Elawyers Elawyers
Ohio| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. C-SAND COMPANY, 84-003877 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003877 Latest Update: Jul. 10, 1985

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, C-Sand Company, was issued permit number AE315-10 on May 8, 1981. This permit authorized the erection of a sign to be located approximately 1.8 miles west of SR 267 in Gadsden County, Florida. This location is in an unzoned area and the permit was granted because of its proximity to a nearby commercial activity known as Imperial Nurseries. Prior to submitting an application for this permit to the Department, the owner of the Respondent company contacted the Department's inspectors in the Chipley district office to determine where a sign could be legally erected. He did this in order to locate a site which would be permittable before entering into a lease on the property. The Department's district supervisor met the Respondent's owner in April of 1981 in Quincy. The two of them drove I-10 for a couple of hours looking for a sign site which would be permittable. The Department's district supervisor informed the Respondent that only two locations could be issued a permit, one of these being the site which is the subject of this proceeding. Based upon this representation, the Respondent entered into a lease for this site, subject to issuance by the Department of a permit to erect a sign thereon. After all of this had transpired, on May 4, 1981, the Respondent completed the permit application and submitted it to the Department. Prior to the Department's issuance of the subject permit, one of its inspectors whose duty is to observe a proposed sign site and determine if it is as represented in the application and if it meets the requirements of the statutes and rules, field inspected the proposed site of the subject sign. Based on this inspection he recommended the issuance of the permit upon his determination that this area was unzoned commercial, that the sign site was within 800 feet of a commercial activity known as Imperial Nurseries, and that this commercial activity was within 660 feet of the right of way of I-10, and visible from the main traveled way of I-10. There is sufficient credible evidence in the record of this proceeding to support a finding of fact that the subject area was as the field inspector found it to be. The area in question is rural in nature and generally suitable for agricultural activities. However, the business being conducted by Imperial Nurseries in 1981 was the growing of ornamental evergreens primarily for distribution in Northern markets. These ornamental evergreens were grown in containers on top of the ground, and shipped by truck. The cuttings were grown, then rooted, and planted in containers until mature. Between 1,500-2,000 yards of potting material was hauled in by truck each year from Tennessee, Georgia and Canada. This material consists of pine bark, peat moss and sand, which is mixed on the premises. The entire nursery is irrigated by an impact sprinkler system. There are 260 acres under irrigation. Approximately 1,400 tons of liquid fertilizer are mixed each year, and delivered via this irrigation system. There has been a weather shed on the property since before 1981, and this is within 660 feet from I-10. Portable toilets are located in various places on the property to accommodate the nursery employees. Beyond 660 feet from I-10 is a potting station and a loading area. Further away is an office building, two lunch rooms, and two storage buildings for fertilizer and peat moss. Nevertheless, parts of the overall operation of conducting the business of this nursery are situated 660 feet and less from I-10. Imperial Nursery ships its mature evergreens via truckers and brokers. Nursery employees assemble the shipments in the field, and they are brought to a central location for loading onto the trucks. These trucks are 40-45 foot refrigerated tractor-trailers. Approximately 400 truck loads of cuttings are shipped each year to an area from Washington D.C. to Canada The operation of Imperial Nurseries is the same now as it was in 1981. The field inspector's recommendation to approve the site as a permittable location was joined in by his supervisor after the supervisor had also conducted a field inspection of the area. Both of them based their approvals on the weather shed, the portable toilets, and the activities observed by them such as the employees moving the potted plants around, the loading and unloading of material taking place, and the employee activity throughout the area but particularly in the vicinity of the weather shed. The site where the Respondent proposed to erect his sign was within 800 feet of the various locations on the Imperial Nurseries property where its loading, unloading, or other activities took place. The assertion of the Respondent on his sign permit application that the proposed location was within 800 feet of a business was not false or misleading. The Department's inspector and his supervisor concurred in this characterization of the area. Neither has the Respondent violated any of the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. All of the facts were set forth on his permit application, and these facts were verified by the Department after the area was inspected to determine their accuracy. The policy of the Department leaves the determination of what is and what is not an unzoned commercial area to the field inspector, with the approval of his supervisors. In this case, the determination was made that the activities of Imperial Nurseries were commercial in nature, and the permits were granted on the basis of this determination, not on the representation of the Respondent. In the summer of 1984, the subject site was inspected by the Department's Right-of-Way Administrator, who determined that the business being conducted by Imperial Nurseries was agricultural, and not commercial in nature. Although Imperial Nurseries has an agricultural exemption on its property and its employees are classified as agricultural for withholding tax purposes, the facts support a finding that Imperial Nurseries is a commercial activity. There is no statutory definition of "agricultural" and the Department has not defined the term by rule. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged, Second Edition, defines "agriculture" as the cultivation of the ground, the art of preparing the soil, the tillage or the culture of the earth. These are not the activities of Imperial Nurseries. Pursuant to the issuance of the sign permit by the Department, the Respondent's lease on the property where the sign was erected became effective, and this lease continues to date.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department's violation notice seeking removal of the Respondent's sign on the north side of I-10, approximately 1.8 miles west of S.R. 267 in Gadsden County, Florida, be dismissed; and that permit number AE 315-10 remain in effect as a permit for a non-conforming sign. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 10 day of July, 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1985.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57479.02479.08479.11479.111
# 1
UNIVERSAL OUTDOOR, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 97-003767 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 12, 1997 Number: 97-003767 Latest Update: Apr. 09, 1998

