile Joint Underwriting Association; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; Allstate Insurance Company; Government Employees Insurance Company; The Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Companies; Liberty Mutual Insurance Group; First Floridian Auto and Home Insurance Company; and United Service Automobile Association have standing to intervene in this proceeding. Florida Insurance Council, Property and Casualty Insurance Association of America, and the American Insurance Association, all have a substantial number of members affected by the rule. These associations exist, in part, to protect their member's interests in legislative and regulatory matters involving insurance. The subject matter of this rule is within the associations' scope of interest and activity and they are often involved in these types of rule challenges. Intervenor, Florida Automobile Joint Underwriters Association (JUA), is the automobile residual market in Florida. The JUA makes PIP available to high-risk customers and operates as a standard insurance company under its governing statutes and rules. All the individual companies that sought to intervene in this proceeding pay claims under PIP provisions. Both the JUA and the individual companies are directly affected by the rule. The rule affects rates and premiums which are calculated based in part on loss experience. Loss costs are affected by the rule because the rule regulates what must be paid under PIP coverage. Additionally, the rule affects the profits and losses of individual companies. The issue in this case is limited to a consideration of whether the inclusion of SEMG on the “list of diagnostic tests deemed not to be medically necessary for use in the treatment of persons sustaining bodily injury covered by personal injury protection benefits” is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Accordingly, the place to start is with the language of the statute being implemented. § 627.736(5)(b)6., Fla. Stat. As indicated earlier, there was no evidence that the Legislature intended the words used in the statute to have any meanings other than their ordinary meanings. Thus, by reading the statute, it is clear that the tests to be included in any proposed rule must be “diagnostic tests.” It is undisputed that “diagnosis” and “treatment” in the medical area are different procedures and refer to different aspects of providing medical care to a patient. When used in a medical context, the term “diagnosis” means the art of distinguishing one disease from another or the determination of the nature of or cause of disease or injury, whereas the term “treatment” means the management and care of a patient for the purpose of combating disease or disorder. See Dortland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 27th Ed. (1988) and Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, 26th Ed. (1995). In short, there is a diagnosis phase of medical care wherein a practitioner uses various tests, procedures and historical information to determine the nature, i.e. what the patient’s condition is and/or how severe the condition is, and the cause, i.e. automobile accident or fall, of a given disease or condition. Distinct from the diagnostic phase there is a treatment phase of medical care wherein a practitioner, through tests, therapies, procedures and medicines manages or cares for a patient’s condition. However, in their ordinary usage, the terms “diagnosis” and “treatment” can overlap. In ordinary usage, the term “diagnosis” does not differ significantly from the medical term and means the art or act of identifying a disease from its signs and symptoms. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1984). The term “treatment” means “the act or manner or an instance of treating someone or something: HANDLING, USAGE.” Id. The term “treat” means to “deal with.” Id. In its ordinary sense, “treatment” has a broader meaning than it does in its medical sense and can include diagnosis. Thus, in this case, the tests referred to in the statute are diagnostic tests used in handling or dealing with a person who has been physically hurt in a motor vehicle accident. Also, by giving the term “treatment” its ordinary meaning the Department has the authority to differentiate between the appropriateness of a diagnostic test used in the medical diagnostic phase and the same test used in the medical treatment phase. In this case, SEMG, especially static SEMG, is used as a test in both the medical diagnosis and treatment phases in dealing with persons injured in a motor vehicle accident. Therefore, it is a diagnostic test that may be considered under the other criteria of the statute. For a test to be included in the rule it must be medically unnecessary, based on a lack of demonstrated medical value and a lack of general acceptance by the relevant provider community and not be dependant for results entirely from subjective patient response. As can be seen, the statute does not deal with the overuse of a given test, but only defines medical necessity by the three criteria listed above. In reality, some types of test overuse may only be determined on a case-by-case basis, since whether a generally or occasionally, medically beneficial test is useful or redundant at a particular time in treatment or diagnosis depends greatly on the reasons the test is being employed. Thus, if a test has a degree of medical value, it cannot be on the list; if a test has a level of general acceptance by the relevant provider community which includes the Doctors of Chiropractic, it cannot be on the list; and if a test is not dependent for results entirely on subjective patient response, it cannot be on the list. The medical value of any test is not related in any way to the manner in which payment for that procedure is made. In that regard, the medical validity of a procedure does not vary as to whether the patient is covered by Workers' Compensation, Medicare, private insurance, or PIP. PIP patients typically have injuries to the connecting soft tissues of their spine as well as injuries to organs and broken bones. Muscles, ligaments, and tendons can be stretched or injured, which can lead to a breakdown in spinal-joint motion or a spinal-joint misalignment. Spinal-joint misalignment may cause interference in the patient's nervous system. Soft tissue and misalignment injuries are routinely the subject of chiropractic care. SEMG is effective in recording changes in the electrical activity of muscles associated with spinal injuries known as vertebral subluxations. Vertebral subluxations are commonly associated with automobile accidents, and are diagnosed and treated by chiropractic physicians. In spinal injuries, there is a depolarization that occurs at the cellular level. Electrical activity is generated at the cellular level and runs down the muscle fiber. SEMG measures the surface manifestation of the amount of electrical activity generated and the depolarizations in the area. The purpose is to measure muscle tension. SEMG is objective and quantitative. It eliminates subjective impressions or input and provides an objective and unbiased assessment of the electrical activity of the patient's paraspinal muscles. It allows a medical professional to distinguish objectively between observed muscle tension that is electrically active, which is associated with spasm, from observed muscle tension that is not electrically active, which is associated with contracture. It is debatable whether SEMG provides no more useful information to a practitioner than information gleaned by hand palpation of the injured area. The problem is that hand palpation can sometimes be inconclusive, especially in regard to determining if a muscle is hard from spasm or contracture. The question is one of over or redundant use of a test. Again that question is not part of the criteria for inclusion of a test in the rule. The criteria only include whether a test can be used by the practitioner to make a valid diagnosis or conclusion. In regard to SEMG, published documentary evidence demonstrates that spasm and contracture share a similar physical manifestation, i.e. the muscle is hard to the touch, and may not be distinguished through palpation and that, in the occasional instances where had palpation is inconclusive, SEMG can differentiate the conditions, and “provide[] an important element of diagnostic information.” Specific to automobile-related injuries, when hand palpation is inconclusive, SEMG has medical value to chiropractic physicians in that it allows the treating chiropractic physician to determine if a patient has an injury or does not have an injury, to quantify the extent of the injury, to monitor the patient's response to treatment, and to assess the point of maximum clinical improvement or maximum therapeutic benefit. While its diagnostic usefulness may be limited to certain situations when hand palpation is inconclusive, the evidence demonstrated that SEMG had some utility in the diagnostic phase of medical care. Therefore, SEMG should not be included in the proposed rule. Dynamic SEMG is also utilized on motor vehicle accident victims. Its primary use is to provide the level of documentation for services rendered a person involved in a motor- vehicle accident required to demonstrate injury, permanency of injury, the need for treatment, and the response to treatment before payment will be made under a PIP plan. Overall, SEMG has advanced as a clinical tool from its earliest, more experimental uses in which no computer support was available, through the time in which the best technology available was the Commodore 64 (or earlier) computer, to today, when advances in technology and understanding have resulted in the elimination of problems of electrical interference, bandwidth filtering and electrode placement, and have resulted in a higher threshold of sensitivity. The evidence in this case demonstrates that SEMG has medical value for use in the treatment of persons sustaining bodily injury covered by personal injury protection benefits. The Department admitted and the evidence showed that some surface EMG techniques may be useful in the treatment of persons sustaining bodily injury in motor vehicle accidents in appropriate circumstances. Based on the admissions of the Department, it is clear that SEMG has a degree of demonstrated medical value. Therefore, its inclusion on the