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EARNEST ANTHONY VARVOUTIS vs BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY, 92-001094 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Feb. 21, 1992 Number: 92-001094 Latest Update: Dec. 03, 1992

The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a certified public accountant (C.P.A.) should be denied on the grounds set forth in Respondent's order of December 5, 1991, as clarified by the Joint Prehearing Stipulation entered into by the parties on July 1, 1992?

Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1985, after graduating from college, Petitioner went to work as a staff accountant with the public accounting firm of DeLoitte, Haskins and Sells (DH&S). He remained with DH&S until his position was eliminated. His last day of work was February 19, 1988. That same day, Petitioner went to the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Unemployment Compensation's (Division's) office (unemployment office) on Oakland Park Boulevard and U.S. 1 in Fort Lauderdale to inquire as to whether he was eligible for unemployment compensation. 1/ He brought with him a check (termination check) he had received from DH&S in an amount equal to approximately eight to ten weeks pay. The termination check represented not only severance pay, but also compensation for overtime work and unused sick leave and vacation time paid to Petitioner in one lump sum. 2/ After waiting on line, Petitioner spoke with a Division employee about his situation. He showed the termination check to the employee and explained what it represented. The employee then advised Petitioner that he would not be eligible for unemployment compensation until after the period of time for which he had been paid by DH&S had expired. Having been so advised, Petitioner left the unemployment office without submitting a claim. In the weeks that followed, friends and acquaintances of Petitioner, who believed that he had been given erroneous information regarding his eligibility for unemployment benefits, suggested to him that he further pursue the matter. Not having been successful in finding permanent, full-time employment, Petitioner ultimately followed their suggestion. On March 23, 1988, he returned to the unemployment office, with a copy of the termination check he had received from DH&S, to find out if he had indeed been given erroneous information by the Division employee with whom he had spoken during his initial visit the month before. He discussed his situation with another Division employee who worked in the office. This employee told Petitioner that he was eligible for unemployment benefits and that he would be able to receive "retroactive benefits" for the period following his first visit to the office. She advised Petitioner to fill out an unemployment compensation claim form, while she completed the paperwork that was necessary for him to obtain the "retroactive benefits" due him. Before leaving the office, Petitioner filled out a claim form and submitted it for filing. On the form, Petitioner checked the box indicating that, upon the termination of his employment with DH&S, he had not "received wages in lieu of notice." Nowhere on the form did Petitioner indicate that he was seeking "retroactive benefits;" however, he did not have to do so in order to complete the form inasmuch as no part of the form addressed the subject of "retroactive benefits." Petitioner received his first unemployment compensation check in late April of 1988. Shortly thereafter, on May 2, 1988, he began working for Safeguard Services, Inc. (Safeguard). Petitioner continued to receive unemployment compensation checks until August of 1988, notwithstanding that he was fully employed by Safeguard throughout the period. To receive these payments, Petitioner had to fill out and submit weekly claim certifications. In these certifications, he failed to disclose his employment with Safeguard and falsely certified that he had been "unemployed or partially unemployed" during the time periods covered by the certifications. 3/ He gave such information regarding his employment status knowing it to be false in order to continue to receive unemployment benefits. While still employed by Safeguard, Petitioner was contacted by a "headhunter" from Source Finance, an employment recruiter. The possibility of Petitioner using the services of Source Finance to assist him in finding a new job was discussed. Source Finance thereafter prepared a resume for Petitioner without his authorization, approval or knowledge. The resume indicated that Petitioner was a C.P.A. in the State of Florida. 4/ Petitioner was not then, nor has he ever been, licensed to practice public accounting in this state. Petitioner left the employ of Safeguard in October of 1988. Following his termination he went to the unemployment office to file a claim for unemployment compensation. Under "USUAL OCCUPATION" on the unemployment compensation claim form, Petitioner put down "CPA." In fact, Petitioner did not practice public accounting (although he had worked for a public accounting firm), nor did he regularly hold himself out as a C.P.A. Furthermore, he made clear to the Division employee to whom he handed his completed claim form that he was not yet a C.P.A., although he was hoping to become one and toward that end was leaving town the next day to take the C.P.A. examination. While Petitioner used poor judgment in referring to himself as a C.P.A. on the form, in so doing he did not intend to defraud the Division or to lead potential clients to believe that he was eligible to practice public accounting in this state. In or around December of 1988, the Division notified Petitioner in writing that it was seeking to recoup from him $2,600.00 in unemployment compensation benefits that he had improperly received while he had been employed full-time by Safeguard. In a letter written the latter part of January of 1989, Petitioner responded by asking the Division for clarification. Shortly thereafter the Division sent Petitioner a second letter demanding payment. Petitioner responded by writing another letter to the Division indicating that he would not make payment until he was given what he considered to be an adequate clarification of the Division's position. Subsequently, Petitioner was charged in Broward County Circuit Court (Case No. 89-6975 CF) with unemployment compensation fraud, in violation of Section 443.071(1), Florida Statutes. He retained Martin Jaffe, Esquire, to serve as his defense counsel and agreed to a fee arrangement that was described as follows in a letter dated June 28, 1989, sent to him by Jaffe: In the event this cause is resolved prior to the start of pre-trial depositions, the total fee shall be $10,000.00. The sum of $5,000.00 has been received on this date. The remaining balance of $5,000.00 shall be paid on or before September 1, 1989. In the event that it is necessary to take pre-trial depositions, an additional fee of $5,000.00 shall be due and owing. In the event that this matter shall proceed to trial, there shall be an additional fee of $2,000.00 per day of trial. It is agreed that those fees detailed in paragraphs B and C shall be paid out of any "reward monies" that you receive from the Internal Revenue Service. 5/ You hereby agree to execute the necessary documents to assign said payments to me. It is further understood, of course, that in the event that you do not receive any monies or insufficient monies from the Internal Revenue Service, you shall still be responsible for all payments delineated herein. The State Attorney offered to enter into a plea bargain agreement with Petitioner. Petitioner initially rejected the offer. As time passed, it became apparent that Petitioner would not be able to pay for Jaffe's services. Jaffe therefore suggested that Petitioner reconsider his decision to reject the offer the State Attorney had made, which Jaffe believed, based upon the limited information that he had regarding the case, 6/ to be "very favorable." Petitioner did reconsider and he agreed with Jaffe that it was in his, Petitioner's, best interest to accept the offer. On October 23, 1989, in accordance with the terms of the plea bargain agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendre to the felony charge of unemployment compensation fraud that had been lodged against him. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Petitioner was placed on probation for 18 months and ordered to repay $2,600.00 to the Division within the first year of his probation. Petitioner timely repaid the $2,600.00 and in all other respects successfully completed the terms and conditions of his probation.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Accountancy enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure based upon his lack of "good moral character," within the meaning of Section 473.306(4), Florida Statutes, without prejudice to Petitioner reapplying for licensure no sooner than one year following the date of this Recommended Order and showing that, in light of his subsequent good conduct and/or other pertinent circumstances, his having committed unemployment compensation fraud in 1988 no longer constitutes a basis upon which to conclude that he lacks the "good moral character" required of applicants for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 14th day of September, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1992.

Florida Laws (8) 443.071458.331473.306473.308473.322473.323775.082775.084
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs BRUNDERMAN BUILDING COMPANY, INC., 09-000859 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port Charlotte, Florida Feb. 16, 2009 Number: 09-000859 Latest Update: Nov. 05, 2009

