Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In September 1992, respondent, Jacksonville Transportation Authority (JTA), issued Invitation to Bid No. CF-0310-92 (ITB) inviting contractors who held certificates of prequalification to bid on Department of Transportation (DOT) projects to submit proposals for performing construction work on 1.6 miles of State Road 9A in Duval County, Florida. The contract to be awarded was the third contract of three contiguous construction projects on State Road 9A and was commonly known as contract 3. It was to be completed within twenty-four months. Essentially, the work involves the widening of that road from two to four lanes, and adding connector ramps, a median, and other associated improvements. The project is more specifically identified as project number 72002-3533. The ITB called for sealed bids to be filed no later than 2:00 p.m. on September 23, 1992, with an award of the contract to be made to the lowest responsive bidder at JTA's meeting on September 29, 1992. The ITB provided further that "the right is reserved (by JTA) to reject any and all bids." A total of six contracting firms filed bids in response to the solicitation. They included petitioner, Hubbard Construction Company (Hubbard), and intervenor, Petticoat Contracting, Inc. (PCI), both of whom were prequalified. Hubbard is a large construction firm headquartered in Orlando, Florida, and has been in the construction business for some seventy years. In 1992 alone, it bid on more than 300 jobs and did approximately $180 million in business. Conversely, PCI is a much smaller firm headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, with approximately forty-five employees. It has been in business for almost seven years and is minority (female) owned and operated. Hubbard was the lowest dollar bidder with a bid in the amount of $6,257,722.38, while PCI was the second lowest bidder with a bid in the amount of $6,270,121.43, or approximately $12,400.00 higher than Hubbard. After the bids were opened, they were evaluated by JTA's engineering consultant, Sverdrup Corporation, a Jacksonville engineering firm. Concluding that Hubbard's bid was "unbalanced" in several material respects and thus was irregular, the consultant recommended that the contract be awarded to PCI, the second lowest bidder. This recommendation was concurred in by JTA's staff and was presented to JTA at a meeting held on September 29, 1992. After a discussion regarding the bid proposals, including consideration of comments from Hubbard and PCI representatives, JTA voted to award the contract to PCI. Hubbard then timely filed its protest. In its protest, Hubbard generally contended that JTA had erroneously determined that Hubbard's bid was unbalanced, and by doing so, JTA had imposed upon Hubbard a bid requirement not encompassed within the ITB. It also contended that under the standard used by JTA, all other proposals, including that of PCI, were unbalanced. Finally, the protest argued that PCI was not actually a disadvantaged business enterprise and thus should have been required to furnish documentation concerning its compliance with minority subcontractor requirements. As to this latter contention, no proof was submitted at hearing, and thus no discussion of that allegation is required. The ITB Requirements JTA has its own set of specifications that were distributed to each of the bidders on the project. Among other things, the ITB provided that "(a)ll work is to be done in accordance with the Plans and Special Provisions, and the Standard Specifications of the State of Florida Department of Transportation." The latter reference was to the 1991 edition of the Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction used by DOT. Those specifications are included in the ITB because JTA must build its roads and bridges to state road specifications. In this regard, article 2-6 of those specifications provided in relevant part as follows: A proposal will be subject to being considered irregular and may be rejected if . . . it shows irregularities of any kind; also the unit prices are obviously unbalanced, either in excess of or below the reasonable cost analysis values. The ITB also contained an Appendix A which included supplemental specifications to accompany the DOT document. However, it did not modify article 2-6. The ITB further contained a section entitled Special Provisions which represented "modifications and additions to the corresponding Articles" in DOT's Standard Specifications and the supplemental specifications set forth in Appendix A. Again, article 2-6 was not changed but section 4-1 of the Special Provisions, which constitutes an addition to DOT's specifications, provided that all items which are constructed or installed will be paid for at the unit price bid regardless of the total quantity utilized. Unit prices shall represent the actual costs and profit earned for labor, equipment and materials used in completing the unit of work bid. Therefore, the DOT standard specifications, and specifically article 2-6, were controlling on this contract. In construing the foregoing provisions, JTA considers a bid item to be "irregular" when it is far higher or lower than the engineer's estimate and the average of the other bids. When an irregularity is discovered in a bid, a decision is then made as to whether the irregularity is material or significant in terms of its affect on the competitive process and ensuring that no bidder receives a substantial advantage over other bidders. The potential effect of any irregularity on JTA's interest is also considered in deciding whether the irregularity is material such that the bid should be rejected pursuant to article 2-6 of the specifications. In conjunction with the above analysis, JTA compares the other contractors' bids with the engineer's estimate, and if they are closely approximated, it deems the estimate to be accurate. Conversely, where the average bids and the estimate are not close, JTA concludes that the estimate may be erroneous. It is noted that the consultant relies on the DOT specifications and DOT's historic pricing methods when preparing his estimates. The ITB called for each bidder to submit a unit price for each component of work required under the contract. This required each bidder to estimate the cost for providing services for more than one hundred sixty items, including item 110-1-1 (clearing and grubbing), item 102-2 (topsoil), and item 715-91-120 (high-mast lighting poles), which items are of particular concern in this controversy. The amount of the bid upon which award of the contract was to be based equaled the sum of the prices for the listed items. Item 110-1-1 is a lump sum item, rather than work on a per unit basis, and required the contractor to clear and grub 79.489 acres of land. This work is done at the outset of the project and is generally completed within the first ninety days of the job. Item 102-2 involved the placement of 120,041 square yards of topsoil on the embankments which was to serve as a layer for seeding the grass. However, the parties agree that the contractor had the choice of using either topsoil or a muck blanket extracted from the job site through excavation. If the latter option was chosen, this would eliminate the need to procure topsoil from off-site. Even so, to avoid the possibility of a change order by the contractor, which had occurred on several earlier projects, JTA expected the contractor to estimate his actual cost for topsoil as if the topsoil was to be obtained from off-site. The final disputed item required the contractor to furnish and install fifteen 120-foot street lighting poles. Bidders were required to give a price for a single pole and then multiply that price times the estimated quantity that would be required. This work is generally completed during the last phase of the job. The Submissions As noted earlier, six contractors filed bids in response to the ITB with prices ranging from a low of $6,257,722.38 by Hubbard to a high of $6,997,656.41 by the highest bidder. Hubbard proposed to complete the job in thirteen months even though the ITB allowed twenty-four months while PCI intended to use the full amount of time. As to the three items in dispute, the record reflects the engineer's estimated cost, Hubbard's cost, PCI's cost and the average cost for all bidders excluding Hubbard were as follows: Item Estimated Cost Hubbard PCI Average costs 110-1-1 $150,000.00 $545,000.00 $176,600.00 $147,100.14 102-2 33,011.28 1,200.41 82,828.29 71,064.27 715-91-120 180,000.00 25,500.00 204,750.00 199,701.54 In preparing its bid, Hubbard assumed that the DOT standard specifications would be interpreted and supplied in conformity with DOT's historical interpretation. Therefore, Hubbard prepared its bid in the same manner as it always had, including prior JTA submissions, and this resulted in the above deviations from estimated and average costs for the following reasons. Hubbard obtained a copy of the plans and specifications approximately two weeks before the date for filing its bid and then assigned a team of estimators to prepare the numbers in the bid package. Because several items are subcontracted out, including grassing, striping and electrical work, Hubbard had to wait until the subcontractors returned their prices before it knew the actual cost of those services. As is true in almost every case, the subcontractors did not furnish their prices until the final day or hour. Hubbard was reluctant to leave those items blank until the last moment fearing it would be difficult for the persons filing the bid in Jacksonville to complete the lengthy proposal before the deadline, and an error might be made by them in their haste to change the prices on multiple items for which they received price quotations in the last hour. Accordingly, in filling out the items on which subcontractors would be used, Hubbard used its best estimate of the subcontractor prices based upon its prior experience on other jobs. However, to allow for variances that might occur between the actual subcontractor prices and the estimated prices, Hubbard left blank one lump sum item so that this item's estimated cost could be adjusted up or down at the last moment depending on the other variances. In this way, the total amount of the bid would not change. As it turned out, there were variances in twenty to thirty items which were based on subcontractor prices, with one item (high mast lighting poles) coming in substantially higher than originally estimated. As noted above, Hubbard did not change the estimated subcontractor prices but rather calculated the difference between its estimate and the actual subcontractor prices and added that number to the lump sum price for clearing and grubbing. This resulted in increasing the cost for clearing and grubbing from an actual cost of around $150,000.00 to $545,000.00 while the estimated cost for fifteen high mast lighting poles ($25,500.00) was substantially below its actual cost of more than $170,000.00. According to Hubbard, it follows this practice on virtually every bid document it prepares, including those filed with JTA, and has never had one rejected on the ground certain items were materially unbalanced. Testimony that these preparation procedures are standard in the industry and enable contractors to give the public the best possible prices by allowing for last minute changes while protecting against error was not contradicted. In preparing its topsoil estimate, Hubbard determined that the anticipated muck and subsoil excavation would eliminate the need to procure topsoil from off-site. Therefore, it proposed a cost of only one cent per square yard for adding topsoil to the embankment on the theory that no topsoil would be procured from off-site. Because Hubbard's computer would not take a zero cost, and the cost was already included in the embankment charges, Hubbard put the next lowest price, or one cent, as the cost for topsoil. The final relevant item, high mast lighting, was to be subcontracted out to a specialty contractor. Hubbard originally estimated a cost of $1,700.00 per pole for fifteen poles, or a total cost of $25,500.00. At hearing, Hubbard conceded that this estimated cost was either a mistake on the part of the person filling out the proposal or "a mistake of judgment" by an estimator, and that its actual costs were substantially higher. However, it felt that there was no disadvantage to JTA by preparing its bid in that manner. In its proposal, PCI used a cost of $176,000 for clearing and grubbing, 69 per square yard, or a total cost of $82,828.29, for topsoil, and $13,650 for each high mast lighting pole, or a total cost of $204,750.00. These estimates did not substantially deviate from the bidders' average or the engineer's estimated costs. As to the topsoil item, PCI also intended to use muck excavated from the job site in lieu of topsoil. However, it was not sure that the amount of muck excavated would be adequate, and thus it estimated the amount of topsoil that would be required if the soil was obtained off-site, added a component for overhead and profit, and arrived at a total cost of 69 per square yard. Finally, PCI's estimated cost for pile splices, mobilization, maintenance of traffic and prestressed concrete beams were unbalanced to some degree and constituted a violation of section 4-1. However, these variances were relatively minor in nature and were not material. The Evaluation Process JTA utilized the services of an outside engineering firm to serve as consultant on the project. Immediately after the bids were opened, the consultant's duties were to verify that certain basic requirements were met and that the contractor had the capacity to perform the work. He was also required to prepare a bid tabulation listing the contractors' estimates with the engineer's estimate and to determine if any irregularities were present. A recommendation would then be submitted to the JTA staff regarding the award of the contract. The staff was also required to review the bids