The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon his handicap in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended ("FCRA"), more specifically Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2004).2/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Dana D. Ripley, was, at all times relevant to this proceeding, certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a law enforcement officer. He was employed as a police officer by the Lake City Police Department from 1997 until March 2002. On March 15, 2002, Mr. Ripley completed a sworn "pre- application" for a deputy sheriff's position with the PCSO. The pre-application is used as a screening device to reject candidates who are ineligible for employment with the PCSO, such as persons with felony convictions or activities related to illegal drugs. The pre-application asked a series of questions regarding criminal convictions and drug activities. One of the questions was, "Have you ever sold, purchased or offered for sale any illegal drug?" Mr. Ripley circled the answer, "Yes." He indicated that he had possessed steroids "5 to 10 times," the last time being in 1994. In the space provided in the pre- application to explain any "yes" answers, Mr. Ripley wrote, "During my years in university [sic] I purchased and used anabolic steroids to assist my athletic pursuits while in school." Cpl. B. J. Lyons, the PCSO background investigator who oversaw Mr. Ripley's application, testified that the answers regarding steroids were a "concern," but not alone sufficient to stop the application process. As part of the pre-application process, Mr. Ripley attested that he had read the job duties and functions for the deputy sheriff's position and was "capable of performing the duties of the job as described with or without a reasonable accommodation." Nowhere in his pre-application or full application did Mr. Ripley indicate that he had a disability, an impairment of a major life function, or the need for any accommodation. Having met the criteria on the pre-application, albeit with one "concern," Mr. Ripley went on to complete the full application process, which included signing waivers and obtaining a physician's clearance to take a physical abilities test. On October 30, 2002, Mr. Ripley's physician certified that there was "no unreasonable danger of harm" in Mr. Ripley's undergoing the physical abilities test "with/without a reasonable accommodation." On November 25, 2002, Mr. Ripley was given a "Notice of Conditional Offer of Employment" by the PCSO. The conditional offer stated that, if Mr. Ripley satisfactorily completed psychological testing, a psychological interview, a drug test, and a medical examination, he would be eligible for appointment to a deputy sheriff's position by the sheriff. The conditional offer expressly stated that placement in the applicant pool does not assure that the sheriff would appoint the applicant to a deputy sheriff's position. On November 26, 2002, Mr. Ripley took the PCSO's physical abilities test, in which he went through a test course that included running 220 yards, climbing a wall, running over hurdles, crawling under obstacles, dragging a 150-pound dummy a distance of 50 feet, and simulated firing of a police weapon. The maximum acceptable time for completing the test course was six minutes and 30 seconds. Mr. Ripley completed the course in two minutes and 50 seconds, which Cpl. Lyons termed a very good time. Also on November 26, 2002, Mr. Ripley sat for a polygraph examination conducted by Allen Stein, an independent polygraph examiner under contract with the PCSO. Mr. Stein's report stated the following in relevant part: During the pretest interview, Mr. Ripley said he resigned from the Lake City Police Department following a discussion with the Chief of Police in which they agreed a change of scenery would be desirable for him. Mr. Ripley had been absent from work for about a nine month period because of three colon surgeries because of a colitis condition. Following his return to duty, he had an amnesia episode while on duty, which resulted in the meeting with the Chief. It was suggested to Mr. Ripley that the City Manager wanted him to be terminated. In an earlier instance, he fainted as a result of dehydration resulting from the removal of a large part of his large intestine. A blood test was done after he had fainted which disclosed prohibited substances in his system. He had neglected to tell his supervisor about the various controlled substances that he had to take to assist in weaning him from the narcotics that had been prescribed for him following the surgeries. In both cases mentioned above, internal affairs investigations were conducted that resulted in a written counseling and then, the requested resignation. He resigned in March 2002. Mr. Ripley said he has operated a motor vehicle not more than ten times after having consumed enough alcoholic beverages that if stopped, he might have been charged with driving under the influence. The last time was in June 2002. Mr. Ripley said that in 1988 through 1996, he took steroids to assist him in competing in bodybuilding and power weight lifting events. He consumed about two cycles per year. He estimated that he had spent about $800.00 to purchase steroids. Cpl. Lyons was concerned about several of the statements Mr. Ripley made to Mr. Stein during the pretest interview. He took the "change of scenery" in the conversation with the police chief to mean that Mr. Ripley should quit the Lake City Police Department and leave town. This conclusion was supported by the reference to the city manager's wanting Mr. Ripley terminated. Cpl. Lyons believed something was "not right" about Mr. Ripley's having an amnesia episode, but then meeting with the chief, rather than going for medical attention. Cpl. Lyons was concerned about the blood test that revealed the presence of prohibited substances in Mr. Ripley's system. Cpl. Lyons was concerned regarding Mr. Ripley's admission that he had operated a motor vehicle after consuming enough alcohol that he could have been charged with driving under the influence, particularly the admission that he had done so as recently as June 2002, which was after Mr. Ripley applied for employment with the PCSO. Finally, Cpl. Lyons noted that Mr. Ripley's statement that he took two annual cycles of steroids over a period of eight years, ending in 1996, conflicted with his statement in his pre-application that he had possessed steroids only "5 to 10 times," the last time being in 1994. On December 11, 2002, Mr. Ripley and seven other candidates sat for the PCSO's oral examination. Mr. Ripley scored 57 out of a possible 63 points, a passing score, but the lowest of the eight candidates who sat for the oral examination on that day. Cpl. Lyons was surprised at Mr. Ripley's low score because applicants who have prior law enforcement experience usually obtain higher scores on the oral examination than do inexperienced applicants. On or about November 20, 2002, Cpl. Lyons obtained from the Lake City Police Department an offense report regarding Mr. Ripley. On January 25, 2002, at around 4:00 p.m., a Lake City patrol car was dispatched "in reference to a disoriented person running around in the street in his underwear." While the officers in the patrol car were unsuccessfully searching the area to which they had been dispatched, they received a second call concerning the same person. The officers contacted the complainant, who told them she had seen a barefoot man, in long underwear and a shirt, walking down the middle of a residential street mumbling to himself and stumbling around. She saw the man fall several times and was worried he would be run over by a car. She and her son coaxed the man into sitting on their front porch until the police could arrive. The lead officer, Sgt. Marshall Sova, recognized the disoriented man as Mr. Ripley, who said he was working on a robbery case. Sgt. Sova walked Mr. Ripley to the patrol car and placed him in the back seat, told the other officer, Misty Gable, to call Columbia County EMS to the scene, then radioed his lieutenant to come to the scene. Sgt. Sova reported that Mr. Ripley was hallucinating, pointing to the empty yard next door, and telling Sgt. Sova, "There they are, go get them," believing he was seeing the men who "committed the robbery." Sgt. Sova sent Officer Gable to Mr. Ripley's residence, one street away from where he was apprehended, to make sure it was secured. Officer Gable drove to Mr. Ripley's house and found the front door standing wide open. She looked inside and saw "no fewer than two hand guns, two full gun magazines, four boxes of ammunition, two police radios, and the keys to the Lake City Police squad car that was parked in his driveway, along with household electronics such as a large TV, video game players and games, a cable box, etc., in plain view from the open front door." Officer Gable radioed a report to Sgt. Sova, who told her to wait there until he and their superior officer, Lt. Dubose, could come over to the house. Columbia County EMS arrived at the scene and carried Mr. Ripley on a stretcher to the rescue vehicle. The paramedics checked Mr. Ripley's blood sugar and found that it was low. Mr. Ripley was transported to the Lake City Medical Center. Lt. Dubose arrived and went with Sgt. Sova to Mr. Ripley's residence for the purpose of obtaining the Lake City Police Department property that Officer Gable reported was inside Mr. Ripley's open apartment. The house was in a state of complete disarray, with standing water in the bathroom. In addition to the Lake City Police Department property, the officers found several prescription drug bottles and body- building supplements. All of the prescription drug bottles were empty, including one that had been refilled with 30 pills two days prior to these events. The officers took possession of the police department property, secured Mr. Ripley's apartment, then returned to headquarters. At the hearing, Cpl. Lyons of the PCSO testified that this police report from the Lake City Police Department caused him great concern about Mr. Ripley's suitability for the position of deputy sheriff. However, nothing in the report caused him to suspect that Mr. Ripley was disabled. At the hearing, Mr. Ripley recounted his medical history and provided his version of events in Lake City. In June 2000, Mr. Ripley suffered a severe sprain of his right ankle while on duty. The medications prescribed for the pain in his ankle exacerbated a colitis condition for which Mr. Ripley was already taking medication. The aggravated colitis required three hospitalizations in the course of one month. In late August 2000, Mr. Ripley underwent surgery to remove his large intestine and rectum, then an ileoanal J-pouch anastomosis, the surgical construction of a fecal reservoir using the lower end of the small intestine. For the better part of a year after the surgery, Mr. Ripley was prescribed large doses of pain medications. He qualified for long-term disability for a period of four months and was sporadically off work for nine months. He returned to work full time in March 2001, then was back in the hospital during June 2001. At the end of July 2001, Mr. Ripley returned to work. His physicians were attempting to wean him from the opiates he was taking for pain. His physician wrote to the Lake City Police Department in support of Mr. Ripley's request for either light duty or night duty. The department placed him on night duty. Mr. Ripley testified that he struggled with his recovery for two years. He suffered from pouchitis, an inflammation of the ileal reservoir created by the reconstructive intestinal surgery. Mr. Ripley suffered from the flu in January 2002 and stated that he was in a state of dehydration when found wandering his neighborhood on January 25, 2002. On January 29, 2002, four days after the "underwear incident" described above, Mr. Ripley entered a substance abuse treatment program for his dependence on prescription medications at Shands at Vista, in Gainesville, Florida. He successfully completed the program on February 22, 2002. Mr. Ripley did not inform the PCSO of his participation in or completion of this program while he was an applicant for a deputy sheriff's position. The PCSO did not learn of Mr. Ripley's treatment until after he filed the amended charge of discrimination that initiated this proceeding. The incident of January 25, 2002, triggered an internal affairs investigation by the Lake City Police Department. At the conclusion of the investigation, several charges against Mr. Ripley were sustained, including conduct unbecoming a police officer, immoral conduct, possessing prescription drugs in a police station without notifying his supervisor, and violations of department policy on the use and secure possession of weapons. The Lake City Police Department internal investigation report form dated March 1, 2002, contains the following notation: "Actions were sustained; employee resigned prior to disciplinary action." At the hearing, Mr. Ripley's chief contentions were that the PCSO was ready and willing to hire him, that it was dissuaded from doing so entirely due to the Lake City Police Department's report of the January 25, 2002, incident, and that this incident was caused by his disability. The disability claimed by Mr. Ripley was prescription drug dependency, subsequently rehabilitated through his successful completion of the Shands substance abuse treatment program in February 2002. Accepting arguendo that Mr. Ripley's claimed disability meets the criteria of "handicap" for purposes of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, the evidence did not establish that the PCSO was ever made aware of this disability, much less based its decision not to hire Mr. Ripley on that disability. Cpl. Lyons, who was Mr. Ripley's main point of contact with the PCSO, was unaware of any of Mr. Ripley's medical records, except for the medical clearance form authorizing Mr. Ripley to take the physical abilities test. In their discussions, Mr. Ripley never mentioned to Cpl. Lyons that he had a drug dependence problem or any other disability, nor did he request any form of accommodation. Cpl. Lyons believed Mr. Ripley to be "very physically fit," as evidenced by his exceptionally good time in the physical abilities test and saw nothing that made it appear Mr. Ripley would need an accommodation. Cpl. Lyons testified that Mr. Ripley's medical condition was not considered because it could not be used as a factor in eliminating Mr. Ripley from consideration.4/ Cpl. Lyons brought Mr. Ripley's file to the attention of Lt. Dean LaChance, his superior in the PCSO's Human Resources Division. Cpl. Lyons told Lt. LaChance that one of the applicants had been seen "in his neighborhood running around in his underwear" and that Lt. LaChance might want to look at Mr. Ripley's file and make a hiring decision. Cpl. Lyons sent the file to Lt. LaChance, attaching a note that stated, "Prior [experience with] Lake City. Need to read his [polygraph report]. Also see the report from Lake City [Police Department] . . . Not the greatest pick so far." Lt. LaChance reviewed Mr. Ripley's file, including the pre-application and polygraph. Lt. LaChance recommended that Mr. Ripley's file be closed, meaning that Mr. Ripley should be removed from the pool of eligible applicants. Lt. LaChance based his recommendation on the facts that Mr. Ripley's oral examination scores were low and that "we had better applicants in the file," as well as on the "underwear incident." Lt. LaChance also noted the discrepancies regarding steroids between Mr. Ripley's polygraph examination and his pre- application. Lt. LaChance noted other problems with Mr. Ripley's polygraph: his statement that the city manager wanted him fired; the fact Mr. Ripley resigned during an open internal affairs investigation; Mr. Ripley's "change of scenery" language, which Lt. LaChance took to mean that Mr. Ripley was told to quit or be fired; and Mr. Ripley's admission that he had operated a motor vehicle at least ten times under the influence of alcohol, even while he was going through the PCSO's background investigation. Lt. LaChance never met Mr. Ripley and never spoke to him prior to the hearing in this matter. He had no knowledge that Mr. Ripley claimed a disability and saw nothing in Mr. Ripley's file to make him suspect that Mr. Ripley had a disability. He had no knowledge that Mr. Ripley had gone through a drug abuse treatment program. The only medical information available to Lt. LaChance was Mr. Ripley's polygraph statements regarding his prior surgeries. Based on Mr. Ripley's statements, Lt. LaChance considered Mr. Ripley's medical condition to have been temporary and "fixed" by his surgery. Mr. Ripley had done a "great job" on the physical abilities test, and Lt. LaChance did not consider him to be disabled in any way. Lt. LaChance testified that it is the PCSO's general practice not to hire people who have been terminated or have resigned under investigation from other law enforcement agencies. He stated that his agency has more than enough qualified applicants and has no need to hire an applicant with "the kind of baggage" that Mr. Ripley presented. Mr. Ripley believed that part of the "understanding" between him and the Lake City Police Department was that the internal investigation report of the January 25, 2002, incident would not be circulated to potential employers. This belief explains why Mr. Ripley apparently thought he could finesse the question of why he resigned with casual references to a "change of scenery," and why Mr. Ripley did not mention his prescription drug dependency and rehabilitation in his PCSO application. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, it is found that the PCSO had no knowledge of Mr. Ripley's claimed disability. No PCSO employee perceived Mr. Ripley as having a disability. Mr. Ripley's application file was closed based on factors unrelated to his alleged disability.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 2005.