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent failed to provide workers' compensation insurance coverage for employees, and, if so, what penalty should be assessed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, monitoring businesses within the state to ensure that such businesses are providing the requisite workers' compensation insurance coverage for all employees. The Division's headquarters are located in Tallahassee, Florida, but its investigators are spread throughout the state in order to more effectively monitor businesses. Respondent is a construction company that has been operating in excess of 30 years. It is a small company and usually only has a few employees at any given time. The company is located in Charlotte Harbor, Florida. Workers' compensation coverage is required if a business entity has one or more employees and is engaged in the construction industry in Florida. Workers' compensation coverage may be secured via three non-mutually exclusive methods: 1) The purchase of a workers' compensation insurance policy; 2) Arranging for the payment of wages and workers' compensation coverage through an employee leasing company; or 3) Applying for and receiving a certificate of exemption from workers' compensation coverage, if certain statutorily-mandated criteria are met. On January 8, 2009, Ira Bender, investigator for the Division, was doing on-site inspections in Port Charlotte, Florida. Bender stopped at the site on Edgewater Drive where new construction was underway at a YMCA. Bender observed a man (later identified as Thomas Woodall) sweeping the floor. Bender questioned Woodall and was told that Woodall worked for Respondent. When asked about his workers' compensation insurance coverage, Woodall advised that his insurance was maintained through Frank Crum Leasing Company ("Crum"). Bender called Crum and found that although Woodall had been carried as an employee of Respondent in the past, he had been released from coverage. The reason for his release was that his employment had been terminated for lack of business. Bender called Respondent to inquire about workers' compensation coverage. He was told that Respondent did not realize Woodall had been dropped from the Crum insurance coverage and that he would be reinstated immediately. In fact, coverage was restarted on that same day. Based on his finding that an employee had been working without coverage, Bender called his supervisor and provided his findings. The supervisor authorized issuance of a SWO based on the findings. The SWO was served on Respondent via hand- delivery at 11:45 a.m., on January 8, 2009. The SWO was also posted at the work site. The Division then requested business records from Respondent in order to determine whether there were any violations. If there were violations, then the Division would ascertain the amount of penalty to assess. Respondent cooperated and submitted the business records, as requested. After review of the business records, the Division issued its first Amended Order of Penalty Assessment ("Order") on January 14, 2009. The process employed by the Division was to locate all uncovered employees, i.e., those working without workers' compensation insurance for any period of time. The employees were then assigned a class code from the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) publication. Each trade or type of employment is assigned a code which sets the rate to be applied to an individual depending on the type of work he/she is performing. The Division assigned codes to the employees, determined how much the employee had been paid during the period of non-coverage, assigned the rate to the gross pay, and calculated the insurance premium needed to cover the worker for the time in question. A penalty of 1.5 times the premium was then assigned. The Order assessed a total penalty of $21,165.98 against Respondent. Respondent objected to the amount and refused to sign it due to errors contained in the Penalty Worksheet attached to the Order. Signing the Order would have allowed Respondent to return to work, but he refused to sign because he knew it was not correct. Pursuant to discussions between the parties and "additional records received," the Division issued a second Order on January 16, 2009, assessing a penalty of $6,501.27. Respondent believed that the Division was still in error and provided yet additional information--some verbal--to the Division. A third Order was issued on January 21, 2009, reducing the penalty to $3,309.56. However, Respondent still believed the penalty worksheet contained errors. Again, Respondent refused to sign and provided additional information to the Division. The Division issued a fourth Order on January 28, 2009, assessing a penalty of $2,822.24. That Order had an error concerning the spelling of an employee's name, but the penalty amount was correct. Respondent would not sign the fourth Order, because he did not believe he had intentionally violated any statute or rule concerning workers' compensation coverage for his employees. A corrected (fifth amended) Order was ultimately issued on May 19, 2009.1 The fifth Order asserts the amount of penalty now in dispute, which is the same amount appearing in the fourth amended Order. Respondent signed the fifth Order and entered into a payment plan for payment of the penalty, paying a down payment of $1,000 and monthly payments of $30 until paid in full. Respondent takes great offense to the fact that the penalty assessments were not faxed to him more quickly. He maintains that he had every intention to resolve this matter as quickly as possible, but the Division delayed and dragged out the process. The penalty worksheet attached to the fifth Order listed nine "Employee Names" that are subject to the penalty assessment. Each will be discussed below. The first "employee" is listed as "Cash" and is assigned Class Code 5403. This "employee" represents checks found in Respondent's records with the payee listed as "cash- casual labor" totaling $2,178.00 in gross payroll. Code 5403 was assigned because that is the code used by Crum for Respondent's general business. The manual rate for Code 5403 is $24.74. A penalty of $808.26 was assessed for that employee. The second employee is Jacob Prewitt. Prewitt was assigned Class Code 5221, due to the word "driveway" appearing on a check issued to him. Driveway work falls under a lower approved manual rate ($10.37) than general construction. The gross payroll amount was $1,960, and the penalty assigned to Prewitt was $304.88. The third employee is Woodall, assigned a Class Code of 5606, with a manual rate of $3.84. That code is used for supervisors and is, again, not as dangerous an occupation as general construction. The gross payroll for this entry was $1,008, and the penalty assessed for Woodall was $58.07. Cash is the fourth employee and has been covered in the discussion in paragraph 16, above. Barry Lawrence is the fifth employee; he is assigned Class Code 5437 as a cabinet maker/installer with a manual rate of $13.01. Lawrence had a Verification Letter issued by the Division indicating he was exempt from workers' compensation coverage. However, that exemption was limited to cabinet- making. By installing the cabinets, Lawrence performed work outside his exemption status. The gross payroll for his work was $6,200, and the penalty assessed for Lawrence was $1,209.33. Respondent was completely unaware that the exemption letter did not cover installation and had, in fact, always allowed cabinet- makers to install the cabinets as well. Brunderman Builders is listed as the sixth employee. It is assigned Class Code 5403 with a manual rate of $14.39. The gross payroll for this entry was $550, resulting in a penalty assessment of $118.73. The seventh employee is Jorge Gonzolas, assigned Class Code 5403, the general contracting code. Gonzolas was the employee of a contractor who was subcontracting with Respondent. The contractor died unexpectedly, and Gonzolas was left without payment for the work he had performed. Respondent generously decided to pay Gonzolas for his work, thereby, effectively making Gonzolas a de facto employee. The amount paid Gonzolas was $599.00; the penalty assessed for Gonzolas was $129.30. Woodall is again listed as employee number eight, this time with Class Code 5610, reflecting casual labor he did on one date that his insurance was not in place. The payroll amount for this work was $37.50. The penalty assessed for Woodall was $4.02. The ninth employee was Julio Garcia, assigned Class Code 8742 for outside sales, with a manual rate of $.64. The payroll amount for Garcia was $1,300. His penalty assessment amount was $12.48. Garcia was another one of the deceased subcontractor's employees that Respondent volunteered to pay for work Garcia had performed. The total payroll at issue for Respondent was $14,477.50. The total premium for that amount of payroll would have been $1,881.48, and the penalty assessed was $2,822.84. This is a fairly insignificant portion of Respondent's $5.5 million annual payroll. Respondent did not intentionally attempt to avoid the payment of workers' compensation insurance for its employees. There is no pattern of avoidance or indication that non-payment was Respondent's goal. Rather, there are plausible and reasonable explanations about the unpaid premiums. For Woodall, Respondent believed he was still covered through the Crum policy. For Gonzolas and Garcia, Respondent was simply attempting to be a nice guy. For Prewitt, the employee's exemption had unknowingly lapsed. For Lawrence, Respondent relied upon a Verification Letter from the state, but misinterpreted its scope. The Division, on the other hand, only pursued Respondent based on an actual finding of non-coverage. But for Woodall's presence at a work site doing manual labor (sweeping the floor), the Division would not have looked at Respondent's records. There is no indication the Division acted other than in strict accordance to its governing rules.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, upholding the assessment of a penalty of $2,822.24 against Respondent, Brunderman Building Company, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 2009.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57440.02440.10440.107440.38
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs MAD DOG MARKETING GROUP, INC., 13-003217 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tangerine, Florida Aug. 22, 2013 Number: 13-003217 Latest Update: Mar. 19, 2015

The Issue The issue is whether the Stop-Work Order and the Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment entered by Petitioner on July 25, 2013, and August 13, 2013, respectively, should be upheld.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency tasked with the responsibility of enforcing the requirement of section 440.107(3), Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure the payment of workers' compensation for their employees. Respondent, Mad Dog Marketing Group, Inc., is a corporation organized under chapter 607, Florida Statutes, and was registered with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, throughout the period of July 26, 2010, to July 25, 2013. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was engaged in the operation of a hardware store business with three locations in Florida. On July 25, 2013, based upon an anonymous referral, Tracey Gilbert, the Department's compliance investigator, commenced a workers' compensation compliance investigation of Respondent by visiting the job site, an appliance parts store at 730 West Brandon Boulevard, Brandon, Florida, and interviewing Sharon Belcher. According to Ms. Gilbert, Ms. Belcher informed her that she had 11 employees at the time of the site visit and that she did not have workers' compensation coverage for them. Ms. Belcher showed Ms. Gilbert an application for workers' compensation insurance and said she had not taken action with it since the company wanted a $10,000 premium. She also showed Ms. Gilbert some OSHA and workplace posters, but not the typical "broken arm poster" that describes workers' compensation coverage for a place of business. Ms. Belcher then gave Ms. Gilbert a list of Respondent's 11 current employees. On her laptop computer, Ms. Gilbert consulted the Department's Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) database to determine whether Respondent had secured workers' compensation coverage or an exemption from the requirements for coverage for its employees. CCAS is the database Ms. Gilbert routinely consults during the course of her investigations. She determined from CCAS that Respondent neither had workers' compensation coverage for her employees nor had received an exemption from such coverage from the Department. Ms. Belcher's recollection of her meeting with Ms. Gilbert differs from Ms. Gilbert's. Ms. Belcher recalled that she had applied for insurance with ADP on July 11, 2013, received the "broken arm poster," and believed she was covered at the time Ms. Belcher conducted her investigation. She offered an exhibit showing photographs of posters (but not the "broken arm poster") on the office bulletin board. She also offered an exhibit she testified was the UPS label from the tube containing the "broken arm poster." No photograph of the "broken arm poster" was produced as an exhibit. Ms. Gilbert did not contact ADP to verify whether Respondent had coverage on the date of her site visit to the Brandon store. Ms. Gilbert issued a Stop-Work Order to Respondent and a concurrent Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation at 11:20 a.m. on July 25, 2013. Ms. Belcher first submitted an application for workers' compensation coverage on July 11, 2013, but coverage was not bound on that date. Ms. Belcher submitted the paperwork to bind her insurance coverage on the afternoon of July 25, 2013, according to Mark Cristillo, an employee of ADP Insurance. Mr. Cristillo testified that he had made several attempts during the month of July 2013 to obtain the signed documents from Ms. Belcher, including an attempt as late as July 23, 2013, at 11:45 a.m. Ms. Belcher told Mr. Cristillo at that time that she had not reviewed the quote package. At 11:20 a.m., the time Ms. Gilbert's issued the Stop-Work Order on July 25, 2013, Ms. Belcher had not bound her insurance coverage. When she submitted the payment with the signed documents to ADP later that afternoon, the coverage was bound effective 12:01 a.m. on July 25, 2013. The records produced by Ms. Belcher were given to Chad Mason, one of the Department's penalty auditors, to calculate the penalty. He reviewed the records and determined the amount of gross payroll paid to Respondent's employees during the three- year penalty period preceding the investigation during which Respondent was not in compliance with the workers' compensation coverage requirements. Using Respondent's bi-weekly payroll chart, Respondent's Florida Department of Revenue UCT-6 reports, and the classification codes for each employee, Mr. Mason calculated a Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment of $42,251.43, based upon what Respondent would have paid in workers' compensation premiums had it been in compliance with Florida's Workers' Compensation Law. The order was issued on October 24, 2013. Mr. Mason determined that the appropriate codes for Respondent's employees were 8010 and 8810, which are hardware store employees and general clerical employees, respectively. These codes were derived from the Scopes Manual, which lists all of the various jobs that may be performed in the context of workers' compensation. The manual is produced by NCCI, the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc., the nation's most authoritative data collecting and disseminating organization for workers' compensation. The parties stipulated prior to hearing that all of the individuals listed on the penalty worksheet of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment were "employees" in the state of Florida of Respondent during the periods of non-compliance listed on the penalty worksheets. However, Respondent claimed that some of the employees were out-of-state and not subject to Florida law. Ms. Belcher testified that, as of July 25, 2013, three of its employees, Fred Hasselman, Douglas Strickland, and Josh Hyers, were employees of the Tennessee store and not subject to a Florida penalty. Mr. Hyers was a Florida employee prior to July 1, according to Ms. Belcher. However, all three of the employees were listed on the Florida Department of Revenue's UCT-6 form for the time period of the non-compliance. The UCT-6 form lists those employees who are subject to Florida's Unemployment Compensation Law. Mr. Mason reasonably relied upon the UCT-6 filings for the relevant time period to calculate Respondent's gross payroll in Florida. No evidence was produced to show them listed as Tennessee employees on that state's comparable tax form or any official document from outside Florida. The logical assumption is that they are Florida employees under the law. Accepting all the employees disclosed by Respondent as Florida employees led Mr. Mason to make his calculations of the penalty assessment using the appropriate codes from the Scopes Manual for hardware store and general clerical workers, 8010 and 8810. All the named employees on the Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment were paid by Respondent in the amounts indicated on the penalty worksheet that accompanies that assessment during the penalty period of July 26, 2010, through July 25, 2013. Even though small discrepancies came up at the hearing regarding the classifications of some of Respondent's employees, the parties had stipulated to the accuracy of the classifications of those employees so those numbers will be accepted for purposes of this decision. Based upon the testimony at the hearing and the pre-hearing stipulations of the parties, the penalty assessment in the amount of $42,251.43 is accurate. Mr. Mason correctly applied the methodology for determining the amount of coverage required, determining that the appropriate premium for the three- year period would have been $28,167.50. When multiplied by the factor used to calculate the penalty, 1.5 times the premium, the total amount due is $42,251.43. The Department has proven by clear and convincing evidence that at the time the Stop-Work Order was issued and served on Respondent on the morning of July 25, 2013, Respondent had not secured workers' compensation coverage for its employees as required by chapter 440. On two occasions, August 2 and August 21, 2013, Ms. Gilbert returned to Respondent's Brandon location after the Stop-Work Order had been issued. The first was to serve the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and the second was to serve the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. On both occasions, the business was open in violation of the Stop-Work Order. A business under a Stop-Work Order may elect to enter into a payment plan after a ten percent down payment to keep the business open while a challenge to DOAH is under way. Respondent had not entered into such a plan. Therefore, the Department seeks $1,000 penalty for each of the days Ms. Gilbert visited the Brandon store and saw it open for business. This total additional penalty of $2,000 could have been greater had the Department further investigated whether the business remained open on other days after the Stop-Work Order had been imposed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order upholding the Stop-Work Order and Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and assess a penalty in the amount of $42,251.43. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Department fine Respondent an additional $1,000 per day for the two days Respondent did not comply with the Stop-Work Order, resulting in a total penalty of $44,251.43. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Trevor S. Suter, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Kristian Eiler Dunn, Esquire Dickens and Dunn, P.L. 517 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.57120.68440.02440.05440.10440.107440.3857.105 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.2015
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KENNETH R. FRITZ vs CITY OF PEMBROKE PINES, 09-000681 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Feb. 10, 2009 Number: 09-000681 Latest Update: Jun. 14, 2010