The Issue Whether the Petitioner's outdoor advertising sign located at 1.106 miles south of State Road 50, on State Road 91, is an illegally erected sign pursuant to the Notice of Violation No. 10B-DM-1997-125-NF. Whether Petitioner's outdoor advertising structure is eligible for a permit pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact On June 26, 1997, Respondent's Inspector issued Notice of Violation No. 10B-DM-1997-125-NF for an outdoor advertising sign located 1.106 miles south of State Road 50, on State Road 91, in Orange County, Florida. The subject sign is located within 660 feet of the right-of-way of State Road 91, outside any city limits. On June 26, 1997, the above-referenced sign did not have a current valid permit. On June 26, 1997, the above-referenced sign was not an on-premises sign. Charles Tucker is the owner of the subject sign and the property on which it is located. Charles Tucker has never had a valid State Outdoor Advertising Permit for the subject sign. Charles Tucker has not applied for a permit under Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. Sometime in the late 1960's, Winter Garden Inn constructed the subject sign on property owned by Charles Tucker. The Inn received permits for said sign from Respondent for each year until 1973, and displayed advertising signage thereon. Charles Tucker has owned the subject sign since 1974. In 1981, Tucker leased advertising copy on the sign to the R.C. Dunn Oil Company. In 1983, Charles Tucker painted out the advertising copy, after it had remained on the subject sign for two years (from April 1981 through April 1983). However, the advertising copy remained visible for several years thereafter. On May 19, 1997, Charles Tucker entered into Lease Agreement with Petitioner, for the purpose of maintaining and operating the sign. Respondent agreed to be agent of record for all matters relating to the sign and signage. Petitioner has not properly completed an application for a permit under Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. There has been a seven-year period of time during which the subject sign displayed advertising copy. No structural changes have been undertaken on the subject sign since it was constructed.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary enter a final order which finds that the Respondent properly issued the Notice of Violation, but that Petitioner, Universal Outdoor, Inc., is entitled to a State Outdoor Advertising Permit, under the provisions of Section 479.105(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Upon proper application in accordance with this chapter within a reasonable period of time, payment of a penalty fee of $300.00 and all pertinent fees required by this chapter, including annual permit renewal fees payable from 1974 to the present, a permit should be issued. DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of March, 1998, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Kelly A. Bennett Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Mark Gamble Real Estate Representative Universal Outdoor, Inc. 5333 Old Winter Garden Road Orlando, Florida 32811 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: Diedre Grubbs 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (5) 120.57479.02479.07479.105479.16
# 2
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. TRI-STATE SYSTEMS, INC., 84-003980 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003980 Latest Update: Aug. 01, 1985

Findings Of Fact On or about May 8, 1981, the Department issued permit number AE316-10 to Henderson Signs. This permit authorized the erection of a sign to be located approximately 1.9 miles west of SR 267 in Gadsden County, Florida. This location is in an unzoned area, and the permit was granted because of its proximity to a nearby commercial activity known as Imperial Nurseries. Subsequently, the Respondent, Tri-State Systems, Inc., purchased the subject permit from Henderson Signs, and thereafter the sign in question was erected by the Respondent. The area where this sign was placed is rural in nature and generally suitable for agricultural activities. However, the business being conducted by Imperial Nurseries in 1981 was the growing of ornamental evergreens primarily for wholesale distribution in Northern markets. These ornamental evergreens were grown in containers on top of the ground, and shipped by refrigerated trucks. A view of the area in 1981 would show evergreen plants in containers sitting on top of dry sod. Imperial Nurseries produces three to four million evergreens, does two to three million dollars in business, and employs approximately 130 employees. Although the only structure now situated within 660 feet of the interstate is a weather shed, in 1981 there was a loading dock located within 660 feet of the interstate from which the loading and shipping took place, there was a portable toilet, low bed trucks, semi-trailers, and tractors working near this loading dock, and men working in the area. Prior to the Department's issuance of the subject permit, one of the its inspectors whose duty is to observe a proposed sign site and determine if it is as represented in the application and if it meets the requirements of the statutes and rules, field inspected the proposed site of the subject sign. Based on this inspection he recommended the issuance of the permit upon his determination that this area was unzoned commercial, that the sign site was within 800 feet of a commercial activity known as Imperial Nurseries, and that this commercial activity was within 660 feet of the right of way of I- 10, and visible from the main-traveled way of I-10. There is sufficient credible evidence in the record of this proceeding to support a finding of fact that the subject area was as the field inspector found it to be. The field inspector's recommendation to approve the site as a permittable location was joined in by his supervisor after the supervisor had also conducted a field inspection of the area. Both of them based their approvals on their observations in 1981 of commercial activities being conducted within 660 feet from I- 10. The site where the Respondent erected its sign was within 800 feet of the place where the loading dock was situated in 1981. The assertion of Henderson Signs on its sign permit application that the proposed location was within 800 feet of a business was not false or misleading. The Department's inspector and his supervisor concurred in this characterization of the area. Neither has the Respondent violated any of the provisions of chapter 479, Florida Statutes. All of the facts were set forth on the permit application submitted by Henderson Signs, and these facts were verified by the Department after the area was inspected to determine their accuracy. The policy of the Department leaves the determination of what is and what is not an unzoned commercial area to the field inspector, with the approval of his supervisors. In this case, the determination was made that the activities of Imperial Nurseries were commercial in nature, and the permit was granted on the basis of this determination, not on the representation of Henderson Signs or the Respondent. In the summer of 1984, the subject site was inspected by the Department's Right-of-Way Administrator, who determined that the business being conducted by Imperial Nurseries in 1984 was agricultural, and not commercial in nature. Although Imperial Nurseries now has an agricultural exemption on its property, there is no evidence that it had this in 1981, and the facts support a finding that Imperial Nurseries is a commercial activity and was such in 1981. There is no statutory definition of "agricultural" 1/ and the Department has not defined the term by rule. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged, Second Edition, defines "agricultural" as the cultivation of the ground, the art of preparing the soil, the tillage or the culture of the earth. These are not the activities of Imperial Nurseries now, and were not in 1981.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department's violation notice seeking removal of the Respondent's sign on the north side of I-10, approximately 1.9 miles west of S.R. 267 in Gadsden County, Florida, be dismissed; and that permit number AE 316-10 remain in effect as a permit for a nonconforming sign. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 1st day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1985.

