Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Florida Clearwater Beach Hotel, Inc., is the owner of Lots 1-5 and 49-52 at 490 North Gulfview Boulevard, Clearwater Beach, Florida. Lots 1-5 are located on the southwest corner of Baymont Street and Gulfview Boulevard and front directly on Clearwater Beach. They measure approximately one hundred feet in depth and one hundred forty-one feet at their widest point. Lots 49-52 lie immediately across the street from Lots 1-5 and are approximately one hundred feet south of Baymont Street. They form a square and measure one hundred feet on each side. Petitioner purchased the property in question in 1978. Prior to that time the two parcels of land enjoyed common ownership and a common development pattern for at least forty years. A twenty-two room facility presently sits on Lots 1-5 and is rented out as ten units. Lots 49-52 are used as a parking lot for the tenants and guests of the facility. The property is presently zoned CTF-28 (High Density Commercial Tourist Facilities), which provides for a complete range of motel/hotel developments. The major emphasis of the district is tourist oriented with a permitted maximum density of forty-two hotel or motel units per acre. Petitioner wishes to destroy the existing structure and replace it with a new rectangular-shaped facility containing approximately twenty-two motel or hotel units. Because of the need to comply with flood ordinances, it must be built on pilings or piers. The proposed new structure will consist of four living levels over grade level parking. Petitioner's property measures less than two hundred feet in depth; therefore, the maximum height of its proposed facility cannot exceed forty feet under existing zoning requirements. Other property owners whose lots exceed two hundred feet in depth may construct buildings not to exceed eighty feet in height. Under present plans, the proposed hotel will have a forty-four foot height, which will require a four-foot variance. Petitioner contends that the hotel cannot be built with smaller dimensions. It also contends that a vista or side setback on the northwest corner of the building is required since present plans call for a small portion of the building to project into the vista area. This is due to the north property line running at an angle to the south property line and the proposed building being rectangular in shape. This variance will be contingent upon the City vacating a right-of-way adjacent to Baymont Street, thereby giving Petitioner an additional twenty feet in which to build its new facility. The City opposes the application on the ground that all criteria necessary to grant a variance have not been met. It specifically points out that the problems encountered by Petitioner are not unique to Petitioner alone, but are hardships common to all area owners.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner, Christa Bartok, on the basis of her disability, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA).
Findings Of Fact Based on evidence offered at hearing and testimony of witnesses, as well as the facts agreed upon in the Pre-hearing Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are found: Bayou Breeze is a residential condominium association in Pensacola, Florida. Ms. Bartok was a prospective buyer of a condominium unit from its owner, a Bayou Breeze resident. The address of the unit was 300 Bayou Boulevard, Unit 106, Pensacola, Florida. Ms. Bartok is a person with a non-visible disability, which she described as anxiety, emotional distress disorder, and an autoimmune disease. Ms. Bartok was also the owner of a dog named Moni, weighing more than 40 pounds. She identified Moni as her emotional support dog. At all times material to this matter, Ms. Bartok was represented by Simone Sands, a real estate broker. The seller of Unit 106 was represented by Greg Thomas, also a realtor. The communication regarding all aspects of the sale of the property was through the two realtors. At the time of executing the contract, Bayou Breeze3 Bylaws provided, in pertinent part, Pets. Pets shall be kept or maintained in and about the condominium property only if unit owner is granted a conditional license to maintain one pet by the Association. Such a license will be granted subject to the following conditions and reservations: A. Acceptable Pets. The only pets to be maintained on condominium property shall be dogs under twenty (20) pounds when fully grown, cats and small birds. In addition, the Declaration of Condominium Paragraph XVI provided, in pertinent part, Approval of Purchasers, Lessees and Transferees No unit owner shall sell, lease or otherwise convey a unit, nor shall any sale, lease, conveyance or transfer of a unit other than by foreclosure or by devise or operation of law on account of the death of the unit owner, be effective unless the board of directors of the Association shall have approved the identity of the proposed purchaser, lessee or transferee in writing. Application of a proposed purchaser, lessee or transferee shall be in writing and on a form to be provided by the Association and shall be accompanied by two letters of recommendation. Any such application not rejected within 10 days after receipt by the Association or an officer thereof shall be deemed to have been approved. The costs for the submission of an application shall not exceed $100. … 3 The association name changed from Pensacola Executive House Condominium Association, Inc. to its current name. Right of First Refusal Should an Owner wish to sell or transfer his Unit, he shall deliver to the Association an Owner’s written notice containing a copy of the executed purchase agreement between buyer and seller, which agreement shall be executed subject to the Associations [sic] waiver of its right of first refusal and consent to the sale or transfer. The Owner shall also submit to the Association, within five (5) days from receipt of any request from the Association, any supplemental information as may be required by the Association. Ms. Bartok received the declarations and bylaws. However, a list of items to be submitted to the Association for sale of a property was provided to the owner, which included: letter of intent to sell, application for sale/transfer, two letters of recommendation, background check, and contract for sale. The list of items provided to the owner was not provided to Ms. Bartok. On June 20, 2020, Ms. Bartok executed a residential contract for purchase of Unit 106. A term that Ms. Bartok included in the contract provided, in pertinent part: “contingent upon buyer receiving HOA approval for her emotional support dog which is over condo weight restrictions but meets Fair Housing Act requirements for HOA waiver.”4 Ms. Bartok also provided a letter with her contract dated June 15, 2020, from her treating physician, Timothy Tuel, M.D., of Baptist Health Care. The letter stated: Dear Christa, I do believe you have several medical conditions that would benefit from a properly trained emotional support animal. Please contact me if you have other questions. 4 Ms. Bartok executed a counteroffer for the property on June 24, 2020, which did not change the term regarding approval of her ESA. Although, the letter does not specifically identify Ms. Bartok’s disability, it references her “medical conditions,” and that she could benefit from having an ESA. In addition to the contract and letter from Dr. Tuel, Ms. Bartok provided a completed application, two letters of recommendation, and a receipt for training for her dog.5 Ms. Bartok did not provide a completed background check because Mr. Thomas had advised Ms. Sands that the “HOA manager does it.” In addition, on June 30, 2020, in response to Ms. Sands’ text of, “good morning any reply from HOA,” Mr. Thomas indicated, “[n]o, not yet they’re doing background check.” Thus, Ms. Bartok had a reasonable belief that she could rely upon Mr. Thomas’ statement that the HOA was facilitating the background check and there was no need to provide the information at that time. Ms. Trimaur, the property manager for the Association, has managed Bayou Breeze condominiums for more than 11 years, and generally, receives all applications for sale or transfers of units at Bayou Breeze. She received the application materials Ms. Bartok submitted for the sale of Unit 106, which included the sales contract, letter from Dr. Tuel, reference letters, and the receipt for pet training sessions. Although Ms. Trimaur stated that it was difficult to read the digital copy of the letter from Dr. Tuel, she recalled that there was reference to Ms. Bartok’s “medical condition.” Ms. Trimaur also testified that Mr. Thomas told her that Ms. Bartok requested a waiver of the pet policy. Ms. Trimaur did not receive the financial or criminal background information with Ms. Bartok’s application packet. Ms. Trimaur submitted the application materials to Mr. Cross for review. She testified that she also had verbal discussions about the dog with Mr. Cross. 5 The receipt for training referenced “Beginner Training-for Moni” and was scheduled to begin on July 25, 2020. Mr. Cross, the president of the association, reviewed a copy of the application materials. He testified that Ms. Trimaur bypassed normal approval process by submitting the packet without the background checks due to COVID-19. As the Association president, Mr. Cross is required to review all application materials to determine whether the Association elects to exercise its right of first refusal. Mr. Cross testified that he reviewed the contract. However, he testified that he did not recall reading Ms. Bartok’s term that the acceptance was contingent upon approval of her emotional support dog. Mr. Cross did not state that there were pages missing or that there was anything that would prevent him reviewing the contract in its entirety. Mr. Cross testified that he reviewed the recommendation letters,6 which noted the size of Petitioner’s dog. He also spoke to Ms. Trimaur about the dog. After review of the application materials that Ms. Bartok submitted, Mr. Cross sent a letter to Anai, the owner of Unit 106, on July 2, 2021. The letter stated: Dear Anai, The association is in receipt of your request to sell your condominium unit 106 Bayou Breeze Condominiums, 300 Bayou Breeze, Pensacola, Fla. As you know there are specific requirements a potential new purchaser of a condominium must meet, according to the Bayou Breeze Declaration of Condominiums, Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws and Rules and Regulations, before they will be eligible to purchase a Condominium at the said premises. Section X of the By-Laws states the following: Pets. Pets shall be kept or maintained in and about the 6 The recommendations were not offered into evidence in this case. condominium property only if a unit owner is granted a conditional license to maintain one pet by the association. Such a license will be granted subject to the following conditions and reservations: Section A clearly states that a dog weighting [sic] 20 pounds or less that was fully grown could qualify. Section D. states that the dog must be carried in the arms when taken in and out of the building. The information that you have submitted so far is primarily the request for the Association to waive its pet restrictions in accordance to the By-Laws, section X of the Condominium Governing Laws. Unfortunately, that is something that we cannot do. Don’t get me wrong, I love dogs. I, at one time lived at Bayou Breeze but had to move because I wanted a dog. I have been the president of this association for 29 years. Over the years the association has had many requests much like your potential buyer’s request to waive our rules. We are well aware of the HUD laws as well as the American Disability Act. We have, unfortunately been to court several times on this issue. We have never waived the pet requirements. Even though we have not received all of the background information and detailed documentation that is necessary for the Association to approve a purchase of this unit, I am notifying you that the Association cannot except [sic] this application, because of the current situation that you have presented. Sincerely Charles D. Cross President, Bayou Breeze Condominium Association 300 Bayou Breeze, Pensacola, Fl. 32501 Mr. Cross acknowledged in his written position statement that Ms. Bartok submitted a request for waiver for an ESA. He testified that he did not deny the request for an ESA because it was not clear to him that the request was for an ESA. Both Mr. Cross and Ms. Trimaur testified that Ms. Bartok’s request for an ESA was not accepted because the materials provided were incomplete, i.e. that the application did not include the financial and criminal background check. Both Ms. Trimaur and Mr. Cross testified that other tenants of Bayou Breeze have been approved for ESAs. The letter from Mr. Cross to Anai is inconsistent with Mr. Cross’ testimony. First, the letter signed by Mr. Cross clearly states that he is aware of the request for a “pet waiver” and stated that he is “well aware of the HUD laws as well as the American Disability Act. … We have never waived the pet requirements.” Second, the letter states that “Even though we have not received the background information, … the Association cannot except [sic] the application, because of the current situation that you have presented.” At hearing, Mr. Cross testified that he expected to receive more information. If the application packet was incomplete and Mr. Cross expected to receive additional information, it would follow that Mr. Cross would specify in writing to Anai the items that were needed to complete the application. That did not happen in this case. The letter makes no reference that additional information could be provided or what information was necessary. Last, Mr. Cross claimed the letter to Anai was not a denial letter. However, it clearly stated that the request to waive the pet restriction was something the Association could not do and has never done, even when involving the ADA. The undersigned finds that the statements in the letter together with the term in the contract seeking a waiver and Ms. Bartok’s letter from her physician demonstrates that Respondents had notice of Ms. Bartok’s request for a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the ADA. The undersigned also finds that Respondent’s letter of July 2, 2020, was a denial of Ms. Bartok’s application for purchase of Unit 106 based on her request for a reasonable accommodation, a waiver for her ESA. Ms. Bartok testified that she believed the July 2, 2020, letter was a denial of her application. Believing she could not purchase the property, she canceled the contract on the same date. After Ms. Bartok canceled the contract, believing that the Association improperly denied her request for a “pet waiver” for her ESA, she submitted a letter dated July 8, 2020, requesting a reasonable accommodation for her disability. That letter included another letter from Dr. Tuel, to the Association, which stated, in pertinent part: Dear Housing Association: Christa Bartok is my patient and has been under my care since April 7, 2020. I am intimately familiar with her history and with the functional limitations imposed by her disability. She meets the definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Due to [intentionally omitted] illness, Christa Bartok has certain limitations regarding performing some life activities. [Intentionally omitted] can be a direct effect of a chronic illness. In order to help alleviate these difficulties, and to enhance his/her ability to live independently and to fully use and enjoy the dwelling unit you own and/or administer, I am prescribing an emotional support animal that will assist Christa Bartok in coping with his/her disability. Her dog Monroe (Moni) qualifies as an emotional support animal under the guidelines put forth by the Fair Housing Act and The American’s [sic] with Disabilities Act. … Ms. Bartok credibly testified that she submitted the letter with attachments to Mr. Cross’ email address. She submitted a second request for reconsideration of the Association’s decision on July 10, 2021. Ms. Bartok did not receive a response to her letters. Although Mr. Cross confirmed his email at the final hearing, he denied receiving Ms. Bartok’s emailed requests for reasonable accommodation. The undersigned credits Ms. Bartok’s testimony on the issue of whether the emails were sent to Mr. Cross. Ms. Bartok testified that after she canceled the contract, she purchased another home. She asserts that she incurred costs for the difference in the amount of the mortgage she has paid since the denial letter was issued, the difference in costs for HOA dues, and the loss associated with extending her rental agreement prior to purchasing her new home. Ms. Bartok did not provide any supporting documents to demonstrate her loss that she asserts she incurred as a result of Respondent’s discriminatory actions. Ultimate Findings of Fact The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Bartok established that she suffers from anxiety, emotional distress disorder, and an autoimmune disease, and therefore, she has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she is disabled within the meaning of the FHA. Ms. Bartok’s additional term included in her application for sale and the request for accommodation submitted following rejection of her application, was sufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was on notice that Ms. Bartok sought the “pet waiver” as a reasonable accommodation for her ESA. The undersigned finds the preponderance of evidence supports a finding that approving Ms. Bartok’s dog as an ESA was a reasonable accommodation that would assist Ms. Bartok by providing emotional support; and Respondents refused the requested accommodation. There is not sufficient evidence to establish that the Association has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for withholding approval of Ms. Bartok’s ESA. Therefore, Ms. Bartok established by a preponderance of evidence that Respondents discriminated against her based on her disability, by failing to approve a request for a reasonable accommodation (approving Ms. Bartok’s ESA) in violation of the FHA.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Christa N. Bartok, pro se 203 Southeast Syrcle Drive Pensacola, Florida 32507 For Respondent: Sharon D. Regan, Esquire Post Office Box 13404 Pensacola, Florida 32591
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order granting Christa Bartok’s Petition for Relief, in part, as follows: finding that Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice based on Ms. Bartok’s disability, by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation to Ms. Bartok in the form of an ESA; and (b) ordering Respondents to prohibit the practice of denying reasonable accommodations to individuals and potential buyers who request a reasonable accommodation on the basis of their disability. Ms. Bartok, having failed to prove she suffered any quantifiable damages as a result of her purchase of a different home, she is not entitled to damages or other financial relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 2021. Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Sharon D. Regan, Esquire Post Office Box 13404 Pensacola, Florida 32591 Christa N. Bartok 203 Southeast Syrcle Drive Pensacola, Florida 32507 Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The issues for determination at final hearing were (1) whether Petitioner's coastal construction Permit No. 86-155PB, authorizing Petitioner to construct and temporarily maintain an experimental reef structure seaward of the DuPont residence in West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, should be extended under Special Permit Condition 10 of the Permit and (2) whether the experimental reef structure should be removed pursuant to Special Permit Conditions 3 and 12 of the Permit.
Findings Of Fact On April 6, 1987, American Coastal Engineering, on behalf of Willis H. DuPont (Petitioner) and Florida Atlantic University's Department of Ocean Engineering, was granted coastal construction Permit NO. 86-155PB 3/ (Permit) by the Department of Natural Resources (Respondent). 4/ The Permit authorized Petitioner to construct and temporarily maintain an experimental reef structure seaward of the DuPont residence in West Palm Beach, Florida. The experimental reef structure, referred to as a prefabricated erosion prevention reef (PEP reef), is a 550 foot submerged breakwater which was constructed using prefabricated concrete segments, placed end-to-end underwater in the nearshore area. The purpose of the PEP reef is to reduce erosion of the beach landward of the structure. The PEP reef was installed on May 5, 1988. Special conditions were placed on the Permit, to which Petitioner agreed. The special conditions in pertinent part provide: The permittee shall adjust, alter or remove any structure or other physical evidence of the work or activity permitted, as directed by the Executive Director, if in the opinion of the Executive Director, the structure, work or activity in question results in damage to surrounding property or otherwise proves to be undersirable or becomes unnecessary. Adjustment, alteration, or removal required under this provision, shall be accomplished by the permittee at no cost to the State of Florida. * * * 10. The proposed submerged breakwater shall be removed within two years following installation of the experimental structure unless determined by the staff to remain in place for an extended period of time. This determination shall be based on a staff evaluation of the monitoring data, existing statutory regulations, and the feasibility of the project in concurrence with the beach management plan at that time. The experimental structure shall only remain in place after two years upon written approval from the Executive Director indicating an extension has been granted. * * * 12. The Executive Director may order removal of the experimental structure as soon as the shoreline along any portion of the area required to be nourished under Special Permit Condition 6 erodes up to or landward of the pre-nourished beach profile indicating a complete loss of the nourished beach material from that location and accretion at another location within the area to be