Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, respondent Alan Kaye was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida and respondent KNAC of Miami Realty, Inc. was a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida. Respondent Alan Kaye was an officer of and qualifying broker for respondent KNAC of Miami Realty, Inc. Respondents secured a 90-day listing from Christina Trivino for the sale of her residence located at 271 N.W. 148th Street in North Miami, Florida. When that listing expired, respondents obtained an extension. On or about November 28, 1987, respondents solicited and obtained a sales contract for the purchase and sale of the Trivino property. In connection therewith, the purchasers, Marie C. Eduoard and Henry S. Roy, entrusted to the respondents a total earnest money deposit of $6,200.00, and the respondents placed the deposit in the escrow account of respondent KNAC of Miami Realty, Inc. In accordance with the provisions of the sales contract, the purchasers were to pay a total of $62,000 for the property, and assume the existing first mortgage in the principal amount of approximately $45,000. While the contract initially called for the closing to occur on or before February 15, 1988, Ms. Trivino was very anxious to close earlier due to some problems she was having with the Internal Revenue Service. Accordingly, the closing date was changed to occur on or before January 15, 1988. Among the terms of the sales contract was a provision that conditioned the sale upon the purchasers' assumption of the first mortgage in the principal amount of approximately $45,000. Paragraph 8 of the contract provided that If, after diligent effort on the part of the purchaser, the purchaser is unable to obtain said first mortgage, all monies deposited hereunder shall be refunded to purchaser and parties herewith agree to enter into a Release on Deposit Receipt; and this contract shall be declared null and void. At some point in time, it became known to the respondents and the seller Trivino that the bank which held the first mortgage on the subject property would not authorize an assumption of the mortgage by the purchasers without either a $3,000 paydown of the mortgage amount or the completion of qualifying papers by the purchasers. The testimony from Ms. Trivino and Mr. Kaye differ widely with regard to the dates upon which and the manner in which they became aware of this problem, as well as their communications with each other thereafter. Ms. Trivino testified that in early January, 1988, she became concerned about the status of the transaction and began making repeated calls to the respondents which calls were never returned. She admits talking with Todd Kaye, respondent's son, in the respondents' offices on January 5, 1988, whereupon the mortgage problem was discussed. At that time, needing "desperately" to sell the house, Ms. Trivino offered to hold a second mortgage for the purchasers in the amount of approximately $3,000.00. She states that she also spoke with the officials at the bank regarding the mortgage. In spite of numerous unreturned telephone calls, Ms. Trivino did not hear anything further from Mr. Kaye until his letter dated January 29, 1988. That letter informed Ms. Trivino of the mortgage situation and indicated that "there is some doubt whether or not the Buyer has this extra money." Mr. Kaye further informed Ms. Trivino that "for all practical purposes, since the closing has not taken place, due to no one (sic) fault, the contract is void." Ms. Trivino then had her employer, a licensed real estate broker, write a letter dated February 3, 1988, to Mr. Kaye requesting Mr. Kaye to retain the $6,200 deposit pending a determination of the matter. She asserts that she made numerous further attempts to contact Mr. Kaye regarding this matter, but he would not return her calls. According to Mr. Kaye, he delivered the sales contract to a title company in early December, 1987, with the requests that the title company do a title check, that the mortgage holder be contacted, and that a mortgage assumption package for the buyers be obtained. Mr. Kaye states that he was thereafter informed by the title company that the mortgage holder would not allow an assumption of the mortgage without a paydown of about $3,000. Mr. Kaye states that he communicated to the buyers the problem with the mortgage assumption and also communicated Ms. Trivino's offer to take a second mortgage for $3,000. According to Mr. Kaye, the buyers did not want a second mortgage and did not feel that they could qualify for an assumption of the first mortgage because they were unemployed at the time. Instead, they wanted a return of their $6,200 deposit. Mr. Kaye felt that the sales contract had become void because of the inability of the buyers to assume the first mortgage, as provided in Paragraph 8 of the sales contract. Accordingly, he returned the $6,200 deposit to the buyers on January 10, 1988. He did not request Ms. Trivino's consent nor did he notify Ms. Trivino that he had refunded the deposit to the buyers because he felt that Ms. Trivino was fully aware that "the deal was dead."