Florida Laws (8) 1.01120.57120.6835.22479.02479.08479.11479.111
# 3
LAMAR OF TALLAHASSEE vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 08-003175 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sylvan Park, Florida Jul. 02, 2008 Number: 08-003175 Latest Update: Sep. 03, 2010

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Transportation's Notice of Denied Application for an outdoor advertising permit at State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, Leon County, issued to Lamar of Tallahassee on May 30, 2008, should be upheld pursuant to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes,1/ or whether the sign should be permitted as a nonconforming sign as defined by Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Department is a state agency empowered to regulate outdoor advertising signs along the interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems of Florida pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Lamar is licensed to engage in the business of outdoor advertising within the state of Florida pursuant to Section 479.04, Florida Statutes. Lamar owns a V-shaped sign located on certain real property at 1940 Thomasville Road in Tallahassee. Thomasville Road is also known as State Road 61. Lamar does not own the real property, but has the right to erect and maintain its sign on the property under a lease that Lamar executed with the landowner in 1998. Lamar's sign was erected in 1998, with the approval of the City of Tallahassee. The sign is located on the southwest corner of the intersection of Thomasville and Betton/Bradford Road, behind the Southern Flooring showroom. The east side of the sign face is within 660 feet of and visible to State Road 61. State Road 61 is a federal-aid highway and thus a "controlled road" subject to the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the east side of the sign requires a permit from the Department. The west side is visible only to Bradford Road and does not require a permit from the Department. On February 10, 2008, Lisa Adams, an outdoor advertising inspector conducting an annual inventory on behalf of the Department, identified the subject sign as an unpermitted sign that is visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams completed a Department compliance checklist stating that the sign was possibly illegal because it lacked a Department permit and the east side of the sign was visible from State Road 61. On April 22, 2008, the Department issued a notice of violation stating that the sign was illegal and must be removed within 30 days of the date of the notice, pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. Lamar did not file a request for hearing in response to the notice of violation, and does not contest the notice of violation in this proceeding. On May 16, 2008, Lamar filed an Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit for the sign. The Department reviewed the application and issued a Notice of Denied Application on May 30, 2008. The application was denied because the sign site does not meet the spacing requirements of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes, in that it is closer than 1,000 feet from another permitted sign owned by Lamar. The other permitted sign was built in 1979. The 1,000 foot spacing requirement has been in the statute at all times since the 1998 construction of the sign at issue in this proceeding, meaning that it could never have met the spacing requirement of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes. Myron Laborde was Lamar Advertising Southeast's regional manager in 1998 when the sign was built. His area of authority included Tallahassee. Mr. Laborde testified that in 1998 the view of the sign from State Road 61 was obstructed by several palm trees, some scrub oaks, and a very tall tallow tree. Some of these trees were removed when Southern Flooring took over and remodeled the old Helms Exterminators building at 1940 Thomasville Road about four years ago. Mr. Laborde testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees, but only "if you . . .turn your head 90 degrees" while driving north on State Road 61. Loyd Childree has been the vice-president and general manager of Lamar of Tallahassee since 2003. Mr. Childree testified that the renovations to the Helms Exterminators building began some time after March 2005, and that the building's size was nearly doubled to accommodate the Southern Flooring showroom. Mr. Childree testified that a lot of trees were removed during the renovation, including palm trees and a "canopy-type tree" about 25 to 30 feet tall with a full crown similar to that of an oak. Mr. Childree testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees. Mr. Childree further stated that Lamar markets the sign to advertisers based on the traffic counts from Bradford Road, not those from State Road 61. Ms. Adams, the inspector who identified the possible illegality of the sign, has worked for the Department's contractor, TBE Group, since August 2004. Her job is to conduct an inventory of permitted signs on controlled roads such as State Road 61 and determine which unpermitted signs are visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams inventoried State Road 61 in 2005, 2006 and 2007 without identifying Lamar's sign as an unpermitted sign visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams testified that her predecessor in the position inventoried State Road 61 every year since Lamar's sign was erected and never identified the sign as one visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams testified that she might have seen the sign in a previous year but did not identify it as illegal because she believed it had "on-premise" advertising, i.e., it advertised Southern Flooring. With certain restrictions, a sign erected on the premises of a business establishment that bears advertising for that establishment is exempt pursuant to Section 479.16(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. Adams frankly conceded that she was speculating and that her memory was unclear as to whether she had seen and noted this sign in past years. In any event, Lamar's log of advertisers showed that Southern Flooring never advertised on the sign. Lynn Holschuh is the Department's state outdoor advertising administrator, and had held this position since 1992. Ms. Holschuh testified that State Road 61 has been inventoried by an outdoor advertising inspector every year since Lamar's sign was erected in 1998. None of the inspectors noted the visibility or possible illegality of the sign until Ms. Adams noted the sign on February 12, 2008. Ms. Holschuh lives in Tallahassee and has driven on State Road 61 hundreds of times over the years. In her deposition, she testified that she believed the sign was not visible when it was built, and only became visible from State Road 61 when a third party removed the obstructing trees. The testimony of Mr. Laborde, Mr. Childree, and Ms. Holschuh was credible and uncontroverted as to the history of the sign. It is found that the sign was not visible from State Road 61 when it was erected in 1998, but that it became visible from State Road 61 when trees were removed by the landowner during renovations to the old Helms Exterminators building at some point after March 2005. Lamar's sign, now visible from State Road 61, is subject to the Department's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 479.01, Florida Statutes, because State Road 61, as a federal- aid primary highway, is a "controlled road" under the statute. A sign visible from a controlled road must carry a Department