list of medically unnecessary tests is arbitrary and capricious; has exceeded the Department’s grant of rulemaking authority; and has enlarged, modified, or contravened the specific provisions of law implemented. The Department also admitted and the evidence showed that SEMG is not dependent for results entirely upon subjective patient response. Therefore, under the terms of the statute, the inclusion of SEMG on the list of medically unnecessary tests has exceeded the Department’s grant of rulemaking authority and has enlarged, modified, or contravened the specific provisions of law implemented. The evidence also demonstrated that SEMG is generally accepted in the relevant provider community. In 1996, the two primary organizations that represent chiropractic physicians in Florida, the Florida Chiropractic Association and the Florida Chiropractic Society, were asked to develop a set of guidelines to apply to the chiropractic profession. Their work resulted in a report and the publication of the Chiropractic Practice Guidelines and Parameters for the State of Florida (CPG). The CPG was unanimously accepted and endorsed by the Florida Board of Chiropractic on August 22, 1996. The CPG was copyrighted and published by the Florida Chiropractic Association, Inc. and the Florida Chiropractic Society, Inc. in 1997. The CPG is a set of rules or guidelines that a practicing chiropractic physician can follow regarding the treatment of chiropractic problems. The CPG constitutes the consensus agreement of the chiropractic profession on many of the procedures that a chiropractor might provide. The CPG references SEMG both in comparison with needle EMG and as to its own merits. As a comparative matter, the CPG provides that “needle techniques are appropriate for the evaluation of specific muscles, while surface electrodes are appropriate for kinesiological studies of the “global” function of groups of muscles.” In terms of test-retest reliability and longitudinal muscle studies, SEMG was found to be superior to needle EMG. The CPG also states that SEMG provides an objective and quantifiable measure of muscular activity in areas of vertebral subluxation. Although the section discussing SEMG concludes with language indicating a degree of qualification, the CMG rates SEMG as “established.” An “established” rating means that SEMG is accepted as appropriate by the practicing chiropractic community for the given indication in the specified patient population. The rating of “established” was made with a Consensus Level of 1, which is the highest level of consensus available. In addition, the rating was supported by various categories of evidence used to analyze a given test, including expert opinion, clinical experience or effectiveness studies (Evidence E), refereed literature or published monographs, legal decisions and/or authority (Evidence L) and available controlled studies (Evidence C). The rating of “established” also requires one or more controlled trials. Therefore, read as a whole, the CMG demonstrates the medical value of SEMG as a clinical and diagnostic tool for evaluating paraspinal muscle activity, quantifying palpation findings, performing longitudinal studies, and detecting muscle spasm. Dr. Jenkins’ testimony regarding the lack of reliability of the CPG and attempt to disown the CPG as an authoritative statement by the Board of Chiropractors cannot be given weight since he was on neither the Florida Committee for Adoption of Guidelines nor the Board of Chiropractic when the CPG was accepted and endorsed. Additionally, during his tenure on the Board stretching back to 1997, the Board has not rescinded or amended the CPG. Finally, the evidence did not demonstrate that the CPG was superceded by the 1999 Universe of Florida Patients with Neck Pain or Injury Medical Practice Guidelines. These Universe Guidelines appear to relate only to medial doctors and not to Chiropractic Physicians. The Guidelines state they are not applicable to Chiropractic Physicians licensed under Chapter 460, Florida Statutes. The fact that the CPG describes SEMG as “[a]ccepted as appropriate by the practicing chiropractic community” provides a strong demonstration of the medical value of the test, and strong evidence of the high level of general acceptance of the test by the relevant provider community. Additionally, the American Medical Association Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) 2004 Manual is a proprietary system of the AMA for reporting medical services and procedures. CPT Codes are the uniform, established system for reporting medical services for reimbursement under government and private insurance programs. CPT coding is mandatory to describe the services a physician renders when submitting that service for payment to an automobile insurance carrier. In order to be assigned a five-digit CPT Code, the procedure must be “consistent with contemporary medical practice and be . . . performed by many practitioners in clinical practice in multiple locations. Code assignment is performed by a CPT Editorial Panel, consisting of 17 physician members, and a larger CPT Advisory Committee of medical and allied health professionals. Among the objectives of the CPT Advisory Committee is to “provide documentation to staff and the CPT Editorial Board regarding the medical appropriateness of various medical and surgical procedures. . . .” (emphasis supplied) Among the considerations for Code assignment are the requirements “that the service/procedure is a distinct service performed by many physicians/practitioners across the United States,” and “that the clinical efficacy of the service/procedure is well established and documented in peer review literature.” Dynamic SEMG has been assigned a five-digit CPT Code 96002. Similarly, The review and interpretation of dynamic SEMG has been assigned a five-digit CPT Code 96004. The fact that SEMG has been found to meet the requirements of the AMA for assignment of five-digit CPT Codes provides evidence of the medical value of the test, and strong evidence of the high level of general acceptance of the test by the relevant provider community. Finally, the rulemaking record for Rule 64B-3.004 contains information regarding SEMG. The literature submitted as part of the rulemaking record reveals, by a preponderance of competent, substantial evidence, that SEMG does not lack demonstrated medical value, and that it has a level of general acceptance by the relevant provider community. The primary documents submitted in the course of rulemaking included the 1993 Guidelines for Chiropractic Quality Assurance and Practice Parameters (Mercy Conference), the National Guideline Clearinghouse summary of the 1998 Council on Chiropractic Practice Guideline entitled Vertebral subluxation in chiropractic practice, a pair of AAEM Literature Reviews, entitled The Use of Surface EMG in the Diagnosis and Treatment of Nerve and Muscle Disorders and Dynamic Electromyography in Gait and Motion Analysis; the American Academy of Neurology study on Clinical utility of surface EMG; a report from Connie Coleman; two submissions from Dr. Jerome True, and a 2003 literature review, Surface EMG in Chronic Paraspinal Pain. Neither the Mercy Conference Guidelines nor the AAEM Surface EMG Literature Reviews contained any information or analysis more recent than 1993. Those documents did not reflect the current state of technology or understanding of SEMG, and could not form the sole bases for a rule based on SEMG’s demonstrated medical value and level of general acceptance in 2003. The National Guideline Clearinghouse summary of the 1998 Council on Chiropractic Practice Guidelines, and the American Academy of Neurology study on Clinical Utility of Surface EMG both provide support of the medical value for SEMG. As indicated, the 1998 Council on Chiropractic Practice Guidelines, which was subject to external peer review, and which even critics of SEMG recognize as being authoritative, determined that SEMG earned a rating of “established” “for recording changes in the electrical activity of muscles associated with vertebral subluxations” based on expert opinion, literature support, and controlled studies. The American Academy of Neurology study drew three conclusions, one of which was that Surface EMG “is an acceptable tool for kinesiologic (movement) analysis of movement disorders because it is a method for recording and quantifying clinically important muscle-related activity with the least interference on the clinical picture,” and confirmed its usefulness for several maladies, some of which result from automobile accidents. A report from Connie Coleman concluded that SEMG should not be in the rule, based on the American Academy of Neurology study, the AAEM Surface EMG Technology Literature Review, and a position paper authored by Aetna Insurance. Ms. Coleman’s report cannot be given any weight since she cited only the negative recommendations of the American Academy of Neurology study regarding SEMG, but omitted the third, positive recommendation from the study referenced above. Furthermore, as support for her recommendation to include spinal ultrasound in the rule, Ms. Coleman relied on the National Guidelines Clearinghouse document referenced above, which she stated was: a comprehensive database of evidence-based clinical practice guidelines and related documents produced by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in partnership with the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Association of Health Plans (AAHP). However, Ms. Coleman failed to note that the same National Guidelines Clearinghouse document gave SEMG a rating of established “for recording changes in the electrical activity of muscles associated with vertebral subluxations.” Of the two reports submitted by Dr. True, only one recommended that SEMG should have been on the list, with that recommendation based on a single journal article. Dr. True’s other submission mentioned SEMG, but made no specific recommendation regarding the test. However, Dr. True’s second submission did note that allegations of over utilization and abuse have “nothing to do with determining whether a test is medically valid.” Dr. True also relied on the Chiropractic Practice Guidelines and Parameters for the State of Florida, which recognize the medical validity of SEMG. Finally, David Marcarian, the developer and manufacturer of SEMG equipment, submitted