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the respondents be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4062 The parties' proposed findings of fact have been fully considered and are accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, with the following exceptions: Petitioner 8. The evidence demonstrates that the amount of the deposit was $6,200 in lieu of $6,000. 13. Partially rejected based upon the seller's testimony that she spoke to Todd Kaye in respondent's offices on or about January 5, 1988. 15. Accepted with the addition of the fact that the respondent communicated this offer to the buyers. Respondent 4. The evidence demonstrates that the amount of the deposit was $6,200 in lieu of $6,000. 8. The date of "early December" is rejected as not established by competent, substantial evidence. 10. Rejected as not established by competent, substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire DPR, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Manuel M. Arvesu, Esquire 100 North Biscayne Blvd. Miami, Florida 33132 Darlene Keller, Executive Director DPR, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 =================================================================
The Issue By an information filed by the Florida Real Estate Commission, respondent Thomas F. Thayer was charged with fraud, dishonest dealing and breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Florida Statutes s.475.25(1)(a). In essence, the information charges that respondent, as the real estate broker for the Jacobs and in order to obtain a ninety percent loan commitment for the Jacobs, falsely represented to a mortgage corporation that the Jacobs Intended to move into the duplex they planned to purchase and sell their present home.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times to this proceeding, respondent was a registered real estate broker. Respondent had been an acquaintance of Mr. and Mrs. Richard Jacobs for a period of four to five years. Some two years before the transaction in question, Jacobs had expressed to respondent his desire to purchase property containing a duplex for purposes of a tax shelter. Mr. Jacobs testified that he intended the purchase to be an Investment somewhere in the neighborhood of $5,000.00. There was also evidence that Mr. Jacobs understood that there were tax shelter benefits from living in half the duplex and depreciating the other half. In April of 1974, respondent showed the Jacobs a duplex. At the time, the Jacobs were living in a two bedroom, two bath waterfront home with a swimming pool, valued somewhere in the neighborhood of $60,000.00. The location of the duplex was in a lower rent neighborhood near some railroad tracks. However, the front portion contained three bedrooms, two baths, a thick shag carpet and a built-in bar. There were also two large screened-in patios. The Jacobs were impressed with the duplex, and on April 19, 1974, they signed a deposit receipt contract prepared by respondent to purchase the duplex for $41,000.00. This contract was subject to the Jacobs being able to obtain ninety percent financing at 9.25 percent annual Interest within fifteen days from the date of acceptance by the sellers. The contract also contained certain conditions regarding inspection of the rear apartment; electrical, plumbing, roofing and appliance defects; termite damage and the inclusion of a metal storage shed. Such conditions were included in the contract at the request of Mr. Jacobs. In order to obtain ninety percent financing, it was necessary that the lender be assured that the borrower actually intends to reside on the mortgaged property. This assurance comes about through either an affidavit executed by the borrower at the time of closing and/or the filing with the lender of a sales listing on the present home of the borrower. From this point forward, disputes in the testimony arise. Respondent testified that Mr. Jacobs was aware of the financing requirement that he would have to indicate an intent to sell his present home. Jacobs acknowledged that he was so aware, but testified that he never had any intent to move from his waterfront home to the duplex, and so informed respondent. However, when he went in to make the loan application with the mortgage company, he told its representative that he would be living in the duplex. Respondent then informed the mortgage company that he would be sending them a multiple listing form on the Jacobs' present residence. Jacobs stated at the hearing that he and his wife never intended to reside in the duplex and that he followed respondent's advice regarding the filing of a multiple listing only because he had faith and trust in respondent, who told him such things were done all the time. Respondent testified that the Jacobs never informed him that they did not intend to live in the duplex or that they did not intend to sell their present home. In fact, there was testimony from Mr. Jacobs that between the time of the deposit receipt contract and the first letter approving the mortgage loan commitment, he and his wife were looking at other homes on the water in which to live. The multiple listing form was signed by the Jacobs and delivered to the mortgage company by respondent, but it was never turned in to the multiple listing service. Sometime subsequent to receiving the mortgage loan commitment on May 29, 1974, Jacobs inspected the rear apartment of the duplex and became very upset and disgusted with its condition. Repairs were estimated at $1,000.00 and the sellers only offered to contribute approximately $75.00 toward such repairs. Jacobs then went to an attorney who advised him that it would be illegal to continue with the purchase because of the misrepresentation as to the Jacobs' intent to reside in the duplex. Jacobs then called the mortgage company and told them he did not intend to live in the duplex. Thereafter the mortgage company informed Jacobs that they were unable to obtain a mortgage commitment. Respondent testified that he first became aware that the Jacobs did not intend to live in the duplex the night after Jacobs inspected the rear apartment and spoke with his attorney. In summary, the testimony in this case is conflicting with respect to respondent's knowledge of the Jacobs' intent as to where they would actually reside. In order for respondent to be found guilty of fraud, dishonest dealing and breach of trust in a business transaction, as prohibited by Florida Statutes s 475.25(1)(a), the Real Estate Commission must prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent actually knew that the Jacobs never intended to reside at the duplex property. That proof is lacking in this case. Here, the substance of the matters in dispute are as readily susceptible of proving respondent's innocence as they are susceptible of proving guilt. Jacobs testified that he originally wanted the duplex as an investment which would provide a tax shelter and that he did not intend to live in it. Yet, he verbally represented to the mortgage company that he did intend to live in the duplex, signed a multiple listing agreement and actually did look at other homes to live in during the period of time between signing the deposit receipt contract and obtaining knowledge of the original loan commitment. There was no evidence that respondent had any knowledge of or was involved in the Jacobs' search for another home in which to live. Jacobs was willing to go through with the purchase of the duplex until he became aware of the extent of damages to the rear apartment. It was at this time that he Informed the mortgage company that he did not have any intention of living in the duplex or selling their house. And, it was at about this same time, according to respondent, that respondent first learned that the Jacobs did not intend to reside in the duplex. There is no clear and convincing evidence in this record that proved that respondent knew that the Jacobs did not plan to live in the duplex at the time respondent forwarded the multiple listing to the mortgage company on April 30, 1974. The most credible evidence tending to show such knowledge on respondent's behalf is the fact that after the multiple listing agreement was signed and delivered to the mortgage company, the house was never actually put up for sale, was not shown to anyone, and the agreement was not filed with the multiple listing service. Yet, this is consistent with the evidence that the Jacobs did not receive word of the loan commitment until after May 29, 1974 (later to be rescinded on July 5, 1974) and the fact that the Jacobs were in the process of looking for yet another home to purchase. It is logical to assume that they were not yet ready to sell their present home with the uncertainties that existed, and this Instructed respondent to delay the selling process. In summary, it is concluded that the Real Estate Commission failed in its burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the misconduct charged; to wit: fraud, dishonest dealing and breach of trust in a business transaction. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the information charging respondent with a violation of Florida Statute 475.25(1)(a) be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30th day of December, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Louis B. Guttman, III, Esquire Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 James F. Spindler, Jr., Esquire and James R. Eddy, Esquire EDDY AND SPINDLER, P. A. 700 East Atlantic Boulevard Pompano Beach, Florida 33060
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Richard C. Lightner, was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0408120. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker, with a home address of 1221 Duval Street, Key West, Florida 32040. Respondent, or a representative on his behalf, did not appear at the hearing to refute or otherwise contest the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: The Department enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's Real Estate brokers license. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Raymond O. Bodiford, Esquire 515 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040 Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION REAL ESTATE COMMISSION DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE Petitioner vs. Case No. 0154510 DOAH No. 87-3668 RICHARD C. LIGHTNER III Respondent /
Findings Of Fact Documents introduced into evidence revealed that the Respondent Jeremiah C. Clarke is a registered real estate broker and Clarke Real Estate is an entity registered as a partnership broker and authorized to act as such with the Commission. On or about September 15, 1975, Jerry Kent, a salesman with Respondent, Clark Real Estate, obtained an oral open listing from Esther Braverman on a condominium unit denominated as "Apartment B-804, 1111 Crandon Boulevard, Key Biscayne, Florida." Pursuant thereto, salesman Kent showed the condominium unit to Jacques Benoist and Jeanine Benoist, his wife, who executed a deposit receipt contract to purchase a condominium unit on September 27, 1975. Esther Braverman, the seller, executed the contract during October of 1975. The deposit receipt contract provided for a $10,000 earnest money deposit to be held in the escrow account of the law firm of Snider, Young, Barrett, and Tannenbaum, P.A., attorneys for seller Braverman. Said deposit was made on September 27, 1975, by delivering a check to attorney Bruce L. Hollander, a member of the firm, who deposited the deposit in the firm's escrow account. (See Commission's Exhibit No. 9). The deposit receipt contract also obligated the seller, Esther Braverman, to pay Respondent Jeremiah C. Clark a commission of $7,875. Specifically, the contract provides that "I, or we, agree to pay to the above assigned broker a commission for finding the above signed purchaser for the above described property, the sum of $7,875 . . . ." Closing took place on January 19, 1976, at the offices of Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association, Miami Beach, Florida, from whom the Benoists had obtained financing for the purchase. At the closing on January 19, 1976, Esther Braverman signed and delivered a warranty deed made out to Jacques Benoist and Janine Benoist, transferring the property to the Bravermans. The warranty deed was recorded with the clerk of the Dade County Circuit Court by the lending institution, Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association. (See Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2) At the closing, Jeremiah Clark was given a check representing the commission to Clarke Real Estate in the amount of $7,875. Thereafter, Jerry Clarke was requested by the lending institution to hold the funds in escrow until the bank dispursed the mortgage proceeds. He was then told that the mortgage proceeds would be paid within the following week. Respondent Clarke agreed, pursuant to a request from the seller's attorney, Bruce Hollander, to hold the commission check until January 27, 1976, without depositing same. Mr. Clarke held the commission check until January 29, 1976, as agree. On that day, he dispursed the proceeds to salesman Jerry Kent and the balance was credited to Clarke Real Estate. The mortgage funds were never disbursed because the lending institution could not obtain a quit-claim deed from the seller, Esther Braverman's former husband and therefore in the lending institution's opinion, the defect was not discovered until after the closing. On May 6, 1976, attorney Hollander acting for his law firm and the seller sent Respondent Jeremiah C. Clarke and Respondent Clarke Real Estate a letter stating that the mortgage proceeds had not been disbursed by the lending institution and requested a demand for the commission check. The Commission takes the position that the closing which occurred on January 19, was an escrow closing and that the Respondent Jeremiah Clarke was not authorized to disburse the proceeds from the commission check until notification that the mortgage proceeds were disbursed by the lending Institution. The Respondents, on the other hand, took the position that their only obligation was to find a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to complete the transaction, which acts were consummated by their salesman, Jerry Kent. Based on my examination of the document introduced herein, and the testimony adduced during the hearing, the undersigned concludes that the Respondent's position that it was entitled to receive the commission monies here in dispute has merit. Although the Commission takes the position that an escrow closing occurred, an escrow has been defined as a written instrument which by its term imports a legal obligation and which is deposited by the grantor, promisor, or obligor, or his agent with a stranger or third party to be kept by the depository until the performance of a condition or a happening of a certain event and then to be delivered over to the grantee, promisee, or obligee. It cannot be seriously contended herein that the Respondent Clarke was acting as an escrow for himself when consideration is given to the above definition of an escrow. See Love v. Brown Development Company, 131 So. 144. It is further essential to an escrow that delivery of the instrument be to a stranger or to a third person, that is, to one who is not a party to the instrument, or a person so free from any personal or legal identity with the parties to the instrument as to leave them free to discharge his duty as a depository to both parties without involving a breach of duty to either. For example, a deed delivered to a grantee cannot be regarded as held in escrow. Here, Respondent Clarke was in no way acting for anyone other than himself or as agent for his salesman, Jerry Kent, both of whom had a direct stake in the commission proceeds. Additionally, upon examination of the deposit receipt contract, the broker became entitled to the commission proceeds when the buyer (purchaser) was found. Additionally, and as an aside, it was noted that the lending institution in fact recorded its mortgage the day following the closing This would lead any examiner of the public records to believe that the lending institution was satisfied with the title as conveyed on the closing date. It was further noted that the Respondents had no indication that there was a problem with the title until approximately five months following the closing. Finally, the undersigned received a letter from attorney Lipcon dated August 1, 1975, advising that the civil case which was pending before the Dade County Circuit Court involving similar issues as posed herein before the commission had been fully and finally settled. There was a stipulation for dismissal signed by attorneys for each of the parties including the attorney for the firm that made the complaint against the Respondents stating in essence that the monies paid to Respondent Clarke and which was retained by him as full and final settlement of his brokerage commission were to be retained by Respondent Clarke as final payment of his commission in connection of the sale of the subject condominium. For all of these reasons, I shall recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as found above, it is hereby recommended that the complaints filed herein be dismissed in their entirety. Recommended this 23rd day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent Lydon was registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as a real estate salesman. By an administrative complaint filed on February 8, 1978, the petitioner sought to revoke, suspend or otherwise discipline the respondent's license and right to practice thereunder. The ground for such complaint is that respondent collected money as a salesman in connection with a real estate brokerage transaction in a name not his employer's and without the express consent of his employer. The respondent admits, and the evidence demonstrates, that in December of 1973, the respondent obtained a listing agreement for the sale of real property from Mary E. Renney, brought the seller Renney and the buyer Stephen together, prepared the contract for sale and obtained a check made payable to him in the amount of $500.00 for this transaction, which check was cashed by him. Mr. Lydon testified that he did these things as a personal favor to Mrs. Renney and that his broker knew about these transactions. No evidence was presented that respondent's broker gave his express consent to the events described herein.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent Alford R. Lydon, Sr., be found guilty of the charges contained in the administrative complaint dated February 8, 1978, and that said finding constitute the written reprimand discussed above. Respectively submitted and entered this 2nd day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Meer Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Alford R. Lydon, Sr. 3301 58th Avenue North Lot 146 St. Petersburg, Florida 33714
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not James T. Speaks, Respondent, engaged in conduct amounting to a failure to maintain in an escrow bank account deposits he received as a selling broker which were entrusted to him in the course of his brokerage activities until a proper or authorized disbursement of such monies was made. Based on its Administrative Complaint filed on May 17, 1978, the Florida Real Estate Commission, Petitioner, seeks to revoke, annul, suspend or otherwise discipline licensee James T. Speaks, who holds Florida Real Estate License No. 0083459, based on conduct which will be set forth herein in detail.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony presented during the course of the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: During October of 1976, Donna W. Ross was a listing broker to sell the property of Katherine Scanlon. During mid-October, 1976, Respondent Speaks located purchasers for the Scanlon property and submitted an offer to the listing broker, which offer was accepted by the seller. Respondent Speaks deposited a $1,000.00 binder deposit in his escrow account. (See FREC Composite Exhibit No. 7.) The closing of the real estate transaction in the Scanlon property took place in Attorney David Booher's office who, based on evidence received during the course of the closing, questioned Respondent Speaks as to the negotiability of a $1,000.00 check Respondent Speaks presented as a refund of the escrow deposit he had tendered to secure the deposit receipt contract for the Scanlon property. Virginia RawIs, who was formerly employed by Booher and Crabtree, Realtors, called the Barnett Bank of Regency to verify if sufficient funds were on deposit in Respondent Speaks' account and was advised that sufficient monies were not on deposit to cover the check. At that juncture, Respondent Speaks acknowledged that he had tendered a check which was drawn on an account without sufficient funds to cover it and agreed that the $1,000.00 binder deposit should be deducted from his commission monies due. This agreement was acceptable to all parties concerned at the closing and another check representing the commission monies due Respondent Speaks, less the $1,000.00 deposit, was drawn and made payable to Speaks. Donna W. Ross, the listing broker, was also present during the hearing and verified the testimony of Attorney Booher respecting the presentation by Respondent Speaks of the $1,000.00 check which was not secured by sufficient funds. As noted in the appearance section of this Recommended Order, the Respondent, James T. Speaks, did not appear during the hearing although copies of the Notice of Hearing were mailed to his last known addresses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I hereby recommend that the Registered Real Estate Broker license of Respondent, James T. Speaks, be suspended for a period of two (2) years. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1973, Mr. and Mrs. Delmar D. Carter purchased the Buccaneer Motel and Woodside Apartments [the motel] from C.E.K., Inc., whom respondents represented in the sale. Respondents agreed to accept less from C.E.K., Inc., as their commission on the sale, that they might have otherwise, because the Carters agreed to give respondents the exclusive right to resell the motel for a period of five years. Two years after they purchased the motel, the Carters asked O.B. Linkous to try to sell the motel, but the Carters sell held the motel when the resale agreement expired in late 1978. One of the obligations assumed by the Carters in exchange for the motel was secured by a mortgage that C.E.K., Inc., had executed in favor of O.B. Linkous Realty, Inc., on December 14, 1972. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. This assumed obligation required the Carters to make certain monthly payments to the corporate respondent including a payment of $862.19 on January 1, 1979. Under the mortgage agreement, the entire principal (originally $88,247.93) would become due if a "default continue for a space of 30 days." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. On January 25, 1979, Mr. Carter delivered to Mr. Linkous a check in the amount of $862.19, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, as payment of the amount due on January 1, 1979. When he handed the check to respondent Linkous, Mr. Carter told him that the funds in the account on which the check was drawn were insufficient for the drawee to pay the check, but that he would deposit sufficient funds on the following day. Respondent Linkous answered that he saw no problem since he intended to deposit the check in his own account in another bank and assumed it would be at least a day before the check was presented to the drawee. On the following day, Mr. Carter deposited $865.96 in the account on which the check was drawn. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. On January 31, 1979, the balance in the account was $1,000.32. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Instead of depositing the check, respondent Linkous took the check, on the same day he received it, to the Flagship First National Bank of Ormond Beach, on which it was drawn, and persuaded a teller there to stamp it so as to indicate that it had been dishonored because sufficient funds were not on deposit. On February 7, 1979, a mortgage foreclosure complaint was filed against the Carters and C.E.K., Inc., (as holder of a junior mortgage), in which respondents' attorney alleged that the Carters had "defaulted under the note and mortgage by failing to pay the payment due January 1, 1979, and all subsequent payments." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. The Carters retained counsel who filed an answer and counterclaim in which it was alleged, inter alia, that Linkous "deliberately with premeditated design, deceived and tricked [the Carters]." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. After these pleadings had been filed, the Carters agreed to respondents' counsel's suggestion that they grant the corporate respondent the exclusive right to sell the motel for another five-year period in exchange for an end to the litigation, and executed an agreement to that effect. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. The parties stipulated that both respondents hold real estate licenses issued by petitioner.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondents' licenses for a period of five years. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Ralph Fetner, Jr., Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Howard Hadley, Esquire 827 Deltona Boulevard Deltona, Florida 32725
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner's loss of a real estate broker's license by a stipulated disciplinary suspension in 1983 is a proper bar to his mortgage broker application as principal broker for Center State Mortgage Company.
Findings Of Fact Terry E Christensen ("Christensen") was first licensed as a mortgage solicitor in 1983, under Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. In 1984, he obtained his mortgage broker's license. The licenses were renewed in 1984 and 1985. His employer was Cenflorida Mortgage Corporation in Altamonte Springs, Florida, where he served as principal broker and vice president. (Testimony of Christensen, Petitioner's Exhibit #1.) Christensen left Cenflorida Mortgage Corporation in April 1986, and started his own company, Center State Mortgage Corporation in Longwood, Florida. He immediately filed his application with the Department of Banking and Finance ("Department") for registration as principal mortgage broker with the new company. That application was denied by letter dated May 13, 1986, for violations of Section 494.05(1)(h) and (k), Florida Statutes. The letter provides, in pertinent part: The application is denied by the determi- nation of the Division of Finance that Section 494.05(1)(h) and (k is [sic] being violated. Section 494.05(1)(h) of the Mortgage Brokerage Act states that conduct of an applicant would be cause for denial of a license. Section 494.05(1)(k) states that a licensee may be denied a license if they currently have a real estate broker or salesman license under suspension. In your particular case, our records indicate that your real estate license has been suspended for a five year period, starting June 21, 1983. (Testimony of Christensen, Petitioner's Exhibits #1 and #2.) On June 29, 1983, the Florida Real Estate Commission suspended Christensen's real estate broker's license for a period of five years. Christensen first told the Department about his real estate broker's license suspension when he applied for license as a mortgage solicitor in 1983. (Testimony of Christensen.) Subsection 494.05(1)(k), Florida Statutes, was added to the statutes effective October 1, 1985. (Chapter 85-271, Laws of Florida.) Around the same time the new law took effect, the Department commenced revocation proceedings against Christensen. By its notice docketed on September 27, 1985, and its amended notice dated March 4, 1986, the Department informed Christensen that it intended to suspend or revoke his mortgage broker's license under Chapter 494 on the basis of his prior activities as a real estate broker. Those prior activities were the subject of a civil consent judgement against Christensen and his realty company and resulted in the stipulated suspension of his real estate broker's license addressed above. The Department's administrative proceeding #85-28-DOF was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and was assigned DOAH Case No. 86-0328. (Petitioner's Exhibits #3 and #4.) The parties stipulated to the facts, and on June 10, 1986, DOAH Hearing Officer, J. Lawrence Johnston, issued his Recommended Order recommending dismissal of the complaint. The Recommended Order provides: * * * 3. In this case, Petitioner, Department of Banking and Finance (Department), has not established in the evidentiary record or anywhere else in the official record of this case that the real estate broker license of Respondent, Terry E. Christensen (Christensen), was suspended based on fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. As seen in the Procedural Background, Christensen sufficiently generally placed in issue whether suspension of his real estate broker's license was based on fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. The Department did not succeed in pre-hearing procedures to specifically eliminate the issue. The facts stipulated by the parties are not sufficient to prove that the suspension of Christensen's real estate broker license was based on fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. Although a copy of the Administrative Complaint in the Florida Real Estate commission case was referred to in the copy of the Florida Real Estate Commission Stipulation that was filed in this case, it was not attached to the Stipulation or otherwise made part of the evidentiary or official record in this case. This Hearing Officer is therefore given no choice but to conclude that the Department has not proven its case. * * * (Petitioner's Exhibit #5.) The Department adopted the Recommended Order in its entirety and dismissed the case. (Petitioner's Exhibit #7.) From 1983 until mid-1986, Christensen processed approximately five hundred mortgage loan applications with an approximate value of $50,000,000.00. To his knowledge, no complaints have ever been made to the Department regarding Christensen's activities as a mortgage solicitor or broker. (Testimony of Christensen, Petitioner's Exhibit #6.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued granting the mortgage broker's license to Terry Christensen. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 \ Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2498 The following constitute my specific rulings on the proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. PETITIONER'S FINDINGS OF FACT 1-3. Adopted in Paragraph #1. 4-5. Adopted in Paragraph #5. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Paragraph #3. 8-12. Adopted in Paragraph #4. 13. Rejected as unnecessary. 14-15. Adopted in Paragraph #4. 16-18. Rejected as unnecessary. RESPONDENT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Adopted in Paragraph #1. 2-4. Adopted in Paragraph #4. 5. Rejected as unnecessary. 6-8. Adopted in Paragraph #4. 9. Rejected as immaterial. 10-11. Adopted in Paragraph #2. 12-16. Rejected as immaterial. 17. Adopted, as to the first sentence, in paragraphs #3 and #4; otherwise, rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Gorham Rutter, Jr., Esquire Suite D 338 North Magnolia Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Robert Good, Esquire Suite 501 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Honorable Gerald Lewis, Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles Stutts, Esquire General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301