permit. Lamar contends that the facts of this case establish that its sign meets the definition of a "nonconforming sign" set forth in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes: "Nonconforming sign" means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. Lamar's sign was not visible from State Road 61 in 1998 and therefore was "lawfully erected" in terms of the Department's licensing requirements. Lamar contends that the removal of trees by a third party constituted "changed conditions" that rendered the sign out of compliance with state law, and that the sign is therefore a nonconforming sign under Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes. The Legislature has provided no definition of the term "changed conditions," and the Department has no rule to provide interpretive guidance to the words of the statute. On September 17, 2008, Lamar filed a motion for leave to amend its petition for hearing in this case to challenge the Department's alleged interpretation of the phrase "due to changed conditions" as an unadopted rule. In particular, Lamar alleged that the Department was applying an unadopted rule limiting "changed conditions" to those initiated by a government agency. On September 19, 2008, the Department filed an unopposed motion to remand the case to the agency. The motion was granted on September 22, 2008. In the Florida Administrative Weekly dated November 26, 2008 (vol. 34, no. 48, p. 6228), the Department published a Notice of Development of Proposed Rule, with the following preliminary text of an amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: 14-10.006 Additional Permitting Criteria. Each application for an outdoor advertising sign permit shall meet the requirements of Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S. In addition, an application must comply with the requirements of the agreement between the state and the United States Department of Transportation referenced in Section 479.02(1), F.S., which have not been duplicated in Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S., or superseded by stricter provisions in those statutes. The requirements are: through (8) No change. (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means only the actions of a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., which includes for example: Rezoning of a commercial area, reclassifying a secondary highway as a primary highway, or altering a highway's configuration causing a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. (Emphasis added) Ms. Holschuh testified that this draft rule language was written in direct response to Lamar's allegation that the Department's denial of its application was based on an unadopted rule. On December 16, 2008, the Department held a workshop on the draft rule. At the workshop, the Florida Outdoor Advertising Association ("FOAA") submitted the following suggested draft language for subsection (9) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means, and shall include, any of the following: An action taken by a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., such as the rezoning of a parcel of property fro commercial to noncommercial, reclassifying a secondary highway to a primary highway, altering a highway's configuration, or the taking of any other action within the powers of such governmental entity which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction; The action of a third party, who is not the owner of a preexisting sign, relating to modifications to the topography, vegetation, buildings or other physical characteristics of the property upon which the sign is located, or the property surrounding the sign, which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. an act of God which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. The Department rejected the FOAA's proposed language, and ultimately abandoned the effort to adopt a rule defining the term "changed conditions." On September 18, 2009, the Department filed a motion with DOAH to reopen this case and proceed to a fact-finding hearing regarding its proposed rejection of Lamar's application. In her deposition, Ms. Holschuh testified that the rulemaking effort was abandoned because the language proposed by the FOAA made it clear that it would be "nearly impossible" to arrive at a definition that would cover "every situation that might arise for when an existing sign might suddenly become visible." Ms. Holschuh testified in deposition that it is now the Department's policy to review these matters on a case-by- case basis. However, she also testified that the Department, as a matter of "policy," continues to limit its consideration of "changed conditions" to actions taken by a governmental entity. The Department bases this limitation on the examples provided by 23 C.F.R. § 750.707(b), defining "nonconforming signs" for purposes of the Federal Highway Administration: A nonconforming sign is a sign which was lawfully erected but does not comply with the provisions of State law or State regulations passed at a later date or later fails to comply with State law or State regulations due to changed conditions. Changed conditions include, for example, signs lawfully in existence in commercial areas which at a later date become noncommercial, or signs lawfully erected on a secondary highway later classified as a primary highway. Ms. Holschuh stated that the Department's policy was applied to Lamar in the instant case, and would continue to be applied in the future unless some "extraordinary circumstance" in a specific case led the Department to revisit the policy. At the final hearing, Ms. Holschuh backed away somewhat from her flat statement that the Department's "policy" was to limit consideration of changed conditions to those caused by government action. She stated that FOAA's proposed rule language caused the Department to reconsider its position that governmental action should be the exclusive reason for granting a permit for "changed conditions," and testified that the Department will consider other circumstances in its case-by-case review of permit applications. Ms. Holschuh testified that, under the facts presented in this case, the Department would deny the permit because there is DOAH case law on point for the proposition that tree removal does not constitute "changed conditions," and because broadening the definition of "changed conditions" to include the situation presented by this case would open up the process to abuse. Ms. Holschuh testified, at more than one point in the proceeding, that the Department would have very likely granted the permit had the trees been removed by the Department rather than the private landowner. She gave no indication that Section 479.105(1)(e), Florida Statutes, or any other statute would prevent the Department from granting the permit for Lamar's nonconforming sign, should the Department find that the sign fell into nonconformity due to "changed conditions." The DOAH case law cited by Ms. Holschuh is Lamar of Tallahassee v. Department of Transportation, Case Nos. 08-0660 and 08-0661 (DOAH September 15, 2008), discussed more fully in the Conclusions of Law below. Ms. Holschuh testified that Lamar's sign is not located in a Department right-of-way and is not a hazard to the public in its current location.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation denying the application of Lamar of Tallahassee for a state sign permit for a location described as State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, in Leon County, Florida (Application Number 57155). DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2010.

