Elawyers Elawyers
Ohio| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
# 2
E. L. COLE PHOTOGRAPHY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 97-001397BID (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tarpon Springs, Florida Mar. 18, 1997 Number: 97-001397BID Latest Update: Oct. 07, 1997

The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner, E. L. Cole Photography, Inc., was properly denied award of Bid Number 97-DC-7059, to provide photographic film to the Department.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, Department of Corrections, was an agency of the State of Florida, with authority to procure goods, supplies, and services from vendors through the process of competitive bidding. Sometime prior to February 14, 1997, the Department sent out Invitations to Bid soliciting bids for the providing of photographic film. Both Kodak 135 mm color-and black-and-white film and five different types of Polaroid instant camera film were needed for use by the agency, state-wide. Bids were to be submitted in time for the scheduled bid opening on February 25, 1997. This was a procurement reserved for minority bidders. The bids were opened, as scheduled, on February 25, 1997. Petitioner was one of seven bidders. The low bidder, Laube Photo, was disqualified because it was not a certified minority business. Of the remaining six bidders, Ace Office Supply submitted a bid of $3,151.00 on Item 1, the Kodak film; and a bid of $175,250 on Item 2, the Polaroid film. Ace’s total bid was $178,601.00. Petitioner’s bid was $3,793.20 on the Kodak film; and $181,425.00 on the Polaroid film, for a total of $185,218.20. All the bids from the other bidders were higher than that of Petitioner. Based on the figures submitted, Ace Office Supply was the low responsive bidder. It’s certification as a minority bidder was confirmed by the agency’s minority office. In its protest submitted on March 6, 1997, Petitioner addressed the warranty which pertains to the film to be supplied. Petitioner questioned whether that warranty would cover film proposed to be furnished by Ace, which Petitioner contends would be gray market product. Special Condition 16 of the Invitation to Bid provides in pertinent part: A warranty is required on all items purchased against defective materials, workmanship and failure to perform in accordance with required industry performance criteria, for a period of not less than ninety (90) days from date of acceptance by the purchaser. Any deviation from this criteria must be documented in the vendor's bid response or the above statement shall prevail. Neither Ace nor the Petitioner indicated any deviation from the warranty requirements. Therefore, the warranty stated applies to product supplied by either bidder. Petitioner also challenged the difference between the bids as relates to the description of the commodity to be provided. Though not required to do so by the Invitation to Bid, Petitioner listed the catalogue number of each item and enclosed with the bid pertinent pages from the manufacturers' catalogues reflecting the commodity and the catalogue number. Ace listed only the commodity and the product number as opposed to the catalogue number. Both methods are acceptable, however. The use of the product description by Ace was no more than a minor irregularity which did not affect the price, nor did its use give Ace an unfair advantage. By the same token, Petitioner's use of the incorrect catalogue number in one instance was also an irregularity, but it, too, was considered minor. From both submittals, it was clear that the product offered was the product sought, and the price for each item was clearly stated. The specifications contained in the bid solicitation in issue were not prioritized in importance. Price, quality, and warranty were all important. The warranty requirement was inserted to ensure against the provision of substandard product. Both Ace and Petitioner provided the requisite warranty, and Ms. Holcomb presumed both bidders would have honored it. The only area of difference between the bids was in price. Both Petitioner and Ace have provided products to the Department in the past. There have been no complaints regarding either the product provided or the service provided by either supplier. "Gray market” products are those made outside the United States by or under license of a manufacturer, which bear the brand name of the manufacturer, but which are not intended for sale in this country through the manufacturer's authorized distributors. They may or may not carry a full manufacturer's warranty. There is no reference to gray market goods in the Invitation to Bid, and Ms. Holcomb did not consider the possibility of gray market goods being furnished until Petitioner raised the issue in its letter of March 6, 1997. When Ms. Holcomb received this letter, she checked with the minority certification office which indicated it would not certify anyone who supplied gray market goods. Thereafter, Ms. Holcomb referred the matter to the Department's legal staff, and she is not aware of what that office did regarding the gray market issue. The evidence regarding the position of the minority certification office regarding gray market goods is hearsay evidence and may not be dispositive of that issue. Mr. Cole, Petitioner's owner and a long-time photographer, raised the issue of gray market product because it has been his experience that when vendors bid inside of their commodities specialty field, a gray market product can be sold at a lower price resulting in a competitive disadvantage to other responsive bidders. Though cheaper in price, a gray market product may not carry the same manufacturer's warranty as does product sold on the authorized market. In addition, many gray market products do not meet the same quality standards of manufacture as authorized products. Mr. Cole claims Ace would provide a gray market product based on the fact that the prices quoted by Ace are below the prices quoted by Petitioner. Cole submitted the manufacturers' price lists with his bid in the hope that all vendors would be bidding on the same product. Referencing the prices submitted by Ace in its bid, Mr. Cole concludes that the film to be supplied by Ace is not an authorized product. His experience indicates that gray market dealers' prices are similar to those quoted by