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on marital status in determining his monthly retirement benefits in violation of the provisions of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Kenneth Fritz (Petitioner or Mr. Fritz) has been a firefighter with the City of Pembroke Pines (Respondent or the City) since 1991. His date of birth is June 6, 1948, and he entered the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) on December 1, 2006, at age 58.5 years old. As Respondent's employee, Mr. Fritz participated in the City's Pension Plan for Firefighters and Police Officers (the Plan). The DROP option that Mr. Fritz chose allowed him to name a joint annuitant and contingent survivors. Mr. Fritz, who has been divorced since 1986, chose his daughter who on December 1, 2006, was 32.25 years old, and his son who was 29.333 years old, as his surviving beneficiaries. Each will receive a 50 percent share of the retirement income upon his death payable for the remainder of their lives. Mr. Fritz alleged that the pension fund benefit system discriminates against him based on marital status. There is no factual dispute that his benefits, with a 32-year-old daughter are $3,938.12 a month, as compared to $4,366.59 a month if he had a 32-year-old wife. The benefits are not affected by his having named his son as an additional beneficiary. Mr. Fritz brought his concerns to the attention of Patricia Shoemaker, the Benefits Administrator for Municipal Police Officers' and Firefighters' Retirement Funds for the State of Florida Department of Management Services. On January 29, 2008, March 17, 2008, July 9, 2008, and September 25, 2008, Ms. Shoemaker sent letters to Mr. Anthony Napolitano, Chairman of the Pembroke Pines Firefighter's Pension Plan, requesting an explanation of the apparent violation of the following statutory provisions: § 175.333. Discrimination in benefit formula prohibited; restrictions regarding designation of joint annuitants. For any municipality, special fire control district, chapter plan, local law municipality, local law special fire control district, or local law plan under this chapter: and (1) No plan shall discriminate in its benefit formula based on color, national origin, sex, or marital status. § 175.071(2) Any and all acts and decisions shall be effectuated by vote of a majority of the members of the board; however, no trustee shall take part in any action in connection with the trustee's own participation in the fund, and no unfair discrimination shall be shown to any individual firefighter participating in the fund. (Emphasis added.) In her letter of September 25, 2008, Ms. Shoemaker noted that she had received no responses to her previous letters and that "[W]hile state premium tax moneys were released this year based on our understanding that the Board was researching this matter, future state tax moneys will not be released unless the plan is determined to be in compliance with Chapters (sic) 175, F.S." On October 15, 2008, Deputy City Attorney Julie F. Klahr finally responded to Ms. Shoemaker as follows: Your letter to the Pembroke Pines Police and Fire Retirement Plan has been referred to this office for reply. The issue is whether a spouse only benefit is discriminatory on the basis of marital status. For the reasons which follow, the benefit is fully in compliance with Florida law. Section 175.333(2)(a), Florida Statutes, clearly recognizes the propriety of a plan offering a spouse only survivorship benefit that alone should resolve this issue. The benefit at issue in Pembroke Pines is a spouse-only benefit, which not only exceeds the minimums required by Chapter 175, but also pre-dates the enactment of Ch. 99-1, Laws of Florida (1999). The complaining employee sought to designate a child as a beneficiary but without an age appropriate actuarial reduction. Nothing in Chapter 175, or any other law, mandates a retirement plan to provide a costly, generation skipping benefit without providing for actuarial equivalence. To the extent that your view is that the plan provision must be altered, it is a "minimum benefit" which is required, only if unencumbered Chapter 175 insurance premium tax rebates are present to pay the full cost as provided in §175.351. The City does not concede this is a correct interpretation, nor does any such Chapter money exist. Any required action to the contrary is an improper unfunded mandate. Moreover, the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and corresponding regulations of the Department of the Treasury mandated the use of the actuarial factors at issue. Nothing in Chapter 175, Florida Statutes, directs a plan to violate tax provisions necessary to maintain qualification. It is the City's position that according a benefit to a spouse of a deceased member, provided the plan otherwise exceeds minimum benefits under Chapter 175, is a matter reserved to the City under its home rule powers in the Florida Constitution and Chapter 166, Florida Statutes. If any member feels aggrieved by the structure of the Ordinance Code, that person may seek remedies under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. It should be observed, however, that the status at issue is that of the purported survivor and not the member. As a result, no violation of Florida's civil rights law is presented. See, Donato v. AT & T, 767 So.2d 1146 (Fla. 2000). Further §760.10(8)(b), Florida Statutes, exempts bona fide retirement plans from coverage under this law. The first provision cited as support for the City's position is as follows: § 175.333(2)(a) If a plan offers a joint annuitant option and the member selects such option, or if a plan specifies that the member's spouse is to receive the benefits that continue to be payable upon the death of the member, then, in both of these cases, after retirement benefits have commenced, a retired member may change his or her designation of joint annuitant or beneficiary only twice. Although the Deputy City Attorney asserted that this section alone should resolve the matter, Mr. Fritz observed the subsection does not authorize discrimination based on marital status but only limits the number of times that a joint annuitant or beneficiary may be changed. The City also relied on the fact that the Plan predates Chapter 99-1, Laws of Florida, but the statement of legislative intent indicates that the law is applicable to existing plans, and reads as follows: Legislative declaration. It is hereby declared by the Legislature that firefighters, as hereinafter defined, perform state and municipal functions; . . . and that their activities are vital to the public safety. It is further declared that firefighters employed by special fire control districts serve under the same circumstances and perform the same duties as firefighters employed by municipalities and should therefore be entitled to the benefits available under this chapter. Therefore, the Legislature declares that it is a proper and legitimate state purpose to provide a uniform retirement system for the benefit of firefighters as hereinafter defined and intends, in implementing the provisions of s. 14, Art. X of the State Constitution as they relate to municipal and special district firefighters' pension trust fund systems and plans, that such retirement systems or plans be managed, administered, operated, and funded in such manner as to maximize the protection of the firefighters' pension trust funds . . . This chapter hereby establishes, for all municipal and special district pension plans existing now or hereafter under this chapter, including chapter plans and local law plans, minimum benefits and minimum standards for the operation and funding of such plans, hereinafter referred to as firefighters' pension trust funds. The minimum benefits and minimum standards set forth in this chapter may not be diminished by local charter, ordinance, or resolution or by special act of the Legislature, nor may the minimum benefits or minimum standards be reduced or offset by any other local, state, or federal law that may include firefighters in its operation, except as provided under s. 112.65. (Emphasis added.) The City claimed, but Ms. Shoemaker's reference in her letter to the release of state premium tax moneys appears to contradict its claim, that it does not have to pay minimum benefits required by Chapter 175, although not conceding its applicability, because it has no unencumbered insurance premium tax money, a prerequisite the imposition of the following requirement: § 175.351. Municipalities and special fire control districts having their own pension plans for firefighters. For any municipality, special fire control district, local law municipality, local law special fire control district, or local law plan under this chapter, in order for municipalities and special fire control districts with their own pension plans for firefighters, or for firefighters and police officers, where included, to participate in the distribution of the tax fund established pursuant to s. 175.101, local law plans must meet the minimum benefits and minimum standards set forth in this chapter. * * * However, local law plans in effect on October 1, 1998, shall be required to comply with the minimum benefit provisions of this chapter only to the extent that additional premium tax revenues become available to incrementally fund the cost of such compliance as provided in s. 175.162(2)(a). (Emphasis added.) Apparently, not satisfied with the answer, on January 20, 2009, Ms. Shoemaker wrote again, this time to Ms Klahr, as follows: Dear Ms. Klahr This is to acknowledge receipt of your October 15, 2008 letter in response to my July 9, 2008 letter to the Board of the Firefighters' Pension Plan. While we appreciate your response regarding the propriety of a plan offering a spousal benefit and the appropriateness of an age appropriate actuarial reduction, our question for the Board was a different one relating to the plan's compliance with the provisions of ss. 175.333(1) and 175.071(2), F. S. as they relate to discrimination based on marital status. Based on our understanding of the issue relating to the calculation of the member's benefits, Mr. Fritz does not have a spouse, but wishes to designate his daughter as his beneficiary. He understands and agrees that it is appropriate to actuarialty [sic] adjust his benefit based on the age of his daughter. The actuary provided two calculations, one based on a spouse that was his daughter's age and one based on a beneficiary that was his daughter's age. His benefit when calculated with a young age spouse was greater than his benefit when calculated with the same young age beneficiary. It appears that the only difference in the two calculations is the marital status of the member and not the age of the joint annuitant. If our understanding of the facts relating to this issue are incorrect, please let me know. We have asked that the Board review the plan provisions with their plan attorney and actuary and provide an explanation as to how the plan meets the statutory provisions, specifically ss. 175.333(1) and 175.071 (2), F. S. Mr. Fritz pointed out that, in addition to the statutory provisions cited in Ms. Shoemaker's letter and various others that he cited, the City's Employee Handbook also includes a statement that the City does not discriminate based on marital status. The City's actuary noted that, however outdated, the additional benefit is based on the assumption that a firefighter's spouse is more dependent on the employee's income and pension then any other adult relative. In addition, the deputy city attorney testified that the Plan was adopted in the firefighters' collective bargaining agreement.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding that Respondent did not commit an unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Cherof, Esquire Goren, Cherof, Doody & Ezrol, P.A. 3099 East Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Kenneth R. Fritz 16389 Malibu Drive Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33326 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (12) 112.65120.569120.57175.021175.071175.101175.162175.333175.351760.01760.10760.11
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OLENDER CONSTRUCTION, CO., INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, 06-005023 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 11, 2006 Number: 06-005023 Latest Update: Sep. 16, 2008