CFR (1) 23 CFR 750.707(b) Florida Laws (13) 11.45120.52120.54120.569120.57479.01479.015479.02479.04479.07479.105479.11479.16 Florida Administrative Code (2) 14-10.00414-10.006
# 4
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. CIRCLE D. RANCH, 75-001418 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001418 Latest Update: Oct. 06, 1976

The Issue Whether Respondent has violated Sections 479.07(1),(4),(6) and 479.11(1),Florida Statutes. At the hearing, it was announced that the signs in question are owned by a partnership known as Henderson Signs, Don Henderson and Gene Henderson being partners thereof. It was stipulated that the above-captioned cases would be consolidated for hearing and that Henderson Signs had been notified of the violations and was prepared to proceed with a hearing. The stipulation was accepted by the hearing officer and the caption of the case amended to show Henderson Signs as Respondent.

Findings Of Fact 1. It was stipulated by the parties that the two signs in question are owned by Respondent and are located as indicated on Exhibit 3 as follows: The Circle D. Ranch sign is located 9/10 of a mile east of the east lane of State Highway 81 and 85 feet south of the right-of-way fence of Interstate Highway I- The Arrowhead Campsite sign is located 1.1 miles east of the east lane of State Highway 81 and 190 feet south of the right-of-way fence of Interstate Highway I-10 (Exhibits 1,2,3 & 4, Testimony of Williams, Jordan). No state permit tags are affixed to the signs and they are not located in a zoned or unzoned commercial area as determined by physical observation (Testimony of Mr. Williams). The signs are located outside any incorporated city or town (Exhibits 3 & 4, late-filed Composite Exhibit 5, Testimony of Mr. Williams, Mr. Jordan).

Florida Laws (3) 479.07479.11479.111
# 5
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs MAXMEDIA OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 89-003819 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jul. 18, 1989 Number: 89-003819 Latest Update: Oct. 27, 1989

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Maxmedia Outdoor Advertising, Inc., owns and maintains a V- shaped sign located on State Road 551 (Goldenrod Road) in Orange County, Florida, north of State Road 50. State outdoor advertising sign permits were obtained for both sides of the "V" in May 1986. The applications for permit stated that the sign was 15 feet from the right-of- way. Sometime prior to June 1, 1989, Department of Transportation (DOT) Outdoor Advertising Inspector, Michael Dollery, inspected the sign in question. He found that no state permits were displayed and that the sign encroached on the state right-of-way. A follow-up inspection was conducted on September 15, 1989, and the same findings were made. In determining that the sign encroached on the right-of-way, the inspector utilized a DOT right-of-way survey map (Petitioner's Exhibit #4), prepared in 1987, approved on 5/12/88, and updated most recently on 5/8/89. The inspector also located a right-of-way survey marker in the field and photographed the sign in relation to the marker. Both the survey and photograph plainly indicate that approximately five feet of both sides of the "V" extend into the right-of-way. Since the sign has two sides and two permits, separate violation notices were issued. The two violation notices are the subject of Division of Administrative Hearings cases #89-3819T and #89-3820T. Respondent does not contest the DOT survey and did not object to its admissibility. He did not produce his own survey nor any basis for his contention that the sign was proper at the time of erection. In DOAH Case #89-3821T, the sign at issue is located within the incorporated limits of the City of Lake Mary in Seminole County, Florida, at an interchange of 1-4 and Lake Mary Boulevard. The sign is owned and maintained by Respondent, Maxmedia. It is "V" shaped, with the apex of the "V" pointing at Lake Mary Boulevard. It is within 660 feet of the interstate (I-4) and is approximately 850 feet from a 2-faced permitted billboard located across Lake Mary Boulevard. The sign is 20 feet high. DOT has no record of a permit for this sign, nor was one displayed at the time of inspection. DOT's District Outdoor Administrator claims that the sign is visible from the main travel-way of 1-4. DOT issued its notice of violation only for the west face of the sign, since that is the side which faces the interstate. As depicted on a DOT right-of-way survey (Petitioner's Exhibit #8), the offending face of the sign runs lengthwise, parallel to 1-4. Respondent claims that the sign was purposefully built only 20 feet high, instead of the more common 50 feet, so that it would not be visible from 1-4. The sign was placed to be read from Lake Mary Boulevard. Respondent submitted a series of photographs taken from 1-4 and from Lake Mary Boulevard, including the portion of Lake Mary Boulevard overpass over 1-4. The sign is distinctly lower than the other signs which are visible from 1-4. The sign is visible from Lake Mary Boulevard but is obscured by the tree line when viewed from 1-4. Even assuming that the subject sign structure could be viewed from 1-4, a passer-by on 1-4 would have to quickly turn and crane his neck to read the sign, given its parallel orientation. Respondent claims that the placement of the sign was based on a consultation, on-site, with DOT's former District Supervisor, Oscar Irwin, who concurred that the sign would not be an "Interstate 4 reader." The sign was permitted by the City of Lake Mary on October 17, 1984. According to the federal highway system map of Seminole County (Petitioner's Exhibit #6) Lake Mary Boulevard is not part of the federal-aid primary highway system.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered requiring that the sign in Cases #89-3819T and #89-3820T be removed, and dismissing the notice of violations in Case #89- 3821T. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 27th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Attorney Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Mac Davidson Maxmedia Outdoor Advertising Post Office Box 847 Winter Park, Florida 32790 Ben G. Watts, P.E., Interim Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Florida Laws (5) 120.57479.02479.07479.11479.16
# 6
NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 98-004456 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Dade City, Florida Oct. 07, 1998 Number: 98-004456 Latest Update: Dec. 20, 1999

The Issue Did the Department of Transportation (Department) properly issue the Notice of Denied Application pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10.004(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code?