The Issue Did Respondent leave the Southside Middle School campus without permission in the 1989-90 school year; in that same year, did Respondent make a threatening complaint in writing to Vice Principal, Peggy Williams; in that same year, did Respondent fail to submit a written report of a fight between students; did Respondent use profanity in the school year 1990-91 while employed at Southside Middle School; did Respondent leave campus without permission and leave his classes unattended in the school year 1991-92 while employed at Lake Shore Middle School; did Respondent engage in inappropriate conduct with students by grabbing a male student, M.F., by the shoulders and squeezing that student's shoulders and making that student go to his knees in the school year 1992-93 while employed at Lake Shore Middle School; did Respondent in that same year grab and hit A.H. in the chest and in the stomach; did Respondent in that same year pull the student, J.W.'s ear; did Respondent in that same year plan a field trip to Walt Disney World, Florida, without approval from the Duval County School District; did Respondent fail to follow district procedures for purchasing t-shirts and sweatshirts for students; did Respondent in the school year 1993-94 while employed at the Lake Shore Middle School fail to comply with guidelines in submitting a "no show" list related to student attendance; and did Respondent engage in profanity in the presence of students in that same year?
Findings Of Fact At times relevant to the inquiry Respondent has held Florida teaching certificate number 638543 covering the areas of health, biology, and physical education. In the fall of 1989, Respondent began employment with the Duval County, Florida, School Board in a teaching position at Southside Middle School. While serving as a teacher at Southside Middle School, Respondent broke up a fight between two students that was occurring in a hallway. Following the incident his obligation was to file a written report detailing the facts. That report was due immediately. The Respondent had to be reminded twice before rendering the report. The report was rendered before the students met with a school hearing officer to resolve the incident. In the fall of 1991, Respondent voluntarily transferred to an assignment at Lake Shore Middle School. That school is also part of the Duval County School District. On one occasion while Respondent was employed at Lake Shore Middle School, Timothy Hamel, another teacher at that school, observed that Respondent's class had been left unattended from approximately 3:40 p.m. until 4:00 p.m. On another occasion, while Respondent was employed at Lake Shore Middle School, Respondent left campus at a time when he did not have classes and did not return until after school had concluded for the day. As a consequence, he missed instruction periods for some classes that he was responsible for teaching. This circumstance was established through testimony from Arlene Guthrie, Assistant Principal for Curriculum at Lake Shore Middle School. The proof submitted at hearing did not satisfactorily demonstrate that the Respondent had made arrangements to cover classes which he missed on this occasion. In the spring of 1993, Respondent was interested in taking some students on a field trip to Walt Disney World, Florida. A conversation was held between the Principal at Lake Shore Middle School and the Respondent concerning this field trip. The principal was persuaded that it was too late in the year to schedule a field trip. Nonetheless, Respondent replied that he was going on the field trip and would rent a van on his own to transport the students, separate and apart from school sanctioned transportation. In the conversation concerning the field trip, the principal asked Respondent if he had obtained parent/guardian permission slips for the students to attend the outing. Respondent replied in the affirmative. A permission information sheet directed to the parents or guardians pertaining to the nature of the field trip was prepared on the Lake Shore Middle School letterhead and signed by Respondent, as sponsor for a school club known as Manhood, Achievement, Community Service. That information sheet indicated that the trip would take place on May 28-30, 1993. Further, it indicated that expenses would be taken care of, except for meals and spending money for the students. The correspondence went on to indicate that the parents or guardians would be informed of the hotel address after receipt of confirmation of room reservations. The information sheet indicated the departure and return time. Respondent confirmed the knowledge of the parents about those details by having them sign the information sheet. As discussed between Respondent and the principal, there was no mention in the information sheet about Respondent arranging for transportation on his own by renting a van. When the principal asked Respondent about the duration of the trip, Respondent indicated that it was more than a single-day trip. The principal wanted to know if Respondent had made arrangements for a place to stay. At that time, Respondent replied that no such arrangements had been made but that Respondent would obtain a place to stay. The principal was not convinced that the parents and guardians were sufficiently apprised of the nature of this outing and told Respondent that Respondent could not take the trip. After the conclusion of the conversation between the Respondent and the principal, Respondent still insisted that he was going on the field trip to Walt Disney World. In the conversation between the principal and Respondent concerning the field trip, the issue related to the payment for the trip was addressed. The principal was concerned that there was not enough money to pay for the trip and asked the Respondent how the balance of the money was to be paid. Respondent replied that the parents would pay. When the principal asked if Respondent had consulted with the parents concerning this additional cost, the answer was no. The conference between the principal and Respondent was held two or three days before the trip was to take place. When it became obvious that the school district, from the principal's perspective, did not wish to sanction the trip, matters were left in the posture that if the Respondent wanted to go on the trip as an adult in charge of those children, then that arrangement would have to be carried out between Respondent and the parents. In that setting of a private trip the school district did not want the Respondent to create the appearance that the trip was a trip sanctioned by the school district. Eventually correspondence was given to the Respondent from Gerlieve R. Oliver, Assistant Superintendent, Middle Schools, Duval County School System, confirming that the Respondent did not have permission to take an official school trip to Disney World. The correspondence also informed the Respondent that he could not take a non-school related trip, given that the written communications to parents concerning the trip was made on school letter head, thus creating the appearance of being a school sponsored trip. This appearance caused the school district to instruct the Respondent that he could not take a non-school trip either. This communication dated May 26, 1993, informed the Respondent that the parents or guardians of the students who were to be taken on the trip would be made aware of the telephone conversation between the Respondent and Ms. Oliver concerning the field trip. The conversation between Respondent and Assistant Superintendent Oliver was instigated by Respondent. It is that telephone conversation that led to the preparation of the correspondence. The correspondence from the assistant superintendent to the Respondent reminded the Respondent that if he failed to follow the directions that he might put himself in jeopardy concerning employment with the district and admonished Respondent to be more careful in adhering to directions. The correspondence from Ms. Oliver to Respondent also mentioned that if Respondent were more careful about following procedures in the future that this would result in the Respondent being able to provide opportunities for his students. This is taken to mean opportunities such as field trips. While Respondent was employed at Lake Shore Middle School there was a policy related to what is referred to as a "no show" list. In particular, at the commencement of the school year a given school counts the number of students in attendance as a means of determining the amount of money the school is entitled to for conducting its operations. The expectation is that the individual school teacher will document this count by calling a roll each day and turning in a slip to the administrative offices verifying the students who did not attend school on that day. Respondent did not comply with that requirement. While Respondent was teaching at Lake Shore Middle School an incident occurred between male students K.A. and M.F. in the school lunch room. K.A. and M.F. were arguing. Respondent came over and broke up the argument by grabbing both of the students by their respective shoulders. On two other occasions while Respondent was in the lunch room with the students, he grabbed A.H. around the neck in the first encounter and the second encounter grabbed that student by the shoulder. When Respondent grabbed A.H. around the neck the student winced and frowned. The reason for that initial encounter between the Respondent and A.H. is not clear. On the second occasion Respondent grabbed A.H. by the shoulder, A.H. had similar expression in that he winced and frowned. Again it is unclear concerning the reason for Respondent's actions. In the experience of K.A., while attending a class taught by Respondent, he observed Respondent curse in class on a somewhat frequent basis. That frequency was as much as four times a day, three days a week. On one occasion K.A. observed Respondent grab D.A. around the neck and tell D.A. to sit down or Respondent was going to be "kicking his fucking ass." Other curse words that K.A. heard the Respondent use were words like "ass", "damn", and "asshole". According to Ms. Guthrie, an expert in education, cursing in front of students, using inappropriate discipline such as grabbing necks and shoulders of students and leaving the class unattended on more than one occasion, constitutes a circumstance in which the Respondent has lost his effectiveness as a teacher. That opinion by Ms. Guthrie is accepted.
Recommendation Based on the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent in violation of the four counts in the Administrative Complaint and suspending the Respondent's teaching certificate for thirty (30) days. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Nathan L. Bond, Esquire 2121 Killarney Way, Suite G Tallahassee, Florida 32308 J. David Holder, Esquire 1408 Piedmont Way Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Steven A. Williams 6200 South Barnes Road, P-20 Jacksonville, Florida 32216-5633 Karen Wilde, Executive Director Education Practices Commission 301 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Kathleen M. Richards, Administrator Professional Practices Services 352 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact I. Respondent has worked as a custodian at Lake Worth High School since January, 1980. During the 1983-84 school year, he was assigned to work the 3:00 p.m. 11:30 p.m. shift. His duties included cleaning the top floors of the administration building, the old gymnasium, and the fieldhouse. His immediate supervisor was Edward Jerkins, Head Custodian at Lake Worth High School. Sometime in April, 1983, Mr. Jerkins received information that respondent and another custodian, Sam Kelly, were allegedly using marijuana while at work. Mr. Jerkins decided to investigate. On May 26, 1983, at approximately 9:45 p.m. -from the upper level of the administration building which overlooks the old gym area -Mr. Jerkins saw Sam Kelly enter the gym. Mr. Kelly was not assigned to work in this area, and it was not yet break time. Mr. Jerkins then saw respondent, who was sweeping the sidewalk outside of the old gym, enter the gym several minutes later. Mr. Jerkins waited for approximately one half hour, then proceeded to the old gym. On his way to the gym, he noticed that no one else was in the area. The doors to the gym were locked. He unlocked the doors with his key and entered the gym. He observed respondent and Sam Kelly sitting in the bleachers, and detected a strong odor of marijuana. Smoke was visible. Mr. Jerkins accused both men of smoking marijuana. The next day, he reported the incident to David D. Cant1ey, Principal of Lake Worth High School. After receiving Mr. Jerkins' report, Mr. Cantley warned both men that if they were found using marijuana on the school campus he would recommend to the Superintendent that their employment be terminated. II. On August 10, 1983, Kurt W. Auwaerter, Detective for the Lake Worth Police Department, was assigned to road patrol duties on the midnight 8:00 a.m. shift. He patrolled the southwest section of Lake Worth which includes the Lake Worth High School campus. On this date, Detective Auwaerter made his first routine check at Lake Worth High School at approximately 12:30 a.m. He dr9ve his police car to the rear of the school where the cafeteria was located. At that point he observed an unidentified man standing by a car. Since no one else was in the area and it was late at night, Detective Auwaerter became suspicious. He approached the man and asked for identification. The man produced a Florida drivers license, which indicated that he was the respondent. During this exchange, respondent was standing next to the door on the driver's side of the car. The detective, while speaking to respondent, looked into respondent's car with his flashlight. In plain view on the front seat of the car was a tray which held a cigarette "rolling" paper containing a brownish-green vegetable material. The detective recognized this material as marijuana. In addition, when the detective reached into the front seat of the car, he found a small manila envelope containing more of the same substance. He then arrested respondent for possession f marijuana, and transported him to the Lake Worth Police Station. The detective weighed the substance believed to be marijuana and determined that it weighed less than 20 grams. The substance was field tested and the test showed that it was, in fact, marijuana. 1/ On August 29, 1983, W. Paul LaChance, a schools board investigator, met with respondent and Principal Cantley. Because respondent spoke and understood little English, Carmen Chereza, an Hispanic native and substitute teacher at Lake Worth High School, was asked to interpret. Ms. Chereza translated Mr. LaChance's questions into Spanish and directed them to respondent. When he answered the questions, she repeated his answer in Spanish. If he agreed that it was correct, she translated it into English for Mr. LaChance and Principal Cantley. Respondent indicated that, sometime after midnight on August 10, 1983, he left work at Lake Worth High School. He approached his vehicle in the school parking lot and saw a small bag on the ground containing what he thought was marijuana. He picked it up and hid it in his car -intending to use it later. A few minutes later, Detective Auwaerter arrested him for possession of marijuana and took him to the Lake Worth Police Department. Respondent is familiar with marijuana and testified, at hearing, that he believed the substance in the bag to be marijuana. If a student is caught in possession of illicit drugs on school grounds, disciplinary action is taken. This rule should apply, with equal firmness, to employees of the school system. Due to the prior warning he received in May, 1983, respondent understood that if he was caught with marijuana on the school campus he would be recommended for termination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent be terminated from his employment for misconduct in office. DONE and ENTERED this percent percentay of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of May, 1984.
