Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: l. The Petitioner, Terry Wooden, a black male, was hired by the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Corrections, on December 5, 1980 as a Correctional Officer I at River Junction Correctional Institution. River Junction Correctional Institution (RJCI) is a secure facility responsible for the care, custody and control of certain inmates. Correctional Officers are assigned to security posts which are located throughout the facility. Some "inside" security posts are located within inmate dormitories. Outside perimeter security posts, which are small tower-like buildings, are located along the perimeter fence and are the last observation posts between containment and possible inmate escape. For security reasons, the Respondent prohibits sleeping on the job and requires its correctional officers to remain alert at all times. Supervisors (generally employees holding the rank of sergeant) often make "rounds" of the facility wherein security posts are visited to ensure that the officer on, duty at that post is alert. RJCI procedure requires that an officer on duty at a security post "challenge" a supervisor or other correctional officer who approaches the security post. When a supervisor enters a dormitory, the officer assigned to that post is required to challenge that person by immediately leaving the officer's station (located within the dormitory) to meet the approaching person. If the officer is on the telephone or engaged in some activity, it is acceptable for the officer to wave his hand to the approaching person or indicate in some other manner that he is aware that someone has entered the area. When a supervisor approaches an outside security post, the officer on duty is required to meet the approaching individual at the door of the building. Discipline of employees at RJCI is based on a progressive system. During the time the Petitioner was employed at RJCI, a sergeant was required to report a sleeping/unalertness violation by a correctional officer to the shift lieutenant (supervisor of all employees on a particular shift). There were no written guidelines and the reporting officer was required to exercise some discretion in determining whether he believed that an offense had been committed. On the first incident, the shift lieutenant would counsel the employee about the infraction, but no written report was made. On the second report of an offense to the shift lieutenant, a written report of the incident would be prepared by either the reporting officer or the shift lieutenant. The shift lieutenant would interview the employee about the alleged violation and refer the report to the department head (correctional officer chief). The department head would then submit the written report to the personnel manager with recommendations. Upon receiving a written report of an infraction from the department head, the personnel manager would gather information pertaining to the offense and give it to the superintendent, along with recommendations for disposing of the case. The superintendent would then schedule a "predetermination conference", confront the employee with the allegations and determine the disciplinary action to be taken. Prior to 1979 and until June 1982, L. C. McAllister, a white male, was superintendent at RJCI; from June 1982 to December 10, 1982, George Ragans, a white male, was acting superintendent at RJCI; from December 13, 1982 through August 1983, Ken Snover, a white male, was superintendent at RJCI. Each superintendent was responsible for determining the particular penalty to be imposed using guidelines set forth in Chapter 33, Section 9 of the Rules of Personnel. Generally, the employee's first sleeping/unalertness violation reported to the personnel manager, and ultimately, the superintendent, would result in counseling (oral reprimand); the second violation would result in a written reprimand; the third violation would result in a suspension; the fourth violation would result in a longer suspension or dismissal; and, the fifth violation would result in dismissal. Major Miles, a white male, is a department head and functions as the overall supervisor of correctional officers at RJCI. Miles assigns posts and shifts to correctional officers. Major Miles usually assigns new correctional officers to midnight shift after they complete orientation. After Petitioner completed his orientation period, he was placed on midnight shift (12:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.) and assigned to Post 23 in "G" dormitory. The Petitioner completed his one year probationary period on December 5, 1981. The Petitioner was assigned an overall rating of "satisfactory" by his shift supervisor, Lieutenant Carter, a black male. The evaluation stated that Petitioner got along well with supervisors and fellow employees. In December of 1981, Lieutenant Childs, a white male, became the Petitioner's shift supervisor. Initially, the Petitioner and Lieutenant Childs enjoyed a friendly relationship. Lieutenant Childs drove the Petitioner to work on several occasions and both men shared a common interest in sports. On December 13, 1981 an officer made a routine check of "G" dormitory and found Petitioner asleep in the officer's station. The Petitioner was counseled about this first infraction. Shortly after Petitioner's sleeping incident of December 13, 1981, Major Miles changed Petitioner's post assignment from dormitory to Perimeter Post 3. Major Miles changed Petitioner's post because several inmates had complained to him that a lot of stealing was taking place and that Petitioner was not watchful enough to prevent it. The inmates also complained that Petitioner's counseling style seemed like harassment. After Petitioner's post was changed from "G" dormitory to Perimeter Post 3, his relationship with Lieutenant Childs began to turn sour. The Petitioner was "concerned" because he believed that Lieutenant Childs had input into Major Miles' decision to reassign him. On May 10, 1982, Lieutenant Childs found the Petitioner unalert at Perimeter Post 3. The Petitioner received a written reprimand for this second infraction. On August 19, 1982, Sergeant Pollock, a black male, found Petitioner unalert while on duty at Perimeter Post 3. Sergeant Pollock reported the incident to Lieutenant Childs but suggested that Petitioner be counseled rather than "written-up". Sergeant Pollock believed that a lesser punishment might encourage Petitioner's improvement. Lieutenant Childs told Pollock to think about it for a couple of days. On August 21, 1982, Sergeant Parks and Sergeant Tharpe found Petitioner unalert at his post. When Sergeant Pollock discovered this incident, he changed his mind about his previous recommendation to Lieutenant Childs. Childs told Pollock to submit a written report. The Petitioner was suspended for 3 days for these third and fourth sleeping/unalertness infractions. On September 2, 1982, Lieutenant Childs completed an employee rating evaluation on Petitioner for the period September 1, 1981 to September 2, 1982. Petitioner was given an overall rating of "satisfactory", but Lieutenant Childs noted several areas of concern. Lieutenant Childs mentioned that Petitioner seemed to interpret counseling sessions "as personal threats conspired, for no bonafide reason to harass him." However, Lieutenant Childs went on to note that Petitioner's attitude and work performance was improving and that Petitioner was "making a definite and positive effort to correct his shortcomings." On October 28, 1982 an inmate escaped from RJCI. At the time of the inmate's escape, Petitioner was on duty at Perimeter Post-3 and William Chessher, a white correctional officer, was on duty on Perimeter Post 2. Major Miles, the department head, recommended that both men be disciplined for being unalert. Because the inmate's escape route took him through Perimeter Post 3's primary area of responsibility, Major Miles recommended that Petitioner be dismissed; Miles recommended that Chessher be reprimanded or suspended because the escape route was along Perimeter Post 2's secondary area of responsibility. On November 18, 1982, Acting Superintendent George Ragans held a predetermination conference concerning Petitioner's October 28, 1982 unalertness charge. Mr. Ragans found that the offense was substantiated but did not follow Major Miles' recommendation that Petitioner be dismissed. Ragans suspended the Petitioner for fifteen (15) days for this fifth sleeping/unalertness violation. Immediately following the November 18, 1982 predetermination conference, Ragans suggested to Petitioner that Petitioner should request a shift change. However, Petitioner explained to Ragans that he had a new baby at home, was taking college courses and did not want a shift change at that time. When Petitioner returned to work on December 16, 1982 after his fifteen (15) day suspension he had decided that he wanted a shift change. Petitioner went to the control room to find out how to submit a shift change request. In the control room, Petitioner spoke with a female officer concerning the procedures for requesting a shift change. The female officer agreed to type a shift change request for Petitioner. The female officer typed the request and gave Petitioner a copy. Shift change requests are directed to the shift lieutenant, in this instance, Lieutenant Childs, who then passes the request to Major Miles for final action. The female officer told Petitioner that she would put the original request for shift change in Lieutenant Childs' box in the control room. For some reason, Lieutenant Childs never received Petitioner's written request for shift change. In January 1983, the Petitioner spoke with the new superintendent, Ken Snover, regarding a