and to make a recommendation to the JTA. During the course of his evaluation of Hubbard's bid, the consultant noted a marked variance between estimated costs for clearing and grubbing of $150,000.00 and Hubbard's price of $545,000.00, particularly since the average cost of all other bidders was $147,100.14. He next noted the proposed cost for high mast lighting poles ($25,500.00) and found it to be "extremely low" in relation to the engineer's estimated price ($180,000) and the average cost of almost $200,000.00 submitted by the other bidders. In addition, he found the engineer's estimated cost for topsoil of $33,011.28 to be much higher than Hubbard's proposed cost of $1,200.41, especially since the other bidders averaged $71,064.27. Finally, the consultant conducted a similar review of PCI's proposal, and while he found some irregularities in its bid, he did not consider them material. Thereafter, in a letter to JTA's executive director on September 28, 1992, the consultant noted that: Upon examination of the bids, it became evident that some of Hubbard Construction Company's unit prices are unbalanced. Item No. 110-1-1, Clearing and Grubbing, is a lump sum item and is one of the first pieces of work to be performed in this project. Hubbards' bid amount is $545,000.00. The engineer's estimate is $150,000.00 and the average of all other bidders is $147,000.14. Item no. 715-91-120, High Mast Lighting Pole Complete (Furnish and Install)(120'), also appears to be unbalanced. This work would be performed near the end of the contract. Hubbard's bid amount is $25,500.00. The engineer's estimate is $180,000.00 and the average of the other bidders is $199,701.54. Hubbard's bid amount will not cover the cost of the materials required of this item based on reasonable expected costs. Both of the items are in contradiction to Section 4, Article 4-1 which states "Unit prices shall represent the actual costs and profit earned for labor, equipment and materials used in completing the unit of work bid." Item 102-2, Topsoil, shows an inconsistency. Hubbard's bid amount is $1,200.41. The engineer's estimate is $33,011.28 and the average of the other bidders is $71,064.27. Based on the results of the bid review noted above, it is recommended that Hubbard Construction Company's bid proposal be considered irregular as per Article 2-6 of the Standard Specifications, and therefore rejected. A similar evaluation process was subsequently conducted by the JTA staff, and it reached the same conclusion as the consultant. Its recommendation to reject the bid of Hubbard on the ground the bid was "irregular as per Article 2-6 of the JTA Standard Specifications" and to award the contract to the second lowest bidder, PCI, was conveyed by memorandum to the JTA Highway Committee on September 29, 1992, and was approved by JTA the same date. Was the Agency's Action Arbitrary? JTA's conclusion that Hubbard's bid was materially unbalanced and irregular and thus violated article 2-6 was based on two principal concerns. First, JTA considered the adding of nearly $400,000.00 in costs to clearing and grubbing to be "front-end loading" and thus improper. This means the bid was structured so that a large amount of money, not commensurate with the amount of work actually performed, would be paid at the beginning of the project. In this case, clearing and grubbing would be completed within the first ninety days of the project yet Hubbard would receive almost $400,000.00 in excess of its actual costs to perform that work. JTA believed that this would reduce its control over the performance of the contract, it would be unfair to other bidders on the project, the money would be used to finance other portions of the work, and the possibility existed that Hubbard might not complete performance on the job after being paid the up-front money. Second, and based on what it says has happened on other jobs, JTA feared that by allowing Hubbard to underprice its topsoil item, Hubbard could conceivably request a change order increase of more than $100,000.00. This amount was calculated on the theory that Hubbard might have a $60,000.00 overrun on muck (120,000 cubic yards x 50 ) because it was using the muck to meet the topsoil requirement, and a $1,200.00 underrun on topsoil (which represents the amount bid) because no topsoil would be used, or a net overrun of $58,800.00. At the same time, JTA feared that an overrun on muck would lead to an overrun on subsoil excavation. At a price of $5.00 per cubic yard for any overruns on this item, JTA would be forced to spend as much as $53,000.00 more on a change order for this item. Assuming this actually occurred, PCI would then be the low bidder by almost $88,000.00. Initially, JTA's concerns must be tempered by the fact that on the previous contract for State Road 9A, known as contract 2, Hubbard structured its bid in the same manner as on contract 3. On that contract, its bid was almost three times the engineer's estimate for clearing and grubbing and exceeded the engineer's estimate for mobilization by more than four fold. Even so, Hubbard was more than $200,000.00 lower than the second low bidder and was $400,000.00 lower than the engineer's estimate. On that project, JTA awarded the contract to Hubbard and did not raise the contention, as it did here, that the bid was materially unbalanced. At hearing, the consultant was unable to give a satisfactory explanation as to why the prior bid was "regular" but the instant bid was "irregular" even though both bids had been prepared in the same manner and contained "obviously unbalanced items." In this case, JTA did not give bidders any notice that it intended to construe article 2-6 any differently than it had on prior contracts. In addition, in preparing its bid, Hubbard assumed that article 2-6 would be interpreted in the same manner as did DOT since the ITB provided that the DOT specifications would apply. Moreover, there was nothing in the ITB Special Provisions which gave notice that JTA intended to place a different interpretation on article 2-6 than was customarily done by DOT. According to uncontradicted testimony, DOT has consistently interpreted article 2-6 in the following manner. DOT does not find balancing in and of itself to be a sufficient basis to reject a bid as being irregular under article 2-6. Indeed, virtually every bid submitted for any highway construction project, including those of PCI and Hubbard here, are unbalanced in some respect. If DOT has serious concerns about an unbalanced bid, the terms of article 2-6 require that a study be made to see if the unit prices are "either in excess of or below the reasonable cost analysis values." To do this, DOT performs a study of the time value of money related to the major components of work in a contract on an item by item intra-bid basis, compares the results of that analysis to an irrevocable schedule of construction, and then determines whether the taxpayers would be detrimentally affected by awarding the contract to a bidder with the unbalanced items. In other words, a contractor is paid as units of work are completed, and to the extent major items of work are unbalanced so that payments are deferred or accelerated, the cash flow of the agency may be adversely affected. Without a time value of money analysis, a determination cannot be made as to whether the taxpayers are detrimentally affected by an unbalanced bid. Indeed, out of several thousand bids over a twelve year study period (1975-1987), DOT rejected no more than six because of unbalancing, and then only after such an analysis was performed. As to Hubbard's bid, a former DOT secretary expressed the view that Hubbard's bid did not even rise to the level necessary to invoke the analysis. In any event, by failing to follow its own specifications and performing such a study, JTA could not fairly conclude that the awarding of a contract to PCI would positively impact its net present value of money. This is especially true here since Hubbard proposed to complete the project in thirteen months and PCI in twenty-four months, and neither party submitted a construction schedule with its bid. Therefore, JTA had no basis to conclude that article 2-6 had been violated. Finally, there was no evidence to support the contention that JTA would lose control of the project if Hubbard was paid the excess monies for clearing and grubbing. JTA's concern that Hubbard might fail to complete the job if it received a large payment up front is also without merit. While front end loading is a legitimate concern where a contractor might not finish the project, the facts dispel that concern here. Besides having to post a performance bond, Hubbard would also be disqualified from bidding on other jobs in the event a project was abandoned. Given Hubbard's size and reputation, and the fact that the contract itself provides for JTA retaining a percentage of the payment of work until all work is completed, it is found this concern is not legitimate. As to the concern over topsoil, there was insufficient evidence to establish that muck was more likely to overrun than any other item. Indeed, JTA acknowledged at hearing that the engineer's estimate for muck excavation was as accurate as it could be and no analysis or testing had been performed which would support a change in position. In addition, a JTA board member testified that the topsoil pricing was not considered the primary basis for rejection of Hubbard's bid. Finally, the use of a one cent price for topsoil did not affect the overall price of the bid or give Hubbard an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by others.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by respondent awarding the contract for project no. 72002-3533 to Hubbard Construction Company. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-6302BID Petitioner: 1-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in findings of fact 4 and 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 7-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 12. Partially accepted in findings of fact 8 and 12. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 12. 16-19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 20-22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 23. Accepted in finding of fact 4. 24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 25. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 27-29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 30. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 31. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 32. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 33. Rejected as being unnecessary. 34-35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 36-38. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. 39-40. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. 41. Rejected as being unnecessary. 42. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 43. Rejected as being unnecessary. 44. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 45. Rejected as being unnecessary. Respondent: Partially accepted in findings of fact 2 and 3. Partially accepted in findings of fact 4 and 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Partially accepted in findings of fact 15 and 17. 6-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. Partially accepted in findings of fact 13 and 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Rejected as being unnecessary. Intervenor: Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in findings of fact 4 and 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 5-10. Partially accepted in finding of factg 15. 10A-C. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 11. Partially accepted in findings of fact 3 and 16. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, cumulative, not supported by the more persuasive evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles N. Francis, Jr. Executive Director Jacksonville Transportation Authority P. O. Drawer O Jacksonville, Florida 32203 F. Alan Cummings, Esquire Mary M. Piccard, Esquire P. O. Box 589 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0589 Cindy A. Laquidara, Esquire Kenneth A. Tomchin, Esquire P. O. Box 4099 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Herbert R. Kanning, Esquire 12-14 East Bay Street Suite 302 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