The Issue Whether respondent's Florida Teacher's Certificate should be revoked or otherwise disciplined on charges of professional misconduct, including gross immorality, acts involving moral turpitude, conduct which seriously reduces his effectiveness as an employee of the school board, intentionally exposing a student to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement, exploiting a professional relationship with a student for personal gain, and failing to conform to standards of ethical conduct, in violation of Section 231.28, Florida Statutes, and Rules 6B-1.06(3)(e) and (h), and 6B-1.01(3), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds Florida Teacher's Certificate 342171, covering the area of physical education. At all times material to the administrative complaint, respondent was employed as a physical education teacher at Lake Worth High School in the Palm Beach County School District. From 1973, when he joined the Palm Beach County School District, to the date of his suspension for the acts complained of in the administrative complaint, he was consistently rated to be a good teacher. His teaching ability and performance were not in question. He also maintained a close relationship with his students, frequently assisting them beyond the requirements of his job. On the afternoon of May 23, 1983, at approximately 2:30 p.m., respondent entered the K-Mart department store in Lantana, Florida, accompanied by his niece, Cathy Brown. While shopping in the store, he selected a 68-quart cooler, bearing a price tag of $43.58, then proceeded to the hardware department, where he selected a Black and Decker electric drill, bearing a price tag of $22.99. He left the hardware department and proceeded to the garden/patio area or Garden Shop. Before reaching the double glass doors separating the main building from the Garden Shop, he stopped and placed the large box (containing the 68-quart cooler) and the small box (containing the electric drill) on the floor at the end of an aisle approximately 30 feet from the double glass doors. Be then walked directly to the double glass doors opening onto the Garden Shop, and glanced in the direction of the checkout counter located at the Garden Shop exit. He then walked back past the cooler and electric drill, and proceeded into the appliance department where he met Cathy Brown. Ms. Brown had previously selected a package of hair curlers, bearing a price tag of $1.38. He and Ms. Brown briefly examined several items on a display counter in the appliance department, then returned to the place where he had placed the cooler and electric drill. He picked up these two items and proceeded to the Garden Shop; Cathy Brown, who was carrying the hair curlers, accompanied him. Jeanette Grimes, a 17-year-old Lake Worth High School student, was--at that particular time--the cashier at the register located at the Garden Shop checkout counter. Ms. Grimes knew respondent. Be had been her physical education teacher for two years and basketball coach for one year. She considered him a friend. As respondent approached the checkout counter where Ms. Grimes was serving as cashier, he placed the box containing the cooler and the box containing the electric drill on the floor at the far end of the checkout counter, not on the counter itself. At that time there were customers at the checkout counter who were being waited on by Ms. Grimes. He and Cathy Brown walked away from the checkout counter and began looking at plants. After Ms. Grimes had finished checking out the customers at her counter, he and Ms. Brown again approached the checkout counter, where he engaged Ms. Grimes in conversation. At no time did he place any items on the counter for Ms. Grimes to examine and ring up. At that time she rang up a $1.00 item and a $5.00 item, totalled the transaction at $6.00, then rang up a $.30 tax, and totalled the transaction at $6.30. He handed Ms. Grimes $10.00 in payment for the merchandise. She mistakenly rang up $10.00 for an additional item of merchandise, voided the $10.00 item off her tape, and re-rang $10.00 as cash tendered. At that point the cash register opened and indicated that change in the amount of $3.70 was due. Ms. Grimes gave respondent $3.70 in change and a receipt for the transaction. During the course of ringing up the transaction, the items of merchandise remained on the floor at the end of the counter. Ms. Grimes did not pick up the items and examine them for a price tag while ringing up the amounts. Upon the completion of the transaction, Ms. Brown engaged Ms. Grimes in conversation. Ms. Brown handed to Ms. Grimes the box containing the electric drill and the package containing the curlers; Ms. Grimes placed the items into a bag which she gave to Ms. Brown. Respondent then picked up the box containing the 68-quart cooler and left the store, accompanied by Ms. Brown, who carried the bag containing the curlers and the electric drill. Both respondent and Ms. Brown were aware that they had not paid the full price for the merchandise, and that what they were doing was wrong. Mr. Frank Heim, K-Mart's Lobs Prevention Manager, (store detective) observed respondent's activities in the K-Mart continuously, from the time respondent selected the electric drill in the hardware department to his exit from the store. Mr. Heim observed the transaction at the checkout counter, then immediately proceeded to Ms. Grimes' register, examined the register tape, and proceeded to the parking lot to ask that respondent return to the store. Mr. Heim located respondent at his (respondent's) truck in the parking lot. Respondent had placed the cooler in the back of his truck and Cathy Brown was still holding the bag containing the curlers and the electric drill. Mr. Heim identified himself to respondent, advised him of a problem with the purchase which he had just made, and requested that he return to the store with the merchandise to clear the matter up. Respondent replied that he had paid for the merchandise and had a receipt, that it was not his fault if the cashier rang up the wrong prices. After some additional conversation, respondent removed the cooler from the back of his truck and accompanied Mr. Heim back to the store. Upon entering the store through the Garden Shop entrance, respondent placed the cooler on the floor just inside the entrance, then stopped and attempted to discuss the matter with Mr. Heim. Mr. Heim advised respondent that they could not discuss the matter at that location, that they would have to go to his office. As they approached Mr. Heim's office, respondent again stopped, placed the cooler and the bag containing the other two items on the floor, and stated to Mr. Heim that he was not going inside his office. Mr. Heim replied that they could not discuss the matter in the store, and that respondent would have to accompany him inside his office. Respondent replied that he did not have time to discuss the matter, that he was in a hurry and had to leave. Mr. Heim then advised respondent that he was not free to leave and that he was being detained for shoplifting. Respondent became agitated, stated "You've got your stuff back," and began walking away. Mr. Heim sought help from others, then blocked respondent's path at the glass doors between the main store and the Garden Shop. He told respondent not to make the situation worse by trying to leave the store, but respondent attempted to force his way by Mr. Heim. Mr. Heim grabbed him by the arm and a brief scuffle ensued. At that point, respondent ripped up his cash register receipt and discarded the remnants onto a display counter. Mr. Heim immediately retrieved the remnants and later Scotch- taped the pieces together. After respondent became calmer, he returned with Mr. Heim to his office. After entering the office, Mr. Heim advised respondent of his "Miranda" rights. Mr. Heim asked him for identification and asked him to empty his pockets in order to make sure he had no weapons. Respondent removed a total of approximately $22.00 from one of his socks while in the office. Respondent admits that at the time he entered the K-Mart store, he had only approximately $30.00 on his person. The total retail price of the three items, according to the price tags affixed to each, totalled $67.95. In response to Mr. Heim's questions, respondent continuously stated that it was not his fault that the cashier rang up the wrong prices and that he paid her the amount she rang up. Conflicting accounts of this incident were given by Mr. Heim and respondent. Taking into account Mr. Heim's detached and professional manner, and his lack of apparent bias or motive to falsify, it is concluded that his testimony is more credible than respondent's, and is persuasive. As a result of this incident, respondent was arrested and charged with the crime of retail theft. Based upon the circumstances described herein, Jeanette Grimes was fired by the K-Mart department store. She was also arrested and charged with the crime of retail theft. Jeanette Grimes' job at K-Mart was a requirement for one of her school classes, "Work Experience." As a result of her being fired, she failed the course. Respondent's effectiveness as a teacher was seriously reduced as a result of his conduct and the accompanying notoriety which it received in the community. The circumstances of his offense, his arrest, and his suspension from his teaching position, all received notoriety through publication of articles in three newspapers of general circulation in the Lake Worth community.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Education Practices Commission find respondent guilty of violating Section 231.28 and Rule 6B-1.06, as alleged, and revoke his Florida Teacher's Certificate. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Holder, Esquire P. O. Box 1694 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John Chamblee, Esquire 202 Cardy Street Tampa, Florida 33606 Donald L. Griesheimer, Executive Director Department of Education Education Practices Commission Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ralph D. Turlington, Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue This is a rule challenge proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. In his original petition the Petitioner sought to challenge several rules of the Department, as well as certain Department policy and procedure directives and internal operating procedures of Florida State Prison. At the hearing the scope of the issues was narrowed by agreement of the Petitioner to challenges to the following: Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code; Department of Corrections Policy and Procedure Directives 4.07.06 and 4.10.51; and Florida State Prison Institutional Operating Procedure No. 4-86.04.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony at the final hearing and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact. The Petitioner, Ervin J. Horton, is an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is presently confined at Florida State Prison. At the time of the hearing in this case, the Petitioner was on confinement status and he has been on confinement status in the past. Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, has been adopted by the Department of Corrections. The title of the rule is "Legal Documents and Legal and Privileged Mail." The general subject matter of the rule concerns the preparation, mailing, and receipt of legal documents and legal mail by inmates. The rule is applicable to the Petitioner. The Department of Corrections has adopted Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.07.06, which is titled "Preparation And Processing Of Legal Documents And Legal Mail." This directive is for the most part a restatement of many of the provisions of Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code. The directive also includes a provision requiring each prison Superintendent to issue an institutional policy memorandum to effectuate the provisions of the directive. The Department of Corrections has adopted Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.10.51, which is titled "Law Libraries." The directive is in part a restatement of portions of Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code. However, for the most part it sets forth the Department's policies regarding the establishment, operation, and maintenance of prison law libraries. Portions of the directive contain limitations on the time, place, and manner in which inmates may use the law libraries. The Superintendent of Florida State Prison has adopted Institutional Operating Procedure No. 4-86.04, which is titled "Preparation Of Legal Documents By Inmates." This is an institutional policy memorandum required by Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.07.06. IOP No. 4-86.04 addresses the same general subject matter as is addressed by Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.07.06. The IOP includes additional specific details for implementation of Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.07.06 and Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, at the Florida State Prison facility. As a result of his status as an inmate at Florida State Prison, the Rule, the Policy And Procedure Directives, and the Institutional Operating Procedure described above are applicable to the Petitioner to the extent they regulate his activities within the scope of those documents. The documents described above in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of these findings of fact are the only documents to which this rule challenge proceeding is addressed. The testimony at the hearing consisted largely of anecdotal testimony regarding a long series of Petitioner's alleged individual problems within the State correctional system. Some of his problems have been real; others appear to probably have been imaginary. All of the problems described by Petitioner were largely irrelevant to the issues raised in the petition. And to the extent portions of Petitioner's testimony were relevant to the general subject matter at hand, the testimony did not tend to demonstrate that the challenged documents were invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. The exhibits offered by Petitioner were of the same general tenor as his testimony.
The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2015),1/ Petitioner forfeited his Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) Investment Plan account by entering a nolo contendere plea to two counts of violating section 893.13(2)(a)1., Florida Statutes, a second-degree felony.