several documents, including a literature review of journal articles ranging in dates from 1982 to 2002. The review discussed each of the journal articles, and concluded that “SEMG is a useful diagnostic tool in the evaluation of spine pain patients, and suggests that it be done routinely in cases where there is a need for disability and impairment determination.” The evidence did not demonstrate that Mr. Marcarian’s materials should be given less weight than older material containing dated information. The evidence submitted in this proceeding demonstrates a definite trend in both the understanding of the medical validity of SEMG and its acceptance by the chiropractic and medical community. Each of the 21 journal articles comprising Petitioner’s Exhibit 8, ranging in dates from 1988 to 2004, used SEMG as a tool to provide an objective measurement of muscle activity. Although many of the articles were focused on the muscular conditions leading to such conditions as low back pain, fibromyalgia, and whiplash disorders, rather than the clinical efficacy of SEMG itself, the fact that SEMG was so widely used as a measure of muscle activity is evidence of its medical value. Additionally, several of the articles focused on SEMG as a diagnostic tool in and of itself. Going back as far as 1988, researchers reported that “clear and consistent surface paraspinal EMG patterns can be discerned between differing groups of lower back pain patients and non-pain controls if the methodological limitations inherent in previous studies are corrected,” and concluded that “[t]he findings of the present study clearly point to the utility of differential diagnosis in lower back pain surface EMG studies,” and that “[r]esults strongly indicate that when careful attention is given to both diagnosis and position, surface EMG recordings can differentiate among the various types of lower back pain, as well as between those with and without lower back pain.” Electromyographic recordings of 5 types of low back pain subjects and non-pain controls in different positions, Arena, et al., "Pain", 37 (1989) pp. 63, 64. Through the early 1990s, researchers began noting the effect that technological advances were having on the medical efficacy of Surface EMG. Researchers during that period were recognizing that advances in surface electromyography (EMG) have prompted a renewed interest in examining the fatigue properties of back muscles. See Fatigue, recovery and low back pain in varsity rowers, Roy, et al., Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise, vol. 22, no. 4, p. 463. As a result of those advances, those researchers concluded that “the EMG technique is able to correctly identify persons with LBP from two very different populations” [Id. at p. 467] and that “the results of this study have verified the usefulness of a surface EMG measurement technique to identify changes in back muscles that are characteristic of LBP in rowers . . . The technique may be useful to athletic trainers and other health professionals for evaluating the muscular component of LBP in their patients.” (Id. at 468). During that same period, researchers were beginning to conclude that, though not without limitations, "[e]lectromyo- graphic spectral analysis was shown again to be a highly sensitive and highly specific diagnostic test.” Comparison of Spinal Mobility and Isometric Trunk Extensor Forces with Electromyographic Spectral Analysis in Identifying Low Back Pain, Klein, et al., Physical Therapy, vol. 71, no. 6, p. 41 (1991). Other groups noted that contemporaneous research studies “have also shown the reliability of dynamic EMG measurements of paraspinal low back muscles,” and concluded that “[w]e believe that [EMG] is an invaluable aid in detecting and objectifying disturbed function in paraspinal muscles in back pain patients and in general disability. This agrees with recent research which indicates that kinetic EMG patterns (in contrast to static levels) may best show the complex biomechanical events in the lumbar region.” Electric Behavior of Low Back Muscles During Lumbar Pelvic Rhythm in Low Back Pain Patients and Healthy Controls, Sihvonen, et al., Arch. Phys. Med. Rehabil., vol. 72, pp. 1080, 1086 (1991). By the mid to late 1990s, the continuing research, though still recognizing that there were things left to learn, was becoming more conclusive as to the value of SEMG. In 1997, researchers funded by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs stated that “[w]e predict that in the future the concept of surface EMG- based imbalance or load sharing parameters may provide the clinician with important person-specific information already in the acute stage of the injury, to help prevent the development of a chronic disability. Surface EMG provides us with a powerful, noninvasive tool to investigate the status and function of muscles.” Development of new protocols and analysis procedures for the assessment of LBP by surface EMG techniques, Oddsson, et al., Journal of Rehabilitation Research and Development, vol. 34, no. 4, p. 425 (1997). During that same year, researchers in California studying muscular electrical signals, noted the technological advances that were serving to make SEMG more effective. In their study, they found that “[s]uccessful myoelectric recording with surface electrodes during dynamic exercise of the low back is relatively recent. This is largely due to the recent development of small high-competence preamplifiers located close to the muscle which reduces the electronic artifact during dynamic activity to allow analysis of the myoelectric signal.” Relationships Between Myoelectric Activity, Strength, and MRI of Lumbar Extensor Muscles in Back Pain Patients and Normal Subjects, Mooney, et al., Journal of Spinal Disorders, vol. 10, no. 4, p. 354 (1997). By the early 2000s, SEMG was becoming established as a reliable and valuable tool in the assessment and diagnosis of automobile related injury. In a peer-reviewed study regarding whiplash-associated disorders (WAD), the authors concluded that: Patients with whiplash associated disorder Grade II can be distinguished from healthy control subjects according to the presence of cervical muscle dysfunction, as assessed by surface electromyography of the upper trapezius muscles. Particulary the decreased ability to relax the trapezius muscles seems to be a promising feature to identify patients with whiplash associated disorder Grade II. Assessment of the muscle (dys)function by surface electromyography offers a refinement of the whiplash associated disorder classification and provides an indication to a suitable therapeutic approach. Cervical Muscle Dysfunction in the chronic Whiplash Associated Disorder Grade II (WAD II), Nederhand, et al., Spine, vol. 25 (15), p. 8 of 10 (2000). The authors noted that “the use of palpation to assess either muscle point tenderness or muscle spasm is questionable because manually tested musculoskeletal signs have shown poor interexaminer reliability, and very little is known about its diagnostic validity.” Id. The authors found that “SEMG as a measure of the inability to relax the upper trapezius muscles may be useful in diagnostic testing. In the literature this feature was shown to be related to cervical pain and muscle fatigue and therefore supports the clinical importance of this study’s findings.” Id. at p. 8 of 10. Also in 2000, researchers, while still recognizing the lack of absolute precision with all manner of electro-diagnostic testing (including X-rays, MRIs, CT scans, myelograms), stated that “surface electromyography (SEMG) is a non-invasive method of analysis of the degree of muscular activity and function.” Chronic Low Back Pain Assessment Using Surface Electromyography, Ambroz et al., JOEM, vol. 42, no. 6, p. 661 (2000). In recognition of the advances in technology, the authors noted that “[r]ecent technological advancement has overcome the previous limitations of data acquisition and processing.” Id. at 661. That study, while noting the need for accounting for physical conditions including body fat, and recognizing the advantages of further testing and study, made the following findings: More recent investigations have found a significant relationship between pain and SEMG-measured muscle activity in the upper and lower back and have suggested that SEMG can be a valid tool for objectively assessing LBP. Also, although Biederman questioned the reliability of SEMG reading in biofeedback research, two subsequent studies addressing the validity of this technique reported good reliability for the static and dynamic SEMG activities in the assessment of CLBP. By using a rigorous matching protocol that included BMI [body mass index], our study demonstrated a statistically significant difference between CLBP patients and pain free controls. Thus, the results of this study support the previous investigations suggesting that SEMG is a useful diagnostic tool in the assessment of CLBP. Furthermore, in this study the use of one of the latest and more technologically advanced semi devices available has contributed to a more reliable collection and processing of this data, giving more strength to this analysis. Finally, in 2004, the evidence regarding the medical value of SEMG demonstrates that it has achieved a full level of general acceptance. In a study released in June 2004, the authors concluded that “[s]urface electromyography has been shown to be useful in the evaluation of spine pain in much the same way that EKGs have become indispensable for chest pain evaluation. SEMG testing is easy to do, inexpensive, has no morbidity, and provides important information for the pain practitioner.” Objective Documentation of Spine Pain, Ambroz, et al., Practical Pain Management, May/June 2004, p. 36 Thus, it is clear that the evidence in this case demonstrates that there was no “lack” of demonstrated medical value to SEMG, but, that SEMG has a level of general acceptance for use in the treatment of patients by the relevant provider community. The real dispute in this case is how often SEMG is used in the relevant provider community. Therefore, the inclusion of SEMG in Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B-3.004 exceeds the Department’s grant of rulemaking authority, enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of Section 627.736(5)(b)6., Florida Statutes, and is arbitrary and capricious.

Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.54120.56120.68627.736
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CHRISTIAN THEODORE, F/K/A EMMANUEL THEODORE vs FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, 96-004327N (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 13, 1996 Number: 96-004327N Latest Update: Jun. 27, 1997

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Emmanuel Theodore, a minor, suffered an injury for which compensation should be awarded under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.

Findings Of Fact Fundamental findings Christian Theodore is the father and natural guardian of Emmanuel Theodore (Emmanuel), a minor. Emmanuel was born a live infant on September 15, 1991, at St. Mary's Hospital, a hospital located in West Palm Beach, Florida, and his birth weight was in excess of 2500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services during the birth of Emmanuel was Annie Dawn-Marie Graham, M.D., who was, at all times material hereto, a participating physician in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded under the Plan when the claimant demonstrates, more likely than not, that the infant suffered an "injury to the brain or spinal cord . . . cause by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." Sections 766.302(2) and 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Here, the parties argued, at hearing, that Emmanuel's neurologic motor status was most likely dispositive of the subject claim. Consequently, no proof was offered regarding his mental status and, given the conclusions which follow, it was unnecessary to address whether any untoward events occurred during the course of Emmanuel's birth. Emmanuel's neurologic motor status On November 7, 1996, following the filing of the claim for compensation, Emmanuel was examined by Michael Duchowny, M.D., a board certified pediatric neurologist. Dr. Duchowny's examination of Emmanuel's neurological motor status revealed normal muscle strength, bulk, and tone; no unusual movements or weakness of the lymphs or trunk; and, no muscle atrophy. Hands were held in a very steady fashion without posturing, and Emmanuel completed finger-to-nose and other tasks of coordination without difficulty. Fine motor coordination was similarly intact, without asymmetries. Finally, muscle strength with respect to gait was noted as normal and, despite prominent pes planus (flat feet), there were no difficulties in Emmanuel's ability to stand and walk. In Dr. Duchowny's opinion, which is credited, Emmanuel's motor status was normal, or, stated otherwise, he evidenced no physical impairment.

Florida Laws (10) 120.68766.301766.302766.303766.304766.305766.309766.31766.311766.313
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DONALD M. HINES vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 75-000151 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-000151 Latest Update: Apr. 21, 1976

Findings Of Fact Testimony was received from the claimant and Dr. Lever, his psychiatrist. The deposition of his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Terheyden, was received together with the records of his various hospitalizations. The deposition of Donald Jones, Personnel Director, was also received. Generally, the evidence showed that prior to 1967, the claimant had injured his back. The claimant testified that this injury occurred in 1963 on the job. Dr. Lever testified that he first began to treat the claimant in 1967 for a condition he later diagnosed as schizophrenia paranoid type reaction and that he had treated him off and on since 1967 for this condition. Dr. Lever testified and his records state that the claimant's mental condition was caused by the childhood deprivation of affection but that the pain from the 1963 back injury had interfered with the claimant's personal relationships with co-workers and his sexual relations with his wife causing the schizophrenic reaction to manifest itself. The claimant was hospitalized for nine days in 1967 and eighteen days in 1970 for psychiatric treatment. The claimant was able to return to work between hospitalizations under drug therapy prescribed by the doctor. This enabled the claimant to function although with occasional episodes of psychotic reactions caused by personal crises which had resulted in his hospitalizations as indicated. Dr. Lever testified that he had last seen the claimant several days before the hearing. Dr. Terheyden's deposition and records of his hospitalization indicated that the claimant first was treated in 1964 for back problems. This treatment continued until 1967 when surgery was performed on the claimant's back. There was no indication from Dr. Terheyden's records or deposition what caused the initial injury. Dr. Terheyden also treated the claimant for injuries to his back in 1970 and 1971, performing a second operation in 1972 on his back. Dr. Terheyden's deposition indicated that the claimant could not physically perform the duties he had performed for the school board after his last operation. The claimant testified that he had first injured his back in 1963 but that it was not reported to his employer although he had told the tile setter for whom he worked directly. Several days after the initial injury, he went to the doctor and had remained under his treatment until his 1967 operation. The claimant indicated that no report of injury had been filed with the employer because the tile setter for whom he worked had discouraged reporting the injury. However, upon examination on this point, he could not offer any satisfactory reason why the report was not filed or why the tile setter would have discouraged filing the report. The records and deposition of Donald Jones, together with Exhibit 3, which lists the reports of on-the-job injuries indicate that the claimant filed reports of on-the-job injuries in 1961, 1964, 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971. These records and testimony do not indicate any report filed in 1963. These records indicate that the claimant missed substantial periods of work after the 1970 injury not related to the psychiatric treatment listed above. Based upon the foregoing, the Hearing Officer makes the following findings of fact: The claimant had a back injury prior to 1967 which required surgery in June of 1967. Said injury caused a schizophrenia paranoid type reaction to manifest itself but did not cause the claimant's mental disease. Although the claimant testified that said injury occurred on the job in 1963 but was not reported, this testimony was inconsistent with the reports of injuries on the job in 1961, 1962, and 1964 contained in Exhibit 3. The claimant's failure to report the 1963 injury was not adequately explained by the claimant. Considering the interest of the claimant in the outcome of the case, the lack of any separate evidence to support his testimony, the reports of injury for the years preceding and following, and the inability of the claimant to explain this apparent discrepancy, there is insufficient believable evidence to support a finding that the 1963 injury was job related. Subsequent to the 1967 operation and the treatment for schizophrenia, the claimant returned to work and worked until 1972 rendering useful and efficient service and receiving incremental raises during these years. During the period of 1967 to 1972, the claimant injured his back in January 1970, July 1970, and January 1971, all of which occurred or arose out of the performance of regularly- assigned duties on the job. These injuries necessitated a 1972 operation to claimant's back. Although the claimant had pre-existing physical and mental ailments, it was the 1970 and 1971 injuries and 1972 operation to the claimant which prevented him from performing the duties which he had performed for the school board.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the claimant, Donald M. Hines, receive in- line-of-duty benefits. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1975, at Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1975. COPIES FURNISHED: L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32304 Donald Feldman, Esquire FELDMAN & ABRAMSON, P.A. 402 Ainsley Building Miami, FL 33132

Florida Laws (2) 121.021121.091
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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs ROBERT J. MEEK, D.O., 13-003237MPI (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 23, 2013 Number: 13-003237MPI Latest Update: Apr. 14, 2014

The Issue What administrative sanction should be imposed on the participation of Robert J. Meek, D.O., (Respondent), in the Florida Medicaid program.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida Medicaid program. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been a provider with the Florida Medicaid program and has had a Medicaid provider number that was issued pursuant to a Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner. "Medicaid" is the medical assistance program authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq., and regulations thereunder. Respondent holds a doctor of osteopathic medicine degree and was licensed to practice medicine in Florida, Virginia, and Ohio. Because of his criminal conviction, which will be discussed below, his license to practice medicine in Ohio has been revoked and the licenses issued by Virginia and Florida have been suspended. At the time of the formal hearing, Respondent was incarcerated in a federal prison and his license to practice medicine in Florida was suspended. Respondent’s testimony at the formal hearing was taken by telephone. Respondent first became licensed in Florida in 2005. After completing a residency in proctologic surgery, Respondent worked at Colorectal and GI Specialists of South Florida from July 2006 until February 2007. Respondent then worked at The Hemorrhoid Relief Center from April 2007 through June 2009. Respondent practiced proctology five days a week during those periods. In addition to his regular jobs, from the fall of 2007 through the summer of 2009, Respondent worked some weekends at Physicians Immediate Care. Prior to May 2009, Respondent had no background, experience, or training in pain management. Between the middle of May 2009 until the end of February 2010, Respondent worked between one and three days a week at Executive Pain Clinic in Palm Beach County, purportedly in the practice area of pain management. Respondent’s employment at Executive Pain Clinic led to the federal grand jury indictment, dated August 12, 2011, against