shift change. Mr. Snover told Petitioner to proceed through the change of command and if he was still not satisfied, to return and speak with him again. One night, while on duty sometime after December 16, 1982 Petitioner asked Lieutenant Childs about a shift change. Lieutenant Childs told Petitioner that there were going to be a lot of changes made. Petitioner spoke to Major Miles on one occasion after December 16, 1982 and asked about a shift change. Major Miles told Petitioner to submit a written request. Major Miles never received a written request for shift change from Petitioner. Sometime prior to August 1, 1983, Petitioner was temporarily assigned to "G" dormitory and worked with officer Gano, a white male. Gano complained to Lieutenant Childs that Petitioner was sleeping on duty. Before Gano complained to Childs, Childs had received allegations of Petitioner being asleep from other correctional officers. Because of those complaints, Childs had instructed two sergeants to closely review Petitioner's dormitory work habits. On one occasion, the sergeants told Lieutenant Childs that Petitioner appeared to be asleep while on duty. On August 1, 1983, Lieutenant Childs instructed officer Gano to let him know if Petitioner was sleeping by giving a pre-arranged signal. Officer Gano found Petitioner asleep or "non-alert" and gave the pre-arranged signal. Lieutenant Childs entered the dormitory without Petitioner challenging him and found Petitioner unalert. Lieutenant Childs wrote a report on Petitioner's sixth sleeping infraction. Superintendent Ken Snover held a predetermination conference concerning Petitioner's August 1, 1983 unalertness charge. Snover ordered the Petitioner's dismissal, effective August 18, 1983. Steve Williams, a white Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on April 20, 1981 and was given an oral reprimand for this first offense. Williams was caught sleeping again on June 21, 28, and July 31, 1981. Because of the personnel manager's vacation a predetermination conference letter could not be sent until after the third occurrence and all three violations were addressed at the same conference. Williams was given a written reprimand for this second sleeping infraction. Thomas Jackson, a black Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on October 29, 1982 and was given an oral reprimand for this first offense. On May 13, 1983, Jackson was caught sleeping a second time and was given an official reprimand. On August 10, 1983, Jackson was caught sleeping a third time and was suspended for one week (5 working days). Jackson was offered and accepted a shift change, from midnight to evening shift. Dennis Edwards, a white Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping in July 1982 and was counseled for this first offense. In Apri1 1983, he was caught sleeping again and was given a written reprimand. In July 1983, Edwards was suspended for 5 working days because of his third offense of sleeping while on duty. Larry Garrett, a black Correctional Officer I, was counseled for sleeping on duty for his first offense, but no documentation was made to his personnel file. On September 5, 1981 Garrett was caught sleeping a second time and was given a written reprimand. On December 3, 1981, Garrett was caught sleeping a third time and was suspended for three days. Garrett was offered a shift change, but declined because he was taking classes and had a newborn baby. On December 16, 1981, Garrett was caught sleeping for the fourth time and was terminated. Michae1 Weeks, a white Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on June 9, 1981 and was given a written reprimand for this first offense. On May 10, 1982 he was caught sleeping a second time and was given a written reprimand. Weeks was caught sleeping again on August 1, 8 and 10, 1982. Weeks was given a predetermination conference letter, but before the hearing was held, he was caught sleeping again on August 18, 1982. Weeks voluntarily resigned on August 18, 1982. Warren Harris, a black Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on November 29, 1979 and was given a written reprimand for this first offense. On June 13, 1981, Harris was caught sleeping again and was given another written reprimand. On September 9, 1981, Harris was caught sleeping for the third time and was suspended for three days. Harris was caught sleeping again on October 28 and 29, 1981 for his fourth offense. Harris was given a letter of termination, but resigned before the termination took effect. Harold Bailey, a white Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on June 14, 1982 and was counseled for this first offense. Bailey was caught sleeping again on July 17, 1982 and was given a written reprimand. On January 5, 1983 Bailey was caught sleeping on duty for the third time and was suspended for five days. On April 2, 1983, Bailey was charged with a fourth offense but Superintendent Snover found the allegations "unsubstantiated." Nevertheless, Bailey was counseled and documentation of the incident was placed in his personnel file. Bailey was offered a shift change but he refused it. Bailey's shift was later changed. In an effort to assist employees who were working midnight shift and having problems staying awake, the personnel manager and the superintendent would sometimes offer the employee a shift change or encourage the employee to seek a shift change. At various times, both black and white employees were offered, or encouraged to seek shift changes when they were having trouble on midnight shift. From time to time, correctional officers would submit requests for shift and/or post changes. Major Miles, the department head, usually made shift or post changes based on an individual's written request and the needs of the institution to have certain security posts staffed. Major Miles made some shift and post changes without a written request and over the objection of the employee if it was required by the needs of the institution. Shift and post changes at RJCI were given to both white and black employees in a substantially similar manner. Lieutenant Childs, upon receiving a request for a shift or post change, was required to forward the request to Major Miles for final action. Lieutenant Childs would forward a request for shift or post change with a favorable recommendation only if he believed the employee "earned" the recommendation by good performance on his current shift or post. As shift lieutenant, Childs was authorized to make some temporary post re-assignments for employees on his shift. During the last several months of Petitioner's employment, Petitioner was permanently assigned to Perimeter Post 3, but Lieutenant Childs temporarily assigned him to a post in "G" dormitory. While Petitioner was temporarily assigned to "G" dormitory, Lieutenant Childs became aware through "the grapevine" that Petitioner wanted to have Mondays and Tuesdays off, rather than Tuesdays and Wednesdays. Because different post assignments, carried different days off, a change in days off would have required a post change. Lieutenant Childs told Sergeant Pollock to tell Petitioner that he would arrange for Petitioner to have the desired days off as soon as possible if Petitioner's work performance improved. In January 1983 a new Department of Corrections directive required that certain correctional officers receive 160 supplementary hours of training. A majority of the staff at RJCI was required to complete the supplemental training. From January 1983 through August 1983, personnel at RJCI were engaged in the on-going training program. One set of training classes were scheduled from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.mand another set of classes were scheduled from 6:30 p.m. until 10:30 p.m., five days a week. During the period from January 1983 through August 1983, shift and post changes were made primarily to allow correctional officers the opportunity to attend the training sessions as required. As superintendent of RJCI, Ken Snover conducted "predetermination conferences" wherein he was required to review allegations, determine whether or not the charges were substantiated and then decide what disciplinary action to take. Superintendent Snover did not apply a lesser standard of proof at predetermination conferences where Petitioner was charged with sleeping/unalertness violations than he applied when white officers were involved. On one occasion Snover found that the allegations of sleeping were not sufficient to warrant disciplinary action against two white employees, Harold Bailey and Walter Dean, where the allegation was made by one sergeant but denied by both correctional officers. At the predetermination conferences that Snover conducted where Petitioner was charged, the allegations were all substantiated by one or more individuals and denied only by Petitioner. Perimeter Post 3 as well as other perimeter posts, are isolated outside security posts and are generally not considered to be the most desirable security post assignments. Both black and white officers were assigned to Perimeter Post 3 and other perimeter posts. A slight majority of the correctional officers permanently assigned to perimeter posts were black. There was no indication that correctional officers were assigned to Perimeter Post 3 on a racial basis nor as a "set up" to achieve dismissal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the complaint and the petition for relief filed by Mr. Terry Wooden. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of September, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day September, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED::: Drucilla E. Bell, Esq. Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Marva Davis, Esq. 379 E. Jefferson Street P. O. Drawer 551 Quincy, FL 32351 Louie L. Wainwright Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on. Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 3230 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. The first sentence is rejected as a recitation of testimony. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by Competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 31 and 32. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 20 and 30. Matters not contained therein are rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Matters not contained therein are rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and/or misleading. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 14A. Rejected as subordinate. 14B. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. 15A. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. 15B. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. 16A. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. 16B. Rejected as misleading and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or misleading. Rejected as misleading and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 27,^ 28 and 29. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 26, 27, 28 and 29. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as misleading and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 39, and 41. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate, misleading and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. (No paragraph 34). Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 43. Matters not contained therein are rejected as a recitation of testimony. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12 and 15. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 16 and 17. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. - Adopted in Findings of Fact 19 and 20. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27, 28 and 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 31 and 32. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Findings of Fact 39 and 47. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 41. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 41. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38.
The Issue Whether Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l), 33-3.0083(9)(i) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, William Van Poyck, Mike Ramadanovic and Kenneth Boudreaux, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rules challenged in these cases, Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l), 33-3.0083(9)(i), and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Rules"). Petitioner Van Poyck is on death row, which is considered administrative confinement. All exercise privileges for Petitioner Van Poyck have been suspended for almost three years. Petitioner Ramadanovic at the time of the final hearing was in close management confinement. All exercise privileges for Petitioner Ramadanovic have been suspended for almost one year. Petitioner Bourdreaux at the time of the final hearing was in close management confinement. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. The Challenged Rules. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, governs exercise of inmates who have been placed in "administrative confinement". Administrative confinement is the removal of an inmate from the general inmate population for one or more specified reasons. Rule 33-3.0081(1), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (l) Exercise -- Those inmates confined on a 24-hour basis excluding showers and clinic trips may exercise in their cells. However, if confinement extends beyond a 30-day period, an exercise schedule shall be implemented to ensure a minimum of two hours per week of exercise out of doors. Such exercise periods shall be documented on the confinement records. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only when clear and compelling facts can document such exercise periods should not be granted. The superintendent or assistant superintendent may restrict exercise for an individual inmate when the inmate continues to pose a serious threat to the safety, security and order of the institution by recent demonstrations of violence, by continuing threats of physical harm, written and spoken, toward staff and other inmates; by involvement in acts which seriously interfere with the staff's daily security functions, or by actions demonstrating an extreme escape risk. Inmates shall be notified in writing of this decision and may appeal through the grievance procedure. The denial of exercise shall be for the shortest length of time to accomplish the goal of safety, security and order within the institution and shall be documented on Form DC4-814. Medical restrictions may also place limitations on the exercise periods. Recreational equipment may be available for the exercise period provided such equipment does not compromise the safety or security of the institution. Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code, governs exercise of inmates who have been placed in "close management". Close management is the "long-term single cell confinement of an inmate apart from the general inmate population, where the inmate, through his own behavior, has demonstrated an inability to live in the general population without abusing the rights and privileges of other inmates or disturbing the security, order or operation of the institution." Rule 33-3.0083(1), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: Exercise -- Those inmates confined on a 24-hour basis, excluding showers and clinic trips, may exercise in their cells. However, if confinement extends beyond a 30-day period, an exercise schedule should be implemented to ensure a minimum of 2 hours per week of exercise outside of cell. Such exercise periods will be documented on the confinement records. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only when clear and compelling facts can document such exercise periods should not be granted. Medical restrictions may also place limitations on the exercise periods. Recreational equipment may be available for the exercise period provided such equipment does not threaten the safety or security of the institution. Rule 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, governs exercise of inmates who have been placed in "disciplinary confinement". Rule 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (n) Exercise -- Those inmates confined on a twenty- four hour basis (excluding showers and clinic trips) may exercise in their cells. However, if confinement extends beyond a thirty-day period, an exercise schedule should be implemented to ensure a minimum of two hours per week of exercise outside of the cell. Such exercise periods should be documented on the confinement records. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only when clear and compelling facts show that such exercise periods should not be granted. Restrictions may also be placed on the exercise periods by medical staff. The reason for any exercise restrictions shall be documented. Period of Outdoor Exercise. The Challenged Rules all provide that inmates may exercise in their cells and that "a minimum of two hours per week of exercise outside of the cell" should be provided to inmates in administrative confinement, close management and disciplinary confinement. Unless specified otherwise, all references to "inmates" in this Final Order are to an inmate in administrative confinement, close management or disciplinary confinement. At Florida State Prison, non-death row inmates subject to the Challenged Rules are given an opportunity to attend one, two-hour exercise session a week. If an inmate misses a session for medical or attorney "call out", a holiday or inclement weather, the session is not made up. The Challenged Rules do not specifically require that missed sessions be made up. On their face, the Challenged Rules provide that two hours of exercise should be provided without indicating any exceptions. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, is mandatory: two-hours of exercise must be provided each week. The amount of time inmates are allowed to exercise is affected by the budget and staff of the Respondent. Because of lack of funds and staff, the Respondent is not able to provide more exercise time to non-death row inmates subject to the Challenged Rules. At Florida State Prison, a maximum security prison, there are thirteen wings housing inmates. Ten wings house inmates (including four housing inmates on death row) in various types of confinement status. Nine of the ten wings have a separate area, referred to as a "yard", in which inmates may exercise outdoors. There are two correctional officers on duty at each of the yards during the outdoor exercise period for non-death row inmates subject to the Challenged Rules. One sergeant also rotates between the yards. Four to five correctional officers are required to take inmates in and out of the yards. Each inmate must be strip searched, handcuffed with his hands behind his back and then escorted into the yard. Exercise Yards. The Challenged Rules do not specify the size of the area in which outdoor exercise to be provided to inmates. The Challenged Rules also do not specify the number of inmates that may be placed in an area for outdoor exercise. Yards at Florida State Prison consist of a fenced concrete slab. The yards for non-death row inmates are approximately 24' by 33', or 792 square feet. Usually 17 inmates are placed in the yard next to the inmates' wing at a time. The number of inmates in the yard on occasion may be 20 to 25. This is the exception, rather than the rule. Recreational Equipment. The Challenged Rules do not require that recreational equipment be provided to non-death row inmates. Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, provide that recreational equipment may be available for the exercise period if it does not compromise the safety or security of the institution Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code, is silent concerning recreational equipment. Recreational equipment is not provided to inmates during exercise at Florida State Prison. Inmates tend to fight over recreational equipment and to abuse it when it is provided. In light of the findings of fact, infra, concerning death row inmates, the evidence failed to prove that the failure to provide non-death row inmates with recreational equipment is arbitrary or capricious. Although there is a rational and reasonable reason for not providing recreational equipment to inmates who have proven to be a disciplinary problem (including some death row inmates) the Respondent is evidently prohibited from withholding recreational equipment for death row inmates by court decree. No such decree applies to non- death row inmates. Yard Suspension. The Challenged Rules provide that exceptions to the provision for outdoor exercise may be made "only when clear and compelling facts can document such exercise periods should not be granted." Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code. Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, contain very similar language. Rules 33-3.0083(9)(i) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, do not specify who may decide who is to be denied exercise in the yard, referred to as being placed on the "yard suspension list", or the specific reasons for placing an inmate on such a list. The various institutions are given discretion to decide who will place an inmate on the yard suspension list and the reasons for such suspensions. Rules 33-3.0083(9)(i) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, also do not specify the procedures for placing an inmate on the yard suspension list, do not require periodic review of the list, do not specify a maximum period of time an inmate may be on the list and do not specify the conditions which must be met for an inmate to be removed from the yard suspension list. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, provides who may restrict exercise, requires that there be a "serious threat to the safety, security and order of the institution by recent demonstrations of violence, by continuing threats of physical harm, written and spoken, toward staff and other inmates" and other acts, requires that inmates be notified in writing and provides that denial of exercise be for the shortest length of time possible. There is a list of inmates at Florida State Prison who have been denied yard exercise. Inmates are placed on the yard suspension list because of security problems similar to those specified in Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, caused by an inmate. The procedure for placing an inmate on the yard suspension list is as follows: The chief security officer recommends that an inmate be placed on the list. The recommendation of the chief security officer is reviewed by a team of senior correctional officers and the superintendent. The superintendent makes the final decision of whether an inmate is placed on the yard suspension list. Any inmate placed on the list is notified in writing and may appeal the decision through the grievance procedure. Chapter 33-29, Florida Administrative Code. The following procedure is followed to determine whether an inmate is removed from the yard suspension list: The list is reviewed monthly by the team of senior correctional officers that recommends the placement of an inmate on the list. If an inmate's behavior demonstrates that he has adapted to the institution and is no longer acting out in such a manner to create a security problem, a recommendation is made to the superintendent to remove the inmate's name from the list. The superintendent makes the final decision of whether an inmate's name is removed. Inmates are placed on the yard suspension list for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the goal of changing the inmate's behavior and to eliminate the threat to security caused by the inmate. Inmates on the yard suspension list are still allowed to exercise in their cells. Although cells are small and exercise is not necessarily easy in the cells, inmates may do elevated push-ups, step-ups, and jog in place. There are at any given time approximately 100 inmates at Florida State Prison on the yard suspension list. Inmates may be kept on the yard suspension list for years. Inmate Jimmy Stephens has been on the yard suspension list since February, 1990, and was previously on the yard suspension list for over fifteen years. Petitioner Van Poyck was placed on the yard suspension list upon his arrival at Florida State Prison on December 28, 1988, and remained on the list until January 7, 1992. Death Row Inmates. Inmates on death row are in administrative confinement and are, therefore, subject to Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code. Inmates on death row are provided two, two-hour exercise sessions each week. A total of four hours of exercise. If an exercise session is missed by a death-row inmate, the session is made up. The yards provided to death row inmates are larger than the yards provided to non-death row inmates. The yards for death row inmates at Florida State Prison are 71' by 69' (4,899 square feet), 80' by 64' (5,120 square feet), 62' by 91' (5,642 square feet) and 74' by 80' (5,920 square feet). Approximately 24 to 30 death row inmates are placed in the yard next to the inmates' wing at a time. Death row inmates are provided with a variety of recreational equipment. The amount of exercise time, the size of the yards and the amount of recreational equipment provided to death row inmates was agreed to in a consent decree in a federal court proceeding involving the Department of Corrections.
Findings Of Fact On August 28, 1987, Respondent, David E. Hancock, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer, holding certificate #11-87-502-02. On March 4, 1988, Respondent, Floyd W. Winkle, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer, holding certificate #11-87-502-03. In March, 1989, Respondents were employed as correctional officers by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). CCA operates the county corrections facilities for Bay Counnty, Florida. Additionally, CCA is responsible for booking new arrestees into the jail facility. On March 11, 1989, Respondent Hancock was the supervisor of the night shift at the main jail facility in Bay County. Respondent Winkle was the booking officer. The evening of the 11th was a very heavy evening for arrests. The facility was understaffed for the numbers of arrests being processed. In fact, the holding cells, located in the basement of the jail, were full and female prisoners were being held in the interview rooms across the hall from the holding cells. Marcus Kitchens was brought to the jail in a highly intoxicated state. He was bleeding and exhibited lacerations and abrasions to his face and limbs. Mr. Kitchens was also in a very noisy and rowdy state. During the course of the evening, one of the female prisoners requested to use the restroom facilities. These facilities are located in the holding cells which were occupied by the male prisoners. The male prisoners were transfered to an interview room so that the female prisoner could use the restroom facility in the holding cell. The transfer was made by Officer Winkle. One of the inmates was Marcus Kitchens. He had not yet been officially booked into the jail. While transferring the male prisoners back to the holding cell Mr. Kitchens asked Officer Winkle for a blanket. For a number of valid security reasons jail policy does not permit a prisoner to have a blanket until the prisoner is officially booked into the facility and on his her her way to a more permanent cell. When Mr. Kitchens was told that he could not have a blanket he became violent and charged Officer Winkle, hitting the officer on the left side of face with his fist and knocking the officer's glasses off. Officer Winkle pushed Mr. Kitchens into the holding cell. Mr. Kitchens grabbed Officer Winkle by the shirt and pulled him into the holding cell with him. The two landed up against one of the walls of the holding cell and Mr. Kitchens hit Officer Winkle several more times in the chest and abdomen with his fist. While Officer Winkle was trying to block the blows, Mr. Kitchens hit Officer Winkle again on the left side of the face. Officer Winkle then grabbed Mr. Kitchens and put him on the floor. Officer Hancock heard the noise from the altercation and responded from another part of the basement area to the site of the altercation. By the time Officer Hancock arrived, Officer Winkle had Mr. Kitchens on the floor. Officer Winkle was sitting on top of Mr. Kitchens trying to subdue him. Officer Hancock stepped in between Officer Winkle and the inmate, put his knee into Mr. Kitchens chest, grasped the shoulder area and shoved Mr. Kitchens against the back wall of the holding cell. Officer Hancock inquired if Officer Winkle was alright. After Officer Winkle responded that he was, Officer Hancock told him to leave the cell. Officer Winkle left the cell and Officer Hancock released Mr. Kitchens from the wall. Mr. Kitchens began to charge Officer Hancock. Officer Hancock ordered him not to move and Mr. Kitchens sat back down on the floor. Officer Hancock left the cell and the door was locked. The entire altercation to the close of the cell door lasted a maximum of two and one-half minutes. It was while Respondents were in the holding cell with Mr. Kitchens that the alleged excessive use of force occurred by Officer Winkle banging Mr. Kitchens' head against the floor and hitting him three times on the side of the head with his fist after Mr. Kitchens had submitted to the officers. The use of excessive force was testified to by an officer who arrived from another part of the basement area after the altercation began and who could only have seen the last few seconds of the incident. The only testimony this officer gave regarding Officer Hancock was that while he was leaning against the cell wall he told Officer Winkle that Mr. Kitchens was "all his" after which Officer Winkle allegedly banged Mr. Kitchens' head on the floor and punched him on the side of the head. Contrary to this officer's testimony and corroborative of Respondents' testimony was the testimony of the nurse on duty at the jail facility. She did not see any excessive use of force and did not hear Officer Hancock make the statement referenced above while the officers were in the holding cell. She also testified that Mr. Kitchen's appeared to be struggling somewhat while he was on the floor. Officer Hancock testified that he told Officer Winkle Mr. Kitchens was "all his" after the officers had locked the door to the holding cell. Officer Hancock made the statement in response to Officer Winkle's complaint that he needed help in booking. The statement was meant to communicate to Officer Winkle that help would not be forthcoming and that he had to handle Mr. Kitchens during the booking process. Clearly, given the facts of this case, such a vague statement, regardless of where it was made, does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that Officer Hancock aided, abetted, counseled or procured any battery being effected against Mr. Kitchens. Moreover, this case boils down to a swearing match between the various parties and witnesses involved. On these facts and given the demeanor of the witnesses, such a swearing match does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that Respondents have failed to maintain the good moral character required of correctional officers. Additionally, given the fact that the Respondents were subdueing a violent inmate and the very short time span in which the alleged use of force occurred it is improbable that any excessive force was used which would reflect on the character of either Respondent. Therefore the Administrative Complaints against each Respondent should be dismissed. 1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the amended Administrative Complaints filed against David E. Hancock and Floyd W. Winkle be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, William F. Reid, is currently and has been at all times pertinent to the issues herein, an inmate at UCI, having been committed to the custody of the DOC for an offense committed prior to July 1, 1978. At the time of filing of the Petition, he was in administrative confinement at UCI but, at the time of the hearing, had been released and was not in that status. Petitioner concedes that even during the period of his administrative confinement, he was awarded basic gain time as provided for since he was committed prior to July 1, 1978. However, due to the fact that he was unable to work while in administrative confinement, he did not receive any incentive gain time during that period. Work opportunities for inmates in administrative confinement status are extremely limited. This is because of the security and manpower problems involved in providing adequate supervision of this category of inmate during a work detail. Rule 33-3.081, Florida Administrative Code, allows the placing of an inmate in administrative confinement then disciplinary or criminal charges are pending against him and his presence in the general prison population would present a danger to himself, to others, or to the security and order of the institution. It is also authorized when an investigation is pending and the inmate's presence in the prison population might tend to interfere with that investigation. If, for medical reasons, an inmate's remaining in the prison population would create a health or safety risk, administrative confinement is also authorized. Another reason justifying administrative confinement is when the inmate is alleged to have committed misconduct and there is concern that because of that, his safety is at risk. The rule does not provide any maximum length of time for administrative confinement and the reason for this is that the investigations supporting it are of varying complexity and take differing lengths of time. Petitioner and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all of whom have been in administrative confinement in the past, all denied that they had received the required informal hearing called for under the rule. At best, they were told by the officer placing them in administrative confinement generally why this action was being taken. However, they contend they were never given any opportunity to submit anything to a senior official or a classification officer and they are of the opinion that at no time was there an emergency situation involved. The impression that the inmates have is that a corrections officer can have an inmate confined or released for any reason whether there is adequate justification or basis for the action. Clifford Towbridge has been an inmate at UCI since December, 1983. When he was placed in administrative confinement he was advised of this fact by a corrections officer who told him to pack his things and who put him in administrative confinement status without telling him why. He contends he got no hearing but was ultimately told he was being confined because a confidential informant advised that his life was in danger. Approximately two to three weeks later, he was released when he signed a paper indicating that his life was not in danger. At no time was he told who had made the allegation against him and he was not given a hearing either before confinement or before release. Curtis Mangram had an experience with administrative confinement at his prior incarceration at Belle Glade Correctional Institution. At that time he was given no hearing nor was he brought before a review board. When he left administrative confinement at Belle Glade he was assigned to UCI and remained clean until August 4, 1984 when he was placed in administrative confinement there. It appears that his name was mentioned in connection with the rape of a prisoner and he was placed in administrative confinement for several weeks pending investigation of that incident. One day after his release he was again placed in administrative confinement for possession of contraband wine. He was given no hearing prior to being placed into administrative confinement nor was he initially given a reason for this action. However, he wrote several letters to officials within the DOC to determine why this action was taken. The first response he got indicated he was being placed in for evaluation but regardless of the reason, he is sure he was not given a hearing. On neither occasion of his being placed in administrative confinement, in his opinion, was there any emergency reason for precipitous action. From first hand and from what he has seen and heard, it is his opinion that prisoners are placed in administrative confinement solely on the uncorroborated allegations of other prisoners and when this happens, there is no hearing prior to she placement nor within a timely period thereafter. As was stated previously, the witness was placed in administrative confinement on August 4 and was released on August 28. At that time he was told the reason for him having been placed in administrative confinement (the alleged rape) was resolved. The following day, August 29, he was placed back in administrative confinement and was told by a corrections officer that the action was being taken because Lt. Dixon, an investigator, wanted him back in. Later on, Officer Ward, Dixon's assistant, read him his rights and asked him some questions after which the witness was returned to administrative confinement. The witness admits that he had the wine which he subsequently found out was the basis for his second administrative confinement but he was never punished for the wine nor was he ever charged with the rape. He was in administrative confinement for a total of four months at UCI and had he been punished for the unlawful possession of the wine, it is his opinion he would have been placed in disciplinary confinement for fifteen or thirty days, a period much shorter than the entire period of his administrative confinement. Inmate Edwin Paul has been placed in administrative confinement for investigative reasons twelve or thirteen times during the two and a half years he has been an inmate at UCI. He relates that when he is placed there, the corrections officer comes up to him and tells him to pack his things but never gives him a reason for this action. The response to his inquiry is always that someone will tell him. It is his experience that at UCI, regardless of what the rule requires, no review is done and the inmate is not told anything until he files a grievance. That generally takes approximately ninety days to resolve and during this time, the inmate is in administrative confinement earning no incentive gain time. According to Paul, his requests for information as to the reason for his status are met with various answers such as "you're a menace," "none of your business," or "I don't know." It is his opinion that administrative confinement can be imposed on an inmate at the whim of a correctional officer. He contends that in all of his periods of administrative confinement either no charges were preferred against him, or he was found not guilty of the allegation that was laid, but during all that period, he has not received any gain time that he would have earned had he not been placed in administrative confinement. This has affected his status in that had he not been placed in administrative confinement, his sentence would have been up after forty months confinement. Because of his inability to earn gain time, he is not serving the fiftieth month of his period of confinement. Petitioner was placed in administrative confinement on March 17, 1985. He was not then nor has he since that time been given an informal hearing by a correctional officer, he states. He claims he was placed in administrative confinement by a corrections officer - and was not given an opportunity to sign anything regarding this action. On this occasion he was in for two and a half months. In a prior period of administrative confinement, he claims he was not told why he was there officially. Only through the information given him by a friendly corrections officer two weeks after the fact was he advised why he was incarcerated. Never has a senior corrections officer ever held a hearing with him, he states, nor has he ever been told how long the investigation on which his administrative confinement status is based will take. He has not seen any investigative report nor has he even been given any assistance in finding out the reason for his status. Even a personal interview with the superintendent of UCI has not changed this process, he says. Reid and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all contend that the implementation of the rule regarding administrative confinement creates great stress for them because of, (1) the loss of incentive gain time, (2) the inability to get appropriate exercise, and (3) the impact that the status has on the ability to receive visitors, and all agree that being afforded a hearing or being told why the administrative confinement action was being taken would tend to reduce that stress. Petitioner admitted that he does not have much of a problem with the rule except for the fact that it does not put any time limit on the length of the investigation. His complaint is primarily with the way the rule is followed by UCI. Mr. Tabah, the classification specialist at UCI, related that there is no formal board hearing when inmates are placed in administrative confinement. The inmates' case is reviewed by the chief correctional officer and this review is termed a hearing. This action, however, is itself reviewed by the classification team within 72 hours of the hearing. At the inmates' hearing, a form DC4-318 is prepared by the chief correctional officer on which the reason for the administrative confinement action is listed. The bottom half of this form is subsequently filled out by the classification team during its review as to its concurrence or non-concurrence and the team's recommendation for action. The inmate is given a copy of this review and has an opportunity to make comment thereon. Both the recommendation of the team and the comments of the inmate, if any, are referred to the superintendent. Every inmate in administrative confinement is reviewed weekly. Each inmate is usually advised of the reason for his being placed in administrative confinement either at the time or immediately thereafter. Only in emergency cases can the inmate be placed in administrative confinement without review/hearing by the chief correctional officer. In that case, the hearing is held within forty-eight hours. Review of the files on both Mangram and Towbridge reveal that, as to Towbridge, the inmate was advised by the corrections officer placing him in administrative confinement on February 13, 1985 as to the reason therefor. The chief corrections officer approved the actions of the corrections officer thereafter and the following day, the classification team reviewed the action and furnished the inmate with a copy of their recommendation. As to Mangram, the records reflect that he was placed in administrative confinement on August 18, 1984. An informal hearing was held that same day and the action was reviewed by senior corrections officer Bryant at 4:00 P.M. the same day. Mr. Mangram was retained in administrative confinement because of the belief that the safety of the institution required it. It was felt that Mangram was a potentially violent inmate who posed a clear danger to others. As to Mr. Paul, the file reflects that the two times he was in administrative confinement he was advised of the reasons and given a hearing. As to Petitioner, the record reflects that on January 24, 1985 he was placed in administrative confinement and given the reasons therefor by corrections officer Brown. The reviewing corrections officer supervisor Bryant concurred.
Findings Of Fact On November 15, 1975, Eagler was employed by DOR as a correctional officer at Florida Correctional Institution, Lowell, Florida, and was working the first or 12:00 to 8:00 a.m. shift. At about 7:30 a.m. Eagler was required to participate in the conduct of a prisoner count according to the following standard procedure. At the institution there are four separate dormitories labelled A thru D respectively. Dormitories A and B are located at the south end of the institution and Dormitories C and D are located at the north end. Between the north and the south ends of the institution is the dining hall and lieutenant's office. During the count, a team of two correctional officers are assigned responsibility for two dormitories. In the first dormitory, one officer conducts a prisoner count while the other observes. The roles are then reversed with the second officer conducting his own prisoner count. In the event the two counts do not coincide, a recount is conducted in order to isolate the source of the error. The procedure is repeated in the second dormitory. A count is then made of the dining hall personnel after which all correctional officers meet in the lieutenant's office to report the total count. If the count does not coincide with the actual prisoner population, an escape and recapture plan is immediately implemented. On the morning in question, Eagler along with correctional officer Robert L. Bannister was assigned to conduct the prisoner count in B and C dormitories. In the initial count of B dormitory, Bannister came up with a count of 60 while Eagler came up with a count of 59. Although the procedure is to require both counts to coincide, Eagler at this point declared that he would accept Bannister's count. Sergeant Arthur J. Chandler was the shift supervisor and upon learning of these events ordered Eagler to conduct a recount. In response, Eagler said he would accept Bannister's count but Chandler advised that such procedure was impermissable and ordered Eagler to conduct a recount. Eagler refused and then refused a third time. Eagler never did conduct a recount so Bannister along with another correctional officer conducted a recount of Dormitory B and a proper count was cleared at 8:00. During Eagler's discussions with Sergeant Chandler, Eagler not only refused to conduct a recount but became boisterous and talked in a loud angry manner, occasionally using mildly profane language. This was done within the sight and hearing of some 40 to 50 inmates in Dormitory B. Sergeant Chandler directed Eagler to go to the lieutenant's office but Eagler did not immediately comply although he did ultimately proceed to the lieutenant's office at an undetermined time. The importance of implementing the prisoner count procedure expeditiously cannot be overemphasized. The success of recapturing an escaped prisoner and the minimization of such mischief as an escaped prisoner might accomplish in the community is directly proportional to the timeliness of the implementation of the escape and recapture plan. It is also considered good corrections procedure to avoid airing differences between correctional officers in front of inmates. It is more desirable to present a common front to the inmates and resolve differences in private.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Career Service Commission sustain the action taken by DOR. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL R. N. McDONNELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building, Room 530 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond Gearey, Esquire Department of Offender Rehabilitation 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Department of Administration Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. William R. Eagler 5273 Northwest 63rd Place Ocala, Florida 32670 Earl Archer, III, Esquire Department of Offender Rehabilitation 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Rule 33-3.002(11), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, Darryl James McGlamry, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rule at issue in this proceeding. The Petitioner has challenged the validity of Rule 33-3.002(11), Florida Administrative Code. Prior to incarceration, the Petitioner wore his hair in a manner that covered his ears and collar. If allowed to, the Petitioner would continue to wear his hair in the manner he wore it prior to incarceration. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-3.002(11), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.002(11), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Rule"), provides, in pertinent part, the following: (11) Male inmates shall have their hair cut short to medium length at all times with no part of the ear or collar covered. . . . The Challenged Rule applies to male, but not female, inmates. The Challenged Rule is necessary in order to reduce the ability of male inmates to change their identity by changing their hair style. The Challenged Rule alleviates security problems, including the ability during an escape to alter an inmate's appearance more rapidly by cutting long hair. Long hair can also constitute a security problem because of the ability to hide contraband in it. The rationale for the Challenged Rule was explained in the Final Order entered in Redman v. Department of Corrections, DOAH Case No. 84-0598R, April 19, 1984, as follows: Mr. Watson explained the considerations behind forbidding full beards and requiring short haircuts. According to his uncontroverted testimony, uniformity of prisoners' appearance is a desideratum in and of itself. There are health and sanitation problems with longer hair. Many inmates are involved in food preparation. The prison issues toothpaste, but not shampoo. In a fight, long hair can be pulled more readily than short hair. Some inmates work in close proximity to machinery. Although some visitors to the prison have short hair and do not wear beards, it is easier, in general, to distinguish inmates from visitors if the former are all close shorn. (Prison uniforms also help in this regard.) Escapees would be able to alter their appearance more rapidly if they had long hair (by cutting it off) or a beard (by shaving) than if they were put to the trouble of acquiring a wig or a false beard. This is still the Respondent's rationale for the Challenged Rule. Hair Length for Female Inmates. The Respondent does not have a rule governing female inmate hair length. It is the policy of the Respondent to allow female inmates to wear their hair at a length that is consistent with the community standard for females. Conditions are imposed by the Respondent on the way female inmates wear their hair. Female inmates are not allowed to wear their hair in what is considered a radical style or to cut designs into their hair. Nor are female inmates allowed to wear their hair in a traditionally male style. Radical braiding is also not allowed. The Challenged Rule is not applied to female inmates because the community standard for female hair styles is different than the community standard for males. The length that females keep their hair can range from relatively short to below the shoulder. Like their male counterparts, allowing female inmates to have long hair causes some of the same problems that caused the Respondent to limit the length of male inmate hair styles. Longer hair for female inmates can create security problems because of the ability to hide contraband and the ability to alter appearances during escape attempts. There are also hygiene problems relating to lice and inadequate shampooing and safety hazards related to female inmates with long hair. It is easier to handle some of the security problems associated with female inmates hiding contraband because there are only 2,500 female inmates to be searched. There are approximately 43,000 male inmates, making it more difficult to conduct searches of the hair of male inmates who might choose to grow their hair long. There are significant differences in the manner in which female and male inmates are treated because of the differences in their gender. It is easier socially for a male inmate to accept short hair. Requiring short hair for males does not create the type of adverse reaction it could cause for many female inmates. Due to the possible adverse impact and the message it might send to female inmates that they are different from other women in society, requiring short hair for female inmates is not justified by the security, hygiene, safety and other concerns which justify short hair for male inmates.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application for certification as a correctional officer should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: On or about January 1, 1989, Petitioner was employed as a probationary employee with the Dade Correctional Institute (DCI) in Miami, Florida. The DCI is a twenty-five acre compound which houses approximately 944 inmates. The compound is comprised of eight dormitories, vocational shops, an educational building, two dining hall satellites, and a main dining hall. For each work shift, correctional officers are stationed within each dormitory, along the perimeter area, inside the radio control room, and throughout the grounds. The minimum number of correctional officers required for each shift is Because of the limited number of officers on-duty during a given shift, their responsibilities, and security considerations, it is imperative that correctional officers maintain a level of detachment from inmates. Petitioner was aware of this mandate at the time of her employment with the DCI. On or about January 19, 1989, Corrections Officer Garnett instructed the Petitioner to perform an inventory with an inmate, DeMarco, to verify state property numbers. Later in the day, when Officer Garnett questioned DeMarco regarding the inventory sheet, she was told that Petitioner had directed another inmate, Williams, to perform the inventory. Since this was contrary to the original instructions, Officer Garnett contacted the Petitioner by radio to determine the location of the inventory sheet. At that time Petitioner informed Officer Garnett that the inventory was complete and that the sheet was in her pocket. When confronted in person and directed to produce the inventory sheet, Petitioner admitted she had given the inventory work to inmate Williams, that the inventory was not completed and that she had misrepresented the matter. Subsequently, the inventory was retrieved from Williams. Inmates are not normally allowed access to the DCI clothing room. Officer Garnett had authorized inmate DeMarco to assist Petitioner with work in the clothing room. Inmate Williams was not authorized to work the clothing room. Petitioner allowed inmate Williams access to the clothing room. Initially, Petitioner denied having done so, but later recanted and admitted that she had allowed inmate Williams to assist her in the clothing room. Personal relationships between correctional officers and DCI inmates are prohibited. Petitioner was counseled on numerous occasions about the rules and procedures which prohibit discussions of a personal nature with inmates. Fraternization is considered a serious security breach for which an officer may be terminated from employment. On or about January 23, 1989, Petitioner admitted she had had personal discussions with inmates (including inmate Williams) but assured Major Thompson that she would refrain from such conduct in the future. Petitioner continued to have personal conversations with inmates after the counseling session of January 23, 1989. Specifically, Mr. Callahan witnessed a personal conversation between Petitioner and inmate Williams which took place within a dormitory that inmate Williams was not assigned to be in. Later, Petitioner wrote a love note to inmate Strausser which was found at her duty post. A search of inmate Strausser's cell revealed he had possession of Petitioner's home telephone number. Petitioner initially denied her relationship with inmate Strausser but later told Major Thompson that they are engaged to be married. Petitioner's employment with DCI was terminated in June of 1989. Contrary to Petitioner's belief, she is not certified as a correctional officer. Petitioner has, however, completed all - educational/training requirements to become certified.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for certification as a correctional officer. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-6684 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY PETITIONER: None submitted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT: Paragraphs 1 through 5 are accepted. With the date being corrected to January 19, 1989, paragraph 6 is accepted. Paragraphs 7 through 19 are accepted. Paragraphs 20 and 21 are rejected as hearsay or irrelevant. To the extent that Petitioner admitted having inmate Williams in the clothing room to, Major Thompson, paragraph 22 is accepted. Paragraphs 23 through 25 are accepted. Paragraph 26 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 27 through 28 are rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 29 through 37 are accepted. Paragraph 38 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 39 through 54 are accepted. Paragraph 55 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 56 is accepted. Paragraphs 57 through 59 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Isabel Machin 9411 S.W. 4th Street Apartment 201 Miami, Florida 33174 Elsa Lopez Whitehurst Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer and a certified instructor, committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued November 16, 2004, and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was certified by Petitioner as a correctional officer and as an instructor. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) at its Indian River Correctional Institution (IRCI) with the rank of Major. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ken Torres was employed by the DOC at IRCI with the rank of Lieutenant. On June 11, 2003, Tvaris Burch, Errol Whiley, and Keith Conley were inmates at IRCI. At no time did any of these three inmates have authorization to be in Respondent’s office at IRCI. The only door to Respondent’s office opens to a long hallway. This door is normally locked. At approximately 6:15 p.m. on June 11, 2003, Respondent entered his office at IRCI and was followed by Lt. Torres. Respondent and Lt. Torres saw three inmates on the floor attempting to hide under Respondent’s desk. Each inmate attempted to conceal his identity by pulling his tee shirt up over his head. It is undisputed that both Respondent and Lt. Torres ordered the three inmates to come out from under the desk and the inmates refused those orders. It is also undisputed that the inmates came out from under the desk after Respondent threatened to order Lt. Torres to spray them with chemical agents. What happened next is the center of the dispute in this proceeding. Petitioner alleged that Respondent kicked one of the inmates and that he kicked and punched another inmate as they came out from under his desk. Petitioner also alleged that Respondent failed to file a mandatory Use of Force Report and that he lied to an investigator (Mr. Glover) in a sworn statement. Respondent asserted that he did not kick or otherwise use unauthorized force against any of the three inmates, that he had no reason to file a use of force report, and that he did not lie to the investigator. In support of its allegations, Petitioner presented the testimony of inmate Burch, Mr. Glover, and Lt. Torres. In addition, Petitioner presented the investigative report prepared by Mr. Glover and certain affidavits gathered by Mr. Glover during the course of his investigation. The following facts are not in dispute. After the three inmates came out from under the desk and were on their feet, they were ordered to remove the tee shirts from their heads and were identified as being inmates Burch, Whiley, and Conley. They were stripped searched by Respondent and Lt. Torres and contraband was removed from them. Additional security was called and took the three inmates to the prison nurse for a pre-confinement physical. This type medical examination is mandatory for an inmate about to be confined for disciplinary purposes. The inmates did not complain to anyone that they had been injured or mistreated by Respondent or by anyone else. The nurses noted no injury on any of the inmates. The three inmates were then confined for disciplinary reasons. An incident report was written and a Disciplinary Report was filed for each of the three inmates. Neither Respondent nor Lt. Torres filed a Use of Force Report, which is a mandatory report after physical force is used against an inmate. On June 12, 2003, approximately 24 hours after the incident in Respondent’s office, both inmate Burch and inmate Whiley declared a medical emergency. Both inmates were promptly taken to the medial unit and examined by prison nurses. Inmate Burch told nurse Rhea Harris that he had been injured by being kicked in the head, but he would not identify the person who kicked him. At the final hearing, inmate Burch testified that Respondent kicked him in the head as he was coming out from under the desk and in the knee when he tried to stand up. He further testified that the blow to the knee caused him to fall to the floor, which broke his glasses. Ms. Harris observed a bump on the side of inmate Burch’s head that could be consistent with inmate Burch’s being kicked.5 Inmate Whiley was seen by Nurse Debra Barriner on June 11 and June 12, 2003. On June 12, 2003, inmate Whiley told Ms. Barriner that he had a sore neck and a sore area on his face on the left cheek. Ms. Barriner observed areas of slight swelling and discoloration that were consistent with inmate Whiley’s complaints. Inmate Whiley refused to tell the nurse what caused his neck and left cheek to become sore. In an affidavit subsequently secured by Mr. Glover, inmate Whiley alleged that Respondent had kicked him as he was coming out from under the desk and hit him in the stomach after he stood up. In an affidavit secured by Mr. Glover, inmate Conley stated that he was not struck by Respondent on June 11, 2003, but that he saw Respondent strike inmates Burch and Whiley. Approximately a week after the incident in Respondent’s office, corrections officers intercepted a note being passed from the cell of inmates Burch and Whiley to the cell of inmate Conley. This note was turned over to Lt. Torres, who was the shift supervisor, who testified that he threw the note away and could not recall its details. Lt. Torres did recall that the note made a reference to his being promoted as a result of the allegations that had been made against Respondent. In a sworn interview given to Mr. Glover, Lt. Torres stated that he saw Respondent kick inmates Burch and Whiley. He repeated that statement at the formal hearing. On closer examination, Lt. Torres testified that he did not witness Respondent make physical contact with any of the inmates, but that he saw him making kicking motions in the directions of the inmates. On further examination, the following exchange occurred between Petitioner’s counsel and Lt. Torres beginning at page 85, line 22 of the Transcript: Q. Let me ask you this: If you did not see Major Passino actually strike an inmate, why then did you feel that it was necessary to report such an incident.[6] A. Why did I feel that? That’s my responsibility. Q. At the time that this incident occurred, why did you consider that there had been a use of force. A. Why? Q. Yes. A. Only because of what the inmates said, that they were injured, did I suspect that there was a use of force. Q. And that was only after the inmates had declared a medical emergency – A. Yes, sir. Respondent’s testimony that he did not use unauthorized force against inmates Burch and Whiley is found to be credible. The conflict in the evidence is resolved by finding that Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent battered inmate Burch or Whiley.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing all counts of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of, June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether the correctional officer certification of Steven S. Wright should be revoked or otherwise penalized based on the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Steven S. Wright is a certified correctional officer, having been issued certificate number 43-88-502-05 on December 19, 1988. Mr. Wright was employed as a Correctional Officer I at Lake Correctional Institute in June 1989. On the morning of June 20, 1989, and on other occasions, Mr. Wright had discussed drugs with inmates. He did not encourage or support the use of drugs. He believed these discussions were a useful part of the rehabilitation process. Later on June 20, 1989, Inmate Clinton Gholson approached Mr. Wright in the Food Services area and placed a piece of paper in Mr. Wright's pocket. Mr. Wright was planning to be married in a short time. Gholson had indicated that he and some other inmates wanted to make a wedding present for Wright in Arts and Crafts. Because inmates are generally prohibited from giving gifts to correctional officers, Mr. Wright and Gholson had agreed to a paper work process which was to be followed if Gholson and the others wished to make the gift for Mr. Wright. Authorization was to be sought before Mr. Wright actually received the gift. Gholson was to give Mr. Wright a choice of gifts Gholson could make. Mr. Wright understood that Gholson was to give him a short written list from which to pick. While Mr. Wright was working on June 20, 1989, Gholson approached him from behind and slipped the piece of paper into Mr. Wright's back pocket. Gholson indicated it was the gift list and Mr. Wright was to circle the gift he wanted. Gholson said something like, "You do that and that's what we'll make." Mr. Wright did not look at the note then. He forgot about it and finished his work. When Mr. Wright got home that evening, he discovered the note in his pocket. When he opened it, instead of a gift list, he found $3.00 and a note asking Mr. Wright to smuggle drugs (a "twenty cent piece") into the prison and they would make $240.00 from it. Mr. Wright was scheduled off from work the next two days. He was afraid he would lose his job because of what Gholson had done. When Mr. Wright returned to work on June 23, 1989, he told Sergeant Alexander what had happened. She sent him to Major Collier to make a report. Wright made the report and submitted it. He had forgotten to bring the note and money that day, so he could not attach it to the report. When Mr. Wright returned home that night, the note and money were gone. It was never determined if his wife or his nephew or someone else had thrown it away. Once Gholson knew he had Mr. Wright in a bad position, he used it to his advantage. He began demanding money from Mr. Wright and stated at various times that he had given Mr. Wright $10.00 to buy drugs and that he had loaned Mr. Wright $10.00. Mr. Wright reported these incidents immediately. When Gholson wrote another note demanding $10.00, Mr. Wright immediately turned that note over to Major Collier. A hearsay statement from Gholson in the form of a taped interview was submitted into evidence. It is found that Gholson's statements are so unbelievable as to be unworthy of any credibility. Even if the statements were not hearsay, they would be too unbelievable to form the basis for a finding of fact. Mr. Wright was fired from his job at Lake Correctional Institute as a result of these incidents and Gholson's statements. While there are some insignificant inconsistencies among the various statements and reports given by Mr. Wright, I find that his testimony and account of these events is absolutely credible and worthy of belief. While it is not disputed that Mr. Wright left the correctional institute on June 20, 1989, with a note and $3.00 which Gholson slipped into his pocket, it is affirmatively found that Mr. Wright had unwittingly done so. Mr. Wright had no idea that Gholson had placed money into his pocket until he reached home later that night. Mr. Wright did not knowingly accept money from Gholson.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order dismissing all charges against Steven S. Wright. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of June, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1991.