The Issue The issue for consideration herein is whether the Respondent's proposed award on BID No. HSMV - 90022010 to Dunn Construction Company, Inc., should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department was the state agency responsible for the solicitation of bids for and award of contracts for the construction of state buildings in Florida. Both Greenhut and Dunn are qualified contractors who are certified to bid on state construction contracts in general and this procurement in particular. In December, 1991, the Department issued an advertisement for bids for the project in issue herein, the construction of the Kirkman Complex Addition Data Center in Tallahassee, Florida. According to the Advertisement for Bids, all bids "must be submitted in full accordance with the requirements of the Drawings, Specifications, Bidding Conditions and Contractual Conditions, which may be examined and obtained ..." from the Department's designated architect/engineer, Clemons, Rutherford and Associates, Inc. in Tallahassee. Section B-21 of the request for proposals (invitation to bid) reads, in pertinent part: The recommendation for contract award will be for the bidder qualified in accordance with Section B-2 and submitting the lowest bid provided his bid is responsible and it is in the best interest of the Owner to accept it. The Owner reserves the right to waive any informality in bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the owner. Bids received on this project were originally scheduled to be opened and read aloud on January 15, 1992 with the tabulation and Bid Award Recommendation to be posted the following days at the location where the bids were opened. The proposal as originally issued called for the submittal of a Base Bid with four Alternates, 1a, 1b, 2, and 3. Alternate 1a was a deduct for merely extending the existing Johnson Controls System to incorporate the new work instead of providing a totally new and independent control system. Alternate 1b called for adding furniture and landscaping for certain of the rooms shown on the drawings; Alternate 2 called for adding a "shelled" fourth floor as described in the proposal; and Alternate 3, as originally issued, called for: Add a complete fourth floor as indicated in drawings including the finished interior partitions with full HVAC, Plumbing and Electrical Service. Include furniture and landscaping for rooms 414 and 419. (Includes items in Alternate No. 2) As a result of questions received from prospective bidders at the pre-bid conference which indicated some confusion as to the meaning and intent of the Department regarding Alternate No. 3, by letter to all prospective bidders, dated January 8, 1992 the Department's architect indicated: Alternate #3 shall be the fourth floor complete, as shown on drawings, which includes items in Alternate #2. Addendum #1 to the request for bids, dated January 10, 1992, clarified Item 1-3.6), PROPOSAL FORM, of the PROJECT MANUAL to ADD to "Alternate #3", "(Include items in Alternate #2)". Item #2-1 of Addendum #2, dated January 16, 1992, deleted the sentence changed by Item #1- 3.6, and revised the sentence to read as follows: This includes any items required in addition to Alternate #2 to complete the remainder of the work for the Fourth Floor. Information contained at the beginning of each Addendum calls the bidders' attention to the change and indicates that failure to incorporate it may result in disqualification. The due date for bids was extended at the instance of the Department. Both Petitioner and Intervenor submitted bids for this project as did several other concerns on January 23, 1992. Greenhut's base bid was $4,139,000 with a deduct of $63,600 for Alternate 1a, and additions for Alternates 1b, 2, and 3 of $69,500, $239,000, and $209,000 respectively. Greenhut's total bid, therefore, through Alternate 3, was $4,592,900. Dunn's base bid was $4,079,000 with a zero deduct for Alternate 1a, and additions for Alternates 1b through 3 of $67,000, and $428,000. Dunn's total bid, therefore, was $4,574,000 for a difference of $18,900. Greenhut's bid was submitted on a form which provided for the base bid, the deduct for 1a, and the additions for 1b. 2 and 3 with the figure for 3 being those costs in addition to those identified in Dunn's bid was submitted on a prior form which provided for a base bid, a 1a deduction if any, (there was none), and additions for 1b, 2, and 3 with the figure for 3 including the figure listed for 2. An initial review of Dunn's bid form, then, showed a base bid of $4,079,000, no 1a deduction, a 1b addition of $67,000, a 2 addition of $311,000, and a 3 addition of $428,000. This letter figure included the $311,000 figure for Alternate 2, which should have been deducted from the bid during tabulation. When the bids were opened on January 23, 1992 by Mr. Everline, each figure on each bid was read off and listed on the bid tabulation form in the appropriate area. No attention was given at that time to the appropriateness or correctness of the figures listed on each bid form, nor was any attention paid to any other technical requirement of the procurement. This was merely a transfer of figures from the bid form to the tabulation form, and when this was done, Mr. Everline announced to all in attendance, including many contractor representatives, that the "apparent low bidder" was Greenhut. In arriving at that conclusion, Mr. Everline added all of Dunn's figures together without deducting the $311,000 listed for Alternate 2, a figure which was included in the $428,000 figure listed for Alternate 3. This resulted in an incorrectly large total bid for Dunn. Sometime later that day, a representative of Dunn contacted Mr. Everline to indicate that Dunn had inadvertently bid on the wrong form which precipitated its misleading presentation. Mr. Everline properly declined to discuss the matter and referred the Dunn representative to the Department's legal counsel. Sometime thereafter, when the bids had been tabulated and reviewed for responsiveness and legal qualification of bidders, Mr. Everline suggested to representatives of DHSMV that in order to forestall a protest, only so much of the project as extended through Alternate 2 be awarded. DHSMV officials, however, had sufficient funds available for the entire project, including some additional funds, if necessary, for cabling, and insisted they wanted the entire project awarded. The Department's legal counsel, upon review of the situation, concluded that the Dunn's actual bid intent was clear to include the amount listed for Alternate 2 within that listed for Alternate 3, and not to consider the two as additives to each other. It further concluded that Dunn's use of the improper form on which to submit its bid was immaterial and afforded it no improper competitive edge over other bidders. Therefore, it was concluded that Dunn was the low responsive bidder and, on February 4, 1992, the Department issued a Notice of Award to Dunn. Thereafter, Greenhut filed its Petition For Hearing taken as a protest to the award. Both the Department and Dunn agreed that Greenhut had standing to protest the award and that the protest was timely filed. It is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of General Services enter a Final Order in this case dismissing the protest of Greenhut Construction Company, Inc., in regard to the proposed award of contact in bid number HSMV - 90022010 to Dunn Construction Company, Inc. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 21st day of April, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-1297 BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. - 9. Accepted. Accepted. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 22. Accepted and incorporated herein. Argument and not Finding of Fact except for 1st sentence which is accepted. & 25. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. - 3. Accepted. 4. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. & 8. Accepted. 9. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. Irrelevant but accepted as true. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Irrelevant but accepted as true. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Irrelevant. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. FOR THE INTERVENOR: Accepted. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 15. Accepted. 16. - 19. Accepted. 20. & 21. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 24. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Emmanuel, Esquire 30 South Spring Street Post Office Drawer 1271 Pensacola, Florida 32596 Sylvan Strickland, Esquire Suite 309, Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Harry R. Detwiler, Jr., Esquire 315 S. Calhoun Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald W. Thomas Executive Director Department of General Services Suite 307, Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Susan Kirkland General Counsel Department of General Services Suite 309, knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the decision of the respondent, Department of Corrections (Department), to award the subject bid to intervenor, Doctors and Physicians Laboratories, Inc. (Doctors), comported with the essential requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact Background On October 16, 1991, the Department of Corrections (Department) issued invitation to bid number 91-CO-5369 (hereinafter "the ITB"), which sought to secure appropriate services to perform drug tests on certain applicants for employment and existing employees of the Department. The deadline for submitting bids was established as 11:00 a.m., November 7, 1991. At the time of the deadline, the Department had received four bids, including those of petitioner, Toxicology Testing Service, Inc., and intervenor, Doctors and Physicians Laboratories, Inc. (Doctors). Petitioner's bid was $372,000, and Doctors' bid was $315,491.60. Based on its evaluation, the Department ranked Doctors first and petitioner second, with composite scores of 91.67 and 90.38, respectively, and proposed to award the contract to Doctors. Petitioner filed a timely formal written protest to contest the Department's decision, and charged that the Department materially departed from the evaluation criteria contained in the ITB. The Invitation to Bid Pertinent to this case, section 4.7 of the ITB established the evaluation criteria to be used in determining the acceptability of the bids as follows: 4.7 Evaluation Criteria Criteria Point Value 1. References 5 2. Firm Profile 5 3. Firms Qualifications 15 Understanding of Scope of Services 25 Bid Price 50 100 And, section 4.7.5 of the ITB established the following methodology to be utilized in awarding points for the bid price criteria: The award for bid price shall be determined as follows: The Bidder who submits the lowest bid price will be awarded 50 points. All others bidders will be awarded points based on the following formula: Bid Price Points = 50 X [1-A/B] where: A = the difference between the percentage of the bid being evaluated and the low bid(s). B = the low bid. The lowest bid price will be computed by multiplying the unit prices for Items 1, 2 and 3 for all three years by the estimated quantity. The estimated quantity is for bidding purposes only and is not a guarantee. The total annual cost for Items 1 and 2 for all three years will be added to determine the Total Cost for all three years. The vendor with the lowest Total Cost will be awarded the 50 points. Negative points will not be awarded. Pursuant to the provisions of section 5.13 of the ITB, the contract was to be awarded to the bidder that received the highest overall point total under the criteria established by section 4.7 of the ITB. The Department's evaluation and the protest Based on its evaluation of the bids, the Department's evaluation committee awarded petitioner 49.34 points for its technical proposal (items 1-4 of the evaluation criteria) and Doctor's 41.67 points for its technical proposal. Bid price points were then established through a preexisting computer program, which derived 41.04 points for petitioner and 50 points for Doctors. When totalled, petitioner received 90.38 points and Doctors received 91.67 points. Accordingly, the Department proposed to award the contract to Doctors. Petitioner filed a timely protest to contest such award. The gravamen of that protest is petitioner's contention that the Department applied a methodology other than that established by the ITB to derive the bid price points and that had it utilized the methodology established by the ITB petitioner would have received the most points and been the prevailing bidder. 1/ Consistent with petitioner's contention, the proof demonstrates that the computer program used to derive the bid price points and the methodology established by the ITB to derive such points differed with regard to the definition of A in the formula, discussed supra. In the computer program, factor A was defined as the difference between the price of the bid being evaluated and the low bid. In the ITB, factor A was defined as the difference between the percentage of the bid being evaluated and the low bid. The Department was not, however, aware of this dichotomy until the subject protest, believing that its ITB conformed with the methodology it had previously programed for its computer, and, at hearing, offered proof, which is credited, that use of the word "percentage" in the definition of A was a typographical error which should have read "price." Notably, the Department heavily weighed price (50%) in its ITB, and it is apparent the Department intended to use a formula that would create a difference in price scoring that was relative to any difference in the bid prices. Use of the formula, as correctly defined in its computer program, would accomplish such goal. Use of the formula, as incorrectly defined by the ITB and interpreted by petitioner in these proceedings, would not accord any meaningful weight to price. 2/ Under such circumstances, it cannot be reasonably concluded that the Department departed from the essential requirements of law when it declined to apply the methodology as interpreted by petitioner to award the contract. Moreover, for the reasons that follow, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Department's decision to stand by its award based on the correctly defined methodology departed from the essential requirements of law. Here, the proof demonstrates that petitioner, upon receipt and review of the ITB, was well aware that the formula for awarding points based on price was nonsensical, and most likely, in error. 3/ Notwithstanding, petitioner took no action under the provisions of general condition 6 and special condition 4.4 of the ITB to raise any question or seek any clarification or interpretation of the formula from the Department. 4/ Rather, petitioner submitted its best price offer, more likely than not, without reliance on the erroneous formula set forth in the ITB. 5/ Under such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the Department's award of the contract, based on an application of the correct definition of factor A, accorded any bidder an unfair advantage or otherwise departed from the essential requirements of law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered dismissing the subject bid protest. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of May 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May 1992.
The Issue Whether Respondent acted contrary to the agency's governing statutes, rules or policies, or the bid specifications in its proposed decision to award Contract No. T1285 to Intervenor Kamminga & Roodvoets, Inc. ("K & R").
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of the proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On May 14, 2008, the Department released its bid solicitation for Contract T1285. The proposed contract was for the construction of a one-way pair through Lake Alfred, including new construction, reconstruction, milling and resurfacing, widening, drainage improvements, lighting, signalization, signing and pavement marking and landscaping on State Road 600 (U.S. 17/92). Polk County, the location of the project, lies in the Department's District 1. Qualified contractors, including Mid-State and K & R, received an electronic disk containing the solicitation, bid blank, plans and specifications for Contract T1285. The letting date for this project was June 18, 2008. Bids were to be submitted on or before that date via Bid Express, the electronic bidding system used by the Department. No party submitted a protest of the terms, conditions, and specifications contained in the solicitation pursuant to Subsection 120.57(3)(b), Florida Statutes. The work to be performed on Contract T1285 included the installation of limerock road base to be paid for in accordance with line item 0175, Optional Base Group 09 ("Base Group 09"). The bid documents included a set of "Supplemental Specifications." Section 6 of the Supplemental Specification was titled "Control of Materials." Subsection 6-3.3, titled "Construction Aggregates," provided as follows: "Aggregates used on Department projects must be in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-103."2 Under the heading "Developmental Specifications" is a February 15, 2008, revision to the Construction Aggregates subsection that provides: Subarticle 6-3.3 (Page 54) is expanded by the following: 6-3.3.1 Department Directed Source for Aggregates: For this Contract, obtain aggregates for use in limerock base from the following vendor: Vulcan Construction Materials LP. Upon award of the Contract, provide the vendor and the Department a schedule of project aggregate needs. Once a schedule has been provided to both the Department and vendor, the Engineer will issue written authorization, with a copy to the vendor, for the purchase of aggregates from the vendor. This authorization is required before aggregates will be released by the vendor. Pick up the required aggregate such that the project schedule will be maintained. Payment to the vendor by the Contractor will be due upon receipt of the materials pursuant to the Department's Vendor Contract No. BDH50. This rate is the unit price agreed upon by the Department and the vendor and will be made available to bid proposal holders at the time of bid at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/aggregate /aggregate.htm. The Department will make payment to the Contractor for the aggregates on progress estimates as a part of the bid unit price for the appropriate pay items. The rate is subject to change and adjustments for such changes will be made to the bid unit price of the appropriate pay items. Disputes with the vendor concerning aggregate supply will not be cause for Contract time adjustments, time suspensions or monetary adjustments to the Contract amount. The Contractor will be solely responsible for providing the necessary advance notice to the vendor and other coordination to obtain timely aggregate supply for the project. The import of Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1 was that all bidders would be required to obtain the limerock needed for Base Group 09 from a single vendor, Vulcan Construction Materials LP ("Vulcan"). The winning bidder would agree to pay Vulcan in accordance with a separate contract negotiated between Vulcan and the Department. The hyperlink provided in Developmental Specification 6-3.3.13 led to a document called "Aggregate Guidance" produced by the Department's State Construction Office. The front page of the Aggregate Guidance document contained "Bidder Information" consisting of a spreadsheet setting forth the Vulcan price per ton for limerock base and limestone coarse aggregate, with the price varying depending on the date and port of delivery. Between January and June 2008, the Vulcan price per ton for limerock base from both the Port of Tampa and Port Canaveral was $16.93. The Aggregate Guidance page contained additional hyperlinks with the following titles: "Aggregate Vendor Contract Usage," "Aggregate Vendor Contract," "Aggregate Vendor Projects List," "Aggregate Vendor Authorization Letter," "Aggregate Vendor Contract Frequently Asked Questions," and "Aggregate Price Adjustment Sheet." Alvin Mulford is the vice-president of Mid-State who, along with his estimator, put together his company's bid for Contract T1285. Mr. Mulford testified that his company has been bidding on Department work, and that he has never before seen a provision similar to Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1. Mr. Mulford directed his estimator to obtain clarification from the Department, to be sure that the bidders were required to purchase the limerock base from Vulcan. One reason for Mr. Mulford's concern was the "exorbitant" rate charged by Vulcan in comparison to other vendors. The restriction to a single supplier was so abnormal, and that supplier's rate was so out of line with the market, that Mr. Mulford decided to seek guidance from the Department through the question and response internet bulletin board provided by the Department for its projects. The question posed by Mid-State was as follows: Does the contractor have to use Vulcan materials for the limerock base at a rate of $16.93 per ton as stated in the Developmental Specifications 6-3.3.1? If so from which location is the material to be picked up? Is it also true that payment to the vendor (Vulcan Materials) will be due immediately upon receipt of the materials? I wanted to clarify this issue as it is unusual for the contractor to be limited to the use of only one vendor. The Department's response was as follows: The unit rate for the Material can be found at the following website: http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/ Aggregate/Aggregate.htm Pickup locations for the Material can be found at the following website: http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/ Aggregate/Aggregate.htm Payment should be issued by the Contractor to the Vendor (Vulcan Construction Materials LP) upon receipt of the materials as defined in Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1. Because the Department's response did no more than redirect him to the Department's website, Mr. Mulford decided to look at the website in more detail. He investigated the hyperlinks, including the Vulcan contract with the Department. When he clicked on the hyperlink titled "Aggregate Vendor Contract Usage," he found a document that provided as follows, in relevant part: Aggregate Vendor Contract Usage by Districts With the execution of the contract with Vulcan Construction Materials LP, contract number BDH50, Vulcan has committed to provide aggregate in the types and quantities defined in the contract (attached). The process for this contract in Districts 1, 5, and 7, is as follows: Include in the projects identified in the attached spreadsheet the appropriate special provision beginning with the July 2007 lettings. The District Specifications Engineer and District Construction Office will need to coordinate this effort. There are two special provisions for the purpose of notifying construction contract bidders of the Department's intention toward the aggregate. The first special provision is the mandatory version that will direct the bidder to obtain aggregates for the specified work from Vulcan. The second special provision provides the bidder an option to obtain its aggregates from Vulcan. * * * After these projects have been awarded, the contractor is required to notify FDOT and Vulcan a schedule of its aggregate needs for the project. After receiving this schedule, FDOT's Resident Engineer will issue written authorization to the contractor, with copy to Vulcan. This authorization is required before Vulcan will release aggregate to the contractor. Payment to Vulcan will be from the contractor. FDOT will pay cost of aggregate on progress estimates as part of the contractor's bid price for the work. The contractor is required to include in its bid price for the work the cost of the aggregate at the Vulcan rate. The Vulcan rate will be posted on the FDOT State Construction Website showing the rate. When adjustments are made to the Vulcan rate, FDOT will make adjustments in the construction contract unit price. . . . (Emphasis added.) Mr. Mulford testified that he understood the underscored language in the hyperlinked document to be a directive to the bidders and therefore a mandatory requirement of the bid specifications. He did not ask the Department for further clarification because he believed the requirement was clearly stated in the hyperlinked document. David Sadler, the director of the Department's office of construction, testified that the hyperlinked document was developed by his office to offer guidance to the districts as to the concept behind and use of the aggregate vendor contract. The document was not a part of the bid solicitation document. Mid-State's bid price was $7,429,398.44. Mid-State's price for Base Group 09 was $619,645.80, or $19.30 per square yard. This price reflected the Vulcan rate for limerock base of $16.92 plus tax and Mid-State's costs for the work associated with Base Group 09. 19. K & R's bid price was $7,370,505.24, or $58,893.20 lower than the bid price of Mid-State. K & R's price for Base Group 09 was $256,848.00, based on a stated unit price of $8.00 per square yard for limerock base. K & R's price for Base Group 09 was $362,797.80 lower than that of Mid-State, accounting for more than the differential between the overall bids of Mid-State and K & R. Marcus Tidey, Jr., K & R's vice president in charge of its Florida division, testified that K & R was well aware that the Vulcan price for limerock base was $16.93, and that K & R understands its obligation to pay that price to Vulcan should K & R be awarded Contract T1285. Mr. Tidey testified that at the time of bid submission, he cut K & R's bid price to $8.00 per square yard as a competitive strategy to win the contract. Mr. Tidey made a conscious decision that K & R would absorb the difference between $8.00 bid price and the Vulcan price of $16.93. Mr. Tidey testified that K & R needed to win this job in order not to have its crews and equipment sit idle during the economic downturn, and therefore decided to take all of its markup, roughly $250,000, out of the bid. He could have made the $250,000 cut on any item or items in the bid, but decided on Base Group 09 because the limerock base was a big item and therefore easy to cut by a large amount. Mr. Tidey also testified that the contract provides a $400,000 incentive payment for early completion of the job, meaning that K & R will be able to work "faster and smarter" and make up for the price reduction at the end of the job. Mr. Tidey testified that he obtained the Vulcan prices from the Department's website as instructed by Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1. He did not click on the hyperlinks, which appeared to reference the contract between the Department and Vulcan and therefore was of no concern to him. The Department and K & R dispute Mid-State's assertion that the underscored language of the hyperlink set forth in Finding of Fact 15 was a requirement of the bid specifications, based on Mr. Sadler's direct testimony and the underlying illogic and unfairness of requiring bidders to seek out hidden specifications. The Department and K & R concede that if the bid specifications did in fact require the bidders to include in Base Group 09 the full costs associated with obtaining the limerock base from Vulcan, then K & R's bid is nonresponsive. Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1 directed bidders to the Department's webpage for the purpose of obtaining the current Vulcan rate quote. It did not instruct the bidders to investigate the hyperlinks or to assume that the information contained therein was mandatory. Absent an instruction to bidders to review the information contained in the hyperlinks, the Department could not make such information mandatory without placing less curious bidders at a competitive disadvantage. The Department had no intent to play hide-and-seek with the bid specifications in the manner suggested by Mid-State. In addition, K & R points to three line items of the bid specifications in which the Department eliminates competition, instructing the bidders not to bid and inserting a fixed unit price and bid amount for all bidders as to those items. K & R reasonably asserts that the Department was fully capable of treating Base Group 09 in the same fashion, had it intended to require the bidders to pass through to the Department all the costs associated with obtaining the limerock base from Vulcan. However, the Department supplied the bid quantity (31,106 square yards) and left it to the bidders to determine the price per unit they would bid. K & R's bid was responsive. Nothing in the bid specifications prevented K & R from absorbing part of the cost of the Vulcan limerock base and passing the savings on to the Department, or required bidders to pass on to the Department the full costs of complying with the bid specifications regarding Base Group 09. The sole remaining issue is whether K & R's bid, though facially responsive, was materially unbalanced. The Department routinely conducts reviews of bid line items that appear "unbalanced," i.e., for which there appear to be significant differences between the price bid and the Department's cost estimate, in order to determine whether the price difference is due to a quantity error by the bidder. The Department's review confirms that the bid quantity specified on the bid blank is accurate. If a quantity error is found, the bids are recalculated using the bidders' unit prices and the correct quantities to determine whether the bid rankings would change. A bid for which there is a discrepancy between the bid and the Department's estimate is termed "mathematically unbalanced." A mathematically unbalanced bid that affects the ranking of the low bid is "materially unbalanced." A mathematically unbalanced bid is acceptable, but a materially unbalanced bid affords the bidder an unfair competitive advantage and must be rejected. The Department followed its usual procedure in analyzing the K & R bid to determine whether it was unbalanced. Philip Gregory Davis, the Department's state estimates engineer, testified that there were some unbalanced items in the K & R bid, but no quantity errors that would have changed the ranking of the bids. Richard Ryals, the project designer who conducted the unbalanced bid review, testified that the quantities were correct for Base Group 09. As noted above, K & R's low bid for Base Group 09 was an intentional strategy, not the result of a quantity error. K & R's current bonded capacity qualification with the Department is $258 million in contracts at any one time. K & R posted a bid bond, and has more than enough capacity to comfortably perform this contract. There is no economic danger to the Department in accepting K & R's low bid.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing Mid-State's formal written protest and awarding Contract T1265 to K & R. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2009.
The Issue Whether the Barton-Malow Southern, Inc., deviated from the bid requirements, and if so, whether such deviation consists of a minor deviation which may be waived by the respondent, or whether Ron A. Royal, Inc., should be awarded the elementary school "C" project as the lowest responsive bidder.