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The sign structure which is the subject matter of this proceeding was originally erected prior to November 11, 1971, at the intersection of I-75, an interstate highway, and SR 52, in Pasco County, Florida. Both I-75 and SR 52 are roadways under the Department's jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing and regulating outdoor advertising sign structures. The original sign structure had one sign facing which faced north. The interchange of I-75 and SR 53 is located outside of the incorporated area of any town or city. The Federal-State Agreement (Agreement) which provides the Department with the authority to regulate outdoor advertising was adopted in 1972. When the Agreement was adopted, it contained a rule which provided, inter alia, that any sign structure located outside of the incorporated area of any town or city could not be located adjacent to or within 500 feet of a restricted interchange or intersection at grade. That rule has now been codified in Rule 14-10.006(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code. At the time it was given authority to regulate outdoor advertising, the Department took an inventory of all existing sign structures. Those existing sign structures that did not conform to the rules set forth in the Agreement were "grandfathered in" as legally nonconforming signs and allowed to remain at their current locations. National's sign structure, which is the subject matter of this proceeding, contained only one sign facing which faced north. National's sign was "grandfathered in" as a legally nonconforming sign structure. National's sign was nonconforming because it was not located within an incorporated town or city and was located adjacent to or within 500 feet of a restricted interchange. Some time prior to l973, National's sign was issued state permit number 1417-10. In 1973, National's sign permit number was changed to AU061-35 which is the permit number currently assigned to National's sign structure. On July 9, 1998, National submitted an application for an outdoor advertising sign permit for a proposed sign facing, which was to face south, to be constructed on the existing nonconforming sign structure under permit number AU061-35. National's existing permitted sign structure has a sign facing which faces north and is located at the intersection of I-75 and SR 52 in Pasco County, Florida. The addition of a south sign facing to the existing legally nonconforming sign structure would create a back-to-back sign structure. The application as submitted by National was incomplete in that National failed to include in its application proof of local government approval. At the hearing, National produced proof of local government approval for the south side facing requested in the permit application. On July 22, 1998, the Department issued a Notice of Denied Application to National citing the following reasons for the denial: 14E Site is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange or intersection at grade (S. 14- 10.006(1)(b)5., FAC). * * * 14I Other -- No local government approval. The permit application did not include local government approval at the time it was submitted to the Department. However, the Department did not return the permit application as being incomplete. Subsequently, National obtained local government approval. National's existing legally nonconforming sign structure is located within the restricted area of the I-75 and SR 52 interchange in that it is located adjacent to the on-ramp carrying traffic from SR 52 to the southbound lanes of I-75 and is within 500 feet of the interchange.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a sign permit at the location requested in the permit application previously filed by National. DONE AND ENTERED this _25th_ day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this _25th_ day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Jennifer Sloane, Esquire Livingston and Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.60479.01479.02479.07 Florida Administrative Code (4) 14-10.00414-10.00614-10.00728-106.216
# 7
KOA KAMPGROUND vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 89-004563 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Kissimmee, Florida Aug. 24, 1989 Number: 89-004563 Latest Update: Jun. 08, 1990

The Issue Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, violated Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, by placing a sign facing a state road right-of-way without a valid sign permit. Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, violated Section 479.07(9)(a)2, Florida Statutes, by placing a sign in violation of the DOT spacing rule. Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, violated Section 479.04(1), Florida Statutes, by operating outside the city limits without a state license. Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, is entitled to the issuance of a sign permit for the east-facing sign located 678 feet West of Seven Dwarfs Lane on US Highway 192, in Osceola County, Florida. Whether Respondent, Peloso, violated Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, by placing a sign facing a state road right-of- way without a valid sign permit. Whether Respondent, Peloso, violated Section 479.07(9)(a)2, Florida Statutes, by placing a sign in violation of the DOT spacing rule. Whether Respondent, Peloso, violated Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, by failure to display a current valid sign permit tag. Whether Respondent, Peloso's state permit number AG636-10 become invalid and subject to revocation by the DOT.

Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) is the state agency charged with the duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which regulates outdoor advertising structures along the state highway system. Petitioner, KOA Campground, as Lessor, and Respondent, Arthur S. Peloso, as Lessee, entered into a Lease for space to erect a sign structure to be located approximately 0.67 mile east of State Road 535 (north side) adjacent to U.S. 192 in Osceola County on March 1, 1982. The real property described in said Lease covered an area approximately 100 feet in width adjoining the Peloso property to the east. On the property encompassed in said Lease, dated March 1, 1982, KOA erected some time in 1982, at its expense, an existing sign on its property which was constructed to face east. The message on the sign related to the KOA Campground which is on the same site. As such, it is an on-premises sign not requiring a DOT sign permit so long as the message on the sign relates to the business being conducted on the property. On the land adjoining the property described in said Lease, Peloso erected a sign, at his own expense, on his property in 1982 which was constructed to face west. At that time in 1982, Peloso applied for and received two outdoor advertising permits nos. AG636-10 and AG637-10, from the DOT. AG636-10 was issued for the west facing sign and AG637-10 was issued for the east facing sign. AG636-10 was promptly posted on the west facing sign which presently advertises Peloso's restaurant in Kissimmee, Florida. Said permit has remained posted on that sign continuously to the present time. AG637-10 was lost by Peloso. Thereafter, a request was filed by Peloso to replace permit AG636-10 rather than AG637-10. As a result, permit AX346-35 was issued to replace AG636- 10, and no replacement for AG637-10 has been issued. AX346-35 has now been posted along with AG636-10 on the west-facing sign owned by Peloso. Peloso has continuously paid the renewal fees relating to both permits issued. Pursuant to paragraph 6 and 7 of the Lease, dated March 1, 1982, the 100 foot strip of land owned by KOA was leased to Peloso and states: "6. Said premises are hereby leased for use by the lessee as a site for billboard advertising sign only, and for no other use or purposes unless the lessor gives his written consent thereto, and shall be operated at all times in a lawful manner. The lessee shall carry all necessary insurance, procure all necessary permits and licenses, and build and construct all signs in strict conformity with applicable Florida Statutes; and the lessor shall not be liable or held responsible therefor in any manner whatsoever. The parties agree that the lessee shall position his sign so that it faced in the general direction of west and the lessee shall provide space for the lessor to place a sign in the vicinity thereof also, so that it faces in the general direction of east." The Lease does not set forth a specific purpose on its face, but was requested in order to accommodate setback requirements under local law, and possibly to allow the sign to be erected to overhang the KOA boundary line. Said Lease has not been terminated and is still in full force and effect. On October 14, 1988, Peloso filed applications for two outdoor advertising sign permits "to rebuild and improve existing sign structure", which were treated as an amendment to the existing permits and tentatively approved by DOT. KOA filed an application for an outdoor advertising sign permit for the east-facing sign on its property sometime in the Fall of 1989. Peloso is the holder of the two existing permits (AG636-10 and AX346- 35), and is entitled to maintain permits for both an east-facing and a west- facing sign in the vicinity of the present Peloso restaurant sign (AG636-10). KOA has whited-out the copy on its sign and presently is not advertising any business (on-site or off-site) on the sign. Peloso has ceased construction on his new sign structure.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Alleged Violations of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code and Notice to Show Cause, dated June 30, 1989, directed to KOA Campground be dismissed, so long as its sign qualifies for exempt status under the provision of Section 479.16(1), Florida Statutes. The Alleged Violations of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code and Notice to Show Cause, dated October 20, 1989, directed to Arthur S. Peloso be dismissed, upon compliance with Section 479.07(5)(b), Florida Statutes, (lost tag). Thereafter, DOT should process the Amended Application of Peloso, dated October 14, 1988, relating to the construction of a new sign structure and ensure compliance with all applicable statutes and rules. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Buildi.ng 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitoner, KDA Campground. Paragraph 1- Accepted in substance except the statement the original permit was issued "for the existing sign on KOA property...", which is rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 2- The first sentence is rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. The second sentence is Accepted. Paragraph 3- Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4- Rejected. Paragraph 5- Accepted in substance. Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Respondent, Arthur S. Peloso. Paragraphs 1-9. Accepted in substance. The Department of Transportation did not file proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: William H. Muntzing, Esquire 1102 Oak Street Post Office Box 421966 Kissimmee, Florida 34742 Philip W. Watson, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson Firstate Tower, 17th Floor Post Office Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32302 Rivers Buford, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450

Florida Laws (5) 120.57479.04479.07479.08479.16 Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-10.004
# 8
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs NORTH FLORIDA PECAN 1 & 2, 99-000699 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Feb. 16, 1999 Number: 99-000699 Latest Update: Jun. 19, 2000