Respondent and 30 other defendants for multiple charges. Succinctly stated, Executive Pain Clinic was a pill mill. Among the charges brought against Respondent were a count for conspiracy to unlawfully distribute and dispense and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of the Controlled Substance Act and a count for conspiracy to commit money laundering. The federal grand jury indictment was related to Respondent’s practice of medicine at Executive Pain Clinic.2/ Of the 31 persons named in the indictment, 13 were licensed to practice medicine in Florida. Of those 13 doctors, 11, including Respondent, entered into a plea agreement to resolve the charges. By his plea agreement, Respondent pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering in exchange for the United States agreeing to dismiss the other charges against him. As part of the plea agreement, Respondent agreed to testify on behalf of the United States in its prosecution of the two medical doctors who were charged by the indictment, but who refused to enter into a plea agreement to resolve the charges. As of the formal hearing, Respondent had so testified, thereby satisfying his obligation under the plea agreement. In addition to the plea agreement, Respondent entered into a "Stipulated Statement of Facts," (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) which contained the following, which are hereby adopted by the undersigned as findings of fact: Had this case proceeded to trial, the government would have presented evidence by way of witness testimony, Court authorized wire interceptions of coconspirators and documentary evidence. The evidence would establish that the defendant was a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida and maintained a Drug Enforcement Administration registration number which enabled him to order and purchase Schedule II-V controlled substances. The evidence would establish that from in or about 2009 through in or about April 2010, the defendant conspired and agreed with coconspirators to receive monetary compensation from Executive Pain clinic [sic] and to deposit such monetary compensation into a financial institution. The monetary compensation was the proceeds of specific unlawful activity, that is, the illegal distribution of oxycodone pills, a Schedule II controlled substance. The defendant and conspirators [sic] participated in the operation of illegal "pill mills" wherein individuals seeking controlled substances paid for examinations by the defendant and coconspirator physicians based upon alleged complaints of pain. The defendant and coconspirator physicians illegally prescribed large quantities of oxycodone, 30 mg. pills and other controlled substances without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the usual course of professional practice. The defendant and coconspirator physicians prescribed controlled substances without reviewing prior medical records, referring individuals to medical specialists, or recommending alternative treatment modalities. The defendant and coconspirator physicians prescribed a predetermined "cocktail" of controlled substances which contained oxycodone 30 mg. and 15 mg. xanax and/or soma. No individualized or particularization of treatment of care was used, other than to vary the quantity of drugs prescribed in the "cocktail." The evidence established that the pain management clinics wherein the defendant and coconspirator physicians were employed were, in fact, facilities used for the illegal distribution of controlled substances. The defendant and coconspirators engaged in the above-described criminal conduct for a profit motive. The monetary compensation received by the defendant had a value of more than $10,000. During Respondent’s tenure at Executive Pain Clinic, approximately 628,200 dosage units of oxycodone were ordered under his name. Respondent was assigned a large safe at Executive Pain Clinic, in which the dosage units were deposited. Many of the prescriptions written at Executive Pain Clinic were filled on-site. Patients paid cash for the prescriptions filled at Executive Pain Clinic. Respondent was not paid by Medicaid for his work at Executive Pain Clinic. Executive Pain Clinic was not a Medicaid provider. Respondent saw an average of 40 patients per day at Executive Pain Clinic, spending as few as five minutes with some before prescribing pain medication. A very high percentage of those patients left with a prescription for a controlled substance. Respondent prescribed large quantities of oxycodone or other controlled substances in complete disregard to whether the patient was or was not a Medicaid recipient and without knowing whether Medicaid would pay for the prescription. Respondent was not qualified to practice pain management when he practiced at Executive Pain Clinic, and he practiced beyond the scope of his expertise. Respondent testified that in the month of August 2009, he began to question the legality of what he was doing at Executive Pain Clinic. Nevertheless, he did not leave that employment until the end of the following February. As a result of his plea, Respondent was sentenced to be incarcerated for a period of 66 months. As reflected by the plea agreement, that sentence may be adjusted following Respondent’s cooperation in testifying against two of his codefendants. On April 20, 2012, the Florida Department of Health (DOH) filed an Administrative Complaint before the Board of Osteopathic Medicine against Respondent alleging certain facts pertaining to his plea in the federal proceeding. DOH designated that Administrative Complaint as Case No. 2011-15165. The Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent pled guilty to a crime that "relates to the practice of, or the ability to practice, osteopathic medicine." Respondent did not challenge the factual allegations of the Administrative Complaint. On March 5, 2013, the Board of Osteopathic Medicine entered a Final Order in Case No. 2011-15165. The Final Order found Respondent guilty of the alleged violations, reprimanded his license, administered a fine in the amount of $5,000, restricted his practice, and suspended his license for a period of six years. The Final Order found as a mitigating factor that Respondent had provided free medical services to the underserved community. The restriction on his practice, as set forth in the Final Order under the heading "Permanent Practice Restriction," is as follows: Respondent shall not own, operate, or work in a Pain Management Clinic as defined by Section 459.0137, Florida Statutes. Further, Respondent is permanently restricted from prescribing or dispensing any schedule II controlled substance as defined by Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. The suspension of his license, as set forth in the Final Order under the heading "Suspension," is as follows: Respondent’s license to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida is hereby suspended for a period of six (6) years and until such time as he appears before the Board and can demonstrate that he is clinically safe to practice osteopathic medicine by: 1) submitting evaluations by either the University of Florida CARES program; the Center for Personalized Education for Physicians (CPEP) clinical assessment, or by other Board-approved equivalent, and comply with the prerequisite recommendations of the evaluation. The Board reserves jurisdiction to set terms and conditions, including probation, at the time of reinstatement; or 2) be accepted into and practice only in a residency program and appear before the Board after successful completion of the residency program. The Board reserves jurisdiction to set terms and conditions, including probation, at the time Respondent appears before the Board. Respondent worked part-time at East West Physicians in Broward County from June 2009 to October 2010. Although Respondent prescribed pain medication while employed at East West Physicians, there was no evidence that East West Physicians was a pill mill. Respondent worked at Palm Beach Wellness and Rejuvenation after federal authorities closed Executive Pain Clinic. Respondent testified, credibly, that he worked at Palm Beach Wellness and Rejuvenation for 22 days over a period of five and one-half months. Palm Beach Wellness and Rejuvenation was a pill mill. On September 20, 2011, prior to the Administrative Complaint involving the federal proceeding, DOH filed an Administrative Complaint before the Board of Osteopathic Medicine against Respondent alleging certain facts pertaining to his practice at Palm Beach Wellness and Rejuvenation. DOH designated that Administrative Complaint as Case No. 2011-02478. Respondent did not challenge the factual allegations of the Administrative Complaint. On March 14, 2012, the Board of Osteopathic Medicine entered a Final Order that contained the following under the heading "FINDINGS OF FACT": The allegations of fact set forth in the Administrative Complaint are approved, adopted, and incorporated herein by reference as the findings of fact of the Board. There is competent, substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings and conclusions. The Final Order imposed against Respondent an administrative fine in the amount of $10,000.00; ordered him not to own, operate, or work in a pain management clinic; and suspended his license to practice for a period of one year. The Administrative Complaint in Case No. 2011-024783/ included the following factual allegations in paragraphs 5-76, which were incorporated in DOH's Final Order as findings of fact: At all times material to this Complaint, the Respondent was a dispensing practitioner. At all times material to this Complaint, the Respondent was practicing at Total Medical Express of Boca Raton, which was also known as Palm Beach Pain and Rejuvenation (clinic). The Respondent was practicing pain management while he was at the clinic. The Respondent prescribed controlled substances such as Ambien, Ativan, Flexeril, Lisinopril, oxycodone (also known as Roxicodone), Percocet, Valium and Xanax to his patients. Ambien is the brand name for zolpidem, which is prescribed to treat insomnia. According to Title 21, Section [sic] 1308.14, Code of Federal Regulations, zolpidem is a Schedule IV controlled substance. Zolpidem can cause dependence and is subject to abuse. Ativan is the brand name for lorazepam, which is a benzodiazepine, and is prescribed to treat anxiety. Lorazepam can decrease mental alertness and affect judgment. According to Section [sic] 893.03(4), Florida Statutes, lorazepam is a Schedule IV controlled substance that has a low potential for abuse relative to the substances in Schedule III and has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of lorazepam may lead to limited physical or psychological dependence relative the substances in Schedule III. Flexeril is the brand name for cyclobenzaprine hydrochloride. Flexeril is prescribed as an adjunct to rest and physical therapy for relief of muscle spasms associated with acute, painful musculoskeletal conditions. Flexeril is not a scheduled drug. Lisinopril is the brand name for a drug of the same name. Lisinopril is prescribed to treat hypertension. Lisinopril is not a scheduled drug. Oxycodone is an opioid commonly prescribed to treat pain. According to Section [sic] 893.03(2), Florida Statutes, oxycodone is a Schedule II controlled substance that has a high potential for abuse and has a currently accepted but severely restricted medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of oxycodone may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. Opiate, or opioid, drugs have similar actions as the drug opium and are typically prescribed to treat pain. Opioid drugs are synthetically manufactured, while opiate drugs are naturally occurring, but the terms opioid and opiate are often used interchangeably. Opioid drugs are addictive and subject to abuse. Percocet is the brand name for a drug that contains oxycodone and is prescribed to treat pain. According to Section [sic] 893.03(2), Florida Statutes, oxycodone is a Schedule II controlled substance that has a high potential for abuse and has a currently accepted but severely restricted use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of oxycodone may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. Roxicodone is the brand name for an immediate release formulation of oxycodone. Valium is the brand name for diazepam and is prescribed to treat anxiety. According to Section [sic] 893.03(4), Florida Statutes, diazepam is a Schedule IV controlled substance that has a low potential for abuse relative to the substances in Schedule III and has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of diazepam may lead to limited physical or psychological dependence relative to the substances in Schedule III. Xanax is the brand name for alprazolam and is prescribed to treat anxiety. According to Section [sic] 893.03(4), Florida Statutes, alprazolam is a Schedule IV controlled substance that has a low potential for abuse relative to the substances in Schedule III and has a currently accepted medical use treatment in the United States. Abuse of alprazolam may lead to limited physical or psychological dependence relative to the substances in Schedule III. Facts Specific to Patient J.W. J.W. was a resident of Irvine, Kentucky. On or about February 24, 2010, J.W. presented to the clinic for the first time with complaints of lower back pain. On or about March 26, 2010, the Respondent saw J.W. and diagnosed him with lower back pain, lumbar spine stenosis, lumbar disk displacement, and chronic pain secondary to trauma. On or about March 26, 2010, the Respondent prescribed 180 tablets of Roxicodone 30 mg, 90 tablets of Roxicodone 15 mg, and 60 tablets of Xanax 1 mg to the patient. People who travel from out-of-state to Florida for pain management are associated with aberrant drug behavior, such as drug abuse or diversion, and are considered high risk patients. The Respondent did not evaluate the patient for drug abuse or drug diversion despite the fact that the patient was from Kentucky. The Respondent inappropriately prescribed multiple immediate release opioids to treat J.W. The Respondent placed J.W. at risk of a drug overdose by prescribing multiple release opioids in conjunction with a benzodiazepine. Facts Specific to Patient W.T. W.T. was a resident of Louisa, Kentucky. On or about January 25, 2010, W.T. presented to the clinic for the first time with complaints of lower back and left shoulder pain. On or about March 25, 2010, W.T. presented to the Respondent, who diagnosed the patient with lower back pain, lumbar disk displacement, chronic pain, and pain in the left shoulder. On or about March 25, 2010, the Respondent failed to perform an adequate physical examination of the patient, or the Respondent failed to document that he performed an adequate physical examination. On or about March 25, 2010, the Respondent failed to offer the patient pain management techniques other than stretching. On or about March 25, 2010, the Respondent prescribed 180 tablets of Roxicodone 30 mg, 90 tablets of Roxicodone 15 mg, and 60 tablets of Xanax 2 mg to the patient. The Respondent inappropriately prescribed multiple immediate release opioids to W.T. The Respondent put W.T. at risk of a drug overdose by prescribing multiple immediate release opioids in conjunction with a benzodiazepine. People who travel from out-of-state to Florida for pain management treatment are associated with aberrant drug behavior, such as drug abuse or diversion, and are considered high risk patients. The Respondent did not evaluate the patient for drug abuse or drug diversion despite the fact that the patient was from Kentucky. Facts Specific to Patient M.P M.P. was a resident of Hancock, Maine. On or about December 30, 2009, M.P. presented to the clinic for the first time with complaints of lower back pain. On or about December 30, 2009, the patient tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinols (THC). THC is the psychoactive ingredients in marijuana, or cannabis. According to Section [sic] 893.03(1), Florida Statutes, THC is a Schedule I controlled substance that has a high potential for abuse and has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in Florida. Its use under medical supervision does not meet accepted safety standards. THC is a central nervous system depressant. On or about March 26, 2010, M.P. presented to the Respondent, who diagnosed the patient with lumbar disk degeneration, chronic lower back pain, degenerative disk disease of the lumbar spine and lumbosacral root lesions. On or about March 26, 2010, the Respondent failed to perform a physical examination of the patient or the Respondent failed to document that he had performed a physical examination of the patient. On or about March 26, 2010, the Respondent prescribed 60 tablets of Valium 10 mg, 30 tablets of Lisinopril 20 mg, 30 tablets of Flexeril 10 mg, 180 tablets of Roxicodone 30 mg, and 60 tablets of Roxicodone 15 mg to the patient. The Respondent inappropriately prescribed multiple immediate release opioids to the patient. The Respondent put the patient at risk of an overdose by prescribing a benzodiazepine and opioids. The Respondent compounded the patient’s risk of an overdose by prescribing Flexeril in addition of a benzodiazepine and opioids. On or about March 26, 2010, the patient tested positive for THC again. The Respondent did not send the patient’s sample out to a laboratory for confirmation to verify that the patient had been positive for THC. The Respondent failed to address the patient’s use of illegal substances in the medical records. The Respondent put the patient at high risk for a drug overdose by prescribing 60 tablets of Valium 10 mg, 30 tablets of Lisinopril 20 mg, 30 tablets of Flexeril 10 mg, 180 tablets of Roxicodone 30 mg, and 60 tablets of Roxicodone 15 mg to the patient while the patient was taking THC. People who travel from out-of-state to Florida for pain management treatment are associated with aberrant drug behavior, such as drug abuse or diversion, and are considered high risk patients. The Respondent did not evaluate the patient for drug abuse or drug diversion despite the fact that the patient was from Maine. Facts Specific to Patient D.S.1 D.S.1 was a resident of Florida, and lived approximately 130 miles away from the clinic. D.S.1 first presented to the clinic on or about March 2, 2010, with a primary complaint of upper, middle and lower back pain and shoulder pain. On or about April 1, 2010, D.S.1 presented to the Respondent, who diagnosed the patient with cervical, thoracic and lumber disk degeneration, lumbar root lesions, chronic pain and muscle spasms. On or about April 1, 2010, the Respondent prescribed 30 tablets of Flexeril 10 mg, 180 tablets of Roxicodone 30 mg and 60 tablets of Roxicodone 15 mg to the patient. The Respondent inappropriately prescribed the patient two immediate release opioids. Facts Specific to Patient D.S.2 Patient D.S.2 was a resident of Middlesboro, Kentucky. On or about March 11, 2010, D.S.2 presented to the clinic for the first time with complaints of lower back pain. On or about April 8, 2010, D.S.2 presented to the Respondent, who diagnosed the patient with thoracic and lumbar disk displacement, chronic lower back pain, degenerative disk disease and lumbar and thoracic spinal stenosis. On or about April 8, 2010, the Respondent prescribed 30 tablets of Ativan 2 mg, 30 tablets of Ambien 10 mg, 180 tablets of Roxicodone 30 mg, and 90 tablets of Roxicodone 15 mg to the patient. The Respondent inappropriately prescribed the patient two immediate release opioids. The Respondent put the patient at risk of overdose by prescribing the patient a combination of Ambien, Ativan, and oxycodone. People who travel from out-of-state to Florida for pain management treatment are associated with aberrant drug behavior, such as drug abuse or diversion, and are considered high risk patients. The Respondent did not evaluate the patient for drug abuse or drug diversion despite the fact that the patient was from Kentucky. Facts Specific to Patient S.F. S.F. was a resident of Florida and lived approximately 24 miles from the clinic. On or about March 10, 2010, S.F. went to the clinic for the first time but his intake form does not indicate what his chief complaint was. On or about April 9, 2010, S.F. presented to the Respondent, who diagnosed the patient with chronic lower back pain, degenerative disk disease and lumbar spinal stenosis. On or about April 9, 2010, the Respondent prescribed 180 tablets of Roxicodone 30 mg and 60 tablets of Roxicodone 15 mg to the patient. On or about April 9, 2010, the Respondent wrote in the medical records that the patient drank a six pack of alcohol a day, five days a week and the patient was "drinking excessively." The Respondent prescribed high doses of opiates to S.F. despite the patient’s excessive use of alcohol. The Respondent put the patient at risk of an overdose by prescribing 180 tablets of Roxicodone 30 mg and 60 tablets of Roxicodone 15 mg when the patient was using alcohol excessively. The Respondent failed to counsel the patient about the dangers of using oxycodone with the levels of alcohol that the patient was imbibing or he failed to document that he counseled the patient. S.F.’s medical records include a magnetic resonance imaging (M.R.I.) study, dated March 20, 2010. S.F.’s M.R.I. indicated that he had an abdominal aortic aneurysm that would be adverse to hypertension. The Respondent failed to refer S.F. to an in-patient detoxification center despite the patient’s use of alcohol and abnormal M.R.I. If his license to practice osteopathic medicine is reinstated in Florida, Respondent intends to practice in South Florida in a practice area other than pain management. Section 409.913(17) contains the factors that Petitioner must consider in determining the length of time a Medicaid provider, such as Respondent, should be terminated from the Medicaid program. Mr. West considered those factors in reaching the conclusions that a termination lasting 20 years is the appropriate sanction to be imposed against Respondent. Petitioner considers the seriousness of the misconduct to be the strongest factor to be considered. Pill mills cause serious problems in the State of Florida, and have been the focus of both regulatory agencies and law enforcement agencies on the state and federal level for several years. Medicaid patients in South Florida are not underserved, and there will be little or no impact on access by recipients to Medicaid services if Respondent is terminated as a provider. The United States Department of Health and Human Services, through its Office of Inspector General, has suspended Respondent's participation in all federally funded health care programs for a period of eight years.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order adopting the findings of fact and the conclusions of law set forth in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order terminate Robert J. Meek, D.O., as a Florida Medicaid provider for a period of ten years. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2014.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57409.907409.913459.0137893.03
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs ATAUR RAHMAN, M.D., 11-001882PL (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Apr. 15, 2011 Number: 11-001882PL Latest Update: Jul. 07, 2024
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BOARD OF VETERINARY MEDICINE vs. SAMY HASSAN HELMY, 89-002464 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-002464 Latest Update: Jan. 12, 1990

The Issue The issue for consideration is whether Respondent's license as a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine in Florida should be disciplined because of the misconduct alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, the Respondent was a licensed veterinarian in Florida practicing under license number VM 2884, and the Board of Veterinary Medicine was and is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating the practice of veterinary medicine in this state. On July 22, 1988, Bonnie Judd, owner of a golden retriever puppy, "Einstein", accidentally backed over the animal with her automobile injuring it badly. She immediately took the puppy which was, at the time, approximately 4 or 5 months old, to the Respondent for treatment. Respondent examined the dog and informed Ms. Judd that the animal's leg was broken and that surgery would be required to repair it. He did not then indicate any other injuries and at no time did he suggest taking the animal to the university hospital for evaluation. He advised her to leave the animal with him and had her sign certain documents including an informed consent form which indicated that Respondent was to fix a "broken tibia only." Ms. Judd contends that that notation was not on the form when she signed it and it is so found. He did not then suggest putting the dog to sleep, either. At approximately 4:30 that same afternoon, Respondent called Ms. Judd and told her she should pick the animal up because no one would be at the clinic all weekend. When she arrived at Respondent's facility, he informed her that the dog had also been dipped for fleas, his shots had been updated, and a pin had been placed in the left rear leg. Respondent estimated the prognosis for healing of the broken tibia would be between 4 and 6 weeks. At this time Ms. Judd paid the Respondent his fee of $350.00, $200.00 of which was by post dated check, and an additional $15.00 for medications. At that point, Respondent's wife updated Einstein's vaccination records to reflect the shots which had been given. During the period between July 22, 1988 and August 16, 1988, Ms. Judd returned Einstein to the Respondent for treatment approximately one or two times a week. Toward the end of that period, Respondent, for the first time, informed Ms. Judd that Einstein's injuries were far more extensive than merely a broken leg. During these follow up visits, however, the Respondent would check the broken tibia and its wound, changing the bandage, administering antibiotics, and changing the cast. On most of these visits, Respondent reported to Ms. Judd that the leg was healing and the animal's condition was satisfactory. Respondent claims that at the very beginning, he told Ms. Judd of the animal's other injuries and that it should be taken to the university's veterinary hospital for evaluation and possible euthanasia. The copies of his records, provided as evidence, reflect notations of other injuries and support his claims, but they are photo copies of the actual documents and cannot be properly examined for authenticity. However, the evidence shows that Respondent treated the animal for the broken tibia for several weeks after the initial visit, notwithstanding, he claims, she only wanted the animal treated and kept alive long enough for her husband to come home and make the decision. This would seem to indicate the treatment for the tibia was the chosen treatment and not merely a stop-gap. Further, Ms. Judd claims that it was only when she decided to seek another opinion that Respondent mentioned the other injuries. This is a question of whom to believe - Ms. Judd, who admits to having lied to her husband about what happened to another dog she accidentally killed, or Respondent, who, it appears, denies any impropriety though evidence to the contrary indicates otherwise. On balance, it is found that Respondent did not advise Ms. Judd of any additional injuries until late in the course of treatment and neither recommended hospitalization nor consideration of euthanasia early on. Also during this period, he provided Ms. Judd with antibiotics and tranquilizers to administer to Einstein but the medications were improperly packaged and labeled. They did not contain the necessary information relating to drug name, drug strength, quantity, or directions for use and they were not in child proof containers. According to a departmental expert witness, this was below professional standards and it is so found. As previously found, during the last or next to last visit, Dr. Helmy informed Ms. Judd that the animal also had a broken pelvis but that that injury should not be dealt with until the broken leg was healed. He indicated that when appropriate, the pelvis could be corrected by further surgery. Subsequent to her last visit, on August 16, 1988, Ms. Judd received a bill for an additional $350.00 for the periodic follow-up visits mentioned. Ms. Judd, seeking another opinion, took Einstein to the office of Dr. Charles MacGill in Crystal River on August 17, 1988. At Dr. MacGill's advice, she requested the animal's medical records and all x-rays from Dr. Helmy which he refused to provide. He indicated that the only X-rays he had taken were those made after surgery, which had never been developed. He also indicated he did not need to take prior x-rays because he was able to assess the animal's injuries with his hands. There is some question as to the propriety of inserting a pin into the dog's tibia to reduce a closed fracture without the use of an x-ray, and while the experts consulted indicated it can be done, it is not good practice and is below professional standards. It is so found. During his examination, Dr. MacGill noted that Einstein could not walk. His back leg muscles had atrophied and there was a suppurating hole showing gross infection in the left rear tibia. A rectal examination confirmed Dr. Helmy's diagnosis of a broken pelvis. After taking several x-rays of the animal, Dr. MacGill advised Ms. Judd that in addition to the broken tibia and fractured pelvis, the distal femur was broken; the tibial fracture had not properly healed and showed signs of osteomyelitis; and there was a fracture of the fifth lumbar vertebra which was exerting pressure on the spinal cord. Dr. MacGill prescribed several antibiotics for the animal and, because of the spinal fracture, advised Ms. Judd she should take Einstein to the University of Florida School of Veterinary Medicine for evaluation. Ms. Judd readily agreed. Ms. Judd took Einstein to the university hospital on August 22, 1988 and left him there for an assessment of the damage. At the same time, she signed a consent form authorizing euthanasia in the event the opinion of the physicians was that the dog's nerve damage was too extensive for him to survive. Thereafter, she was advised that the nerve damage incurred was irreversible and extensive, and the animal was put to sleep. Examination of the animal at the hospital indicated he was unable to stand on his rear legs; he had neurological deficits in the right rear leg; evidenced pain on palpation of the left shin; and had a grinding in the hip joints. The left rear tibia showed an open, infected wound, and a rectal examination confirmed the pelvic fracture. X-rays taken at the hospital during this examination revealed that the only fracture which had been treated was the fracture of the tibia. This x-ray also confirmed the existence of osteomyelitis in that wound. In the opinion of Dr. Robert Parker, associate professor of surgery at the school, and the individual who saw Einstein there as attending surgeon, the technique of pin placement utilized by Dr. Helmy in reducing the fracture to the tibia was adequate, but Dr. Parker was concerned that the fracture was not stable. He concluded as well that the contamination of the wound, either at the time of fracture or at the time of surgery, could not be controlled due to the instability and poor drainage of the fracture site. Dr. Parker formed no opinion as to the Respondent's compliance with the community