The Issue Whether Petitioner failed to obtain workers’ compensation insurance meeting the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Olender is a Delaware corporation that is registered to do business in Florida and engaged in the business of construction. Primarily, Olender frames the walls of structures and installs siding, windows and moisture barriers to such structures. Such activities are construction activities under the Florida’s workers’ compensation law. See Ch. 440, Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6. On June 22, 2006, an investigator for the Department visited the Alta Westgate Apartment complex construction project, located at 6872 Alta Westgate Drive, Orlando, Florida. The visit was prompted by a “confidential tip” received by the Department from Tyler Balsinger, a former employee of Petitioner. The Alta Westgate complex is owned by Alta Westgate, LLC. The general contractor responsible for the construction of the complex was W.P. South Builders. The overall project manager for the general contractor was Robert Beliveau. The on-site representative for the general contractor was Danny Campbell. Mr. Campbell provided the Department’s investigator with a list of subcontractors on the project worksite. The list reflected that the subcontractor for framing was Olender and that John Olender was the person in charge of the company’s work at the project site. Among other things, the contract also included the installation of a moisture barrier, generally known as Tyvek, on the framed structures. Because of the nature of construction work, it is not unusual to have several subcontractors on a construction worksite at the same time. It is unlikely that Olender was the only subcontractor working on the day the Department’s investigator visited the Alta Westgate project. The subcontract required that Olender secure the payment of workers’ compensation on its employees. The evidence was not clear regarding whether the general contractor, under its subcontract with Olender, would provide workers’ compensation insurance on the employees of Olender’s subcontractors. However, the evidence was clear that J.P. Builders did not secure such workers’ compensation insurance on the employees of Olender’s subcontractors. Mr. Campbell also provided the certificate of insurance for Petitioner. The certificate reflected that Modern Business Associates, Inc. (MBA), an employee leasing company, provided workers’ compensation for Olender’s leased employees. See § 468.520, Fla. Stat. MBA entered into a client service agreement with Olender. Under the agreement, Olender would lease employees from MBA and MBA would provide payroll services and workers’ compensation coverage for the employees it leased to Petitioner. The agreement terminated on August 30, 2006. MBA’s Client Service Agreement with Petitioner states on p. 3: Insurance Coverage. MBA is responsible for providing Workers’ Compensation coverage to workers employed by MBA and assigned to Client, in compliance with applicable law, and as specified in the Proposal. Workers performing services for Client not covered by this Agreement and not on MBA’s payroll shall not be covered by the workers’ compensation insurance. Client understands, agrees, and acknowledges that MBA shall not cover any workers with workers’ compensation coverage who has not completed and submitted to MBA an employment application and tri- fold, and which applicant has not been reviewed and approved for hire by MBA. (emphasis supplied) Other than information necessary to supply its services, MBA was not aware of any specific project or projects on which Olender was working when it leased employees from MBA. John Olender and Ruben Rojo were two employees that Olender leased from MBA and for whom MBA provided workers’ compensation insurance. The workers’ compensation policy complied with Florida’s workers’ compensation requirements. After speaking with Mr. Campbell, the Department’s investigator, who is fluent in Spanish, walked around the complex’s worksite. She did not have a hardhat on. She eventually saw about 10 to 12 workers on the third floor of one of the buildings under construction (Building 8 or 9). The Department’s investigator could not say if they were framing. At some point, John Olender, the company’s project superintendent, saw the Department’s investigator, noticed she did not have any safety equipment on, and went to meet her. The investigator yelled to the workers on the third floor and showed her Department badge or identification. She was speaking Spanish to them. The workers ran in an effort to avoid the Department’s investigator. Mr. Olender, who does not speak or understand Spanish, sent for Ruben Rojo. Mr. Rojo is the assistant superintendent for Olender and works under John Olender. He is fluent in Spanish. He does not hire employees for Olender, but oversees the work being performed under Olender’s subcontracts. The Department’s investigator continued to attempt to explain to the workers that she was not interested in their immigration status, but was there to make sure they were covered by workers’ compensation insurance. At least some of the workers came down to talk to her. Mr. Rojo thought the investigator was asking about the workers’ immigration status and told them that they did not have to talk to her. However, apparently some workers very reluctantly gave her limited information. The workers who talked to her were Pedro Antonio Mendez, Jaco Sarmentio, Juan Cardenas, Alvaro Don Juan Diaz, Jose Varela Orellana, Nesto Suarez Ventura, Miguel Martinez Diaz, Jose Perez Renaldo and Antonio Hernandez. She did not obtain any addresses, phone numbers or other identifying information from the employees. The evidence did not show whether these individuals gave the Department’s investigator the correct information. Importantly, they did not tell her who their employer was or what duties they were performing. None of these individuals testified at the hearing. John Olender did not recognize these workers. Mr. Rojo told the investigator that Olender subcontracted the framing portion of its contract to “T-Bo”. T-Bo was also known as Primitivo Torres. In his deposition testimony, Mr. Torres did not recognize these workers’ names. He also thought that most of the workers he employed for his framing subcontract with Olender were illegal immigrants. Mr. Torres was unclear in his testimony regarding his status with Olender. He did indicate that he worked in both Orlando and Tampa. Apparently, at times, he was an employee and at other times he was a subcontractor. He was listed as a leased employee under MBA’s contract with Olender. The evidence suggests, but does not prove, that Mr. Torres was a person who supplied immigrant workers to construction sites. In Orlando, Mr. Torres lived in an apartment complex in the Rosemond area with his employees. The rent was sometimes paid by Olender and then deducted from the remuneration paid to Mr. Torres. Mr. Torres paid his employees from the money he received under his subcontract with Olender. Mr. Torres also testified that when the Department’s investigator contacted him in June 2006, to discuss workers’ compensation insurance, he told her that he neither secured the payment of workers’ compensation for himself nor for the other workers in both Tampa and Orlando. Donna Knoblauch, who oversaw Olender’s main office, received a faxed copy of a certificate of workers’ compensation insurance from Mr. Torres. However, the faxed certificate was an illegible copy of what appeared to be a certificate of liability insurance issued by a company in Texas. The certificate does not have a legible “sent date,” a legible workers’ compensation policy number, legible dates of coverage, a legible producer name, or any information indicating that coverage includes the State of Florida. The document is insufficient to demonstrate that Mr. Torres provided workers’ compensation coverage for his employees that worked under his subcontract with Olender. John Olender testified that Mr. Torres utilized, at most, 20 framers for the construction at Alta Westgate. Mr. Torres corroborates that number and indicates that various people worked in crews of around five. On the other hand, Danny Campbell testified that Olender had approximately 20 workers when the project started, increased to approximately 75 people performing framing duties on the worksite and decreased to about 20 workers by the time the Department’s investigator visited the worksite. Mr. Campbell testified that on January 22, 2006, he believed that Olender had approximately five individuals for the punch-out group, three–to-five cleaners, a forklift operator, approximately two individuals installing the Tyvek moisture- barrier paper, two individuals performing window installation and approximately 15–to-20 individuals installing siding at the worksite. No other testimony supports the number of workers Mr. Campbell believed to be at the jobsite on June 22. On balance, the best evidence of the approximate number of workers was that of Mr. Olender and Mr. Torres. However, these figures were only estimates of the actual number which may have been less than 20 workers. In any event, the employment of these 12 workers on the third floor was not demonstrated by the evidence. Their names did not appear on the list of employees leased by Olender from MBA and were otherwise, unknown to the Mr. Olender, Rojo and Torres. While at the jobsite, the Department’s investigator also spoke with Victor Ibarra. Mr. Ibarra drove a forklift and indicated that he worked for Olender. Again, no address or other identifying information was supplied to the investigator. Later, the investigator spoke with a woman who purported to be Mr. Ibarra’s wife. There was no information on the forklift indicating that it belonged to Olender and Olender denies employing a person named Victor Ibarra. Mr. Campbell testified in his deposition that Olender had forklifts on the jobsite. However, he did not testify that the forklift Victor Ibarra drove on June 22, 2006, was owned by Olender. Likewise, Mr. Campbell did not testify that Mr. Ibarra was an employee of Olender. Mr. Ibarra’s name did not appear on the list of leased employees provided by MBA. The Department's investigator included Mr. Ibarra as an employee of Olender based on Mr. Ibarra’s statements. However, the evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that Mr. Ibarra was an employee of Olender, since Mr. Ibarra did not testify at the hearing. Mr. Campbell’s testimony does not corroborate the hearsay statements of Mr. Ibarra since the testimony does not indicate the forklift Mr. Ibarra drove belonged to Olender or to another subcontractor on the project. After talking to Mr. Ibarra, the Department’s investigator met Rosa Barden, Martha Alvarado and Ismael Ortiz, who were applying a moisture barrier paper known as “Tyvek” to a building at the construction site. The three individuals told the investigator that that they had been hired by Mr. Rojo on behalf of Olender and had only worked for about a day. The investigator included these three individuals as employees of Olender. No addresses or other contact information was obtained by the investigator. None of these individuals testified at the hearing. Mr. Rojo testified that he did not know the three individuals on the “paper crew” and did not hire them. None of the three individuals were listed as leased employees with MBA. However, Olender’s subcontract clearly lists the application of Tyvek as a part of its contract. Additionally, the payment information supplied by the general contractor shows that Olender was paid for Tyvek application on all the buildings in the complex. Unlike Mr. Ibarro’s testimony, the contract and payment evidence independently corroborates the otherwise hearsay statements of these three individuals and Olender should have provided workers compensation insurance on them. There was no evidence that Olender provided such workers’ compensation insurance; such failure violates Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. See §§ 440.10(1)(g) and 440.38(7), Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.019. In total, the Department’s inspector met with John Olender for approximately one hour discussing the work performed by Olender and the employees retained by Olender. During this meeting, Mr. Olender, identified members of a “punch-out” crew who had worked on the project. The punch-out crew repaired any defects in framing prior to inspection. The names supplied by Mr. Olender were Juan Gonzalez, Miguel, Sal, William, WI Gerardo (noted as El Guardo in the third Amended Order of Penalty assessment), Pedro, Jacobo and Boso. Mr. Olender did not know their last names. The evidence did not show the period of time that the punch-out crew would have been working at the project site. Presumably, they would have begun some time after the initial building was framed. The Department’s investigator did not personally see the punch-out crew at the project. Mr. Olender also informed the Department’s investigator that he did not handle matters concerning workers’ compensation insurance and that she would have to contact the Company’s main office in Missouri. He provided the number for the office. He also gave the investigator the number for Michael Olender, the president of the company and the number for Mr. Torres. The investigator issued a Workers’ Compensation Request for Production of Business Records to Olender. She left the Request with John Olender. The request for records asked for certain categories of Olender’s business records for the period of January 22, 2004 to June 22, 2004. Of importance here, the Department requested records in categories 1, 4, 5 and 6. In general, category 1 covers all payroll records, including checks and check stubs, time sheets, attendance records and cash payment records. Categories 4, 5 and 6 cover all records that relate to subcontractors, including their identity, contract, payment thereof, workers compensation coverage for all the subcontractor’s employees, and/ or the employees’ exemption status. These records are required to be maintained by a company doing business in Florida. Mr. Campbell testified that some members of the punch- out crew often approached him about whether he had paid Olender so that they in turn could be paid. Again, none of these individuals testified at the hearing. However, given the admissions of Olender’s employee and Mr. Campbell’s testimony, the evidence supports the conclusion that the eight individuals on the punch-out crew were employed by Olender. None of these employees were leased employees and therefore, were not covered by the workers’ compensation policy provided by MBA. There was no evidence that Olender secured any workers' compensation insurance on these eight employees. Such failure violates Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. See §§ 440.10(1)(g) and 440.38(7), Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.019. The Department’s investigator contacted Ms. Knoblauch while she was on her way to a medical appointment. The investigator requested Olender’s proof of workers’ compensation insurance. Ms. Knoblauch told the investigator that she was not at the office where the records were kept, but on the way to a medical appointment. She said she would be returning to the office after the appointment. The investigator said she needed the records immediately. Ms. Knoblauch offered to skip her appointment and requested time to turn around and return to the office. The investigator refused to permit her the time to return to the office. At some point, MBA supplied the Department’s investigator with a list of Olender’s leased employees. The list did not contain any of the names she had gathered during her visit to the worksite. Within a few hours from the beginning of the investigation, the Department's investigator issued a Stop Work Order and an Order of Penalty Assessment on June 22, 2006. The Order was served via certified mail on Michael Olender and Olender’s legal counsel. The Stop Work Order required that Olender "cease all business operations in this state" and advised that a penalty of $1,000.00 per day would be imposed if Olender were to conduct any business in violation of the Stop Work Order. Additionally, along with the Order, the Department issued and served on Petitioner via certified mail a Division of Workers’ Compensation Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Calculation, requesting records for a period of three years. The request, made pursuant to Section 440.107(7), Florida Statutes, asked the employer to produce, for the preceding three years, documents that reflected payroll, proof of insurance, workers’ compensation audit reports, identity, duration, contracts, invoices and check stubs reflecting payment to subcontractors, proof of workers’ compensation coverage for those subcontractors, employee leasing company information, temporary labor service information, and any certificate of workers’ compensation exemption. The request asked for the same type of records that had been requested earlier. Neither request for records was specific to a particular construction job that Olender may have performed work on. The investigator informed Mr. Campbell that Petitioner was being issued a Stop-Work Order and gave him a copy of the Order. Mr. Campbell faxed the Order to Olender’s office in Missouri. The Department’s investigator also checked the Department’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (“CCAS”) database. The system tracks workers' compensation insurance policy information provided by workers’ compensation carriers on an insured employer. The database did not contain an entry that reflected a current State of Florida workers' compensation insurance policy for Olender. The database did reference that Olender had a stop-work order served on it on July 12, 2002, which had been lifted on July 31, 2002, with payment of the penalty. Florida law requires that employers maintain a variety of business records involving their business. See § 440.107(5), Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.015. The Rule is limited to records regarding a business’ employees and any payout by the employer to any person. In this case, under the Rule, the only records Olender was required to maintain related to its employees and its subcontractor, Mr. Torres. There was no evidence regarding any other subcontractors Olender may have contracted with. The only records supplied by Olender to the Department were the records from MBA that included workers’ compensation information and W-2 forms for Olender’s leased employees, the illegible proof of insurance for Mr. Torres and copies of checks from Olender to Mr. Torres for the subcontract. Those records reflected that John Olender, Ruben Rojo and Primitivo Torres were leased employees and covered by workers’ compensation insurance under Olender’s contract with MBA. Olender supplied no records regarding workers’ compensation coverage for the eight employees who were members of the punch- out crew, the three workers who were members of the paper crew or the 12 workers who were on the third floor. When an employer fails to provide requested business records that the statute requires it to maintain, the Department is required to impute the employer's payroll using "the statewide average weekly wage as defined in Section 440.12(2)." § 440.107(7)(e), Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.028. The penalty for failure to secure the workers' compensation insurance coverage required by Florida law is 1.5 times the premium that would have been charged for such coverage for each employee identified by the Department. The premium is calculated by applying the approved manual rate for workers' compensation insurance coverage for each employee to each $100.00 of the gross payroll for each employee. In this case, the Department, after several amended assessments, imputed the payroll for Olender for the period beginning January 22, 2004, Petitioner’s date of incorporation, and ending June 26, 2006. Included in the calculation were the eight individuals on the punch-out crew identified by John Olender, the 12 employees who were working on the third floor, the forklift driver Victor Ibarra, and the three individuals on the paper crew. In calculating the premium for workers' compensation insurance coverage, the Department's investigator used the risk classifications and definitions of the National Council of Compensation Insurance, Inc. ("NCCI") SCOPES Manual. The appropriate code for Olender’s employees was classification code 5561 which covers framing of multiple family dwellings. The gross payroll imputed to each of the 27 employees was $683.00 per week. The Department then utilized the imputed payroll for same employees for the years 2004 and 2005. The Department’s calculation resulted in an assessed penalty of $1,205,535.40. However, the evidence establishes that Olender had 11 direct employees rather than 27 employees during the period of the Alta Westgate contract. Olender’s performance under that contract began on April 3, 2006. Other than the period of time involved with the Alta Westgate project, there was no evidence regarding the period of time Olender conducted business in Florida that would require it to comply with Florida law. The date of incorporation of Olender is insufficient to demonstrate that Olender engaged in any business in Florida that would require it to comply with Florida’s workers’ compensation law. Therefore, the penalty calculation must be modified to reflect only those eleven employees for the time period Olender performed under its contract on the Alta Westgate project.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order: Finding that Olender Construction Co., Inc., failed to have Florida workers' compensation insurance coverage for 11 of its employees, in violation of Sections 440.10(1)(a) and 440.38(1), Florida Statutes; and Recalculating the penalty against Olender. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Colin M. Roopnarine, Esquire Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Jeremy T. Springhart, Esquire Broad and Cassel 390 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1500 Orlando, Florida 32801 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.57440.02440.10440.107440.12440.38468.52090.803 Florida Administrative Code (4) 69L-6.01569L-6.01969L-6.02169L-6.028
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs PFR SERVICES CORP., 18-001632 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Mar. 27, 2018 Number: 18-001632 Latest Update: Aug. 08, 2019

