The Issue Whether respondent's license as a real estate broker should be disciplined on charges that he failed to deliver money which he was not entitled to retain, violated a duty imposed on him by a real estate contract, and was culpably negligent in a business transaction.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and at all times pertinent to the charges has been, a licensed Florida real estate broker. (Admission.) In October, 1979, Mary Cole owned a house at 3713 Anna Drive, Apopka, Florida. Since she had decided to move to Miami for possibly two years, she hired respondent, a broker in Orlando, to handle renting and management of her house. They verbally agreed that the house should be rented as a "handy-man special," that the tenants would be expected to make certain repairs and improvements to the home in return for a reduced monthly rent. Specifically, they agreed that respondent would locate tenants and manage the property for a two-year period; that the tenants would pay rent of $150 a month in addition to maintaining the house, replacing drywall, paneling the interior walls with plywood on hand, tiling the bathroom and completing other necessary repairs; and that respondent would remit to Ms. Cole, monthly, $90 of the $150 rental payment he collected from the tenants. As to the remaining balance of $60, the parties disagree. (Testimony of Mells, Cole.) Ms. Cole understood that respondent would spend between $36 and $40 of the 60 to pay for building materials used by the tenants in repairing and doing finishing work to the house; that he would retain only $24 as his fee for acting as the rental agent. Respondent, however, believed that the full $60 balance was to be retained as his property management fee. This conflict need not be resolved here since it is immaterial to the ultimate issue. (Testimony of Cole, Mells.) They also disagree on who paid for replacement of the stove and refrigerator. When the home was rented, the stove and refrigerator were operable but Ms. Cole realized they would need replacing. The tenants eventually replaced them. Respondent contended that he reimbursed the tenants $105 for these items. Ms. Cole claims that the tenants told her they paid for them. Since this conflict is also immaterial, it is unnecessary to resolve it here. (Testimony of Cole, Mells.) In October, 1979, respondent rented the house to tenants pursuant to his verbal agreement with Ms. Cole. The next month, he forwarded to her a check for $350, including the first and last months' rent and a $100 security deposit. In December, 1979, and continuing through November, 1980, he forwarded, each month, a $90 rental payment to Ms. Cole. Although he was regularly collecting rent payments from the tenants, he did not forward to Ms. Cole any payments in December, 1979, or January, 1980. In February, he forwarded to her a $75 payment, $15 short of the required $90. Ms. Cole tried, without success, to contact respondent about the missing payments. Then, in frustration, she contacted the tenants and told them to forward their checks directly to her. (Testimony of Cole; Mells.) Respondent explains that he withheld rental payments to Ms. Cole for December, 1979, January, 1980, and part of February, 1980, in order to set aside funds to pay for needed repairs to the leaking roof of Ms. Cole's house. (He did not, however, obtain her prior authorization to withhold payments for this purpose. Respondent testified only that he wrote Ms. Cole a letter, not produced at hearing, stating that he would withhold funds for roof repairs.) In March, 1980, when he found that Ms. Cole had instructed the tenants to send the full payments directly to her, he kept rent money he had withheld because he thought she was trying to avoid paying his management fee. (Tr. P. 61.) 2/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent be administrative fined $1,000 for the above two violations of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Kimberly D. Coyle, filed her first application for licensure as a real estate salesman in 1979 with Respondent, Department of professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission. She did not pass the examination and resubmitted a second application in February, 1980. However, she did not take the examination at that time. By application dated November 2, 1981, she filed another application for licensure with Respondent. All responses on the application at that time were complete and correct. The application was returned to Petitioner in January, 1982 with a request that she resubmit the same and enclose a passport photograph and a set of her fingerprints which had been previously omitted. Because Petitioner was in a hospital at that time, her mother returned the original application together with the requested fingerprints and photograph. These were received by the Commission on February 10, 1982. The November application was refiled a third time on March 4, 1982 because the required $25 application fee had not been included with the prior two submissions. Applicant was thereafter approved for licensure, and successfully passed the salesman examination. On December 8, 1981, Petitioner was arrested in Dade County and charged with three counts of possessing a controlled substance. She was later placed in the South Miami Hospital Addiction Treatment Program on December 11, 1981 where she remained for six weeks. On March 1, 1982, Coyle was accepted as a participant in the State Attorney's Diversion Program and has been a successful participant since that time. As a result of her participation, adjudication on the charges has been withheld pending a successful completion of the conditions of her program. On April 30, 1982, the Commission wrote Petitioner a letter in which it advised her that the December 8 arrest had come to its attention, and requested that she forward a "complete explanation of these charges along with an explanation of (her) partial answer to. . .question (six)." Question six requires that the applicant answer whether she had ever been arrested without regard to whether she was convicted, sentenced, pardoned or paroled. Petitioner furnished a reply to the Commission's inquiry on June 8, 1982. She gave a full explanation of the charges and stated that a partial answer to question six was given on the March 4 submission because "as of March 4, 1982. . .(she) had not yet appeared in court." On July 2, 1982, Respondent notified petitioner that her application was denied on the ground that her answer to question six on the application "failed to reveal the 1981 drug charge." The denial precipitated the instant case. 1/ Petitioner is twenty-one years old. She is currently employed as a waitress in Miami. If her application is approved, she intends to work for her mother's real estate firm in Marco Island, Florida. Coyle stated that when her application was originally submitted in November, 1981, it was complete and accurate. The resubmissions in February and March, 1982 were made by her mother, and simply involved the refiling of the November application with the additional items (photograph, fingerprints and check) requested by the Commission. There was no intent on the part of Coyle to deceive the Commission, and when asked to clarify her response to question six, she did so in a full and truthful manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Kimberly D. Coyle for licensure as a real estate salesman be GRANTED. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1982.