Ace. Mr. Cole admits there is nothing in Ace's bid to indicate it would not honor the ninety-day warranty called for in the Invitation for Bid. He also admits that gray market products could meet the warranty requirement, and there is nothing in the IFB which prohibits gray market film, notwithstanding the other evidence of record that the minority certification office would not certify providers who offered gray market goods. It also must be noted that on at least two items called for in the IFB, Petitioner underbid Ace. This happened because Petitioner elected to take a loss on those items, but, Cole contends, Ace's use of gray market prices allowed it to underbid him overall. There is no independent evidence that the product to be submitted by Ace would be gray market product. In any case, the evidence shows that Petitioner substantially underbid four other responsive bidders in this procurement. Mr. Cole does not see that as a problem, since the price differential between Petitioner's bid and the next lowest bidder is not, in his opinion, disqualifying. This argument is not persuasive.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a Final Order in this case awarding procurement 97-DC-7059, to provide photographic film to the Department, to Ace Office Supply. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Matthew M. Carter, II, Esquire 610 North Duval Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Scott E. Clodfelter, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Harry K. Singletary, Jr. Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500

Florida Laws (2) 120.57218.20
# 3
JACKSONVILLE KENNEL CLUB, INC., AND ORANGE PARK KENNEL CLUB, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, 14-001002RU (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 04, 2014 Number: 14-001002RU Latest Update: Nov. 21, 2014

The Issue Are the February 13, 2014, letters of Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Division), requiring totalisator reports to "identify the Florida [permitholder] in reports as both host and guest when applicable," statements that amount to a rule, as defined in section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes (2013).1/

Findings Of Fact Florida permits and regulates betting on greyhound racing,2/ jai alai games,3/ quarter horse racing,4/ and harness racing.5/ The Division is responsible for administration of Florida's statutes and rules governing this betting. JKC and OPKC are separate, individually permitted facilities. Jacksonville Greyhound Racing owns and operates both the JKC and the OPKC. It is not, however, a party to this proceeding. The betting system is a pari-mutuel system. This "means a system of betting on races or games in which the winners divide the total amount bet, after deducting management expenses and taxes, in proportion to the sums they have wagered individually and with regard to the odds assigned to particular outcomes."6/ Each race, contest, or game is an "event."7/ The aggregate wagers called "contributions" to pari-mutuel pools are labeled "handle." § 550.002(13), Fla. Stat. An "intertrack wager" is "a particular form of pari-mutuel wagering in which wagers are accepted at a permitted, in-state track, fronton, or pari-mutuel facility on a race or game transmitted from and performed live at, or simulcast signal rebroadcast from another in-state pari-mutuel facility."8/ The JKC offers intertrack wagering at its permitted facility located in Jacksonville, Florida. It does not offer live events. The OPKC offers intertrack wagering and wagering on live events conducted at its permitted facility in Orange Park. The Racetracks are host tracks when they transmit live greyhound racing to other in-state and out-of-state facilities for off-track wagers.9/ They are guest tracks when wagers are made at their separate permitted locations on pari-mutuel races or games conducted at third-party facilities.10/ Florida statutes and the Division's rules require detailed reports from permitholders to the Division and other permitholders, including tables of wagers, pool data, and winnings.11/ These reports are generated by "totalisators." A totalisator is "the computer system used to accumulate wagers, record sales, calculate payoffs, and display wagering data on a display device that is located at a pari-mutuel facility."12/ The Division's Form DBPR-PMW-3570 requires host permitholders to report intertrack wagering "handle" by guest on a monthly basis. The host permitholders must sign and attest to the accuracy of the information submitted in the form. Also, Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-7.023(2) requires generation of reports for each pool within each contest to be printed immediately after the official order of finish is declared. On March 9, 2012, the Division issued a letter to AmTote International ("AmTote"), a licensed totalisator company, and copied Jacksonville Greyhound Racing, notifying AmTote that Florida permitholders and the Division would need a breakdown of the handle of the Racetracks in order to pay appropriate purses, taxes, or other liabilities. It sent a similar letter to other totalisator companies. This was an effort to be accommodating and flexible. The letter concluded: "Please continue to provide handle information broken down by source, which is required by rule to all those in the state of Florida who have been users of that information in the past." The Racetracks rely upon AmTote to provide their totalisator services. Between March 2012 and March 2014, AmTote commingled the Racetracks' wagering data into a single "community," reporting all wagering as coming from the OPKC in order to reduce interface fees paid for the totalisator service. The guest track wagering data and reports exchanged with the other totalisator companies from the Racetracks show up on the AmTote settlement files as OPKC. The reports do not differentiate between wagers made at each of the Racetracks. Before March 1, 2012, AmTote segregated wagering data as coming from either JKC or OPKC. During the two years reported by the Racetracks as a single community, the Racetracks separately provided Florida host tracks a supplemental report breaking down the sources within the common community. The Racetracks provided these supplemental reports--via email or other means--to assist Florida host tracks