The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether Respondent, PFR Services Corp., failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for its employees in violation of chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2017)2/; and (2) if so, the penalty that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement that employers in the State of Florida secure the payment of workers' compensation insurance covering their employees, pursuant to chapter 440. Respondent is a Florida corporation. At all times relevant to this proceeding, its business address was 8040 Northwest 95th Street, Hialeah, Florida. The evidence establishes that Respondent was actively engaged in business during the two-year audit period, from October 17, 2015, through October 16, 2017, pertinent to this proceeding.3/ The Compliance Investigation On October 16, 2017, Petitioner's compliance investigator, Cesar Tolentino, conducted a workers' compensation compliance investigation at a business located at 8040 Northwest 95th Street, Hialeah, Florida. The business was being operated as a restaurant, to which National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") class code 9082 applies. Tolentino observed Maria Morales, Gabriela Nava, and Geraldine Rodriquez performing waitressing job duties and Rafael Briceno performing chef job duties. The evidence established that these four persons were employed by Respondent. Additionally, the evidence established that corporate officers Rosanna Gutierrez and Mary Pineda were employed by Respondent.4/ The evidence established that neither had elected to be exempt from the workers' compensation coverage requirement. In sum, the evidence established that Respondent employed six employees, none of whom were independent contractors, and none of whom were exempt from the workers' compensation coverage requirement. Tolentino conducted a search of Petitioner's Coverage and Compensation Compliance Automated System, which consists of a database of workers' compensation insurance coverage policies issued for businesses in Florida, and all elections of exemptions filed by corporate officers of businesses in Florida. Tolentino's search revealed that Respondent had never purchased workers' compensation coverage for its employees; that its corporate officers had not elected to be exempt from the workers' compensation coverage requirement; and that Respondent did not lease employees from an employee leasing company. Gutierrez acknowledged that Respondent had not purchased workers' compensation coverage for its employees, and told Tolentino that she did not know it was required. Based on Tolentino's investigation, on October 16, 2017, Petitioner served Stop-Work Order No. 17-384 ("Stop-Work Order") on Respondent. At the time Tolentino served the Stop-Work Order, he informed Gutierrez that if Respondent obtained a workers' compensation policy and provided Petitioner a receipt of the amount paid to activate the policy within 28 days of issuance of the Stop-Work Order, Respondent's penalty would be reduced by the amount paid to activate the policy. On October 16, 2017, Petitioner, through Tolentino, also served on Respondent a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation ("Business Records Request"), requesting Respondent provide several categories of business records covering the two-year audit period from October 16, 2015, to October 16, 2017. Specifically, Petitioner requested that Respondent provide its payroll documents consisting of time sheets, time cards, attendance records, earnings records, check stubs, check images, and payroll summaries, as applicable. Petitioner also requested that Respondent provide, as applicable, its federal income tax documents; account documents, including business check journals and statements and cleared checks for all open or closed business accounts; cash and check disbursements records; workers' compensation coverage records; and independent contractor records. At the time Tolentino served the Business Records Request, he informed Gutierrez that if Respondent obtained a workers' compensation policy and provided Petitioner the complete business records requested within ten business days, Respondent's penalty would be reduced by 25 percent. The evidence establishes that Respondent did not provide any business records within that time period, so is not entitled to receive that penalty reduction. On November 16, 2017, Petitioner issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, assessing a total penalty of $35,262.32 against Respondent for having failed to secure workers' compensation coverage for its employees during the audit period. On December 14, 2017, Gutierrez met with Tolentino and, at that time, provided documentation to Petitioner showing that Respondent had acquired workers' compensation coverage for its employees, effective October 28, 2017, and had paid $3,966.00 for the policy. At the December 14, 2017, meeting, Gutierrez presented an envelope postmarked October 30, 2017, showing that Respondent had mailed Petitioner proof of having obtained the workers' compensation coverage within 28 days of the date the Stop-Work Order was issued; however, this mail was returned, so Petitioner did not receive such proof within 28 days. The evidence established that this mail was returned to Respondent on December 4, 2017——several days after the 28-day period had expired, and too late for Respondent to take additional steps to deliver to Petitioner the proof of its having purchased the workers' compensation policy.5/ Because Petitioner did not receive Respondent's proof of having purchased a workers' compensation policy within 28 days of issuance of the Stop-Work Order, it did not reduce the penalty imposed on Respondent by the amount that Respondent had paid for the premium. The evidence also establishes that at the December 14, 2017, meeting, Respondent tendered to Petitioner a cashier's check in the amount of $1,000.00. As a result of having received proof of workers' compensation coverage for Respondent's employees, Petitioner issued an Agreed Order of Conditional Release from Stop-Work Order ("Order of Conditional Release") on December 14, 2017, releasing Respondent from the Stop-Work Order. The Order of Conditional Release expressly recognized that Respondent "paid $1,000.00 as a down payment for a penalty calculated pursuant to F.S. 440.107(7)(d)1." Additionally, page 1 of 3 of the Penalty Calculation Worksheet attached to the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment admitted into evidence at the final hearing reflects that Respondent paid $1,000.00 toward the assessed penalty of $35,262.32. This document shows $34,262.32 as the "Balance Due." Calculation of Penalty to be Assessed Petitioner penalizes employers based on the amount of workers' compensation insurance premiums the employer has avoided paying. The amount of the evaded premium is determined by reviewing the employer's business records. In the Business Records Request served on October 16, 2017, Petitioner specifically requested that Respondent provide its payroll documents, federal income tax documents, disbursements records, workers' compensation coverage records, and other specified documents. When Gutierrez met with Tolentino on December 14, 2017, she provided some, but not all, of the business records that Petitioner had requested. Respondent subsequently provided additional business records to Petitioner, on the eve of the final hearing. Petitioner reviewed all of the business records that Respondent provided. However, these business records were incomplete because they did not include check images, as specifically required to be maintained and provided to Petitioner pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.015(6). Check images are required under Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.015(6) because such images reveal the payees, which can help Petitioner identify the employees on the employer's payroll at any given time. This information is vital to determining whether the employer complied with the requirement to have workers' compensation coverage for all of its employees. Because Respondent did not provide the required check images, the records were insufficient to enable Petitioner to calculate Respondent's payroll for the audit period. Under section 440.107(7)(e), business records provided by the employer are insufficient to enable Petitioner to calculate the employer's payroll for the period for which the records are requested, Petitioner is authorized to impute the weekly payroll for each employee as constituting the statewide average weekly wage multiplied by 1.5. To calculate the amount of the penalty due using the imputed method, Petitioner imputes the gross payroll for each employee for each period during which that employee was not covered by required workers' compensation insurance. To facilitate calculation, Petitioner divides the gross payroll amount for each employee for the specific non-compliance period by 100.6/ Petitioner then multiplies this amount by the approved NCCI Scopes Manual rate——here, 2.34, which applies to restaurants——to determine the amount of the avoided premium for each employee for each non-compliance period. This premium amount is then multiplied by two to determine the penalty amount to be assessed for each employee not covered by required workers' compensation insurance for each specific period of non- compliance. Performing these calculations, Petitioner determined that a penalty in the amount of $35,262.32 should be assessed against Respondent for failing to provide workers' compensation insurance for its employees, as required by chapter 440, for the period from October 17, 2015, through October 16, 2017. As discussed above, on December 14, 2017, Respondent paid a down payment of $1,000.00 toward the penalty, and this was expressly recognized in the Stop-Work Order that was issued that same day. Thus, the amount of the penalty to be assessed against Respondent should be reduced by $1,000.00, to $34,262.32. As previously noted, this amount is identified on page 1 of 3 of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment as the "Balance Due." As discussed in paragraphs 17 and 18, above, the evidence establishes that Respondent purchased a workers' compensation policy to cover its employees within 11 days of issuance of the Stop-Work Order, and mailed to Petitioner proof of having purchased such policy on October 30, 2017——well within the 28-day period for providing such proof. However, as discussed above, this mail was returned to Respondent on December 4, 2017——too late for Respondent to take additional steps to provide such proof to Petitioner within the 28-day period. There is no evidence in the record showing that failure of the mailed proof to be received by Petitioner was due to any fault on Respondent's part. Respondent's Defenses On behalf of Respondent, Gutierrez testified that Respondent did everything that Tolentino had told them to do. Respondent purchased workers' compensation insurance and provided proof to Petitioner that its employees were covered.7/ Gutierrez also testified that although Respondent's business was created in May 2013, it did not begin operating and, therefore, did not have any employees, until January 2016.8/ However, as previously noted, the persuasive evidence does not support this assertion.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order determining that PFR Services Corp. violated the requirement in chapter 440, Florida Statutes, to secure workers' compensation coverage for its employees during the audit period, and imposing a penalty of $30,296.32. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 2019.