Findings Of Fact On April 20, April 27, and May 4, 1986, the Board advertised its Notice of Call for Sealed Bids, soliciting bids for the construction of Elementary School "C". The notice advised that the contract to be awarded would require approval of subcontractors by the Board and stated that the Board "reserves the right to reject any and all bids received and to waive any and all informalities in regard thereto." A pre-bid conference was held on May 15, 1986, at which time the potential bidders were advised that page 14 of the bid documents entitled "List of Subcontractors" would be deleted and addendum #1 would include a more specific list of subcontractors to be completed by the bidder. The original list of subcontractors stated: The undersigned, hereinafter called "Bidder", list below the names of all the subcontractors who will perform under the Bidder. Any work item (Trade) not included will be assumed by the owner as being performed by the Bidder's own forces." A space was provided for the bidder to state the work item and the name of the subcontractor who would perform the work. Addendum #1 instructed the bidders to delete the original page C.14 and insert the enclosed sheet C.14 (addendum #1) "List of Subcontractors" for submission with the sealed bids. The substituted list of subcontractors provided as follows: The undersigned, hereinafter called "Bidder", lists below the names of the subcontractors who will perform under the Bidder. In the event the general contractor will perform one of the phases listed with his own personnel, he shall state by "general contractor". The form listed 20 specific areas of work, such as site work, iron and steel work, roof decks, and electrical, and provided a space for the bidder to fill in the firm name and address of the subcontractor for each specific area. Bids were submitted to the Board by nine (9) general contractors. The lowest bid by $310,000, was submitted by Barton-Malow; the second lowest bid was submitted by Royal. On the list of contractors submitted with Barton Malow's bid, Barton- Malow listed "G.C". (General Contractor) for the work areas described as site work, concrete work, masonry work iron and steel work, and lathing and plastering. Barton-Malow listed a subcontractor and "G.C." for phases described as hard tile and electrical. For the work areas described as "roof decks" and "roofing and sheet metal" three (3) subcontractors were listed for each of the areas. The list submitted by Royal with its bid provided that the concrete work would be performed by the general contractor and listed a single subcontractor for each of the other 19 areas of work specified. Barton-Malow was the only bidder who listed multiple subcontractors for a specified work area. In the blanks provided for the subcontractors' addresses, Royal listed the city where each subcontractor was located; Barton-Malow did not provide any addresses bout stated at the top of the column "will be advised upon request." None of the bidders provided street addresses for the subcontractors, however, only one bidder other than Barton Malow failed to provide the city in which the subcontractor was located. Immediately after the bids were opened and read, 1/ the meeting was adjourned and Mr. Derryberry, Mr. Collins, and two other people reviewed the bids. Mr. Derryberry concluded that the Barton-Malow bid was not in compliance with the bid requirements due to the manner in which Barton-Malow had filled out the subcontractor list. Mr. Derryberry therefore recommended to the Board that the Barton-Malow bid be rejected because of the perceived irregularities and the bid of Royal be accepted. The recommendation of the architect was adopted as the recommendation of the school administration and presented to the Board at a public meeting on June 3, 1986. The Board received the report of the architect and the administration, heard from the attorneys and representatives of Barton- Malow and Royal, and then voted to waive any irregularities and accept the Barton-Malow bid. The original page C.14 was approved by the Board in about 1980 and used since that time. However, there had been some difficulty with that form on two different jobs within the last six months, and therefore it was decided to clarify the purpose of the form by specifically listing all the major subcontracting areas. The intent was to require all bidders to list the primary subcontractor in each of the major work areas, and thus prevent bid shopping after the bids were opened. The architect, Mr. Derryberry, prepared and included the amended form C.14 as part of Addendum #1 to the bid documents. Although the Board never formally approved the amended form, Mr. Derryberry had the authority to clarify any of the bid documents by addendum. Page C.14 (Addendum #1) lists 20 major subcontracting areas; however, in almost all of the areas it would be possible for more than one subcontractor to perform the designated work, and in several areas it would be unlikely that one subcontractor would perform all the required work. For example, site work includes paving, earth moving, culvert work, fencing, and irrigation, and one subcontractor would not normally do the work in all those areas. The amended page C.14 does not state that only one subcontractor should be listed for each specified work area. The bidders were not advised at the pre-bid conferences or subsequent thereto, that only one subcontractor should be listed in each category. The only information the bidders received regarding the list of subcontractors was the information contained on the revised page C.14. In other words, the bidders were simply directed to list "the names of the subcontractors who will perform under the Bidder", and to list general contractor when "the general contractor will perform one of the phases listed with his own personnel." In the subcontractor list submitted with their bid, Barton-Malow listed "Batten Electric Co./G.C." for the subcontract "Electrical", and listed "Bauer & Assoc./G.C." for the "Hard Tile" subcontract. The listing of a subcontractor and the general contractor in these areas is not a deviation from the bid requirements. There is no indication on the list submitted by Barton- Malow that the listing of a subcontractor and the general contractor in the hard tile and electrical categories meant anything other than both the subcontractor and the general contractor would perform the work required in those areas, and there was no evidence presented at the hearing that would require a different conclusion. 2/ Categories 5 and 6 on the subcontractor list are "roof decks" and "roofing and sheet metal." Although listed as two separate categories, the same subcontractor would have to perform both due to the bid requirements. Further only one subcontractor can perform the roofing work; it is not an area that is divisible into subcategories that can be performed by different subcontractors. For categories 5 and 6, Barton-Malow listed "H. H. Robertson/Architectural Exteriors/Commercial Roof Decks." As admitted by Barton-Malow, that all three subcontractors "will perform" the subcontract is an impossibility. 3/ From the list submitted by Barton-Malow it cannot be determined who will perform and be responsible for the roofing work. When asked at the hearing who was going to perform the roofing work for Barton Malow, the vice-president of operations for Barton-Malow responded, "One of those three would have done it." He indicated that a submission would have been made to the Board designating the subcontractor. By listing three subcontractors for the two roofing categories, Barton-Malow deviated from the bid requirements. The subcontractor list contained one basic requirement, that the subcontractors listed "will perform." By listing three subcontractors for the roofing, when only one subcontractor could performs Barton-Malow would be able to bid shop for subcontractors after the bid submission. This would give Barton Malow a definite advantage over the other bidders who complied with the bid requirements and listed only the one contractor who would perform the work. The other bidders would be bound to use the subcontractor listed and therefore, would be unable to negotiate for a better price after obtaining the contract. However, by listing multiple subcontractors, Barton-Malow would be able to negotiate for a better price because it had not committed itself to any one subcontractor. In five categories, site work, concrete work, masonry work, iron and steel work, and lathing and plastering, Barton Malow listed general contractor. About an hour after bid opening, Mr. Derryberry called Mr. Polso, the Vice- President of Operations for Barton-Malow, to inquire about the bid because it was so much lower than the other bids. Mr. Polso assured Mr. Derryberry that there had been no mistake in the amount bid. Mr. Derryberry then asked about the listing of general contractor for the iron and steel work because he had never known of a general contractor doing that type of work. Mr. Polso stated that he had not had time to determine the low bidder in that category and was still getting prices. He also said that Barton-Malow would not be doing the lathing and plastering. However, when Mr. Derryberry advised that he was recommending that the bid be disqualified due to the incompleteness of the subcontractors form and asked whether Barton-Malow wished to withdraw its bid, Mr. Polso stated that Barton-Malow had no intention of withdrawing its bid. Subsequently, Mr. Polso met with Mr. Derryberry and Mr. Collins at the school offices and advised them that Barton-Malow had every intention of performing the work where general contractor had been listed. Barton-Malow is a wholly owned subsidiary of Barton Malow Company and has the resources of Barton-Malow Company available when necessary. In 1985, Barton-Malow did between 60 and 70 million dollars of construction work; Barton- Malow Company had a dollar volume of 600 million dollars. Barton-Malow has the capacity to perform work in the areas where it listed general contractor. Barton-Malow prepares its bid by estimating the value of the total project and the value of the majority of the specific trades involved. If Barton-Malow does not receive a bid from a subcontractor that it feels is competitive in a particular trade area, it performs that work itself. The C.14 (Addendum #1) form permitted a bidder to list "general contractor" in any or all subcontract areas in which it would perform the work with its own personnel. Once the bids are opened, the bidder cannot unilaterally substitute a subcontractor for the general contractor. The general contractor would be required to do the work unless it received authorization to substitute a subcontractor based upon a showing of good cause. The evidence does not support a finding that Barton-Malow was incapable of performing the work in the areas in which it listed "general contractor." Therefore Barton- Malow did not deviate from the bid requirements by listing "general contractor" in five of the twenty specified areas. Although Baron-Malow deviated from the bid requirements by failing to list any addresses on its subcontractor list, this was a minor irregularity which did not give Barton-Malow any competitive advantage over the other bidders. In Division C, Article 5, Section 5.3.1., the bid documents provide: It is the intent of the owner to award a Contract to the lowest responsible Bidder provided the Bid has been submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Bidding Documents....The Owner shall have the right to waive any informality or irregularity in any Bid or Bids received and accept the Bid or Bids which in his judgment, is in his own best interests.
Findings Of Fact On or about December 29, 1981, the College solicited sealed bids for construction of alterations and additions to the Technical and Gymnasium Buildings located on its campus in Madison, Florida. In response, seven general contractors submitted bids. (P-1, P-2, P-3.) Bids were publicly opened on February 9, 1982. Griffin Construction, with a bid of $536,575, was the apparent low bidder; the second lowest bidder was Long Contractors, with a bid of $539,512. (Testimony of Griffin, Sims, Rutherford; P-3, P-4, P-5.) After the low bid was identified, Tom McClanahan, representing Long Contractors, asked that the subcontractor list accompanying the low bid be opened. Griffin Construction's subcontractor list was then opened. McClanahan asked if the license and charter numbers of the subcontractors were listed. 2/ Upon learning that these numbers were not included on Griffin Construction's subcontractor list, McClanahan protested. (Testimony of Sims, Rutherford, Griffin.) At its February 15, 1982, meeting, the College District Board of Trustees ("Board") rejected the low bid of Griffin Construction on the sole ground that the omission of subcontractor license and charter numbers constituted a failure to comply with the conditions of the bid documents. 3/ The Board then voted to award the contract to Long Contractors, the second lowest bidder, on the ground that it was the lowest bid conforming to the bid documents. In so doing, the Board followed the College president's recommendation--a recommendation based on his belief that the non-complying bid must be rejected, that it did not involve a matter of Board discretion. (Testimony of Sims, Rutherford, Griffin; Stipulation of Parties; P-41.) The bid specifications contain instructions to bidders requiring "each Bidder . . . [to] submit with his proposal a list of the subcontractors who will perform the work . . . as indicated by the `List of Subcontractors' form." (P-1, P-2.) The instructions further provide: The applicable subcontractor license registration or certification number must be noted on the bid opposite his name, and in the event that the subcontractor is a corporation, his State Corporate Charter number shall also be noted. If the subcontractor is an out of state firm, their Charter number with the Secretary of State to do business in the State of Florida should also be noted. The "Listing of Subcontractors" form provided with the specifications contains column headings for the names and addresses of the subcontractors but does not contain a separate heading for the requested license or corporate charter numbers. 4/ The form states that the subcontractor list "is an integral part of the bid." (P-1, P-2.) The bid instructions further require bidders to evaluate and determine the qualifications of their listed subcontractors. The bidder shall have determined to his own complete satisfaction that a listed subcontractor has been successfully engaged in this particular type of business for a reasonable length of time, has successfully completed installations comparable to that which is required by this agreement and is qualified both technically and financially to perform that pertinent phase of the work for which he is listed. (P-1, P-2.) The bid documents expressly reserve to the College the right "to reject any or all bids, and to waive informalities." (P-1 P-2.) No bidder correctly listed the required license and corporate charter numbers on its "Listing of Subcontractors" form. Griffin Construction. Griffin failed to include any license or corporate charter numbers. However, by subsequent letters dated February 9 and February 18, 1982, and at hearing, it supplied the required subcontractor license and charter numbers. Long Contractors. Long listed for its roofing subcontractor a sheet metal registration number, not the required roofing license number. [A sheet metal registration does not qualify a contractor for roofing work. See, 489.105, 489.113, Fla. Stat. (1981).] For its electrical subcontractor, Long omitted the prefix, "ER" from the listed number. For its plumbing subcontractor, Long listed a mechanical registration number instead of the required plumbing certification or registration number. [A mechanical registration does not qualify a contractor to perform plumbing work. See, 489.105, 489.113, supra.] Of the four areas requiring state licenses--roofing, heating and air conditioning, electrical, and plumbing--Long listed correctly only the registration number for its heating and air conditioning subcontractor. Long incorrectly listed No. FO6962 as the corporate number of Gandy Enterprises, its painting subcontractor. This is the number of a related corporation, Industrial Coatings, Inc. Remaining Bidders. Of the five other general contractors submitting bids, two-- Richard Walker Construction Company and GRC Contracting, Inc.--omitted all subcontractor license and charter numbers. The other three bidders failed to completely list all the required numbers. (Testimony of Rutherford; P-11, P-12, P-13, P-14, P-15, P-16, P-17, P-34, P-37, R-1, R-5.) The project architect testified that the submittal of incorrect or incomplete subcontractor license and charter numbers was a deficiency which a bidder should be allowed to cure after bid opening. But the failure to submit any required "number" was a deficiency which, in his opinion, could not be similarly corrected. He failed, however, to supply a reasonable basis for drawing such a distinction. Therefore, his opinion on this question is given little weight. 5/ (Testimony of Rutherford.) Subcontractor license and charter numbers are readily obtainable and can be verified by contacting the pertinent state agency--the Florida Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, or the Florida Department of State. (Testimony of Griffin, Rutherford; P-32, P-33, P- 34, P-35, P-36, P-37.) The project architect, William Rutherford, routinely requires the listing of subcontractor license and charter numbers on bids for public construction projects. The main purpose it serves is that it would enable him to identify the listed contractor, since sometimes subcontractors have similar business names. Although if he was uncertain about the qualifications of a subcontractor, he would ordinarily question the general contractor. (Testimony of Rutherford.) Although Mr. Rutherford has customarily required the listing of subcontractor "numbers" on public projects, he has never made any use of those numbers in the past. (Testimony of Rutherford.) The general contractor who is awarded the contract is responsible to Mr. Rutherford and the College for construction of the project in accordance with the bid specifications. If, after bid opening, a listed subcontractor is unable to perform, Mr. Rutherford would ordinarily arrange for substitution of a new subcontractor acceptable to the general contractor and owner. (Testimony of Rutherford.) Griffin Construction's failure to list the license and charter numbers of its listed subcontractors, and its subsequent curing of that failure, did not affect the amount of its bid 6/ by giving it an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other bidders. The bid omission did not allow Griffin Construction the opportunity to change any material element of its bid after bid opening. The inclusion or exclusion of subcontractor "numbers" at bid opening does not affect the ability of a contractors to obtain the required bond, the quality of bidding general contractors, the quality of listed subcontractors, the quality of work performed, or any material feature of the competitive bidding process. (Testimony of Griffin, Rutherford.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the construction contract in question be awarded to Vick Griffin Construction Company, the lowest responsible bidder. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 29th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence addressed at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The request for sealed bids for the construction of the Project was advertised on October 9, 16 and 23, 1991. There were six addenda to the original bid documents which added, deleted or modified provisions of the original bidding requirements, contract requirements, administrative requirements and technical specifications. The original bid documents plus the six addenda will be referred to herein as the "bid documents". The bid documents required that all bids be in full accord with the contract documents. Sealed bids for the Project were opened on October 30, 1991. Wright submitted the lowest lump sum bid for the Project, with Sovran submitting the second lowest lump sum bid and Kellogg submitting the third lowest lump sum bid. At the time of the bid opening, the bid documents listed only four casework manufacturers that were approved to furnish casework for the Project. Empire Custom Cabinets, Inc. (Empire) was not listed as one of the four approved casework manufacturers in the bid documents. The bid documents did not require the bidder to list the casework manufacturer it intended to obtain the casework from, but only that the bidder name the casework subcontractor. The only work item in the bid documents which requires identifying the name of the manufacturer on the subcontractor's list is the metal roof system. Because Empire's bid on the casework was extremely low compared to other bids received by Wright on the casework, Wright called Empire prior to submitting its bid to confirm that Empire's bid was submitted per plans and specifications. Although Wright did not specifically inquire of Empire at this time as to which manufacturer Empire was obtaining the casework from for the Project, Empire did advise Wright that Empire's bid on the casework was according to plans and specifications. Additionally, Empire did not divulge or advise Wright at this time that the bid was based on Empire manufacturing the casework for the Project. Based on this representation from Empire, Wright listed Empire as its casework subcontractor, and calculated its lump sum bid for the Project using Empire's bid. Although Wright listed Empire as its casework subcontractor in its bid, this did not create an irregularity in Wright's bid since Wright's bid was per plans and specification without exception or exclusion. This would require Wright to furnish casework for the Project manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers listed in the bid documents regardless of which subcontractor Wright listed as the subcontractor for casework. By letter dated November 1, 1991, the Board's architect for the Project requested Wright to have Empire submit written certification by one of the four approved casework manufacturers that its casework was being furnished to Empire for the project. By letter dated November 4, 1991, Empire advised Wright that Empire's bid on the casework for the Project was based on casework to be manufactured by Empire. On the same day, Wright furnished the architect for the Project a copy of Empire's letter of November 4, 1991. In response to a request by the Board, Wright, by letter dated November 7, 1991, advised the Board that Wright would furnish casework manufactured by one of the four approved manufacturers listed in the bid documents for the Project. By letter dated December 3, 1991, Empire advised Wright that Empire would need to withdraw its bid if Empire was required to use casework manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers listed in the bid documents. On that same day, Wright furnished the Board a copy of Empire's letter and requested that the Board allow Wright to remove and replace Empire with Steven Ward and Associates, Inc. (Ward), as the casework subcontractor since Ward would be able to furnish and install casework manufactured by LSI Corporation of America, Inc., one of the four approved casework manufacturers. No Action has been taken on that request. The bid documents provide for a subcontractor to be removed and replaced from the list of subcontractors after the bid is opened if there is a showing of good cause and written approval by the Board and the Project architect is obtained. Although Empire's bid on the casework for the Project submitted to Wright was based on Empire manufacturing the casework, there is competent substantial evidence in the record to establish facts to show that at the time Wright submitted its bid on the Project it had reasonable grounds to believe that Empire's bid on the casework was based on Empire furnishing and installing casework manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers. After determining that Empire could not perform under its bid, Wright obtained a bid from Ward for furnishing and installing the casework for the Project which was less than Ward's original bid submitted to Wright before the bid opening. However, this bid was substantially more than Empire's bid, and if Wright is allowed to substitute Ward for Empire, Wright will have to absorb the additional costs since the bids were lump sum bids. Wright is neither attempting to furnish casework from a manufacturer that is not approved, nor is Wright requesting an increase in the lump sum bid price. The advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project required that all bidders be prequalified by the Board prior to the bid date. Sovran and one other bidder were not prequalified by the Board prior to the bid date in accordance with Advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project. Sovran received the bid documents for the Project approximately one month before the bid date but did not file a Notice of Protest of the prequalification requirement contained in the Advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project. Sovran holds a certificate as a general contractor licensed in the State of Florida in accordance with Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. As a certified general contractor Sovran, pursuant to Section 489.125, Florida Statutes, was authorized to bid on the Project notwithstanding the Board's prequalification requirement. This was explained by the Board's representative at the bid opening. The bid documents required that a subcontractor list be submitted by all bidders, and when submitted with the bid becomes an integral part of the bid. The purpose of the subcontractor list was to prevent bid shopping, and to allow the Board an opportunity to review the subcontractors to determine if any subcontractor on the list had performed unsatisfactorily on previous Board projects. Neither the statutes relating to competitive bidding nor the bid documents prohibit the listing of the general contractor together with a subcontractor on a subcontractor list. The subcontractor list submitted by Sovran indicated "Sovran Constr/Naples" as the name of the subcontractor for the masonry work and "Sovran/Naples" as the name of the subcontractor for the poured-in-place concrete work. "Naples" is Naples Concrete and Masonry Work, Inc. The bid received by Sovran from Naples was for both labor and materials for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran neither requested nor did Naples furnish Sovran a bid to provide labor only for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. There was no agreement between Sovran and Naples whereby Sovran would supply the materials and Naples would furnish the labor for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran did request and receive bids from other companies for furnishing materials only for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran listed itself, the general contractor, along with Naples on the subcontractor list for the purpose of supplying the materials for the poured-in- place concrete and masonry work. Sovran's main reason for supplying the materials was that Naples was not bondable. Without a payment bond from Naples, Sovran would be without protection and could be forced into paying double for the materials in the event Naples failed to pay the material suppliers. Although the Superintendent of the Lee County Schools has recommended to the Board that the Board accept Wright's bid for the Project, the Board has not voted on that recommendation. The fact that Wright used Empire's bid to calculate its lump sum bid in no way excuses Wright for the requirement set out in the bid documents that casework used for the Project (when the time comes) be manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers. Wright gains no economic advantage in this regard since the lump sum bid price remains the same. The advertisement for Sealed Bids on the Project provides that the Board reserves the right to waive any and all irregularities of any bid received.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly RECOMMENDED: That the Board enter a Final Order dismissing the instant bid protest and awarding to Wright the contract for the construction of Elementary School "C", Job No. 91063. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of February, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13 day of February, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 91-7597B1D The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1 - 3(1,2 and 3 , respectively); 4 - 5(6); 6(4); 7 - 9(5); 12(10); 13(11); 15 - 16(12); 17(13); 18 - 19(16); 20(29); 21(18); 23(19); 24 - 25(20); 26(22); 27(23); 28(22); 29 - 30(29); 32 - 33(25); and 34(26). Proposed finding of fact 10 is rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record in that Wright's bid was as per plans and specifications without exceptions or exclusions which included the use of casework manufactured by one of the approved casework manufacturers. Proposed finding of fact 11 is rejected as not being supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record in that the Board knew of Empire's bid being based on nonconforming materials prior to issuing its Notice of Intent. However, the only information the Board had in reference to Wright's bid before issuing its Notice of Intent was that Wright had bid as per plans and specifications and would be installing casework manufactured by one of the approved manufacturers. The only question was whether Empire could furnish casework manufactured by one of the approved manufacturers. Proposed finding of fact 14 is neither material nor relevant. How the Board's architect interpreted Wright's bid is neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed finding of fact 22 is unnecessary to the conclusion reached in the Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 31 is more in the way of an argument than a finding of fact. Proposed findings of fact 35 and 36 are covered in the Preliminary Statement. The timeliness of Kellogg's protest is not an issue and therefore, a finding that it was timely is unnecessary. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent While not specifically adopting proposed finding of fact 1, where material or relevant or necessary to this proceeding, and supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record the stipulated facts have been adopted. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 2(4,5); 3(9); 4 - 5(7); 7 - 8(8); 10(16); 11(14); 12(31); 13(21); and 15(23). Proposed finding of fact 6 is more in the way of an argument than a finding of fact. Proposed finding of fact 9 and 14 are neither material nor relevant. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Intervenor See ruling on Respondent's proposed finding of fact Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 2 - 3(21); 4(24); 5 - 6(21); 13(23); 14(24,28); 15(22); 16 - 17(23,24); and 18(28). Proposed findings of fact 7 through 12 are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Gurley, Esquire Norton, Gurley & Darnell, P.A. 1819 Main Street, Suite 610 Sarasota, FL 34236 Marianne Kantor, Esquire The School Board of Lee County 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, FL 33901 James M. Talley, Esquire Fisher, Rushmer, Werrenrath, Keiner, Wack & Dickson, P.A. Post Office Box 712 Orlando, FL 32802 Karl Engel Superintendent Lee County School Board 2055 Central Avenue Ft. Myers, FL 33901 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400
The Issue The two major issues in this case are as follows: Was the failure of Datamaxx to submit resumes of training and maintenance personnel as required by Performance Mandatory No. 10 of the Invitation to Bid a material deviation from the Invitation to Bid such as to render Datamaxx a nonresponsive bidder? If Datamaxx was a nonresponsive bidder, must the contract be awarded to Burroughs, or must DHRS, pursuant to Section 13A-1.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, have the contract rebid, or seek single source procurement or negotiation approval from the Division of Purchasing?