with reporting requirements. They did not provide them simultaneously with the other reports and data. There were frequently errors that had to be identified and corrected. In an effort to be flexible and work with the Racetracks, the Division tolerated this method of reporting for two years. But it created problems for both the Division and for the other permitholders in the state. On February 13, 2014, the Division prepared and issued correspondence to AmTote, as well as the two other Florida totalisator companies, announcing that it intended to require proper reporting of the data required by rule, including reports of each permitholder. The letter states: This letter is to address the issue of proper and complete identification of each individual permitholder in totalisator reports. Rule 61D-7.024(1), Florida Administrative Code, requires all Florida pari-mutuel permitholders to use an electronically operated totalisator. Rule 61D-7.023(9), F.A.C. states in part, ". . . Each report shall include the permitholder's name . . .," and Rule 61D-7.024(4), F.A.C. states in part, ". . . reports shall be kept logically separate . . . ." Further, Rule 61D-7.023(1), F.A.C. states, "The totalisator licensee shall be responsible for the correctness of all tote produced mutual accounting reports. " In accordance with Florida Administrative Code, the division requires each permitholder to be properly and uniquely identified by totalisator reports provided to the division and to the permitholders. In addition, the totalisators are responsible for the correctness of all tote produced mutual accounting reports. Reports provided after February 28, 2014 must properly identify the Florida Permitholder in reports as both host and guest when applicable. Improper identification of permitholders will be considered a violation of the Florida Administrative Code. On March 11, 2014, AmTote began segregating wagering data from the Racetracks in compliance with the February 13, 2014, letter. The Racetracks will incur additional financial costs if AmTote ends the reporting of all wagering data as coming from OPKC for purposes of reports provided to other totalisator companies licensed in Florida and begins segregating their wagering data by individual permitholders. These costs stem from additional interface fees incurred outside the regulatory jurisdiction of Florida. The only evidence of these costs is the testimony of Matthew Kroetz, vice-president of Operations for Jacksonville Greyhound Racing. The testimony of Mr. Kroetz about the cost of the required change is confusing because he mingles assumed costs for a third closed track as if it were reactivated and operational. Bayard Raceways is that track. The Racetracks' parent company owns it. But the likelihood and timing of that reactivation is speculative. In addition, Bayard is not a party to this proceeding. Neither is the parent company. Mr. Kroetz' testimony establishes that the current cost for the two petitioners is a total of $1,500 per month. He projects that costs for reporting, as the letter requires, would be $4,500 per month for the two Petitioners and the track that may reopen in the future. That testimony is unrebutted and consistent with his testimony that the recurring fees for all three tracks would total over $50,000 annually. It is accepted as accurate. But the $3,000 increase from $1,500 to $4,500 per month is not due solely to the reporting requirement. It is also due to lumping in the non-active track. The evidence does not support including that track, the opening of which is speculative. The monthly fee for the two operating tracks is $1,500 divided by two or $750. Subtracting that, as the current cost for an existing track, from the $3,000 increase, lowers the estimated increase to $2,250. Dividing that by three gives the increased monthly cost per track, or $750 per track. This results in the projected annual cost increase for each of the Racetracks of $9,000. Although Mr. Kroetz testified in summary that the changes would result in an increased cost of "about a thousand dollars per month per facility," that testimony is not persuasive. It is inconsistent with the more detailed testimony relied upon above and would require the improbable and unsupported conclusion that the monthly increase would be more than the existing fees.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.54120.56120.57120.68550.002
# 7
REX SHEPHERD AND DALE HARPER vs ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 99-000745BID (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Feb. 18, 1999 Number: 99-000745BID Latest Update: Aug. 16, 1999

The Issue As described in the parties' Prehearing Stipulation Petitioners are challenging the Respondent's (SJRWMD) solicitation process with regard to the "Invitation to submit an Offer to Purchase property known as the Zellwin Airstrip." Petitioners seek to set aside the award of purchase to Intervenors and to have the solicitation process re-advertised. The issue for resolution is whether Petitioners are entitled to that relief.

Findings Of Fact In 1996 the Florida Legislature mandated that the St. Johns River Water Management District (SJRWMD) attempt to purchase farms on the north shore of Lake Apopka as part of a long-term restoration and reclamation project. Petitioners, Rex Shepherd and Dale Harper, are pilots and owners of an aerial advertising business, American Outdoor Aerial Advertising. In early 1998 the business was operating out of Crakes field, a small airstrip owned by Kent Crakes as part of Crakes' North Lake Apopka farm. Petitioners' business owned airplanes and banners which it flew for its advertising clients such as Sears and GEICO. Sometime in early 1998 it became obvious that Petitioners would need to move their operation to another field. There were break-ins at the hanger, and the airstrip was beginning to flood as a result of the reclamation project. Kent Crakes referred Rex Shepherd to Leonard Freeman, the individual with SJRWMD who was involved with land acquisition in the area. Around March or early April 1998 Petitioners commenced discussions with Mr. Freeman regarding their use of the farm airstrip at Zellwin Farms, also part of the SJRWMD Lake Apopka farms acquisition program. Mr. Freeman was the SJRWMD point of contact for the Zellwin Farms acquisition. By early 1998, the property