Florida Laws (11) 120.569120.57120.68210.25296.32440.02440.09440.10440.107440.12440.38 Florida Administrative Code (2) 69L-6.01569L-6.028 DOAH Case (1) 18-1632
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SUWANEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs JAMES SEAY, 91-006046 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Live Oak, Florida Jun. 18, 1992 Number: 91-006046 Latest Update: Aug. 07, 1995

Findings Of Fact Respondent James Seay, who had worked as a teacher in Suwannee County for many years, was out sick first with a stomach virus and then with recurring head pain for the entire school week of March 4-8, 1991. He visited physicians on March 5, 7 and 8, and took three prescribed medicines. Mr. Seay telephoned the morning of March 4, 1992, and told Sonja Suber, a secretary who was "the designated person at the school," (T.48) responsible for obtaining substitute teachers and maintaining sick leave records, that he was ill and would not be in that day. The parties agree that respondent was on sick leave through March 8, 1991. On the evening of March 4, 1991, he telephoned Nancy Roberts, director of elementary education for the Suwanee County School District and principal of Douglass Center. When Mr.Seay told her he would not be in the following day, she cancelled an observation she had scheduled for his benefit. The next day or the day after Sonya Suber telephoned respondent to relay Ms. Roberts' advice that a meeting scheduled for March 11, 1991, had been cancelled. On Saturday, March 9, 1991, Mr. Seay telephoned Ms. Suber and said "that he would be coming Monday to the school but he would not report to the classroom." T. 29. He had earlier expressed to Ms. Roberts discomfort "with the students that were assigned" (T. 46) to him. On Monday, March 11, 1991, at 7:53 o'clock in the morning, he appeared as promised and signed in at Suwanee County School District's Douglass Center. After greeting Sonya Suber, he went to the teachers' lounge. He did not give any indication that he was unwell or make any request for leave. Ms. Roberts saw Mr. Seay reading a newspaper in the lounge. She asked him to accompany her to her office, where she "let him know that he was a teacher assigned to the Alternative Program at the Douglass Center and what his responsibilities were . . . working with the students there." T.50. Respondent handed Ms. Roberts one of his attorney's cards, and told her "that there was nothing [she] could do to make him go in that classroom and that he was not going to that classroom," (T.50) and asked her "to stop harassing him." Id. After Mr. Seay's return to the teachers' lounge, Ms. Roberts gave an account of events to Mr. Charles F. Blalock, Jr., petitioner here. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. The following morning Mr. Seay signed in at the Douglass Center at ten before eight, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, but he again went to the teachers' lounge rather than to his assigned classroom. Again he told nobody he was ill, and asked nobody for sick leave. Ms. Roberts twice asked him to go to his classroom. When she told him his failure to teach the class he had been assigned "could be construed as insubordination on his part," (T.53) he asked her to clarify what she meant by insubordination and, with her permission, made a tape recording of her answer. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. He refused to go to his classroom. On Wednesday, March 13, 1991, Mr. Blalock wrote a letter to Mr. Seay advising him that he was suspended with pay, and that, as superintendent, he would recommend suspension without pay and ultimately dismissal at the next regular meeting of the School Board. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. When Ms. Roberts telephoned Thursday morning with word that Mr. Seay was at Douglass Center, Mr. Blalock went himself to speak to Mr. Seay. Twice he personally directed Mr. Seay to go to his classroom and get to work. Confronted with Mr. Seay's silent refusal, Mr. Blalock handed him the letter of suspension, dated the day before. When the School Board met, heard what had transpired, and listened to a presentation by Mr. Seay's lawyer, it decided that Mr. Seay should have a physical examination and be examined by a psychiatrist. At the school board meeting, nobody suggested that respondent was on sick leave at any time after March 8, 1991. In keeping with the collectively bargained agreement between the School Board and teachers like Mr. Seay under continuing contract with the School Board, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, petitioner demanded that respondent go for medical and psychiatric examinations, by letter dated April 10, 1991. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. A second, follow-up letter reiterating the demand, dated April 29, 1991, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9, reached Mr. Seay by registered mail. As of the time of the hearing, Mr. Seay had not complied with the Board's demand that he submit to a physical examination and be examined by a psychiatrist.