monitored. Petitioner requested an extension of the Permit. On July 10, 1991, Respondent issued a final order denying an extension of the Permit, pursuant to Special Permit Condition 10, and directing the Petitioner to remove the PEP reef pursuant to Special Permit Conditions 3 and 12. An extension of the Permit beyond the two years following installation of the PEP reef, according to Special Permit Condition 10, is based upon three factors: (1) an evaluation by Respondent's staff of monitoring data gathered by Petitioner, (2) statutory regulations existing at the time of the extension request, and (3) the feasibility of the project in concurrence with the beach management plan existing at the time of the extension request. Although Petitioner's monitoring data addressed the question whether the PEP reef was performing its function, it did not address existing statutory regulations or the project's feasibility in concurrence with the current beach management plan. 5/ Petitioner's monitoring data was collected over a two-year period with surveys being performed through March 1990: March 1988 (preconstruction), May 1988 (post-construction), August 1988, December 1988, February 1989, April 1989, July 1989, November 1989, and March 1990. The data was collected along 17 profile stations: seven stations were located within or immediately adjacent to the boundaries of the PEP reef, and five to the north and five to the south of the PEP reef. The data indicated that the PEP reef was an experiment and approved by Respondent as an experiment. As a conclusion, Petitioner indicates that the PEP reef is functioning for the purpose it was designed in that it is providing a benefit to the beach. Respondent disagreed with Petitioner's conclusion. For one, Respondent disagreed with the method of analysis used by Petitioner to analyze the data because Petitioner's analysis failed to filter out seasonal effects. This procedure brought into play the first of the three factors in Special Permit Condition 10 which was used for denial of the Permit extension. Petitioner's monitoring data was utilized and analyzed by Respondent. Using the data gathered, Respondent created profile plots which are cross sectional depictions of the shoreline profiles and which displayed changes to the shoreline occurring during the survey period. Respondent used a shoreline change analysis in determining the PEP reef's effect on the shoreline in its vicinity. The analysis focused on the net change in the shoreline, i.e., the net change in the location of the mean high water line, factoring out the seasonal variations which occur along the coast by comparing profile plots from the same time of year taken during the two-year monitoring period. The shoreline change analysis indicated that in the vicinity of the PEP reef the shoreline showed irregular periods of both accretion and erosion. However, the shoreline did not reflect the typical pattern that was expected with a functioning breakwater. To the contrary, the irregular periods of accretion and erosion and the irregular configuration of the shoreline indicated that factors other than the PEP reef were affecting the shoreline. One such intervening factor was attributed to the large number of existing shoreline structures called groins which are scattered throughout the area. Groins are structures intended to stabilize the shoreline by blocking the down drift movement of sand, thereby altering the natural coastal processes. The monitoring data shows that, in terms of accretion or erosion, the PEP reef produced no recognizable influence on the shoreline in its vicinity. As to the second factor in Special Permit Condition 10, at the time the Permit was granted in 1988, no regulations specifically applicable to experimental structures existed. However, in 1989 a provision specifically addressing the permitting of experimental structures became law. /6 The provision provides that the "intent" of the Florida Legislature is to "encourage the development of new and innovative methods for dealing with the coastal shoreline erosion problem," and that, in authorizing the "construction of pilot projects using alternative coastal shoreline erosion control methods," the Respondent must determine, among other things, that "the proposed project site is properly suited for analysis of the results of the proposed activity." Groins in the PEP reef area alter the natural coastal processes and, therefore, play a significant role in the analysis of the shoreline processes. The effect of the groins affected the Respondent's ability to determine the effectiveness of the experimental structure. As a result, the Respondent was unable to make a determination in accordance with the legislative mandate. As to the third factor in Special Permit Condition 10, Petitioner presented no evidence addressing this factor. Petitioner has failed to show that the experimental structure, the PEP reef, has satisfied Special Permit Condition 10. It has failed to show that the intended purpose of the PEP reef has been accomplished, i.e., that the PEP reef is effective or beneficial. In denying Petitioner's request for an extension of the Permit, Respondent directed removal of the PEP reef pursuant to Special Permit Conditions 3 and 12. Special Permit Condition 3 provides for removal, alteration or adjustment of the PEP reef if it "proves to be undersirable or becomes unnecessary." The construction of the PEP reef consisted of, among other things, the placing of individual reef units end-to-end. To alert boaters to the location of the PEP reef, a buoy was placed at each end of the structure. The stability of the PEP reef is questionable. In 1989 a storm dislodged the individual units. In an effort to prevent sliding, Petitioner attempted to realign the units to their original position and added more weight to the units. Despite Petitioner's efforts to stabilize the structure, the PEP reef has experienced continued movement. Furthermore, because of the continued movement, boaters' safety would be compromised in that the buoys would be ineffective in warning them of the location of any units which may be dislodged. Also, the additional weight to the units could cause the individual units to settle, potentially affecting the performance of the PEP reef, and could induce erosional scour around the structure itself. Special Permit Condition 12 provides for removal when "the shoreline along any portion of the area required to be nourished . . . erodes up to or landward of the pre-nourished beach profile indicating a complete loss of the nourished beach material from that location and accretion at another location." The shoreline analysis showed that the shoreline in many portions of the nourished area eroded landward of the pre-nourished beach profile. The mean high water line had positioned landward of its pre-project location. Petitioner has failed to show that the PEP reef does not fall within the conditions of Special Permit Conditions 3 and 12. Federally protected and endangered marine species have attached themselves to and/or now reside in the PEP reef, complicating the removal of the PEP reef. In order not to disturb or disrupt this marine life, Respondent has expressed a desire in relocating the structure to a position further offshore.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Natural Resources 7/ enter a final order DENYING an extension of Permit No. 86-155PB. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of April 1994. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April 1994.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) should grant the application of the City of Destin (City) and Walton County (County) for a Consolidated Joint Coastal Permit (JCP) and Sovereign Submerged Lands Authorization (Application) to restore a 6.9 stretch of beach in the City and County.
Findings Of Fact The Gulf of Mexico beaches of the County and City were critically eroded by Hurricane Opal in 1995. The erosion problem was identified by DEP, which placed the beaches on its list of critically-eroded beaches, and by the County and City, which initiated a lengthy process of beach restoration through renourishment (also called maintenance nourishment.)1 The process, which included an extensive studies2 and construction design, as well as pre-application conferences with DEP staff, culminated in the filing of the Application on July 30, 2003. The Application proposed to dredge sand from an ebb shoal (i.e., a near-shore) borrow area south of (i.e., offshore from) East Pass in eastern Okaloosa County, using either a cutter head dredge (which disturbs the sand on the bottom of the borrow area and vacuums it into a pipeline which delivers it to the project area) or a hopper dredge (which fills itself and is moved to the project site). On the project site, heavy equipment moves the dredged sand as specified in the design plans. The project is executed in this manner and progresses along the beach, usually at a pace of about 300-500 feet a day. Each day work is in progress, public access to the beach is restricted for a length of about 500-1000 feet in the immediate vicinity of the area of beach being worked. Water Quality Increased turbidity is the primary water quality concern in a project of this nature. Increased turbidity can adversely impact submerged seagrasses and hard-bottom habitat, along with the benthic communities depending on them. When sand in the borrow area is disturbed by dredging, sand and silt become suspended and increase turbidity to some extent and for some duration, depending primarily on the nature of the bottom material and the dredging method. (The cutter head dredge vacuums most if not all of the disturbed sand and silt into the pipeline while, by comparison, the hopper dredge would result in higher turbidity in the water in the borrow area.) Sand delivered to the project site via pipeline must remain suspended in water for transport. When the sand is deposited on the beach, the excess water, with suspended particulate matter, will drain off and return to the Gulf of Mexico. Even if hopper dredges are used, and if material is deposited on the project site other than via pipeline, some of the material will be deposited in the littoral zone, and some material deposited landward of the waterline will be inundated by the tides and wave action and potentially re-suspended in water in the littoral zone. If the water is turbid upon discharge in the littoral zone, the near-shore can become more turbid. Sand Quality The primary determinant of the amount and duration of turbidity generated in the borrow area and in the littoral zone of the project site is the quality of the bottom material in the chosen borrow area. The coarser the material, the less turbidity. The best quality bottom material usually is found in the kind of borrow area proposed for use in the Application. Sand in the borrow area came from some of Florida's finest beaches. It has been cleaned of fine material (silt) not only by wave action but also as the sand moved along shore in the littoral zone and by the currents in the East Pass inlet. Numerous tests of the bottom material in the proposed ebb shoal borrow for the project indicate that it generally