was already under contract and was scheduled to close some time around June 1998. Mr. Freeman and the Petitioners met at the Zellwin Farms airstrip in June 1998, and Petitioners determined the property would be suitable for their operation. Eager to accommodate Petitioners because of their predicament and also in anticipation of the SJRWMD's eventual sale of the Zellwin parcel, Mr. Freeman gave permission for Petitioners to store their equipment on the site and gave them a key. Because Zellwin Farms was beyond what SJRWMD considered to be the lake's historic shoreline, the SJRWMD knew that it would need to dispose of its 1400 acres as surplus, in whole or part. Mr. Freeman's desire was to find a way to dispose of the property as the best thing for the SJRWMD. Thus, because of the Petitioners' immediate interest in relocating their business, Mr. Freeman began negotiating with them for their purchase of the airstrip and related buildings. In September 1998, Mr. Freeman met again with Petitioners at the airstrip and discussed a specific proposal. Petitioners talked about offering $250,000 under a lease-purchase arrangement, and sent a letter dated September 10, 1998, to Mr. Freeman with that offer. Mr. Freeman later suggested that since the appraised value was $275,000, an offer in that amount would be easier to get approved. Mr. Freeman did not have the authority to obligate the SJRWMD to sell the property and Petitioners understood that. Still, Petitioners felt they were negotiating in good faith with staff who could make a strong recommendation to the board. Petitioners believed in early October that they had a hand-shake deal subject to further discussions regarding specific terms. They knew that a competitive solicitation might be an option for the SJRWMD but they also believed that they would be given an opportunity to meet another third party's offer. This belief was based not on some specific agreement for a "right of first refusal," but rather on Mr. Freeman's good-natured assurances that they would work it all out. Mr. Freeman requested that the SJRWMD special counsel develop a draft contract based on Petitioners' offer. The offer would then need to be signed by Petitioners and approved by Mr. Freeman's supervisor before going to the SJRWMD governing board. The counsel never finished the draft and it was never given to Mr. Freeman or the Petitioners. By the end of October 1998, Robert Christianson, Mr. Freeman's supervisor and director of the SJRWMD Department of Operations and Land Resources, learned that Petitioners were flying in and out of the Zellwin airstrip and using it for their business base of operations. This activity was beyond the storage permission that Mr. Freeman had granted. (Even that permission was beyond his individual authority.) Mr. Freeman and Mr. Christianson met with Petitioners on October 27, 1998, to work out a license agreement for their use of the airstrip. Such an agreement was necessary to protect the parties' respective interests and to cover the SJRWMD for any liability in the landlord/tenant relationship. The result of that meeting was a written license agreement for Petitioners to use, maintain, and provide protection for the property for a period from October 30, 1998, to April 30, 1999, subject to revocation with advance notice. Petitioners used the airstrip property under that agreement and made improvements, mostly cleaning up the facility so it could be used. At the October meeting it became obvious to Petitioners that the informal negotiations for their purchase were terminated and that the SJRWMD was going to solicit competitive offers for the purchase. This concerned the Petitioners and they felt let- down by Mr. Freeman. Still, they concentrated on getting the license agreement worked out. Rex Shepherd's account of the October meeting was that Mr. Christianson was very clear about the fact that the SJRWMD had to go for competitive bid, that they were bound by a board and rules and regulations even though both he and Mr. Freeman would like for Petitioners to have the airport, and that they should be able to work it out. At the end of the meeting, and as they were leaving the trailer, Mr. Shepherd commented to Mr. Freeman that he really did not want to lose the airport and wanted to be apprised of what was going on so that if there were a higher bid, he could have the opportunity to match it, or if it were too high, that they would have 30 or 60 days to vacate the property. According to Mr. Shepherd, Mr. Freeman simply responded, "We'll work all that out, don't worry about it." On November 11, 1998, the SJRWMD governing board voted to surplus the Zellwin Farms property with direction to the staff that the sale be widely advertised in the aviation community and not be a sole source deal. Consistent with the board's direction and pursuant to Section 373.089(3), Florida Statutes, the SJRWMD advertised a "Notice of Intention to Sell" the airstrip property in the Orlando Sentinel for three consecutive weeks, November 9, 16, and 23, 1998. The notice identifies the airstrip property as an "Approximately 47-acre agricultural airport facility, 2,200'? square feet asphalt runway, 5,250 ? square feet metal hanger, 2,048 ? storage square feet building, well and septic tank at a location of northwest Orange County, Florida, Sections 20 and 29, T-20-S, R-27-E, on Jones Avenue, 1 ? mile west of U.S. Highway 441, Zellwood." The Notice of Intention to Sell states that "[a]ll interested persons are invited to submit an offer to the District for purchase of said lands. Contact the District . . . and request an Airport Sales Package." Both the Airport Sales Package and the Notice of Intention to Sell state that the airport property will be sold for the highest price obtainable. The sales package states that full cash offers to be paid at closing will be given first consideration and that 10 percent of the purchase price must be paid when the offeror was notified that it was successful. The sales package also states that any person adversely affected by an offer solicitation shall file a Notice of Protest, in writing, prior to the date on which the offers are to be received, and shall file a formal written protest within ten (10) days after filing the Notice of protest pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 40C-1.801. * * * Failure to timely file a notice of protest or failure to timely file a formal written protest shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. (SJRWMD Ex. 3). Both the Notice of Intention to Sell and the sales package require that sealed "offers for purchase" be submitted to the SJRWMD prior to 2:00 p.m. on December 4, 1998, the advertised time for opening of the offers. Nothing in the Notice or sales package reserves a right of first refusal for any person. Instead, both plainly state "no offer will be accepted after the date and hour specified for submittal of offers." (SJRWMD Exhibits 1 and 3) Although Petitioners did not see the newspaper notice, they had knowledge that the SJRWMD advertised the sale of the airstrip property through a competitive solicitation process in the newspaper. They had been clearly informed of need for the competitive process by Mr. Christianson at the October meeting and they were present when a pre-solicitation meeting/inspection took place at the airstrip in November prior to the offers being accepted by the SJRWMD. Intervenors requested a sales package from the SJRWMD on November 30, 1998, and December 2, 1998. Petitioners requested and received a sales package prior to the opening of the offers to purchase. The sales packages were not available to the public until December 2, 1998, the same day Petitioners received their package. Mr. Freeman told Petitioners they needed to submit their bid. Although the sales package stated that facsimile offers would not be accepted by the SJRWMD, Leonard Freeman informed Petitioners that they could fax their Offer to Purchase. The SJRWMD did accept a facsimile offer to purchase from Petitioners on December 4, 1998, at 1:07 p.m. Offers to purchase were opened by the SJRWMD at 2:10 p.m. on December 4, 1998. Petitioners submitted an offer to purchase the airstrip property for $275,000, where Petitioners would pay $1,500.00 per month for 60 months ($90,000 with $72,000 applied toward principal) with a balance of $203,000 cash to be paid at the end of the 60-month term. Intervenors submitted an offer to purchase the airstrip property for $310,000, where Intervenors would put 10 percent down ($31,000 earnest money deposit) at award of Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the balance of $279,000 cash would be paid at closing on or before May 1, 1999. Petitioners' offer to purchase was not the highest offer; it did not provide for cash at closing; and it did not meet the requirement of 10 percent to be paid upon notification. Staff recommended to the SJRWMD board that it award the purchase of the airstrip property to the highest offeror, Intervenors. The governing board approved staff's recommendation at its regularly scheduled meeting on December 9, 1998. On December 9, 1998, Petitioners filed a Notice of Protest. On December 18, 1998, Petitioners filed a copy of their Formal Bid Protest with the SJRWMD. Petitioners never grasped the implications of the competitive solicitation process until after the offers were opened and the award was made to Intervenors. Even if Petitioners had seen the newspaper notice and had received the sales package sooner, they still would not have protested because they understood that their "agreement" was outside of the process. That is, they mistakenly perceived that after the offers were in they could negotiate further to exceed the high offer. Chagrined, and genuinely regretful of the misunderstanding, Mr. Freeman had to tell Petitioners that further negotiations were foreclosed after the offers were opened. Mr. Freeman's earlier assurances to Petitioners were the result of an excess of bonhomie rather than any deception. He wanted them to have the airport and he wanted to work out the sale of surplus property. Petitioners were aware that he did not have the authority to bind his agency to an agreement. Mr. Freeman never specifically told Petitioners they had a right of first refusal; they wanted that advantage and surmised agreement from Mr. Freeman's and Mr. Christianson's vague counsel to not worry and that it would all be worked out. The SJRWMD devised a competitive process for disposition of the Zellwin airstrip that was consistent with its statute and with the direction of its governing board. Intervenors responded with an offer that met all the published requirements. Petitioners did not, and any culpability of SJRWMD's staff for Petitioners' misunderstanding is not so egregious as to require that the process begin again. Petitioners occupied the property, used it, and made improvements to enhance their use. This, however, was in reliance on their license to use the property and not on some certainty that they would ultimately be able to own the property. As Petitioners testified at hearing, they were disappointed that the SJRWMD decided to solicit competitive proposals; they knew that it was possible someone would offer more than they could match. (Harper, Transcript pages 117-120).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: that the SJRWMD enter its final order denying Petitioners' request to reject all bids and re-advertise the sale. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry Dean, Executive Director St. Johns River Water Management District Post office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 John W. Williams, Esquire St. Johns River Water Management District Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 Clayton D. Simmons, Esquire Stenstrom, McIntosh, Colbert, Whigham And Simmons, P.A. Post Office Box 4848 Sanford, Florida 32772-4848 Stanley Dollen 1230 Kelso Boulevard Windermere, Florida 34786 Herbert Clark 5416 Trimble Park Road Mt. Dora, Florida 32757

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57373.089
# 8
GLOBE INTERNATIONAL REALTY AND MORTGAGE CORPORATION, MATTHEW RENDA AND KENNETH V. HEMMERLE vs FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT CORPORATION, 95-002514 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida May 16, 1995 Number: 95-002514 Latest Update: Feb. 28, 1996

The Issue Whether Florida Power & Light Company (hereinafter referred to as "FPL") properly refused the request of Globe International Realty & Mortgage, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Globe") to supply electric service to the premises located at 808 Northeast Third Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida?