The Issue Whether Petitioners' rental property was licensed under Chapter 509, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioners, Robert Meller, Jr., and Kristine M. Meller, were owners of a rental property (a house located at 4516 Bowan Bayou) in Sanibel, Florida. In addition, they owned a condominium in the same area. Respondent Cross held a valid real estate license at all times material to matters at issue. Respondent Cross had a business relationship with Petitioners, which antedated the purchase of the Bowen Bayou house as a result of being the leasing agent for a condominium association with which Petitioners were associated. Respondent DBPR is the State of Florida agency which represents the FREC in matters such as this matter. In January 2000, Petitioners purchased the house in Sanibel located at 4516 Bowan Bayou. On or about January 20, 2000, Respondent Cross mailed a Rental Property Management Agreement to Petitioners for the property located at 4516 Bowan Bayou, Sanibel, Florida. The parties to this contract were Petitioners and Properties in Paradise, Inc. Petitioner, Robert Meller, Jr., signed the contract and returned the contract to Respondent Cross. Petitioners maintain that the Rental Property Management Agreement was not signed by Petitioner, Robert Meller, Jr., and that his name is forged. He maintains that he entered into an oral agreement with Respondent Cross, individually, to manage the property. From the purchase of the house in January 2000 through April 2001, Petitioners received correspondence, including a monthly "owner statement" reflecting short-term rental income, commissions, and debits for maintenance, from Properties in Paradise, Inc., regarding all aspects of the business relationship contemplated by the Rental Property Management Agreement. By letter dated January 20, 2000, Petitioner, Robert Meller, Jr., authorized "Revonda Cross of Properties in Paradise as my agent in establishing telephone and electrical service and so forth for my property on Sanibel Island at 4516 Bowen's [sic] Bayou Road." Thereafter, Petitioners received correspondence from Respondent Cross relative to the subject property wherein she is identified as "Operations Manager, Properties in Paradise, Inc." During the relevant time period, Petitioners' property was rented at least 22 times; once for 17 days, four times for 14 days, once for nine days, thirteen times for seven days, and once for five days. The frequency and term of these rentals qualify for the statutory definition of a "resort dwelling" and transient rental dwelling. Properties in Paradise, Inc., listed the property located at 4516 Bowan Bayou in the list of properties it provided the Division of Hotels and Restaurants as licensed in accordance with Chapter 509, Florida Statutes (2005). In April 2001, Properties in Paradise, Inc., through an attorney, notified clients that it had effectively ceased doing business. At that time, Petitioners were owed $11,588.06, which went unpaid. Petitioners made a claim in July 2001, against Respondent Cross to recover their loss from the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. In October 2003, Petitioners' claim was denied by the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, enter a final order denying Petitioners' claim for recovery from the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph A. Solla, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Robert L. Meller, Jr., Esquire Best & Flanagan, LLP 225 South 6th Street, Suite 4000 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402-4690 Revonda Stewart Cross 1102 South East 39th Terrace, No. 104 Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Nancy B. Hogan, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Herman J. Vis is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0475507 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was a broker percentVestige International Services Corp., 654 Madrid Drive, Poinciana, Kissimmee, Florida 34758, a dissolved Florida corporation. On April 6, 1992, the Division of Land Sales filed a Notice to Show Cause directed to Respondent for violations of Chapter 498, Florida Statutes. Respondent admitted the violations and requested an informal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. Following an informal hearing, on July 30, 1992, the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes entered a Final Order directed to the Respondent which found Respondent had violated Sections 498.023(1) and (2), Florida Statutes and imposed a fine of $2,500 and administrative costs of $1,500 for a total of $4,000 to be paid by him within 45 days from the date of the order. Respondent failed to comply with the Final Order and the Division sought and obtained a Final Judgment in the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida. Following notice and an opportunity to be heard, the Final Judgment, dated September 28, 1993, directed Respondent to comply with the Final Order and pay an additional civil penalty of $1,000. Respondent has a duty imposed by law to pay the civil and administrative fines and costs and has failed to do so. As of the date of this Order, Respondent has paid neither the $2,500 civil penalty nor the administrative cost of $1,500. The civil judgments in favor of the Petitioner have not been satisfied. Respondent's explanation of his misunderstanding of the law and his good intentions does not relieve him of his obligation to comply with the Final Order and Final Judgment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: The Florida Real Estate Commission issue and file a Final Order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(b) and (e), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint. The Final Order should further direct that all of Respondent's real estate licenses, registrations, certificates and permits, be suspended for a period of five (5) years or until such time as Respondent satisfies the judgments in favor of the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Land Sales, whichever occurs first. Should Respondent satisfy the said judgments within the time allowed, then Respondent's real estate licenses, registrations, certificates and permits, should thereafter be placed on probation for a period of one (1) year with such terms and conditions as the Commission may deem appropriate and should include the payment of a five hundred dollars ($500) administrative fine to be paid by the Respondent within his probationary period. Should all said judgments and fines not be satisfied within the above time allowed, then all Respondent's real estate licenses, registrations, certificates and permits shall be, in accord with the Commission's penalty guidelines, permanently revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-7 Respondent's proposals. Respondent submitted, in letter form, a restatement of the testimony of witnesses or disputation of that testimony. Said comments cannot be ruled on individually, but have been reviewed and considered. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Legal Section - Suite N 308 Hurston Building North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Herman J. Vis (pro se) 654 Madrid Drive Kissimmee, Florida 34758 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are, first, whether Respondent, a certified real estate appraiser, committed various disciplinable offenses in connection with three residential appraisals; and second, if Respondent is guilty of any charges, whether she should be punished therefor.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board ("Board") is the state agency charged with regulating real estate appraisers who are, or want to become, licensed to render appraisal services in the State of Florida. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("Department") is the state agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting complaints against such appraisers. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Elsa Cartaya ("Cartaya") was a Florida-certified residential real estate appraiser. Her conduct as an appraiser in connection with the matters presently at issue falls squarely within the Board's regulatory jurisdiction. Case No. 04-1680 In the Administrative Complaint that initiated DOAH Case No. 04-1680, the Department charged Cartaya with numerous statutory violations relating to her appraisal of a residence located at 930 East Ninth Place, Hialeah, Florida (the "Hialeah Property"). Specifically, the Department made the following allegations against Cartaya:1 Respondent developed and communicated an appraisal report (Report) for the property commonly known as 930 E. 9 Place, Hialeah, Florida 33010. A copy of the report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 1. On the Report, Respondent represents that: she signed it on July 27, 2000, the Report is effective as of July 27, 2000. On or about October 26, 2001, Respondent provided a "Report History" to Petitioner's investigator. A copy of the report history is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. On the Report History, Respondent admits that she completed the report on August 7, 2000. On Report, Respondent represents that there were no prior sales of subject property within one year of the appraisal. Respondent knew that a purchase and sale transaction on subject property closed on July 28, 2000. Respondent knew that the July 28, 2000, transaction had a contract sales price of $82,000. A copy of the closing statement is attached hereto as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 3. Respondent knowingly refused to disclose the July 28, 2000, sale on Report. On [the] Report, Respondent represented that the current owner of subject property was Hornedo Lopez. Hornedo Lopez did not become the title- owner until on or about July 28, 2000, but before August 7, 2000. On [the] Report, Respondent represents that quality of construction of subject property is "CBS/AVG." The public records reflect that subject property is of mixed construction, CBS and poured concrete. On [the] Report, Respondent represents: "The income approach was not derived due to lack of accurately verifiable data for the mostly owner occupied area." The multiple listing brochures indicate as follows: for comparable one: "Main House 3/2 one apartment 1/1 (Rents $425) and 2 efficiencies each at $325. Live rent free with great income or bring your big family." A copy of the brochure for comparable one is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 4. for comparable three: "Great Rental . . . two 2/1 two 1/1 and one studio. Total rental income is $2,225/month if all rented." A copy of the brochure for comparable three is attached and incorporated as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 5. On or about October 23, 2001, Petitioner's investigator inspected Respondent's work file for Report. The investigation revealed that Respondent failed to maintain a true copy of Report in the work file. On [the] Report, Respondent failed to analyze the difference between comparable one's listing price, $145,000, and the sale price, $180.000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits to having received a request for appraisal of subject property indicting a contract price of $195,000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits that the multiple listing brochure for subject property listed the property for $119,900, as a FANNIE MAE foreclosure. On [the] Report History, Respondent also admits that she had a multiple listing brochure in the file, listing subject property for $92,000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits that she did not report the listings in Report. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits knowledge that comparable three was "rebuilt as a 2/1 with two 1/1 & 1 studio receiving income although zoned residential." On [the] Report, Respondent failed or refused to explain or adjust for comparable three's zoning violations. On the foregoing allegations, the Department charged Cartaya under four counts, as follows: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest conduct, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes.[2] COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT III Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT IV Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having accepted an appraisal assignment if the employment itself is contingent upon the appraiser reporting a predetermined result, analysis, or opinion, or if the fee to be paid for the performance of the appraisal assignment is contingent upon the opinion, conclusion, or valuation reached upon the consequent resulting from the appraisal assignment in violation of Section 475.624(17), Florida Statutes.[3] In her Answer and Affirmative Defenses, Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 5-9, 11, 13-15, 17-19, and 23-25 of the Amended Complaint. Based on Cartaya's admissions, the undersigned finds these undisputed allegations to be true. Additional findings are necessary, however, to make sense of these particular admissions and to determine whether Cartaya committed the offenses of which she stands accused. In April 2000, Southeast Financial Corporation ("Southeast") asked Cartaya to prepare an appraisal of the Hialeah Property for Southeast's use in underwriting a mortgage loan, the proceeds of which would be applied by the prospective mortgagor(s) towards the $205,000 purchase price that he/she/they had agreed to pay Hornedo Lopez ("Hornedo") for the residence in question.4 In preparing the appraisal, Cartaya discovered that the putative seller, Hornedo, was actually not the record owner of the Hialeah Property. Rather, title was held in the name of the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"). The Hialeah Property was "in foreclosure." Cartaya informed her contact at Southeast, Marianella Lopez ("Marianella"), about this problem. Marianella explained that Hornedo was in the process of closing a sale with Fannie Mae and would resell the Hialeah Property to a new buyer soon after acquiring the deed thereto. Cartaya told Marianella that, to complete the appraisal, she (Cartaya) would need to be provided a copy of the closing statement documenting the transfer of title from Fannie Mae to Hornedo. No further work was done on the appraisal for several months. Then, on July 25, 2000, Marianella ordered another appraisal of the Hialeah Property, this time for Southeast's use in evaluating a mortgage loan to Jose Granados ("Granados"), who was under contract to purchase the subject residence from Hornedo for $195,000. Once again, Cartaya quickly discovered that Fannie Mae, not Hornedo, was the record owner of the Hialeah Property. Once again, Cartaya immediately informed Marianella about the situation. Marianella responded on July 26, 2000, telling Cartaya that the Fannie Mae-Hornedo transaction was scheduled to close on July 28, 2000. On July 27, 2000, Marianella faxed to Cartaya a copy of the Settlement Statement that had been prepared for the Fannie Mae sale to Hornedo. The Settlement Statement, which confirmed that the intended closing date was indeed July 28, 2000, showed that Hornedo was under contract to pay $82,000 for the Hialeah Property——the property which he would then sell to Granados for $195,000, if all the pending transactions closed as planned. Upon receipt of this Settlement Statement, Cartaya proceeded to complete the appraisal. In the resulting Appraisal Report, which was finished on August 7, 2000,5 Cartaya estimated that the market value of the Hialeah Property, as of July 27, 2000, was $195,000. The Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the house at the Hialeah Property was, in fact, constructed from CBS and poured concrete, as alleged.6 At the time Cartaya gave the Department a copy of her workfile for this appraisal assignment, the workfile did not contain a copy of the competed Appraisal Report.7 (The workfile did, however, include a working draft of the Appraisal Report.) The allegation, set forth in paragraph 21 of the Administrative Complaint, that Cartaya "failed to analyze the difference between comparable one's listing price, $145,000, and the sale price, $180,000," was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. First, there is no nonhearsay evidence in the record that "comparable one" was, in fact, listed at $145,000 and subsequently sold for $180,000. Instead, the Department offered a printout of data from the Multiple Listing Service ("MLS"), which printout was included in Cartaya's workfile. The MLS document shows a listing price of $145,550 for "comparable one" and a sales price of $180,000 for the property——but it is clearly hearsay as proof of these matters,8 and no predicate was laid for the introduction of such hearsay pursuant to a recognized exception to the hearsay rule (including Section 475.28(2)). Further, the MLS data do not supplement or explain other nonhearsay evidence.9 At best, the MLS document, which is dated July 25, 2000, establishes that Cartaya was on notice that "comparable one" might have sold for more than the asking price, but Cartaya has not been charged with overlooking MLS data. Second, in any event, in her Report History, Cartaya stated that she had analyzed the putative asking price/sales price differential with respect to "comparable one" and concluded that there was no need to make adjustments for this because available data relating to other sales persuaded her that such differentials were typical in the relevant market. Cartaya's declaration in this regard was not persuasively rebutted. Since the evidence fails persuasively to establish that Cartaya's conclusion concerning the immateriality of the putative asking price/sales price differential as a factor bearing on the value of "comparable one" was wrong; and, further, because the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that an appraiser must, in her appraisal report, not only disclose such information, even when deemed irrelevant to the appraisal, but also expound upon the grounds for rejecting the data as irrelevant, Cartaya cannot be faulted for declining to explicate her analysis of the supposed price differential in the Appraisal Report. The evidence is insufficient to prove, clearly and convincingly, that Cartaya "failed or refused to explain or adjust for "comparable three"'s zoning violations." This allegation depends upon the validity of its embedded assumption that there were, in fact, "zoning violations."10 There is, however, no convincing evidence of such violations in the instant record. Specifically, no copy of any zoning code was offered as evidence, nor was any convincing nonhearsay proof regarding the factual condition of "comparable three" offered. Cartaya cannot be found guilty of failing or refusing to explain or adjust for an underlying condition (here, alleged "zoning violations") absent convincing proof of the underlying condition's existence-in-fact. Case No. 04-1148 In the Administrative Complaint that initiated DOAH Case No. 04-1148, the Department charged Cartaya with numerous statutory violations relating to her appraisals of residences located at 1729 Northwest 18th Street, Miami, Florida ("1729 NW 18th St") and 18032 Northwest 48th Place, Miami, Florida ("18032 NW 48th Place"). These appraisals will be examined in turn. With regard to 1729 NW 18th St, the Department alleged as follows: On or about April 29, 1999, Respondent developed and communicated a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report for the property commonly known as 1729 NW 18th Street, Miami, Florida. A copy of the report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 1. On or about March 18, 2001, David B. C. Yeomans, Jr., A.S.A., and Mark A. Cannon, A.S.A., performed a field review of the report. A copy of the review is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. The review revealed that unlike it states in the Report, the subject property’s zoning was not "Legal," but "legal noncomforming (Grandfathered use)." The review further revealed that Respondent failed to report that if the improvements sustain extensive damage or demolishment or require renovation which exceeds 50% of the depreciated value, it is likely that a variance would be necessary to build a new dwelling. The review further revealed that Respondent failed to report that subject property has two underground gas meters. The review further revealed that unlike Respondent states in Report, subject property’s street has gutters and storm sewers along it. The review further revealed that subject property is a part of a "sub-market" within its own neighborhood due to its construction date of 1925. Respondent applied three comparables built in 1951, 1953, and 1948, respectively, all of which reflect a different market, without adjustment. Respondent applied comparables which have much larger lots than the subject, which is of a non-conforming, grandfathered use. Respondent failed to adjust for quality of construction even though subject is frame and all three comparables are of concrete block stucco construction. Respondent failed to note on the Report that comparables 1 and 2 had river frontage. Respondent failed to adjust comparables 1 and 2 for river frontage. The review revealed that at the time of the Report there were at least five sales more closely comparable to Subject than those which Respondent applied. On the foregoing allegations, the Department brought the following three counts against Cartaya: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT III Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of culpable negligence in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes. Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Administrative Complaint. Those undisputed allegations, accordingly, are accepted as true. The rest of the allegations about this property were based upon a Residential Appraisal Field Review Report (the "Yeomans Report") that David B.C. Yeomans, Jr. prepared in March 2001 for his client Fannie Mae. The Yeomans Report is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2, and Mr. Yeomans testified at hearing. Mr. Yeomans disagreed with Cartaya's opinion of value regarding 1729 NW 18th St, concluding that the property's market value as of April 29, 1999, had been at the low end of the $95,000-to-$115,000 range, and not $135,000 as Cartaya had opined. The fact-findings that follow are organized according to the numbered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraphs 6 and 7. The form that Cartaya used for her Appraisal Report regarding 1729 NW 18th St contains the following line: Zoning compliance Legal Legal nonconforming (Grandfathered use) Illegal No zoning Cartaya checked the "legal" box. Mr. Yeomans maintains that she should have checked the box for "legal nonconforming" use because, he argues, the property's frontage and lot size are smaller than the minimums for these values as prescribed in the City of Miami's zoning code. The Department failed, however, to prove that Cartaya checked the wrong zoning compliance box. There is no convincing nonhearsay evidence regarding either the frontage or the lot size of 1729 NW 18th St.11 Thus, there are no facts against which to apply the allegedly applicable zoning code provisions. Moreover, and more important, the Department failed to introduce into evidence any provisions of Miami's zoning code. Instead, the Department elicited testimony from Mr. Yeomans regarding his understanding of the contents of the zoning code. While Mr. Yeomans' testimony about the contents of the zoning code is technically not hearsay (because the out-of-court statements, namely the purported code provisions, consisted of non-assertive declarations12 that were not offered for the "truth" of the code's provisions13), such testimony is nevertheless not clear and convincing evidence of the zoning code's terms.14 And finally, in any event, Cartaya's alleged "mistake" (which allegation was not proved) was immaterial because, as Mr. Yeomans conceded at hearing, in testimony the undersigned credits as true, the alleged "fact" (again, not proved) that 1729 NW 18th St constituted a grandfathered use would have no effect on the property's market value. Paragraphs 8 and 9. The Yeomans Report asserts that "[b]ased on a physical inspection as of March 17, 2001[,] it appears that the site has two underground gas meters and there were gutters and storm sewers along the subject's street." It is undisputed that Cartaya's Appraisal Report made no mention of underground gas meters or storm water disposal systems. While the Department alleged that Cartaya's silence regarding these matters constituted disciplinable "failures," it offered no convincing proof that Cartaya defaulted on her obligations in any way respecting these items. There was no convincing evidence that these matters were material, affected the property's value, or should have been noted pursuant to some cognizable standard of care. Paragraphs 10 and 11. The contention here is that Cartaya chose as comparables several homes that, though relatively old (average age: 48 years), were not as old as the residence at 1729 NW 18th St (74 years). Mr. Yeomans asserted that older homes should have been used as comparables, and several such homes are identified in the Yeomans Report. The undersigned is persuaded that Mr. Yeomans' opinion of value with respect to 1729 NW 18th St is probably more accurate than Cartaya's. If this were a case where the value of 1729 NW 18th St were at issue, e.g. a taking under eminent domain, then Mr. Yeomans' opinion might well be credited as against Cartaya's opinion in making the ultimate factual determination. The issue in this case is not the value of 1729 NW 18th St, however, but whether Cartaya committed disciplinable offenses in appraising the property. The fact that two appraisers have different opinions regarding the market value of a property does not mean that one of them engaged in misconduct in forming his or her opinion. Based on the evidence presented, the undersigned is not convinced that Cartaya engaged in wrongdoing in connection with her appraisal of 1729 NW 18th St, even if her analysis appears to be somewhat less sophisticated than Mr. Yeomans'. Paragraphs 12 through 16. The allegations in these paragraphs constitute variations on the theme just addressed, namely that, for one reason or another, Cartaya chose inappropriate comparables. For the same reasons given in the preceding discussion, the undersigned is not convinced, based on the evidence presented, that Cartaya engaged in wrongdoing in connection with her appraisal of 1729 NW 18th St, even if he is inclined to agree that Mr. Yeomans' opinion of value is the better founded of the two. With regard to 18032 NW 48th Place, the Department alleged as follows: On or about August 9, 1999, Respondent prepared and communicated a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report for the Property commonly known as 18032 NW 48th Place, Miami, Florida, 33055. (Report) A copy of the Report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 3. On the Report, Respondent incorrectly stated that the property is in a FEMA Zone X flood area. In fact, the property is in an AE Zone. In Report, Respondent states: "Above sales were approximately adjusted per market derived value influencing dissimilarities as noted." Respondent failed to state in Report, that comparables 1 and 3 have in-law quarters. In [the] Report, Respondent represented comparable 1 had one bath, where in fact it has at least two. In [the] Report, Respondent failed to state that comparable 1 has two in-law quarters. In [the] Report, Respondent stated that comparable 3 is a two-bath house with an additional bath in the in-law quarters. On the foregoing allegations, the Department brought the following three counts against Cartaya: COUNT IV Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT V Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT VI Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of culpable negligence in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes. Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 18 and 20 of the Administrative Complaint. Those undisputed allegations, accordingly, are accepted as true. The rest of the allegations about this property were based upon a Residential Appraisal Field Review Report (the "Marmin Report") that Frank L. Marmin prepared in May 2001 for his client Fannie Mae. The Marmin Report is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Mr. Marmin did not testify at hearing, although his supervisor, Mark A. Cannon, did. Mr. Marmin disagreed with Cartaya's opinion of value regarding 18032 NW 48th Place, concluding that the property's market value as of August 9, 1999, had been $100,000, and not $128,000 as Cartaya had opined. The fact-findings that follow are organized according to the numbered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraph 19. Cartaya admitted that she erred in noting that the property is located in FEMA Flood Zone "X," when in fact (she agrees) the property is in FEMA Flood Zone "AE." She did, however, include a flood zone map with her appraisal that showed the correct flood zone designation. Cartaya's mistake was obviously unintentional——and no more blameworthy than a typographical error. Further, even the Department's expert witness conceded that this minor error had no effect on the appraiser's opinion of value. Paragraphs 20 through 24. The Department asserts that two of Cartaya's comparables were not comparable for one reason or another. The Department failed clearly and convincingly to prove that its allegations of fact concerning the two comparables in question are true. Thus, the Department failed to establish its allegations to the requisite degree of certainty. Ultimate Factual Determinations Having examined the entire record; weighed, interpreted, and judged the credibility of the evidence; drawn (or refused to draw) permissible factual inferences; resolved conflicting accounts of what occurred; and applied the applicable law to the facts, it is determined that: Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that Cartaya did not commit culpable negligence in connection with the appraisals at issue. Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that Cartaya did not fail to exercise reasonable diligence in developing the appraisals at issue. Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that, in connection with the Appraisal Report relating to the Hialeah Property, Cartaya did commit one unintentional violation of Standards Rule 2- 2(b)(vi) of Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and two unintentional violations of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(ix).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order finding that: As to Case No. 04-1148, Cartaya is not guilty on Counts I through VI, inclusive; As to Case No. 04-1680, Cartaya is not guilty on Counts I, II, and IV; she is, however, guilty, under Count III, of one unintentional violation of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(vi) and two unintentional violations of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(ix). As punishment for the violations established, Cartaya's certificate should be suspended for 30 calendar days, and she should be placed on probation for a period of one year, a condition of such probation being the successful completion of a continuing education course in USPAP. In addition, Cartaya should be ordered to pay an administrative fine of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2004.
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what, if any, disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with responsibility for prosecuting administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent is now and has been at all times material to this proceeding a licensed real estate salesman in the state, holding license number 0189734. The license was last issued as a salesperson %Say Realty & Investments, Inc., 6306 Pembroke Road, Hollywood, Florida 33023. Respondent was employed as a salesperson with Sales Alvin, Inc. from June 28, 1990, to March 10, 1991. Respondent's license was placed with Say Realty and Investments, Inc. effective March 11, 1991. During the time Respondent was employed by Sales Alvin, Inc., she carried out a series of acts in connection with the listing for rent of a condominium without the knowledge and consent of her employing broker. While Respondent was a salesperson for Sales Alvin, Inc., on or about February 19, 1991, Respondent listed an unfurnished condominium for rent at a monthly rental price of $700. The condominium was owned by Mr. Roy Barrett. Respondent listed the rental unit, and Alon Granovsky, another salesperson employed by Sales Alvin, Inc., procured a tenant for the condominium. Respondent drafted a lease between the tenant and the owner of the condominium on or about February 21, 1991. Respondent collected a check from the tenant in the amount of $2,100 for payment of the initial rent and security deposit. Respondent then delivered the check to the owner of the condominium, and the owner gave Respondent a receipt for $2,100. Respondent gave Mr. Granovsky a personal check for $210 on or about February 21, 1991, as a commission for procuring the tenant for the condominium. Respondent did not inform her employing broker of the rental transaction or that she had given a commission check to Mr. Granovsky. Mr. Granovsky disclosed the transaction to his employing broker and delivered his commission check to his broker. Respondent's broker gained additional knowledge of the transaction when he received a money order from the tenant in the amount of $700 for the rent due for the month of March. Respondent's employing broker confronted Respondent regarding the transaction. Respondent provided her employing broker with a personal check for $350 as a portion of the commission due the employing broker and subsequently delivered the balance of the commission due. The entire commission was disbursed by the employing broker. While employed by Sales Alvin, Inc., on or about March 3, 1991, Respondent solicited and obtained a listing for the sale of a house. Respondent provided the owners of the house with a Sellers Net Sheet on the letter head and form used by Sales Alvin, Inc. The Sellers Net Sheet approximated the cash to seller at closing if the house sold at the listed price. Respondent became employed by Say Realty and Investment, Inc., on or about March 11, 1991. Respondent listed the house while she was employed by Sales Alvin, Inc. When Respondent placed the house in the multiple listing service ("MLS"), she showed Say Realty and Investment, Inc., as the listing broker. When the brokers at Sales Alvin, Inc. questioned the listing with Say Realty and Investment, Inc., the listing was transferred to Sales Alvin, Inc. Respondent has no history of prior disciplinary action against her license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner should enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's license for 90 days, imposing an administrative fine of $1,000, and placing Respondent on probation for one year subject to such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the Commission. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1992.
The Issue This is a case in which the Petitioner seeks to suspend or revoke the Respondents' licenses, or take other disciplinary action against the Respondents, for reasons which are alleged in a five-count Administrative Complaint. All of the allegations of the Administrative Complaint arise from two transactions; a rental agreement involving property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Capraro and another rental agreement involving property owned by Ms. Supino. The Administrative Complaint alleges that as a result of the Respondents' actions in connection with these two transactions the Respondents have violated Section 475.25(1)(b), (d), and (k) Florida Statutes. The Respondents dispute some of the factual allegations and deny that there was any violation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact: 2/ At all times relevant and material, Robert H. Karn has been licensed as a real estate broker, having been issued license number 0122138. At all times relevant and material, Robert H. Karn, Inc., has been a corporation licensed as a real estate broker, having been issued license number 0214562. The street address of both Respondents is 5211 Southwest 91 Terrace, Cooper City, Florida 33328. (Tr. 6-7) Findings regarding the transaction involving the Capraro property During May of 1983, Robert H. Karn was the listing broker for the rental of a residence owned by Joseph A. Capraro and Vita M. Capraro. (T. 51, 156) Letitia Daugherty was interested in renting a residence and another broker, Lois Rutkin, showed the Capraro property to Daugherty. Negotiations followed and thereafter, on May 13, 1983, Letitia Daugherty, as prospective tenant, and Joseph A. Capraro and Vita M. Capraro, as landlords, signed a document titled Agreement To Enter Into A Lease. The Agreement required that Daugherty pay the amount of $950.00 "as an earnest money deposit and as a part of the rental price on account of offer to rent the property . . . ." The Agreement provided that the rent would be $475.00 per month, that the "pre- payments" would be $475.00 for the last month's rent, and that a security deposit in the amount of $475.00 would be paid as follows: $150.00 on June 14, 1983, $150.00 on July 14, 1983, and $175.00 on August 14, 1983. The agreement also provided that rent would be due on the 14th of each month. (Pet. Ex. #1; Tr. 21, 22, 24, 97-98) During the negotiations which led up to the agreement to enter into a lease, Daugherty was represented by Lois Rutkin, a real estate broker associated with Drew Realty, and the Capraros were represented by Robert H. Karn. All of the terms of the agreement to enter into a lease were agreed to by all parties prior to that document being signed. It was also specifically understood that the $950.00 paid by Daugherty represented the first and last month's rent. The cashier's check for the $950.00 was made payable to the order of Robert H. Karn because he specifically requested that it be made payable to him. (Tr. 21, 23- 26, 33, 49, 54, 57, 171) If a formal lease had been entered into pursuant to the terms of the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease, Daugherty's $950.00 deposit would have been applied as follows: $475.00 for the first month's rent from May 14 to June 13, 1983, and $475.00 for the last month's rent. Further, if such a lease had been entered into consistent with the Agreement, Daugherty would not have been obligated to pay any further amounts until June 14, 1983, at which time she would have been obligated to pay $475.00 for one month's rent from June 14 through August 13, 1983, plus a $150.00 payment towards the security deposit. (Pet. Ex. #1) Consistent with her obligation under the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease, and at the specific request of Robert H. Karn, Daugherty obtained a cashier's check in the amount of $950.00 payable to the order of Robert H. Karn and delivered the cashier's check to Robert H. Karn. The cashier's check was thereafter cashed by Robert H. Karn without being deposited in any trust or escrow account. (Pet. Ex. #2) Robert H. Karn prepared a formal written lease for the rental of the Capraro property by Daugherty. The lease prepared by Robert H. Karn contained several provisions which were materially different from the terms contained in the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease. Among the changes were a provision that the rent would be due on the first of each month, that the security deposit would be $950.00, that $285.00 of the money previously paid by Daugherty would be applied as rent from May 14 to May 31, 1983, that $665.00 of the money previously paid by Daugherty would be applied towards the security deposit, that additional payments of $142.50 each would be due towards the security deposit on July 1, 1983, and August 1, 1983, and that the next month's rent in the amount of $475.00 would be due on June 1, 1983. (Pet. Ex. #3, Tr. 55, 60) The written lease prepared by Robert H. Karn also contained the following provisions: Tentant (sic) will have first option to Buy said property at the end of this lease. Drew Realty will receive $142.50 on July 1, 983, for renting this property to the "Tentant (sic). Drew Realty will receive a 3 percent Real Estate Commission if Tentant (sic) buys the property. Robert H. Karn, Inc. will receive $142.50 on August 1, 1983 for the rental listing. Robert H. Karn, Inc. will receive a 3 percent Real Estate Commission if Tentant (sic) buys the property. The written lease which was prepared by Robert H. Karn was given to Daugherty on the evening of May 16, 1983. When Daugherty read the lease and saw that it contained provisions different from the provisions in the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease, she refused to sign it. That same evening she told Lois Rutkin, Dan Drew, and Robert H. Karn that she refused to sign the lease because it was different from what she had agreed to, and she demanded the return of her $950.00 deposit. The $950.00 deposit has never been returned to her. (Tr. 27- 30) On the evening of May 16, 1983, extensive discussions took place between Daugherty, Lois Rutkin, Dan Drew, and Robert H. Karn in an effort to resolve the problem. Robert H. Karn's excuse for changing the terms in the lease was that Daugherty had two dogs, but Robert H. Karn had known about the dogs before the parties signed the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease. During the discussions on the evening of May 16, 1983, Lois Rutkin told Robert H. Karn she wanted him to return the cashier's check he had received from Daugherty and Dan Drew told Robert H. Karn not to disburse the funds from that cashier's check, but to return the money to Daugherty. Robert H. Karn did not return the cashier's check nor did he otherwise make any reimbursement to Daugherty. (Tr. 40, 58-59, 85-86) By the time Lois Rutkin, Dan Drew, and Daugherty asked for the return of the $950.00 cashier's check, Robert H. Karn had already cashed the check and had spent the money. Most, if not all, of the money was spent on behalf of the Capraros to pay for such things as mortgage payments and painting on the Capraro's rental property. After Daugherty refused to sign the lease, Robert H. Karn told the Capraros to treat Daugherty's $950.00 deposit as "default money." Actually, the default was by the Capraros who, through their agent Robert H. Karn, tried to change the terms of the agreement. (Tr. 42, 84, 100, 105, 160- 161, 167, 170, 173-175) Subsequently, Daugherty sued Robert H. Karn in County Court in an attempt to collect her 950.00 deposit. On September 12, 1983, a Default And Final Judgment gas entered in Case No. 83-2532-SPH in County Court in Broward County against Robert H. Karn and in favor of Letitia Daugherty in the sum of $950.00, plus court costs in the amount of $42.00. After the judgment was entered against Robert H. Karn, Daugherty again demanded payment of the $950.00. Robert H. Karn has never paid anything to Daugherty. (Pet. Ex. #4, Tr. 30-31, 45, 47-48) Robert H. Karn never asked the Florida Real Estate Commission for an escrow disbursement order regarding the transaction involving the Capraro rental property. (Tr. 169-170) Findings regarding the transaction involving the Supino property In about the middle of July of 1983, Lucy Supino entered into an oral agreement with Robert H. Karn pursuant to which Robert H. Karn was to attempt to locate a tenant for one or more of Lucy Supino's rental units. During August of 1983 Robert H. Karn rented one of Lucy Supino's rental units to Marilyn McKelvey. Thereafter, Karn, Supino, and McKelvey had various disagreements about the transaction. (Tr. 113-116, 121, 138, 141-142) 3/
Recommendation For all the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order which would (a) find the Respondents guilty of the violations charged in Counts I, II, and III, of the Administrative Complaint, (b) dismiss counts IV and V of the Administrative Complaint, (c) fine the Respondents a total of $950.00, and (d) suspend the licenses of the Respondents for a period of ninety (90) days or until such time as the judgment in Case Number 83-2532, Broward County Court, has been satisfied, whichever is later; provided that in any event the period of suspension shall not exceed ten (10) years. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of January, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1985.
The Issue Whether the respondent's license as a real estate broker should be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined because respondent entered a plea of guilty to the offense of unlawful compensation.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is and was at all times pertinent to this proceeding a licensed real estate broker with the State of Florida, holding license number 0166810. On June 18, 1982, an information was filed in the circuit court charging that between the dates of December 10, 1980 and December 1, 1981, the respondent "did corruptly request, solicit, accept or agree to accept money not authorized by law for past, present, or future performance, to wit: by sending business to Don's Alignment Shop, which said ALBERT RONALD HURLBERT did represent as having been within his official discretion in violation of a public duty or in performance of a public duty, in violation of Section 838.016, Florida Statutes." On July 16, 1982, the respondent appeared before Judge Thomas Oakley and entered a plea of guilty to the offense of unlawful compensation as charged in the information. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and respondent was placed on probation for a period of four years. Respondent was given an early release from probation on August 30, 1984.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter an order finding that the respondent has been convicted or found guilty of a crime which involves moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing and revoking the respondent's real estate license. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Mr. Albert R. Hurlbert c/o Hurlbert Realty 8117 Lakeland Street Jacksonville, Florida 32205 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Howard Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Philip Marzo was a real estate broker licensed under the laws of the State of Florida, holding license No. 0217167; and Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc., was a real estate brokerage corporation licensed under the laws of the State of Florida, holding license No. 0217166. At all times material hereto, Respondent Marzo was the qualifying broker for Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc. On May 9, 1981, Gladstone Keith Russell entered into a Service Agreement with All Cities Realty, Inc. Pursuant to the terms of that Agreement, Russell paid $75 in cash to Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc., as an advance rental information fee in exchange for which All Cities Realty, Inc., agreed to provide Russell with listings of available rentals. On or about May 13, 1981, Respondents provided to Russell one listing, which listing was not suitable to Russell. No other listing information was ever provided by Respondents to Russell. Russell obtained his own rental within thirty days from the date of the Service Agreement. This rental was not obtained pursuant to any information supplied to him by Respondents. Within thirty days of the date that All Cities Realty, Inc., contracted to perform real estate services for Russell, Russell telephoned Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc., to demand a return of his $75 deposit. The salesman who took Russell's advance fee was no longer employed at All Cities Realty, Inc., and Russell spoke with Respondent Marzo. Although Russell demanded a refund of his money, Respondent Marzo did not make a refund to Russell. When Russell spoke with Marzo on the telephone, Marzo, instead of returning Russell's money, used delaying tactics and attempts to keep from making the refund. Since his telephone calls proved unsuccessful, Russell returned to the All Cities Realty, Inc., office to obtain a refund from Marzo. Upon arriving at the office, Russell found that All Cities Realty, Inc., had gone out of business, and he was unable to locate Respondent Marzo. Russell has never received a refund of his $75 advance fee paid to the Respondents.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: Default be entered against Respondents, Philip Marzo and All Cities Realty, Inc., and that a final order be entered finding Respondents, Philip Marzo and All Cities Realty, Inc., guilty of the violations charged in the Administrative Complaints and revoking their real estate licenses. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Philip Marzo 2920 Missionwood Avenue, West Miramar, Florida 33025 Mr. Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Staff Attorney Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact Louis W. George has been registered as a real estate broker in Florida for seven years; he holds license No. 0030981. At all pertinent times, he has done business as Apollo Realty of Miami, and has been, in addition, co-owner with Allen Scherer of Karma Properties, Inc. In an effort to sell a house he owned at 1105 Sharazad Boulevard in Opa locka, Florida, John F. German placed a classified advertisement in a newspaper. Seeing the ad, respondent George telephoned Mr. German and offered his services as a real estate broker. As a result, Mr. German eventually signed an agreement listing the house with Apollo Realty of Miami for 90 days, which elapsed without a sale, in late 1978 or early 1979. In June of 1979, Mr. German again visited respondent, telling him he would let the property go for $25,000. The following day respondent telephoned Mr. German to say, "I'll take it," to which Mr. German replied, "That was yesterday." Later in the telephone conversation, however, Messrs. George and German agreed on a price of $25,000. On June 29, 1979, respondent presented Mr. German with a form "Deposit Receipt." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Mr. German lined through $23,500, substituted $25,000, initialled the alteration, and signed the document. Respondent had already signed. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 recites: Receipt is hereby acknowledged of the sum of . . .$500.00. . .from KARMA PROPERTIES, INC. proceeds to be held in escrow by APOLLO REALTY OF MIAMI subject to the terms hereof. . . This offer is subject to obtaining an FHA commitment of not less than $35,000.00 if commitment is less than-the above $35,000.00 this offer will be null and void . . . [I]n case of default by the purchaser. . .the seller may at his option retain one-half of the deposit herein paid as consideration for the release of the purchaser. . . These written provisions notwithstanding, respondent told Mr. German that he would give the $500 deposit to his attorney, rather than place it in Apollo Realty's escrow account. The deal fell through. On November 19, 1979, Albert I. Caskill, Esquire, wrote Apollo Realty of Miami, on behalf of Mr. German: Demand is herewith made upon you for the $500 deposit being held in your escrow account in relation to the above-referenced transaction. We have been notified by the attorney for the purchasers, Lawrence M. Weiner, that his clients will not be going forward with the purchase, and, accordingly, their failure to complete the transaction pursuant to the contract constitutes a breach of the agreement. Please forward all deposit moneys to this office, same being made payable to the seller, John German. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. The house was off the market from June until the end of November. Mr. German never received any money on account of the transaction. (He did not even get the keys back.) Respondent never deposited any money anywhere on account of this transaction, nor did he pay Mr. German any money directly. He testified that he instructed Allen Scherer, the other principal in Karma Properties, Inc., to deposit $500 with Lawrence Weiner, Esquire; that he read Mr. Caskill's letter of November 19, 1979, and passed it on to Mr. Scherer with instructions to "correct" (T. 36) the situation; but only learned that there was no money in escrow when he received the administrative complaint with which these proceedings began. In these particulars, respondent's testimony has not been credited. The parties stipulated that Mr. Weiner would testify, under oath, that he "never held or received any money in connection with the subject transaction." Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order which has been reviewed and considered. The proposed findings of fact have been adopted in substance for the most part. Proposed findings of fact not adopted have been rejected as immaterial or as inconsistent with the weight of the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reprimand respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Joel S. Fass, Esquire 626 Northeast 124 Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Adam Kurlander, Esquire 1820 Northeast 163 Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