standards. He pointed out that he saw the dog four weeks after injury and was concerned at that time that only one of several fractures had been repaired. The one repaired by Dr. Helmy was the least serious and, in Parker's opinion, the others should have been treated first. He does not know why they were not treated but opined they should have been treated as soon as possible after they were incurred, if the condition of the animal permitted. Referring to the tibia fracture reduction, however, while minimally acceptable, it was not done in the manner that he, Dr. Parker, would have utilized. He felt that the femur fracture should have been treated first and also that the use of a splint in the case of an open wound, as here, contributes to the high risk of infection. This is what happened. Had the dog been brought to the hospital initially, a team would have seen it. Normally, a single practitioner cannot render the same type of treatment because of a lack of experience or equipment, but the appropriate thing for Respondent to have done would have been to stabilize the animal and refer it to a hospital or a team treatment facility. He did not do this. Here, in Parker's opinion, Respondent's repair of the tibia was not the appropriate first thing to do. Had the tibia not been treated, it is probable the infection would not have occurred. The initial fracture was not an open fracture but a closed fracture, and infection was given access by the procedure utilized by Respondent in opening the wound for the insertion of the pin. In Dr. Parker's opinion, the tibia could have been stabilized without a pin so that the animal could be transferred to a team treatment facility. The test, however, is not whether Respondent's treatment met optimum criteria. Here, the failure to refer to a team facility was not actionable error. Any error, if established, must relate to the Respondent's choice of procedures and his performance of them. While each of the injuries alone was not fatal, taken together they were ovehelming and euthanasia would have been a viable option from the very beginning. The neurological problems could have been repaired over a long period, but Dr. Parker would not normally wait for that to decide to do something regarding the fracture. Since the tibia was the fracture of lowest priority, in Parker's opinion, Respondent cannot legitimately claim he did this while waiting for neurological resolution. In this case, since he did not see the x-rays taken early on, Dr. Parker cannot say if Respondent's use of a pin was proper or not. Normally, however, a splint, as used by Respondent, is not used with a pin insertion. If there is an opening of the body, as here, it should not be combined with external stabilization which can introduce infection. While the hip joint fracture had healed by the time Parker saw the animal, there are indications that the healing was imperfect and additional arthritis would probably have set in, requiring further surgery. In this case, the untreated fractures were very bad and should have been treated surgically right away or the animal should have been put to sleep. Even if all had been done properly, however, the dog probably, in the opinion of Dr. Parker, would have had nerve damage and the prognosis for recovery was guarded. According to Dr. MacGill, who examined Respondent's records regarding his treatment of Einstein, Respondent administered several drugs for the dog. Two of these, the antibiotic and the tranquilizer appear appropriate, but the third, Prednisone, is a cortisone derivative which is not indicated or appropriate when infection is present. Whereas Dr. Parker was unwilling to state an opinion as to whether Respondent's treatment of Einstein met minimum standards, Dr. MacGill is not at all reluctant. In his opinion, were he to have treated the animal himself initially, he would have put a bone plate on the femur, done minimal repair with regard to the pelvis, stabilized the back to relieve pressure on the vertebrae, and treated the tibia. Accomplishment of all these is required to meet minimum standards, in his opinion, and Respondent's treatment did not, he believes, meet these standards. It is so found. After the dog was put to sleep, Ms. Judd consulted an attorney, Mr. Travis, who attempted to obtain Einstein's medical records from Respondent. Respondent was not cooperative and declined to furnish them initially though he ultimately did so. Dr. Greene, an expert in veterinary medicine practicing in Tampa, reviewed this case through an examination of the records maintained by all parties and heard the testimony at the hearing. In his opinion, the care rendered by Dr. Helmy constituted negligence from the point that Einstein was operated on. While there is some indication that x-rays may have been taken, showing multiple fractures, surgery under a "questionable anesthetic", one which quiets the dog but does not put him out, when the surgery is not going to serve a valid purpose, along with the use of cortisone, with its resultant reduction of the body's ability to fight infection, after surgery, all constitute inappropriate conduct. Some of the medications prescribed by Respondent were contraindicated for the purpose used here. Inovar, used as an anesthetic during reduction of the tibia fracture, was inappropriate. Enough ampicillin was given for only five days. Prednisone, (cortisone), reduced the animal's ability to fight infection. The anterobe is an antibiotic which would be good to fight infection if prescribed in the appropriate amount which it was not, here. In light of the osteomyelitis, which was more than a mere infection, the amount prescribed was totally insufficient. It should be noted, however, that Ms. Judd did not administer all the medications given by Dr. Helmy. Had she done so, the infection may not have come about or been so severe. In total, Dr. Greene does not believe Respondent acted properly here. Helmy did not asses the other injuries and should not have operated on the tibia as the sole action taken. The other injuries were more serious and were neither treated nor addressed. Further, his review of the records maintained by Dr. Helmy regarding this animal shows they omit any reference to replacing sutures which the dog took out and they omit any mention of a treatment plan. The notes do not show any injuries other than the broken tibia and do not mention the femur, the vertebrae, the pelvis or any other injuries. All medical records should identify and assess all conditions regardless of whether they are treated or not. They cannot be ignored. As was mentioned previously, however, the note of 7/22/88 in Respondent's records as to Einstein does refer to a broken femur shaft and problems with the pelvis, in addition to the tibia fracture. Taken together, the Respondent's treatment constitutes neglect and did not meet minimum standards for the practice of veterinary medicine in Florida. By a Final Order dated July 4, 1987, the Board of Veterinary Medicine found Respondent guilty of violating Chapter 474, Florida Statutes, and, inter alia, placed him on probation from August 4, 1987 to August 3, 1991. The Order also provided that if, during the period of probation, the Respondent is found guilty in a Final Order of the Board of violating any provision of Chapter 474, his license would automatically be suspended.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's license to practice veterinary medicine in Florida be suspended for a period of two years and that thereafter he be placed on probation for an additional period of two years under such conditions as are prescribed by the Board of Veterinary Medicine, and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,500.00. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-2464 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to S. 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Accepted and incorporated herein. & 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. 4. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. & 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. 9. - 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. - 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 16. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein as a finding, not as "it appears." Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a recitation of testimony. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except for the conclusion as to what Respondent found and what he told Ms. Judd. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as contra to the evidence. & 9. Rejected as contra to the evidence. 10. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. & 13. Rejected as contra to the evidence. 14. & 15. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted as to what Respondent did but rejected as to his reasons for failing to treat the other injuries. Rejected. There was no discussion about taking the animal to the University or other veterinarian. & 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. - 22. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected. & 26. Accepted. 27. - 34. Accepted and incorporated herein. 35. - 39. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected. & 42. Accepted and incorporated herein except for the last sentence in paragraph 42 which is rejected. Accepted. - 47. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the testimony. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the testimony. Last sentence rejected. Balance merely a recitation of testimony. Merely a comment on the testimony. Accepted. Accept. Rejected. & 57. Rejected. Accepted. Rejected as merely comment on testimony. Rejected as contra to the evidence. 1st and second sentences accepted. 3rd sentence rejected 4th through 6th sentences rejected. Balance rejected. 1st sentence accepted. 2nd sentence accepted but only after the tibia was set. Third sentence accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura P. Gaffney Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William E. Lackay, Esquire Post Office Box 279 Of Flotifs Building Highway 31 North Bushnell, Florida 33513 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Linda Biedermann Executive Director Board of Veterinary Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.57474.214
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs DOUGLAS SMITH, M.D., 08-004975PL (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Oct. 07, 2008 Number: 08-004975PL Latest Update: Jul. 07, 2024
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