Findings Of Fact The Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding Mr. Combs began working for DOC on May 25, 2001, as a Correctional Officer Level 1 at the Union Correctional Institution (“Union Correctional”) in Raiford, Florida. Union Correctional is a maximum security facility housing approximately 2,000 inmates, and Mr. Combs assisted with their care and custody. In January of 2006, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Sergeant. While his responsibilities were very similar to those of his previous position, Mr. Combs was now supervising other correctional officers. In October of 2011, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Lieutenant, and was responsible for supervising 50 to 70 correctional officers at Union Correctional. In April of 2013, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Captain, and transferred to Florida State Prison in Starke, Florida. A captain is the highest ranking correctional officer on a given shift, and Mr. Combs supervised approximately 50 correctional officers at a time, including sergeants and lieutenants. Like Union Correctional, Florida State Prison is a maximum security facility housing approximately 2,000 prisoners. A colonel manages Florida State Prison, and it has two separate units. One of those units is a work camp housing lower- custody inmates who may work outside the facility, and the main prison is the other unit. Each of the units is run by its own major. In February of 2015, Mr. Combs was promoted to Major and took charge of the work camp at Florida State Prison. At some point in 2014 and prior to his promotion to Major, Mr. Combs had begun taking Oxycodone recreationally. Mr. Combs typically purchased one Oxycodone pill three to four times a week, and Dylan Hilliard (a Correctional Officer 1 at Florida State Prison) was Mr. Combs’ primary source of Oxycodone. Mr. Hilliard usually worked at the main prison, but he occasionally worked at the work camp. Mr. Combs knew Mr. Hilliard because of their employment with DOC. Mr. Combs purchased Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard at the latter’s home in Lawtey, Florida. However, some transactions occurred in Mr. Combs’ state-issued housing on the grounds of Florida State Prison. Mr. Hilliard charged Mr. Combs $35 for an Oxycodone pill, and that was a discount from the $38 price Mr. Hilliard charged others. Mr. Combs allowed his subordinates (Sergeants Jesse Oleveros and Evan Williams) to leave Florida State Prison during their shifts in order to purchase illegal drugs from Mr. Hilliard. After returning from their transactions with Mr. Hilliard, Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams would give Mr. Combs an Oxycodone pill free of charge. Operation Checkered Flag was a joint task force led by the Bradford County Sheriff’s Office, and its purpose was to arrest individuals involved with the distribution and use of illegal drugs. The authorities arrested Mr. Hilliard after he engaged in an illegal drug transaction with an undercover agent from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. A subsequent search of Mr. Hilliard’s cell phone revealed text messages between Mr. Hilliard and several other DOC employees, including Mr. Combs. Mr. Hilliard referred to Mr. Combs as “Chicken-Hawk” or “Hawk” in those text messages, and the two of them used car part terminology as a code for different milligram sizes of Oxycodone. Operation Checkered Flag ultimately resulted in the arrest of 10 DOC employees. The authorities arrested Mr. Combs on July 1, 2015, based on allegations that he had committed six felonies relating to the alleged unlawful and illegal purchase and distribution of Oxycodone. DOC fired Mr. Combs on approximately July 1, 2015. Mr. Combs initially denied all of the allegations. However, after spending nearly 56 days in jail, Mr. Combs reached an agreement with the State Attorney’s Office in Bradford County that called for his criminal charges to be reduced in exchange for his cooperation with Operation Checkered Flag. During an interview on August 20, 2015, with members of Operation Checkered Flag, Mr. Combs admitted that he had purchased Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. In addition, Mr. Combs admitted that on six or seven occasions he allowed Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams to leave the prison grounds so that they could purchase Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. The State Attorney’s Office in Bradford County chose to dismiss most of the charges against Mr. Combs. The Information ultimately filed against Mr. Combs set forth two counts alleging that he violated section 893.13(2)(a)1., by illegally purchasing Oxycodone on March 23, 2015, and March 31, 2015. Those purchases occurred approximately 10 miles from Florida State Prison at Mr. Hilliard’s residence in Lawtey, Florida. Neither Mr. Combs nor Mr. Hilliard was on duty during those transactions. On August 25, 2015, Mr. Combs pled nolo contendere. The Bradford County Circuit Court entered judgment against Mr. Combs based on the two violations of section 893.13(2)(a)1., but withheld adjudication. All of the conduct underlying Mr. Combs’ nolo contendere plea occurred while he was employed by DOC. The SBA Determines that Mr. Combs Forfeited his FRS Benefits At all times relevant to the instant case, Mr. Combs was a member of the FRS. The FRS is the legislatively-created general retirement system established by chapter 121, Florida Statutes. See § 121.021(3), Fla. Stat. The SBA is the governmental entity that administers the FRS Investment Plan, a defined retirement benefits contribution plan. § 121.4501(1), Fla. Stat. Via a letter dated August 3, 2015, the SBA notified Mr. Combs that a hold had been placed on his FRS account due to the criminal charges. As a result, no distribution of employer contributions from Mr. Combs’ account would be permitted until the SBA had evaluated the final disposition of those criminal charges. Via a letter dated September 3, 2015, the SBA notified Mr. Combs that he had forfeited his FRS benefits as a result of his nolo contendere plea. In support thereof, the SBA cited section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, which provides for the forfeiture of a public employee’s FRS retirement benefits upon the entry of a nolo contendere plea to certain types of offenses. The SBA’s letter closed by notifying Mr. Combs of his right to challenge the SBA’s proposed action through an administrative hearing. Mr. Combs requested a formal administrative hearing and asserted that the crimes for which he was convicted did not fall within the scope of section 112.3173(2)(e). In other words, Mr. Combs argued that his convictions were not associated with his employment at DOC and thus did not amount to a violation of the public trust. Testimony Adduced at the Final Hearing Mr. Combs testified that he was responsible for the work camp and the supervision of the correctional officers assigned there. He also testified that he would occasionally supervise correctional officers who normally worked in the main prison. Mr. Combs testified that Mr. Hilliard was his primary source of Oxycodone and that Mr. Hilliard occasionally worked at the work camp. Mr. Combs was aware that two Florida State Prison employees who worked directly under him (Sergeant Jesse Oleveros and Sergeant Evan Williams) were purchasing Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs testified that he allowed Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams to leave Florida State Prison grounds six or seven times in order to purchase Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs testified that Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams would give him an Oxycodone pill after returning from their transactions with Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs acknowledged during his testimony that DOC policy prohibits correctional officers from leaving prison grounds during their shift. Mr. Combs acknowledged that it was a violation of DOC policy and Florida law to allow a correctional officer to leave prison grounds during a shift for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics. Mr. Combs also acknowledged that it was a violation of DOC policy and Florida law to allow a correctional officer to be on prison grounds with illegal narcotics. Finally, Mr. Combs acknowledged that as a sworn officer with the Department of Corrections, he had an obligation to report any criminal activity committed by a correctional officer working at Florida State Prison, regardless of whether that correctional officer reported to him. Findings of Ultimate Fact An examination of the circumstances associated with Mr. Combs’ Oxycodone purchases from Mr. Hilliard demonstrates that there is a nexus between Mr. Combs’ employment as a correctional officer with DOC and his commission of the crimes to which he pled nolo contendere. For instance, Mr. Combs came to know his primary source of Oxycodone (Mr. Hilliard) through their mutual employment with DOC. Indeed, Mr. Combs supervised Mr. Hilliard when the latter was assigned to the work camp at Florida State Prison. Also, Mr. Combs knew that these transactions were illegal. As noted above, he and Mr. Hilliard used a code based on car part references to disguise the actual subject of their communications. Contrary to DOC policy and Florida Law, Mr. Combs allowed two of his subordinates (Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams) to leave Florida State Prison during their duty shifts in order to purchase illegal drugs from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs would then receive a free pill from Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams. Mr. Hilliard sold Oxycodone to Mr. Combs at a reduced price. It is reasonable to infer that Mr. Combs received this discount due to his high-ranking position at Mr. Hilliard’s place of employment and because Mr. Combs facilitated Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams’ purchases of Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs willfully violated DOC policy and Florida law by allowing correctional officers to leave prison grounds during a shift for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics. Mr. Combs knowingly violated his obligation as a sworn correctional officer by not reporting the criminal activity committed by Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs defrauded the public from receiving the faithful performance of his duties as a correctional officer. The public had a right to expect that one of its employees would not purchase drugs from someone he supervised. The public also had a right to expect that Mr. Combs would not use his authority at Florida State Prison to facilitate Mr. Hilliard’s illegal drug sales to other DOC employees. In addition, the public had a right to expect that Mr. Combs would not engage in illegal transactions on the grounds of Florida State Prison. Mr. Combs realized a profit, gain, or advantage through the power or duties associated with his position as a Major at DOC. Specifically, Mr. Combs satisfied his Oxycodone habit through purchases made from a DOC employee who he supervised. Also, Mr. Combs used his position to facilitate other sales by Mr. Hilliard, and Mr. Combs’ assistance led to him receiving free Oxycodone and a discounted price on his Oxycodone purchases. The findings set forth above in paragraphs 49 through 57 are the only ones needed to establish a nexus between Mr. Combs’ public employment and the two counts to which he pled nolo contendere. That nexus is evident from Mr. Combs’ testimony, Mr. Combs’ Responses to the SBA’s Requests for Admissions, and the Stipulated Facts. It was not necessary to consider the exhibits to which Mr. Combs raised objections, i.e., the arrest warrant, the warrant affidavit, and the audio recordings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration issue a final order finding that Petitioner was a public employee convicted of specified offenses that were committed prior to retirement, and that pursuant to section 112.3173 he has forfeited all of his rights and benefits in his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account, except for the return of his accumulated contributions as of the date of his termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Douglas L. Adams is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution. On August 26, 1985, he was awakened early in the morning and brought before a disciplinary hearing for an alleged violation of institutional rules and regulations. Prior to the hearing, he was advised by a correctional officer to pack up all his personal property and to bring it with him to the hearing. Mr. Adams took with him as much as he could which included his clothing and other personal effects, but he was unable to carry all he owned with him at one time. He did not ask for either help in carrying his property or a cart to carry it in prior to leaving his cell area to go to the hearing. When he arrived at the movement center where the hearing was to be held, he advised the authorities there that he did not have all his property with him. At that point, he asked for help or the use of a cart to go get the rest of his property but he was refused because no cart was there. As a result, he went to the hearing leaving some of his property in his cell area and while in the hearing, contends he was required to leave his property in the control center. This property was secured in a storage room behind the control center which, while not locked, was not available for access to other inmates unless they were accompanied by a corrections officer. When the hearing was over and Mr. Adams, who had been directed to administrative confinement requested to go back to his former cell area to get the rest of his property, his request was refused. His property was inventoried by UCI personnel at that time, but because in his opinion the inventory was not complete, Mr. Adams refused to sign the form. When he was released from administrative confinement he claims he did not get all his property back. He relates that he was told he had forfeited whatever property he had not brought to the hearing. As a result, he filed a complaint on September 16, 1985, which was subsequently denied. Petitioner has been incarcerated in 7 or 8 institutions within the Department of Corrections including Florida State Prison, River Junction Correctional Institution, Baker Correctional Institution, Polk Correctional Institution, Old Unit, the Reception and Medical Center, and DeSoto Correctional Institution. At each one of these institutions a rule similar to this one was in existence. At Baker Correctional Institution, the inmate was required to bring his mattress as well. Robert Craig has been in prison for a total of 27 years and has been incarcerated in almost every major penal institution in the State of Florida that was built prior to the last five years. At Avon Park Correctional Institution he underwent a disciplinary hearing and was told at the time to bring all his personal property with him to the hearing. While in the hearing, he was required to leave all his property outside in the hall. At Cross City Correctional Institution the guards took him to the hearing without his property, bringing his property along afterwards. In essence, at all the institutions where he was incarcerated, there was some variation of the same procedure regarding his personal property. He either had to bring it to the hearing or it was packed up prior to the hearing. At no institution was his property inventoried prior to the hearing. As a result, he has lost personal property including a calculator for which he was subsequently reimbursed by the institution. According to Mr. Craig, if the inmate does not bring his personal property with him he either is given a deficiency report or is precluded from going back to get it when the hearing is over. Sgt. Denmark has worked for approximately 8 1/2 years with the Department of Corrections, all at UCI, where he formerly worked at the movement center. One of the functions he performed there was to handle prisoners coming for a disciplinary hearing. The rule as explained to him regarding the inmates' personal property is that the inmate is required to bring all of it with him to the hearing. Once the property is brought with the inmate to the hearing, the inmate is free to either take it into the hearing with him or to leave it in the storage room in back of the movement center during the hearing. If the inmate is sentenced to disciplinary confinement as a result of the hearing, in that case, and at that point, the inmate's property is inventoried. If the inmate is not sentenced to disciplinary confinement, the property is returned to the prisoner who is returned to his area. In the instant case, Mr. Denmark heard the Petitioner tell Sgt. Howe, when he arrived at the movement center, that he had left some of his property in his cell. However, when Adams went into his hearing, he neither took his property with him nor requested that it be secured. According to Mr. Cunningham, the Chief Classification Supervisor, the Union Correctional Institution Policy, (85-52.9 B1) requires inmates to bring all their property to disciplinary hearings. It is an old policy, and the reason for it is to protect the property from theft. In a disciplinary hearing, there is a chance that an inmate might not get back to his old cell to retrieve his property after the hearing. For security reasons, institution officials prefer not to take a prisoner back to his old cell after a hearing because, at that point, he is often angry as a result of the hearing and disruptive. All Department of Corrections' institutions in the region incorporating UCI, except Florida State Prison, have a similar policy. Inquiry of corrections personnel at the agency headquarters in Tallahassee reveals that most major DOC facilities have a similar policy. There are a total of 33 other facilities which hold less than 100 inmates each. These smaller institutions do not, generally, have a similar policy and Florida State Prison has a different situation because of the different security problems. It is the needs of the institution, however, which determine the use of the policy. Mr. Cunnningham is aware of Mr. Adams' hearing and the complaint filed as a result thereof. Upon inquiry it was determined that Mr. Adams had failed to establish a loss and the complaint was denied. Mr. Cunningham does not know whether there was an investigation into the loss of the property left in the cell. It is Mr. Cunningham's understanding that if the witness cannot carry all his property at one time, normally, if the inmate asks for permission to do so, he will be allowed to go back and get the balance before the hearing. This is not in the procedure approved by DOC, however, nor in the IOP at UCI. Corrections Officer Howe is also aware of the fact that Mr. Adams had a hearing on August 26, 1985. He, in fact, was called to the movement center to escort several prisoners, including Adams, to the confinement barracks after the hearings. A part of this duty involves inventorying the prisoners property. Howe told Adams to get his property and bring it in for inventory. At this point, after the hearing Adams said he did not have all his property with him and asked to be taken back to his old cell to get the rest. Howe declined to do this and explained the security reasons for his decision to Adams. He did advise Adams, however, that he would call down to Adams' old cell area and have his property packed which, in fact, he did. It is standard practice at UCI, according to Howe, that if an inmate has a large amount of property, he can request the use of a cart or wheelbarrow which is assigned to each housing area for carrying this excess property. This cart will be returned by a runner who can also help carry the excess. To his knowledge, inmates are not denied the use of these carts. Howe declined to return Adams to his old cell area after the hearing because, at the time, Adams was belligerent and unstable and presented a security risk in his opinion and also, because Adams had previously been advised to bring all his property with him and had failed to do this even though there was a way for him to accomplish it.
Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed on September 12, 1991. The Petition was filed by Ervin James Horton. In the Petition Rule 33-3.00125, Florida Administrative Code, and I.O.P. #P2-89.10 were challenged. The Challenged Rule is titled "Inmate Telephone Use." The Challenged Rule sets forth the "minimum telephone privileges that shall be granted inmates. . . ." The I.O.P. apparently deals with the same general subject as the Challenged Rule. The Petition includes the use of legal terms and phrases with little in the way of factual explanation. As an example, paragraph 4, Affected Interest of the Petitioner, Second Amended Petition, provides the following: 4. That the (Petitioner) is affected by the Agancy [sic] promulgation of 33-3.00125 et. seq. that materially fail to follow the applicable rulemaking procedure setforth [sic] in 120.54. And, establish adequate standards for the Agency decision making as needed June 6th, 1990, August 13th, 1990 that exceed it [sic] grant of authority and fail [sic] to include the requirements of (consistancy) [sic] in delegating to I.O.P. P2-89.10 as 33-1.007(1), (3), (4) mandate and the unbridle [sic] discretion exercised by the Agency to deny (telephonic communication) needed for judicial reason [sic] as requirements of the court in Case # 90- 2968-23 Horton v. Florida Federal S.B. as not being available for judicial needs. [Emphasis in original]. This paragraph is fairly typical of most of the Petition, the First Amended Petition and the Second Amended Petition. Although it contains some "legalize", it does not, read alone or in conjunction with all of the Petitioner's pleadings, adequately put the Respondent on notice as to what the Petitioner is challenging or the basis for his challenge. Apparently, the Petitioner is complaining of the actions of several employees of the Respondent relating to several alleged incidents involving attempts by the Petitioner to use a telephone. In the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition, paragraphs 13-20 pertain to an incident which allegedly occurred in December, 1989, paragraphs 21-42 pertain to an incident which allegedly occurred in May and/or August, 1990, paragraphs 43A-48A pertain to an incident which allegedly occurred in August, 1989, and paragraphs 52A-59A pertain to an incident which allegedly occurred in January, 1991. These events are further referred to in other portions of the Petition and throughout the First and Second Amended Petitions. Paragraph 24, Statement of the Facts, of the First Amended Petition is fairly typical of the allegations concerning specific actions complained of by the Petitioner: 24 That the (Petitioner) has repeatively [sic] been subjected to the (practices) arbitrary, capriociously [sic], exercise pursuant to 33-3.00125 et. seq. F.A.C. as by Florida State prison administrators as T.L. Barton, L.E. Turner, P.C. Decker, and dates of July 23rd, 1988; June 5th, 1990, August 13th, 1989 and as setforth [sic] herein; [Emphasis in original]. The alleged incidents complained of by the Petitioner have allegedly been the subject of unsuccessful grievance proceedings. Having failed to obtain a favorable response to his grievances, the Petitioner is seeking through this process to have the particular incidents reviewed. The Petitioner's allegations concerning the alleged incidents involving his attempts to obtain use of the telephone are not merely allegations intended to prove the Petitioner's standing to institute this proceeding. The Petitioner is complaining about, and seeking review of, actions of the Respondent in denying him the use of a telephone on the dates raised by the Petitioner in his Petition and his First and Second Amended Petitions. 9 The Petitioner has also attempted to raise constitutional arguments to support his challenge to the Challenged Rule and the I.O.P. See paragraphs 6, 11-12, 17, 20, 44A, 50A and 60A of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition. The Petitioner also mentions constitutional provisions in numerous other parts of the Petition, the First Amended Petition and the Second Amended Petition. The statements concerning constitutional issues consist of mere statements that constitutional rights are being violated without any facts to support an argument that the Challenged Rule or the I.O.P. is unconstitutional. Insufficient alleged facts concerning why it is believed that the specific requirements or provisions of the Challenged Rule and the I.O.P. are an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition, the First Amended Petition and the Second Amended Petition. On November 18, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Cancelling Formal Hearing was entered. On December 6, 1991, a pleading titled "Petitioner [sic] Amended Petition Pursuant to Order Issued Nov. 18th 1991 According [sic] Opportunity to Amend" was filed by the Petitioner. The First Amended Petition is very similar to the Petition and suffers from the same deficiencies. The First Amended Petition is devoid of a sufficient statement of the alleged facts pertinent to the issues raised in the Petition or the First Amended Petition which, if proven, would support a determination that the Challenged Rule and the I.O.P. are invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. On December 9, 1991, an Order Concerning Amended Petition was entered dismissing the First Amended Petition and giving the parties an opportunity to file proposed final orders. On December 12, 1991, the Petitioner filed a document titled Petitioner's Motion to File a Second and Final Amendment" and a Second Amended Petition. The Second Amended Petition does nothing to correct the deficiencies of the Petition or the First Amended Petition. The motion to file the Second Amended Petition was denied by Order entered December 18, 1991.
Findings Of Fact At all times materiel hereto petitioners were inmates et Lake Correctional Institution (LCI) and were subject to discipline for failure to obey orders. Piccirillo was disciplined for failure to comply with an order to report to the infirmary or sick call. Piccirillo was aware that his name was posted on the bulletin board directing him to report to the medical department and et the time specified he failed to so report, was disciplined, and he lost gain time. A doctor visits LCI twice per week and inmates with medical problems can be seen by the doctor on these days. No patient is required to undergo medical treatment for minor ills if he so elects. Because of the limited time a doctor is available to LCI it is necessary that those inmates so designated see the doctor at the scheduled time. Inmates who do not understand an order may request clarification. If the inmate cannot read he is not punished for failure to obey written orders. Prior to disciplinary action being taken against an inmate for disobedience of orders, the disciplinary report is investigated and, after the investigator finds the charge to be true, discipline may be administered. Additionally, the inmate has a grievence procedure he may follow after the investigator recommends disciplinary action be taken. Occasionally, inmates are given orders by correctional officers which are unlawful. The inmate may obey the order and say nothing, he may obey the order and file a grievance, or he may refuse to obey he order and successfully defend the disciplinary report for failure to obey the order. It is not an offense for an inmate to refuse to obey an unlawful order.
The Issue Whether Invitation to Negotiate No. 12/13-010, issued by Respondent for the operation and management of Bay Correctional Facility, Graceville Correctional Facility, and Moore Haven Correctional Facility, is contrary to Respondent's governing statutes, rules, or policies.
Findings Of Fact Parties/Interested Persons Petitioner, CCA, is a private corporation specializing in the design, construction, expansion, and management of correctional facilities. CCA currently operates 61 facilities for the United States federal government and state governments. Respondent, DMS, is authorized to contract for private correctional services under specified circumstances. As a prerequisite to entering into a contract for private correctional services, DMS must find the contract will result in a 7% cost savings to the State over public operation of a substantially similar facility. DOC, a non-party, currently operates 48 public correctional facilities and contracts with private vendors for operation of seven private correctional facilities. With respect to privatized facilities, DOC has the duty and responsibility to calculate the cost per inmate per day (per diem rate) for public operation of a substantially similar correctional facility. The per diem rate must be based on the costs of operating a correctional facility of a similar size, type, and location as the facility sought to be privatized. Brief Background Per Diem Workgroup The Florida Legislature first authorized private correctional facility operation in 1993, adopting the Correctional Privatization Act, chapter 957, Florida Statutes (the Act). As adopted, the Act included a cost-savings requirement: the State must find that private operation of a correctional facility would result in a savings of at least 7% over public provision of a similar facility. In 2001, the Legislature created the Prison Per-Diem Work Group, composed of the staffs of the Auditor General, Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA), and the Appropriations Committee of the Florida Senate and of the House of Representatives (the Work Group). The Legislature directed the Work Group to convene, beginning in 2002 and each year thereafter, for the purpose of developing consensus per diem rates for privately operated facilities. See ch. 01-379, § 2, Laws of Fla. In 2002, the Work Group published a Report of Consensus Per Diem Rates (the Report). The Report included a set of Overall Per Diem Rates for each of the three main population types (adult male, youthful offender, and female), as well as Alternative Per Diem Rates and Program Per Diem Rates. The Overall Per Diem Rates represent an average daily operating cost of all publicly operated facilities. The Alternative Per Diem Rates exclude the costs of operating specialty facilities such as death row and work release, which are not operated by private vendors. The Program Per Diem Rates represent the average cost to provide educational and substance abuse programs to inmates within each of the three population groups. By way of example, the 2002 Work Group developed an Overall Per Diem Rate of $50.53 to operate an adult male correctional facility. The 2002 Work Group explained that the Alternative Per Diem Rates provided examples of adjustments that could be made to the Overall Per Diem Rates to facilitate a more direct comparison between public and private correctional facility costs. The Work Group made a location adjustment to remove the cost associated with a Competitive Area Differential paid to correctional officers in South Florida. Further, the Work Group made a series of size adjustments to reflect the extent to which public facilities of similar size to private facilities are above the location-adjusted average operating per diem. By way of example, the 2002 Work Group calculated an Alternative Per Diem Rate of $44.93 for operation of an adult male correctional facility, a location-adjusted rate of $44.83, and size-adjusted rates of $47.71 on the low end, to $57.60 on the high end. The 2002 Work Group did not adjust the calculated consensus per diem rates to account for cost differentials in private correctional facility operation such as credits for property tax payments, corporate income and sales tax payments, and payments to a maintenance reserve fund. The Report notes that such adjustments were outside the scope of the Work Group’s responsibility, which was limited to identifying public facility operation costs. In 2005, the Work Group convened again and developed consensus per diem rates utilizing the same methodology as used in 2002. The Work Group developed the following Per Diem Rates for operation of an adult male facility: an Overall Per Diem Rate of $51.90; an Alternative Per Diem Rate of $44.84; and Size-Adjusted Per Diem Rates of $51.26 on the low end, to $52.66 on the high end. The 2005 Report on Operating Per Diem Rates does not mention further adjustment of the Adjusted Per Diem Rates to account for cost differentials in private facility operations such as credits for property tax payments, corporate income and sales tax payments, and payments to a maintenance reserve fund. However, the Report does include a note that public correctional facilities realize economies of scale by operating above their design capacity, an advantage that private facilities cannot obtain. Private facilities are limited, by both contract and the standards of the American Correctional Association, to operation at no greater than their design capacity. The 2005 Report notes that the Work Group had not attempted to estimate the impact of economies of scale unavailable to private facilities. In 2006, the Legislature removed the requirement that the Work Group convene on a yearly basis and replaced it with convention upon the call of the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate. See ch. 06-32, § 4, Laws of Fla. 2010 Procurement In 2010, DMS rebid the contracts for Moore Haven and Graceville, which were previously operated by GEO Group, as well as the contract for Bay Correctional Facility, which was operated by CCA. CCA was awarded the contract to operate all three facilities. To prepare the 2010 ITN, DOC first selected public correctional facilities similar in size, type, and location to the private facilities which were the subject of the ITN. DOC selected the New River Correctional Institution as similar to Bay and Moore Haven, and Wakulla Correctional Institution as similar to Graceville. DOC separated the programming costs of those facilities from the security and indirect costs, arriving at the base per diem operating costs for the two comparable facilities. Next, DOC added in the costs for educational, health, and other programs based on the level of service required by the contract in the ITN. CCA Deputy Chief Development Officer Lucibeth Mayberry testified that she did not recall whether CCA was aware of the methodology used to calculate the per diem rates for the 2010 ITN. She explained that the per diem rates are the bottom line of any competitive correctional facility procurement, and the 2010 rates allowed CCA to put in a competitive bid. No direct evidence was introduced as to the advertised per diem rates included in the 2010 ITN. However, Ms. Mayberry testified that the current per diem rates by contract for Bay and Moore Haven are around $48.00, while that for Graceville is around $34.00. Post-2010 Cost Reductions Since 2010, DOC has significantly reduced its cost to operate Florida’s public correctional facilities. According to an April 2013 report by OPPAGA, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011-2012, per diem rates for operation of adult male correctional facilities housing inmates similar to the private facilities decreased an average of over 8% from the prior year. The average per diem rate for operation of an adult male public correctional facility for FY 2011-2012 was $42.00. The DOC operating cost reductions are the result of the closure of several public facilities, including three adult male non-specialty facilities; consolidation of inmates from closed facilities; and workforce eliminations and reductions. OPAGGA concludes that the primary cause of the decrease in per diem rates was the reduction in the amount contributed by the State to employee retirement. OPAGGA estimates that the statewide requirement for employee to contribute 3% to their retirement, together with the State decrease to special risk retirement, resulted in a savings of $88 million to DOC. DOC has also reduced costs at public correctional facilities by changing its operations. The State maintains an 8% vacancy rate in correctional officer positions, allowing wardens flexibility to staff security posts according to highest priority on a daily basis, while leaving lower priority posts vacant. In FY 2011-2012, DOC began working its housing officers on 12-hour shifts, which allowed for further reduction in security costs. By consolidating inmates from closed facilities with those in operational facilities, DOC has realized an economy of scale in some facilities where more inmates are housed without increasing security costs. The 2010 contracts for operation of Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville correctional facilities expire in 2013. In January 2013, DMS released the per diem rates for operation of similar facilities to be included in the ITN at issue. The published rates are 17% lower than the rates CCA is paid under the current contract to operate those facilities. Hence, the present controversy. The 2012 Per Diem Development Process Michael Weber, DMS Bureau Chief of Private Prison Monitoring, contacted DOC Deputy Secretary Michael Crews on September 21, 2012, to obtain “key information” from DOC to prepare a document with which to solicit vendors for private correctional facility services at Bay, Moore Haven and Graceville correctional institutions. Key information includes the type of inmate (i.e., male, female, or youth), the custody level (i.e., close, medium, minimum, or community), inmate programs to be offered (e.g., re-entry and education, substance abuse), and the medical profiles of inmates to be housed at each of the three facilities. On October 3, 2012, DOC Director of Institutions James Upchurch responded to DMS with a chart showing inmate type, custody, medical profiles, and programmatic profiles for each of the three facilities operating under the current contracts. DOC later notified DMS of adjustments in both custody and programmatic services for the Bay and Moore Haven facilities during the next contract period. Eventually, DOC decided against changing custody type of inmates housed at those facilities. On October 9, 2012, DOC clarified the need to include within the ITN program services for up to 18% psychological grade three (S3) inmates at Bay and Moore Haven. No changes were made to correctional services provided at the Graceville facility under the current contract. On October 10, 2012, DMS issued the ITN. As issued, responses to the ITN were due November 13, 2012, at 11:00 a.m., Eastern Standard Time. The ITN includes the proposed contract and requires that proposals must be 7% less than the DOC-calculated per diem rate to be considered responsive. However, the ITN as issued did not contain the per diem rate for facilities substantially similar to Moore Haven, Bay, and Graceville. On October 22, 2012, DOC Secretary Kenneth Tucker sent a letter to the Auditor General requesting an audit and certification of an attached set of spreadsheets calculating the per diem rates for public provision of correctional services at facilities comparable to Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville. The per diem rate for each facility was formulated by DOC in three steps: First, DOC selected a comparable facility; broke out the operating costs by security, administration, and programmatic services; and deducted costs for programmatic services (education, substance abuse, and health services) at the comparable facility. This calculation yielded a per diem rate for the comparable facility based solely on security costs and indirect, or administrative, costs. This rate is referred to as the “above-the-line” number for purposes of interpreting the spreadsheets for each of the three facilities. The above-the-line per diem rate for each facility, as submitted to the Auditor General, was as follows: Bay and Moore Haven -- $41.76; Graceville -- $36.62. Second, DOC multiplied the operations per diem for the comparable facility by the contracted population number for each facility. This calculation yielded operational costs for each of the three contracted facilities. DOC then added to that figure the costs associated with providing the programmatic services requested for the inmate population at each of the three facilities based on the proposed contract. This step yielded the unadjusted operational costs for each facility. Third, DOC adjusted the total cost to account for cost savings realized by DOC through its policy of 12-hour shifts (which private providers cannot match), and deducted costs associated with work camps and work squads at the comparable facilities (private corrections providers do not operate work camps). The total costs to operate were adjusted to provide a per diem rate for operation at a private correctional facility that is comparable to operation at a public correctional facility. This step yielded the total adjusted operational cost for each facility. The total adjusted cost was divided by the contract population for each facility to arrive at the adjusted per diem rate for each of the three facilities, as follows: Bay -- $43.22; Moore Haven -- $42.38; Graceville -- $40.51. For each facility, the adjusted per diem rate was slightly higher than the “above-the-line” per diem rate. On October 26, 2012, DMS published on the State VBS a copy of the October 22, 2012, DOC letter to the Auditor General requesting certification of the per diem rates. CCA staff testified they were shocked by the low per diem rates that DOC requested the Auditor General to certify. The published per diem for Bay and Moore Haven was 17% lower than the per diem certified by the Auditor General for the 2010 procurement in which CCA was awarded the current contract. On October 31, 2012, Ms. Mayberry sent a letter to DMS outlining concerns with the proposed per diem rates in the DOC October 22, 2012, letter to the Auditor General. On November 1, 2012, Petitioner’s competitor, GEO Group, sent a letter to DMS raising similar concerns. By letter dated January 24, 2013, the Auditor General’s office notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate of its completion of the audit of the DOC per diem rate calculations. In the intervening period, DMS issued 10 Amendments to the ITN, the majority of which extended the deadline for Responses from the original deadline of November 13, 2012. The Auditor General’s letter reads in pertinent part: The Auditor General performed selected procedures to evaluate the 2011-12 fiscal year operating costs provided by the Department for the State-operated Holmes and Okeechobee Correctional Institutions that were identified by the Department as substantially similar to the privately- operated facilities. Operating per diems are primarily a function of costs and inmate population. * * * Based on the procedures performed, we concluded, pursuant to Section 957.07(1), Florida Statutes, that the 2011-12 fiscal year Holmes Correctional Institution operating per diem of $41.76 provided by the Department was reasonably consistent with the State’s accounting and budgeting records . . . . The Holmes Correctional Institution operating per diem of $41.76 is an appropriate amount to which necessary adjustment may be made for variations in Bay Correctional Facility and Moore Haven Correctional Facility operations. The letter proceeds with the same findings regarding the FY 2011-2012 operating per diem of $36.62 for Okeechobee Correctional Institution as “reasonably consistent with the State’s accounting and budgeting records” and “an appropriate amount to which necessary adjustment may be made for variations in the Graceville Correctional Facility operations.” As such, the Auditor General’s process evaluated only the “above-the-line” per diem rates in each of the DOC spreadsheets and certified those amounts as the starting point for an adjusted per diem rate for each of the contract facilities. On January 24, 2013, DMS posted the Auditor General’s letter as Amendment 11 to the ITN, as well as a spreadsheet for each of the three contract facilities titled “Public Per Diem with Adjustments.” There are two substantive differences between this publication and the October 22, 2012, spreadsheets provided to the Auditor General by DOC. First, the health care per diem rate was adjusted for both Bay and Moore Haven to account for increased health care costs to house up to 18% S3 inmates at those two facilities. Second, that change increased the adjusted per diem rates for the two facilities. As published on January 24, 2013, adjusted per diem rates for the contract facilities were as follows: Bay -- $43.76; Moore Haven -- $42.91; Graceville -- $41.05. Notably, DMS published at the bottom of the spreadsheet for the Bay Correctional Institution, “Respondents must submit a per diem bid for the Bay Correctional Facility that is no greater than $40.69 to be considered responsive.” The spreadsheets for Moore Haven and Graceville contain the same language specifically incorporating the adjusted per diem rate as a term of the ITN and require bids be 7% below the adjusted per diem rate to be considered responsive. On Monday, January 28, 2013, at approximately 5:30 p.m., DMS again posted Amendment 11 and noted as follows: On January 24, 2013, the Department posted on the VBS two changes regarding the above- mentioned competitive solicitation. However, Amendment 11 was not completely posted. As such, the Department hereby posts Amendment 11 in its entirety.[1/] Petitioner filed a notice of intent to protest the specifications of the ITN on January 30, 2013, and filed its Formal Bid Protest Petition on January 31, 2013. Petition and Issues CCA challenges the ITN on both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, CCA alleges DMS is authorized to procure contracts for the operation of private correctional facilities only by Request for Proposal (RFP) pursuant to section 957.07, Florida Statutes. Procedural Challenge/Waiver DMS maintains CCA is precluded from challenging DMS’ choice to procure the private correctional institutional contracts by ITN rather than RFP. The ITN was issued on October 10, 2012, and no intent to protest was filed within 72 hours. DMS argues that the issue of method of procurement has been waived. DMS is correct, as more fully explained in the Conclusions of Law. In order to challenge DMS’ choice to procure private correctional facility operation through ITN rather than RFP, CCA should have filed a notice of intent to protest within 72 hours of DMS posting the ITN on October 10, 2012. Since CCA did not file a notice of intent to protest until January 28, 2013, that issue has been waived. DMS also alleges that CCA waived many of the issues contained in its Petition because CCA did not file notice of intent to protest particular specifications of the ITN within 72 hours of DMS posting the amendments which incorporated those specifications. DMS maintains that CCA is limited in its challenge to whether the per diem rate published on January 28, 2013, accurately accounts for the cost of housing S3 inmates at Bay and Moore Haven. DMS reasons that the only change between the per diem amount published on October 26, 2012, and that published on January 28, 2013, is the small adjustment made to account for S3 inmates and, therefore, it is the only issue timely raised by CCA. DMS’ position on this issue is not supported by the facts. The DOC letter to the Auditor General was not posted as an Amendment to the ITN; did not contain a notice of rights, pursuant to chapter 120.57(3), Florida Statutes; and was not incorporated into the ITN as a term thereof. Neither the above- the-line nor the below-the-line per diem rates had been reviewed or certified by the Auditor General on October 26, 2013, and the certification process was not complete. In fact, the certification process was not completed until January 24, 2013, some 90 days later. DMS represents that CCA’s corporate representative admitted at hearing that CCA could have filed a bid specification protest on October 26, 2012, in response to DMS posting the letter to the Auditor General. However, the testimony of Ms. Mayberry does not bear that out: Q: Was that a discussion that was had internally with regard to different options and vendor relationships about how that might change with filing a protest as opposed to sending a letter? A: At that time, I don’t believe we had -– we knew a protest was possible in Florida and we had filed an intent to protest before which we had withdrawn. But at that time –- we didn’t have a certified per diem. We thought this was going to be fixed. We thought that when we raised concerns, that would be addressed. So I am giving you information because I don’t honestly remember exactly –- I don’t think a protest –- a protest seemed premature to us at that point because we didn’t have certified per diems, as that wasn’t –- we didn’t have the real per diem at that point. We just had the letter from DOC, which we felt certain was going to be adjusted.[2/] Ms. Mayberry did not admit that CCA had a point of entry to challenge the per diem rates in the October 22, 2012, letter; instead she insisted that the rates were not final and a challenge would have been premature. Even if Ms. Mayberry had admitted that CCA could have challenged the posting on October 26, 2012, her opinion would not have been binding on the undersigned because it would have been a legal conclusion. Substantive Challenge Next, CCA challenges the per diem rates included in the ITN through Amendment 11 on the following bases: The per diem rates are not based on the costs associated with comparable publicly operated correctional facilities. CCA maintains DOC acted arbitrarily in selecting the comparable facilities. DOC erred in adjusting the base per diem rate to account for costs associated with programmatic services to be provided under the contract in the ITN. CCA maintains that some adjustments were too high, while others were too low. DOC erred by not including adjustments to the base per diem rate to account for savings realized by operational changes at public institutions which cannot be made by a private vendor. Finally, CCA argues that the overall accounting methodology utilized by DOC is flawed. In summary, CCA argues that the per diem rates for all three facilities are too low because DOC did not correctly choose substantially similar facilities as the bases for public per diem rates, and DOC did not accurately adjust the base per diem rates to fairly account for differences in public and private correctional facility operations. The Contract Facilities CCA challenges DOC’s selection of the Holmes Correctional Institution for comparison to Bay and Moore Haven because Holmes is not “substantially similar” as required by the governing statute. Likewise, CCA challenges the selection of Okeechobee Correctional Institution for comparison to Graceville because it is not “substantially similar.” Under the governing statute, DOC is charged with selecting a public correctional institution which is similar in “size, type, and location” to the facilities sought to be managed by a private correctional institution. Size equates with inmate population of a correctional facility. Both Bay and Moore Haven have a design capacity of 985 inmates. Graceville is a larger facility designed to house 1513 inmates. All three facilities are under contract to operate at design capacity. There are three types of general correctional facilities: adult male, youthful offender, and female. There are also a number of specialty type institutions in the correctional system, such as reception and medical centers, maximum security, death row, and mental health. Adult male facilities may house inmates at different custody levels (close, medium, minimum, and community) and with different health profiles (medical grades 1, 2, and 3; psychological grades 1, 2, and 3; wheelchair; and special needs). Inmates from different custody levels and health profiles may be housed together without changing the primary mission of the facility to a specialty institution. Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville are all adult male facilities, contracted for similar custody levels. Under the ITN, Bay and Moore Haven may accept inmates of medium, minimum, and community custody levels. Both are currently serving 100% medium custody inmates. Graceville is designated to accept close, medium, minimum, and community custody inmates and currently serves 40% close custody inmates. The three facilities are also designated to accept inmates with similar health profiles. Under the ITN, Bay and Moore Haven will accept 84% medical grades 1 and 2, 16% medical grade 3, 82% psychological grades 1 and 2, 18% psychological grade 3, 2% wheelchair, and 6% special needs inmates. Graceville is designated to accept the same percentages of psychological grade inmates and wheelchair inmates, but may accept up to 5% special needs inmates and a small percentage of medical grade 4 inmates. Location refers to the geographic location of a facility. DOC divides correctional facilities regionally. Both Bay (Bay County) and Graceville (Jackson County) are in Region 1. Moore Haven (Glades County) is located in Region 3. For purposes of comparing correctional facility costs, location is significant when a facility is located in South Florida, where employees are paid a competitive area differential. Location is also a factor when an institution is remote from population centers, which may affect staffing and turnover rates. Substantially similar facilities James Upchurch, DOC Assistant Secretary for Institutions and Reentry, selected the public correctional facilities “substantially similar” to the three contract facilities for purposes of calculating the base per diem. Mr. Upchurch came to Florida as Chief of Security Operations for DOC in 1996 following 26 years in operation of public correctional facilities in Mississippi and Arizona. He served as a warden in three different Arizona correctional facilities, including a super max facility, and was a regional director for the State of Arizona as well. Mr. Upchurch was DOC Chief of Security Operations from 1996 until 2011, when, after a brief stint as warden at Franklin County Correctional Institution, he became DOC Director of Operations. In March 2012, Mr. Upchurch was promoted to Assistant Secretary of Institutions and Reentry and now supervises region directors, the deputy assistant secretary for institutions, and the deputy assistant secretary for reentry. Altogether, Mr. Upchurch has 17 years of experience in Florida’s correctional facility operations. After excluding the DOC specialty institutions, Mr. Upchurch identified two institutions similar to Bay and Moore Haven and two institutions similar to Graceville for further review. He asked Vicki Newsome, DOC Assistant Bureau Chief for Population Management and Classifications Services, to pull the facility profiles for comparison. Bay and Moore Haven In his initial analysis, Mr. Upchurch chose Holmes Correctional Facility and Lawtey Correctional Facility as comparable to Bay and Moore Haven and reviewed their facility profiles. Holmes, Bay, and Moore Haven are all located in Region 1 and house adult male inmates. Lawtey does not house S3 inmates and Holmes only houses one S3 inmate. Both Bay and Moore Haven will house up to 18% S3 inmates under the ITN. According to the data reviewed by Mr. Upchurch, Holmes houses 37% close custody inmates, while Lawtey houses no close custody inmates. Neither Bay nor Moore Haven is contracted to house close custody inmates. Holmes is not a stand-alone facility, but rather includes a work camp which is physically separated from the perimeter of the main facility. Lawtey is a stand-alone facility, as are Bay and Moore Haven. Bay and Moore Haven have similar layouts –- four large dorms housing between 250 and 400 inmates each, and one much smaller dorm housing a small number of segregated inmates. By comparison, Lawtey’s inmate population is spread among 10 dorms, one housing 200 inmates and the remainder housing roughly 80 inmates each. Much like Bay and Moore Haven, Holmes houses its population in a series of larger dorms, one housing 250 inmates, seven housing just under 150 inmates each, and one much smaller dorm housing around 60 segregated inmates. Lawtey is a faith- and character-based institution. Bay, Moore Haven, and Holmes are not faith- or character-based. For the 2010 procurement, DOC had chosen the New River facility as comparable, but that facility has since closed. Holmes and New River are 2 of 15 state correctional institutions built on a prototypical layout –- administration and support at the front of the compound, recreation wellness yard in the back, housing units in the middle, and a separate work camp on the grounds but physically separated from the perimeter of the main compound. In the final analysis, Mr. Upchurch selected Holmes as the facility most comparable to Bay and Moore Haven. He based this selection, in large part, on the fact that Holmes was so similar to the New River facility selected for the prior procurement. Mr. Upchurch ruled out Lawtey in his final analysis because it is a faith- and character-based institution, which he testified increases security costs. Further, the layout and dorm capacities of Lawtey are not as efficient as the larger dorms at Bay and Moore Haven. Mr. Upchurch did not verify that Lawtey actually had higher security per diems because it was faith-based. In fact, he explained that the only way to verify that mathematically would be to remove the faith- and character- based mission and compare the resultant costs with the prior costs. Identifying a public correctional institution substantially similar to Bay and Moore Haven is indeed a difficult task. At a contracted inmate population of 985 each, Bay and Moore Haven are significantly smaller than the average adult male public correctional facility. This was true in 2005 when the Per Diem Workgroup was convened to formulate a consensus per diem rate. This disparity in size has only increased in recent years as many public institutions have been closed and their populations consolidated. In FY 2011-2012, only 7 of the 30 public adult male facilities had an average daily population of fewer than 1,500 inmates. Both Lawtey and Holmes are among the seven. The populations of Lawtey and Holmes differ significantly, however. Holmes averaged 1,466 inmates per day in FY 2011-2012, while Lawtey averaged 805. The difference in population between Bay and Moore Haven and that of Lawtey is 185. The difference in population between Bay and Moore Haven and that of Holmes is 481. The evidence was uncontroverted that facility size is one of the most important variables in determining correctional facility costs. The larger the inmate population, the more security is needed. More security means more salaries and benefits. Mr. Upchurch selected Holmes as comparable to Bay and Moore Haven based on its similarity to New River, one of the same prototypes as Holmes, and the similar inmate housing patterns, which were known to him to require similar staffing patterns. Although Holmes has a work camp, which Bay and Moore Haven do not, Mr. Upchurch expected the security costs associated with the work camp (separate perimeter patrol and additional security staffing) would be removed from the per diem rate. Furthermore, Mr. Upchurch considered the security staffing requirements of Lawtey based on his experience not just in Florida, but in his entire 43-year career in public correctional facility operation. Mr. Upchurch’s decision to select Holmes as substantially similar to Bay and Moore Haven was not made without thought or reason or in an illogical manner. Graceville For Graceville, Mr. Upchurch narrowed the decision down to Everglades and Okeechobee correctional institutions, both adult male facilities in Region 4. Everglades and Graceville are similar in population size and inmate profiles. Both facilities house over 1500 inmates. Both house large percentages of close custody inmates (Everglades –- 54%; Graceville –- 42%), and both house S3 inmates, although at different percentages. Mr. Upchurch eliminated Everglades for two reasons. First, based on its location, the facility has experienced high staffing turnover, which has increased hiring and training costs. Second, Everglades has a higher percentage of S3 inmates (24%) than contracted for at Graceville (18%).3/ The evidence was uncontroverted that S3 inmates increase per diem rates because of the cost of psychotropic drugs administered to those inmates. Mr. Upchurch also testified that the presence of S3 inmates can increase security costs. S3 inmates have more disciplinary problems, are more spontaneous, and are more difficult to manage. Mr. Upchurch testified that when a large number of S3 inmates are housed together, they “feed off one another” and create more disturbance. When asked specifically what percentage of S3 inmates would create an increased security cost, Mr. Upchurch estimated around one-third of the population. The number of S3 inmates housed at Everglades does not rise to that level. Mr. Upchurch selected Okeechobee as the facility most substantially similar to Graceville for comparison. The facilities have similar inmate populations –- both house over 1500 inmates with high percentages of medical grades 1 and 2 inmates, similar numbers of special needs inmates, and no wheelchair inmates. However, as emphasized by CCA, Okeechobee serves no S3 inmates. Mr. Upchurch focused on the design efficiencies of the two facilities. Both Okeechobee and Graceville house a large number of inmates in a small number of dorms. The six “T building” dorms at Okeechobee house up to 230 inmates each. The four main dorms at Graceville house approximately 400 inmates each. This design is intentional and creates efficiencies in the officer-to-inmate ratio. Many of the other DOC facilities have multiple smaller “open bay” dorms with less efficient operation.4/ More inmates in fewer dorms equates with lower security costs. Mr. Upchurch also noted that both Okeechobee and Graceville are stand-alone facilities, meaning only one correctional facility is contained within the perimeter.5/ Upchurch testified that, where possible, it is preferable to compare the per diem rates of stand-alone facilities. Mr. Upchurch disagreed with DOC’s selection of the Wakulla Correctional Facility as comparable to Graceville for the 2010 procurement process. The Wakulla facility is actually three different institutions within one: Wakulla Correctional, Wakulla Annex, and Wakulla Work Camp.6/ The facility operates three separate perimeter security details, three separate control rooms, and three sets of security supervisors. Mr. Upchurch testified that he objected to the selection of Wakulla because no adjustment was made to the Wakulla security per diem rate in 2010 to account for the higher security per diem at Wakulla. Thus, he disagreed that Wakulla was comparable. CCA assigns error to Mr. Upchurch’s choice of Okeechobee over Everglades as comparable to Graceville. CCA highlights that Okeechobee houses no S3 inmates, and, therefore, does not incur costs associated with psychotropic drugs for those inmates. Further, CCA notes that between the two comparable facilities, Mr. Upchurch chose the one with the lower total per diem rate -- $33.23 at Okeechobee versus $45.82 at Everglades. The higher per diem rate at Everglades is a factor in both a higher security per diem and a higher health per diem than at Okeechobee. Everglades’ security per diem is $28.00 while Okeechobee’s is $23.99. Higher recruiting and training costs due to turnover likely account for that difference. The health per diem at Everglades is also higher -- $17.14 compared with $8.64 at Okeechobee. The treatment of 24% S3 inmates likely accounts for this higher rate. Mr. Upchurch was aware that the contract with Graceville required the facility to house up to 18% S3 inmates. He did not ignore that requirement in selecting Okeechobee over Everglades. Mr. Upchurch was aware of the process of adjusting the per diem rate of the selected comparable facility to account for the specific programs under the contract. The cost of housing S3 inmates at Graceville was accounted for in the adjustment process. Mr. Upchurch selected Okeechobee as substantially similar to Graceville based upon his significant knowledge regarding the operations of all the DOC facilities. The choice was informed by the size, type, and location of the facilities, as well as the physical layout, size of dorms, efficiencies of staffing, and similarity of inmate profiles. For FY 2011-2012, DOC operated 30 adult male facilities. Of those, 18 had an average daily inmate population of 1500 or higher, as does Graceville. Both Graceville and Okeechobee are stand-alone facilities housing large numbers of inmates in few dorms, which increases staffing efficiencies. Overall, the undersigned does not find that Mr. Upchurch’s choice of Okeechobee was arbitrary, capricious, or erroneous. CCA further assigns error to DOC’s selection of substantially similar facilities because DOC did not undertake a formal process or analytical exercise to select those facilities. It is true that Mr. Upchurch did not review documentation on all 48 DOC correctional facilities, or otherwise consult DOC records, prior to narrowing the choices to two facilities similar to Bay and Moore Haven and two facilities similar to Graceville. Mr. Upchurch relied upon his 17 years of experience in state correctional facility operations, including his knowledge of the facilities’ design, layout, staffing and programming. Once he narrowed the choices, he requested and reviewed the inmate profiles for comparable facilities to the private facilities. As such, his selections were not arbitrary or capricious. Errors Calculating Program Costs Having identified Holmes as substantially similar to Bay and Moore Haven, and Okeechobee as substantially similar to Graceville, DOC began with each facility’s base security per diem plus administrative costs, and multiplied that figure by the contracted population for each of the contracted facilities. To that base operational cost figure, DOC added costs for health services, educational, substance abuse, and behavioral/transition services based on the draft contract in the ITN. DOC program staff specializing in each area calculated the cost to provide the contracted services. Errors were made in those calculations which were admitted to at the final hearing. The health services per diem of $7.82 added to the Bay security per diem was in error. The correct rate is $8.28. As such, the per diem rate published in Amendment 11 for Bay was incorrect. The health services per diem for Graceville was calculated incorrectly as $12.46 rather than $12.56. As such, the per diem rate published in Amendment 11 for Graceville was incorrect. Next, DOC calculated the mental health programmatic costs associated with housing S3 inmates at Bay and Moore Haven as required by the ITN. CCA alleges DOC made an error in calculating that amount because it relied upon FY 2011-2012 pharmacy expenditure data to determine the amount spent on psychotropic drugs, rather than relying on the data from the state accounting system known as FLAIR. Mark Tallent, DOC Director of Budget and Finance, testified that the pharmacy data is a more accurate accounting of the actual amount DOC spent on psychotropic drugs than the FLAIR data. The state accounting system appropriated approximately $11 million for psychotropic drugs and the FLAIR data shows DOC spent over $6 million out of that category. However, Mr. Tallent testified that DOC paid bills for other types of drugs, such as infectious disease drugs, out of that category, so the number is inflated and unreliable as it relates to psychotropic drugs exclusively. He testified that the pharmacy system is more accurate because it correlates each individual prescription with an inmate at a particular facility, allowing for an accurate accounting of the institutional costs for each specific type of drug. Mr. Tallent’s testimony is accepted as credible and reliable. DOC did not err when it calculated the per diem cost of psychotropic drugs based on the figure of $5,045,018 from FY 2011-2012 pharmacy data. Errors in Additional Adjustments The governing statute requires DOC to “calculate all the cost components that determine the inmate per diem in correctional facilities of a substantially similar size, type, and location that are operated by the Department of Corrections, including administrative costs associated with central administration.” § 957.07(1), Fla. Stat. The statute also directs DOC to make some adjustments to account for the public nature of the operation. DOC must include in the per diem an equivalent cost of services that are provided to DOC by other governmental agencies at no direct cost to the agency. Id. Also, the statute requires DOC to include as a cost savings in the calculation of the per diem rate “reasonable projections of payments of any kind to the state or any political subdivision thereof for which the private entity would be liable because of its status as a private rather than public entity,” including corporate income and sales tax payments. § 957.07(2), Fla. Stat. DOC made a number of additional adjustments to account for operations unique to public correctional facilities to arrive at a per diem rate more comparable to that of a private facility. While all these adjustments are not required by statute, they are examined for their accuracy. 12-hour shifts DOC adjusted the per diem to account for the cost savings realized at Holmes and Okeechobee by operating housing security personnel on 12-hour shifts. In calculating the 12-hour shift adjustment, DOC failed to add back in the cost of providing security staff at the private facilities associated with covering the 4 hours essentially unmanned when the cost of the 12-hour shifts were removed. In other words, DOC deducted too much cost when making this adjustment. As such, the per diems published in Amendment 11 for Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville were incorrect. Work Squads DOC also adjusted the per diem by backing out the costs associated with the work squads at Holmes. A correctional facility work squad may perform services such as landscaping, maintenance, or other jobs both on the facility grounds and “outside the fence.” DOC removed the costs associated with work squads under the mistaken impression that none of the private facilities operate work squads. However, Bay and Moore Haven operate work squads in the community, which require supervisory security personnel. As such, the per diem amount published in Amendment 11 for Bay and Moore Haven was incorrect. Work Camps Holmes operates a work camp on its grounds, although it is physically separate from the main unit. The work camp requires both separate perimeter security and supervisory security. DOC adjusted the per diem rate for Bay and Moore Haven to exclude the security costs attributable to the work camp at Holmes. CCA argues that DOC erred by deducting only the security costs attributable to the Holmes work camp, but not other costs associated with the inmate population at the work camp, since private correctional facilities do not operate work camps. Mr. Tallent testified there is no way to back out the costs associated with the work camp at Holmes, other than the salaries and benefits of the security officers, because it is the same budget entity as Holmes Correctional Institution and the costs cannot be separated. No evidence was presented regarding the specific costs CCA expected to be removed, or the amount of those costs. Given the accounting structure of the DOC system, and the uncontested fact that security costs are the driving factor in calculation of correctional facility per diem rates, the undersigned does not find that DOC erred in removal of only the security costs at Holmes. Additional Alleged Errors CCA assigns error to DOC for failure to make additional adjustments to the per diem rates in the ITN. 1. Utility service charge Moore Haven pays a monthly utility service charge of $25,000, which is extraordinarily high. This service charge was not disclosed to CCA by the predecessor operator, GEO Group, and CCA did not take it into account in preparing its response to the 2010 ITN. No evidence was presented to establish that this utility surcharge is paid by the operator of Moore Haven because of its status as a private rather than public entity. If it were, DOC would be required by law to include it as a cost savings when calculating the per diem rate. Without that evidence, the undersigned cannot find that DOC erred by not adjusting the per diem to account for it. DOC has offered to make an adjustment in the per diem to account for this service charge. However, DOC’s offer to make an adjustment during negotiations does not prove an error on its part. 2. Lapse Factor/Vacancy Rate Next, CCA argues DOC erred by not adjusting the per diem rate to account for the DOC “lapse factor.” Contradictory evidence was introduced as to the meaning of “lapse factor” and the related term “vacancy rate.” Based on the preponderance of the evidence, the lapse factor is the percentage of DOC security positions which are temporarily vacant due to normal turnover, during which time recruitment and training of new officers occurs. Mr. Upchurch testified that DOC generally runs a 3% lapse factor. A vacancy rate, on the other hand, is the percentage of positions which remain intentionally unfilled due to a hiring freeze or other cost-saving measure. DOC operates with roughly an 8% vacancy rate as part of its budget cutbacks. For the purpose of the contract sought via the ITN, a vacant position is defined to occur “when the employee assigned to that position has resigned, been terminated, or is reassigned to another position.”7/ The terms of the draft contract do not allow the private correctional facility operator to run a blanket vacancy rate. In fact, the operator will incur a vacancy deduction for positions not filled with permanent employees or contracted staff within 30 days after a position becomes vacant, unless a waiver has been granted.8/ Petitioner argues that DMS erred in not adjusting the per diem rate to account for operation of the public correctional facilities with across-the-board vacancies. DMS testified, and has apparently agreed, that such an adjustment would be fair to account for vacancy rates above the normal 3% lapse factor. Moreover, Petitioner argues that the adjustment should be high enough to account for vacancies in actual posts at comparable institutions. Each warden at each public correctional facility has the flexibility to leave positions, or posts, unfilled on a given day based on the security priority of the post. DOC classifies posts into level 1, 2, and 3 priority positions. Level 1 posts are critical to daily operation of a shift. Level 2 posts are essential to the daily normal operation of a facility and allow all activities and programs to be marginally staffed. Level 3 posts are necessary for long term normal operations. In order to fill a level 1 post, a warden may move to a level 1 post an officer assigned to a level 2 or 3 post for that day; limit non-critical activities, such as recreation or work squads; or pay overtime to fill the level 1 post. Level 3 posts are generally utilized prior to level 2 posts to fill level 1 vacancies. Jinanne West, CCA Senior Director of Financial Planning and Analysis, analyzed the security post charts and daily rosters for the Holmes and Okeechobee facilities. She found that for FY 2011-2012, Holmes had an average security post non-fill rate of 17%, with level 3 posts vacant 73% of the time and level 2 posts vacant 39% of the time. During the same time period, Okeechobee ran an average non-fill rate of 26% with level 3 posts vacant 94% of the time and level 2 posts vacant 72% of the time. CCA’s argument, however, assumes private facilities are required to staff their facilities exactly as public facilities do. The draft contract included as part of the ITN does not bear out that assumption. With respect to security staffing, the contract provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Security Staff Utilization: CONTRACTOR shall develop and implement Security staff utilization in accordance with DC policy and procedure that includes, but is not limited to the following: A table of organization for the security staff for the maximum inmate population for the Facility and the position qualifications, job descriptions, pay levels, number of persons per post, distribution by shift, and security staff to inmate ratio in each housing unit by shift. 5.28.6.2 A detailed Security Post Chart outlining how key functions/duties will be staffed. 6.3 PERSONNEL. * * * CONTRACTOR will provide the Department with a finalized staffing pattern prior to the Service Commencement Date. Positions will be staffed with qualified employees in accordance with the staffing pattern attached hereto as in [Exhibit , to be provided by the CONTRACTOR]. CONTRACTOR’S staffing pattern must be submitted and approved by the Contract Manager prior to the Service Commencement Date. Any modifications to the position requirements or the staffing pattern must be approved in writing by the Contract Manager. * * * Sufficient certified security staff shall be employed at all times to assure that all positions identified as critical complement on the approved staffing pattern, are manned, at all times, for each shift, unless a departure from the staffing pattern has been approved in writing by the Contract Manager. . . . CONTRACTOR shall be required to fill critical complement positions by using overtime or other qualified staff members to ensure that staffing levels do not decrease below the established critical complement. (emphasis added) The private contractor is charged with developing the security staffing pattern for its facility, including the job descriptions, pay levels, number of persons per post, distribution by shift, and security staff to inmate ratio per housing unit. While the contract may penalize the private operator for vacant positions left unfilled after 30 days, no evidence was introduced from which the undersigned can infer that private operation lends itself to any higher than normal lapse rate. It is illogical to count as a cost to the private operator the savings realized by public sector cutbacks. The Legislature intends to ensure more efficient private operation by including the 7% cost-saving requirements. CCA also argued that DOC has an advantage because it maintains high vacancies in individual posts at the level 2 and 3 positions, which private operators cannot do without incurring a vacancy deduction penalty. Again, the contract does not bear that out. The vacancy deduction is tied to vacancies of positions due to resignation, termination, or reassignment. There is no evidence from which to conclude that private operators are separately penalized by running vacancies in individual posts at an institution. In fact, the contract specifically provides for flexible staffing of the private correctional facility similar to that of the public facility –- filling critical complement posts at all times, authorizing the movement of employees from other posts and the use of overtime if necessary.9/ 3. Reception and Medical Center Cost Next, CCA argues that the per diem rates published in Amendment 11 are artificially low and should be further adjusted to account for health care administered to inmates at public reception and medical centers (RMCs). RMCs are public correctional facilities which conduct initial health screening of inmates at intake and may provide medical care to existing inmates as well. Inmates at public institutions may receive health care at RMCs, but the state pays for that health care out of a budget separate from the institution’s budget. In other words, public correctional facilities may send an inmate to an RMC for care and not pay for that care out of the facility’s budget. CCA argues that since it will be charged with the cost to treat inmates at an RMC, the per diem rate should account for that difference as a savings to the public correctional facility. What CCA fails to include in the discussion is the fact that a private correctional facility operator is authorized to use the RMC as a cost-saving measure. Private correctional facilities are required to provide health care, including emergency care, to its inmates offsite only when the onsite Chief Health Officer determines an inmate cannot be treated properly in the facility itself. Only then is the private facility authorized to seek offsite hospitalization or other offsite treatment. The vendor is solely responsible for the costs of the offsite treatment, including the security costs of treating or hospitalizing an inmate offsite. The transfer agreement authorizes the private correctional facility to use the RMC, when space is available, as an alternative to minimize security costs for offsite treatment of the private correctional facility’s inmates. Under these facts, the undersigned cannot find that DMS erred by not including an adjustment to the per diem rate to account for treatment costs of private correctional facility inmates at RMCs. 4. PILOT Fees Next, CCA argued that the published per diem rates are in error because they were not adjusted to account for the fees paid by the private correctional facility to the local government as Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILOTs). A PILOT is made to compensate local governments for the tax revenue lost by virtue of the public correctional facility property being used for a governmental function. DOC does not pay property taxes or PILOT fees related to Holmes, and no such fees are included in the Holmes per diem rates. However, the Bay and Moore Haven facilities are subject to PILOT fees required to be paid to local governments. Such fees are deducted from payments due to private correctional facility operators pursuant to the ITN, and are paid directly to the local governments assessing such fees. Pursuant to section 957.07(2), Florida Statutes, [r]easonable projections of payments of any kind to the state or any political subdivision thereof for which the private entity would be liable because of its status as private rather than a public entity, including, but not limited to, corporate income and sales tax payments, shall be included as cost savings in all such determinations. PILOT fee payments for Bay and Moore Haven are clearly included within the definition of section 957.07(2), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, PILOT fee payments for Bay and Moore Haven should have been included as an adjustment in the Amendment 11 per diem rate spreadsheets. Because PILOT fees were not included in the per diem rates published in Amendment 11 for Bay and Moore Haven, the rates were incorrect. 5. Major Maintenance and Repair Fund The ITN requires payments to be made by private correctional facility operators to the Major Maintenance and Repair Fund (MMRF). MMRF monies are used by the private facilities for maintenance, repairs, and renovations. Payments to the MMRF are deducted by DMS from payments due to private correctional facility operators, thereby reducing the per diem rate paid to private contractors. CCA argues that the per diem rates published in Amendment 11 are erroneous since those rates were not adjusted for MMRF payments. However, if the entire MMRF amount were credited to the private correctional facility, the per diem would not include any costs associated with regular repairs, maintenance, or other facility improvements. The amount paid into the MMRF is returned to the private correctional facility when repairs and maintenance are needed and conducted. There may be better ways to account for the maintenance costs of the private correctional facilities, but the undersigned finds no error in the per diem rate calculation on that basis. 6. Fleet Payments CCA contends the per diem rates should be adjusted to account for the requirement that the private correctional facility acquire a vehicle fleet for each of the three facilities, and that DMS erred in excluding the vehicle fleet costs for Holmes and Okeechobee when calculating the per diem rates. In calculating per diem rates, DMS excluded the one- time fleet cost of $573,986 associated with the purchase of the State vehicle fleet to operate the comparable public correctional facilities. The uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Tallent was that those costs were excluded because the fleets were acquired at the time the Holmes and Okeechobee facilities were first constructed. For example, the Holmes fleet was acquired 24 years ago. Because vehicle costs have changed dramatically during the intervening years, any adjustment to account for fleet cost would be insignificant. Additionally, Mr. Tallent testified that adjusting the per diem rate to account for the fleet charge would provide a windfall to a company, such as CCA, which was currently operating one of the facilities if it was awarded the contract again. At one point, CCA expressed that they were not actually concerned with whether the fleet acquisition cost had been incorporated into the per diem, but rather whether ongoing maintenance costs were included.10/ Mr. Tallent’s testimony was uncontroverted that the operating per diem of the public facilities includes all vehicle maintenance and fuel costs.11/ As such, the undersigned finds that DMS did not exclude vehicle fleet maintenance and fuel costs. The ITN requires private correctional facility operators to provide a fleet of vehicles for use at the Bay, Graceville, and Moore Haven facilities.12/ Given the greater weight of the evidence, the undersigned finds that excluding the fleet costs from the per diem rates incorporated as Amendment 11 was not erroneous. 7. Economies of Scale Last, CCA argues that the per diem rates should be adjusted to account for the economies of scale realized at Holmes and Okeechobee because these facilities are operated above design capacity. CCA maintains this adjustment is necessary since Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville may not exceed design capacity under the contract. Mr. Upchurch agreed that an economies of scale adjustment would be appropriate if a reasonable way to calculate that adjustment could be determined. The 2005 Per Diem Workgroup was convened to establish per diem operating rates for private correctional facilities which would be comparable to operation of public facilities. The report provides, “[t]he workgroup has not attempted to estimate the impact of economies of scale that are not available to private facilities. The workgroup, however, was provided with two estimates ranging from $6.66 per day from the Auditor General’s office to $7.10 per day from Geo Group.”13/ Although the Workgroup report refers to the Auditor General's estimate as an attachment thereto, the estimate was not attached to the report introduced into evidence. Further, no testimony was presented relating to whether the estimates from either the Auditor General or GEO Group were reasonable or otherwise reliable. Given the lack of evidence on whether, and by what methodology, an economies of scale adjustment could be calculated, the undersigned does not find that DMS erred by excluding an adjustment for economies of scale. Accounting Error Jinanne West is CCA’s Senior Director for Financial Planning and Analysis. Ms. West has a master’s degree in accounting and is a certified public accountant. Prior to joining CCA, Ms. West worked for Arthur Andersen for three years, and then taught college accounting. Ms. West evaluated the spreadsheets used to calculate the public comparable per diem rates for Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville and found fundamental accounting errors. To determine DOC’s per diem cost to operate the Bay and Moore Haven facilities, the Amendment 11 per diem rate spreadsheets divided Holmes’ operating costs by its average inmate population of 1,466 to arrive at a per diem rate, but then multiplied the per diem rate by the Bay and Moore Haven inmate populations of 985 to determine the daily costs associated with programming at those facilities. As a result, all operating costs attributable to Holmes were reduced by 33% (1,466 minus 985 divided by 1,466) to arrive at DOC’s projected operating costs to operate a 985-bed facility similar to Holmes. DOC then deducted from the remaining 67% of the Holmes operating costs 100% of the Holmes costs related to Holmes work squads and Holmes work camp staff, and additionally deducted 100% of the savings expected at Holmes due to the transition to 12-hour shifts. However, costs attributable to Holmes work squads and Holmes work camp staff and savings attributable to the 12-hour shift adjustment had already been reduced by 33% in the Amendment 11 per diem rate spreadsheets, given the difference in population between Holmes and the Bay and Moore Haven facilities. By deducting 100% of these costs and expected savings from the remaining 67% of the Holmes operating costs, DOC in effect incorrectly deducted 133% of Holmes’ costs and anticipated savings from the per diem rates. A similar error was found in the spreadsheet for Graceville. The inmate population at Okeechobee is slightly smaller than that at Graceville, leading to erroneous adjustments to the per diem for program costs and adjustments made to account for operational differences at Okeechobee. Due to this error in accounting methodology, the per diem rates published in Amendment 11 for Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville were incorrect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent, Department of Management Services, enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, and withdraw ITN 12/13-010 for the Operation and Management of Bay Correctional Facility, Graceville Correctional Facility, and Moore Haven Correctional Facility. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of July, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 2013.