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Kenneth V. Hemmerle, Sr., is a real estate developer. Matthew Renda is a real estate and mortgage broker. Hemmerle and Renda have known each other since about 1986. At the suggestion of Hemmerle, in February of 1993, Renda, along with Hemmerle, formed Globe. At the time, Hemmerle was involved in a development project on the west coast of Florida and he wanted Renda, through Globe, to handle "the selling and so forth for the project." Globe was incorporated under the laws of Florida. The articles of incorporation filed with the Department of State, Division of Corporations (hereinafter referred to as the "Division of Corporations") reflected that: Renda was the president of the corporation; Hemmerle was its secretary; Renda and Hemmerle were the incorporators of the corporation, owning 250 shares of stock each; they also comprised the corporation's board of directors; and the corporation's place of business, as well as its principal office, were located at 808 Northeast Third Avenue in Fort Lauderdale, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "808 Building"). Globe is now, and has been since its incorporation, an active Florida corporation. Annual reports were filed on behalf of Globe with the Division of Corporations in both 1994 (on April 19th of that year) and 1995 (on March 23rd of that year). The 1994 annual report reflected that Renda and Hemmerle remained the officers and directors of the corporation. The 1995 annual report reflected that Renda was still an officer and director of the corporation, but that Hemmerle had "resigned 9-2-93." Both the 1994 and 1995 annual reports reflected that the 808 Building remained the corporation's place of business and its corporate address. The 808 Building is a concrete block building with a stucco finish housing eight separate offices. The entire building is served by one electric meter. At all times material to the instant case, Southern Atlantic Construction Corporation of Florida (hereinafter referred to as "Southern") owned the 808 Building. Southern was incorporated under the laws of Florida in June of 1973, and administratively dissolved on October 9, 1992. Hemmerle owns a majority of the shares of the corporation's stock. The last annual report that Southern filed with the Division of Corporations (which was filed on June 10, 1991) reflected that: Hemmerle was the corporation's president and registered agent; he also served on the corporation's board of directors; Lynn Nadeau was the corporation's other officer and director; and the corporation's principal office was located in the 808 Building. From 1975 until September 6, 1994, FPL provided electric service to the 808 Building. Charges for such service were billed to an account (hereinafter referred to as the "808 account") that had been established by, and was in the name of, Hemmerle Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "HDC"). HDC was incorporated under the laws of Florida in 1975, and administratively dissolved on October 9, 1992. At the time of HDC's incorporation, Hemmerle owned 250 of the 500 shares of stock issued by the corporation. The last annual report that HDC filed with the Division of Corporations (which was filed on June 10, 1991) reflected that: Hemmerle was the corporation's president and registered agent; he also served on the corporation's board of directors; Lynn Nadeau was the corporation's other officer and director; and the corporation's principal office was located in the 808 Building. Following the administrative dissolution of the corporation, Hemmerle continued to transact business with FPL in the corporation's name, notwithstanding that he was aware that the corporation had been administratively dissolved. At no time has Renda owned any shares of HDC's stock or served on its board of directors. He and Hemmerle have served together as officers and directors of only two corporations: Globe and Hemmerle's Helpers, Inc. The latter was incorporated under the laws of Florida as a nonprofit corporation in March of 1992, and was administratively dissolved on August 13, 1993. Its articles of incorporation reflected that its place of operation, as well as its principal office, were located in the 808 Building. Pursuant to arrangements Renda and Hemmerle had made (which were not reduced to writing), Globe occupied office space in the 808 Building from March of 1993, through September 6, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the "rental period"). Renda and Hemmerle had initially agreed that the rent Globe would pay for leasing the space would come from any profits Globe made as a result of its participation in Hemmerle's Florida west coast development project. Renda and Hemmerle subsequently decided, however, that Globe would instead pay a monthly rental fee of $300 for each office it occupied in the building. 1/ Globe (which occupied only one office in the building during the rental period) did not pay in full the monies it owed under this rental agreement. The office Globe occupied in the 808 Building was the first office to the right upon entering the building. It was across the lobby from the office from which Hemmerle conducted business on behalf of his various enterprises. Globe voluntarily and knowingly accepted, used and benefited from the electric service FPL provided to its office and the common areas in the building during the rental period. Under the agreement Renda and Hemmerle had reached, Globe was not responsible for making any payments (in addition to the $300 monthly rental fee) for such service. On July 26, 1994, the 808 account was in a collectible status and an FPL field collector was dispatched to the service address. There, he encountered Hemmerle, who gave him a check made out to FPL in the amount of $2,216.37. Hemmerle had noted the following on the back of the check: "Payment made under protest due to now [sic] owning [sic] of such billing amount to prevent discontinuance of power." The check was drawn on a Sunniland Bank checking account that was in the name of Florida Kenmar, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as "Kenmar"), a Florida corporation that had been incorporated in May of 1984, 2/ and administratively dissolved on November 9, 1990. (The last annual report that Kenmar filed with the Division of Corporations, which was filed on June 10, 1991, reflected that: Hemmerle was the corporation's president and registered agent; he also served on the corporation's board of directors; and the corporation's principal office was located in the 808 Building.) Hemmerle told the field collector, upon handing him the check, that there were no funds in the Kenmar checking account. Nonetheless, the field collector accepted the check. FPL deposited the check in its account at Barnett Bank of South Florida. The check was subsequently returned due to "insufficient funds." On the same day that he was visited by the FPL field collector, Hemmerle telephoned Sandra Lowery, an FPL customer service lead representative for recovery, complaining about, among other things, a debit that he claimed had been improperly charged to the 808 account. As a result of her conversation with Hemmerle, Lowery authorized the removal of the debit and all late payment charges associated with the debit from the 808 account. Following the July 26, 1994, removal of the debit and associated late payment charges, the balance due on the account was $1,953.91, an amount that Hemmerle still disputed. In an effort to demonstrate that a lesser amount was owed, Hemmerle sent Lowery copies of cancelled checks that, he claimed, had been remitted to FPL as payment for electric service billed to the 808 account. Some of these checks, however, had been used to pay for charges billed to other accounts that Hemmerle (or corporations with which he was associated) had with FPL. As of August 29, 1994, the 808 account had a balance due of $2,387.47. These unpaid charges were for service provided between March of 1993 and August 10, 1994. On August 29, 1994, Hemmerle showed Renda a notice that he had received from FPL advising that electric service to the 808 Building would be terminated if the balance owing on the 808 account was not paid within the time frame specified in the notice. Hemmerle suggested to Renda that, in light of FPL's announced intention to close the 808 account and terminate service, Renda should either apply for electric service to the 808 Building in Globe's name or relocate to another office building. Renda decided to initially pursue the former option. Later that same day, Renda telephoned FPL to request that an account for electric service to the 808 Building be opened in Globe's name. Gigi Marshall was the FPL representative to whom he spoke. She obtained from Renda the information FPL requires from an applicant for electric service. During his telephone conversation with Marshall, Renda mentioned, among other things, that Globe had been a tenant at the 808 Building since the previous year and that it was his understanding that FPL was going to discontinue electric service to the building because of the current customer's failure to timely pay its bills. Renda claimed that Globe was not in any way responsible for payment of these past-due bills. From an examination of FPL's computerized records (to which she had access from her work station), Marshall confirmed, while still on the telephone with Renda, that the 808 account was in arrears and that FPL had sent a disconnect notice to the current customer at the service address. Marshall believed that, under such circumstances, it would be imprudent to approve Globe's application for electric service without further investigation. She therefore ended her conversation with Renda by telling him that she would conduct such an investigation and then get back with him. After speaking with Renda, Marshall went to her supervisor, Carol Sue Ryan, for guidance and direction. Like Marshall, Ryan questioned whether Globe's application for service should be approved. She suggested that Marshall telephone Renda and advise him that FPL needed additional time to complete the investigation related to Globe's application. Some time after 12:30 p.m. on that same day (August 29, 1994), Marshall followed Ryan's suggestion and telephoned Renda. Ryan was on the line when Marshall spoke with Renda and she participated in the conversation. Among the things Ryan told Renda was that a meter reader would be dispatched to the 808 Building the following day to read the meter so that the information gleaned from such a reading would be available in the event that Globe's application for service was approved. At no time did either Marshall or Ryan indicate to Renda that Globe's application was, or would be, approved. Ryan referred Globe's application to Larry Johnson of FPL's Collection Department, who, in turn, brought the matter to the attention of Thomas Eichas, an FPL fraud investigator. After completing his investigation of the matter, which included an examination of the Broward County property tax rolls (which revealed that Southern owned the 808 Building), as well a search of the records relating to Globe, HDC and Southern maintained by the Division of Corporations, Eichas determined that Globe's application for service should be denied on the basis of the "prior indebtedness rule." Eichas informed Johnson of his decision and instructed him to act accordingly. Electric service to the 808 Building was terminated on September 6, 1994. As of that date, the 808 account had a past-due balance that was still in excess of $2,000.00. Although he conducted his business activities primarily from his home following the termination of electric service to the 808 Building, Hemmerle continued to have access to the building until March of 1995 (as did Renda). 3/ During this period, Hemmerle still had office equipment in the building and he went there on almost a daily basis to see if any mail had been delivered for him. It was his intention to again actively conduct business from his office in the building if electric service to the building was restored. Hemmerle (and the corporations on whose behalf he acted) therefore would have benefited had there been such a restoration of service. After discovering that electric service to the 808 Building had been terminated, Renda telephoned FPL to inquire about the application for service he had made on behalf of Globe. He was advised that, unless FPL was paid the more than $2,000.00 it was owed for electric service previously supplied to the building, service to the building would not be restored in Globe's name. Thereafter, Renda, on behalf of Globe, telephoned the PSC and complained about FPL's refusal to approve Globe's application for service. FPL responded to the complaint in writing. In its response, it explained why it had refused to approve the application. On or about November 15, 1994, the Chief of PSC's Bureau of Complaint Resolution sent Renda a letter which read as follows: The staff has completed its review of your complaint concerning Florida Power & Light's (FPL) refusal to establish service in the name of Globe Realty, Inc. at the above- referenced location. Our review indicates that FPL appears to have complied with all applicable Commission Rules in refusing to establish service. Our review of the customer billing history indicates that the past-due balance is for service at this location and not attributable to the judgment against Mr. Hemmerle for service at another location. The interlocking directorships of Globe International Realty & Mortgage, Inc. and Hemmerle Development, Inc. suggest that the request to establish service in the name of Globe Realty is an artifice to avoid payment of the outstanding balance and not a result of any change in the use or occupancy of the building. Thus, FPL's refusal to establish service is in compliance with Rule 25-6.105(8)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Please note that this determination is subject to further review by the Florida Public Service Commission. You have the right to request an informal conference pursuant to Rule 25-22.032(4), Florida Administrative Code. Should that conference fail to resolve the matter, the staff will make a recommenda- tion to the Commissioners for decision. If you are dissatisfied with the Commission decision, you may request a formal Administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. After receiving this letter, Renda, on behalf of Globe, requested an informal conference. The informal conference was held on November 30, 1994. At the informal conference, the parties explained their respective positions on the matter in dispute. No resolution, however, was reached. Adopting the recommendation of its staff, the PSC, in an order issued January 31, 1995, preliminarily held that there was no merit to Globe's complaint that FPL acted improperly in refusing to provide electric service to the 808 Building pursuant to Globe's request. Thereafter, Renda, on behalf of Globe, requested a formal Section 120.57 hearing on the matter.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the PSC enter a final order dismissing Globe's complaint that FPL acted improperly in refusing to provide electric service to the 808 Building pursuant to Globe's request. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of December, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1995.

Florida Laws (3) 120.56120.57607.1421 Florida Administrative Code (2) 25-22.03225-6.105
# 9
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. ROBERT W. THOMAS, 83-001013 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001013 Latest Update: Dec. 02, 1983

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Robert W. Thomas, in August 1982 operated as a contractor under the trade name AA Custom Builders, Inc., at 2505 North Magnolia, Ocala, Florida. Respondent's Florida license as a registered general contractor expired on January 31, 1982. His license as a registered air conditioning contractor expired on June 30, 1976. His license as a registered roofing contractor expired on January 31, 1982, and his license as a registered mechanical contractor expired on January 31, 1982. All above dates are prior to the date of the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint. In late July or early August 1982, Mr. John J. Hicks, a resident of Belleview, Florida, answered Respondent's advertisement in the Marion Shopper. Respondent came to the home of Mr. Hicks and on August 3, 1982, acting under the name AA Custom Builders, Inc., submitted a proposal to Mr. Hicks, wherein he agreed to build an extra bedroom on the Hicks' home for a total of $3,700. Of this amount, $1,000 was to be paid when the material for construction was delivered, and the balance of $2,700 to be paid on September 5, 1982. Mr. Hicks accepted the proposal by affixing his signature the same date. Certain materials were delivered by Ferguson Lumber Company on August 9, 1982, and on that same date Mr. Hicks gave to Respondent a check in the amount of $1,000, payable to Robert Thomas, which was subsequently endorsed by Robert Thomas, d/b/a AA Custom Builders, and deposited to that account at Respondent's bank. Thereafter, Respondent prepared the foundation, laid the blocks, put down plywood flooring, and erected the walls up to the lineal height. No work was thereafter done for several days, during which it rained, after which Respondent one day advised Mr. Hicks he would not finish the job and that Mr. Hicks would have to pay the bill for materials. Just about that time, the lumber company, at the request of Mr. Secor, Respondent's partner/employee, to whose personal account at the lumber company the supplies for this project had been billed, came out and collected all unused materials. Thereafter, Ferguson Lumber Company sent Mr. Hicks a bill for the balance owing of $603. When Mr. Hicks received his bill, he called Respondent, who told him that he, Hicks, would have to pay it. Respondent came out to the Hicks' home on August 19, 1982, and asked Mr. Hicks for the original proposal they had signed. Hicks gave it to Respondent, who in return gave him a letter stating Respondent would not complete the project and including a breakdown of the expenditures of the $1,000 Hicks had previously showed. This breakdown reflects $132.37 paid for materials, $316.63 to Paul Cook, and $250 to Ed Secor. In his testimony at the hearing, Respondent indicated he had paid Cook $316, Secor $350, $113 for some materials, $400 to another laborer, and $1,002.90 for materials for the Hicks job. This last figure was to have been paid by check, but the cancelled check was not available, and there was no showing that the bill to Ferguson Lumber had been paid other than by Mr. Hicks and Mr. Secor, who Hicks called in to finish the job and with whom Hicks split the bill for $603. The total on the breakdown left with Hicks by the Respondent on August 19, 1982, was exactly $1,000--the amount of the deposit. However, the payments testified to by Respondent at the hearing come to far more than the amount paid, and there is substantial evidence that both sets of figures are in error. For example, Secor states that of the money he received from Respondent, only $100 was for the work on the Hicks property. Further, Mr. Hicks was present when Cook was paid with $200 in case--not the $316 or $317 Respondent said he paid. In light of the above, it is clear that Respondent does not know where the $1,000 he was paid by Hicks was spent, but that much of it was diverted to pay expenses for material and labor for other jobs. It was because Secor, to whose account the material for this construction was billed, pulled out of the relationship with Respondent and caused the unused materials to be repossessed by Ferguson Lumber Company, that Respondent was unable to continue with the construction. Though his inability to continue may not have been motivated by any improper motive, he did nonetheless abandon the contract without excuse or justification, and his conduct caused a loss to the innocent consumer, Mr. Hicks. AA Custom Builders, Inc., under which name Respondent contracted with Mr. Hicks, wasn't properly qualified with the licensing authorities of the State of Florida by Respondent or anyone acting in his behalf.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That Respondent, Robert W. Thomas, be reprimanded and that he be assessed an administrative fine of $1,000. However, it is further recommended that the administrative fine be reduced by whatever amount the Respondent pays in restitution to Mr. Hicks for the loss he occasioned up to the amount of $693 plus accrued interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of October 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward C. Hill, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Robert W. Thomas 2505 North Magnolia Ocala, Florida 32670 Mr. Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202

Florida Laws (3) 455.227489.119489.129
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer