The Issue The main issue in these proceedings is whether the Respondent Doctors is entitled to a certificate of need to establish a cardiac catheterization laboratory in Sarasota County. The parties stipulate that the only statutory and rule criteria which remain to be reviewed by the Hearing Officer areas follows: 1. Sections 381.705(1)(a) , (b) , (c) , (d) , , and (h), Florida Statutes. Section 38l.705(1)(h)) will be reviewed insofar as it refers to the availability of health manpower, management personnel, funds for capital and operating expenditures, the alternative uses of the applicant's resources, and the extent to which the proposed services will be accessible to all residents of the district. Section 38l.705(1)(1) and (n), Florida Statutes. Section 381.705(2)(a) , (b) and () Florida Statutes. Rule 10-5.011(1)(e), Florida Administrative Code. 5. Rule 10-5.011 (8)b and (8)0, (9)b, (9)d, (9) e (1) and (9)e(ll) The other statutory criteria and the remaining subsections of the rule have either been stipulated to by the parties or are inapplicable.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Doctors is a 168 bed, acute care general hospital. The hospital has a 40 bed cardiac care unit in which all beds are monitored. Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) owns Doctors. HCA owns or operates four hundred hospitals, including nineteen in Florida. Three of the in-state hospitals have cardiac catheterization laboratories (CCLs) . Two of the existing labs, located in Bradenton and Tallahassee, are available to assist in training and preparation which may be needed in the creation of a cardiac catheterization lab at Doctors. In September 1987, Doctors applied for Certificate of Need No. 5283 to establish a cardiac catheterization laboratory. The certificate of need has been preliminarily approved by the Respondent HRS. The initial agency action has been challenged by the Petitioner, Memorial. Memorial is the primary existing health care facility which would compete with Doctors by providing cardiac catheterization services in the same city where the new lab is to be located. Consistency with State and Local Health Plans The local health plan does not directly address the need for CCLs in the area. As nothing in the plan is relevant, no inconsistencies are created with the plan in the balancing of criteria with regard to the certificate of need determination. The State Health Plan provides that an average of 600 cardiac catheterization procedures per laboratory are to be maintained in each district through 1990. To determine the use rate under Rule 10-5.011, Florida Administrative Code, HRS must look to the number of procedures provided in the district between June 1984 and July 1986. The data reveals that seven programs completed 5,841 procedures. The required averages were exceeded by over two hundred procedures per lab. The need criteria has been met by Doctors for purposes of the State Health Plan, and the local plan, as it existed at the time of the initial review of the application. Existing Facilities Memorial is an 849 bed, acute care hospital which is a regional referral hospital in the area. The hospital provides Level 3 cardiac services. These services include angioplasty and open heart surgery in addition to cardiac catheterization. Memorial's first catheterization lab opened in 1978. Memorial currently contains two CCLs that assist in fulfilling the health care needs of the district. Before the recent addition of three CCLs within the district, Memorial served as the center for cardiac services. Manatee County and Charlotte County now have their own CCLs, which reduces Memorial's pool of potential patients in need of those services. In spite of reductions in the patient pool in the past, Memorial's use of its two CCLs has continued to grow. The Sarasota County area has a unique characteristic in that many tourists who arrive in the winter months (October-April) make use of the two local hospitals, Doctors and Memorial. The use of Memorial's CCLs increases as the local cardiologists need to complete a number of diagnostic tests in order to evaluate these new patients quickly, in times of critical need. Because of the season, Memorial's CCLs are heavily utilized for emergency procedures in the winter months. Accordingly, patients who have elective procedures scheduled are often reprioritized because of the emergency needs for use of the CCLs for more seriously ill patients. This last-minute rescheduling results in prolonged hospitalizations for the nonemergency patients and increases the cost of their medical care. Although the quality of testing does not appear to suffer from the season, a significant pool of patients is denied the opportunity for convenient medical care. The treating physicians are denied lab use and test results at the anticipated times within these patients' courses of treatment. Because of Memorial's inability to make the labs readily accessible to the pool of patients scheduled for elective procedures in the winter, a need exists for a CCL for this pool of patients. Doctors primarily seeks to provide cardiac catheterization services for diagnostic purposes. However, the lab will be capable of providing immediate endocardiac catheterization pacemaking in cases of cardiac arrest. A rapid mobilization team will be available for emergency procedures when the need arises. Angioplasty and open heart surgery procedures are not planned in conjunction with the CCL services. The lab will be in operation from 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, excluding holidays. Quality of Care Doctors currently provides quality care. There are no complaints outstanding, and the hospital has sufficient capabilities and support services to provide for a CCL. Doctors is JCAH accredited and provides the necessary services required under the catheterization rule. The same cardiologists are on staff of both Memorial and Doctors. Most of these physicians admit patients to both hospitals. Approximately one-third of Doctors' admissions are patients with cardiac problems. Many of these patients require catheterization and are transferred to Memorial. If it is determined that a catheterization is needed before admission, physicians admit those patients to Memorial. Alternative Care The other CCL which currently exists in Sarasota is an outpatient lab. This facility is owned and operated by a group of invasive cardiologists who also perform catheterizations at Memorial. Because the outpatient lab restricts a patient's selection of a physician able to perform a cardiac catheterization to the lab owners, this lab is not a realistic alternative for most patients or the referring physicians. A hospital-based lab gives those involved greater personal choice, and it is better equipped to handle unanticipated emergencies. Reasonable and Economic Accessibility Memorial's CCL services are not always accessible at the times scheduled for elective procedures. Some patients have remained hospitalized for days until they can be rescheduled. The delays increase the costs attached to the procedures due to the length of the hospital stay and the additional services required. Patients admitted to Doctors who require the services of a CCL are moved to Memorial by ambulance and have to be admitted there. These transfers cost patients an additional $180-$340. The ambulance charges are not reimbursed by medicare so the majority of the patients pay these charges themselves. The proposed lab will be capable of providing a range of diagnostic tests without the need to admit patients to another hospital prior to, or during treatment at, Doctors. This will reduce costs two ways: The additional ambulance and hospital costs will be omitted, and the proposed charge for the service is less than the current charge set by Memorial. Availability of Resources Doctors currently has a staff of trained cardiac nurses. There are two nurses on staff who have taught cardiac catheterization techniques at an accredited nursing school prior to moving to Sarasota. Although the husband and wife team was originally recruited to the area by Memorial, the two nurses chose to leave that facility because of the stress from the high level of activity in those labs. Doctors plans to cross train staff and to allow for a trained special procedures staff with alternating roles and duties. The proposed CCL will be staffed with 2.5 FTEs. These consist of the 1 FTE cardiac nurse and 1.5 FTE special procedures technicians. The budgeted FTEs do not include an allocation of time for an administrative director or secretarial/clerical services. The assistant hospital administrator anticipates that provisions will be made for management personnel at a later stage of the lab's development. Although the number of FTEs scheduled is less than those anticipated for a CCL which provides more complex procedures, the number scheduled by Doctors is reasonable for the number of services and kind of services it seeks to provide for the type of cardiac patients in its care. The proposal for the lab, as described in the application and revised in the omissions response, is financially feasible. The proposed expenditure of funds will serve the needs of the hospital's current patient pool as well as the special needs of the community for cardiac catheterization services. While Doctors' proposal does not increase geographic access, it will increase access in the population center, where services are currently inaccessible for one pool of patients at certain times. A need for a project is evidenced by the utilization of like and existing services. The rule which contains the need methodology takes into account the utilization of existing facilities in determination of numeric need. Numeric needs exists in this district, pursuant to Rule 10-5.011. Written Referral Agreement Doctors submitted a written referral agreement with a facility with open heart surgery services within 30 minutes travel time by emergency vehicle under average travel conditions. The agreement meets the general requirements of HRS. The agency does not require a detailed agreement during the preliminary granting of a certificate of need because other local providers do not wish to assist applicants during the CON process. However, such applicants are able to obtain more detailed agreements after the certificate is approved. The agency has determined that the agreement is sufficient. Because a rational basis has been given for the determination, the agency's acceptance of the agreement is given great weight by the Hearing Officer. Competition and Service Doctors' project will affect competition between Doctors and Memorial. Doctors will provide services for patients who would have gone to Memorial for such services in the past because Doctors was unable to provide the service. This is because of the geographic location and the fact that the same cardiologists are on staff at both hospitals. It appears that Doctors will be providing services for patients who are not in critical need of the services. This will allow Memorial to concentrate on the more complex cases has traditionally dealt with in the past. The stress from "unhappy" elective patients will be reduced at Memorial's labs, but so will the economic incentive for the staff which is related to the number of procedures performed. The elective cardiac catheterizations are quicker and easier to perform and increase the earnings of the lab staff. Both hospitals compete directly for staff. There is a "revolving- door" situation in staffing as local heath care personnel negotiates and works in either hospital, most of the time. Because of cash bonuses offered by Doctors for joining its staff Memorial is concerned about the adverse impact upon its CCL staff. Testimony presented at hearing showed by substantial and competent evidence that Memorial is committed to equipping its two labs with the most responsive equipment available for its more complex needs. The preservation of its current lab staff has been planned for by an able administrator. Recruitment is done nationwide and plans are being made with the local community college to provide nurses training involving cardiac catheterizations. The evidence also demonstrated that Memorial plans to meet the competition by improving the health services delivery, quality assurance, and cost-effectiveness. It appears that there is room for all three labs in Sarasota, and that healthy competition will occur in the area. Past and Proposed Indigent care Doctors has given little care to the medically indigent in the past. In fact, the hospital has maintained a written policy suggesting that those who cannot pay for services should be transferred by physicians to another hospital. Rather than admit such patients, the Doctors has chosen to pay into an indigent care fund. The new assistant director maintains that the current hospital policy is to provide health care to Medicaid and indigent patients in the CCL. Doctors projects that 2.5 per cent of its catheterization volume will be Medicaid and .75 per cent will be indigent care. Alternatives to the Project The alternative which has been developed and studied by Doctors is its past use of Memorial's CCLs. This use has been found to be more costly for elective cardiac catheterizations than the current proposal. The status quo has not met the needs of the elective catheterization patients in the geographical area. Similar Inpatient Services Memorial is using its similar facilities in an efficient manner. It is not using the facilities in an appropriate manner as most elective catheterization patients do not want to be in a hospital any longer than necessary. These people are predominantly type A personalities who do not like being rescheduled and charged additional hospital costs. Problems in Outpatient Inpatient Care Elective catheterization patients have a problem obtaining local inpatient care when they want it and when their cardiologists have prepared for it in their treatment plans. This does not appear to be a serious health problem, but the evidence has demonstrated it is a serious problem. Proposed Volume of Catheterizations Based upon numeric need, utilization of Memorial, physician support, and the growth history of other providers within the district, the projected utilization of 246 procedures in 1990, 294 in 1991, and 351 in 1992 is reasonable. There is no evidence which has been extrapolated from reliable data which shows that the proposed lab, coupled with alternative treatments and currently available noninvasive technological advancements, will reduce the average number of procedures per lab within the district below 600 each year. Due to the population growth projections for Sarasota County, approval of Doctors' application will have minimal impact on lab utilization at Memorial or other facilities within the district. Doctors' projected number of procedures will not decrease procedures at Memorial below its 1987 level of 2,495 cardiac catheterization procedures performed on an annual basis.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Flagler and St. Augustine have each applied for a CON to establish an inpatient cardiac catheter-ization program within HRS Service District IV. Each had the opportunity of responding to HRS' "omissions letter" for the cure of certain initial flaws. However, in its preliminary review of the applications, HRS denied both applicants and this proceeding followed. HRS initially denied Flagler's application, stating it had only partially complied with Sections 381.705(1)(a), (b), (i), (l), (n), and (2)(b) and (d) F.S. (1989) and Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)4.a, 4.c., and 8.b. F.A.C. HRS initially denied St. Augustine's application, stating it had only partially complied with Sections 381.705(1)(a), (b), (h), (i), (l), (n), and 2(b) and (d) F.S. and Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)4.a., 4.c., and 8.b. F.A.C. and that the applicant failed to demonstrate any compliance with Sections 381.705(1)(m) and (2)(a) F.S. Prior to formal hearing, the parties stipulated that there is a numerical need under Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)8. F.A.C. for one additional inpatient cardiac catheterization laboratory in HRS District IV for the applicable planning horizon for these applications. That planning horizon is January 1992. The parties further stipulated that both applicants have provided quality care; that, except for existing inpatient catheterization laboratories, there are no alternatives to the proposed facilities; that health manpower and management personnel are available for operation of the proposed programs; that the salaries listed on each application are reasonable; that the costs and methods of construction proposed are reasonable; that either applicant, if approved, would meet the scope of services, hours of operation, and health personnel requirements of Rule 10-5.011(1)(e) F.A.C.; and that St. Luke's Hospital in Jacksonville provides open heart surgery and is within one-half hour ambulance travel time from either applicant. It was also stipulated at formal hearing that the equipment costs proposed by both applicants are reasonable and that the costs of construction, as proposed in the applications, are reasonable. Facilities operated by Flagler Hospital, Inc. and St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P. are located in the city of St. Augustine, St. Johns County, Florida. The two facilities are less than 500 yards apart and, for all practical purposes, are directly across U.S. 1 from one another. Both facilities are 115-bed general acute care hospitals providing the same services except that Flagler provides obstetrics and St. Augustine does not. The service areas of the two hospitals consist of the five zip codes immediately surrounding the two facilities as the primary service area and St. Johns County, except the Ponte Vedra area, as the secondary service area. Flagler operates as a not-for- profit hospital. St. Augustine operates for profit. The applicant for CON 6011 is "Flagler Hospital, Inc." This corporation is based out of its only and local facility described supra and is locally operated. Regardless of any other terminology applied during HRS' review leading up to the formal Petition in DOAH Case No. 90-2035, and regardless of any inadvertent changes of the style of that cause thereafter, the "applicant" for CON 6012 is, in fact, "St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P.," a limited partnership. The applicant's August 23, 1989 Letter of Intent in CON 6012 is in the name of "St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P. d/b/a St. Augustine General Hospital." The Identification of Principal Parties form submitted by the applicant states that the legal name of the applicant/parent corporation is "St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P." and that the facility/project name is "St. Augustine General Hospital." As of the date of formal hearing, "St. Augustine Hospital, Inc." (no "General" in this name) was a wholly-owned subsidiary of "Healthtrust, Inc." and the only general partner in the applicant, and "Healthtrust, Inc." was the sole limited partner in the applicant. "Healthtrust, Inc." purchased the shares of all the other former limited partners in July 1990, only after this cause had reached the formal hearing stage. The Board of Directors of the general partner, "St. Augustine Hospital, Inc.," is located in Nashville, Tennessee, as is the Board of Directors of "Healthtrust, Inc." Health Corporation of America (HCA) owns a significant number of shares (approximately 30-34%) of "Healthtrust, Inc." "Healthtrust, Inc." is a nationwide hospital chain with approximately 90 hospitals, which "spun off" from HCA in 1987. Thus, "Healthtrust, Inc." is both the sole owner of the general partner and the sole limited partner in the applicant, a limited partnership. The past lineage of the several St. Augustine legal entities is somewhat convoluted, but it is a significant and material consideration for purposes of this CON proceeding that "Healthtrust, Inc." collects management fees from St. Augustine General Hospital, which is the applicant's d/b/a namesake, and that "Healthtrust, Inc." seems to have been underwriting St. Augustine General Hospital in one context or another for an uncertain period of time. St. Augustine General Hospital has been losing money annually. Its net loss for fiscal year 1990 was $2 million. By a September 25, 1989 letter from Stephen C. Brandt, "Healthtrust, Inc.," otherwise known as "The Hospital Company," has committed to loan "St. Augustine General Hospital, Inc." sufficient funding to implement and provide cardiac catheterization services at "St. Augustine General Hospital." The proposed recipient of "Healthtrust Inc.'s" commitment, which is "St. Augustine General Hospital, Inc.," is not the same entity or legal "person" as the applicant, "St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P.," and the parties further agree that there is no such legal entity as "St. Augustine General Hospital, Inc." (TR-132-133) Also, it is not clear from this record what other enterprises or ventures are attributable to "St. Augustine Hospital, Inc.," the general partner in the applicant. Therefore, even if the true intent of Mr. Brandt's letter was to show that the general partner, "St. Augustine Hospital, Inc." and not the nonexistent "St. Augustine General Hospital, Inc.," would receive funding from "Healthtrust, Inc.," there is no guarantee that "Healthtrust Inc.'s" funding commitment to the general partner would be used as a simple conduit to St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P., the applicant. With regard to quality of care, either applicant is capable of providing high quality cardiac catheterization services. However, St. Augustine's proposed physical plant is less ideal than that proposed by Flagler. St. Augustine proposes a lab with a procedure room that contains only 314.5 square feet of floor space. The industry standard is 480 square feet. The State of Florida has not adopted by rule a standard for the minimum size of a cardiac catheterization procedure room. However, the Inter-Society Commission for Heart Disease Resources has issued a report, relied upon by architects in designing cardiac care facilities, which recommends a minimum size for a procedure room of 50.4 square yards, which equals 453.6 square feet. The State Health Plan has adopted the Inter-Society Commission Report. Undersizing the lab has the potential to downgrade the quality of care in St. Augustine's proposed lab in several respects. It limits the storage space necessary and required to conduct routine procedures and crash procedures in cardiac arrest situations and interferes with maintaining the "sterile field," essential to routine catheterization procedures, but more importantly, in the event of a cardiac arrest or other emergency situation, there may not be adequate room for as many as five additional persons to enter the room, together with emergency equipment, to resuscitate and stabilize the patient. Concerns about undersizing of space are not applicable to Flagler's proposed catheterization lab. St. Augustine submitted that it could convert space adjacent to its proposed lab for its cardiac catheterization program at a cost of approximately $33,000, but expert testimony was persuasive that such a conversion could be considerably more expensive. To the extent that St. Augustine's planning would need to be revised, additional drawings would have to be prepared to show the reconfiguration of the room with the cost increase. Even assuming, arguendo, that St. Augustine's $33,000 figure is correct and that $33,000 is a proportionately low cost of such a change of plans in relation to St. Augustine's entire proposed project costs, it is found that such a construction conversion as proposed would constitute a change in the St. Augustine application so substantial that it would require amendment of St. Augustine's pending application and therefore such a conversion cannot be considered anew and without prior HRS review at this stage of the CON proceedings. The State Health Plan contains certain preferences relevant to this comparative CON review. Both applications benefit from the State Plan's favoring of an applicant proposing to provide cardiac catheterization services in a county that does not presently have a catheterization lab if it can be demonstrated that patients are leaving the county for such services. Upon the credible evidence as a whole, including but not limited to the testimony of Messrs. Jernigan and Nelson, Ms. Dudek, and Drs. Matthews, Prakash, and Mehrotra, it is found that a minimum of 225 patients had to travel outside St. Johns County, primarily to Jacksonville, Duval County, for such services in 1988, and there is competent, substantial evidence upon which a reasonable person may infer that that number is increasing (See Finding of Fact 20). HRS' viewpoint that freestanding labs which do not require a CON in order to operate in the proposed service area now accommodate these patients or will soon take up this slack is not supported by credible, competent substantial evidence. (See Finding of Fact 19) The State Health Plan also favors disproportionate Medicaid providers. Flagler is a federally designated disproportionate share hospital and qualifies for this preference. (See, also, Findings of Fact 15 and 20). Both applicants have committed to provide services to all patients regardless of their ability to pay and therefore both applicants meet this State Health Plan preference. The Local Health Plan also contains criteria relevant to these applications, among which is that plan's preference for an applicant who proposes to provide catheterization services in an area of concentrated population which is currently without an existing program. The city of St. Augustine constitutes such a designated area, and since both applicants' facilities are located there, they are each entitled to such preference. Both facilities are located in the District IV subdistrict with the highest use rate, and both are entitled to the Local Health Plan's preference for an applicant in the area of highest catheterization use. St. Augustine would be the logical place to put a catheterization lab if need were shown, and HRS' own rule reveals the need for one lab. (See also Finding of Facts 4, 14, 20) The Local Health Plan also prefers the applicant who will provide the proposed services in the most cost effective manner. Hospital Cost Containment Board (HCCB) figures suggest that Flagler is superior in this regard but are not persuasive in and of themselves. Historically, the applicants have been comparably cost-effective, dependent upon the procedure or service assessed. However, for the reasons set forth infra in respect to long-term financial feasibility in general, Flagler has the edge in this preference area. The Local Health Plan contains a preference for an applicant addressing a current access problem. HRS determines need for inpatient cardiac catheterization labs on a district-wide basis rather than a county-by-county basis. No cardiac catheterization subdistricts have been designed and promulgated by HRS rule. The Local Health Plan uses a subdistrict basis; subdistrict 3 contains St. Johns County without any inpatient cardiac catheterization programs and southeastern Duval County where three hospitals provide such services. Either applicant's facility meets the access standard of Rule 10-5.011(e)4.a. F.A.C., that is, access within one hour of automobile travel time under ordinary conditions for 90% of the district population. However, the access problem bears some further specific commentary. St. Johns County residents now regularly travel, primarily to Jacksonville, Duval County, and to a lesser extent, to Gainesville, Alachua County, to receive these services. Increased costs and duplicate procedures often accrue unnecessarily to patients who seek treatment outside the service area/county. Moreover, the need to travel probably depresses the number of catheterization procedures done on St. Johns County residents, either because of the genuine logistics of lack of continuity of care, travel costs to the patient and family, and stress on the patient and family caused by out-of-county procedures or because of the patients' perceptions that these problems exist. Health care of patients who forego catheterization for these reasons would be qualitatively improved if they could submit to the procedure in their own locale; likewise, health care and costs to all catheterization patients would be improved it they could access the procedure close by with lesser travel, stress, and peripheral costs. That an access problem exists has been thoroughly and conscientiously demonstrated by both applicants. It has also been established that the city of St. Augustine location of either applicant would enhance accessibility for the elderly, handicapped, and medically indigent who are the least likely patients to submit to travel for inpatient catheterization services. For those reasons and since the two facilities to be utilized by the applicants are in such close proximity, it can only be concluded that the award of a CON to either applicant would equally improve access to inpatient cardiac catheterization services on a geographic basis alone. Both applicants will be able to meet the personnel requirements of Rule 10-5.011(e)5.b. F.A.C. The premise that a de minimis higher FTE projection by St. Augustine automatically translates into better patient care was not proven and is suspect due to the size limitations of St. Augustine's proposed lab. (See Finding of Fact 10) Flagler's argument that because Flagler assigned a higher pay rate to different members of its catheterization team and because Flagler is willing to pay higher salaries overall does not translate into an advantage upon the state of this record as a whole. Either applicant will provide services to all persons in need, regardless of ability to pay, and each applicant further proposes serving Medicare, Medicaid, indigent, private pay, and HMO/PPO. Both applicants must, by law, comply with any conditions HRS may place on their CONs. In these respects, it is concluded that each applicant equally meets those respective Local Health Plan preferences, even though Flagler has clearly shown that its past "track record" in the area of Medicare, Medicaid, and indigent care exceeds that of St. Augustine in both quantity and quality. (See Findings of Fact 11 and 20) All capital projects or expenditures proposed by St. Augustine have to be approved by Healthtrust, Inc., although the hospital management can approve "substitutions" of capital items of less than $5,000 per invoice. This restriction on local management, St. Augustine's potentially imprudent freezing of its per procedure cost for two years, and its perennially low occupancy rate overall (42 out of 115 beds last year) impact unfavorably on both the short-term and long-term feasibility of its project. St. Augustine raised the valid point that since, due to litigation, neither applicant can meet its projected opening date, some adjustment of each applicant's pro forma, based on inflation, is in order, however what this adjustment should be was never persuasively quantified by the witnesses. St. Augustine challenged Flagler's pro forma statement on basically three grounds: that the nine-month earlier projected starting date (now past) for Flagler's lab projects an artificially lower patient charge due to inflation; that Flagler's supply expense of $200 is too low; and that Flagler did not amortize remodeling costs of $147,000. Both applicants' projections in the category of patient charge per procedure are found to be reasonable, but St. Augustine also suggested that Flagler's patient charge per procedure should be increased by 3.75%, which assumes a nine-month adjustment, at a 5% annual interest rate to increase Flagler's procedure charge from $1,385 to $1,437 for year one and from $1,475 to $1,530 for year two. Such a result would not render Flagler's proposal unreasonable and would have the effect of increasing Flagler's profitability. However, no evidence showed Flagler intended to increase its charge. Flagler's projected supply expense per procedure is reasonable. Assuming Flagler depreciates renovation costs over a 20 year period, the resulting minimal increase in depreciation is not a significant concern proportionate to Flagler's "bottom line" profitability. HRS opposes both applications in part upon its assertion that neither applicant can attain its proposed number of procedures so as to insure long term financial feasibility. One of HRS' premises for this assertion is its contention that there are few cardiologists residing or practicing in St. Johns County. This is a truism so far as it goes, but not a controlling factor in light of significant other forces at work. Rather than cardiologists' clientele "feeding" a cardiac catheterization lab, as HRS originally supposed, the undersigned finds, upon the greater weight and credibility of all witnesses, including HRS' Ms. Dudek, that the absence of an inpatient cardiac catheterization lab in the city of St. Augustine, St. Johns County, has, in fact, depressed the availability of cardiologists in the county. Upon the testimony of Mr. Conzemius and Dr. Lambert, it is found that because there is no inpatient cardiac catheterization lab available, cardiologists currently cannot be recruited by either applicant. Establishment of such a lab by either applicant would result in more cardiologists locating in St. Augustine and St. Johns County with a concomitant improvement in patient accessibility to cardiology services. HRS' assertion that neither applicant can attain its break-even use rate is not based upon any definitive or even cursory study by HRS of existing county use rates, CONs are not required for outpatient catheterization services which may be offered in freestanding facilities. The record does not establish with specificity the extent of utilization or service volume of outpatient cardiac catheterization labs, if any, in St. Johns County. There is expert cardiologist testimony that freestanding catheterization labs are not a medically acceptable alternative to inpatient programs in a hospital. HRS contended that neither applicant has projected reasonable patient utilization figures guaranteeing long-term financial feasibility of their respective projects, but conceded that either proposal would be financially feasible if it attracted the projected patient numbers. The greater weight of the credible evidence supports a finding that sufficient numbers of inpatient cardiac catheterization patients can be captured by either applicant. Typically, 20% of cardiac catheterizations are done on an outpatient basis, so the 225-patient figure demonstrated for 1988 understates the potential cardiac catheterization patients in St. Johns County by 20%. Thus, approximately 55 more patients obtained catheterization out of county in 1988 than are shown by the inpatient figures, so mathematically one could project 270 such procedures on St. Johns County residents actually occurred in 1988. Application of the statewide use rate of 8.9 such procedures per 1,000 people applied to the appropriate January 1, 1992 planning horizon with the predicted population increase would yield an even higher potential patient figure of 674. Subdistrict 3 has historically experienced a yet higher use rate of 10.1 cardiac catheterization admissions. Either Flagler's 250 (first year) and 300 (second year) or St. Augustine's 275 (first year) and 325 (second year) is a reasonable projection which meets the HRS recommended minimum volume of 300 procedures per year in the second year. See, Rule 10-5.011(e)8.a. and e. F.A.C. Having a cardiac catheterization program would complement the obstetrical care which is exclusive to Flagler. Both applicants indicated their willingness to make their services available to a broad payor mix. St. Augustine projects utilization by class of pay for both year one and year two of operation as 2.2% Medicaid, 56.9% Medicare, 38.9% insurance, and 2.2% indigent. Flagler projects utilization by class of pay for both years as 7% Medicaid, 60% Medicare, 31% insurance, and 2% indigent. St. Augustine's projection of 2.2% of its cardiac catheterization services for Medicaid patients is reasonable but its projection of that same percentage for charity is inconsistent with St. Augustine's prior service and is unreasonable. Considering Flagler's historical Medicaid and indigent service history, its several contracts to provide care to these classes of pay, and the comparable cardiac catheterization utilization experience of similar providers, Flagler's projections in this respect are reasonable. If Flagler has erred in this portion of its assessment, increased percentages of patients covered by insurance reimbursements would only improve Flagler's "bottom line" for long- term financial feasibility. Both applicants' pro forma statements are based on operation of the proposed cardiac catheterization lab only, not including ancillary services and other charges related to the entire patient episode of care. Both applicants will receive an incremental layer of profit from establishing a cardiac catheterization lab, but that amount was not quantified on this record. The greater weight of the credible expert evidence shows that St. Augustine's understatement of a number of expenses will result in its lab experiencing a net loss which it will be tempted to "pass on" through other hospital charges. St. Augustine's commitment to following Healthtrust, Inc.'s policies with regard to depreciation, amortization, and assigning useful life to equipment is not persuasive that these corporate principles are preferable to the generally accepted accounting principles used by Flagler. If St. Augustine's commitment to freezing its charge per procedure does not result in its raising fees elsewhere, this commitment may still aggravate instead of alleviate St. Augustine's financial predicament, for the entire facility currently operates at a net loss. Rule 10-5.011(1)(e)6. F.A.C. as amended, August 1988, requires that CON cardiac catheterization applicants who do not provide open heart surgery services include a written protocol for the transfer of emergency patients to a hospital providing open heart surgery which is within 30 minutes' travel time by emergency vehicle under average travel conditions. No statute, rule, or credible testimony herein defined "protocol" contrary to the interpretation given that term in Florida Medical Center et al. v. HRS, 11 FALR 3904 (1989). HRS' Ms. Dudek determined that each submittal met HRS' intent in the current rule. Her rule interpretation, based on agency expertise, is entitled to great weight. Flagler filed a protocol which is specific to cardiac catheterization patients in need of open heart surgery but did not specify which open heart surgery facility would be utilized. St. Augustine submitted a current transfer agreement between St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P. and St. Luke's Hospital, Jacksonville, the closest open heart surgery provider. This agreement is not specific to cardiac catheterization patients. St. Augustine also has an agreement with doctors at St. Luke's for open heart services backup. St. Luke's is within one-half hour's emergency travel time from either applicant's facility. There was no valid reason advanced in this record to suppose that Flagler could not also obtain travel and backup services with St. Luke's if it were granted the CON applied-for. Therefore, it is found that both applicants have complied with the current rule. Inherent in all challenges to the applicants' respective financial projections is the completeness of each application, and evidence as to the completeness of both applications has been received. Upon the testimony of HRS' health planning expert and agency representative, Elizabeth Dudek, it is found that at the time both applications were filed and at all times material to these applications, there was no consensus at HRS as to what constituted a "capital project" pursuant to Section 381.707(2)(a) F.S.; HRS had no definitional rule in place; HRS regularly looked to an applicant's audited financial statements with respect to the impact statement required under that section; and HRS did not require that there be a separate page labelled "assessment" for compliance with that section. Ms. Dudek reviewed both applications in the context of Section 381.707(2)(a) for HRS against other information already internal to HRS (exemptions, determinations for exemptions, or non-reviewables) and determined for purposes of initial review that both applicants had "captured" what HRS needed to know under Section 381.707(2)(a). This remained her opinion at formal hearing. (TR-586-589, 591- 593) St. Augustine expressly stated in its omissions response that it "has no capital projects applied for, pending, approved or underway in any state" (emphasis in original). In fact, the HCCB reported that for the eight-month period ending August 31, 1989, St. Augustine had $59,000 in construction in progress. Moreover, St. Augustine failed to list a lobby and patient wings renovation project costing approximately $540,000. St. Augustine's application contained no mention of these projects and no assessment, discussion, or analysis of their impact. St. Augustine's own Comptroller, David Chapman, would have defined these as capital projects (TR-93-94), and a common understanding of the English language would suggest that his is a reasonable interpretation of the clear statutory language. Flagler provided a page titled "FLAGLER HOSPITAL, INC. CURRENT CAPITAL PROJECTS" (Flagler-10), which listed the following "capital projects," as their expert witnesses defined that term under the statute. Maintenance and Yard Service Facility $61,000 (Review exemption pending) Storage Room Improvements $75,000 (Review exemption pending) Flagler Hospital Replacement Facility CON #2883; $21,728,558 Cost overrun application is being developed Rick Knapp, a certified public accountant and Flagler's expert in health care finance, accounting, and financial feasibility, also testified that Flagler's inclusion of the replacement hospital in the application as a "capital project" when the replacement hospital was essentially paid out before Flagler's CON application was even filed was probably not necessary under the statute but was intended for full disclosure. In fact, the evidence at formal hearing shows that Flagler's $21 million-plus replacement facility was completed, occupied, and paid for prior to Flagler's submission of the CON application to HRS in September 1989. The audited financial statements submitted with Flagler's application also indicated that, as of September 30, 1988, there had been construction in progress of $17 million, and an estimated $7.5 million for expected completion of construction in fiscal year 1989. Evidence admitted at formal hearing showed that the construction had been completed and the facility occupied in February 1989. Flagler began to depreciate its replacement facility upon occupancy. An overrun of approximately four million dollars was accrued and paid as of February 1989, but determining its exact amount was delayed by litigation with the architect and retainage by the general contractor. It cannot be determined from the application and omissions response that the cost overrun had been financed in full, but the two smaller capital projects were considered in the preparation and submission of Flagler's omissions response and specifically, depreciation expenses are included in the omissions response for all three of the above-identified projects. The hospital-wide pro forma contained in Flagler's omissions response shows a "healthy bottom line" for Flagler, even after consideration of the then-pending capital projects. Mr. Knapp represented that pages R-1, 2 of Flagler's omissions response (Flagler-11) meet the requirements of Section 381.707(2)(a) F.S., requiring a complete listing of all capital projects and an assessment of the capital projects' impact on the applicant's ability to provide the proposed cardiac catheterization lab. However, a close reading of pages R-1, 2 reveals that pages R-1, 2 do not repeat the list of capital projects just described or "showcase" Flagler's capital projects' impact on Flagler's ability to provide the services of the proposed catheterization lab, but rather, they make the detailed evaluation of the impact of the proposed cardiac catheterization lab on the cost of other services provided by Flagler, which detailed evaluation is required by Section 381.707(2)(c) F.S. Indeed, R-1 is entitled "IMPACT OF PROPOSED PROJECT ON COSTS OF OTHER SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE APPLICANT." Flagler's own witnesses concede that pages R1, 2 must be read in conjunction with Flagler's audited financial statements in order to arrive at the analysis of how other "health facility development projects and health facility acquisitions applied for, pending, approved or underway" will affect Flagler's ability to finance its catheterization lab. However, when compared to the pro forma on Table 3.3 of the application, it is clear that there is no impact of the listed capital projects on the proposed program. According to Mr. Conzemius, Flagler applied to HRS in March 1989 (six months prior to the filing of Flagler's CON application) and was turned down for an exemption on its overrun, and in the future Flagler will be applying for a CON regarding it. Flagler has disguised none of its activities from HRS and resolved and paid out the cost overrun prior to formal hearing so that the overrun, if it ever could have impacted on Flagler's proposed project, cannot do so now. Flagler's proposed cardiac catheterization lab will be paid for by cash funds in hand; the application contained a typographical error indicating that the funds were assured, when in fact, they are in hand. There will be no debt incurred by Flagler for the construction of the project.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order granting CON 6011 to Flagler Hospital, Inc. and denying CON 6012 to St. Augustine General Hospital, L.P. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of January, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 90-2034 and 90-2035 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner Flagler's PFOF (1-77): Accepted: 7, 10, 15, 16, 22, 23, 30, 34, 58 Rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary and nondeterminative: 4, 5 Rejected as subordinate or unnecessary: 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 Accepted except where subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative to the facts as found; not necessarily adopted: 1-3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 33, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 65 Rejected as mere legal argument: 6 Subjects covered but proposals rejected in form proposed because they are mere legal argument or recital of unweighted, unreconciled testimony and/or exhibits: 71, 72, 73 Covered as modified to reflect actual stipulations and credible record evidence as a whole, eliminating subordinate matters and mere legal argument: 8, 9, 28, 29, 32, 35, 36, 37, 43-52, 57, 60, 63, 74-77 The weight and credibility of all the evidence has been weighed within the RO and applies to all rulings. Petitioner St. Augustine's PFOF 6-(69)-73: [NOTE: St. Augustine numbered its preliminary matters 1-5 and its PFOF begin with #6; it also proposed two #69's] Accepted, except where subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative to the facts as found: 6-15, 17-24, 26, 27, 28, 33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 47 Accepted as modified to more closely conform to the material facts of record or to eliminate subordinate or unnecessary proposed facts or facts which were not proven: 31, 34, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 66, 67, 68, 69#2, 72 Accepted, except where subordinate, unnecessary or mere legal argument: 39, 43 Rejected as subordinate, immaterial or mere legal argument: 16, 25, 29, 32, 36 Subjects covered but proposals rejected in the form proposed because they are mere legal argument or recital of unweighted, unreconciled testimony and/or exhibits: 30, 42, 44, 45, 46, 50, 51, 60, 70 Rejected as not proven for the reasons set out in the RO: 56 Accepted in part, the remainder is rejected in part as mere legal argument, recital of unweighted, unreconciled testimony and exhibits, and/or not proven: 57 PFOF 59: First paragraph cumulative. All paragraphs beginning with a dash on the same page under 59: Subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found or mere recital of unweighted or unreconciled testimony and/or exhibits and legal argument. Dash 1 on next page: Rejected as contrary to the credible record evidence as a whole. Remaining dashes beginning on that page: subordinate and not determinative and/or mere recitation of unweighted or unreconciled testimony and exhibits. Credibility determination made. Accepted but cumulative that historically Flagler has served more Medicaid patients than St. Augustine and is a disproportionate Medicaid provider. The remainder is rejected as mere legal argument or recital of unweighted or unreconciled testimony and/or exhibits: 61 Rejected that the same payor mix may be expected. The evidence supports Flagler's projected 7% Medicaid rate. The remainder is mere legal argument, subordinate and cumulative to the facts as found, and/or contrary to the weight of the credible record as a whole: 62-65 Accepted as modified to eliminate mere legal argument and to more closely conform to the material facts of record: 69#1 In all its parts, is rejected as mere legal argument and not determinative of any material fact: 71 PFOF 73: The subject matter is covered within the RO. Recital of deposition testimony in a belated attempt to impeach a witness who has testified has been rejected as not a proposed finding of material fact. The remainder is mere recitation of unweighted or unreconciled testimony/exhibits. The weight and credibility of all the evidence has been weighed within the RO and applies to all rulings. Respondent's PFOF (1-13): Accepted, except as subordinate or unnecessary: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 13 Rejected in part as mere legal argument or unweighted or unreconciled testimony or exhibits (not proven upon the credible record evidence as a whole); otherwise accepted: 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12 The weight and credibility of all the evidence has been weighed within the RO and applies to all rulings. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth F. Hoffman Patricia A. Renovitch Attorneys at Law Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A. Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Jay Adams, Esquire Attorney at Law 1519 Big Sky Way Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard Patterson Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The ultimate issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent has committed violations of provisions of law relating to the practice of dentistry and, if so, what penalty should be imposed by the Board of Dentistry. In Count I of the complaint, it is alleged that the Respondent made fraudulent misrepresentations in an application for a renewal certificate submitted to the Board. The Respondent contends that statements he made do not constitute misrepresentations and that to the extent they were misrepresentations, they were not material and did not affect his licensure. In Count II, it is alleged that the Respondent was grossly incompetent, guilty of malpractice and willful negligence, and failed to meet minimum standards of performance in his treatment of a patient, Michelle Marie McPhail. The Respondent denies the allegations. In Count III, it is charged that the Respondent was grossly incompetent, guilty of willful malpractice and willful negligence, and failed to meet minimum standards of performance in his treatment of a patient, Sandra Gray. The Respondent denies the allegations. Petitioner offered no evidence in support of Count IV of the complaint, and the count has been dismissed. In Count V, it is charged that the Respondent was guilty of gross incompetence, malpractice and willful negligence, and failed to meet minimum standards of performance in connection with his treatment of a patient, Catherine Ardizone. The Respondent denies the allegations.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a dentist licensed to practice dentistry in Florida. He holds License No. 4333, issued by the Board of Dentistry. After graduating from dental school, Respondent entered the oral and maxillofacial surgery program at Grady Hospital, in connection with Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. He completed two years of that program and entered the United States Army. He served for three years as a dental officer in the Army. In 1973, the Respondent completed an oral surgery residence at University Hospital in Jacksonville, Florida. During 1973 and 1974, he was a professor in the School of Dentistry at the University of Connecticut. The Respondent has been practicing dentistry in the Jacksonville, Florida, area since 1976. He specializes in the field of oral and maxillofacial surgery with an emphasis on orthognathic surgery and temporomandibular joint reconstruction. The Respondent is board certified as an oral and maxillofacial surgeon. He has good qualifications in the field and has never previously been the subject of any disciplinary proceedings. Findings of Fact Respecting Count I of the Administrative Complaint During the time that the Respondent was teaching at the University of Connecticut, he made a decision to return to Florida to practice oral and maxillofacial surgery. The Board of Dentistry at that time utilized a system of issuing annual certificates to licensed dentists depending upon whether they were practicing dentistry in the State of Florida. A dentist practicing within the State would be issued an annual renewal certificate. A dentist practicing outside of the State would be issued a conditional renewal certificate. If a dentist practicing outside of Florida decided to practice in Florida, it was necessary to apply for issuance of an annual renewal certificate in exchange for the conditional renewal certificate. An application form needed to be filled out and a resume provided to the Board. The Board's staff would check the applications, and a copy would be sent to each Board member for approval or disapproval. Upon approval by a majority of the Board, the annual certificate would be issued, allowing the dentist to practice in Florida. The Respondent applied to exchange his conditional certificate for an annual certificate by an application that was received by the Board of Dentistry on July 29, 1974. In the application, the Respondent described his residency at the Grady Memorial Hospital program that was associated with Emory University as follows: From June 1967 through July of 1969 I was a resident at Grady Memorial Hospital in Atlanta, Georgia. The extent of my duties were in Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery. I left upon my graduation. This statement was untrue. The residency program at Grady Memorial Hospital was a three-year program. Residents were given annual contracts for each of the three years. The Respondent received contracts for the first and second years of the program. He was not offered a contract for the third year. He was not offered the contract because his performance during the second year was found to be inadequate. The persons evaluating him felt that he had been devoting too little time to the program and that he was not carrying his weight in the program. Although the Respondent was issued a certificate at the conclusion of each year of the residency program, he did not graduate from it. It was a three-year program, and he did not complete it. At the time that the Respondent applied for issuance of the annual certificate that would allow him to practice in Florida, there was no requirement that a licensed dentist participate in any residency program. The Respondent would have been eligible for licensure and to receive his annual certificate whether he had completed the program at Grady Memorial Hospital or not. Indeed, he would have been eligible for his annual certificate even if he had never attended a residency program. Furthermore, even if completion of a residency program had been a requirement for the Respondent to receive an annual certificate, the Respondent did complete such a program at University Hospital in Jacksonville, Florida. The Respondent's statement that he left Grady Memorial Hospital upon his graduation was not true and constituted a puffing of the Respondent's credentials. The statement is not, however, such as to indicate bad moral character. The statement did not cause the Board or anyone else to take any action with respect to the Respondent's licensure that would not otherwise have been taken. Findings of Fact Respecting Count II of the Administrative Complaint On April 8, 1977, Michelle McPhail was scheduled for an appointment at the Respondent's Orange Park, Florida, office for the purpose of having her third molars, or wisdom teeth, extracted. She was a high school senior who had recently turned 18 years old. She was in very good health and had suffered no prior serious illnesses. She was approximately 5 feet 6 inches tall and weighed approximately 120 pounds. Michelle arrived at the Respondent's office at approximately 1:45 p.m. She had not previously visited the Respondent. X-rays were taken. The Respondent conferred with Michelle and her mother regarding the surgery and the fact that it could be safely performed in his office. The Respondent has performed hundreds of similar procedures in his office both prior to and subsequent to Michelle McPhail's visit. During the surgical procedure, the Respondent was assisted by two dental assistants. One of the assistants took Michelle into the room where surgery would be performed. Michelle was placed in a dental chair in a reclining position. Generally, an assistant of the Respondent's would have taken the patient's vital signs (pulse, blood pressure, and temperature) at this point in the procedure. While that was the general procedure, the evidence does not establish that Michelle's vital signs were taken. If they were, no notation of them was made in her chart. Initially, a mask was placed over Michelle's nose and mouth, and she was administered a 100 percent oxygen solution. The concentration was gradually changed until she reached a level of 30 percent oxygen and 70 percent nitrous oxide. At this point, the Respondent followed his typical procedure for anesthetizing a patient. He administered Xylocaine as a local anesthetic. Xylocaine serves to deaden tissue in the immediate area where surgery would be performed. The Respondent had one of his assistants draw two vials, one containing Demerol and one Valium. The Respondent observed the patient and first administered 15 milligrams of Valium. The Respondent administered the Valium by pulling blood from the patient's arm into the syringe, then injecting the Valium, diluted with the patient's own blood, slowly into the vein. The Valium was injected very slowly. The entire injection would take approximately 5 minutes. The needle was then left in Michelle's arm, and the Demerol syringe was attached. Seventy-five milligrams of Demerol were administered in the same manner, but over a shorter period of time, approximately 1 or 1 1/2 minutes. At that point, the needle was withdrawn, and a sponge was placed on the spot and later was replaced with a Band-Aid. The Respondent at that point regarded Michelle as being properly sedated. She was responsive, but quite sedate. Valium is primarily a tranquilizer. Demerol is a potent narcotic. It is used primarily as a pain killer and has tranquilizing effects. A potential side effect of both drugs is respiratory depression. Demerol depresses the length and depth of breathing. Valium depresses the depth of breathing. Use of the two drugs together increases the respiratory depressant effect of them both. The dosages of Valium and Demerol that the Respondent administered were within proper medical limits, but on the outer edge of those limits. Together, the doses, while not inappropriate, were quite high. Use of the drugs at these levels necessitates careful monitoring of a patient's respiration. The manner in which the Respondent administered the drugs is not the most desirable procedure. It would be more desirable to administer the drugs through a continuous intravenous ("I.V.") drip system. That system assures that the drugs will be administered evenly. The system that the Respondent utilized, while less desirable, was commonly utilized by oral and maxillofacial surgeons in 1977. Many continue to use the system of mixing the drug with the patient's own blood rather than a continuous I.V. drip system, despite the preferability of the latter. Utilizing the method used by the Respondent, while less desirable, does not constitute negligence, malpractice, or a failure to practice within community standards. Once the drugs were administered, the Respondent commenced to extract Michelle's third molars. During the procedure, the Respondent sat just to the right of the patient's head. One of his assistants was directly across the table from him, to the immediate left of the patient's head. The other assistant was to the Respondent's immediate right, approximately adjacent to the patient's hip. The Respondent did not assign the specific duty of monitoring the patient to himself or either of his assistants. It was his practice at the time to himself monitor the patient and ask that his assistants do likewise on a frequent basis. The Respondent did not have any mechanical or electronic means of monitoring the patient's vital signs during the surgical procedure. No constant readings of blood pressure, pulse, heartbeat, or respiration were taken. What monitoring was done was done by individual observation, again without any person having the specific responsibility to do that. The Respondent first extracted Michelle's third molars on the right side. As he began to move to the left side, Michelle began moving her head and moving about. She displayed apprehension, a slight tachycardia, or increase in heartbeat, and may have cried. These symptoms could have meant that the patient was experiencing a lack of oxygen or too much carbon monoxide, as a result of an adverse reaction to the Valium and Demerol. The symptoms could also have been construed as the patient having metabolized the drugs and coming but of sedation. The latter is the more likely explanation, but the former is the more dangerous. The Respondent did not carefully observe the patient's vital signs at that time. He removed the bite block, which had been used to keep her mouth open during the surgical procedure, from her mouth. After a few moments, her breathing appeared to return to normal. The Respondent construed her symptoms as having been the result of her coming out of sedation. Accordingly, he administered 5 milligrams of additional Valium and 25 milligrams of additional Demerol. They were injected in a fashion similar to the original injections. The Respondent then proceeded to extract the third molars on the patient's left side. The total surgical procedure lasted from 25 to 30 minutes. When the extractions were completed, either the Respondent or one or his assistants observed that Michelle was not breathing well. The Respondent became aware that her condition was serious. One of the assistants was sent to an adjoining room to bring the emergency cart. The same assistant was dispatched to locate a physician in an adjoining office. The physician was not present, and the assistant was only able to locate another dentist who was in an adjoining office. The Respondent commenced to administer emergency resuscitation ("C.P.R.") procedures. Michelle was at that time without pulse or respiration. The Respondent was successful in ventilating the patient with artificial respiration. The C.P.R. that Respondent administered was in several respects not in accordance with American Heart Association guidelines. The Respondent administered five heart compressions for every two ventilations. He stopped the compressions while the ventilations were taking place. American Heart Association guidelines provide for five compressions for every one ventilation, with compressions being continued and not stopped. Furthermore, Respondent did not place Michelle on a hard backboard or surface which would have increased the effectiveness of the compressions. The Respondent sent one of his assistants to contact emergency rescue unit personnel. The rescue unit arrived at the Respondent's office within minutes. When they arrived, the rescue unit personnel took over the life- support efforts and transported Michelle to the Orange Park Hospital. The Respondent had administered a dosage of Epinephrine to the patient. He administered it through an injection under her tongue. This drug would have served to improve the ability of Michelle's heart to pump blood through her system. The drug could have been more effectively administered if the Respondent had maintained an open I.V. to the patient during the surgical procedure. It was not, however, the Respondent's practice, nor the practice at that time among a majority of oral surgeons, to maintain an open I.V. during this type of surgical procedure. Once she was at the hospital, appropriate medications were administered to Michelle, and she was placed on a respirator. She was diagnosed as having suffered cardiac respiratory arrest. This condition caused insufficient oxygen to be provided to the patient's brain, liver, lungs, and kidneys. While she could be maintained in a technically alive state while on the respirator, her brain had suffered irreparable damage. During the hospitalization, Michelle did not show any significant brain functions for any significant period of time. After four days, it was concluded that her brain was dead. It is probable that irreversible brain injury had occurred before Michelle arrived at the hospital. Michelle's parents made the very difficult decision of removing her from the respirator, and she died. There are numerous possible explanations for the very tragic death of Michelle McPhail. The most likely explanation is that she suffered an adverse reaction from the Valium and Demerol that was administered. It is likely that her respiration had been compromised to the extent that she suffered cardiac arrest which resulted in irreversible damage to her brain, liver, lungs, and kidneys. There are other possible explanations, and it cannot be determined with certainty that her death resulted from an adverse reaction to the drugs administered by the Respondent. What the evidence does reveal is that Michelle McPhail displayed symptoms of respiratory failure during the course of the surgical procedure. Rather than carefully monitoring her condition or stopping the procedure because of the overwhelmingly severe consequences that could result from respiratory failure, the Respondent viewed her symptoms as being the result of her coming out of sedation. That may have been the more likely explanation. Given the possible consequences of the less likely explanation, however, the Respondent's administration of additional drugs and continuation of the surgical procedure was inexcusable. Thereafter, it is clear that the Respondent and his assistants were not adequately prepared to deal with an emergency situation. The manner in which the Respondent administered C.P.R. does not itself constitute negligence, malpractice, or a failure to practice in accordance with community standards. C.P.R. was not, however, administered in the most effective manner so as to save the patient's life. The Respondent's administration of additional Valium and Demerol to Michelle McPhail and his failure to be adequately prepared to administer life- support procedures constitute incompetence, malpractice, and willful negligence in the practice of dentistry and a failure to meet the minimum standards of performance in diagnosis and treatment when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. Subsequent to the experience with Michelle McPhail, the Respondent has improved his techniques for sedating patients, monitoring patients, and for dealing with potential emergencies. He now administers sedatives through a continuous I.V. drip system. He has electronic monitoring devices which constantly monitor the patient's pulse and blood pressure. The Respondent now utilizes three assistants, one of whom has the specific duty of observing the patient and monitoring the patient's condition. The Respondent now maintains an open I.V. so that if drugs need to be administered on an emergency basis, the most rapid avenue for accomplishing it exists. Findings of Fact Respecting Count III of the Administrative Complaint The Respondent's primary specialty within the area of oral and maxillofacial surgery is orthognathic surgery. Orthognathic surgery involves the repositioning of the skeletal parts of the head through surgical techniques to correct jaw deformities. Patients are typically referred to orthognathic surgeons by orthodontists. Orthodontists seek to correct misalignment of teeth by the use of braces and other nonsurgical techniques. When orthodontic procedures and techniques are insufficient to correct misalignment of teeth, surgical techniques may be appropriate. Sandra Gray is a former patient of the Respondent. She was referred to the Respondent by an orthodontist who practices in Jacksonville, Florida. Sandra Gray had a severely bad relationship between her upper and lower jaws. Her upper jaw protruded too far forward, causing a very severe overbite. Her upper and lower teeth could not meet in the front. The orthodontist concluded that orthodontic techniques were insufficient to correct the deformity. The Respondent first saw Ms. Gray on May 14, 1976. He had previously seen her files and orthodontal records. He examined her, took her history, and did X rays and photographs. He determined that surgery on her upper jaw, or maxillary, could correct the condition. The Respondent met with Sandra Gray on a number of occasions and discussed the nature of her condition, the surgical technique that he would utilize, the amount of time that she would need to stay in-the hospital, and possible complications at great length with her. He made models of her jaw and performed a mock surgical procedure to demonstrate to her what would occur. Ms. Gray waited a year before deciding to go ahead with the surgery. The surgery was scheduled for May 25, 1977. Prior to her entering the hospital, the Respondent took final impressions from which splints were fabricated for use during and after the surgery. The Respondent planned to divide the maxilla into four segments. The splint that he had made would in part be used as a guide during surgery to assure that what was being planned actually occurred. Ms. Gray entered the hospital on May 24, 1977, and a complete physical was performed. Prophylactic antibiotics were administered. The surgery was performed on May 25, as scheduled. The surgery proceeded as planned without significant incident. The Respondent performed a full thickness superior and inferior flap to remove tissue from the area where the incision would be made. There is a difference of opinion as to whether the Respondent should have disturbed as much tissue as he did. Some orthognathic surgeons would not have used the inferior flap due to concerns with compromising the blood supply to the area. Others would use the procedure followed by the Respondent because of the danger of destroying tissue and compromising blood supply if there is no inferior flap. Once the flaps were made, the Respondent made incisions through the maxillary and removed bone tissue. The splint was inserted to demonstrate that the correct amount of tissue had been removed. The splints used by the Respondent were made in such a manner as to not fit tightly against the patient's upper palate. A splint that fits too tightly can compromise blood supply to the area. Eventually, the pieces of Ms. Gray's upper jaw were wired together and further secured with the splint. The surgical techniques necessarily compromise blood supply to the area of the incision. The techniques that the Respondent utilized were not such as to unduly compromise blood supply. Nothing in the surgery performed by the Respondent on Sandra Gray constituted incompetence, malpractice, willful negligence, or a failure to meet minimum standards of performance. After surgery, Sandra Gray was taken to the intensive care unit of the hospital, which was being used as a recovery room. On the first postoperative day, her vital signs were good, and she was doing well. She was transferred to a general hospital ward. Ice was placed in the area of the surgery to reduce swelling, and a clear liquid diet was administered. On the second day, Ms. Gray was receiving antibiotics, vitamins, clear liquids, and an I.V. diet. The need for good hygiene was stressed to her, and she was told to constantly cleanse the area. On the second day, the Respondent observed a dusty-looking area, grayish in appearance, below the incision line in the front of Ms. Gray's mouth. He made a note in the hospital records that the area "looked necrotic." Necrotic means dead. Necrotic tissue has a brown appearance and resembles dead meat. The Respondent had heat applied to the area and carefully observed it. The dusty appearance receded by the next day, and there was fresh blood in the area, indicating that the area was not necrotic. Respondent kept her on antibiotics. He had some concerns about her hygiene. He directed that nurses irrigate her mouth three times per day. No evidence of infection was observed. The patient was maintained on antibiotics and discharged on the morning of May 31, 1977. There were no indications of infection. She was taking fluids orally and had no fever. She was discharged on an oral dosage of antibiotics. She was given further instructions regarding hygiene, and the importance of keeping her mouth clean was stressed. The following day, the patient's mother contacted the Respondent. Sandra Gray experienced swelling around the I.V. site on her arm. The next day, Ms. Gray came into the Respondent's office. The Respondent examined her and found that the incision line looked badly infected. He noticed food debris in the area. Cultures were taken, and Sandra Gray was advised to be readmitted to the hospital immediately. The Respondent took the cultures to the lab at the hospital. The patient went home to get her clothes, but then called and said that due to family problems, she would not be able to enter the hospital until the next day. She did not arrive at the hospital until 1:45 on the next afternoon. The Respondent saw her immediately. She was immediately placed on a broad spectrum dosage of antibiotics. She remained in the hospital for eight days. On June 5, lab tests revealed that the infection was a Klebsiella bacteria infection. The antibiotic regimen was determined to be correct and was continued. Wires and splint were removed from the patient's mouth, and it was found that there had been a complete loss of tissue across the anterior part of the mouth. The right side was gray, necrotic, and not viable. The left side had some viability that might have been saved. The Respondent performed a debridement, or removal of bone tissue, from the right anterior maxilla. When he removed the splint, hue observed a dehiscence on the palate, indicating that the infection had spread. There was evidence of blood supply to the bone. The Respondent placed a flap over the area where the debridement had been performed. There was no evidence of necrosis on the palatal side of the incision. Cultures were taken to determine whether the infection was spreading and becoming systemic. The Respondent was seeking to lose as little bone tissue as possible and to prevent the spread of the infection. Ms. Gray was continued on an antibiotic regimen. The infection appeared to be coming from the top of the patient's mouth and moving downward, rather than from the palate. The Respondent felt that a further conservative debridement would be required, but he wanted to save as much of the patient's upper jaw as possible. She left the hospital after eight days with no apparent infection. Sandra Gray was hospitalized a third time. There was no evidence of infection, but there was considerable necrotic tissue and bone. A second debridement was performed. The result was that Sandra Gray was left with very little upper jawbone, no upper teeth, and several fistulas, or holes, in her upper palate, so that her nasal cavity and mouth were connected. Sandra Gray was hospitalized a fourth time in order to attempt a graft of tissue to cover the fistulas. The graft was only partially successful, and Sandra Gray's condition remains largely as it was following her third hospitalization. She is able to wear a device which serves as an upper denture and covers the fistulas. The cause of what one witness described as a surgical misadventure with Sandra Gray cannot be reliably determined. A severe compromise of blood supply during surgery could have caused tissue to die and provided a convenient avenue for Klebsiella germs to spread inordinately. It does not appear that the surgical techniques used by the Respondent presented an inordinate risk of a compromise of blood supply. Compromise of blood supply and potentially bad results that flow from it are an understood risk of this type of surgical procedure. There are other viable explanations that can explain the misadventure. There were more than normal incidents of Klebsiella infections at the hospital where surgery was performed during this period. It is possible that the patient contracted a Klebsiella infection from the hospital and that the Klebsiella itself invaded the weakened area of her mouth, killing tissue and spreading. Klebsiella infections are relatively rare, but they can be devastating. It does not appear that the techniques utilized by the Respondent presented an inordinate risk of Klebsiella infection to the patient. Nothing in the Respondent's examination, care, and treatment of the Patient Sandra Gray constitutes incompetence, malpractice, willful negligence, or failure to meet minimum standards of performance. It appears that the surgery was performed with requisite skill, that the infection was promptly diagnosed, and that appropriate steps were taken to combat the infection. While the results were devastating to the patient, the evidence does not establish that it was the fault of the Respondent. Findings of Fact Respecting Count IV of the Administrative Complaint No evidence was offered by the Petitioner in support of the allegations set out in Count IV of the Administrative Complaint. The count should he dismissed. Findings of Fact Respecting Count V of the Administrative Complaint The Findings of Fact set out with respect to Count III of the Administrative Complaint, except those that relate strictly to the patient Sandra Gray, apply equally to the allegations of Count V of the Administrative Complaint. The Findings of Fact respecting Count III are accordingly incorporated into this portion of the Recommended Order dealing with the allegations of Count V. Catherine Ardizone is a former patient of the Respondent's. She was referred to the Respondent by an orthodontist. She had a very severe overbite. Her lower jaw was very small in relation to her upper jaw. Her front teeth did not meet, and her overbite was extremely severe. This condition had caused a somewhat degenerative arthritic condition in her mandibular joint. The orthodontist concluded that orthodontic techniques were inadequate to correct her condition. The Respondent first saw Catherine Ardizone on January 25, 1977. He determined that orthognathic surgery could correct her condition. Prior to surgery, he saw her on more than ten occasions. He took X rays and photographs, made models and drawings, and performed mock surgery utilizing the models he made. He discussed the surgical techniques in detail with Ms. Ardizone. He advised her of possible complications, including infection, and stressed to her the importance of good hygiene. Several types of orthognathic surgery were considered, including surgery on both the upper and lower jaws. Respondent ultimately decided that surgery on the lower jaw could be performed to lengthen the lower jaw and chinbone and lower the anterior portion of the lower jaw, causing her teeth to more nearly meet. The surgery was scheduled for August 9, 1977. The patient was admitted to the hospital. The surgery was performed without significant incident. Bone was removed from the front of her lower jawbone, or mandibular, and the chinbone was cut out and extended forward. An oblique osteotomy, or sagital osteotomy, was performed along the sides of the mandibular. This kind of incision allows the bone to slide along itself. An artery runs along the bone in this area and must be preserved. The Respondent performed the surgery in a manner that should not have compromised blood supply to the area. Initially, no wiring was done on the back part of the mandibular because the area appeared secure without it. Two splints were applied in such a manner as to secure her lower jaw. Following surgery, Catherine Ardizone did well during her hospitalization. She healed well, but she did have some trouble keeping her mouth clean. On the third postoperative day, the Respondent made a note about her hygiene and discussed it with her. She improved, and there was no evidence of infection during the entire length of her stay. She was not advised of any infection because she did not have any. She was advised that she would need to do better hygiene and that she had some irritation on her gums because of the way she was brushing. She was discharged on August 14. Catherine Ardizone visited the Respondent's office on August 15. There appeared to be food debris in one area of her mouth and a dehiscence in the front part of her jaw near the incision around her chin. The Respondent observed milk and food by-products in those areas. The patient was advised that she would need to irrigate this area better. The Respondent took a culture of the area and advised her to return to the hospital. She did not immediately return to the hospital, but again visited the Respondent's office on the following day. It still appeared that her hygiene was poor. It appeared that the dehiscence had spread and that there was pus and infection. The Respondent immediately admitted her to the hospital, and further cultures were taken. She was placed on a broad spectrum dosage of antibiotics and prepared for a debridement of the area. There was some necrotic tissue, but not in the bone. The cultures revealed a Klebsiella infection. A debridement was performed on August 17. There was a slight loss of bone, and one tooth was lost. Tissue was grafted into the area. She was released from the hospital free of infection and with a prescription for antibiotics. She was hospitalized a year later without any indication of infection or further bone loss. The purpose of this hospitalization was to release tissue that the Respondent had grafted into the area to free up her lower lip so that she could open her mouth more normally. Catherine Ardizone's bite is improved somewhat over her preoperative condition. The improvement is not as profound as had been hoped due to the interruption and debridement that were necessitated because of the infection. Her condition is not markedly worse than it was when she first visited the Respondent. It does not appear that the Respondent's examination, diagnosis, and treatment of Catherine Ardizone constitutes incompetence, malpractice, willful negligence, or a failure to meet minimum standards of performance. The results were certainly less positive than had been hoped, but the evidence does not establish that the less than perfect result was caused by any inappropriate action on the part of the Respondent. The surgical techniques employed by the Respondent did not improperly cut off blood supply to Catherine Ardizone's lower jaw. As is the case with Sandra Gray, there are several possible explanations for the infection. The evidence does not establish that the Respondent did anything improper that caused the infection or that he responded inappropriately to it.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida State Board of Dentistry dismissing Counts I, III, IV, and V of the Administrative Complaint filed against Gerald Franklin Jenkins. That a final order be entered by the Florida State Board of Dentistry finding the Respondent, Gerald Franklin Jenkins, guilty of violating the provisions of Sections 466.24(3)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1975), as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, and suspending Respondent's license to practice dentistry in the State of Florida for a period of three years. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of October, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: L. Haldane Taylor, Esquire 1902 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Edward M. Booth, Esquire Lamar Winegeart, III, Esquire 2508 Gulf Life Tower Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Fred Varn Executive Director Board of Dentistry Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact I The Parties Charter Medical of Orange County, Inc., (Charter) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation, founded in Macon, Georgia in 1969. The parent corporation operates approximately 92 hospitals throughout the country, including Florida. Most of its hospitals are psychiatric or substance abuse facilities. Orlando Regional Medical Center (ORMC) is a 1,119- bed, nonprofit medical system comprised of four divisions. In downtown Orlando it operates a 630-bed tertiary care hospital and a 255-bed Arnold Palmer Hospital for women and children. A Sand Lake campus is located 10 miles southwest of Orlando, off I-4, and includes medical/surgical beds and 32 licensed short-term psychiatric beds. ORMC's St. Cloud Campus in Osceola County, south of Orlando, includes 84 medical/surgical beds. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) is the state agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the certificate of need program pursuant to Sections 381.701-.715, F.S. Psychiatric Institute of Orlando, Inc., d/b/a Laurel Oaks Hospital, (Laurel Oaks) is a subsidiary of P1A Psychiatric Hospitals, Inc., which is a subsidiary of National Medical Enterprises (NME). P1A owns approximately 50 psychiatric hospitals throughout the county, including (30-bed Laurel Oaks, in southwest Orange County, a short-term psychiatric and substance abuse facility for children and adolescents Health Management Associates, Inc., (HMA) is a health management company which owns or operates 16 hospitals in the southeastern United States, including four psychiatric hospitals in Florida. HMA's Crossroads University Behavioral Center is a 100-bed free-standing psychiatric hospital in northeast Orange County. Its 60 adult beds and 40 adolescent beds opened in January 1989 as a licensed long-term facility, but it has been operating continually as a short-term facility. The Applications Charter proposes to develop a new free-standing 60- bed psychiatric hospital (40 beds for adults, 10 beds for adolescents and 10 beds for children). It plans a wide range of treatment modalities utilizing a multi-disciplinary team approach, tailored to the age and needs of the patient. Although no specific site has been selected, several have been identified in southwest Orange County. Charter anticipates the total cost for the project will be $7,783,000. Charter's patients will be primarily commercially insured (71%), with 15% Medicare and 4% indigent. Charter has committed to serve this share of indigent for the first two years of operation. As a specialty hospital, Charter is not eligible to accept Medicaid patients. ORMC proposes to build a 60-bed free-standing facility on a 7.2 acre site within 40 acres it already owns at Sand Lake and adjacent to its existing Sand Lake Hospital, for a total project cost of $6,678,935. No new licensed beds are required as ORNC will transfer its 32 short term beds from the sixth floor of the Sand Lake Hospital and will convert 28 of its licensed medical/surgical beds from its downtown hospital. The 60 beds will consist of 30 adult and 30 adolescent short term beds. Since the existing 32 beds are primarily adult beds, ORMC's project will be adding adolescent beds to the inventory in District 7. Proximity to Sand Lake Hospital will facilitate shared services, including engineering, dietary and laundry. ORMC also expects the joint use of therapists at its psychiatric facility and its existing brain injury rehabilitation unit at Sand Lake. Because the facility will be added to ORMC's general hospital license, it can and will accept Medicaid patients. ORMC has committed to serve 20% Medicare, 8% Medicaid and 8% indigent patients. ORMC will likely seek an outside management firm to operate its psychiatric facility. The Review On August 23, 1988, HRS published a need for 140 short-term psychiatric beds in District 7. Its SAAR issued in January 1989, recommended approval of a total of 137 beds. When the SAAR was amended in March 1989, to include the Charter approval, the total surged to 197 approved beds. Even after First Hospital withdrew its application for 55 beds, the total approved exceeded the published need for the 1993 horizon year by two beds. Numeric Need The short-term psychiatric bed need rule is found at Rule 10- 5.011(1)(o) , F.A.C. "Short-term" is defined as an average length of stay of 30 days or less for adults, and 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years. A favorable need determination will not normally be given to an applicant unless a bed need exists according to sub-paragraph (1)(o)4 of "the rule". Rule 10-5.011(1)(0)4, F.A.C. provides as follows: Bed allocations for acute care short term general psychiatric services shall be based on the following standards: A minimum of .15 beds per 1,000 population should be located in hospitals holding a general license to ensure access to needed services for persons with multiple health These beds shall be designated as short term inpatient hospital psychiatric beds. 20 short term inpatient hospital beds per 1,000 population may be located in specialty hospitals, or hospitals holding a general license. The distribution of these beds shall be based on local need, cost effectiveness, and quality of care considerations. The short term inpatient psychiatric bed need for a Department service district shall be projected 5 years into the future based on the most recent available January or July population estimate prior to the beginning to the respective batching cycle. The projected number of beds shall be based on a bed need ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population. These beds are allocated in addition to the total number of general acute care hospital beds allocated to each Department District under Paragraph 10-5.011(1)(m). The net need for short term psychiatric beds shall be calculated by subtracting the number of licensed and approved beds from the number of projected beds. The population estimates are based on population projections by the Executive Office of the Governor. Occupancy Standards. New Facilities must be able to project an average 70% occupancy rate for adult psychiatric beds and 60% for children and adolescent beds in the second year of operation, and must be able to project an average 80% occupancy rate for adult beds and 70% for children and adolescent short term psychiatric inpatient hospital beds for the third year of operation. No additional short term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in a service district is at or exceeds 75% for the preceding 12 month period. No additional beds for adolescents and children under 18 years of age shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adolescent and children short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds in the Department district is at or exceeds 70% for the preceding 12 month period. Hospitals seeking additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds must show evidence that the occupancy standard defined in paragraph six is met and that the number of designated short term psychiatric beds have had an occupancy rate of 75% or greater for the preceding year. Unit size. In order to assure specialized staff and services at a reasonable cost, short term inpatient psychiatric hospital based services should have at least 15 designated beds. Applicants proposing to build a new but separate psychiatric acute care facility and intending to apply for a specialty hospital license should have a minimum of 50 beds. The parties do not dispute that application of the formula yields a need for 140 beds, the total published in the applicable fixed need pool. Nor do the parties dispute that the occupancy standard was met, since HRS uses the lower standard of 70% as a threshold for determining whether need should be published. The parties agree that approval of both Charter's and ORMC's applications results in an excess of two beds over the published need. There is substantial dispute as to whether that excess is justified, and as to the composition of the beds as "speciality hospital" or "general hospital" beds. The only provision in agency rules or policy for exceeding bed need calculations is when "not normal" or "special" circumstances exist in the District. HRS' Policy Manual for the Certificate of Need program, dated October 1, 1988, provides in Section 9-6 B. (3): If a qualified applicant exist but the proposed project exceeds the beds or services identified in the fixed need pool, the department may award beds or services in excess of the pool when warranted by special circumstances as defined in rule 10- 5.011(1)(b), 1-4, F.A.C. and, specifically for nursing homes Rule 10-5.011(1)(K)2.j. F.A.C. (Laurel Oaks Exhibit #10, P. 9-2) The referenced sections of Rule 10-5.011(1)(b), F.A.C., relate to the enhancement of access--primarily economic access and access by underserved groups. Access is addressed in Part VII, below. No evidence was presented regarding special problems of access in District 7. Rather, HRS asserts that its excess approval was based on "rounding up" the numbers of beds, and on the favorable occupancy rates in the district. In its SAAR, HRS calculated the following occupancy rates by age cohort in the district: Adult 75.8% Child/Adolescent 74.8%; and in Orange County: Adult 57.4% Child/Adolescent 100. The adult rate is therefore slightly above the 75% minimum in the district, and substantially below the minimum in Orange County. The child/adolescent rate is above the 70% minimum in both the district and county. HRS appropriately does not utilize occupancy in beds other than licensed short term psychiatric bed in calculating its rates as it would be difficult to compute the number of available beds (medical/surgical, long term psychiatric, etc.). The rule specifies that a minimum of .15 beds per 1000 population "should" be allocated to hospital1s holding a general license and that .20 beds per 1000 population may be located in either speciality hospitals or hospitals holding a general license. Of the 140 beds needed in District 7, 75 may be located in a speciality hospital under this formula. 30 speciality beds were awarded to West Lake and are unchallenged. The Charter application for 60 speciality beds exceeds by 15, the 45 speciality beds left to be allocated. The State and Local Health Plans The State Health Plan is dated 1985-1987. Goal 1 is the only portion of the plan that is relevant in this review. It essentially reiterates the need methodology described above, regarding the .35 beds per 1000 population and the 70% and 75% annual occupancy thresholds. The applicable local health plan is the 1988 local health plan for District 7. This plan divides the district into "planning areas": Brevard, Osceola, Seminole and Orange -- the four counties within the district. Planning areas, unlike subdistricts, are more in the nature of guidelines and do not carry the same legal weight as subdistricts. Both applicants are committed to submit data to the local health councils, as provided in recommendation #2. Both applicants have committed to provide a fair share of care to the underserved, although ORMC's commitment is substantially greater and has a proven record to support it. Recommendation #5 provides that no new short-term psychiatric or substance abuse beds shall be approved until all existing beds in the planning area are operating at or above 75% occupancy for the most recent twelve months for which data is available from the local health council. This criteria is barely met when adult and children/adolescent occupancy is combined, and is not met by the occupancy rate for adult beds in Orange County. Financial Feasibility The pro formas of both applicants, which are no more than best guess estimates, are generally reasonable, based upon the experience of the applicants' existing programs. Charter's proposal makes no provision for management fees, although such fees are remitted to the parent company by its subsidiaries and are reported to the Health Care Cost Containment Board. Charter anticipates that it would not incur additional corporate overhead to support this facility if it is built. In recent years ORMC's psychiatric unit has lost money in its operation when overhead is factored into the cost. Its Program Director, Jeffrey Oppenheim, reasonably anticipates the new facility will make a profit, as it will serve a better mix of age cohorts and will offer a more desirable setting than its limited facility now located on the sixth floor of a medical/surgical hospital. The financial feasibility of both applications depends on the programs' ability to attract patients. That ability is not seriously questioned. Both applications have substantial experience in operating financially efficient health care programs. Quality of Care and Accessibility No evidence was presented to challenge either applicant's ability to provide quality care. Nor, however, was the quality of care of existing alternative programs at issue. Geographic access in District 7 is not a problem, and none suggests that the access standard in Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.g., F.A.C., is not met (travel time of 45 minutes or less for 90% of the service area population). Charter's inability to provide Medicaid services and its time-limited commitment to serve even 4% indigents amount to only minimal contribution to the economically underserved population. In the past, ORMC has been a receiving facility for Baker Act patients and it anticipates it will again when the psychiatric program has its new quarters. It is only one of two hospitals in Orange County eligible to provide Medicaid services and is the fifth highest provider of charity and Medicaid in the State of Florida, according to Medical Health Care Cost Containment Board data. Impact on Existing Facilities and Competition Positive competition among providers already exists in District 7. There are eleven existing short term psychiatric programs in the four-county area, including both speciality and general hospitals, and adult, children and adolescent programs. Only three obtained an occupancy rate of more than 75% for the fiscal period ending June 1988. The Availability of Health Manpower There is a shortage of nurses, qualified social workers and counsellors in District 7. HMA has experienced problems in recruiting staff at its Orlando facility. Competition for these staff has caused salaries to rise, and consequently the cost of providing services has risen. Turnover results when staff are attracted to new facilities, causing training problems and affecting quality of care. Charter has the corporate resources to conduct effective recruiting, but has no experience recruiting in the Orlando area. ORMC, a large diverse facility, with good opportunity for lateral and upward mobility, has experienced few problems staffing its programs. The Availability of Alternatives Eight of eleven District 7 short term psychiatric facilities have operated below 75% occupancy in the last two years. These under-utilized facilities are plainly alternatives for new projects proposing the same services. Neither applicant is proposing novel or innovative services in psychiatric care. That licensed long term psychiatric facilities such as HMA, are operating short term programs does not justify the approval of new short term beds, but rather suggests these programs could be converted, with little or no capital outlay, into short term programs. Conversion of under-utilized acute are beds to short term psychiatric beds is also an alternative in District 7. Acute care bed occupancy rates in each county of District 7 failed to reach 60% in the most recent 12-month period of available data. The criterion of Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.f., F.A.C. favors the conversion of under-utilized beds in other hospital services unless conversion costs are prohibitive. There has been a trend in the last several years away from inpatient care and toward less restrictive treatment modalities. Both applicants acknowledge this trend with their inclusion of partial hospitalization programs in their plans. ORMC has no reasonable alternative to building a new facility if it is to maintain its inpatient psychiatric program. There is an increasing demand for the medical surgical beds it currently occupies on the sixth floor of Sand Lake Hospital. There is no appropriate space in its downtown facilities. Balancing the Criteria Comparative Review and Summary As reflected above, not all of the relevant statutory and rule criteria have been met by these applicants. There remains, however, the planning horizon numerical need for additional short term psychiatric beds. While that need could likely be met with the utilization of beds that are not licensed for the provision of short term care, such a solution frustrates state licensing requirements. Three alternative dispositions exist: to deny both ORMC and Charter applications, leaving an unmet need in this cycle for 86 beds; to grant one application only; or to approve both and exceed the need by two beds. HRS argues that the two-bed difference is of little consequence and that the excessive number of specialty beds if Charter is approved is irrelevant, as no general hospital is currently competing for the beds. It is not possible to conjecture that appropriate general hospital applicants will participate in a near future cycle, but it is certain that if those beds are awarded in this cycle to a specialty hospital, they will not be available in a future cycle. Nothing requires that all beds identified in a fixed pool must be awarded in that cycle. The converse follows when, as here, other considerations weigh against approval of additional beds. Between the two applicants, ORMC more consistently meets the rule and statutory criteria. Although it still proposes a substantial capital outlay, (ORMC) relies on conversion of existing licensed beds and results in less impact on other existing programs. Its contribution to the underserved population is more substantial; it proposes more needed adolescent, rather than adult beds; and it does not violate the .15/.20 general hospital, specialty hospital bed balance. That balance needs to be maintained in this case to insure competition among Medicaid providers. In summary, the evidence supports approval of ORMC's application and denial of Charter's.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED That a Final Order be entered denying CON number 5691 to Charter Medical of Orange County, Inc.; and granting CON #5697 to Orlando Regional Medical Center. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 15th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASES NO. 89-1358,89-1366.89-1368,89-2039 & 89-2041 The following constitute rulings on the findings of fact proposed by each party: Charter Medical of Orange County, Inc. Adopted in substance in paragraph 1. Adopted in substance in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. 6.-17. Adopted in statement of the issues. 18. Adopted in paragraphs 6 and 7. 19.-36. Rejected as unnecessary, except as summarized in paragraph 6. 37. Addressed in paragraph 30. 38.-5O. Rejected as unnecessary, except as summarized in paragraph 36. 51.-57. Rejected as unnecessary, except at summarized in paragraph 7. 58.-6I. Adopted in paragraph 16. 62.-69. Rejected as unnecessary and contrary to the methodology in the rule. 70. Adopted in substance in paragraph 16. 71.-77. Rejected as unnecessary. 78. Rejected as contrary to the evidence and law. "Not normal" does not include high occupancy rates in several facilities. 79.-8I. Adopted in summary in paragraph 21. 82.-83. Rejected as immaterial. The evidence in this case supports maintenance of the balance, notwithstanding past practice. 84. Adopted in paragraph 15. 85.-103. Rejected as unnecessary. 104. Rejected as contrary to the law and evidence. 105. & 106. Adopted in paragraph 22. 107.-109. Adopted in paragraph 23. 110. & 111. Rejected as unnecessary. 112. & 113. Adopted in paragraph 24. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 25. 116.-149. Rejected as unnecessary. 150. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 26 and 29. 151.-161. Rejected as unnecessary. 162.-164. Adopted in substance in paragraph 27. 165.-171. Rejected as unnecessary. 172. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 173.-180. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 181. Adopted in paragraph 5. 182.-190. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 43. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 193.-198. Rejected as unnecessary. 199. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 200.-206. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 8. 210.-213. Rejected as unnecessary. 214. Adopted by implication in paragraph 33. 215.-218. Rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. & 221. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 222. Adopted in summary in paragraph :28. 223.-238. Rejected as unnecessary. Orlando Regional Medical Center Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 9. 3.-7. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 42. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 42. Adopted in summary in paragraph 12. Adopted in paragraph 1. Rejected as ummaterial. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 15. Addressed in the preliminary statement. Adopted in paragraph 14. Rejected as unnecessary. 22.-24. Adopted in summary in paragraph 16. Adopted in paragraph 15 and conclusion of law #7. Adopted in substance in paragraph 21. Adopted in paragraph 15. Rejected as unnecessary. 29 & 30. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in paragraph 22. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 23. Adopted in paragraph 23. 36 & 37. Adopted in paragraph 24. Adopted in paragraph 11 and 33. Adopted in paragraph 8. Adopted in paragraph 11. 41 & 42. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 25. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 26. 48.-52. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 10. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence (the finding as to no alternatives). The finding regarding Park Place is unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 42. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 36. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 30. 63.-66. Rejected as unnecessary. 67. Adopted in paragraph 47. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1. & 2. Addressed in Preliminary Statement. Adopted in paragraphs 6. and 9. Adopted in paragraph 24. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in paragraph 36. 7.-9. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in paragraph 30. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 26. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Adopted in paragraph 33. Adopted in substance in paragraph 32. Adopted by implication in paragraphs 30 and 34. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Adopted in summary in paragraph 13. Adopted in paragraph 15. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. The policy is found in HRS' Policy Manual. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in paragraph 21. Rejected as unnecessary. 26 & 27. Adopted by implication in 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 33 & 34. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 46. Rejected as contrary to the evidence, and immaterial (as to the ratio). Rejected as contrary to the definition "not normal" and immaterial. 38 & 39. Rejected as argument. Adopted in paragraph 16. Adopted in paragraph 20. Rejected as unnecessary. 43 & 49. Rejected as argument. Laurel Oaks Hospital Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 13. & 9. Addressed in Preliminary Statement. 10. Adopted in paragraph 18. 11.-21. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 8. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 14. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. The term is "should", not "shall". Adopted in paragraph 15. 36 Adopted in paragraph 13. 37.-40. Adopted in paragraph 16. 41 & 42. Adopted in paragraph 18. 43 & 44. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 45.-47. Rejected as argument and unnecessary. 48 & 49. Adopted in paragraph 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 16. 52 - 54. Rejected as unnecessary. 55 & 56. Adopted in summary in paragraph 20. 57.-61. Rejected as unnecessary or argument. 62.-65. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 20 and 23. 66 & 67. Adopted in paragraph 22. 68. Adopted in paragraph 23. 69.-72. Rejected as unnecessary or cumulative. 73 & 74. Adopted in substance in paragraph 24. 75. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 76.-78. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Adopted in paragraphs 30 and 31. Adopted in paragraph 37. 82.-85. Rejected as unnecessary. 86. Adopted in paragraph 30. 87 & 88. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 34. Adopted in paragraph 41. Adopted in paragraphs 38 and 39. 92.-95 Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 39. Adopted in paragraph 35. Adopted in paragraph 30. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 101-112. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 27. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 35. 116-121. Rejected as cumulative or unnecessary. Health Management Associates1 Inc:. (HMA) 1. & 2. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 6. 5.-6. Rejected as unnecessary. 7.-11. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 16. Adopted in paragraphs 15 and 23. Adopted in paragraph 25. Adopted in paragraph 16. Adopted in paragraphs 16 and 18. 20 Adopted in paragraph 19. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 21. 23 & 24. Rejected as unnecessary. 25 & 26. Adopted in paragraph 5. 27.-51. Rejected as unnecessary. 52. Adopted in paragraph 35. 53.-55. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Michael J. Cherniga, Esquire Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301 James M. Barclay, Esquire Cobb, Cole & Bell 315 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Steven R. Bechtel, Esquire Mateer, Harbert & Bates 225 East Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32802 Edgar Lee Elzie, Esquire MacFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly First Florida Bank Building, Suite 804 Tallahassee, FL 32401 C. Gary Williams, Esquire R. Stan Peeler, Esquire Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor 227 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 John Brennan, Jr., Esquire Bonner & O'Connell 900 17th street, Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20006 Robert S. Cohen, Esquire Haben & Culpepper 306 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 John Miller, General Counsel HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. R. S. Power, Agency Clerk HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), should grant the application of the Petitioner, RHPC, Inc., d/b/a Riverside Hospital (Riverside), for a certificate of need, CON Action No. 6582, for the addition of 31 acute care beds.
Findings Of Fact The Applicant and the Application. The applicant, the Petitioner, RHPC, Inc., d/b/a Riverside Hospital (Riverside), is a 102 bed acute care hospital 1/ located at 6600 Madison Street, New Port Richey, Florida, in the West Pasco County Subdistrict of HRS Service District 5, which also includes Pinellas County and East Pasco County. Included among its complement of beds are 14 obstetrical (OB) beds. There are no existing pediatric beds. Riverside's application is for a certificate of need to spend approximately $2,000,000 to renovate its existing OB unit, add 14 beds to the OB unit, add 11 medical/surgical beds and add six pediatric beds. The addition of the pediatric unit will be accomplished by relatively minor alterations to existing space and existing beds, and the cost attributable to this phase of the application is negligible. Similarly, the 11 additional med/surg beds will be accomplished by adding beds to existing private rooms, to create semi-private rooms, at a cost of only approximately $44,000. (Gas and electric lines for the additional beds already have been run to the headwall of these rooms and can be connected without difficulty or much expense.) Most of the $2 million total capital expenditure proposed in the application is attributable to the cost of modernizing the OB unit, with the addition of 14 beds in the process. The addition of 14 beds to the unit does not add significantly to what the modernization effort would cost without the addition of the 14 beds. The proposed new OB unit would include private rooms, to go along with the semi-private rooms that make up the existing 14-bed unit. In addition, the proposed modernized 28-bed OB unit would consist of the combined labor/delivery/recovery/post-partum (LDRP) rooms now preferred by most patients. Pertinent State Health Plan Provision. The 1989 State of Florida Health Plan states at the outset of a list of preferences to be utilized in comparing applications for additional acute care beds: No additional acute care beds should generally be approved unless the subdistrict occupancy rate is at or exceeds 75 percent, or, in the event of an existing facility, an applicant shall demonstrate that the occupancy rate for the most recent 12 months is at or exceeds 80 percent. The Need Methodology. Using the F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038 methodology, the district and subdistrict would show numeric need of approximately 201 and 230, respectively. See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(5). Regardless of the calculated bed need, HRS does not normally approve additional beds in a subdistrict unless the annual average acute care bed occupancy rate is 75 percent or higher during the 12-month base period of July, 1989, through June, 1990. See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(d). The 670 licensed beds in the West Pasco Subdistrict reported only 68.92% occupancy during the 12- month base period, resulting in no projected need for additional acute care beds in the subdistrict for the applicable 1996 planning horizon. Even when a subdistricts's need for additional acute care beds projected by the methodology is zero, an application by an existing hospital still may be approved where that hospital's annual average occupancy rate exceeds 75 percent for the 12-month base period (again, in this case, from July, 1989, through June, 1990.) See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(e). During the 12-month base period from July, 1989, through June, 1990, Riverside's occupancy averaged 72.40%, not high enough to be approved under F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(e). Observation Bed Days. Three types of beds days are included in a category of so-called "outpatient observation bed days." First, "twenty-three hour patients" are patients who are not eligible for inpatient services under the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) criteria for the Medicare program. Second, "observation patients" are similar non-Medicare patients. Third, some outpatients (or ambulatory surgery patients) also use beds for part of a day. With new cost containment and review/regulation developments in hospital care, more patients are spending up to 23 hours in the hospital before a decision is made that further hospitalization in not needed. As a result, "observation" bed use has increased. Outpatient observation services have been recognized and defined by HCFA. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida (the Medicare intermediary) and the Health Care Cost Containment Board (HCCCB) have addressed issues such as reimbursement, billing and reporting of observation beds. Services are provided to "observation bed" patients under doctor's orders, including diagnostic services, observation and monitoring by nursing personnel and/or medical intervention or treatment. Calculation of occupancy rates under the HRS need methodology does not take into account the so-called "observation bed days." 2/ There was no evidence that any part of District V or the West Pasco Subdistrict are inaccessible geographically. Other Need Factors. The evidence showed that there is a seasonal peak utilization and occupancy of acute care beds in District V and in the West Pasco Subdistrict during approximately October or November through March or April each year. This seasonal peak is reflected by the statistics. As previously stated, Riverside's occupancy averaged 72.40% during the period from July, 1989, through June, 1990. During the first quarter of 1990, occupancy was 86.83%. Riverside's average occupancy for calendar year 1990 was 73.87%. For the period from March, 1990, through February, 1991, average occupancy for Riverside's acute care beds was 71.2%. 3/ For the period from March, 1990, through February, 1991, occupancy for Riverside's obstetrics beds was 92.9%. There is no acute care pediatric unit in the West Pasco subdistrict. Subdistrict residents (as well as others in Riverside's general service area) needing level II pediatric services generally go to a Pinellas County or East Pasco County hospital for them. Given the choice, some but not all of these patients likely would prefer to get these services at Riverside, depending primarily on the severity of the particular medical needs. But the evidence did not quantify the number predicted to switch to Riverside. Also, occupancy of pediatric beds in Pasco county was less than 15% during 1987 and 1988. Medical Care for the Poor. The State Health Plan also notes that the uncompensated care burden on hospitals has grown during the 1980s because of a growing number of low-income persons; simultaneously, the proportion of persons covered by Medicaid has dropped. Numerous statewide studies, moreover, have shown that hospitals' uncompensated care is increasing at the same time that their ability to absorb the cost of care is decreasing. Riverside's predecessor bought the hospital from Pasco County in 1982. As a condition to the purchase, Riverside's predecessor agreed to provide Medicaid and indigent care for Pasco County in perpetuity. When Riverside purchased the hospital on December 29, 1983, it assumed the contractual obligation to provide Medicaid and indigent care in perpetuity. Riverside is a disproportionate share provider within the meaning of the State and local health plans. Approximately, 13% of Riverside's total annual patient days are for Medicaid patients. In 1990, 2,647 of Riverside's obstetrical, and 4,272 of its non-obstetrical patient days, were Medicaid. Riverside's charity care deduction from gross patient revenue for fiscal year 1990 was 1.07% of gross patient revenue. Riverside's Medicaid deduction from gross patient revenue for fiscal year 1990 was 5.96% of gross patient revenue. Approximately, 14.8% of Riversides's services go to Medicaid and indigent patients. Although Riverside has only 14% of the beds in the West Pasco subdistrict, it does more than 90% of the non-emergency, non-OB Medicaid care. Approval of the Riverside application would enable Riverside to spread its administrative and overhead costs over a larger base, thereby reducing average charges. Approval of the Riverside application also would make Riverside more profitable and thereby better able to absorb the cost of the Medicaid and indigent care it provides. If Riverside converts existing acute care beds to pediatric or OB beds, it probably would have to squeeze out paying patients during seasonal occupancy peaks, thereby losing more revenue and profits. Competition. If the Riverside application is approved, Riverside's share of the market represented by the West Pasco subdistrict will rise from approximately 14% to approximately 18%. HCA controls the rest of the market. There are no existing OB beds in the West Pasco subdistrict other than at Riverside. The HCA hospital in New Port Richey had an OB unit which it recently abandoned. As a result of the grant of Bayonet Point's application, CON Action No. 6583, with which Riverside had been in direct competition in this application review cycle, Bayonet Point now is approved for a seven-bed OB unit as part of its bed complement. Upgrading its existing OB unit and adding 14 more OB beds will enable Riverside to capture more private paying patients, which will better enable it to compete with the HCA hospitals. At present, Riverside's OB unit is utilized almost exclusively by indigent and Medicaid patients because of the hospital's contract with Pasco County. This unit now is operating at close to absolute capacity. With the upgrades and additional beds, Riverside can work to capture some private pay patients; without them, Bayonet Point will capture the private pay patients. Financial Feasibility. Riverside operated at a deficit from 1983 essentially to the present. By the end of 1990, Riverside had accumulated a deficit of $8.8 million. Riverside's corporate parent, American Healthcare Management, Inc. (AHM), was funding the deficit. From 1985 through December, 1989, AHM was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. During that time period, there was legitimate concern whether AHM would be able to continue to fund Riverside deficits. AHM emerged from bankruptcy in December, 1989, stronger financially. It has since become stronger still. AHM reduced its debt by approximately $88 million. Part of the debt reduction was achieved by the sale of $43 million of underperforming assets. In addition, $45 million of bond debt was exchanged for common stock on September 30, 1991. The interest savings on the bond-for-stock exchange is $6 million a year. As a result, AHM's current debt-to-equity ratio is approximately $160 million to $130 million. AHM's corporate staff has been reduced from about 102 to 65. Its corporate office were transferred from expensive quarters in Dallas, Texas, to less expensive quarters in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Corporate expenses have been greatly reduced as a result. Accounts receivable have been reduced by better collection methods, and the $43 million of assets sold to reduce corporate debt had been underperforming. AHM had $21 million cash and short-term investments as of December 31, 1989. As of the date of the final hearing, it had $18 million cash and short- term investments. Riverside's gross margin (profit) for the first nine months of 1991 was $4 million. After depreciation, amortization, and interest and home office costs, Riverside generated approximately $1.2 million for the first nine months of 1991. Internal cash flow generated by AHM and Riverside would be sufficient to finance Riverside's application project. Since the capital costs of Riverside's proposed project are relatively small, financial feasibility is relatively easy to achieve. Besides costing relatively little, the 31 new beds will not increase intercompany interest or management fees significantly. In addition, the 31 new beds would enable Riverside to better compete for private pay patients. Given the expected utilization of the new beds, the proposed project will be to the financial benefit of the applicant. The pro forma bears this out. It projects 75.11% occupancy for the 31 new beds in the second year of operation (July, 1994, to June, 1995). (This projection does not include expected "observation bed days.") A profit of $2,477,199 for the 31 beds is projected for the second year of operation (not counting any portion of the preexisting intercompany interest or management fees).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Riverside application for a certificate of need, CON Action No. 6582, for the addition of 31 acute care beds. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1992.
The Issue This proceeding was initiated when HRS proposed to deny San Marco's application for Certificate of Need No. 3304 for an ambulatory surgical center in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. San Marco filed a timely petition for formal hearing. Initially four intervenors were involved: Baptist, Memorial, Surgical Services of Jacksonville, Inc. and Medivision of Duval County, Inc. Surgical Services filed its Notice of Voluntary Dismissal on March 7, 1985, and Medivision withdrew on October 28, 1985. At the hearing, San Marco offered evidence through eight witnesses and 28 exhibits; HRS presented one witness and one exhibit; and the two intervenors presented nine witnesses and 26 exhibits. Certain exhibits, by stipulation of the parties, were entered as "Hearing Officer Exhibits." Those four exhibits included the state agency action plan, the petitioner's application for CON, a three-volume state health plan and the District IV health plan The primary issue is whether San Marco is entitled to Certificate of Need No. 3304 for an ambulatory surgical center which will include two operating rooms. During the course of the proceeding several ancillary issues developed; those issues are summarized here and are addressed in the body of this recommended order: In determining need for a free-standing ambulatory surgery center, is it appropriate to consider evidence of out- patient surgical services provided by hospitals? (Petitioner's Motion in Limine, T-9). Is the project proposed by San Marco an "ambulatory surgical center" as defined in subsection 381.493(3)(a), Florida Statutes? (Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, T-500). Should the intervenors, Baptist and Memorial be dismissed for failure to establish standing? (Petitioner's Motion for directed verdict, T-1182). The briefs, memoranda and proposed orders of the parties have been carefully considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order. A specific ruling on each proposed finding of fact is included in the Appendix attached hereto. On March 25, 1986, Petitioner filed a Motion for Restricted Reopening of Record. Basis for the motion is Medivision's withdrawal of its application for certificate of need. The motion is denied.
Findings Of Fact The Parties San Marco is a limited partnership. The owners are Stuart Yachnowitz, individual general partner and sole limited partner; Surgi-Centers of America, Inc., (SCA), a Florida corporation, corporate general partner; and Jacksonville Women's Health Organization, Inc., a Florida corporation, (JWHO), corporate general partner. The sole shareholders of SCA are Stuart Yachnowitz, his father, Joseph Yachnowitz and Susan Hill. The owners of JWHO are Joseph and Stuart Yachnowtiz. (T-47, 48, CON application pp. 20-23). San Marco intends to include local physicians in the ownership of the surgicenter. (CON application p. 40) The surgieenter will be managed by Y and S Management Corporation, the company now providing management services to JWHO. Y and S Management Corporation is owned by Joseph and Stuart Yachnowitz. Including JWHO, it manages eight licensed abortion clinics throughout the country as well as two free-standing ambulatory surgery centers (FSACs) which primarily perform abortions. Susan Hill, the chief operating officer for Y and S for the past ten years, prepared the CON application for the surgicenter. (T-47-49, 108-111). The building at 1561 San Marco Boulevard in Jacksonville, currently occupied by JWHO for its licensed outpatient abortion clinic, will be renovated and occupied by San Marco. The facility will be expanded from approximately 3000 square feet to 4700 square feet. Two operating rooms (ORs) will be added along with ancillary facilities necessary for licensure as an ambulatory surgical center. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1, CON application p. 4, T-52, 54, 55). Abortions will continue to be performed at the facility at an estimated rate of 168 procedures a month. (Petitioner's Exhibit #2, T-102, 103). Other surgical procedures will be added in the categories of gynecology, general surgery, and plastic surgery at the projected rate of 15 per month for the first month of operation to 90 per month after a little over a year's operation. The 90 additional procedures per month is anticipated to continue through the second year of operation. (Petitioner's Exhibit #2, CON application p. 40, T- 102, 103). San Marco anticipates drawing some patients for the additional procedures from its existing caseload and utilizing some physicians who currently practice at the abortion center. (T-62, 63, 101, 102, 247). Memorial is a not-for-profit acute care hospital, located in Duval County in close proximity to the San Marco facility. Since May 1985, Memorial has been providing outpatient surgery services in a dedicated outpatient facility adjacent to the acute care hospital. The same day surgery" facility contains two laser rooms and four operating rooms. (T-854, 913, 914). Baptist is a not-for-profit acute care general hospital also located within close proximity to the San Marco facility. It currently provides outpatient surgical services in twelve ORs and 3 cystoscopy rooms in its main facility. Sometime around August 1987, its new adjacent 17-story structure, The Pavillion, is anticipated to open. The fourth floor of that facility will be dedicated to outpatient surgery and will include four operating rooms and two cystoscopy rooms. (T-939, 984, 987, 988, 1045, 1047). HRS reviewed San Marco's application and determined that it should be denied on the following basis: "There appears to be an insufficient projected number of outpatient procedures to allow this facility to be viable." (State Agency Action Report, September 6, 1984). The State and Local Health Plans The 1985-1987 State Health Plan does not directly address the need for additional ambulatory surgical centers. It adopts as an objective that ". . . By 1989, 30 percent of all surgical operations should be performed on an outpatient basis." (Vol. II p. 81). It addresses ambulatory surgical centers as an alternative delivery system which lowers costs by substituting less costly services. (Vol. II p. 76). And, it outlines a brief history of the increase of ambulatory surgical centers in Florida during the decade of the 1980s. It acknowledges, "As in the case of hospitals, saturation of the marketplace for outpatient surgery has caused new entrants into the field to be more highly specialized in order to attract sufficient business. (Vol. II p. 27). HRS District IV includes Duval, Nassau, Baker, Clay, St. Johns, Flagler and Volusia counties. The 1985 District IV Local Health Plan adopts sub-area boundaries in planning for certain specialized services, including ambulatory surgery. Sub-area A is comprised of Baker, Nassau, Duval, Clay and St. Johns counties. (p. 112). In contrast to the State Health Plan, it makes specific recommendations: that sub-area boundaries should be used for planning purposes; that no additional units should be approved prior to the adoption of state rules; and that no ambulatory surgery units should be added to the district through 1986, when the agency will review the matter again. (p. 20). Utilizing 1983 data to base its projections and the need methodology of a challenged draft state rule, it concludes that Sub-area A has a surplus of 14 ambulatory surgical units. (p 143). Existing Like Facilities and Other Alternatives to the Proposed Service. Ambulatory surgery is typically performed in three types of facilities: general hospitals which mix inpatient and outpatient surgery in main operating rooms; hospitals which maintain separate "dedicated" outpatient operating rooms, sometimes even in adjacent buildings; and free-standing surgical centers which are unassociated physically or administratively with a hospital. (T. 387-390). Testimony in this proceeding was virtually unanimous as to the distinct disadvantages of serving surgical outpatients in a non-dedicated operating room setting. The mingling of' less ill or well outpatients with seriously ill inpatients increases the opportunity for contagion, heightens patient anxiety, deprives patients of access to their families, presents scheduling problems (including the bumping of outpatients in emergencies), and generally increases the cost of the service to the outpatient consumer. (T-386, 388-392, 1125- 1128). Both Baptist and Memorial have recognized the need for separate, dedicated operating rooms. The comparison of hospital-based dedicated ambulatory surgery rooms with free-standing ambulatory surgery rooms stirs somewhat more controversy. There are advantages and disadvantages to both. A hospital-based unit may or may not be more accessible to the physicians. While doctor's offices are often near hospitals, parking still is a problem. While some patients might prefer to avoid a hospital setting altogether, some are comforted by the proximity in the event of an emergency or decision to recuperate overnight. While costs are generally lower in a free-standing facility, there may be an advantage to having the expensive equipment immediately available in some cases (T-241-246, 392, 758-760,996, 1000-1001). If comparing non-dedicated ORs to free-standing ambulatory centers is comparing apples to oranges, then comparing hospital-based ambulatory centers to free-standing ambulatory centers is comparing red apples to green apples. Personal preferences often dictate the choice, but either one will make a pie. There exists no adopted rule governing methodology for determining need for ambulatory surgery centers. In this proceeding, each party presented its own methodology through an expert witness. Those methodologies are described as follows: Petitioner's Need Methodology Howard Fagin, PhD, was qualified as an expert in Health Planning and Health Economics without objection. (T-377) In his opinion there is a need for additional ambulatory surgery rooms. His opinion is based on a four-step process which includes: Analysis of the service area and population within that service area; Review of existing facilities providing comparable or related services; Examination of the utilization of those services within the existing facilities; and Analysis of the need for new health care facilities based upon population and need for new services in the area. 393, 394) Dr. Fagin identified Duval County as the primary service area, and Nassau, Baker, Clay and St. Johns counties as the secondary service area. The surrounding counties depend on Duval for their medical care in many cases. Together, the primary and secondary service areas comprise HRS District IV, Sub- area A (Local Health Plan, p. 112). Population figures are taken from those compiled and projected by the Executive Office of the Governor. (T.-396) For several reasons it is difficult to obtain data on out-patient surgical procedures in Florida. Out-patient surgery is a relatively new phenomenon; some hospitals do not separate in-patient from out-patient procedures in reporting; other hospitals count cases rather than procedures. (T-398) Dr. Fagin felt comfortable with data obtained from the state and from the N. E. Florida Health Planning Council, as adjusted with the use of data obtained from Baptist and Memorial for 1982, 1983, and 1984. (Petitioner's exhibits #11, 12 and 13) For 1984, he figured 31.1 percent of the surgical cases in Duval County were out-patient cases, with the trend increasing. (T-403) Petitioner's Exhibit #15 is the summary of Dr. Fagin's need analysis with two columns, one assuming an out-patient surgery rate of 35 percent of total surgeries, and the other assuming a rate of 40 percent. The number of available ambulatory surgery rooms (24) is based upon the availability of four rooms in one recently opened free-standing ambulatory center (AMI) and twenty other free-standing or dedicated (used only for out-patients) operating rooms in Duval County hospitals. The analysis assumes that the rooms will be operated five days a week, two hundred and fifty days a year (5 days x 52 weeks, minus 10 days for holidays and "down-time"). The figure of 960 cases per year, per room, is further derived from the assumptions the room will be operated 6 hours a day, an average case (including preparation, surgery, and cleanup) will take 1.25 hours, and the rooms will be utilized 80 percent of the time. In addition to the number of cases described to dedicated and free-standing rooms through that process, 3000 cases are presumed to be done each year in non-dedicated operating rooms. This figure is derived from rounding off the reported 3030 out-patient cases in non-dedicated units in 1983. The rationale for including those cases is that due to lack of sufficient free-standing units, the out-patient services must be provided in the regular hospital OR environment. The number of such cases, according to Dr. Fagin, should decrease as the number of free-standing units increases. (T. 414-415). Dr. Fagin's methodology applied to various hypothetical fact situations yields the following conclusions as to need for (+), or excess of (- ), free-standing ambulatory surgery operating rooms: Assuming a service area including all of HRS District IV, Sub-area A, 24 currently available rooms; and 960 cases per room per year: (Petitioner's Exhibit #15) 35 percent 40 percent + 6 rooms + 10 rooms Same assumptions as A, above: (intervenor`s Exhibit #16) 30 percent rate + 1 room Same assumptions as A, above, except limited to Duval County: (Intervenor Exhibit #17) 30 percent 35 percent 40 percent -4 rooms -1 room +2 rooms Same assumptions as A, above, except 31 existing rooms, instead of 24: (Intervenor Exhibit #18) 30 percent 35 percent 40 percent not calculated -2 rooms +3 rooms Same assumptions as A, above, except 31 existing rooms and service area limited to Duval County: (Intervenor Exhibit #19) 30 percent 35 percent 40 percent -11 rooms -8 rooms -5 rooms Same assumptions as A., above, except 1200 cases per room per year, instead of 960: (Intervenor Exhibit #20) 30 percent 35 percent 40 percent -4 rooms -1 room +3 rooms Same assumptions as A, above, except 1200 cases per room and 31 existing available rooms: (Intervenor Exhibit #21) 30 percent 35 percent 40 percent -11 rooms -8 rooms -4 rooms Same assumptions as A, above, except 1200 cases per room, 31 existing available rooms and Duval County only: (Intervenor Exhibit #22) 30 percent 35 percent 40 percent -15 rooms -13 rooms -10 rooms HRS Need Methodoloy Reid Jaffe, Medical Facilities Consultant for the Office of Community Medical Facilities, was qualified as an expert in health care planning with emphasis on certificate of need. (T-533) He explained the ambulatory surgical center need methodology as summarized in DHRS Exhibit #1. The Department typically uses a single county as its planning area for ambulatory surgery applications. (T-556). Therefore, the data is based on Duval County population and services provided by Duval County facilities. To obtain the volume of surgical procedures in Duval County hospitals, letters were written requesting the break-out for the period February 1984-January 1985. While the process is not an exact science, Mr. Jaffe feels that since the Department asks for the same type of information over a period of time, the anomalies in the figures will become obvious. (T-569). Based upon the returns to the questionnaire, the Duval total surgery rate, (out-patient and in-patient) was determined as 97.7 per 1000 population; the out- patient surgery rate was determined to be 30.2 per 1000 population. The July, 1987 population projection was 623,091. Need was projected at both 30 percent out-patient to total surgeries and 40 percent out-patient to total surgeries. The out-patient surgical potential (number of procedures) is derived from subtracting the hospital out-patient surgical volume from the projected number of procedures needed at a 30 percent and 40 percent rate. From that line was deducted the projected breakeven procedures for each of three free-standing ambulatory surgery centers in various stages of development in Duval County. The 30 percent rate yielded a bottom line of 5,922 excess procedures, and the 40 percent rate yielded a bottom line of 165 procedures remaining for some other facility to perform (unmet need). Since HRS considers the facility breakeven point to be considerably more than 165 procedures per year, it concludes that no additional facilities are required at this time. HRS did not explain its assumption that the rate of surgeries performed on an out-patient basis at hospitals would remain constant (30.2 per 1,000 population), while the overall percentage of out-patient surgeries to total surgeries would increase to 40 percent. (DHRS #1, T-569-576). Intervenor's Need Methodology Michael Swartz testified for Memorial and Baptist as an expert in health care planning and hospital administration. (T-704) He rejected the second-hand data utilized by both Petitioners' and HRS' experts. He devised a poll that was sent to all area hospitals and attempted to verify the responses through direct contacts and, in some instances, a walk-through of the facilities and review of hospital records. Information reported in State Agency Action reports was used for St. Luke's, since that one hospital failed to respond. (T- 704-707, 711-713). Like the other need methodology experts in this proceeding, Mr. Swartz relied on population projections from the Executive Office of the Governor. (T- 711). The geographical service area was considered Duval County, because that is what the state considers and in Mr. Swartz' opinion an ambulatory surgery center draws from a less than 30-minute driving period. (T-712). Mr. Swartz found in his data gathering that, while the number of surgeries per 1000 population has fluctuated only slightly, the mix of surgeries (in-patient to out-patient) has shown a dramatic increase in out-patient procedures. (Intervenor's Exhibit #5, T-722). After determining what he considered were the actual numbers of surgeries performed in 1983 and 1984, the actual number of operating rooms in Duval County, and the actual amount of time spent for each case, including clean-up, he determined that the bottom line showed a utilization rate of only 27.8 percent of existing surgical suites in Duval County in 1984. (Intervenor's Exhibit #6, T-729). Utilizing a fixed use rate of 103.3 surgery cases per thousand, Mr. Swartz projected an excess capacity of 109,214 cases in hospitals in 1986 and 1987, and an excess capacity for 19,279 cases in free-standing surgical centers (including AMI, Surgicare III and Medivision) in 1986 and 1987. (Intervenor's Exhibit #12 and #14, T-749, 750). The most fatal flaw in Mr. Swartz' ultimate conclusion, that there is a current and projected excess of surgery suites in Duval County, is that after his painstaking data-gathering process he lumped together all types of existing operating rooms and assumed they were all equally appropriate to handle in- patient and out-patient surgeries. This assumption is contrary to the weight of evidence in this proceeding. Of the three methodologies presented, I find Dr. Fagins most reasonable. It requires some adjustments, however, to conform to the evidence. Proceeding from Petitioner's Exhibit #15, I find the 40 percent out-patient surgery rate reasonable and consistent with credible expert testimony from all sides in this case. (Howard Fagin - T-413; Reid Jaffe - T-573; Rena Blackmer - T-106l; Carol Whittaker-T- 990: Eileen Fullernveider, T- 1125). Utilization of Subdistrict A as the service area is also 4 appropriate here. It is consistent with the District IV local health plan and recognizes the fact that Jacksonville draws from outlying counties for the sophisticated range of medical services it provides. (T-254, 255) while ordinarily free-standing surgery centers might be more neighborhood oriented and draw from a closer geographical area, it is noted that Duval is the only county in Subdistrict A with free-standing or dedicated operating rooms and for that reason patients could be expected to travel into Jacksonville. (Petitioner's Exhibit #14) The one-hour travel time addressed in the CON application, p. 226, would include some travel from the outlying counties. Reid Jaffe, the HRS expert, does not agree with the local health plan because it would be unlikely that a resident of a county that has a hospital or multiple hospitals in it and that have ambulatory surgical programs, to bypass those closer facilities just to go to Jacksonville." (T-554, 555). In the absence of dedicated ambulatory surgical programs, however, some patients very likely would travel to Jacksonville. The continued projection of 3000 cases in non-dedicated operating rooms is reasonable, since not all ambulatory surgery patients would travel to Jacksonville. Further, even when it completes its new ambulatory center, Baptist anticipates continuing to conduct approximately 2096 of its out-patient surgeries in the main ORs. (T-1063, 1064, 1085). Patient and physician loyalty would also account for some continued out-patient surgeries in those hospitals without dedicated ORs. The population projection for 1988 is appropriate, given a two-year planning horizon and the fact that the final hearing in this proceeding was continued until the end of 1985. The surgical rate of 102.94 per 1000 population is slightly higher than the 97.7 rate utilized by HRS but, just under the 103.3 rate utilized by Intervenor's expert, Howard Swartz. (Intervenor's Exhibit #14). Petitioner's Exhibit #15 understates the available ambulatory surgery rooms projected for 1988. A second free- standing ambulatory surgery center has been approved for Jacksonville and has completed its legal proceedings: Surgicare III, with 3 operating rooms. (T-562, Surgical Services of Jacksonville v. HRS, 479 So.2d 120, Affirmed 11/18/85). The record in this proceeding does not clearly reveal the status of a third surgical center, Medivision, with two rooms dedicated to opthomologieal surgery. Since that facility may still be in legal limbo, its rooms are not being counted. While Intervenor, Baptist, on cross examination posited a hypothetical application of Petitioner's methodology which included seven additional available rooms, no competent evidence followed up to substantiate any more than three additional beds. The available ambulatory surgery rooms factor in the methodology is therefore adjusted to 27. Petitioner's methodology also understates "available capacity" by understating the number of cases which could be handled per room, per year. While Dr. Fagin's methodology utilized 960 cases per room, per year, the weight of evidence and expert opinion established that at least 1300 cases per room, per year is a more realistic approximation. Intervenor's need expert, Michael Swartz, determined capacity based on ten available hours per day, five days a week, at 75 percent effici-ency (American College of Surgeons Standard) to be 2,077 cases per room, per year. (Intervenor's Exhibit #9, T-735- 737). The Hill-Burton standard utilized to determine the need for construction funds in the 1970's was 1200 cases per year, based upon data collected in the 1960s when the average time for a ease was 2 hours. (T-740, 741). Average time today is far less. (T-149, 240, 1064) Petitioner's own projected utilization assumes a capacity for 2 operating rooms, with evening and Saturday scheduling to be 300 procedures a month. (Petitioner's Exhibit #2). This translates into 1800 procedures per year, per-room. while recognizing that counting procedures rather than cases yields a higher number, San Marco never asserted that it anticipates performing two procedures for almost every case it handles. Yet this ratio is the only means of reconciling the difference between its expert's projection and that of its administrator. The above-described adjustment to Petitioner's need methodology results in the following adaptation of Petitioner's Exhibit #15: 40 percent Am. Surg. Subdistrict A 1988 Population Surgical Rate Total Surgery 861,120 102.94/1000 pop. 88,644 Ambulatory Surgery 35,457 Available Am. Surg. rooms 27 Available capacity (1300 cases) 35,100 Am. Surg. in Hospitals 3,000 Net Need Cases -2,643 Net Need Rooms - 2 Quality Of Care San Marco will occupy a building presently occupied by the Jacksonville Women's Health Organization, a licensed abortion clinic. If the certificate of need is granted, the existing building will be remodeled to provide two operating rooms and ancillary facilities required for licensure as an ambulatory surgical facility. HRS witness Reid Jaffe does not question the ability of the structure to meet requirements for licensure and does not question the ability of the proposed center to provide quality care. (T-584). The center will develop bylaws and protocols to maintain quality of care. To practice at the center, a physician must be licensed in Florida and must have privileges in good standing at a local hospital (T-59, 60). Jaroslav Fabian Hulke, M.D., was accepted as an expert in obstetrics and gynecology. He has had extensive experience in teaching and conducting out- patient surgery. (Petitioner's Exhibit #7). He has become personally familiar with Y & S Management's facilities and with their staff through his work at the center in Raleigh, North Carolina. He has also observed the facility in Jacksonville and assisted Susan Hill in developing the equipment list for the facilities. His high commendation of Miss Hill, her facilities and the planned equipment was without equivocation; his testimony as to the anticipated quality of care to be offered by this facility is most credible. (T-351, 353, 355). Anesthesia classifications range from I to IV depending on the condition of the patient. Class I and II are relatively healthy. The San Marco center will handle class I and II; some hospital out-patient units handle class III patients on a selected basis. (T-114, 141, 1120). Statistics on emergencies and deaths in free-standing ambulatory centers are not available now. The Free-standing Ambulatory Surgical Association (FASA) is in the process of gathering data. (T-1129, 1153, 1154). Depending on how they are run, equipped and staffed, the free-standing centers are considered extremely safe. (T-1128). Nothing in this proceeding would hint that the proposed administration, staffing or equipment for San Marco is less than high quality. Staffing By their Prehearing Stipulation filed on October 25, 1985, the parties agreed that there exists in Duval County an adequate labor pool of health manpower and management personnel to staff an ambulatory surgical facility. San Marco has the ability, experience and intention to obtain adequate, well- trained personnel to provide staffing for the proposed center. (T-72-75, 232- 236, 351-352). Physical and Economic Accessibility The parties have stipulated that the proposed facility is geographically available to all residents of Duval County. (Prehearing Stipulation, filed October 25, 1985). While the center will focus on the Duval County area, it also will likely draw from surrounding counties to a lesser degree. The existing abortion center already serves the wider area and as found in paragraph 12 above, no free-standing ambulatory center or dedicated out- patient ORs exist in Subdistrict A outside Duval County. For that reason, patients could be expected to drive as much as an hour to get to the facility. (CON application, p. 226). San Marco claims that it will serve 15 percent medicaid and 5 percent medicare patients. (CON application pp. 91-136). The Raleigh-Surgi-Center was used as a model since it is the one facility that receives medicaid reimbursement for non-abortion procedures. (T-89,160). However, while Medicaid does not reimburse for abortions, the State of North Carolina provides state funds and apparently those patients are computed in Raleigh's 21.6 percent figure. (T-89,90). The validity of the model is undermined by the fact that no such reimbursement occurs in Florida. (T-161). Even though the 20 percent Medicaid and Medicare projection is overstated, economic accessibility is enhanced by the willingness of the center to reduce fees for abortion procedures for otherwise Medicaid eligible patients by $50.00 or $60.00, which sum represents the management fee portion of the procedure cost. (T-158-160). More significantly, the projected standard fee for other than abortion procedures, $300.00 - 400.00, is substantially lower than fees at hospitals, including hospitals with separate ambulatory units. (T- 57, 81-82, 907, 1070, 1071, Petitioner's Exhibits #19, 20, 21, 22). Capital Costs and Financial Feasibility The total anticipated project cost for the proposed center is $246,000.00, including $80,000.00 for renovation of the building and approximately $133,000.00 for the purchase of equipment. (T-94-98, 172-173, 327). Capital is available for project start-up through the personal funds of millionaires, Stuart and Joseph Yachnowitz. (T-172). In its review of the application, HRS concluded: "There appears to be an insufficient projected number of out- patient procedures to allow this facility to be viable." (State Agency Action Report, Hearing Officer Exhibit #1). At hearing, HRS witness Reid Jaffe testified that because of the co-mingling of revenues from the abortion center and the proposed ambulatory surgery center, the financial feasibility of the project could not be determined. (T. 588, 589). On the other hand, if the revenues are co-mingled and if the projections in the applicant's pro formas are accurate, then the facility ought to do better than break even. (T-600-601). Christopher Fogel, Petitioner's expert accountant, represents Y & S Management and the ten out-patient facilities owned by Joseph and Stuart Yachnowitz. (T-182, 183) His financial projections for the proposed facility are found in Petitioner's Exhibits #5 and #6. The first projection is based upon the fee of $300.00 per procedure, for one hour of OR time, and the second is based upon $400.00, for 1.3 hours of OR time. The projections presume the facility would continue to offer its existing services (abortions) at its current level and expand to 250, 500 or 1000 procedures per year. At the $300.00 per procedure level, the facility would begin to make money with 500 additional procedures a year. However, by adding back 50 percent of the management fees (profit in the fees available to the Yachnowitz') and adding back depreciation and amortization, a positive cash flow results without any additional procedures, and increases substantially for 250, 500 and 1000 procedures at both the $300.00 and $400.00 per procedure rate. (T-198-206). Given the worst case scenario (no additional procedures), the owners are losing money only for tax purposes, but are actually increasing cash flow through the legitimate tax deduction of a loss which is not a loss of cash. (T-206). H. Impact on Competition The introduction of a free-standing ambulatory center in Duval County had a positive dynamic effect on existing traditional providers of surgical care in Duval County. Prices were lowered and more hospitals began out-patient surgery programs of their own. While the changes in costs and methods of surgical services is also attributable to pressure and incentives from insurers, no one disputes that the competition from AMI (the one free-standing facility in Duval County that is currently operational) was healthy. (T-639, 640, 1132, 893-894, 1061, 996- 997, 239). HRS health care planning expert, Reid Jaffe is of the opinion that currently the four ORs at AMI, the two opthalomological ORs at Medivision, and the 3 general ORs of Surgicare III (approved but not yet opened) are sufficient competition to the hospitals and to each other (T-564- 565, 643). No one seriously contends that the addition of San Marco's 2 ORs would put an existing facility out of business. Memorial's Chief Financial Officer, Earl Winston Lloyd, expects his facility's new out-patient unit to continue to be profitable with or without San Marco. Memorial's out-patient facility has exceeded Memorial's expectations in its productivity and profitability (T. 871- 874). John Anderson, Chief Financial Officer at Baptist, is concerned that Baptist will lose at least 35 procedures per month which are currently being performed at Baptist by physicians who have indicated an interest in practicing at San Marco. (Intervenor's Exhibit #23, T-943-945). However, he doesn't know whether those same doctors are performing out-patient surgeries in other facilities or whether those surgeries might be the ones that are taken to San Marco. (T-976). Rena Blackmer, Director of Surgical Services at Baptist, testified that when competing out-patient units opened at A.M.I., Memorial and St. Lukes, she felt initially that Baptist was losing a share of the market, but there has not been a continuing adverse effect. (T-1062). In 1985, Memorial`s excess revenue over expenses was approximately $2.5 million, with gross patient revenues of $80-82 million. (T. 863, 864). In 1985, excess revenue over expenses for Baptist was approximately $10 million. A $4.6 million loss on refinancing a debt is not included in that total; however, the $4.6 million is a balance sheet entry which impacts the income statement and is not a cash item. (T-956, 957) Total operating revenue in 1985 was $96 million. (T-955) David Mobley M.D. is a plastic surgeon who has been medical director of the Jacksonville Womens Health Organization since 1976. He practices at Baptist Medical Center, and his name appears on Intervenor's Exhibit #23 as one of the doctors whose out-patient surgeries the hospital is concerned about losing to San Marco. Dr. Mobley performs in his private office approximately ten surgeries a week that he would like to transfer to San Marco. Among as those cases are performed in his office, he is reimbursed only the fee that he receives for the same procedure done in a hospital. He absorbs the cost for his operating room at his office, his staff and supplies. (T- 247, 248). For the patient or his insurer however, the cost for the procedure would be at least twice as much in a free-standing surgery center as in the physician's office. (T-268). San Marco: Abortion Clinic or Ambulatory Surgical Center? From all the evidence in this proceeding the uncontrovertible fact emerges that when and if it is approved, San Marco Surgi-Center will merge with the Jacksonville Women's Health Organization and the two entities will make up a single health care facility: the building is the same; the equipment is the same; the owners are primarily the same; the managers are the same; and for purposes of predicting financial success, the revenue and expenses of the two entities have been considered one and the same. San Marco projects that even after two years of operation as a surgical center, a majority of its procedures will remain abortions. (Petitioner's Exhibit #2). Abortions are accomplished in health care facilities through a variety of surgical techniques, the most common of which is dilation and evacuation (D & E). (T-346, 347). Even though D & E's are expected to predominate at the facility in terms of projected number of procedures (168 per month, compared to 90 other surgical procedures per month, by June 1988), the D & E's will not predominate either in gross revenue from fees or in the anticipated OR time. San Marco anticipates the average patient charge for surgeries other than abortions to be $400.00 per case and the average OR time to be 1.3 hours. (T-93, 149). The non-medicaid patient charge for a D & E is $185.00, and the time in the OR room is generally about twenty minutes. (T-148, 158). Taking the same month, June 1988, and multiplying the number of abortions first by fee, then by OR time, yields a total of $31,080 in fees and 55.4 hours in the OR room. The same process for the 90 other surgical procedures yields $36,000.00 in fees and 119.7 hours OR time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Certificate of Need #3304 be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 84-3712 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in substance in paragraph 2. The surgical procedures are summarized by category in paragraph 3. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 2, 16 and 24. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 16 and 19. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 25 and 26. The statement of John Anderson's testimony is unnecessary, Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 26. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Substantially adopted as summarized in paragraph 26. Adopted in part in paragraph 23, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 23, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 23, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12 and 21. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12, 13 and 21. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Adopted in substance in paragraph 4. Adopted in substance in paragraph 5. Adopted in part in paragraph 5, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 20. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as explained in paragraph 22. Rejected as unnecessary. Policy memorandum #7 is addressed in Conclusion of Law No. 3; otherwise this is rejected as a finding of fact. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as repetitive. Adopted in substance in paragraph 24 and 26. Adopted in substance in paragraph 21. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in paragraph 9, otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence or unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 29, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 28. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 28. Adopted in paragraph 28. Adopted in part in paragraph 28, otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 29 as to the profit of $10 million dollars, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. As addressed in conclusions of law #10 and #11, the impact on Baptist was found to be minimal and insufficient to support "standing". Adopted in paragraph 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 10 and 11. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 11. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary, except as to the apples/oranges analogy, which is adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 10, as to the characterization of Dr. Fagin's testimony. Otherwise, rejected as summary of testimony rather than findings of fact. The adoption of 40 percent as reasonable is found in paragraph 12. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. HRS Need Methodology is rejected in paragraph 10.(b) and paragraph 12 as being less reasonable than Petitioners' experts methodology. Rejected as essentially argument, rather than findings of fact. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as repetitive. Adopted in substance in paragraph 33 and Conclusion of Law #3. Rejected as argument unsupported by the weight of evidence. Rejected. See paragraph 7 for discussion of State Health Plan. Rejected as argument, rather than finding of fact. No paragraph of this number is found in Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Adopted in Conclusions of Law, paragraph 4. Rulings on Joint Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent and Intervenors. (Note, the numbers in the left column conform to the numbering of the joint proposed findings) 1. Adopted in substance in paragraph 1, 2 and 3. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted -In paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. 1. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in paragraph 8, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10(b). Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Adopted in part in paragraph 10, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a re-statement of testimony, rather than finding of fact 10.c. Description of Mr. Swartz' methodology is provided in paragraph Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. 13 - 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence, except as reflected in paragraph 10. Adopted in part in paragraph 10.b., otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 25A. Adopted in part in paragraph 10, otherwise rejected as unsubstantiated by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in paragraph 10, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 22 and 23, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 1. Adopted in substance in paragraph 31. Adopted in substance in paragraph 31. Rejected as contrary to the evidence by considering all uncontroverted testimony and evidence describing the facility. Adopted in part in paragraph 32 and 33, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in paragraph 32 and 33, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Adopted in part in paragraph 31, 32 and 33, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. 1. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as argument that is unnecessary or unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph 27. 1. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 4, 5 and 10, otherwise, rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. Adopted in part in paragraph 4 and 5, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. Addressed in Conclusion of Law 6. 1. Adopted in paragraph 17. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. 1. Rejected as cumulative. 2. Rejected as mere re-statement of testimony rather than a finding of fact. 1. 1. 1. 1. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in part in paragraph 24, otherwise rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. 1. Adopted in part in paragraph 26, otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in paragraph 24. Rejected as irrelevant. 1. Addressed in Conclusion of Law 4. 1. Addressed in Conclusion of Law 4. 1. Rejected as unnecessary argument. Adopted in part in paragraph 27, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as the description of an exhibit and characterization of testimony. Adopted in part in paragraph 30, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 1. Adopted in paragraph 24. COPIES FURNISHED: William J. Page, Jr., Secretary Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Huss, Esquire General Counsel Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chris H. Bentley, Esquire William E. Williams, Esquire Jeannette Andrews, Esquire Post Office Box 1739 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Douglas Mannheimer, Esquire Richard Power, Esquire Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael J. Dewberry, Esquire Christopher Hazelip, Esquire 1300 Gulf Life Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Robert Meek, Esquire Post Office Box 240 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Hialeah Hospital, Inc. may be licensed for a 21-bed psychiatric unit, without first obtaining a certificate of need, on the basis that it provided psychiatric services before a certificate of need was statutorily required.
Findings Of Fact Background of the Controversy The Parties The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (the Department) is responsible for determining whether health care projects are subject to review under the Health Facility and Services Development Act, Sections 381.701- 381.715, Florida Statutes. It also licenses hospitals under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes. The Department's Office of Community Medical Facilities renders decisions about requests for grandfather status which would exempt a psychiatric service offered at hospital from certificate of need review. The Department's Office of Licensure and Certification issues licenses but does not grant grandfather exemptions. A hospital will not receive separate licensure for psychiatric beds unless a certificate of need has been obtained for those beds, or the beds are in a psychiatric unit which had been organized before certificate of need review was required. See Section 381.704(2), Florida Statutes (1987). A hospital can provide inpatient psychiatric services to a patient in one of three ways: a) as a patient housed among the general hospital population, b) as a patient housed in a special unit organized within the hospital and staffed by doctors, nurses and other personnel especially to serve patients with psychiatric diagnoses, or c) in a hospital organized as a psychiatric specialty hospital. Serving patients through methods b and c requires special certificate of need approval and licensure. Most community hospitals place psychiatric patients among the general patient population; few hospitals create a distinct psychiatric unit; fewer hospitals still specialize as psychiatric hospitals. Hialeah Hospital, Inc. is a 411-bed general hospital in Hialeah, Florida. It does not currently hold a certificate of need for licensure of a distinct psychiatric unit. As a result, its reimbursement for psychiatric services from the Federal government for Medicare patients is limited. The Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) generally reimburses hospitals for services based upon flat rates which are paid according to categories known as diagnostic related groups. Hialeah Hospital now receives reimbursement for services it renders to psychiatric patients on this basis. If it is entitled to a grandfather exemption from certificate of need review, and its distinct psychiatric unit is separately licensed by the Department, Hialeah Hospital will receive cost-based reimbursement for services to psychiatric patients, which will result in higher income to the hospital. Approval of the grandfathering request will not result in a) any capital expenditure by the hospital, b) the addition of staff, or c) a change in the type of services currently offered at the hospital. Just before July 1, 1983, the hospital had an average daily census of 16-17 psychiatric patients. If the psychiatric services the hospital has offered do not qualify for grandfathering, Hialeah Hospital may apply for a certificate of need for a distinct psychiatric unit. Even without a psychiatric certificate of need, Hialeah is still entitled to continue to serve patients with psychiatric diagnoses among its general population, and to receive the lower diagnostic related group reimbursement for those services from HCFA. Palmetto General Hospital is a licensed general hospital with 312 acute care beds and 48 separately licensed psychiatric short-term beds operated as a distinct psychiatric unit. It is located near Hialeah Hospital, and both hospitals serve the same geographic area. The primary markets of both hospitals overlap. They compete for patients, including psychiatric patients. Agency Action Under Review From 1973 to 1979 the license issued to Hialeah Hospital by the Department bore a designation for 21 psychiatric beds, based on information submitted in the hospital's licensure application. The hospital then dropped the psychiatric bed count from its licensure applications. This change probably was caused by a problem generated by an announcement from the Northwest Dade Community Health Center, Inc., the receiving facility for psychiatric emergencies in northwestern Dade County, which includes Hialeah. That center had written to the Hialeah Police Department, informing the police that when the center was not open, it had a crisis worker at the Hialeah Hospital emergency room, and that persons needing involuntary psychiatric hospitalization should be taken to the Hialeah Hospital emergency room. The only other hospital in Hialeah treating psychiatric patients was Palmetto General Hospital, which did not accept, as a general rule, patients who could not pay for care. The Hialeah Police Department thereafter began dropping psychiatric patients at Hialeah Hospital, much to the distress of the Hialeah Hospital emergency room staff. The Hospital thereafter dropped the designation of any of its beds as psychiatric beds on its annual licensure applications. It still received psychiatric patients from Jackson Memorial Hospital when that hospital reached its capacity for psychiatric patients. On its 1980 licensure application Hialeah Hospital collapsed all of its medical, surgical and psychiatric beds into a single figure. This was consistent with its practice of serving medical, surgical and psychiatric patients throughout the hospital. Hialeah Hospital filed similar licensure applications in 1981, 1982, 1983. In 1984 there was a dispute over the total number of beds to be licensed, which was resolved in early 1985. In 1985, after a change in the licensing statute which is discussed below, the Department informed Hialeah Hospital that its application for licensure was incomplete and could not be processed until Hialeah explained its basis for seeking separate licensure for 20 short-term psychiatric beds. In its response, Hialeah's Vice President stated: [W]e felt it was appropriate to indicate that Hialeah Hospital did accept psychiatric admissions. These patients have been randomly placed in the institution, many times based on other primary or secondary diagnoses. The application indicates bed usage, not that it is currently a discrete unit. Hialeah Hospital does currently have a Letter of Intent [on file] for establishment of a discrete med/psych unit. Hialeah Ex. 24a On August 1, 1985, the Department's Office of Licensure and Certification informed Hialeah Hospital by certified mail that the application for licensure of 20 short-term psychiatric beds was denied for failure to have obtained a certificate of need for them or to have obtained an exemption from review [both could only come from the Department's Office of Community Medical Facilities]. The hospital was provided a clear point of entry to challenge this determination through a proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, but Hialeah filed no petition for review of that decision. Instead, Hialeah pursued the certificate of need application which it had filed in April, 1985 for separately licensed psychiatric beds. There was no reason to challenge the August 1, 1985, denial because the factual bases alleged by the Department were true--the hospital had no certificate of need for psychiatric beds and had not yet asked the Department's Office of Community Health Facilities to decide whether Hialeah qualified for grandfathered beds. On October 21 and 23, 1986, Hialeah Hospital wrote to the Office of Community Health Facilities seeking a determination that it was entitled to have 21 pyschiatric beds grandfathered on its license. In certificate of need application 4025 Hialeah Hospital sought the establishment of a distinct 69 bed psychiatric unit at Hialeah, with separately licensed beds. The application went to hearing and was denied on its merits on February 17, 1987, in DOAH Case 85-3998. In his recommended order, the Hearing Officer discussed the issue of whether Hialeah Hospital was exempt from certificate of need review because it already had a psychiatric unit. He found that the issue was not appropriately raised in the proceeding before him, which was Hialeah Hospital's own application for a certificate of need to establish a psychiatric unit. He therefore found he lacked jurisdiction to consider the grandfathering issue. Hialeah Hospital v. HRS, 9 FALR 2363, 2397, paragraph 5 (HRS 1987). The Department adopted that ruling in its May 1, 1987, final order. Id. at 2365. A letter dated December 5, 1986, from the Office of Community Medical Facilities denied Hialeah's request to grandfather 21 short-term psychiatric beds on its license and thereby exempt them from certificate of need review, as requested in Hialeah's letters of October 21 and 23, 1986. The Department denied the grandfathering request for four reasons: When the Department conducted a physical plant survey on June 1, 1980, there were no psychiatric beds in operation at the hospital; The hospital bed count verification form returned to the Department on January 31, 1984 by the Director of Planning for Hialeah, Gene Samnuels, indicated that the hospital had no psychiatric beds; An inventory of psychiatric beds had been published by the Department in the Florida Administrative Weekly on February 17, 1984 which showed that Hialeah Hospital had no psychiatric beds, and Hialeah never contested that inventory; The Department had not received evidence demonstrating that psychiatric services were provided "in a separately set up and staffed unit between 1980 and 1985." This letter again gave Hialeah a point of entry to challenge the Department's decision to deny licensure of psychiatric beds and it was the genesis of Hialeah's petition initiating this case. It is significant that the Department's Office of Community Health Facilities gave Hialeah a clear point of entry to challenge the December 5, 1986, grandfathering denial with full knowledge that the Department's Office of Licensure and Certification had denied a request from Hialeah Hospital on August 1, 1985, to endorse psychiatric beds on Hialeah's 1985 license. The Departmental personnel knew that those two denials involved different issues. Once the Office of Licensure and Certification told the hospital it had to produce either a certificate of need or a grandfathering approval to have psychiatric beds endorsed on its license, the hospital had to turn to the Office of Community Health Facilities to get a ruling on its grandfathering claim. The letter of December 5, 1986, was the first ruling on the merits of Hialeah Hospital's claim that it was entitled to have 21 beds grandfathered. History of the Department's Specialty Bed Recognition Psychiatric Beds in Florida Hospitals Before July 1, 1983 Before April 1, 1983 no state statute or Department rule required that psychiatric beds in a hospital be located in physically distinct units. Psychiatric patients could be located throughout a hospital. They were not required to be placed in rooms having distinguishing characteristics, or to use group therapy rooms, dining rooms, or other rooms exclusively dedicated to use by psychiatric patients. There were, of course, hospitals that had distinct psychiatric units, and some entire hospitals which were specifically licensed as psychiatric hospitals. After 1983, a hospital had to obtain a certificate of need to organize what had previously been diffuse psychiatric services into a distinct unit dedicated to serving patients with psychiatric diagnoses. Today no special certificate of need is required to serve psychiatric patients in the general hospital population, but without separate licensure the hospital receives Medicare reimbursement from the federal government for psychiatric patients at the level established by the diagnostic related groups, not cost based reimbursement. Before July 1, 1983 annual hospital licensure application forms asked hospitals to identify their number of psychiatric beds as an item of information. The hospital licenses issued, however, were based on the hospital's total number of general medical-surgical beds, a category which included psychiatric beds. The 1983 Amendments to the Florida Statutes and the Department's Rules on Specialty Beds In April of 1983, the Department adopted a rule which established a separate need methodology for short-term psychiatric beds, Rule 10-5.11(1)(o), Florida Administrative Code. Thereafter, the Legislature amended the statutes governing the hospital licensing, Section 395.003, Florida Statutes (1983) by adding a new subsection (4) which read: The Department shall issue a license which specifies the number of hospital beds on the face of the license. The number of beds for the rehabilitation or psychiatric service category for which the Department has adopted by rule a specialty bed need methodology under s. 381.494 shall be specified on the face of the hospital license. All beds which are not covered by any specialty bed need methodology shall be specified as general beds. Section 4, Chapter 83-244, Laws of Florida (underlined language was added). In the same Act, the Legislature amended the planning law to require hospitals to apply for certificates of need to change their number of psychiatric and rehabilitation beds. Section 2, Chapter 83-244, Laws of Florida, codified as Section 381.494(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1983). The Department's rules defined short-term psychiatric services as: [A] category of services which provide a 24- hour a day therapeutic milieu for persons suffering from mental health problems which are so severe and acute that they need intensive, full-time care. Acute psychiatric inpatient care is defined as a service not exceeding three months and averaging a length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and a stay of 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years. Rule 10- 5.11(25)(a), Florida Administrative Code (1983), effective April 7, 1983. A minimum size for any new psychiatric unit was prescribed in Rule 10- 5.11(25)(d)7., which states: In order to assure specialized staff and services at a reasonable cost, short-term inpatient psychiatric hospital based services should have at least 15 designated beds. Applicants proposing to build a new but separate psychiatric acute care facility and intending to apply for a specialty hospital license should have a minimum of 50 beds. After the effective date of the rule, April 7, 1983, no hospital could organize its psychiatric services into a distinct psychiatric unit using specialized staff unless the unit would have at least 15 beds. This did not mean that a hospital which already had organized a distinct psychiatric unit using specialized staff had to have at least 15 beds in its unit to continue operation. Whatever the number of beds, whether fewer or greater than 15, that number had to appear on the face of the hospital's license. Section 395.003(4), Florida Statutes (1983). To change that number, the hospital had to go through the certificate of need process. Section 381.494(1)(g) Florida Statutes (1983). Those hospitals whose pre-existing units were endorsed on their licenses can be said to have had those units "grandfathered". There is no specific statutory exemption from certificate of need review for pre-existing units, but such treatment is implicit in the regulatory scheme. The Department's Grandfather Review Process To know which hospitals were entitled to continue to operate discrete psychiatric units without obtaining a certificate of need, the Department's Office of Community Medical Facilities had to identify hospitals which had separate psychiatric units before the July 1, 1983, effective date of Section 395.003(4), Florida Statutes (1983). An inventory of beds in the existing psychiatric units also was necessary to process new certificate of need applications. The Department's rule methodology authorized additional beds in psychiatric units based upon a projected need of 15 beds per 10,000 population. Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)1., Florida Administrative Code (1983). The Legislature approved the psychiatric service categories which the Department had already adopted by rule when it enacted Section 4 of Chapter 83- 244, Laws of Florida. The Legislature thereby validated a process the Department had initiated in 1976 with its Task Force on Institutional Needs. That group had developed methodologies to be used throughout the state to determine the need for different types of medical services, because local health systems agencies were reviewing CON applications based upon idiosyncratic methodologies. To develop review criteria for psychiatric services, the Task Force had to both define psychiatric services and determine how it should measure them. In doing so, the Department looked for assistance to publications of entities such as the American Hospital Association and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. According to the American Hospital Association, psychiatric services are services delivered in beds set up and staffed in units specifically designated for psychiatric services. In the Task Force report, a psychiatric bed was defined as: A bed in a clinical care unit located in a short-term, acute care hospital or psychiatric hospital which is not used to provide long-term institutional care and which is suitably equipped and staffed to provide evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment of persons with emotional disturbances. An inpatient care unit or clinical care unit is a group of inpatient beds and related facilities and assigned personnel in which care is provided to a defined and limited class of patients according to their particular care needs. HRS Exhibit 14 at 92 and 1-5. The definition of a psychiatric bed in the Report of the Department Task Force on Institutional Needs is compatible with the requirements of the Florida Hospital Cost Containment Board in its Florida Hospital Uniform Reporting Manual. Reports made by hospitals to the Hospital Cost Containment Board include information about services provided in separately organized, staffed and equipped hospital units. The information provided to the Board assisted the Department in determining which Florida hospitals already were providing psychiatric services in separately organized, staffed and equipped hospital units before separate licensure became necessary. The Department surveyed hospitals to determine the number of existing beds in distinct psychiatric units. It also looked to old certificates of need which referenced psychiatric services at hospitals, reports hospitals had made to the Florida Hospital Cost Containment Board, to past licensure applications the Department had received from hospitals, and to the Department's 1980 physical plant survey. These sources of information were, however, imperfect, for the reasons which follow: 1. Certificates of Need Issued 22. Before July 1, 1983, certificates of need were required for the initiation of new services which involved capital expenditures above a certain threshold dollar amount. Hospitals which had a long-standing psychiatric units would have had no occasion to request a certificate of need for psychiatric services. Review of certificates issued would not turn up a hospital with a mature psychiatric service. 2. Hospital Cost Containment Board Information 23. The reports from hospitals during the early years of the Hospital Cost Containment Board are not entirely reliable, because the hospitals did not yet have uniform accounting systems in place, despite the Board's attempt to establish uniform accounting methods through its reporting system manual. Hospitals commonly made errors in their reports. If the reports were prepared correctly, they would identify hospitals with discrete psychiatric units. Hialeah's HCCB Reports for 1981, 1982 and 1983 indicated that the hospital had no active psychiatric staff, no psychiatric beds and no psychiatric services. 3. Departmental Survey Letters 24. In Spring, 1983, the Department tried to verify the existing inventory of beds for specialty services such as psychiatric services, comprehensive medical rehabilitation services and substance abuse services. There is no record, however, that this survey letter was sent to Hialeah Hospital. In late 1983 or early 1984, the Department again attempted to establish inventories for psychiatric beds and rehabilitation beds. It distributed a cover letter and a form entitled "Hospital Bed Count Verification", which asked hospitals to confirm the Department's preliminary count of the hospital's "number of licensed beds". Hialeah's planner returned the form verifying that Hialeah Hospital was licensed for 411 "acute general" beds and that it had no short or long term psychiatric beds. The answer was correct, for that is the figure which appeared on Hialeah's license at that time. The Department did not ask the hospitals for an average daily census of short-term psychiatric patients. The cover letter for the survey form told hospital administrators that the Department was seeking to verify its preliminary bed count for services for which a special bed need methodology had been established, viz., long and short term psychiatric beds, substance abuse beds and comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds. The cover letter drew attention to the Department's intention to use the data collected from the responses to the form as a beginning inventory for short-term psychiatric beds. The cover letter also cautioned hospitals that when completing the form, they should "keep in mind the service definitions". Copies of the definitions were attached to the form. The appropriate inference to be drawn from the answer given by Hialeah Hospital to the survey form was that in January, 1984, the hospital had no beds organized into a short term psychiatric unit. This is consistent with the later letter from the hospital's vice president quoted in Finding of Fact 6, above. The Department published on February 17, 1984, its base inventory of psychiatric and rehabilitation beds in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The publication stated that "any hospital wishing to change the number of beds dedicated to one of the specific bed types listed will first be required to obtain a certificate of need." 10 Florida Administrative Weekly at 493. Hialeah was shown as having no psychiatric beds. Id. at 498. The notice did not specifically inform the hospitals of the right to petition for a formal hearing to challenge the inventory figures published. 4. Licensure Files 25. Although, the Department's licensure application form listed "psychiatric" as a possible hospital bed utilization category before 1983, these categories were set up for informational purposes only. No definitions were given to hospitals describing how beds should be allocated among the categories available on the form, making those figures unreliable. Before 1980 Hialeah Hospital had listed psychiatric beds on its licensure applications, see Finding of Fact 5, above. Since 1980 it listed no psychiatric beds. 5. Physical Plant Survey The Department performed a physical plant survey in 1980 to determine the total number of beds in service at each hospital. That survey did not attempt to make distinctions between different types of services listed on the survey form. The Department's architect who performed the survey did not attempt to evaluate the quality or intensity of the psychiatric services provided at any hospital. Each of the types of information the Department examined to determine the existing inventory of short-term psychiatric beds in 1983 had weaknesses, and no single source is dispositive. It is difficult to credit the assertion that Hialeah Hospital had a distinct psychiatric unit before July, 1983 which was not reflected in any of these sources of information. The use of multiple sources of information served as a cross-check on information from each source. It is understandable that Hialeah would not have applied for a certificate of need to operate a separate psychiatric unit. Before 1983, no such application was needed if the establishment of the unit entailed an expenditure of money below a threshold amount. All of its reports to the Hospital Cost Containment Board, however, indicate that there was no separate psychiatric service at the hospital and that the hospital had no active psychiatric staff. With respect to the Department's survey letters, while the 1984 survey form itself did not specifically inform hospital administrators that their responses would be used to establish a base inventory of psychiatric beds, the cover letter did make that clear. This should have put the hospital's planner, who filled out the form, on notice that if Hialeah had a discrete, short-term psychiatric service the number of beds in that unit should be listed. What is perhaps the most significant point is that the hospital reported no psychiatric beds on its licensure application at all from 1980 to 1985. Medical doctors in general practice can and do treat psychiatric patients, in addition to doctors who specialize in psychiatry. No doubt patients commonly were admitted to the hospital who had primary diagnoses of psychiatric illnesses. The hospital's licensure filings, however, since 1979 fail to record any psychiatric beds. This is important evidence that the hospital did not regard itself as having any distinct unit organized to provide psychiatric care. The Hospital's 1985 correspondence from the Hospital's vice president to the Department, quoted in Finding of Fact 6 confirms this. The failure to list any psychiatric beds at Hialeah on the Department's 1980 physical plant survey is not significant, since determining the number of psychiatric beds was not the focus of that survey. It is true that the Department never conducted site visits at all hospitals to determine whether they had a) distinct psychiatric units, b) psychiatric medical directors, c) written psychiatric admission and treatment policies, or d) psychiatric policy and procedures manuals. The efforts the Department did make to establish the beginning inventory of psychiatric beds were reasonable, however Hialeah Hospital's Licensure History and Efforts to Obtain Grandfather Status The entries on Hialeah's applications for annual licensure from the Department are cataloged above, and need not be repeated. During the years 1980-84, after it ceased listing psychiatric beds on its licensure application, psychiatric services were still being provided to patients throughout the hospital. In 1984, the hospital engaged in correspondence with the Department over the appropriate number of licensed beds for the hospital as a whole. Ultimately the hospital and the Department agreed that 411 beds should be licensed. In its 1985 licensure application, Hialeah then requested that 20 short-term psychiatric beds be listed on the license. The Office of Licensure and Certification questioned this. Ultimately, the Office of Licensure and Certification refused to endorse those 20 psychiatric beds on the license because there was no certificate of need on file for them, nor any statement from the Office of Community Medical Facilities granting the hospital an exemption from that licensure requirement. Hialeah Hospital did not challenge that decision in a proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The discussions between the hospital and the Department's Office of Community Medical Facilities continued, and by late October, 1986, Hialeah requested the Department to approve 21 short-term psychiatric beds at the facility, and sent the Department backup material which it believed justified a grandfather determination. After review, the Department denied the grandfather request by letter dated December 5, 1986. The Department's Action Regarding Other Grandfathering Requests Hialeah's is not the first request the Department received for grandfathering beds. After June of 1983, when the Legislature required CON approval for hospitals to change their number of psychiatric or rehabilitation beds, a number of institutions made similar requests. 1. Comprehensive Medical Rehabilitation Beds The rule on comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds was developed by the Department at the same time as the rule on psychiatric beds. The Department used a similar process to determine the existing inventory of both types of beds. The Department determined that preexisting comprehensive medical rehabilitation units at Parkway General Hospital, Naples Community Hospital, Orlando Regional Medical Center, Holy Cross Hospital, and University Community Hospital entitled those facilities to grandfathering of their comprehensive medical rehabilitation services. The Department has also determined that a preexisting distinct psychiatric unit at Palmetto General Hospital entitled that institution to grandfather status for its psychiatric beds. Parkway General Parkway General Hospital did not specify rehabilitation beds on its licensure applications for the years 1980 through 1984. The Department denied Parkway's request for endorsement of 12 comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds on its 1985 license because Parkway had not obtained a certificate of need for them or an exemption from review. The Department thereafter determined that Parkway had been providing comprehensive medical rehabilitation services before June, 1983 in a physically distinct and separately staffed unit consisting of 12 beds. It then endorsed 12 beds on Parkway's license, even though the rule which became effective in July, 1983 would require a minimum unit size of 20 beds for any hospital organizing a new comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit. See Rule 10-5.011(24), Florida Administrative Code. Naples Community Hospital The Department granted Naples Community Hospital a grandfather exemption for its rehabilitation beds in February, 1987. In had not listed the rehabilitation beds on its license application for the years 1983-1985, had not returned the Department's bed count verification form, nor did it challenge the bed count which the Department published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The hospital had applied for and received a certificate of need in January of 1981 to establish a 22-bed rehabilitation unit and that unit began operation in late 1982. The Department ultimately determined that the hospital had provided rehabilitation services in a physically distinct unit and the services were organized and delivered in a manner consistent with applicable regulatory standards. It granted a grandfather request in February, 1987. Orlando Regional Medical Center A grandfather exemption for 16 rehabilitation beds was granted to Orlando Medical Center in 1986. The 16-bed brain injury unit had been authorized by the Department through certificate of need number 2114 before the Department had adopted its rule governing comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds in 1983. The services were provided in a physically distinct unit. The Department determined the 20-bed minimum size for a new unit did not apply to a unit which qualified for grandfathering. Holy Cross Hospital The Department granted a grandfather exemption for comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds to Holy Cross Hospital after a proceeding was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings to require the Department to recognize the existence of a 20-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation center. The Department determined by a site visit that Holy Cross had established a separate unit, probably in 1974, long before the Department's comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit rule became effective in July, 1983. The unit had its own policy manual, quality assurance reports, patient screening criteria, and minutes of multidisciplinary team staff conferences. The hospital had neglected to report the unit in its filings with the Hospital Cost Containment Board but the hospital contended that it never treated the unit as a separate unit for accounting purposes, and had not understood the need to report the unit as a distinct one under Hospital Cost Containment Board reporting guidelines. The hospital corrected its reporting oversight. The grandfathering is consistent with the hospital's actual establishment of the unit long before the Department's rules went into effect. University Community Hospital A dispute over whether to grandfather a comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit which went through a Chapter 120 administrative hearing and entry of a final order involved University Community Hospital (UCH). The Department initially determined that the nine comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds at UCH had been in existence before July, 1983 and were exempt from certificate of need review. That decision was challenged in a formal administrative proceeding by a competing hospital, Tampa General. The competitor was successful, for both the Hearing Officer in the recommended order and the Department in the final order determined that University Community Hospital's 9 bed rehabilitation unit was not entitled to be grandfathered. University Community Hospital v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 11 FALR 1150 (HRS Feb. 14, 1989). In determining that grandfathering was inappropriate, the Department found that the hospital had not prepared separate policies and procedures for its rehabilitation unit before the rule on comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds became effective, and that the unit did not have a physical therapy room on the same floor as the patients. The beds supposedly dedicated to rehabilitative care were mixed with non- rehabilitative beds, so that a semiprivate room might have one bed used for rehabilitative care and another for an unrelated type of care. This conflicted with the requirement that the rehabilitation unit be physically distinct, with all patients and support services located on the same area or floor, rather than scattered throughout the hospital. The Department also determined that many hospitals offer physical therapy, occupational therapy, or speech therapy, but that to qualify as a comprehensive medical rehabilitation center, these services had to be coordinated in a multidisciplinary approach to the patient's needs, which had not been the case at University Community Hospital. The common strand running through the grandfathering decisions on comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds is that grandfathering is appropriate when a hospital demonstrates that before the comprehensive medical rehabilitation rule became effective in July, 1983, it had a separate unit which met the standards and criteria for a comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit (other than the minimum size for new units). Psychiatric Beds Tampa General Hospital Only two cases involve a decision on whether psychiatric services at a hospital qualify for grandfathering. Tampa General Hospital, which was owned by the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, operated 93 psychiatric beds in 1981, 71 at Hillsborough County Hospital and 22 at Tampa General Hospital. A certificate of need granted in 1981 authorized the expenditure of $127,310,000 for the consolidation of both hospitals and an overall reduction of 14 psychiatric beds after the hospitals were integrated. When the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority obtained its certificate of need, it was not necessary to differentiate between general acute care beds and psychiatric beds for licensure purposes. Increased demand for acute care beds led Tampa General to close its psychiatric unit and make those 22 beds available for ordinary acute care. After the 1983 statutory and rule changes regarding the separate licensure of psychiatric beds, the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority told the Department that Tampa General had no psychiatric beds in operation. On its 1985 licensure application, the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority applied for licensure for 22 psychiatric beds at Tampa General and 77 at Hillsborough Hospital. The Department denied the request for the psychiatric beds at Tampa General. The Final Order entered in Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. HRS, 8 FALR 1409 (Feb. 16, 1986), determined that there had been a discontinuation in the use of psychiatric beds at Tampa General, and that to allow Tampa General to add psychiatric beds after the statutory and rule changes in 1983 would frustrate the certificate of need process and would be detrimental to good health care planning. Palmetto General Hospital Palmetto General Hospital participated in an administrative hearing in 1975 regarding the disapproval of its proposed expansion, which included the dedication of one floor and 48 beds as a psychiatric unit. The Hearing Officer found that there was a need for psychiatric beds in the community and recommended that the Secretary of the Department issue a certificate of need "for that portion of the applicant's proposed capital expenditures relating to the addition of a 48 bed psychiatric unit". Palmetto General Exhibit 32, at 12, paragraph 2. The order of the Hearing Officer was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal in Palmetto General Hospital, Inc. v. Department of HRS, 333 So.2d 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). The approval of the 48 psychiatric beds is clear only from a review of the Hearing Officer's order. Certificate of Need 292X was issued for the 48 psychiatric beds. Palmetto General exhibit 45. Palmetto received Medicare certification for its psychiatric inpatient unit, and listed 48 short-term psychiatric beds on its licensure applications each year from 1979 to 1983. It failed to show its psychiatric beds on the bed count verification survey form sent by the Department. Palmetto General's chief financial officer told the Department on June 10, 1983 that Palmetto General did not have psychiatric beds in a separately organized and staffed unit. This resulted in the issuance of a license which showed no psychiatric beds. The Department itself wrote to the administrator of Palmetto to learn why the 48 short-term psychiatric beds had not been listed on Palmetto's application for licensure in 1985. Palmetto wrote back and acknowledged that it did have 48 short-term psychiatric beds. A license showing those 48 beds was then issued. Thereafter, staff from the HRS Office of Comprehensive Health Planning took the position that the 48 short-term psychiatric beds should not have been listed on the license, and the Department's Office of Licensure and Certification requested that the 1985 license containing the endorsement for those 48 psychiatric beds be returned to the Department for cancellation. Palmetto then sought an administrative hearing on the attempted cancellation of the license. Palmetto and the Department entered into a Final Order dated March 9, 1986 which agreed that Palmetto met all the requirements for the designation of 48 short-term psychiatric beds on its license. Palmetto, had, in fact, operated a 48 bed psychiatric unit on its third floor since 1981, but moved that unit to the sixth floor in 1985. It was dedicated exclusively to psychiatric patients and there were specific policy and procedure manuals developed and used in dealing with psychiatric patients since 1981. The history of Palmetto's licensure is certainly one replete with contradictions. It is inexplicable that the chief financial officer of the hospital would have told the Department in 1983 that it had no separately organized and staffed psychiatric unit when, in fact, it had such a unit. It was also unclear why it would have shown no psychiatric beds on the bed count verification form returned in late December or early January, 1984, or why its April, 1983, and its 1985/1986 license application forms listed no psychiatric beds. Nonetheless, it had obtained a certificate of need for a psychiatric unit after administrative litigation and an appeal to the District Court of Appeal. The unit was opened and remained continuously in existence. It had appropriate policies and procedures in place for a distinct psychiatric unit as the 1983 statutory and rule amendments required for separate licensure of psychiatric beds. History of Psychiatric Bed Services at Hialeah Hospital Since at least 1958, Hialeah Hospital has had psychiatrists on its medical staff, and the number of psychiatric physicians on staff has increased. Thirteen psychiatrists had admitting privileges at the hospital by 1983; there are now 23 psychiatrists with privileges. As is true with most community hospitals, physicians specializing in psychiatry would admit patients to the general population at Hialeah Hospital if they needed intensive psychotherapy or medication which needed to be monitored by nurses. Patients who were homicidal, suicidal or intensely psychotic were not admitted to Hialeah Hospital. Those patients need a more intensive psychiatric environment, either in a locked psychiatric unit or in a psychiatric specialty hospital. The persons physicians placed at Hialeah through 1983 did not need the intensive services of a discrete psychiatric unit. Hialeah Hospital indicated on its licensure application to the Department that it had 21 psychiatric beds throughout the 1970's, but ceased this listing in the 1980's as set forth in Finding of Fact 5 above. The nature of the services available at the hospital had remained constant. Under the psychiatric diagnosis coding system published in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual III, (which is commonly used by psychiatrists) Hialeah Hospital had an average daily census of 25 patients with primary or secondary psychiatric diagnoses in 1980, and 18 in 1981. Only about 25 percent of those patients had a primary psychiatric discharge diagnosis. The additional patients had secondary psychiatric diagnoses. Hialeah must rely on these secondary diagnoses to argue that its average daily census for psychiatric patients approached 21 beds. It was not until 1985 that Hialeah consolidated its psychiatric services to a medical/psychiatric unit. That unit serves patients with medical and psychiatric diagnosis as well as patients with solely psychiatric diagnoses. Before 1983, there was no medical director of psychiatry at Hialeah Hospital, and no separate policies and procedures for the admission of patients to a psychiatric unit, nor any staff dedicated to the care of psychiatric patients. To be sure, the hospital was in a position to provide quality psychiatric care to patients whose needs were psychotherapy, monitored medication, or individual counseling by psychiatric physicians and nurses. This reflects the reality that not all patients who need to be placed in the hospital for psychiatric care require the services of a separate medical/psychiatric unit. Patients with more acute psychiatric illness do need interdisciplinary approaches to their care. These interdisciplinary approaches are more expensive than serving psychiatric patients in the general hospital population. This is why the Federal government provides higher, cost-based reimbursement to the hospitals with specialty psychiatric licenses. Hialeah has not proven that the psychiatric services it was providing before 1983 were significantly different from those provided in typical community hospitals which did not have distinct psychiatric units. Hialeah's long-standing relationship with the Northwest Community Mental Health Center is not especially significant. Certainly, the Center was aware that Hialeah was a potential source of psychiatric care. Baker Act patients who needed hospitalization were taken there between 1980 and 1983. There was a flow of patients back and forth between the Center and the hospital's inpatient population, and discharge plans by Hialeah's social workers included referrals back to the Mental Health Center for follow-up and outpatient care. Similarly, the Dade-Monroe Mental Health Board knew that Hialeah was a potential provider of inpatient psychiatric services. The predecessor to the current local health council, the health systems agency of South Florida, recorded that there were psychiatric admissions at Hialeah Hospital in the early 1980's, and the health systems agency recommended a conversion of existing beds to psychiatric services because of a need for additional psychiatric services in the area. None of this, however, means that Hialeah had operated a distinct psychiatric unit before 1983 which entitles it to grandfather status.
Recommendation It is recommended that the application of Hialeah Hospital for grandfather status for 21 short-term psychiatric beds, and the inclusion of those short-term psychiatric beds on its license and on the Department's bed inventory be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1989.
The Issue This case arises out of Orlando Regional Medical Center's objection to the issuance of a Certificate of Need to Surgical Services of Orlando, Inc., for the construction and operation of an ambulatory surgical center in Orlando, Florida. At the formal hearing, Orlando Regional Medical Center called as witnesses, Herbert E. Straughn, Norton Baker, Terry Weibley, Marlene Mariani, Michael L. Schwartz, Janice Smith, Richard Douglas Signer, Cathy Canniff Gillam, Jack Bradley, Barbara W. Miner, John Bozard and Stephen Haar. The Intervenor, Surgical Services of Orlando, Inc., called as witnesses, Steven Haar, Janice Smith, John Bozard, Michael Means, Jerry Senne, James Leveretee, Stephen Foreman, John S. Lord, Robert C. Klettner, Albert S. Bustamante, Pedro Diaz- Borden, Alberto J. Herran, Marianna Johnson, Richard Toole, Don Newton, Hank Gerken, Gordon Kiester, Leonard J. Levine, Rufus Holloway, Brenda Brinkman, Betty Barker, Wayne Deschambeau, Mark Richardson and Rick Knapp. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services called as its only witness, Mr. Thomas Porter. Surgical Services of Orlando, Inc., offered and had admitted into evidence 33 exhibits. At the formal hearing, the Hearing Officer reserved ruling upon SSO Exhibit No. 14 and that exhibit is admitted. Orlando Regional Medical Center offered and had admitted into evidence, 9 exhibits. At the formal hearing, the Hearing Officer reserved ruling upon SSO Exhibit No. 14 and that exhibit is admitted. Orlando Regional Medical Center offered and had admitted into evidence, 9 exhibits. At the formal hearing, Orlando Regional Medical Center was given permission to file a late-filed exhibit with Surgical Services of Orlando, Inc., and the Department having the opportunity to object to said exhibit. That exhibit has been filed as Orlando Regional Medical Center Exhibit No. 9 and consists of excerpts from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services file relating to this application. That exhibit is admitted. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services offered and had admitted into evidence one exhibit. A map of Orlando reflecting the location of the various hospitals in Orange County was admitted as joint exhibit 1. Subsequent to the formal hearing, each of the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law are inconsistent with this order, they were considered by the Hearing Officer and rejected as being unsupported by the evidence or as unnecessary to the resolution of this cause.
Findings Of Fact Surgical Services of Orlando, Inc., (hereafter referred to as SSO), is a Florida corporation based in Orlando, Florida. The stock of the corporation is owned in equal shares by Steven Foreman, Dr. Rufus Holloway and Randall Phillips. Mr. Steven Foreman is a life underwriter and financial consultant, and real estate investor in the Orlando area. He is secretary and director of SSO. Dr. Rufus Holloway is an otolaryngologist in the Orlando area and is treasurer and a director of SSO. Randall Phillips is a hospital administrator presently employed by American Medical International, Inc. Orlando Regional Medical Center, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as ORMC) is an existing hospital located in Orlando, Florida. It is a not-for-profit regional tertiary care center with 1035 beds and 24 operating rooms. ORMC has two main divisions, the Orange Division and the Holiday Division and is presently constructing a new facility, Sand Lake Division, which will open sometime in mid 1985. The Sand Lake Division will have 4 operating rooms and 150 beds. Dr. Rufus Holloway and Steven Foreman have committed their personal resources to provide financial support for the complete development and operation of the applicant's proposed ambulatory surgical center. The facility will be constructed by a partnership, the Kaley Avenue Medical Partnership of Dr. Holloway, Mr. Foreman and Richard Toole, a citrus owner in the Orlando area, and will be leased to SSO. Two banks in the Orlando area have given commitments to provide the necessary financing for the proposed facility and start-up expenses. Pan American Bank has committed to provide a $2.5 million loan for the construction and equipping of the building and $750,000 line of credit. Dr. Holloway and Mr. Foreman, and the parties of the Kaley Avenue Partnership have sufficient financial resources to fulfill their commitments to the proposed project. The proposed building will be a one floor building containing 15,000 square feet. The total cost for the project will be $2,737,636. The building is to be constructed and equipped by the Kaley Avenue Medical Partnership and leased to SSO at $16 per square foot. The proposed site of the facility is on Kaley Avenue within two or three blocks of ORMC. Its service area will include all of Orange County. The facility will contain five operating rooms with only three of the rooms being completely equipped initially. These rooms will be used for general and local anesthesia. The remaining two rooms will be equipped as demand requires. The applicant has budgeted $743,000 for initially equipping the facility with an additional $160,000 required to equip the two remaining operating rooms. The equipment proposed by the applicant is adequate to perform those procedures which the applicant proposed to perform at its facility. In addition to the five operating rooms, the center will include laboratory, x-ray, administrative areas, as well as holding and recovery areas for the patients. The applicant projects a total number of procedures in the first year of 1,800 and 2,760 in the second year of operation. Based upon a Medicare utilization rate of 15 percent SSO projects an operating loss in the first year of $223,000 with the facility making a profit in the second quarter of the second year and generating a total profit of $766,000 in the second year. The projected break-even point is 2,448 procedures within a year. Projected revenues are based upon an average charge per case of $575. SSO also intends to accept Medicaid patients. Presently, Medicaid does not reimburse freestanding ambulatory surgical centers. Medicaid charges would be included as charity cases in the projected bad debt of 6 percent of gross revenues. Based upon an inflation rate of 8 percent per annum when SSO begins operation in January, 1986, its average charge per case will be competitive with other facilities in the area providing ambulatory surgical services. Medicare now reimburses 100 percent of the facility charges in a freestanding ambulatory facility and 80 percent for outpatient surgery in a hospital setting. Prior to opening, SSO will implement a marketing program directed to four different target groups: physicians, consumers (patients), employers and insurance carriers. SSO has retained a marketing expert who has prior experience in marketing ambulatory surgical care in Florida. Similar marketing has proven successful for other freestanding ambulatory surgical centers in Florida. SSO has budgeted $20,000 for pre-opening marketing expenses and $35,000 for the first year of operation. It is difficult upon this record to make a truly accurate comparison of outpatient surgical rates in existing facilities to the proposed average charge of SSO. ORMC presented evidence that the present average charge in ORMC and three other hospitals per outpatient case is as follows: ORMC $417.19 Florida Hospital $469.86 Winter Park $512.21 Orlando General $560.81 No average charges were presented into evidence for West Orange Hospital, Lucerne Hospital, or Brookwood Hospital. The evidence established that 8 percent is a reasonable inflation or increase rate for health care charges over the next two years. Applying an 8 percent inflation rate to the above average charges these charges for 1986, SSO's first year of operation would be: ORMC $486.61 Florida Hospital 548.04 Winter Park 597.44 Orlando General 654.13 In calculating its present average charge of $417.19, ORMC did not include those outpatient surgeries performed at the Orange Division which are charged at inpatient rates. A memo dated January 19, 1984, to John Bozard, ORMC Vice President for Finance, from Steve Horr, ORMC Assistant Controller/Reimbursement, reflects that Holiday Division had 484 outpatient surgical cases which are estimated to generate gross revenues of $228,547. This results in an average charge per case for the month of December 1983 of $472.20. It is concluded that in 1986 the SSO projected average charge of $575 will be competitive with those existing facilities in the Orange County area. There is presently no rule which contains a specific methodology for determining need for ambulatory surgery centers. HRS uses a methodology which is based upon policy but has not been proposed or promulgated as a formal rule. The present methodology utilizes the total surgery cases for the most recent 12 month period to determine a surgical utilization rate per 1,000 population. By separating inpatient and outpatient surgeries for the same 12-month period, a percentage ratio of outpatient surgery cases to total surgeries is established. Applying the utilization rate to future projected population, HRS then determines the total projected surgeries for future years and from this number calculates the projected outpatient surgeries which will be performed in existing facilities. Literature relating to ambulatory surgeries projects that 18 to 40 percent of all surgical procedures performed could be performed in an outpatient setting. In calculating total potential surgeries HRS utilizes 29 percent as the potential surgeries that can be performed in an outpatient setting. The 29 percent factor is the mean of 18 percent to 40 percent and appears reasonable in light of the fact ORMC, Holiday Division, Winter Park Memorial and Orlando General had outpatient surgery of 29.4 percent, 30.1 percent and 30.6 percent respectively for 1983. Applying the 29 percent factor to projected total surgeries, HRS calculates the projected potential ambulatory surgery for a given year in the future. Subtracting those outpatient surgeries which will be performed in existing facilities from the total potential outpatient surgeries provides the unmet need for outpatient surgical care. This need is reflected in total cases. In evaluating ambulatory surgical applications, HRS utilizes a two year planning horizon. It is projected that SSO would begin operation January 1, 1986, and therefore under the HRS methodology, 1986 and 1987 become the relevant years for the HRS methodology, 1986 and 1987 became the relevant years for looking at projected need. Using the methodology described above, HRS projects the potential number of outpatient surgical cases which could be performed in other than a hospital setting to be 7,203 and 7,347 for 1986 and 1987, respectively. HRS projects the break-even level of the SSO facility at 2,693 surgical cases per year. Subtracting the SSO break-even factor from 7,203 and 7,347 results in an unmet need even after the SSO facility is in operation of 4,510 and 4,654 surgical cases in 1986 and 1987. HRS calculated the outpatient utilization rate in existing hospitals in 1983 to be 15.3 percent. If the unmet need of 4,510 and 4,654 in 1986 and 1987 was met by these existing facilities, that utilization rate would increase to 24 percent or approximately 1 1/2 times the 1983 rate. The projected utilization for the SSO facility for 1986 and 1987 will constitute only about 20 percent and 30 percent respectively of the unmet need for outpatient surgery in those years. The applicant in projecting need used a five year planning horizon to project need for ambulatory surgical services in Orange County for the year 1989. Under SSO's methodology, an outpatient utilization rate of 30 percent, 35 percent and 40 percent was used to project the total potential outpatient or ambulatory surgeries for the year assuming a total surgical utilization rate of 101.45 cases per thousand. Using these assumptions, the applicant projected unmet need for ambulatory surgeries in Orange County in 1989 as: Percentage of Ambulatory Surgery Unmet Need 30% 6,357 35% 9,246 40% 12,136 Although the projected unmet need is somewhat lower than that projected by HRS, it does reflect a need for the SSO facility. The methodology used by ORMC utilizes what ORMC's experts described as the "excess capacity theory." This methodology is based upon the assumption that no need exists for an ambulatory surgical center until such time as all excess capacity in the existing operating suites in Orange County is utilized. Using this approach, ORMC contends that of the 79 total operating suites in Orange County, there are presently 39 excess operating suites available to perform outpatient surgery. By multiplying total number of hours per day per operating room times 260 days, ORMC calculates the total available hours of operation of an operating suite and by multiplying this number times the total number of suites, the total available hours or operating room time for a facility is determined. The total available hours is then divided by the average operating room time for all procedures performed to determine the total number of potential procedures. Using this approach, ORMC's expert opined that there is potential for 95,513 - 98,980 total surgical cases in the existing 79 operating rooms in Orange County These 79 rooms include the 4 new operating suites in ORMC's Sand Lake facility as well as the 4 suite in Florida Hospital's new freestanding ambulatory surgical center. Subtracting the total procedures of 47,712 from the potential capacity, ORMC projects an available excess capacity for growth of 47,801 to 51,268 surgical cases in Orange County. Also using total available hours, hours per average procedure and total hours required for procedure presently being performed, ORMC's expert calculated the number of operating suites presently required. By subtracting this number from the number of existing suites, the ORMC expert concluded that there are presently 39 excess operating suites in Orange County. Once the ORMC Sand Lake facility and the Florida Hospital Freestanding Ambulatory Center (FAC) open, there will be a total or 79 operating suites in Orange County. These are divided as follows: ORMC, Orange Division 14 ORMC, Holiday Division 10 Winter Park Memorial 10 Orlando General 4 West Orange 3 Lucerne 8 Brookewood 5 Florida Hospital 17 Florida Hospital, FAC 4 ORMC, Sand Lake 4 79 At present, ORMC, Holiday Division, is the only facility operating dedicated ambulatory surgical suites. There are no applications pending for dedicated outpatient facilities within hospitals or for a freestanding ambulatory surgical facility. No such applications have been filed for these types of facilities since the SSO application was filed. Each of the existing facilities listed above performs outpatient surgery to some degree. On August 16, 1982, Florida Hospital was issued a Certificate of Need to construct a freestanding ambulatory surgical center. That facility will contain four operating suites and is expected to begin operation in mid 1984. Once this facility is complete, Florida Hospital will not perform outpatient surgery in its 17 other suites, except when special equipment which is available only in those suites is required. Outpatient surgery at Winter Park Memorial and Orlando General now comprises approximately 30 percent of the total surgeries performed at those facilities. Lucerne Hospital operates no separate ambulatory surgery unit and favors SSO's application. ORMC has been performing outpatient surgery for over 20 years. However, the specific facilities in which outpatient surgery has been performed have changed during this period of time. Prior to August 1979, outpatient surgery was performed at the Five North unit in the Orange Division as well as at the Holiday Division. At that time, Orange Five North was closed for renovation and outpatient surgery was concentrated in Holiday One East. In October 1981, an outpatient surgery review committee was established by ORMC to examine more efficient ways to conduct outpatient surgery and to improve utilization of certain departments at the Holiday Division. The end result was a decision to concentrate outpatient surgery at ORMC in one designated unit to be known as Outpatient Day Surgery ("ODS"), and to provide a financial incentive for physicians and patients to utilize the unit. One of the primary reasons for concentrating outpatient surgery in Holiday One East was the inefficiency and increased cost of staffing the units. Outpatient census counts were resulting in overstaffing the 3 to 11 shift. To encourage doctors and patients to utilize Holiday One East, ORMC reduced the rates for outpatient surgery in the ODS unit by approximately 40 percent. Although some outpatient surgery continues to be performed at the Orange Division the charge for such surgeries is at the inpatient rates rather than the reduced rates utilized by the ODS. The ORMC Board of Directors approved the capital expenditure to renovate the Holiday One East area into the ODS unit on September 20, 1982. The ODS unit was renovated at a cost of approximately $600,000, which was below the Certificate of Need threshold requirement. The ODS unit opened on November 28, 1983. The ODS unit is open Monday through Friday, and utilizes a ten hour day with general anesthesia administered to outpatients from 7:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. ODS patients use a separate and distinct entrance to the Holiday Division and have a designated parking area east of the hospital. There are sixteen semi- private holding beds and four recliner chairs located within the ODS unit. The average case load and length of stay are such that holding beds may be used for more than one outpatient per day. As a result of instances where there have been shortages of holding beds for outpatients, ORMC beginning April 2, 1984, established an overflow area of ten beds on the third floor of the Holiday Division. As of May 29, 1984, this overflow area had been utilized on three occasions. The ODS unit contains two dedicated operating rooms where only local anesthesia can be administered. Outpatient procedures requiring general anesthesia are performed in the eight general operating suites of the Holiday Division. These eight operating suites are also used for inpatient surgery. Outpatients are placed in the same holding and recovery areas where inpatients are held. The staff in these areas serve inpatients and outpatients. The ODS unit averages 15 to 16 outpatients per day. In 1983, outpatient surgery comprised 29.4 percent of the total surgeries performed at the Holiday Division. This was a slight increase over the 27.7 percent outpatient percentage for that same division for the previous year. Presently, the two dedicated local anesthesia rooms are being utilized approximately 40 percent of the time. The present utilization rate of the entire Holiday Division is approximately 50 to 55 percent to as much as 80 percent depending upon the particular day of the week. The 80 percent rate is attained on a regular basis at least once per week. ORMC has been issued a Certificate of Need for a children's hospital. As presently designed and approved, the construction of the children's hospital will require the demolition of Holiday One East where the ODS unit is located. It is uncertain where the ODS unit would be relocated. The master facility plan approved by the ORMC Board of Directors includes the construction of a freestanding ambulatory diagnostic center which will include ambulatory surgery. Depending upon the staff and its efficiency and the quality of care provided, a freestanding ambulatory center offers several advantages over outpatient units within hospitals. In such a freestanding facility, only outpatient surgery is performed and the staff and physicians, including anesthesiologists, can be specialized in outpatient surgery. In the freestanding facility, outpatients are not mixed with inpatients. A substantial portion of those patients utilizing outpatient surgery are well patients having elective surgery performed. By specializing in outpatient surgery only, overall operating costs are likely to be less and should result in reduced patient costs. In a hospital setting, there is on occasion a problem with "bumping" elective surgery for emergencies. This would not occur in a freestanding ambulatory surgery facility. Patients will have shorter waits in the facility and Medicare patients will be reimbursed 100 percent rather than the 80 percent reimbursed in a hospital setting. The 550 application is consistent with the applicable criteria enumerated in Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes and need for its facility exists in Orange County. Of the thirteen governing criteria, the parties have stipulated that the criteria contained in Subsections 6, 7, 10 and 11 of Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes, are not applicable to this proceeding. In addition, the parties stipulated that Subsection 1 of Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes, is not applicable to this proceeding to the extent that there is no applicable district health plan or state health plan pertaining to ambulatory or outpatient surgery.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED That HRS issue a Certificate of Need to Surgical Services of Orlando, Inc., to construct and operate a freestanding, five operating room ambulatory surgery center in Orange County. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas L. Mannheimer, Esq. CULPEPPER, TURNER & MANNERED 318 North Call on Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3300 Fred W. Baggett, Esq. ROBERTS, BAGGETT, LaFACE, RICHARD, & WISER P.O. Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 E. G. Boone, Esq. P.O. Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284 Steven R. Bechtel, Esq. MATEER, HARBERT, FREY BECHTEL AND PHALIN, PA P.O. Box 2854 Orlando, Florida 32802 P. Joseph Wright, Esq. MURRAH AND DOYLE, P.A. P.O. Box 1328 Winter Park, Florida 32790 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jayaprakash Kamath, M.D., is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having license ME 0036704. He is board certified in internal medicine and gastroenterology. He has had no prior complaints of any kind against him since he began practicing medicine in Florida in 1980, and he has a reputation for being a competent and caring physician. On the morning of August 1, 1988, while making rounds at Morton Plant Hospital in Clearwater, Florida, the Respondent was paged by one of his partners, Belur Sreenath, M.D. The Respondent returned the call and was asked to see a patient whom Sreenath had just accepted and admitted on a 23-hour basis at Morton Plant. Sreenath reported that the patient was a referral from the Morton Plant emergency room. The patient's regular physician was on vacation, and the regular physician's on-call cover had recommended to the emergency room physician that the patient be referred to the Respondent and Sreenath to treat the patient for diagnosed fecal impaction. It was reported to the Respondent, through Sreenath, that the patient had come into the emergency room at about five in the morning complaining of abdominal pain and constipation. The emergency room physician, Jerry Julius Chase, M.D., had three X-rays done and had done his own "wet reads" of the X-rays before sending them to the radiology department for a definitive interpretation. According to Chase, the X-rays showed "much fecal matter, no obstruction." Chase did not mention any other significant findings. Chase's preliminary diagnosis was "fecal impaction." Sreenath also reported that he (Sreenath) had ordered enemas for the patient. Soon after the Respondent received the call from his partner, the Respondent called Chase, who was still in the emergency room and still had the X-rays. Chase confirmed what Sreenath had told the Respondent, again not mentioning any other significant findings. After talking to Chase, the Respondent visited the patient in his hospital room. By this time it was about 10:00 a.m. The Respondent took a history from the patient, examined the patient, and read the patient's chart. The chart included the results of lab work and the "ER sheet," which included the emergency room physician's diagnosis of abdominal pain and impaction and the results of his "wet-read" of the X-rays, but it did not yet include a report from the radiology department or the X-rays themselves. The Respondent did not contact the radiology department for a definitive interpretation of the X-rays or obtain the X-rays for his own review. By the time the Respondent saw the patient, the patient already had one enema and seemed to be responding to the treatment. Based on the information he had, the Respondent made a diagnosis of fecal impaction, confirmed his partner's orders for enemas for the patient, and added a stool softener. The nursing staff was ordered to monitor the patient's progress. The patient continued to respond satisfactorily to treatment during the day. Between ten and eleven in the evening of August 1, 1988, the patient complained of some abdominal pain or cramping (symptoms that are consistent with a diagnosis of fecal impaction and enema treatments) and the nurses on duty contacted the Respondent's partner, who was on call. Sreenath ordered a combination of demerol and vistaril as an analgesic. One small dose was enough to relieve the patient's pain, and the patient slept through most of the night. He ate 80% of his breakfast the next morning and was not complaining of pain or asking to see a doctor. At approximately 9:15 a.m. on August 2, 1988, a nurse telephoned the Respondent for a decision whether the patient was being discharged or was being admitted as an inpatient. The Respondent still had not seen the patient's X- rays, seen or had reported to him the radiology report on them, or spoken to the radiologist. On questioning, the nurse reported the patient's status to the Respondent. The nurse's report satisfied the Respondent that the patient was responding to the treatment for fecal impaction and could be discharged. The nurse was given orders to have arrangements made for the patient to see his regular physician within a week and to instruct the patient on symptoms to report if they occurred between discharge and seeing his regular physician. In accordance with the Respondent's telephone instructions, the patient was discharged at approximately 9:30 a.m. on August 2, 1988. Although there were no clinical signs or symptoms of it during the patient's stay at Morton Plant, the patient had a large aortic aneurysm, approximately eight centimeters in diameter, in his abdomen just below the renal arteries. The aneurysm was readily apparent on the X-rays, yet Chase did not report it to either the Respondent or to his partner, Sreenath. The radiologist either did not contact Dr. Chase to point out to him that the report of Chases's "wet read" of the X-rays omitted the aneurysm or, if he did, Chase did not relay this information to the Respondent or his partner. The radiologist's written report, stating that the X-rays revealed the large aneurysm, was sent to Chase, not to the Respondent, and Chase did not relay the information in it to the Respondent or his partner. If the Respondent had known about the aneurysm, he would have considered the aneurysm to be the patient's most serious medical concern. He might not have accepted the patient or, if he did, he probably would have brought a vascular surgeon into the case and had the vascular surgeon, or perhaps a cardiologist, closely monitor the patient for possible leaking or dissecting or rupture of the aneurysm. The Respondent also would have had to give consideration to whether the aneurysm was a cause of the patient's abdominal pain. In addition to treating the aneurysm as the patient's most serious medical concern, giving consideration to whether the aneurysm was a cause of the patient's abdominal pain, the Respondent would have had to give consideration to altering his diagnosis for the patient had he reviewed the X-rays or the radiologist report, or had spoken with the radiologist. In addition to showing the existence of the aneurysm, the X-rays indicated that the patient technically may not have been impacted. (The gas pattern was non-specific.) With respect to this patient, the Respondent practiced medicine below that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physicians as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances (below the standard of care) in that he did not either personally review the X-rays on the patient, read or have reported to him the contents of the radiologist's report, or talk to the radiologist. Instead, he relied totally on the emergency room physician's "wet read." As a result, the Respondent's diagnosis of "fecal impaction" may not have been correct, and he did not give proper consideration to the aneurysm. However, except for the failure regarding the X-rays, the DPR otherwise did not prove that it was below the standard of care for the Respondent, who was treating the patient for fecal impaction, to discharge the patient without seeing him on the morning of August 2, 1988, based on the nurse's report to the Respondent. Although it was below the standard of care for the Respondent not to either read the X-rays himself or obtain the radiologist's definitive interpretation, it was reasonable for the Respondent to expect that the emergency room physician would have told him, and noted in the "ER sheet," that the patient he was being referred had an aneurysm of the kind and size of the one the patient had in this case. Even if the emergency doctor had not initially communicated to the Respondent the existence of the aneurysm, either directly or through the "ER sheet," it was reasonable for the Respondent to expect that, in the normal course, the radiologist reviewing the X-rays would have noted that, according to the "ER sheet," the ER doctor "missed" the aneurysm and would have contacted the ER physician to bring this to his attention, and that the ER doctor then would have contacted the Respondent to advise him of the omission. The patient did not experience abdominal pain after his discharge from Morton Plant, but he began to experience back and groin pain. The aneurysm was becoming symptomatic. The patient's symptoms markedly worsened in the early morning hours of August 4, 1988. The patient's wife had him taken to the emergency room at HCA New Port Richey Hospital at approximately half past midnight. The patient was confused, and was complaining of pain in the back and groin area. His blood sugars were three times normal. He was diagnosed preliminarily in the emergency room as having out-of-control diabetes and confusion and as being near sycope. No X-rays were taken in the emergency room at New Port Richey Hospital, and no information was obtained from Morton Plant Hospital. Because the patient and his wife did not know about the aneurysm, they were unable to report it when the emergency room physician took the patient's history. The patient was admitted to New Port Richey Hospital at approximately 2:30 a.m. on August 4, 1988. However, the admitting physician did not see the patient or order diagnostic medical imaging at that time. The admitting physician saw the patient at approximately 9:00 a.m., and ordered X-rays and a CAT scan. Before the X-rays or CT scan were taken, at approximately ten o'clock, the patient suffered an acute hypotensive event while in his hospital room. An emergency abdominal sonogram was ordered, and it was determined that the patient was suffering from the rupture of the abdominal aortic aneurysm (the same one that was evident on the X-rays taken at Morton Plant). Surgery was attempted to resect the ruptured aneurysm. The patient was a poor candidate for surgery of that kind due to his age and other health factors. The patient died on August 6, 1988. If the patient knew of the aneurysm, it is likely that his treatment on August 4, 1988, would have been far different. First, when the aneurysm became symptomatic, they probably would have contacted the vascular surgeon, who would have been on the case already, either immediately or on arrival at the emergency room. The aneurysm would have been closely monitored from the time of arrival at the hospital, and the vascular surgeon would have been prepared for surgery when indicated. 2/ At the very least, the patient and his wife probably would have reported the aneurysm during the taking of a history in the emergency room at HCA New Port Richey Hospital, and the emergency room surgeon could have immediately taken appropriate steps, such as contacting a vascular surgeon and immediately ordering appropriate diagnostic medical imaging. 3/ The Respondent did not dictate admission notes for the patient until August 17, 1988. The Respondent did not dictate discharge notes. The DPR did not prove that it was below the standard of care for the Respondent to delay the dictation of admission notes or for him not to prepare a discharge summary for a patient in the hospital on a 23-hour basis. The DPR also did not prove that the Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Jayaprakash Kamath, M.D., guilty of one count of violating Section 458.331(1)(t), but dismissing the other count of the Administrative Complaint; reprimanding him; and (3) fining him $2,000. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1992.