Findings Of Fact Based on the admissions of the parties, on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact: For at least the past 10 years, the DHRS Data Communications Network has been maintained by Burroughs on a sole source basis. At the end of the previous Burroughs Terminal Maintenance contract with Burroughs, the Department of General Services (DOS) asked DHRS to bid the contract in lieu of sole source procurement, it being the belief of DOS that there was competition in this area. On or about September 19, 1986, DHRS published an Invitation to Bid which advised prospective bidders that sealed bids would be opened on October 20, 1986, for a contract, known as "Burroughs Terminal Maintenance" [Bid No. 86 ATM] regarding maintenance of the terminals of the DHRS Data Communications Network. The Special Conditions of the Invitation to Bid contained, among others, the following provisions: The State has established certain require- ments with respect to bids to be submitted by bidders. The use of "shall," "must" or "will" (except to indicate simple futurity) in this Invitation to Bid indicates a requirement or condition from which a material deviation may not be waived by the State. A deviation is material if, in the State's sole discretion, the deficient response is not in substantial accord with this Invitation to Bid requirements, provides an advantage to one bidder over other bidders, has a potentially significant effect on the quantity or quality of items bid, or on the cost to the State. Material deviations cannot be waived. (at p. 1) No negotiations, decision, or actions shall be initiated or executed by the bidder as a result of any discussions with any State employee. Only those communications which are in writing from the Department's Purchasing office may be considered as a duly authorized expression on behalf of the State. Also, only communications from bidders which are signed and in writing will be recognized by the State as duly authorized expressions on behalf of the bidder. (at p. 2) All personnel performing maintenance must be trained to service the equipment covered by this contract. Training shall be completed before the individual is assigned to service the equipment covered by this contract. Training shall be provided to whatever level is necessary to ensure the individual has the required qualifications to perform satisfactory maintenance service on Burroughs equipment listed in Attachment A of this Invitation to Bid. Bidder shall submit with their bid a summary of their Burroughs training program and resumes of personnel who will be performing this training and the resumes of personnel who will be per- forming the maintenance. (at p. 8) Bidder shall certify to the State, at the time the bid is submitted, that bidder has existing established service centers staffed with personnel trained to service the equipment covered by this contract . . . In lieu of this requirement, if bidder does not have existing established service centers, liaison office, and trained personnel, and bidder submits a plan for compliance, the required certification must be given the State no later than two (2) weeks prior to the anticipated starting date of the contract as indicated in the paragraph of this document entitled Calendar of Events. Failure to comply with this requirement shall result in rejection of the bid and award of the bid to the next lowest responsive bidder. The Invitation to Bid was drafted by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The only bidders on the contract (other than no- bids) were Burroughs and Datamaxx. DHRS found Burroughs and Datamaxx both to be responsive bidders and posted their bids making them public in the recognized manner of publicizing the bidder to be awarded a bid. Both bids were found to be responsive by DHRS at the time they were made public. The Datamaxx bid was the lowest bid and the Burroughs bid was the next to lowest bid. DHRS staff recommended the contract be awarded to Datamaxx. The Datamaxx bid was approximately $784,000 less than the Burroughs bid. In its bid Datamaxx indicated that it understood and agreed to all provisions of the Invitation to Bid, specifically including those dealing with Mandatory Requirements, Verbal Instruction Procedure, Rejection of Bids, Bid Evaluation, Performance Mandatories, and Certification. Datamaxx submitted the Certification required under the terms of the Invitation to Bid and did not submit a plan for compliance with its bid. Datamaxx never requested in writing that the requirement for resumes be waived, and DHRS never advised Datamaxx in writing that it did not have to submit the resumes. Datamaxx did not submit with its bid the resumes of training and maintenance personnel required under Performance Mandatory 10 of the Invitation to Bid. Performance Mandatory No. 10 required the submission of resumes with the bid, and did not concern an event that would take place after the bid had been let. DHRS considered the requirement for resumes to be a mandatory requirement. The qualifications of the persons who would be performing the maintenance under the contract would have a potentially significant effect on the quality of the maintenance provided. Nothing could be more material to the contract than the ability of the personnel to perform that contract. The difference in the dollar amount of the bids of Burroughs and Datamaxx influenced the decision of DHRS in finding Datamaxx to be a responsive bidder. This was a major reason Datamaxx was found to be a responsive bidder. In evaluating the Datamaxx bid, DHRS went outside the material provided in the Datamaxx bid. Subsequent to the posting of bids, DHRS met with Datamaxx and advised Datamaxx that its initial submission was deficient for not including resumes with the bid, that DHRS had waived the resumes, but that in order for DHRS to continue its recommendation that the bid be awarded to Datamaxx, DHRS had to have the resumes prior to the awarding of the bid. DHRS considered it an error and a deficiency in the bid that the resumes were not furnished. Datamaxx, on November 6, 1986, advised DHRS in a letter to Charles Ray that it would submit a plan which would address, among other things, service personnel resumes by November 17, 1986. DHRS could not have considered Datamaxx's letter of November 6, 1986, in evaluating whether Datamaxx was a responsive bidder, because that letter was not received until after DHRS had already found Datamaxx to be a responsive bidder and recommended that the contract be awarded to Datamaxx. Had Datamaxx not submitted the resumes prior to November 17, 1986, DHRS staff would have recommended that the award of the contract be withdrawn. The performance the State would receive under the contract would directly depend on the qualifications of the persons performing the service and the maintenance, and the resumes would be the only source of information regarding the qualifications of the personnel.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that a final order be entered to the following effect: Concluding that the bid submitted by Datamaxx USA Corporation on Bid No. 86 ATM should be rejected on the grounds that it is not responsive, Concluding that the bid submitted by Burroughs Corporation should be rejected on the basis of Rule 13A-1.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, and, Providing for the agency to issue a second invitation to bid/request for proposals or take other action provided by Rule 13A-1.002(3), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-4460B1D The following are my specific rulings on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by both parties: Findings proposed by Petitioner Paragraphs 1 through 19 are accepted with a few minor editorial modifications. The first two lines of paragraph 20 are rejected as redundant. The remainder of paragraph 20 is accepted. Findings proposed by Respondent Paragraphs 1 and 2 are accepted in substance. Paragraph 3 is rejected as constituting unnecessary details. Paragraphs 4 through 7 are accepted. Paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 are rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 11 is rejected in part as irrelevant and in part as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 12 is accepted. Paragraph 13 is rejected as constituting irrelevant and unnecessary details. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Powell Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Edgar Lee Elzie, Jr., Esquire MacFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly 804 First Florida Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, the Department of Insurance, acted illegally, arbitrarily, fraudulently, or dishonestly in rejecting all bids for lease #460:0119 and not awarding subject lease to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Insurance established a requirement to lease 5371 square feet of office space in Daytona Beach, Florida, and a "Request for Space Need" was approved by the Department of Management Services on February 11, 1998. The Department of Insurance subsequently issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for lease #460:0119 (Respondent's Exhibit 1). A non-mandatory pre-bid conference was held on June 1, 1998, in Daytona Beach and two prospective bidders, Petitioner and Nova Village Market partnership attended. The RFP provided that proposals which did not meet all mandatory requirements of the RFP would be rejected as non- responsive. The RFP provided for evaluation criteria are awards factors. The awards factors totaled 100 points with no minimum point total required. Ten of the points were allotted for moving costs defined as the costs of relocating communications, networks, furniture and other equipment. This factor gave the current landlord an automatic 10-point advantage since there would be no relocation costs. Moving costs provisions tend to discourage the presentation of bids because the bidders have to overcome an automatic 10-point advantage provided the current landlord. The RFP also provided that all proposals could be rejected, however, such "rejection shall not be arbitrary, but be based on strong justification." None of the conditions of the RFP were questioned or challenged by interested parties. Two responses were received by the Department of Insurance in response to the RFP and these were opened in Respondent's Tallahassee office on July 8, 1998, by Mr. Kip Wells of the Department. One was received from the current landlord, Nova Village Partnership, hereafter Nova, and the other from the Petitioner. The Nova proposal was deemed non-responsive. Neither Nova nor Petitioner contested the determination that Nova's proposal was non-responsive. Only one responsive proposal, the Petitioner's proposal, remained. On July 9, 1998, the Department representative, Mr. Kip Wells, called Petitioner to schedule an appointment for 9:00 a.m., on July 10, 1998, to visit and evaluate the proposed facility. No persons from the Department appeared at the scheduled appointment. At 10:45 a.m., on July 10, 1998, Kip Wells called Petitioner to say that since Petitioner's proposal was the only responsive proposal received, and that "all bids" were being rejected. Mr. Wells testified at hearing. His reason for rejecting the remaining bid was: When I saw that it was obvious the current landlord was not going to be very cooperative, I decided that one choice was not enough. If we were going to have to make a move, we needed more than one thing to choose from. So, I immediately - - since I had already set up with local people in Daytona to tell them that I was coming down to evaluate the bids, I sent them an E-mail and told them that I would not be meeting the following day to evaluate the bids. Mr. Wells decided to reissue the RFP without any moving costs criteria, and redistribute those 10 points among the other award factors. Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent to Protest and then a Formal Protest, both in a timely fashion. There is no state policy prohibiting the award of a lease to a sole bidder on a RFP. The "Leasing Policy" of the Department of Insurance states that "The Lease Administrator, with assistance from the Division employees, will establish bid or quote specifications. These specifications will include special needs for the Division(s) as well as the evaluation criteria upon which to evaluate the proposals." Neither the Department's Lease Policy (Petitioner Exhibit 3) nor the State's Real Property Leasing Manual (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) give the Lease Administrator the authority to reject or evaluate bid responses. Neither does he have a vote in the bid evaluation process. His responsibility is to coordinate the process. Randall Baker, Manager of Private Sector Leasing of the Bureau of Property Management of the Department of Management Services (hereinafter DMS), testified. The DMS prepares a manual as a guideline for user agencies to assist in the leasing of property. The DMS manual is not binding on agencies and DMS has no review oversight; however, their comments on agencies' leases are reviewed by the state auditing authorities and failure to follow the guidelines can result in audit criticism. Baker confirmed that the agency's written procedures as outlined in the RFP were consistent with the DMS guidelines. The DMS manual states as follows regarding the receipt of only one responsive proposal: When only one responsive proposal is received it may be considered and accepted providing the following conditions are documented: Adequate competition was solicited. The rate is within established rental rate guidelines. The proposal meets stated requirements. The proposal was processed as though other proposals were received. The Petitioner's bid was responsive to the RFP and the lease rate bid by the Petitioner was less than the average rate for state leases in the Daytona area and less than the amount budgeted by the Department for this lease. The lease rate by the Petitioner was reasonably priced and competitive. Although the agency failed to complete the process as envisioned, see paragraph 20 below, this was in no way the fault of Petitioner. The Department's leasing policy requires that the lowest and best response to an RFP be determined through cost analysis and evaluation by an evaluation committee. Mr. Wells did not forward Petitioner's bid to or discuss with the evaluation committee Petitioner's bid, but unilaterally rejected it. It was clear from Mr. Wells' testimony that this was his individual decision and was based upon his personal belief that it was the best thing to do.1 At hearing, the stated justification for rejecting "all bids" was that it gave the Department the opportunity to delete the requirement of moving costs from the awards factors; however, the evidence does not indicate that the moving cost provision result in non-competitive bids. The sole responsive bidder was within the local lease price range and within budget. Neither the Respondent nor DMS has established a policy prohibiting the acceptance of a sole responsive bid if there is competition solicited. The Department of Insurance has accepted a sole bid on at least one project in the past. There was no evidence that the RFP was not an open and fair competition. The evidence shows that it was properly advertised, that all conditions were known, and that all interested parties had an equal opportunity to participate. In sum, there was adequate competition in submitting the bids. Mr. Baker testified regarding the policy of DMS. The DMS policy is that if there is one responsive bidder, there has been competitive bidding. The RFP provides that the Respondent may reject all bids if it has strong justification. See paragraph 5 above. Mr. Baker also provided examples of "strong justification for rejecting proposals." His examples include facilities which are proposed outside the required geographic area, prices considerably in excess of state guidelines and agency budgets, specification changes due to modification of the agency's program requirements, and "intervening external forces." No evidence establishing a strong justification for rejecting the Petitioner's bid was presented. Without completing the process and evaluating the Petitioner's bid, the agency never considered whether the bid was in the state's best interest. However, this was not the fault of the Respondent, and the agency's failure to follow its procedures should not inure to its benefits. Further, Because there was no minimum score required on the evaluation criteria of the RFP, there is no need to evaluate Petitioner's proposal because it is the only responsive proposal. For all the reasons stated above, the rejection of Petitioner's bid was contrary to the terms of the RFP, contrary to state policy, and arbitrary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which finds that: Respondent's actions in rejecting Petitioner's responsive bid were arbitrary; The Respondent did not follow the requirements set forth in the Department of Insurance Leasing Policy, nor the Department of Management Services Real Property Leasing Manual, or the Request for Proposal itself; That no adverse interest to the State or the Department would have occurred had Petitioner's responsive bid been accepted; and therefore, Petitioner's claim shall be upheld as the lowest cost and best proposal for RFP #460:0119, and that the Department of Insurance shall award Petitioner Lease #460:0119. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1998.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Transportation (DOT) acted correctly in deeming the bid of Petitioner White Construction Co., Inc. (White), to be nonresponsive for failure to meet the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) goal for Project No. 220517-1-52-01 (the project) and whether the proposed award to Intervenor Mitchell Brothers, Inc. (Mitchell) is in accordance with governing rules and statutes or is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact The project is for work in Wakulla County. The deadline for submission of bids was June 17, 1998. White and Mitchell bid on the Project. Upon the opening of the bids on or about June 17, 1998, White was the apparent low bidder at $4,140,400.14, and Mitchell was the apparent second low bidder at $5,237,848.89. Pursuant to Rule 14-78, Florida Administrative Code, bidders have three days after bid opening in which to submit detailed information regarding compliance with the project’s DBE requirements. The requirements of this project were that eight percent of the contract work be performed by DBEs. With the bid itself, a bidder only needs to submit a DBE summary, noting whether it will meet the DOT established goal of eight percent. Within the three day period, White submitted DBE utilization forms, one of which listed HSD as one of its DBEs, for work in the amount of $55,326.36. Mitchell submitted the required forms, showing compliance with the DBE goals. The DOT publishes a DBE directory for each bidding cycle. The directory indicates the bidding cycle to which it is to be applied. If a company is not listed in the directory, a contractor is on notice that such company is not a certified DBE. White is an experienced bidder and contractor with the Department of Transportation. The bid and the DBE submission in this case were prepared by a White estimator who had been an estimator for many years. White’s estimator admitted that, while he usually reviewed the DBE directory prior to submission of bids, he failed to do so in this case. White received a copy of the DBE directory for the June Letting, but did not consult it to confirm that HSD was listed. While White has substituted DBE subcontractors on jobs after performance has begun where the DBE cannot complete the work for which it was hired, White has never substituted a DBE subcontractor prior to the performance of the contract or changed subcontractors on its bid after the bid opening because a subcontractor it listed for purposes of meeting the DBE goal was not DBE certified. White, as a common practice, keeps a supply of HSD forms in its office for use in submitting the DBE Utilization Form that indicates White will meet the DBE goal for a particular project. White did not contact HSD or any of the DBEs it listed on the DBE Utilization Form and DBE Utilization Summary Form to confirm that they were DBE certified for the June Letting. White is aware that subcontractors may lose their DBE certification or not apply for recertification. White is also aware that it should not use subcontractors for purposes of meeting the DBE goal that are not listed in the DBE directory unless one calls the Minority Programs Office and confirm directly that a particular company which is not listed is DBE certified for that letting cycle. HSD was not aware that White listed it on the DBE Utilization Form submitted with White’s bid. For White, that is not an uncommon practice. Neither DOT or HSD are depicted by the evidence of having misled White into believing that HSD was a qualified DBE. It is the bidder’s (White) responsibility to verify whether a DBE is authorized for use on a particular project. White personnel did not do this and the applicable DBE directory clearly did not have HSD listed. HSD was not a qualified DBE at the time of the bid letting or proposed bid award. HSD sent a quote for work on the project to Mitchell and White. The quote sent to Mitchell contains a letter in which HSD notes that the company . . . is not listed in the DBE Directory for the June Letting. Unfortunately this means you will not be able to utilize Highway Safety Devices for DBE Goals for the June Letting. At the final hearing, a witness for White asserted that White did not receive the explanatory letter received by Mitchell. Such assertion cannot be credited in view of the demeanor of the witness when testifying. Subsequent to the final hearing in this matter, White submitted information indicating that HSD had received certification as a DBE, effective October 26, 1998. However, White’s submission does not change the fact that HSD was not certified at the time of the bid letting or opening in this matter. White’s bid was evaluated by DOT’s GFEC to determine whether or not White met the DBE goal or provided a good faith effort evaluation for the Project. DOT interprets Rule 14-78.003(2)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code, as not permitting the substitution of a certified DBE for HSD, a circumstance that would have permitted White to meet the DBE goal for the Project. DOT’s Minority Programs Office does the initial evaluation of the DBE portion of the goal. If the goal has not been met, the bid will be reviewed by the GFEC. The GFEC makes a recommendation to the TRC, and the dollar amount of the bid is not a factor considered by the GFEC. The TRC will take into consideration the bid price in its evaluation. The GFEC reviews the bid package by going through every criteria set forth in Rule 14-78.003(2)(b)3,b, Florida Administrative Code, to see if there are any circumstances that would credit the prime contractor in meeting the DBE goal. The GFEC’s evaluation of White’s bid was to determine if the information submitted by White indicated whether good faith efforts were made to meet the DBE goal, not whether White could change HSD for a certified DBE. The GFEC reviewed White’s bid for compliance with the DBE goal and to determine if good faith efforts were made to meet the goal. White did not meet the DBE goal or submit documentation of its good faith effort to do so. The GFEC recommended to the TRC to deem White nonresponsive. The TRC reviewed the GFEC report and accepted the recommendation to deem White nonresponsive. The GFEC determined that Mitchell, however, did meet the DBE goal for the Project. The TRC determined that Mitchell’s bid was within the automatic award criteria and recommended Mitchell be awarded the contract. The TRC recommended to the CAC that White be deemed nonresponsive and award the contract to Mitchell. The review of White’s bid to determine whether it met the DBE goal by the GFEC, the TRC and the CAC were done in accordance with the governing statutes, rules and DOT policy and procedures. Although substitution of DBEs in the performance of a contract after bid-letting is permitted by DOT, the total amount of the bid submitted by a contractor is affected by the bids it receives from DBEs. White selected HSD, without confirming its present status at the time, because White had used this presumed DBE on previous occasions to obtain the best deal for White. White also asserted that, as it may change DBEs after a contract is awarded, the failure to submit a correct DBE is not a material error. However, a contractor may not change DBEs without good cause, such as its inability to perform the work, pursuant to Rule 14-78, Florida Administrative Code. That there is a procedure available after the contract is awarded does not affect the materiality of the failure to submit a qualified DBE in the first instance. If the DOT believes the responsive bids which it receives are too high, it can reject all bids. The bid submitted by Mitchell, at $5,237,848.89, was within the automatic award criteria. DOT’s decision to reject White’s bid for failure to comply with the DBE requirements is consistent with its practice and past policy. The use of an unqualified DBE is a material variation in a bid, as it may impact the price. DOT’s decision to reject White’s bid as non-responsive was not contrary to statute, rule, or policy, or the bid specifications. White did not show that DOT’s action was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Transportation, enter a final order awarding the contract on State Project Nos. 220517-1-52-01 and 220511-1-52-01 to Intervenor, Mitchell Brothers, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED Mary M. Piccard, Esquire Vezina, Lawrence and Piscitelli, P.A. 318 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Brian McGrail, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Donna H. Stinson, Esquire Broad and Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James C. Myers, Agency Clerk Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