Recommendation It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner terminate respondent's employment. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1992. APPENDIX FOR NO. 91-6046 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-11 and 13-20 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 12 pertains to immaterial matters. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 21, respondent apparently also took the position that he had been on sick leave in the unemployment compensation case. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 22 and 23 pertain to subordinate matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-3, 5-8 and 19 have been adopted in substance, insofar as material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 4, 9-12, 21 and 24 pertain to subordinate matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 13 and 15 are immaterial since respondent never requested sick leave. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 14, 16, 17 and 18 have been rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 20, Ms. Roberts' testimony in that regard is unrebutted. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 22, there is no disagreement. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 23 pertains to an immaterial matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400 Charles Blalock, Superintendent Suwanee County School Board 224 W. Parshley Street Live Oak, FL 32060 J. Victor Africano, Esquire Post Office Box 1450 Live Oak, FL 32060 Linsey Moore, Esquire 50 East 2nd Street Jacksonville, FL 32206

Florida Administrative Code (1) 6B-4.009
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs FOREVER FLOORS AND MOORE, INC., 15-003944 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jul. 15, 2015 Number: 15-003944 Latest Update: Jul. 29, 2016

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, Forever Floors and More, Inc. ("Forever Floors"), failed to abide by the coverage requirements of the Workers' Compensation Law, chapter 440, Florida Statutes by not obtaining workers' compensation insurance for its employees, and, if so, whether the Petitioner properly assessed a penalty against the Respondent pursuant to section 440.107, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of the Workers' Compensation Law that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for their employees and corporate officers. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. Forever Floors is a Florida corporation. The Division of Corporations’ “Sunbiz” website indicates that Forever Floors was first incorporated on February 4, 2012, and remained active as of the date of the hearing. Forever Floors’s principal office is at 8205 Oak Bluff Road, Saint Augustine, Florida 32092. Forever Floors is solely owned and operated by Christopher Bohren. Mr. Bohren is the president and sole officer of the corporation. Forever Floors was actively engaged in performing tile installation during the two-year audit period from April 3, 2013, through April 2, 2015. John C. Brown is a government operations consultant for the Department. During the period relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Brown was a Department compliance investigator assigned to Duval County. Mr. Brown’s job included conducting random compliance investigations and investigating referrals made to his office by members of the public. Mr. Brown testified that as an investigator, he would enter worksites and observe the workers and the types of work they were doing. On April 2, 2015, Mr. Brown visited a worksite at 3714 McGirts Boulevard in Jacksonville. He observed two workers installing tile in a shower in an older single-family residence that was undergoing renovations. Mr. Brown identified himself to the two workers and then inquired as to their identities and employment. Mr. Bohren replied that he was the company officer and that his company had an exemption from the requirement to provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage. Mr. Bohren identified the other worker as Dustin Elliott and stated that Mr. Elliott had worked for Forever Floors for about eight months. Mr. Bohren told Mr. Brown that he paid Mr. Elliott sometimes by check and sometimes with cash. After speaking with Mr. Bohren, Mr. Brown returned to his vehicle to perform computer research on Forever Floors. He consulted the Sunbiz website for information about the company and its officers. His search confirmed that Forever Floors was an active Florida corporation and that Christopher Bohren was listed as its registered agent, and as president of the corporation. No other corporate officers were listed. Mr. Brown also checked the Department's Coverage and Compliance Automated System ("CCAS") database to determine whether Forever Floors had secured the payment of workers' compensation insurance coverage or had obtained an exemption from the requirements of chapter 440. CCAS is a database that Department investigators routinely consult during their investigations to check for compliance, exemptions, and other workers' compensation related items. CCAS revealed that Forever Floors had no active workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees and that no insurance had ever been reported to the state for Forever Floors. There was no evidence that Forever Floors used an employee leasing service. Mr. Bohren had an active exemption as an officer of the corporation pursuant to section 440.05 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.012, effective September 24, 2013, through September 24, 2015. There was no exemption noted for Dustin Elliott. Based on his jobsite interviews with the employees and Mr. Bohren, and his Sunbiz and CCAS computer searches, Mr. Brown concluded that as of April 2, 2015, Forever Floors had an exemption for Mr. Bohren but had failed to procure workers’ compensation coverage for its employee, Dustin Elliott, in violation of chapter 440. Mr. Brown consequently issued a Stop- Work Order that he personally served on Mr. Bohren on April 2, 2015. Also on April 2, 2015, Mr. Brown served Forever Floors with a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation, asking for documents pertaining to the identification of the employer, the employer's payroll, business accounts, disbursements, workers' compensation insurance coverage records, professional employer organization records, temporary labor service records, documentation of exemptions, documents relating to subcontractors, documents of subcontractors' workers’ compensation insurance coverage, and other business records, to enable the Department to determine the appropriate penalty owed by Forever Floors. Mr. Brown testified, and Mr. Bohren confirmed, that Mr. Bohren provided no records in response to the Request for Production. The case file was assigned to a penalty calculator, who reviews the records and calculates the penalty imposed on the business. Mr. Brown did not state the name of the person assigned to calculate the penalty in this case. Anita Proano, penalty audit supervisor for the Department, later performed her own calculation of the penalty as a check on the work of the penalty calculator. Ms. Proano testified as to the process of penalty calculation. Penalties for workers' compensation insurance violations are based on doubling the amount of evaded insurance premiums over the two- year period preceding the Stop-Work Order, which in this case was the period from April 3, 2013, through April 2, 2015. § 440.107(7)(d), Fla. Stat. Because Mr. Bohren had no payroll records for himself or Mr. Elliott on April 2, 2015, the penalty calculator lacked sufficient business records to determine the company’s actual gross payroll on that date. Section 440.107(7)(e) provides that where an employer fails to provide business records sufficient to enable the Department to determine the employer’s actual payroll for the penalty period, the Department will impute the weekly payroll at the statewide average weekly wage as defined in section 440.12(2), multiplied by two.1/ In the penalty assessment calculation, the Department consulted the classification codes and definitions set forth in the SCOPES of Basic Manual Classifications (“Scopes Manual”) published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (“NCCI”). The Scopes Manual has been adopted by reference in rule 69L-6.021. Classification codes are four-digit codes assigned to occupations by the NCCI to assist in the calculation of workers' compensation insurance premiums. Rule 69L- 6.028(3)(d) provides that "[t]he imputed weekly payroll for each employee . . . shall be assigned to the highest rated workers' compensation classification code for an employee based upon records or the investigator's physical observation of that employee's activities." Ms. Proano testified that the penalty calculator correctly applied NCCI Class Code 5348, titled “Ceramic Tile, Indoor Stone, Marble, or Mosaic Work,” which “applies to specialist contractors who perform tile, stone, mosaic, or marble work.” The corresponding rule provision is rule 69L- 6.021(2)(aa). The penalty calculator used the approved manual rates corresponding to Class Code 5348 for the periods of non- compliance to calculate the penalty. On May 22, 2015, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of $23,538.34, based on Mr. Bohren’s imputed wages for the periods not covered by his exemption and the imputed wages for Mr. Elliott for the entire penalty period. Mr. Bohren was served with the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on June 8, 2015. The evidence produced at the hearing established that Ms. Proano utilized the correct class codes, average weekly wages, and manual rates in her calculation of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. The Department has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Forever Floors was in violation of the workers' compensation coverage requirements of chapter 440. Dustin Elliott was an employee of Forever Floors on April 2, 2015, performing services in the construction industry without valid workers' compensation insurance coverage. The Department has also demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the penalty was correctly calculated through the use of the approved manual rates and the penalty calculation worksheet adopted by the Department in rule 69L-6.027. Ms. Proano’s recalculation of the penalty confirmed the correctness of the penalty calculator’s work. Forever Floors could point to no exemption, insurance policy, or employee leasing arrangement that would operate to lessen or extinguish the assessed penalty. At the hearing, Christopher Bohren testified that he is the sole proprietor of Forever Floors and that Mr. Elliott had only worked for him for six-to-eight months, mostly on a part-time basis, as of April 2, 2015. He stated that the penalty assessed in this case is more than he has made from his start-up business. After his discussion with Mr. Brown, he immediately procured workers’ compensation insurance coverage for Mr. Elliott and intends to stay within the ambit of the law in the future. Mr. Bohren testified that he was unable to access his business records because they were with his ex-wife, from whom he had an apparently acrimonious departure. Mr. Bohren’s testimony elicited sympathy, but the equitable considerations that he raised have no effect on the operation of chapter 440 or the imposition of the penalty assessed pursuant thereto.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, assessing a penalty of $23,538.34 against Forever Floors and More, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2015.

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.68440.02440.05440.10440.107440.12440.38538.34
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs CONSOLIDATED LOCAL UNION 867 AND CONSOLIDATED WELFARE FUND, 91-000101 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jan. 04, 1991 Number: 91-000101 Latest Update: Apr. 17, 1992

The Issue Whether Respondents have engaged in the unauthorized practice of insurance in the State of Florida, and if so, the penalties that should be imposed. Respondents raise as an affirmative defense the assertion that the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 29 U.S.C. Section 1001, et seq., preempt the regulation of Respondents' activities in the State of Florida by the Florida Insurance Code.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Florida Department of Insurance, is charged with the duty of enforcing the Florida Insurance Code. These duties include the regulation of entities engaged in the business of insurance within the State of Florida.1 Respondent Consolidated Local Union 867 (Local 867) is an unincorporated "labor organization" under the Labor Management Relations Ac-t, also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 152(4) and (5) and is an "employee organization" as defined by Section 1002(4) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sections 1001, et seq. The principal office of Local 867 is at 333 North Broadway, Jericho, New York. Respondent Consolidate Welfare Fund (CWF) was established effective October 1, 1988, by a Trust Agreement entered into by persons purporting to be trustees of Local 867 and by persons purporting to be trustees of employers.2 The stated purpose of CWF was to provide medical, surgical, and hospital care benefits to its participants in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death. During the years 1989 through 1991, Local 867 and CWF contracted to provide participating Florida residents specified health and hospitalization benefits so that those participants would be indemnified against the enumerated health care costs necessitated by injury or illness. In exchange, Respondents received the payment from those participants of an established fee or premium. CWF was initially fully insured by Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield (Empire), an insurance company based in the State of New York. Since July 1, 1990, CWF has been fully self- insured. CWF is operating at a substantial deficit ($4,196,480 at the time of the formal hearing), and substantial claims from Florida consumers remain unpaid. The loss ratio at which CWF operated was, at the time of the formal hearing, approximately 122% with health claims exceeding premiums received. Neither Local 867 or CWF ever held a Certificate of Authority to engage in any aspect of the insurance business as required by Section 624.401, Florida Statutes. At no time pertinent to these proceedings was Empire the holder of a certificate of authority to transact business in the State of Florida. Local 867 is governed by a constitution which has been filed with the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor (Secretary of Labor). Its constitution creates Consolidated Local Union 867 and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: ARTICLE III JURISDICTION This organization has jurisdiction to organize, admit to membership and represent all workers, including without limitation, automobile sales, service and maintenance employees, delivery and oil truck drivers, and miscellaneous employees and all such other persons as may from time to time be determined by the Executive Board. ARTICLE IV OBJECT AND PURPOSE To unite in one organization, regardless of religion, race, color, and sex, nationality or national origin, workers eligible to become, members, To organize unorganized workers and improve their working conditions. To advance, maintain, and protect, at all times, the welfare and interest of the members of this Union. ARTICLE V MEMBERSHIP A. Any person who is employed in a capacity which makes him eligible for Union membership and who is not a member of an organization whose philosophy runs counter to democratic American principles may apply for membership in this Union. The CWF Trust Agreement provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The sole purpose of the Fund is to provide welfare benefits permitted by law to employees and their beneficiaries to the extent that the Trustees determine feasible and to defray the expenses of doing the same. It is intended that the Fund promulgated hereto shall be a "multi- employer plan" . . . within the meaning of ERISA. There were at one time between 1989 and the date of the formal hearing approximately 98 employer groups in Florida affiliated with Local 867 or CWF with approximately 1,000 covered employees. Local 867 is a party to collective bargaining agreements with various employers in different states. There was evidence that Local 867 has relations with employee groups in approximately 15 states, including Florida. These collective bargaining agreements typically pertained to wages, hours of employment, seniority, holidays, vacations, adjustment of disputes, contributions to the CWF for plan benefits, and contributions to the Consolidated Welfare Fund Security Division for pension coverage. By the agreement executed by Local 867 and these various employer groups, more than one employer was required to make contributions to the CWF for plan benefits. Respondents introduced as their Exhibit 3 an agreement dated July l, 1989, between Consolidated Local Union 867, ". . . acting on behalf of itself and the employees covered by this Agreement, now employed or hereafter employed by the Employer and HIG Assoc. Inc. . . ." of Plainview, N.Y. (HIG was referred to in the agreement as the "Employer")." HIG recognized Local 867 as its "duly authorized representative and exclusive bargaining agent" for all full-time employees. Respondents introduced as their Exhibit 19 an agreement dated February 1, 1991, between Consolidated Local Union 867, "acting on behalf of itself and the employees covered by this Agreement, now employed or hereafter employed by Employer and Business Marketing Consultants, 333 N. Broadway, Suite 2000A, Jericho, NY 11753 (hereinafter called the "Employer"). Business Marketing Consultants (BMC) recognized Local 867 as its "duly authorized representative and exclusive bargaining agent" for full time employees. The relationship between Respondents and Florida residents was typically initiated by a Florida employer seeking to obtain group insurance benefits for its employees. CWF provides life, health, accident, and death benefit insurance coverage to Florida employees similar to that offered by traditional insurance companies, frequently at costs lower than those insurance companies for equivalent coverage. The actual solicitation and marketing of the insurance benefits offered by CWF was carried out by licensed insurance sales persons and insurance brokers. For the transactions testified to at hearing, the purpose of the contact between the employer and the insurance agent was to discuss insurance, not the unionization of the employer's employees. In each instance about which there was testimony, the agent would describe the plan offered by Respondents, which offered rates below those quoted by other programs. The employers secured the benefits by applying for membership in an association such as HIG or BMC whereby the employer group became members of the association for the purpose of "all labor relation matters" as they affected "all full time employees" and agreed to the "terms and conditions" of an agreement between the association and Local 867. For the employer groups in Florida, forms styled "Application for Membership and Ratification" were submitted pertaining to Mishkin, Horowitz and Boas, P.A., Gross and Telisman, P.A., and Key Colony Homeowners Association, Inc. A separate "Application for Membership and Ratification" was executed by HIG and by Key Colony Homeowners Association, Inc. (on November 17, 1989), Gross and Telisman, P.A. (on November 28, 1989), and by Mishkin, Horowitz and Boas, P.A. (on December 7, 1989). These agreements were identical with the exception of the dates and the parties. By each application, the employer group applied for membership in HIG, appointed HIG as its exclusive bargaining agent for all labor relation matters as they affect all full-time employees, and agreed "to the terms and conditions of a certain Collective Bargaining Agreement by and between HIG and Consolidated Local Union 867 . . . dated March 1, 1989, covering all full-time employees." No agreement between Consolidated Local Union 867 and HIG Associates dated March 1, 1989, was introduced as an exhibit in this proceeding. Consequently, while it may be reasonably inferred that the agreement dated March 1, 1989, was similar to Respondents' Exhibit 3 dated July 1, 1989, Respondents failed to establish the terms and conditions to which these employer groups agreed. A separate "Application for Membership and Ratification" was executed by BMC and by Key Colony Homeowners Association, Inc., on October 1, 1990, and by Mishkin, Horowitz and Boas, P.A. on September 27, 1990, and on April 21, 1991. These agreements were entered after the entry of the immediate final order on September 10, 1990, and were identical with the exception of the dates and the parties. By each application, the employer group applied for membership in BMC, appointed BMC as its exclusive bargaining agent for all labor relation matters as they affect all full-time employees, and agreed "to the terms and conditions of a certain Collective Bargaining Agreement by and between BMC and Consolidated Local Union 867 . . . dated September 1990, covering all full-time employees." Although it appears from the evidence presented that a similar form was submitted on behalf of Wickstorm Publishers, that form was not introduced into evidence. The employees who wished to be covered by the Respondents' plan were required to become a member of Local 867. A portion of the monthly payments paid by these employees for this coverage was for union dues. Irving W. Mishkin of Mishkin, Horowitz & Boas, P.A. signed a card applying for membership in Local 867 in order to qualify for the plan benefits. Mr. Mishkin never requested a copy of Local 867's constitution, never asked how he could exercise his right to vote for union officers, never requested Local 867 to name a shop steward, and never asked for a copy of the agreement between Local 867 and BMC. Mr. Mishkin was aware that the invoice he received each month included an amount for union dues. Donald Haug, the general manager of Key Club Number Two, a constituent of Key Colony Homeowners Association, was aware that all covered employees would have to become members of Local 867 to qualify for the health plan benefits and that invoices covering contributions for health coverage also included an amount for union dues. There was no commonality of interest among the Florida participants in the CWF plan. Respondents were unable to establish that the relationship between the consumers in Florida and Respondents was anything other than the relationship between an insurer and an insured. The relationship between Florida consumers and Respondents consisted only of the payment of premiums and the filing of claims. There was no evidence that either Respondent engaged in any traditional union activity on behalf of any member in the State of Florida. During the course of the investigation into Respondents' activities, Petitioner received no complaint that there was not a shop steward at the pertinent places of business or that there were no union elections. There was no evidence that any Florida employee requested and was refused a copy of any collective bargaining agreement or a copy of Local 867's constitution. All complaints from Florida employers or employees pertained to unpaid claims. On or about September 10, 1990, the Petitioner filed the Notice and Order to Show Cause against the Respondents which triggered this administrative proceeding and which included an immediate final order for the Respondents to cease and desist subscribing new health plan participants in Florida pending the resolution of this administrative proceeding. On October 22, 1990, Respondents filed an action in the United District Court, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division (CIV. No. 90-40228-WS) seeking an order which declares that certain portions of the Florida Insurance Code have been preempted by ERISA and which enjoins Petitioner from proceeding against the Respondents in this administrative proceeding. That action was pending as of the date of the formal hearing. In a proceeding brought in the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York by the Secretary of Labor against Consolidated Welfare Fund and others, a consent order was entered June 13, 1991, which imposed a moratorium on the payment of claims by CWF. Because of that moratorium, the CWF claims are not being processed or paid. Even without this moratorium, the evidence establishes that CWF is not financially capable of satisfying its claimants and its viability is questionable. There was no evidence that any advisory opinion has been issued by the United States Department of Labor or that any order has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction which determines that Petitioner is precluded from regulating the activities of Respondents in the State of Florida because the provisions of ERISA preempt the Florida Insurance Code. The Secretary of Labor has not found any of the agreements pertinent to this proceeding to be collective bargaining agreements. There was no evidence that the Secretary of Labor has promulgated any other requirements relating to the definition of the term "multiemployer plan" under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Section 1002(37)(A). Those responsible for the maintenance and operation of the benefit plan offered by Respondents had substantial experience within the insurance industry. Entities with substantial experience in the business of insurance aided in the marketing and operation of CWF. Those responsible for the maintenance, operation, administration, and marketing of the benefit plan offered by Respondents were compensated in the form of commissions or administrative fees and salaries that were paid from membership dues, pension contributions, and welfare fund contributions.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Respondents engaged in the unlawful transaction of the business of insurance in the State of Florida without the requisite certificate of authority, which orders Respondents to cease and desist from the unauthorized transaction of insurance in the State of Florida, and which imposes an administrative fine against said Respondents in the total amount of $10,000. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of January, 1992. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1992.

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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. HOMER C. KING, JR., 88-001151 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001151 Latest Update: Aug. 03, 1988

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints relating to the real estate licensing laws. Respondent Homer C. King, Jr. (King), is the sole qualifier for King's Properties located at 1109 North Federal Highway, Suite 3, Hollywood, Florida. Respondent King is now, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed real estate broker in Florida having been issued license Number 00047643. On or about April 6, 1987, Respondent in Circuit Court, Broward County, Florida entered a plea of guilty, to one count of unemployment compensation fraud, a felony. Respondent was placed on probation for two years and ordered to make restitution in the amount of $1,223.00 to the Department of Labor, Division of Employment Security, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation (Department). Respondent has paid restitution to the Department and has complied fully with all the terms of his probation. During his period of probation, Respondent was at all times cooperative with the Department and the Petitioner's Investigator (testimony of Yvette Montgomery, Respondent King's Probation and Parole Officer and James J. Smith, Investigator for the Department of Professional Regulation). During times material hereto, Respondent failed to notify the Petitioner of the above-referenced plea. When Respondent Homer C. King, Jr. was arraigned on the charges of unemployment compensation fraud, he made the court aware that he was told by a representative from the unemployment compensation office that he was entitled to a certain amount of compensation from that office; in reliance on the representation that he was entitled to such compensation, Respondent completed the necessary forms to obtain the amounts he had been advised by the unemployment counselor that he was entitled to. An investigation conducted subsequent to Respondent's receipt of the money reveals that Respondent King had been overpaid. He was required to make restitution of the overpayment to the unemployment compensation office. Respondent King agreed to make restitution and did so in a timely manner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner, Division of Real Estate, enter a Final Order imposing a $250 fine against Respondent made payable to Petitioner within 30 days of entry of the Final Order. Petitioner enter a Final Order issuing a written reprimand to Respondent based on the above-referenced acts and/or conduct. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. The above recommended penalty falls within the Division of Real Estate's rule guidelines. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate - Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Homer C. King, Jr. t/a King Properties 1109 North Federal Highway #3 Hollywood, Florida 33020 Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate - Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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