has less than one percent silt. Expert witnesses for the City, County, and DEP testified that, with such low silt content, turbidity increases of no more than 5-10 Nephalometric Turbidity Units (NTUs) above background levels are expected at the edge of the mixing zone--150 meters down- current from the borrow area, and down-current and offshore from the discharge points on the beach. Moreover, they testified that turbidity levels are expected to return to background levels quickly (i.e., within an hour or so.) SOB and STBR questioned whether the experts could be certain of their testimony based on the test results. But SOB and STBR called no expert to contradict the testimony, and it is found that the expert testimony was persuasive. Standard Mixing Zone Initially, the City and County applied for a variance from the turbidity standards to allow them to exceed 29 NTUs more than 150 but less than 1660 meters down-current from the borrow area, and down-current and offshore from the discharge points, based on Attachment H, the Water Quality Impact analysis in the Application. The analysis was based on an assumption of five percent silt content in the bottom material in the borrow area. SOB and STBR attempted to use the five percent assumption to impeach the expert testimony on water quality. But when the quality of the bottom material was ascertained to be less than one percent, the variance request was withdrawn at DEP's request as being unnecessary and therefore inappropriate. SOB and STBR also argued in their PRO that, if a 1660-meter mixing zone was needed for five percent fines, then a 332-meter mixing zone would be needed for one percent fines. This argument was based entirely on counsel's arithmetic extrapolation. There was no evidence in the record from which to ascertain the validity of the extrapolation. In addition, the evidence was that the bottom material in the borrow area in this case will be less than one percent fines. Shore-Parallel Sand Dike Specific Condition 6 of the Draft Permit requires the permittee to "construct and maintain a shore-parallel sand dike at the beach placement area at all times during hydraulic discharge on the beach to meet turbidity standards prescribed by this permit." The shore-parallel sand dike is essentially a wall of sand built parallel to the shoreline to keep the sand slurry (the mixture of sand and water) being pumped onto the beach from washing back in the water, thereby giving the materials more time to settle out of the water before the water returns to the Gulf of Mexico. Even if this condition were not in the Draft Permit, the City and County would be required to build the dike since it is part of their design for construction of the Project. Turbidity Monitoring The Application included a proposal to monitor turbidity, and the Draft Permit includes the proposed monitoring as a Specific Condition 38. Every six hours during dredging and pumping operations, the City and County are required to sample 150 meters down-current of the borrow area, and down-current and offshore of the discharge point, and report the results to DEP within a week. In addition, Specific Condition 38 requires work to stop if turbidity standards are exceeded, which must be reported immediately. Work may not proceed "until corrective measures have been taken and turbidity has returned to acceptable levels." If more than one exceedence of the turbidity standard is reported, DEP will require the City and County to redesign the project to address and cure the problem. These conditions are part of the reasonable assurance that water quality standards will not be violated. Sediment Quality Control/Quality Assurance Plan Pursuant to Special Condition 4.b. of the Draft Permit, the City and County are required to do a Sediment Quality Control/Quality Assurance Plan, which requires them to measure the quality of the sand as it comes out of the pipeline before it can cause a turbidity problem. If the dredge hits pockets of bad material, which is not expected in this case, work could be stopped before it creates a turbidity problem. Absence of Natural Resources in Project Area DEP performed side-scan sonar tests in the vicinity of both the borrow site and near-shore in the Project area and determined that there were no hard bottoms or seagrasses in either area. Therefore, there are no natural resources within the project area that would be covered or placed in jeopardy by a turbidity plume. Reasonable Assurance Given For all of these reasons, the City and County have provided reasonable assurance that water quality standards will not be violated. Required Riparian Interest Generally, and in the beach nourishment project area, the BOT owns seaward of the mean high water line (MHWL). The City and County own some but not all of the beachfront landward of the MHWL.3 In anticipation of the beach nourishment project, the City and County had the MHWL surveyed as of September 7, 2003.4 The surveys state that the MHWL as of that date shall also be known as the ECL. The surveys also depict the landward and seaward limits of construction and the predicted post-construction MHWL. The surveys indicate that construction is planned to take place both landward and seaward of the ECL. The predicted post-construction MHWL is seaward of the ECL. By resolution, the BOT approved the surveys and established the ECLs for the Project. The City survey was approved, and ECL established, on December 30, 2004; the County survey was approved, and ECL established, on January 25, 2005. The BOT's decisions are being challenged in court. If the decisions are upheld, the BOT intends to file its resolutions and record the surveys. There was no evidence that the City and County have an easement or the consent of all of the other beachfront owners to undertake the proposed beach nourishment project. Some of the other beachfront owners do not consent, including members of SOB and STBR. Standing SOB was incorporated not-for-profit in Florida on January 28, 2004. STBR was incorporated not-for-profit in Florida on February 16, 2004. Both were incorporated to protect and defend the natural resources of the beaches, protect private property rights, and seek redress of past, present, and future unauthorized and/or inappropriate beach restoration activities. No evidence was presented by any party as to whether SOB and STBR have filed their annual reports with the Department of State, and no party filed a Department of State certificate of status as to either SOB or STBR. STBR has six members, all owners of beachfront property in the area of the proposed beach nourishment project.5 SOB has approximately 150 members. These members own approximately 112 properties in the City, approximately 62 of which are beachfront and the rest condominium units of beachfront condominium developments. However, it is not clear from the evidence how many of these beachfront properties are in the area of the proposed beach nourishment project (beyond the four owned by Linda Cherry, who testified). The testimony of Slade Lindsey was sufficient, together with member affidavits, to prove that all six members of STBR use the beaches and waters of the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to the Project area for swimming, fishing, boating, and/or enjoying beach and Gulf vistas. As a result, the construction of the Project will affect their interests at least during the time construction is taking place near their property. If the Project were to result in violations of water quality standards for turbidity, their interests would be affected as long as the violations lasted and perhaps longer if lasting damage to natural resources were to result. However, as found, there will not be any lasting damage to natural resources, and reasonable assurance was given that no water quality violations will occur and that exceedences of water quality standards in the mixing zone will be of short duration, lasting for no longer than an hour. These effects will not be substantial. The evidence was not sufficient to prove that construction of the Project will affect the interests of a substantial number of the members of SOB. First, it was not clear how many of them own beachfront property or even condominium units in developments adjacent to the Project area. Second, the only witness on the subject, Linda Cherry, does not know all of SOB's members and did not state how many of the 39 SOB members who signed affidavits as to their use of the beaches and waters of the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to the Project area are known to the witness. Even if a substantial number would be affected, their interests would be affected no more than the STBR members' interests.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order issuing Draft Permit DEP JCP File No. 0218419-001-JC. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether petitioners' development is entitled to a favorable determination by respondent under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes (1989), and thus is exempt from development of regional impact review.
Findings Of Fact PETITIONERS' EXCEPTIONS In its Exception No. 1., Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's determination that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that Lee County Sheriff's Office, or any other local law enforcement officials strictly enforce Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51. Petitioners' exception is not supported by the record. Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51, requires that a vessel must proceed at idle speed, no wake, within five hundred feet of a water oriented structure, such as a seawall or dock. If enforced, the ordinance would require that boaters on the channel who venture closer than five hundred feet to the seawall which fronts a part of the island's shoreline or a dock located several hundred yards south of the collector canal, which is the site of Petitioners' proposed project, be obliged to travel no faster than idle speed, no wake in those areas. The Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced was based on the testimony of Lt. Graylish of the Florida Marine Patrol. Lt. Graylish appeared as a witness for Respondent and testified as to his opinion as a law enforcement officer on the impact of Lee County Vessel Control Ordinance No. 90-51 on vessel speeds in Estero Bay. During Lt. Graylish's direct examination when asked whether the Marine Patrol enforced the ordinance he replied: Well, we have the power to do it. The hardest problem for us is what in fact is that 500 foot distance. It's really hard on the water to come up with that, and then we've got a lot of transient traffic that goes through that area from out of state during season and part-time residents, and it's very difficult to enforce that when you don't have an actual sign placement indicating what in fact the condition is. [Tr. p. 118, Ins. 15-24] The lieutenant's testimony was uncontroverted. Petitioners produced no competent substantial evidence to refute Lt. Graylish's testimony. Likewise in its exceptions, Petitioners have failed to present competent substantial evidence to demonstrate why the Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced should be rejected. Accordingly, Petitioners' Exception No. 1. is therefore rejected as being contrary to the evidence presented. In its Exception No. 2, Petitioners object to the Hearing Officer's determination that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel (i.e., Coon Key Pass). Petitioners state that the parties only stipulated that "Estero Bay is an area that is, at least, frequented by manatees" and cites to the Transcript in support of its position. [See Petitioners' Exceptions] However, a review of the statement in the record which Petitioners rely on and which was made by Petitioners' own attorney at the hearing demonstrates that the Hearing Officer was correct in finding that the parties stipulated that manatees frequent the channel. In pertinent part the passage states: At this time I would like to stipulate to one thing that was omitted in here [i e., prehearing stipulation], is that we do stipulate that the areas are Outstanding Florida Waters and Class II waters, Estero Bay, and they are waters that are at least frequented by manatees . . . (emphasis added)[Tr. p. 8, Ins. 18-24] The Hearing Officer's finding that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel, which is part of Estero Bay, is consistent with the parties' stipulation. The exception is therefore rejected as unnecessary. In its Exception No. 3, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that since there was no evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced, DNR could not reasonably determine that Petitioners' project would not have an adverse impact on manatees. The issue in this case was whether Petitioners were entitled to a favorable determination under Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, that their proposed project was located so that it would not adversely impact Outstanding Florida Waters or Class II waters an would not contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. It was Petitioners' burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were entitled to a favorable determination. It was therefore incumbent upon Petitioners to present competent evidence regarding the enforcement of Ordinance No. 90-51. This Petitioners did not do. Therefore, Petitioners' Exception No. 3 is rejected as either irrelevant or not being based on competent substantial evidence. In its Exception No. 4, Petitioners allege that Respondent's committed two discovery violations. These allegations are beyond the scope of what is permitted under the rules which deal with exceptions to recommended orders; however they will be addressed. Petitioners claim they were prejudiced by improper testimony from the Respondent's expert witnesses, Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. Petitioners state that these witnesses "allegedly re-examine Petitioners' project area on the afternoon prior to the hearing and alleged the discovery of new observations and conclusions at the hearings." [See Petitioners' Exceptions] Petitioners claim that this alleged re-examination precluded any opportunity for discovery and that therefore, "no testimony relating to this site visit should have been admitted into the record." However, Petitioners raised no such objection at the hearing and by not doing so have waived any right to do so now. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure that would preclude an expert witness from engaging in a review of information to be relied on at the hearing prior to the hearing. Additionally, for clarification only, it should be noted that there is no evidence in the record which would have led Petitioner to believe that Pat Rose visited the site prior to the hearing. In Exception No. 4, Petitioner further alleged that the Hearing Officer should have disallowed the testimony of Lt. Graylish, because his name "first appeared on the prehearing stipulation (not signed by Petitioners) approximately 48 hours before the hearing . . . ." However, Petitioners' did not object at the hearing to the testimony of Lt. Graylish and furthermore, stated on the record in reference to signing the prehearing stipulation: due to our, I guess you would say our geographic differences, the prehearing stipulation was submitted . . . without my signature; and at this time I would like to on the record confirm that I stipulate to that prehearinq stipulation that was jointly prepared and finally submitted by the Department. (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 4, Ins. 21- 25] In addition to having stipulated to Respondent's witnesses, which included Lt. Graylish, Petitioners had raised this very objection prior to the hearing and the Hearing Officer had conducted a telephonic hearing on the matter. The Hearing Officer ruled that the witness would be allowed to testify at the hearing subject to Petitioners' objections at that time. A review of the record of the hearing indicates that Petitioners made no further objections to the lieutenant's testimony. Exceptions as to alleged discovery violations are improper pursuant to the rules and in this case there is no competent substantial evidence to demonstrate the existence of any discovery violations. Exception No. 4 is therefore rejected as being improper. Finally, at Exception No. 5, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's application of law to the findings of fact to support a determination that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating that their proposed project would riot "contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees." Petitioners allegation that this conclusion be rejected is based upon Petitioners' argument, discussed above, that the Hearing Officer erred in finding that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced. As stated in Paragraphs Nos. 1. and 3., any such rejection of the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Petitioners allege that the Hearing Officer's "sole conclusion of possible manatee impacts from this project was based on what he determined to be a lack of evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced. Petitioners have narrowly construed the Hearing Officer's ruling. There is ample evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Petitioners had not met their burden. In fact, the Recommended Order demonstrates that the ruling was also based on competent substantial evidence presented by Respondent that this proposed project demonstrated a potential for harm to manatees. In that regard, the Hearing Officer's conclusion was based on testimony from both Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. It was their testimony which led the Hearing Officer to conclude that a "favorable determination for Petitioners would not lie." The record is replete with evidence the Hearing Officer could have reasonably relied upon to conclude that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proof. [See Tr. p. 118, Ins. 6-9; p. 156 p. 1; p. 158, Ins. 4-6; p. 158. In. 9; p. 159, In.18; p. 176, Ins. 20-23; ; p. 218, Ins. 20-24; p. 219, In. 40p. 316, Ins. 22-23; DNR Exh. 17J Accordingly, Petitioners' exceptions to Conclusion of Law No. 5., is rejected as being contrary to Florida law and the evidence presented. RESPONDENT' S EXCEPTIONS Respondent alleges that Finding of Fact No. 15., should be rejected in its entirety inasmuch as it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. At finding of fact No. 15, the Hearing Officer implies that the Petitioners were "somehow surprised" on June 7, 1991, while the parties were preparing the Prehearing Stipulation to be filed at hearing on June Il, 1991, to learn that DNR intended to take the position at hearing that the proposed project would likely contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area frequented by manatees. In support of this finding the Hearing Officer refers to a comment made by DNR employee David Trimble at his June 5, 1990, deposition, during which he advised Petitioners that based upon the October 17, 1990 memorandum from the Division of Marine Resources he assumed that the manatee issue was "resolved" in Petitioners' favor. However, a review of the record reveals that at no time subsequent to November 8, 1990 or the date on which the unfavorable letter of determination was issued, could Petitioners reasonably claim they believed the issue regarding manatees was resolved. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is not based on competent substantial evidence and is rejected. At his deposition Mr. Trimble was asked who was responsible for making the final determination decision, to which he replied: I evaluate them and make a staff recommendation to my superiors. (emphasis added) [Tr. 22, Ins. 24-25] Q. So you go with your feeling - from what the letters say and - A. Not from my feeling, I go with what the letters say. [Tr. p. 23, Ins. 8-11] Furthermore, Trimble's statement at the deposition that he believed the manatee issue was resolved was given only after Petitioners specifically asked Mr. Trimble his opinion on the matter. Furthermore, Trimble was qualified to give only his opinion as to whether the manatee issue was resolved, not the agency's position which was memorialized in the November 8, 1991, letter of determination. Petitioners' claim that they believed the manatee issue was resolved and the Hearing Officer's subsequent finding that Petitioners' claim was meritious can not be supported on the basis of Trimble's answer to the following question: Q. Was, in your opinion - - and this is your opinion as the reviewer of the request - - was the manatee issue resolved . . . (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 26, Ins. 8-10] Further, the letter that was issued under the Executive Director's signature did not indicate that the manatee issue was resolved, quite the contrary. In fact, the Prehearing Stipulation at page 17, stipulated to by both parties after, the deposition of Trimble listed the following disputed issue for determination at the hearing: 2. Whether the DNR correctly determined that the proposed 132 wetslips in conjunction with the existing 161 slips, will contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. In order to find that Petitioners were somehow surprised by this "newly discovered revelation" (i.e., that manatees were going to be an issue at hearing) the Hearing Officer improperly attributed more weight to the deposition testimony of Trimble thanit was due. Trimble was merely the conduit through which information on the manatee issue from the Division of Marine Resources passed. As he himself stated, he was the reviewer of the information - - he was not the final decisionmaker. Once having reviewed the material sent to him from the other divisions, he merely drafted the unfavorable letter of determination for the Executive Director's consideration. The Executive Director then reviewed the material and issued the letter of determination under his signature.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent enter a final order confirming its earlier determination of November 8, 1990, under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of August 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Ocean Reef Club, Inc., is the developer of certain lands located on the northern end of Key Largo, Monroe County, Florida. The development began as a fishing village in the 1940's and now includes private residences, a marina, and residential docking facilities. Ocean Reef applied in 1982 to DER for a permit to construct a residential docking facility known as Fisherman's Wharf. The facility was to provide a number of parallel docking spaces with an access channel following an existing tidal creek to the northeast connecting to a waterway known as the Harbor House Basin. The permit was issued on October 5, 1984, authorizing construction of a 4-foot wide parallel dock approximately 600-feet long, the dredging of a turning basin through the excavation of approximately 1800 cubic yards of material and the dredging of some 200 cubic yards from an existing tidal creek along a 480 lineal foot length of the creek to a width of 5-feet; all located in No Name Creek, a tidal creek connecting Harbor House Marina to Pumpkin Creek, in Card Sound, Key Largo, Monroe County, Section 11, Township 59 South, Range 41 East. That permit was extended by a letter dated June 10, 1987, and now carries an expiration date of October 5, 1989. The existing permit held by Ocean Reef Club, valid until 1989, would allow the direct dredging of a tidal creek vegetated by seagrasses over a 400- foot length yielding a direct dredging of seagrasses of some 3000 square feet. During the two-year processing time leading to issuance of the permit, Ocean Reef sold a portion of the property comprising the access channel to third parties who now will not grant their permission authorizing channel construction across their property. As a result, in 1987, Petitioner requested a major modification to permit no. 440601649. Although Petitioner attempted to show that its change of plans had been inconsistently processed by DER as a new permit application when DER was obligated to treat it as a modification of a prior permit which would require no new application, processing, or permit, Petitioner was unable to do so. Petitioner's expert professional land surveyor, Joseph Steinocher,, concurred with DER witnesses Kelly Jo Custer and David Bishof that the Ocean Reef plan changes were so significantly altered as to constitute a wholly new project. Steinocher specifically indicated it was a "significant change in that there is no relationship between the two," and Custer, DER's marina permitting specialist, testified that DER's consistently applied policy is to require all such significant permit modifications to be processed de novo as wholly new permit applications because to do otherwise would not be in the public interest. Custer was also qualified as an expert in marine biology and water quality, and from Custer's viewpoint, the changed plans constitute a new and different project for many reasons but primarily because the project impacts on water which have been designated Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW) during the intervening years. The project revision/new permit application plans changed the configuration of the turning basin, providing for a kidney-shaped upland basin with the utilization of an additional portion of No Name Creek, extending Southeasterly toward the entrance of a water body known as Fisherman's Cove. Because the project initially proposed disturbance of wetlands and dredging of mangroves, a mitigation area of some 10,300 square feet was included in the plan. The original proposal called for the straightening of an oxbow in the existing tidal creek and the placement of fill through approximately one-half the reach of the tidal creek to gain access to the dredge area with the fill to be removed after construction. During the processing of the latest permit application, adverse comments were received from DER staff members, and the Petitioner modified the application to eliminate the straightening of the oxbow. The pending proposal involves the construction of 24 boat slips along a floating dock, the installation of boulder rip-rap, and the placement of culverts to allow access to a central island to remain after construction of the docking facility. As a result of prior permit agreements between the parties, Ocean Reef Club had conveyed approximately 730 acres to the State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund by special warranty deed dated March 17, 1982. Petitioner asserted but failed to prove up that all construction involved in the pending proposal is landward of those lands either conveyed by that special warranty deed or otherwise in the control of the State of Florida and in fact would be wholly upon its own property. Even had the private property encapsulation of the construction been established, Petitioner's registered land surveyor admitted that the tidal creek entrance is within the limits of the deed to the State of Florida. Access for the proposed 24-slip facility will be through the existing tidal creek that has water depths ranging from minus 2.2 feet to in excess of minus 8 feet at low tide. The earlier proposal would have required only a small portion of the natural creek to be used by motor boats. The project contemplated in 1984 and the one which is the subject of the present litigation are not comparable either biologically nor legally. It is noted that one condition of the 1984 permit even required navigational barriers to be placed at the mouth of No Name Creek. Accordingly, it is specifically found that the significant plan changes render the pending Ocean Reef permit application truly a new project rather than a minor modification as contemplated by Chapter 17-12 F.A.C. Petitioner also attempted to demonstrate that DER's denial of the new permit application was inconsistent with its issuance of permits for similar marina projects in other locations. Neither these allegedly similar applications, supporting plans therefor, nor permits were offered in evidence for comparison. Moreover, for one reason or another, some of the named projects differed so much from the subject application that one witness, Kenneth L. Eckternacht, expert in hydrographic engineering, physical oceanography, and navigation, characterized the comparison as "apples to monkies." Some projects could only be compared to the applicant's proposal by one similar component, i.e. elimination of, and mitigation with regard to, mangroves. For this reason, Dr. Snedeker's limited testimony in this regard is discounted. Some projects could not be conclusively identified as within OFW. None involved the use of the type of creek system involved in the instant project. Ocean Reef Club also could not show that the current permit denial is inconsistent with the granting of the permit for the project as previously conceived in 1984, and which project cannot now be constructed due to Ocean Reef's sale of certain land to uncooperative third parties. As set forth in the foregoing findings of fact, the two projects are neither biologically nor legally identical or even clearly comparable. Petitioner's assertion that it has proposed special or enhanced mitigation because the existing permit, still valid until 1989 but now impossible to comply with, allows direct dredging of approximately 3,000 square feet while the present permit application, as modified, would not require dredging this 3,000 feet, is rejected. Under the new project plans, the proposed basin will be located immediately adjacent to the existing tidal creek which would provide the navigational access to and from the basin. The connection will be created between the basin and the creek by excavating only 100-150 square feet of mangroves which lie between the creek and the area of the proposed basin. In making the immediately foregoing finding of fact, the testimony of witnesses has been reconciled without imputing any lack of credibility to any of them. Respondent's expert, Kelly Jo Custer, expert in marine biology and water quality and also their agency marina specialist, testified that the cross-hatching on the project plans, if read to scale, confirms the testimony of Petitioner's witnesses that the square footage of mangroves to be removed is 100-150 square feet and that the cross-hatching must take precedence over the raw number copied onto the plans. The wetlands in and around the project site, including No Name Creek, are within an OFW, specifically the Florida Keys Special Waters. The project site is located in North Key Largo, approximately one-half mile north of John Pennekamp State Park within the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent to the Biscayne Bay/Card Sound Aquatic Preserve. All of these waters are Class III surface waters. The marina basin itself will be excavated to a depth of minus four feet mean low water. The 24 proposed boatslips will accommodate moorage of boats as large as 25 feet with a draft of two feet. The marina basin will enhance recreational values and channel, despite its greater depth, and at the inner portions of its several bends. It is also implausible that Petitioner's plans to limit boat size through condominium documents to be enforced through a homeowners association, to install mirrors, signalling devices, and latches at certain points along the creek, and to install tide staffs at creek entrances will prevent potential head-on boat collisions or bottlenecks in No Name Creek. It is equally implausible that these procedures can provide reasonable assurances that there will not be a chronic increase in water turbidity from increased use or damage to biota from propellers and boat impact. The witnesses generally concurred as to the present ecological status of No Name Creek. It contains Cuban shoalweed and turtlegrass scattered with varied density throughout, and especially found in two patches between the proposed basin and the point at which there is a drastic bend or oxbow in the creek. The seagrasses in the creek serve many valuable functions including providing a substrate upon which epiphytes may attach, and providing a source of food and refuge for fish and small invertebrates. Seagrasses also fix carbon which they absorb from the sediments and water column through photosynthesis. Green and red algae found throughout the creek provide habitat and carbon fixing functions similar to that provided by the seagrasses. Corals and sponges are present. Three species of sponge located in the creek are found only in the Florida Keys and nowhere else in the United States. Other creek biota include barnacles and oysters attached to mangrove roots, lobsters, anchovies, needlefish, grunts, mojarres, electric rays, various small fish, and invertebrates. Biological and botanical diversity is an important measure of the creek's rich ecological quality and value. The increased boat use of No Name Creek inherent in this dredging project will adversely affect the quality and diversity of the biota. In a creek of this configuration with mean low tide occurring roughly every 12 hours and NEAP tides approximately every two weeks, direct impact of boat propellers is a certainty. The shallowest parts of the creek tend to be limerock shelves which provide a hospitable substrate for the corals, and which are most susceptible to propeller damage, as are the seagrasses and sponges. Petitioner's assertion through Mr. Castellanos and Dr. Roessler that all boaters can be relied upon to employ tilt motors to best advantage in shallow water so as to avoid overhanging mangrove branches at the creek's edges (shores) and so as to keep their boats within the portion of the channel away from submerged mangrove roots and further can be trusted to proceed slowly enough to allow slow-moving water creatures to escape their propellers is speculative and unrealistically optimistic. Despite all good intentions, the strong currents of this creek and its meandering nature work against the average pleasure boater keeping to the narrow center channel. An even more compelling problem with this project is that increased sustained turbidity from propellers and boat movement within close range of the creek bottom will scour the creek bottom and/or stir up the bottom sediment on a regular basis. Once suspended, bottom particles will be redeposited on the seagrasses, impeding photosynthesis and smothering the sponges and corals. Upon the testimony of Custer, Echternacht, and Skinner, and despite contrary testimony of Roessler and Larsen, it is found that the admittedly strong currents in the creek will not flush the particles sufficiently to alleviate the loose sediment problem, and may actually exacerbate the chronic turbidity problem. Strong currents can create a cyclical situation in which, as the seagrasses die or are uprooted, even more particulate matter is loosened and churned up. Chronic turbidity of No Name Creek has the potential of violating the applicable water quality standards for biological integrity, for turbidity, and for ambient water quality. These impacts will not be offset by Petitioner's creation of 38,100 square feet of new underwater bottom because, although this new area will become vegetated, it will never be as rich or as diverse as the existing bottom. This is also true of the pilings and rip rap in regard to sessile animals/barnacles. Petitioner's plan to replant red mangroves over 10,300 square feet may be sufficient in mitigation of the loss of 100-150 square feet of mangroves by itself (see Finding of Fact 16) but for the foregoing reasons, it does not constitute full mitigation for the new permit application. The project will be of a permanent nature. The project will not adversely affect significant historical and archeological resources.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a final order be entered denying the requested permit. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of September, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of September, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH Case No. 87-4660 The following constitute specific rulings upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 20, and 25 are accepted. Accepted except for the last sentence which is rejected upon the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole. Accepted but specifically not adopted as stated because the plan calls for destruction of certain mangroves (100- 150 ft.) and the planting of others as opposed to mere "addition." 6, 9, 12, and 27 are accepted in part and rejected in part. There was a failure of proof by both parties as to whether the Petitioner would or would not be conducting all activities landward of those lands conveyed. Although there is testimony to this effect, none of the surveys introduced nor other competent evidence allow the undersigned to definitely plot the description contained in Exhibit P-9 with respect to the current permit application plans. In any case, the proposals are not dispositive of the material issues in this case. The reservation, if it does apply, supports denial of the permit. See FOF 9. 8, 26, 28, 29, and 32 are rejected as subordinate and unnecessary, and in some cases as mere recitation of testimony or unproved. See next ruling. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 30, 31 and 33. Portions of these proposals are accepted in substance as reflected in the FOF. In part, they are rejected as mere recitation of testimony or as subordinate and unnecessary. The remainder is not accepted due to the relative weight of the credible testimony which is reflected in the facts as found. 34-36. Rejected for the reasons set out in FOF 13. Respondent's PFOF 1, 2, 4-6, 9, 11, 14-22, 24-34, 38-43, 48-52, 54, sentence 2 of 57, all except sentence 1 of 59, and 60 are accepted but not necessarily adopted in the interest of space and clarity or because they are cumulative or mere recitations of testimony. 3. Rejected for the reasons set out in FOF 16. Rejected. There was a failure of proof by both parties as to whether the Petitioner would or would not be conducting all activities landward of those lands conveyed. In any case, the proposal is immaterial to the environmental issues dispositive in this case. See FOF 9 and ruling on Petitioner's 6, 9, 12 and 27. Rejected as this was the unproven opinion of Mr. Poppel. No consent judgment is in evidence. 10, 12, and 13. Portions of these proposals are accepted in substance as reflected in the FOF. In part, they are rejected as mere recitation of testimony or as subordinate and unnecessary. The remainder is not accepted due to the relative weight of the credible testimony as reflected as the facts as found. 23, 53, sentence one of 57, and sentence one of 59, are rejected as argument of counsel or statement of position. 35-37, 44-47, 55, 56, 58, and 61-64 are rejected as subordinate, unnecessary or cumulative to the facts as found. COPIES FURNISHED: Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Robert A. Routa, Esquire Post Office Drawer 6506 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6506 Richard Grosso, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent wrongfully discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female residing in the community known as the Hammocks in Ocoee, Florida. She was a frequent attendee at Homeowners' Association meetings for a number of years. In April 2007, Petitioner was elected to the Board by its members in recognition of her interest in the community. Petitioner was elected as a director on the Board; she was not an officer. She regularly attended Board meetings and was active and involved. There were no complaints raised by the Board concerning Petitioner's exercise of her duties as a director. The Homeowners' Association of the Hammocks was established to monitor and manage all issues relating to the Hammocks, e.g., maintenance of homes and lots, noise issues, safety, etc. The Homeowners' Association was not named as a Respondent in the instant action.1 The Management Company provided services to the Hammocks and to other properties and communities as well. The responsibility of the Management Company was to manage the day-to-day affairs of the community. For example, the Management Company would ensure that all homeowners were in compliance with restrictive covenants and community rules. It would insure that maintenance of the common grounds was kept current. It would provide consultation concerning any issues that arose within the community concerning enjoyment of the property by homeowners. The Management Company has been under contract with the Hammocks since approximately calendar year 2003. Gary Comstock, vice-president of the Management Company, regularly attends Board meetings as the representative of the Management Company, but does not attend all meetings. During the same period the Management Company was employed by the Hammocks, it was also serving another community known as West Oaks Villages. It provided the same kind of services to West Oaks Villages that it provided to the Hammocks. Some time during calendar year 2007, Petitioner became acquainted with a person by the name of Catherine Hall who resided in West Oak Villages.2 Petitioner met Hall at a polling place during an election period. At that time Hall was involved in a dispute with her own Homeowners' Association at West Oaks Villages. Hall was also concerned about the Management Company and what she saw as possible shortcomings on its part, vis-à-vis, duties and responsibilities to West Oaks Villages. Hall's case was ultimately forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned Case No. 07-3368; the case style included both West Oaks Villages and the Management Company as named respondents. A final hearing was held in that case on September 17, 2007, before Administrative Law Judge Clark. Petitioner testified in Ms. Hall's case at final hearing. At that time, Petitioner was serving as a director on the Board of the Hammocks Homeowners' Association.3 During her testimony, Petitioner expressed concern about the Management Company. Petitioner's testimony in the Hall case was ultimately disregarded by the Administrative Law Judge as being irrelevant. A resident of the Hammocks (Renee Reynolds) somehow became aware of Petitioner's testimony at the Hall final hearing. Reynolds sent a letter to the Board dated October 20, 2007, expressing concern that Petitioner--while serving on the Hammocks Board--would testify against its management company in a DOAH proceeding. The resident felt like this was a conflict of interest and suggested Petitioner might not deserve a "seat" on the Board. Petitioner somehow discovered the letter (which had apparently been attached to an email to her on the day it was written). Petitioner responded to the letter and submitted her written response to the Board on October 21, 2007, i.e., the day after Reynolds' letter was written. Petitioner's response was delivered to the Board at a regularly scheduled meeting on that day. The Reynolds letter and Petitioner's response were discussed at the October 21 meeting. The next Board meeting (hereinafter referred to as the "November Meeting") was held on November 26, 2007. At the November Meeting, one of the issues on the agenda had to do with maintenance of certain lots and houses within the community. Petitioner was told by the Board that she could not cast a vote as the homeowner of a house she was maintaining for some friends. The Board's attorney cited legal precedence for this denial, but Petitioner was not happy with the decision. There were some contentious moments in the November Meeting between Petitioner and other Board members. During the November Meeting, Petitioner brought up the Hall case in reference to some complaints she was making about the Management Company. Review of the video of the November Meeting4 shows that Petitioner was very agitated at this time. In response to some of Petitioner's comments, Comstock asked to make a statement. After his comments, Petitioner was given a brief opportunity to reply. Comstock's comments to Petitioner were also somewhat heated in nature. He said that Petitioner had denigrated the Management Company for quite a number of years, and he was tired of it. He said her unwarranted criticisms were akin to the techniques used by Hitler, i.e., that if they were said often enough, people might actually begin to believe them. He also said that Petitioner's complaints were like those used by bigots in the 1960's to degrade people of color without any basis. His analogies did not compare Petitioner to Hitler or to a bigot; they merely attacked Petitioner's method of making complaints against the Management Company. Comstock also stated at the meeting that if Petitioner continued her verbal abuse of the Management Company, it would take whatever action necessary--even litigation--to put an end to the abuse. Petitioner perceived that comment to be a threat. Comstock says they were not meant as such. Upon review of the videotape and consideration of the context, the comments do not appear threatening. Petitioner took great exception to Comstock's statements and took them personally. However, upon review of the videotape of the November Meeting, the statements do not appear offensive in and of themselves. None of the Board members addressed Comstock's remarks when he finished talking. That is, no one chastised him or said his comments were inappropriate. Also, in attendance at the November Meeting was Spencer Solomon (Respondent in this case), president of the Management Company. Solomon's involvement with the Hammocks had to do solely with financial matters. That is, he handled the financial issues and left day-to-day management issues to Comstock. Solomon rarely attended Board meetings, but was asked by Comstock to attend the November Meeting because of expected "uncomfortable-ness" relating to Petitioner.5 Solomon attended and spoke briefly, during which time he mistakenly said that the Management Company was not a party in the Hall case. That was erroneous and Solomon admitted so at final hearing. His misstatement was not intentional; he believed it to be true at the time it was made. At the November Meeting, Petitioner was allowed to present her side of the story concerning the Hall issue. She explained that she testified in Hall's case as a private person, not as a Hammocks Board member. Petitioner had met Hall prior to taking a position on the Board, but Hall's hearing was held after Petitioner had been appointed to the Board. Petitioner said that she was genuinely concerned about how the Management Company was performing its duties for the Homeowners' Association. Following discussions at the November Meeting, Terri Ballard, the Homeowners' Association representative, advised Board members as to the process for removing a Board member. (There was no testimony or evidence presented at final hearing as to why Ballard raised this issue.) A Board member could be removed by way of one of three methods: They could resign; they could serve their full term and not be re-elected; or, they could be recalled. The recall process was to circulate a petition among homeowners and if a sufficient number signed the petition, the Board member could be removed. A petition was thereafter created and dispersed by Ballard to homeowners. Ballard was responsible for obtaining signatures on the petitions and collecting the petitions from homeowners. Of the approximately 125 lots within the Hammocks, about 65 homeowners (52 percent of the lots) returned signed petitions to Ballard.6 Ballard collected the petitions (also referred to as ballots) and turned them over to Comstock as representative of the Management Company. Comstock then turned the ballots over to the attorney representing the Board. At a specially called meeting in May 2008, the Board voted to recall Petitioner from her position on the Board. The vote followed review of the recall petitions that had been circulated among the other residents of the Hammocks. The petitions were not introduced into evidence, and there is no evidence as to what they said or how the language was worded. Petitioner was allowed to briefly review some of the ballots, but did not review each and every one of them. So far as she knows, no official audit was done to ascertain that all ballots were true and correct or that a sufficient number had been collected. Petitioner believes her recall was retaliation for her testimony in the Hall case. However, her testimony in that case was against the Management Company; she was recalled by the Board. It is clear that the Management Company has no authority or control over the Board. Rather, the Management Company operates under a contract with the Board to perform certain functions. Election and retention of Board members is not one of the Management Company's enumerated tasks. Further, the comments made by Comstock at the November Meeting appeared to be the culmination of years of attacks by Petitioner against the Management Company. There is nothing to suggest that Comstock's comments were limited to or even specifically directed at the Hall matter. Even so, the Board was not a party to the Hall case, and the Hammocks was not discussed at the final hearing in that case. Thus, there could be no retaliation by the Board relating to that case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations finding Respondent, Spencer Solomon, not guilty of an unlawful employment practice and dismissing Petitioner, Victoria Laney's, Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2008.
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. The above-styled case involves a revocation of license, a fine, and a survey fee. 2. A previous case was filed against this Respondent also involving the revocation of the license: Agency for Health Care Administration v. Angel Aides Center, Inc. d/b/a Boynton Beach Assisted Living, AHCA No. 2011012687, Case No.: 12-12-246PH. 3. On April 30, 2013, the Agency entered a Final Order in the above described case [AHCA No: 2011012687, Case No.: 12-246PH] adopting the findings of facts and the conclusions of law set forth in the Recommended Order issued by the Agency’s informal hearing officer, which upheld the revocation. 4. The Respondent appealed the Final Order to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Fourth District Court of Appeal Case No.: 4D 13-1733. 5. On or about June 24, 2013, the parties agreed to place the case in abeyance while the appeal was being reviewed by the Fourth District Court of Appeals. 6. On September 18, 2014, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the Agency’s Final Order revoking the Respondent’s license 7. On November 17, 2014, the Respondent filed a Joint Notice of Dismissing its Request for a Formal Hearing with the DOAH and the Administrative Law Judge issued an order closing the file and relinquishing jurisdiction to the Agency. (Ex. 2) Filed December 24, 2014 3:16 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 8. The assisted living facility license of Respondent is REVOKED. 9. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $5,500.00. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. A check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this /7_ day of Drandre 2014. Elizabeth Du , Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. ‘The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct, of this Final er was served on-the below-named persons by the method designated on this 1? fay of et _ 2014. Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 2 Jan Mills Facilities Intake Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Catherine Anne Avery, Unit Manager Assisted Living Facility Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Finance & Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) | Arlene Mayo Davis, Field Office Manager Local Field Office Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Katrina Derico-Harris Medicaid Accounts Receivable Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Lourdes A. Naranjo, Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail Shawn McCauley Medicaid Contract Management Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Louis V. Martinez, Esq. Louis V. Martinez, P.A. 2333 Brickell Avenue — Suite A-1 Miami, Florida 33129 | (U.S. Mail) John G. Van Laningham Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) _ oe NOTICE OF FLORIDA LAW 408.804 License required; display.-- (1) It is unlawful to provide services that require licensure, or operate or maintain a provider that offers or provides services that require licensure, without first obtaining from the agency a license authorizing the provision of such services or the operation or maintenance of such provider. (2) A license must be displayed in a conspicuous place readily visible to clients who enter at the address that appears on the license and is valid only in the hands of the licensee to whom it is issued and may not be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily. The license is valid only for the licensee, provider, and location for which the license is issued. 408.812 Unlicensed activity.-- (1) A person or entity may not offer or advertise services that require licensure as defined by this part, authorizing statutes, or applicable rules to the public without obtaining a valid license from the agency. A licenseholder may not advertise or hold out to the public that he or she holds a license for other than that for which he or she actually holds the license. (2) The operation or maintenance of an unlicensed provider or the performance of any services that require licensure without proper licensure is a violation of this part and authorizing statutes. Unlicensed activity constitutes harm that materially affects the health, safety, and welfare of clients. The agency or any state attomey may, in addition to other remedies provided in this part, bring an action for an injunction to restrain such violation, or to enjoin the future operation or maintenance of the unlicensed 4 3 provider or the performance of any services in violation of this part and authorizing statutes, until compliance with this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the agency. (3) It is unlawful for any person or entity to own, operate, or maintain an unlicensed provider. If after receiving notification from the agency, such person or entity fails to cease operation and apply for a license under this part and authorizing statutes, the person or entity shall be subject to penalties as prescribed by authorizing statutes and applicable rules. Each day of continued operation is a separate offense. (4) Any person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance. (5) When a controlling interest or licensee has an interest in more than one provider and fails to license a provider rendering services that require licensure, the agency may revoke all licenses and impose actions under s. 408.814 and a fine of $1,000 per day, unless otherwise specified by authorizing statutes, against each licensee until such time as the appropriate license is obtained for the unlicensed operation. (6) In addition to granting injunctive relief pursuant to subsection (2), if the agency determines that a person or entity is operating or maintaining a provider without obtaining a license and determines that a condition exists that poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of a client of the provider, the person or entity is subject to the same actions and fines imposed against a licensee as specified in this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules. (7) Any person aware of the operation of an unlicensed provider must report that provider to the agency.