The Issue Whether Respondent's outdoor sign permit should be revoked because the original sign has been destroyed by an Act of God, as alleged by Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this sign permit dispute, Petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), seeks to revoke the permit for an off- premise outdoor advertising sign owned by Respondent, North Florida Pecan 1 & 2, Inc. (Respondent), on the grounds that the original sign was destroyed by a fire in June 1998, the newly rebuilt sign has lost its nonconforming status, and any rebuilt sign is now illegal. In response to these charges, Respondent contends that the fire that destroyed the sign was an act of criminal mischief or arson, rather than an Act of God, and thus the sign still qualifies for a nonconforming status. The sign in question is located 12.2 miles north of the Flagler County line on the west side of Interstate 95 (I-95) facing south, and is perhaps a mile or so south of the intersection of State Road 207 and I-95 (intersection) in St. Johns County, Florida. Respondent does not own the property where the sign is located, and it conducts no other business activities on that property. The property on which the sign is located is zoned Open Rural by St. Johns County (County), and it is not designated predominately for commercial or industrial uses by the County under the County's future land use map, comprehensive plan, or zoning ordinances. The sign is used to advertise Respondent's combination gas station and "open-area fruit market" located "just off" the intersection. The parties have stipulated that the sign was originally constructed more than 20 years ago before the current sign regulations became effective; under the present law, it would be a nonconforming sign and illegal. On May 27, 1998, a thunderstorm occurred in St. Johns County, resulting in between one-quarter and one-half inch of rainfall in the area. Due to a lightning strike on a tree, a 2-acre fire started approximately 1,000 feet southwest of the intersection in the vicinity of the sign. Although firefighters believed they had "knocked out" the fire within a day or two, the fire continued to smoulder under the dampened top layer of organic matter for several weeks until June 15, 1998, when it "worked its way back to the surface," broke out again, and cleared the containment line of the earlier fire. Aided by a light wind from the southeast and extremely dry conditions, the fire quickly spread eastward at the rate of 1,000 to 1,500 feet every 15 minutes and consumed several hundred acres, including the land on which Respondent's sign was located, before it was brought under control. That fire is commonly referred to as the Fort Peyton fire. In determining the cause of the Fort Peyton fire, forestry officials could not find any indicators of arson, and visual burn patterns clearly indicated that the new fire's origin was where the May 27 fire had begun. Therefore, it was officially classified as a "rekindle or breakout" of the May 27 fire, which was started by lightning. Put another way, the fire was the result of an Act of God, which is "the sudden manifestation and forces of nature." On either May 30 or June 5, 1998, depending on whether court or forestry records are accepted as being the most accurate, a fire began in Flagler Estates, which, "as the crow flies," lies approximately 12 to 15 miles southeast of the Fort Peyton fire. The Flagler Estates fire, however, was the result of an unattended illegal burn which was started by three individuals and went out of control. The fire was brought under control the same evening by firefighters, but only after some 450 surrounding acres were destroyed. The three individuals were later charged with arson. Respondent established that the prevailing winds during May and June 1998 were from the southeast and that "spoilers" or "floaters" (hot debris) from existing fires can sometimes float in the air and ignite new fires several miles away. Indeed, Respondent's investigator observed spoilers from inland fires floating through the air some 8 or 9 miles out in the Atlantic Ocean while he was fishing during that period of time. Accordingly, Respondent contends that it is just as likely that a spoiler floated northeastward from the Flagler Estates fire on May 30, 1998, and ignited the Fort Peyton blaze, some 12 to 15 miles away. If this theory is accepted, it would mean that the Fort Peyton fire would be attributable to arson, and not to an Act of God. The foregoing assumption has been rejected for several reasons. First, spoilers from the Flagler Estates fire did in fact ignite several spot fires in the area, but all of these spot fires occurred on the same day as the fire started and were within an eighth of an mile from the Flagler Estates perimeter. Second, it is highly unlikely that a spoiler would float up to 15 miles and then lie dormant for two weeks before igniting the Fort Peyton fire. Finally, the theory goes counter to the more persuasive evidence given by the supervising forester who investigated the Fort Peyton fire and concluded that it was an outbreak of the earlier fire that was started on May 27, 1998. After the sign was destroyed, Respondent rebuilt the sign at the same location using substantially the same materials that had composed the sign before it burned. However, the materials used to rebuild the sign were not part of the sign structure which was burned in the Fort Peyton fire. The new sign is the same size, shape, and height of the destroyed sign.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order confirming that the outdoor advertising sign maintained by North Florida Pecan 1 & 2, Inc., under sign permit number BR 252-55 is illegal and must be removed. The permit should also be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day 17th of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 J. Stephen Alexander, Esquire 19 Old Mission Avenue St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-10.007
# 9
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. EMPIRE ADVERTISING INDUSTRIES, INC., 76-000160 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000160 Latest Update: Feb. 11, 1977

Findings Of Fact Respondent owns a sign located on the west side of Interstate Highway 95 (1-95) in the city of Pembroke Park, Florida, 0.2 miles north from the Dade County line which bears the copy "Johnny Walker Red". This sign was created by connecting two previous signs by the use of a panel in the middle. The two former signs were six feet by twelve feet each and located approximately six inches apart. When joined they became one sign six feet by twenty-four feet. An alleged violation-of Section 479.07(2), Florida Statutes, was reported by Petitioner's Outdoor Advertising Inspector for changing the size of the signs without first obtaining a proper permit. Subsequent to the reported violation, a meeting was held between Respondent and representatives of the Petitioner concerning the converting of two signs into one. At the meeting, Petitioner's representative, O.E. Black, Administrator of the Outdoor Advertising section, apparently authorized such joinder if the signs were cut in the middle so that technically they constitute two signs. It was further agreed at that meeting that separate permit tags would be retained as required. The sign (or signs) is presently in accordance with the above policy, and application has been made for the necessary permit. (Testimony of Hackett, Simokat). Sign located on SR 5, 400' North of Kendall Drive, Southwest. This is a sign erected in Dade County which did not bear a State permit tag at the time the alleged violation was noted on January 5, 1976. The sign is located on properties zoned for "general use". After receiving the Notice of Violation, Respondent's representative discovered that four tags instead of two had been placed on a nearby sign owned by the company, and that apparently two of them belonged to the sign in question, but inadvertently had not been affixed. He thereupon placed the two extra permit tags on the offending sign. It is agreed by the parties that the sign is properly tagged and permitted at the present time. (Testimony of Conde, Owens). Sign located on SR 25A, southwest corner of Second Avenue and 54th Street N.W., Miami, Florida. This is a sign that was formerly two signs 6' X 12' which were made into one large sign 6' X 24'. A piece of metal was put between the two signs to join them. There is also a plywood embellishment attached to the merged signs which is the same height as the existing sign, but extends on the right end to make the total area approximately 15' x 28'. A permit was applied for by the Respondent and denied because the sign was less than 500' away from other permitted signs. Though, the signs were erected four or five years ago, the consolidated sign with new dimensions is considered by Petitioner to be a new sign that cannot be permitted because of +he above- mentioned spacing requirements. (Testimony of Conti, Simokat).

Recommendation That the alleged violations against Respondent Empire Advertising Industries, Inc., be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip Bennett, Esquire Room 562, Haydon Burns Building Department of Transportation Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Robert Korner, Esquire 4790 Tamiami Trail Coral Gables, Florida 33134

Florida Laws (3) 479.02479.07479.111
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer