Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Osteopathic General Hospital, is a nonprofit osteopathic hospital in Dade County, Florida. It was established in 1953, and is currently licensed for 264 beds. It is one of two osteopathic hospitals located in the Dade-Monroe County area which is the service area of the Dade-Monroe Health System Agency. It is a full service community and teaching hospital providing care in all areas of osteopathic medicine including, but not limited to, radiology. It maintains an emergency room which is open twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days per week. At the November 30, 1976, meeting of the HSA Review Committee I, Petitioner's proposal for the acquisition of a total body CAT Scanner was recommended for approval by a vote of 6 to 1 with one abstention. At its December 21st meeting, the HSA Board of Directors voted to recommend denial on the basis that South Florida already had sufficient scanners to meet current demand. On January 19, 1977, Petitioner was notified by Respondent, HRS, that the Capital Expenditure proposal was not favorably recommended to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The ground for the unfavorable recommendation was that further installation of CAT scanning equipment would compound low utilization of existing facilities. At the time of the hearing in this case, Nine (9) scanners were in operation in Dade County. Of these nine (9) scanners, five (5) were full body scanners and the remaining four (4) head scanners. Eight of these scanners are hospital owned and one physician owned. An additional CAT Scanner is being installed at American Hospital but no evidence was introduced to establish its projected use. Two additional hospitals in Dade County have outstanding approvals under Section 1122 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.A. 1320a-1) for the installation of CAT Scanning equipment. They are Parkway General and Veterans Administration Hospitals. Outstanding 1122 approval is valid for a period of one year and may be extended for a six months period. At the time of the hearing, three (3) scanners in Dade County were utilized at a rate less than 2,040 scans per year. They are Baptist Hospital, Miami International Hospital and North Shore Hospital. Baptist Hospital is located on the other end of town from Petitioner's facility and is not reasonably accessable to patients at Petitioner's facility. The scanner at Miami International Hospital is a first generation head scanner and not a full body scanner. Even so, the utilization of the scanner at Miami international Hospital is less than 100 scans from the OPA 85 percent criteria. The facility at North Shore Hospital was recently placed at that location. The volume of studies performed at CAT Scanner installations typically grows by more than 25 percent between the first and second years of scanner operation. Therefore, during its first year of operation, it should increase its present utilization rate of 1,220 scans per year to 1,525 scans per year. At that point it would be under utilized to the extent of 515 scans per year which far from accommodates the projected needs of Osteopathic General Hospital, the Petitioner. Figures for 1976, showing the actual use by the nine (9) machines range from a low yearly total of 1,220 to over 3,000. The average annual use per scanner is approximately 2,358 scans. The total number of scans in the area for the calendar year 1976, was approximately 18,864. As of the date of the hearing, Respondent had not developed a position as to guidelines for criteria against which CAT Scanner applications would be reviewed. However, a proposal for such guidelines issued from the office of Community Medical Facilities of the Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on February 21, 1977. The guidelines suggest that community need would be established by a demonstration that other existent CAT Scanners in the same HSA area are being utilized at a minimum of 70 percent level or 1,456 scans per year. A standard which the Respondent accepts is that each CAT Scanner in a particular health system agency area must operate at 85 percent of its capacity. Capacity is determined to be 2,400 patients per year which when multiplied by 85 percent equals a standard of 2,040 scans per year. The HSA uses as a part of its planning criteria the estimate that from 3 to 10 percent of the given population can expect to be scanned in a year. The Dade-Monroe population projected for 1980 is 1,650,000 which would generate an annual patient count between 49,000 and 165,000. Assuming a utilization rate of 2,500 scans per year, between 19 and 64 scanners would be required in the community to accommodate the demand. Petitioner's projected use of the CAT scanner is 2,094 procedures annually. This figure does not include additional procedures incurred by virtue of the participation of Westchester General Hospital, the other osteopathic facility in the Dade-Monroe area. Petitioner projects that the cost per scan to be charged by its facility will be $250.00, which includes both the hospital and physician fee. Frequently, the use of the CAT Scanner will obviate the requirement of one or more alternative procedures which may entail more cost to the patient and higher morbidity. There is a waiting time of at least one to two days for ambulatory or inpatient referral from another hospital to one in which scanners are currently located, Inpatient delay, however, is either nonexistent or significantly less in those same institutions. Petitioner does not refer its patients to those facilities having a utilization rate of below 2,040 per year. The installation of a CAT Scanner in Petitioner's facility would result in a substantial saving in cost in many cases by reducing the length of hospital stay, the number of diagnostic procedures employed and elimination of transportation costs to other facilities. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has established as a guideline for the development of health systems plans that a consumer demand for osteopathic services should be considered by the HSA in light of availability of osteopathic facilities to osteopathic physicians and patients. The Bureau of Health Planning and Resources Development of HEW is sensitive to the possibility of osteopathic concern being either slighted or ignored in many health care settings. The Secretary of HEW, because of his concern about discrimination against populations who wish to be served by osteopathic services and facilities in their communities, strongly encourages State agencies and HSA's to incorporate consideration of the needs of the population being served by such services and to their health plans. There is a definite segment of the population in the Dade-Monroe County area which uses exclusively osteopathic physicians for their medical needs. However, there is no CAT Scanner within the Dade-Monroe area which is either owned or operated by an osteopathic facility. All CAT Scanners within the area are operated by allopathic physicians or facilities.
Recommendation Based upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Respondent's unfavorable recommendation to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare be reversed. DONE and ENTERED this 19 day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL R.N. McDONNELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Eric Haugdahl, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sheldon M. Simons, Esquire Professional Building 3661 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33133
Findings Of Fact Introduction Petitioner, Leesburg Regional Medical Center ("Leesburg"), is a 132-bed acute care private, not-for-profit hospital located at 600 East Dixie Highway, Leesburg, Florida. It offers a full range of general medical services. The hospital sits on land owned by the City of Leesburg. It is operated by the Leesburg hospital Association, an organization made up of individuals who reside within the Northwest Taxing District. By application dated August 13, 1982 petitioner sought a certificate of need (CON) from respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), to construct the following described project: This project includes the addition of 36 medical/surgical beds and 7 SICU beds in existing space and the leasing of a CT scanner (replacement). The addition of the medical/surgical beds is a cost effective way to add needed capacity to the hospital. Twenty-four (24) beds on the third floor will be established in space vacated by surgery and ancillary departments moving into newly constructed space in the current renovation project. A significant portion of this area used to be an obstetric unit in the past; and therefore, is already set up for patient care. The 7 bed SICU unit will be set up on the second floor, also in space vacated as a result of the renovation project. Twelve additional beds will be available on the third and fourth floors as a result of changing single rooms into double rooms. No renovation will be necessary to convert these rooms into double rooms. It is also proposed to replace the current TechniCare head scanner with GE8800 body scanner. Based on the high demand for head and body scans and the excessive amount of maintenance problems and downtime associated with the current scanner, Leesburg Regional needs a reliable, state-of-the-art CT scanner. The cost of the project was broken down as follows: The total project cost is $1,535,000. The construction/renovation portion of the project (24 medical/surgical and 7 SICU beds) is $533,000. Equipment costs will be approximately $200,000. Architectural fees and project development costs total $52,000. The CT scanner will be leased at a monthly cost of $16,222 per month for 5 years. The purchase price of the scanner is $750,000 and that amount is included in the total project cost. The receipt of the application was acknowledged by HRS by letter dated August 27, 1982. That letter requested Leesburg to submit additional information no later than October 10, 1982 in order to cure certain omissions. Such additional information was submitted by Leesburg on October 5, 1982. On November 29, 1982, the administrator for HRS's office of health planning and development issued proposed agency action in the form of a letter advising Leesburg its request to replace a head CT scanner (whole body) at a cost of $750,000 had been approved, but that the remainder of the application had been denied. The basis for the denial was as follows: There are currently 493 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district of HSA II. Based upon the HSP for HSA II, there was an actual utilization ratio of existing beds equivalent to 2.98/1,000 population. When this utilization ratio is applied to the 1987 projected population of 156,140 for Lake/Sumter counties, there is a need for 465 medical/surgical beds by 1987. Thus, there is an excess of 28 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district currently. This action prompted the instant proceeding. At the same time Leesburg's application was being partially denied, an application for a CON by intervenor-respondent, Lake Community Hospital (Lake), was being approved. That proposal involved an outlay of 4.1 million dollars and was generally described in the application as follows: The proposed project includes the renovations and upgrading of patient care areas. This will include improving the hospital's occupancy and staffing efficiencies by reducing Med-Surg Unit-A to 34 beds and eliminating all 3-bed wards. Also reducing Med-Surg Units B and C to 34 beds each and eliminating all 3-bed wards. This will necessitate the construction of a third floor on the A wing to house the present beds in private and semi-private rooms for a total of 34 beds. There is also an immediate need to develop back-to-back six bed ICU and a six-bed CCU for shared support services. This is being done to fulfill JCAH requirements and upgrade patient care by disease entity, patient and M.D. requests. Another need that is presented for consideration is the upgrading of Administrative areas to include a conference room and more Administrative and Business office space. However, the merits of HRS's decision on Lake's application are not at issue in this proceeding. In addition to Lake, there are two other hospitals located in Lake County which provide acute and general hospital service. They are South Lake Memorial Hospital, a 68-bed tax district facility in Clermont, Florida, and Waterman Memorial Hospital, which operates a 154-bed private, not-for-profit facility in Eustis, Florida. There are no hospitals in Sumter County, which lies adjacent to Lake County, and which also shares a subdistrict with that county. The facilities of Lake and Leesburg are less than two miles apart while the Waterman facility is approximately 12 to 14 miles away. South Lake Memorial is around 25 miles from petitioner's facility. Therefore, all three are no more than a 30 minute drive from Leesburg's facility. At the present time, there are 515 acute care beds licensed for Lake County. Of these, 493 are medical/surgical beds and 22 are obstetrical beds. None are designated as pediatric beds. The Proposed Rules Rules 10-16.001 through 10-16.012, Florida Administrative Code, were first noticed by HRS in the Florida Administrative Weekly on August 12, 1983. Notices of changes in these rules were published on September 23, 1983. Thereafter, they were filed with the Department of State on September 26, 1983 and became effective on October 16, 1983. Under new Rule 10-16.004 (1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, subdistrict 7 of district 3 consists of Lake and Sumter Counties. The rule also identifies a total acute care bed need for subdistrict 7 of 523 beds. When the final hearing was held, and evidence heard in this matter, the rules were merely recommendations of the various local health councils forwarded to HRS on June 27, 1983 for its consideration. They had not been adopted or even proposed for adoption at that point in time. Petitioner's Case In health care planning it is appropriate to use five year planning horizons with an overall occupancy rate of 80 percent. In this regard, Leesburg has sought to ascertain the projected acute care bed need in Lake County for the year 1988. Through various witnesses, it has projected this need using three different methodologies. The first methodology used by Leesburg may be characterized as the subdistrict need theory methodology. It employs the "guidelines for hospital care" adopted by the District III Local Health Council on June 27, 1983 and forwarded to HRS for promulgation as formal rules. Such suggestions were ultimately adopted by HRS as a part of Chapter 10-16 effective October 16, 1983. Under this approach, the overall acute care bed need for the entire sixteen county District III was found to be 44 additional beds in the year 1988 while the need within Subdistrict VII (Lake and Sumter Counties) was eight additional beds. 2/ The second approach utilized by Leesburg is the peak occupancy theory methodology. It is based upon the seasonal fluctuation in a hospital's occupancy rates, and used Leesburg's peak season bed need during the months of February and March to project future need. Instead of using the state suggested occupancy rate standard of 80 percent, the sponsoring witness used an 85 percent occupancy rate which produced distorted results. Under this approach, Leesburg calculated a need of 43 additional beds in 1988 in Subdistrict VII. However, this approach is inconsistent with the state-adopted methodology in Rule 10- 5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, and used assumptions not contained in the rule. It also ignores the fact that HRS's rule already gives appropriate consideration to peak demand in determining bed need. The final methodology employed by Leesburg was characterized by Leesburg as the "alternative need methodology based on state need methodology" and was predicated upon the HRS adopted bed need approach in Rule 10-5.11(23) with certain variations. First, Leesburg made non-rule assumptions as to the inflow and outflow of patients. Secondly, it substituted the population by age group for Lake and Sumter Counties for the District population. With these variations, the methodology produced an acute care bed need of 103 additional beds within Lake and Sumter Counties. However, this calculation is inconsistent with the applicable HRS rule, makes assumptions not authorized under the rule, and is accordingly not recognized by HRS as a proper methodology. Leesburg experienced occupancy rates of 91 percent, 80 percent and 73 percent for the months of January, February and March, 1981, respectively. These rates changed to 86 percent, 95 percent and 98 percent during the same period in 1982, and in 1983 they increased to 101.6 percent, 100.1 percent and 95.1 percent. Leesburg's health service area is primarily Lake and Sumter Counties. This is established by the fact that 94.4 percent and 93.9 percent of its admissions in 1980 and 1981, respectively, were from Lake and Sumter Counties. Although South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial are acute care facilities, they do not compete with Leesburg for patients. The staff doctors of the three are not the same, and there is very little crossover, if any, of patients between Leesburg and the other two facilities. However, Lake and Leesburg serve the same patient base, and in 1982 more than 70 percent of their patients came from Lake County. The two compete with one another, and have comparable facilities. Leesburg has an established, well-publicized program for providing medical care to indigents. In this regard, it is a recipient of federal funds for such care, and, unlike Lake, accounts for such care by separate entry on its books. The evidence establishes that Leesburg has the ability to finance the proposed renovation. HRS's Case HRS's testimony was predicated on the assumption that Rule 10-16.004 was not in effect and had no application to this proceeding. Using the bed need methodology enunciated in Rule 10-5.11(23), its expert concluded the overall bed need for the entire District III to be 26 additional beds by the year 1988. This calculation was based upon and is consistent with the formula in the rule. Because there was no existing rule at the time of the final hearing concerning subdistrict need, the witness had no way to determine the bed need, if any, within Subdistrict VII alone. Lake's Case Lake is a 162-bed private for profit acute care facility owned by U.S. Health Corporation. It is located at 700 North Palmetto, Leesburg, Florida. Lake was recently granted a CON which authorized a 4.1 million dollar renovation project. After the renovation is completed all existing three-bed wards will be eliminated. These will be replaced with private and semi-private rooms with no change in overall bed capacity. This will improve the facility's patient utilization rate. The expansion program is currently underway. Like Leesburg, the expert from Lake utilized a methodology different from that adopted for use by HRS. Under this approach, the expert determined total admissions projected for the population, applied an average length of stay to that figure, and arrived at a projected patient day total for each hospital. That figure was then divided by bed complement and 365 days to arrive at a 1988 occupancy percentage. For Subdistrict VII, the 1988 occupancy percentage was 78.2, which, according to the expert, indicated a zero acute care bed need for that year. Lake also presented the testimony of the HRS administrator of the office of community affairs, an expert in health care planning. He corroborated the testimony of HRS's expert witness and concluded that only 26 additional acute care beds would be needed district-wide by the year 1988. This result was arrived at after using the state-adopted formula for determining bed need. During 1981, Lake's actual total dollar write-off for bad debt was around $700,000. This amount includes an undisclosed amount for charity or uncompensated care for indigent patients. Unlike Leesburg, Lake receives no federal funds for charity cases. Therefore, it has no specific accounting entry on its books for charity or indigent care. Although Leesburg rendered $276,484 in charity/uncompensated care during 1981, it is impossible to determine which facility rendered the most services for indigents due to the manner in which Lake maintains its books and records. In any event, there is no evidence that indigents in the Subdistrict have been denied access to hospital care at Lake or any other facility within the county. Lake opines that it will loose 2.6 million dollars in net revenues in the event the application is granted. If true, this in turn would cause an increase in patient charges and a falling behind in technological advances. For the year 1981, the average percent occupancy based on licensed beds for Leesburg, Lake, South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial was as follows: 71.5 percent, 58.7 percent, 63.8 percent and 65.7 percent. The highest utilization occurred in January (81 percent) while the low was in August (58 percent). In 1982, the utilization rate during the peak months for all four facilities was 78 percent. This figure dropped to 66.5 percent for the entire year. Therefore, there is ample excess capacity within the County even during the peak demand months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Leesburg Regional Medical Center for a certificate of need to add 43 acute care beds, and renovate certain areas of its facility to accommodate this addition, be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1983.
The Issue The issues are: (1) Whether Respondent exercised influence within a physician-patient relationship for the purpose of engaging a patient in sexual activity in violation of Subsection 459.015 (1)(l), Florida Statutes; (2) Whether Respondent engaged a patient in sexual activity outside the scope of practice or the scope of generally accepted examination and treatment of the patient in violation of Section 459.0141, Florida Statutes; and (3) If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his license to practice as an osteopathic physician.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Health, Board of Osteopathic Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of osteopathic medicine pursuant to Chapters 455 and 459, Florida Statutes. Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed osteopathic physician in the state of Florida, having been issued License No. OS-004450. Respondent has a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree in clinical psychology and experimental psychology from Temple University, was an assistant professor of psychology at a community college before studying osteopathic medicine, and taught as an assistant professor of psychiatry in family practice at Southeastern Osteopathic Medical School. Respondent completed a residency program at Southeastern Osteopathic Hospital in North Hollywood, Florida, and also completed a three-year family practice residency program. After completing his residency programs, Respondent moved to Sarasota, Florida, and began as a family practice physician. In December 1998, Patient K.C. (K.C.) was 33 years old, married, and the mother of two children, six and two years old. Before getting married, K.C. had lived with her parents. She had attended community college for two years but did not obtain a degree. K.C. had been employed as a sales clerk and clerical staff person. On or about December 29, 1998, K.C. first presented to Respondent suffering from migraine headaches and neck pain, chronic conditions she had suffered for approximately ten years. From December 29, 1998, through or about October 1, 1999, Respondent provided osteopathic medical treatment for pain to K.C. During this period of time, Respondent treated K.C.'s migraine headaches and neck pain with heat, osteopathic manipulation, and prescription medication. Respondent also diagnosed anxiety and depression for K.C. and prescribed medication, Ativan, for this condition. Throughout the time Respondent saw K.C., he also prescribed up to six tablets per day of a sedative, Fioricet. During the time that Respondent was treating K.C., he saw K.C. once or twice a month, except for April, August, and September 1999. Respondent's records reflect that he saw K.C. four times in April, three times in August, and six times in September. There are several manipulation techniques used by Respondent in treating patients. One manipulation technique used by Respondent involves traction of the neck and movement of the patient’s head while the patient is lying down on her back. Another technique, while the patient is lying on her back, involves Respondent’s using his chest to exert pressure down on the patient’s crossed arms and body through the spine to Respondent’s hands located behind her neck and thoracic spine. Another technique has the patient roll over to the side with the leg up to the side while Respondent adjusts her pelvic bone. During this procedure, Respondent’s hand and forearm arm are placed on the buttocks to effect a pushing or pulling of the pelvic bone. The last technique Respondent provides is for the upper thoracic and lower neck area. For this, the patient places her hands on top of her head. Respondent then brings his hands around the torso from behind, placing them at the back of her neck. While the hands provide traction to the neck, Respondent pushes his chest against the spine of the patient to lift the thoracic vertebrae. It is not uncommon during this procedure for Respondent to brush his hands on the patient’s breast. Respondent’s normal office procedure is to do manipulations on patients in his treatment room with the door closed and no other persons present for 10 to 15 minutes. From December 1998 until August 12, 1999, Respondent provided adjustments to K.C. and prescribed medication and did not engage in any sexual activity or relationship with K.C. Prior to August 12, 1999, during his treatments of K.C., Respondent sometimes engaged in "random conversations." For example, during one treatment Respondent asked what kind of car she drove and when she told him, Respondent asked K.C, if her husband cared about her. Respondent told K.C. that a sports utility vehicle (SUV) was a safe vehicle, especially for someone with her condition and indicated that his wife drove an SUV. Respondent then insinuated that if K.C.'s husband cared about her, he should or would buy her an SUV. During another treatment, Respondent told K.C. that she had a good body and asked if she had been a cheerleader. During another treatment, Respondent, while engaging in conversation with K.C., made an unrelated statement about how many times per week the average married couple has sex. At another time, while treating K.C. at his office, Respondent mentioned that the sex life of people with chronic pain may be affected by their condition and asked if her sex life was so affected. Still, during another treatment, Respondent asked K.C. about her relationship with her husband, specifically inquiring as to how they related to one another. In the summer of 1999, K.C. traveled by car to Canada to visit her husband's family. For K.C., the trip to Canada was stressful and while there, she was in a lot pain. Because of the pain she was experiencing, K.C. called Respondent's office while she was still out-of-town to schedule an appointment for an adjustment upon her return to Sarasota and to request that one of her prescriptions be refilled. After K.C. returned from the trip to Canada, on the morning of August 13, 1999, she went to Respondent's office for her scheduled appointment for an adjustment. When K.C. arrived at Respondent's office, she was in a lot of pain and began to cry. K.C. told the nurse or medical assistant that she was in a lot of pain and had had a "bad trip to Canada." The nurse then escorted K.C. to an examination room. When Respondent came into to examination room, K.C. was sobbing and could hardly talk. Respondent asked K.C. to explain why she was so upset. Respondent proceeded to do an adjustment and, again, asked K.C. why she was so upset. K.C. described her feelings to Respondent, who then told K.C. that he used to counsel with patients, that he had helped a girl just like her, and that he could help her if she were willing to come back to the office and talk with him. After K.C. agreed to come back and talk to Respondent, he asked K.C. how he could reach her. In response, K.C. gave Respondent her pager number. After K.C.'s morning appointment on August 13, 1999, Respondent contacted K.C. on her pager and asked if she had made arrangements for her sons to be taken care of so that she could come back to the office to talk with him. K.C. told Respondent that she had made arrangements for her sons and agreed to return to Respondent's office that afternoon. When K.C. returned to Respondent's office on the afternoon of August 13, 1999, Beverly Carrington (Beverly), a medical assistant in Respondent's office, was vacuuming the office. At Respondent's direction, Beverly took K.C. to an examination room. Several minutes later Respondent came into the examination room and told K.C. that he had to make some calls and that he would be back in a few minutes. Respondent gave K.C. a sandwich that he said he had left over from lunch. After Respondent gave K.C. the sandwich, he left the examination room, closing the door behind him. Respondent eventually returned to the examination room and sat in a chair next to the chair in which K.C. was sitting. Respondent began asking K.C. questions about herself, similar to questions that she had been asked by counselors or psychologists. While Respondent was talking to K.C., Beverly knocked on the door of the examination room and told Respondent that she had finished vacuuming the office. Respondent indicated to Beverly that she could go home and soon thereafter, Petitioner heard Beverly leave the building.1 After Beverly left the office, Respondent continued to ask K.C. questions for the next 15 or 20 minutes. Respondent then asked K.C. to get up from her chair, face the mirror in the room, and look in the mirror. K.C. felt uncomfortable looking in the mirror, so she kept her head down. Respondent then put his hands on K.C.'s face and held her face up so that she was looking in the mirror. While doing this, Respondent asked K.C., "Don't you know you're beautiful?" Respondent placed his hands on K.C.'s shoulders and brushed his lips against her neck. Respondent began rubbing or massaging K.C.'s neck and while doing so told K.C. that she was "real tight in [her] neck" and that he would like to work on her neck again and see if he could loosen it up and help her relax. Respondent then led her to the examination table and "proceeded to rub [her] neck and then he started to take off [her] clothes." While on the examination table, Respondent helped K.C. take off her shirt, shorts, bra, and shoes and the only remaining clothing that she had on was her underwear. After her clothes were removed, K.C. presumed Respondent would cover her with a towel or give her a robe, but he did not provide K.C. with any covering. Instead, Respondent sat behind K.C., massaged her neck, and talked to her "soothingly" for about ten minutes. Respondent then took his hands and rubbed her arms and then moved his hands to her breasts, and then down to her waist and towards her panties. When Respondent moved toward K.C.'s panties, she would "tense up" and then Respondent would "start rubbing up the top part of her again." Respondent's hands again went toward her underwear and he "put his hand to go under [K.C's] underwear." K.C. was nervous about what was going on and told Respondent that she was uncomfortable. After K.C. told Respondent that she was uncomfortable, he acknowledged that she seemed uncomfortable. Respondent then handed K.C. her clothes, assisted her in sitting up on the examination table, and sat on the table while K.C. dressed herself. After talking to Respondent for about five minutes, K.C. left the doctor's office with a worse headache, feeling distraught. K.C. next saw Respondent a few days later, on a Monday or Tuesday, for an adjustment for a headache and pain. Respondent performed an adjustment on K.C. that day. During this appointment, Respondent, again, told K.C. that he wanted to help and counsel her. He told K.C. about an upcoming gun show and stated that they could talk while driving to the gun show. Later that week, Respondent paged K.C. and asked her to come to his office. In response to Respondent's request, K.C. went to Respondent's office. Once there, Respondent took K.C. to an examination room and talked to her again about the gun show. Respondent again told her that he would like for her to go to the gun show with him so that they could have time to talk. K.C. was in Respondent's office that day about ten minutes and did not receive a treatment. A few days later, on Saturday, K.C. met Respondent at his office to go the gun show. When she got there, Respondent recommended that she leave her car at the office and ride in his Toyota 4-Runner so that they could talk. Respondent stated that he and K.C. were going somewhere in Palmetto, Florida, but they actually ended up at the Manatee Civic Center. While Respondent was driving to the gun show, he told K.C. that he hoped that he was not mistaken as to the dates of the gun show. In fact, when Respondent and K.C. arrived at the Manatee Civic Center, there was no one there. Nevertheless, Respondent pulled his car into a space in the parking lot on the side of the building. Respondent left the car running and took off his seat belt as he talked to K.C. At some point, Respondent kicked his shoes off and loosened his pants and/or pulled them down, reached over toward K.C., took off her seat belt, told K.C. to get more comfortable, and adjusted her power seat in his Toyota 4-Runner to lean back more. Respondent then touched K.C.'s genitals and proceeded to get on top of her and have intercourse. While on top of her, Respondent pointed out that there were police cars in the back of the parking lot. Once Respondent pointed out the police cars, K.C. observed two or four police cars in the parking lot. Even though there were no policemen in the cars, K.C. expressed concern about the police cars to Respondent. Respondent told K.C. that she should not worry because the windows in his vehicle were tinted. Respondent and K.C. were in the parking lot about 20 minutes, although the intercourse was only three to five minutes. After the intercourse, Respondent put his clothes back on or pulled his pants up and drove back to his office. This was the first time that Respondent and K.C. had intercourse. A few days later, K.C. and Respondent engaged in sexual activity in Respondent’s vehicle during lunch while they drove to Marina Jack’s. Respondent picked up lunch at the hospital and then returned to the parking lot of his office, where K.C. met him. K.C. left her car in the parking lot and got in Respondent's Toyota 4-Runner. Respondent gave K.C. her lunch and then "fingered" her while she ate her lunch as he drove to Marina Jack's. During the period between August and October 1999, K.C. went to Respondent's house on Siesta Key. The house was in a gated community, and in order to gain entry, K.C. told the guard at the gate that she was going to Respondent's house and would give the guard her name or another name that Respondent had told her to use. At other times, K.C. would follow Respondent through the gate in her car. Some of these visits were on weekdays during Respondent's lunch break. During some of those visits, K.C. and Respondent would talk and have intercourse. K.C. and Respondent had intercourse at Respondent's house about ten times. One Saturday between August and October 1999, K.C. went to Respondent's house after he invited her to come out and talk to him and go to the beach. That day Respondent met K.C. somewhere in town and drove her to his house. When they arrived at Respondent's house, K.C. took out a bathing suit and went upstairs to change. It is unclear whether K.C. and Respondent had intercourse or engaged in any sexual activity on this day. K.C. contemporaneously reported the sexual relationship with Respondent to her husband and to a minister who had known and counseled her before she met Respondent. K.C. told her minister that the sexual activities with Respondent had occurred in Respondent's office, vehicle, and home. K.C. and Respondent had intercourse a couple of times at the home of a friend of Respondent's, Carole, that was on Tangerine Street and at the home of one of Respondent's friends, Jack Kentish. One Sunday morning in late September, K.C. went to Respondent’s office.2 While there, she went into an examination room to change clothes so that she would have attire appropriate to accompany Respondent to a gun show. About that time, K.C.'s husband showed up at Respondent's office, knocked on the office door, expressed his displeasure at the fact K.C. was there, and had a verbal confrontation with Respondent. K.C.'s husband stopped at Respondent's office after he saw his wife's car parked there. The incident described in paragraph 29, led to Respondent sending a letter dated September 28, 1999, to K.C., advising her that his professional relationship with her would terminate within 30 days. The reason for the 30 days was to allow K.C. time to find another physician. In October 2000, K.C. was admitted to Sarasota Memorial Hospital suffering from major depression, Fioricet dependence, and chronic pain. At or near the time of her admission and at this proceeding, K.C. acknowledged that she had some loss of memory surrounding the events related to the three-month period in which Respondent engaged in improper sexual conduct with her.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Osteopathic Medicine, enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Subsection 450.015(1)(l) and Section 459.0141, Florida Statutes, and Subsection 459.015(1)(bb), Florida Statutes (1999), now 459.015(1)(pp), Florida Statutes, and suspending his license to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida for one year and imposing an administrative fine of $2,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 2003.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA or the Agency) should approve the application for certificate of need (CON) 7700 filed by Miami Beach Healthcare Group, LTD. d/b/a Miami Heart Institute (Miami Heart or MH).
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing and taking action on CON applications pursuant to Chapter 408, Florida Statutes. The applicant, Miami Heart, operates a hospital facility known as Miami Heart Institute which, at the time of hearing, was comprised of a north campus (consisting of 273 licensed beds) and a south campus (consisting of 258 beds) in Miami, Florida. The two campuses operate under a single license which consolidated the operation of the two facilities. The consolidation of the license was approved by CON 7399 which was issued by the Agency prior to the hearing of this case. The Petitioner, Mount Sinai, is an existing health care facility doing business in the same service district. On February 4, 1994, AHCA published a fixed need pool of zero adult inpatient psychiatric beds for the planning horizon applicable to this batching cycle. The fixed need pool was not challenged. On February 18, 1994, Miami Heart submitted its letter of intent for the first hospital batching cycle of 1994, and sought to add twenty adult general inpatient psychiatric beds at the Miami Heart Institute south campus. Such facility is located in the Agency's district 11 and is approximately two (2) miles from the north campus. Notice of that letter was published in the March 11, 1994, Florida Administrative Weekly. Miami Heart's letter of intent provided, in pertinent part: By this letter, Miami Beach Healthcare Group, Ltd., d/b/a Miami Heart Institute announces its intent to file a Certificate of Need Application on or before March 23, 1994 for approval to establish 20 hospital inpatient general psychiatric beds for adults at Miami Heart Institute. Thus, the applicant seeks approval for this project pursuant to Sections 408.036(1)(h), Florida Statutes. The proposed capital expenditure for this project shall not exceed $1,000,000 and will include new construction and the renovation of existing space. Miami Heart Institute is located in Local Health Council District 11. There are no subsdistricts for Hospital Inpatient General Psychiatric Beds for Adults in District 11. The applicable need formula for Hospital General Psychiatric Beds for Adults is contained within Rule 59C-1.040(4)(c), F.A.C. The Agency published a fixed need of "0" for Hospital General Psychiatric Beds for Adults in District 11 for this batching cycle. However, "not normal" circumstances exist within District which justify approval of this project. These circumstances are that Miami Beach Community Hospital, which is also owned by Miami Beach Healthcare Group, Ltd., and which has an approved Certificate of Need Application to consol- idate its license with that of the Miami Heart Institute, has pending a Certificate of Need Application to delicense up to 20 hospital inpatient general psychiatric beds for adults. The effect of the application, which is the subject of this Letter of Intent, will be to relocate 20 of the delicensed adult psychiatric beds to the Miami Heart Institute. Because of the "not normal" circumstances alleged in the Miami Heart letter of intent, the Agency extended a grace period to allow competing letters of intent to be filed. No additional letters of intent were submitted during the grace period. On March 23, 1994, Miami Heart timely submitted its CON application for the project at issue, CON no. 7700. Notice of the application was published in the April 8, 1994, Florida Administrative Weekly. Such application was deemed complete by the Agency and was considered to be a companion to the delicensure of the north campus beds. On July 22, 1994, the Agency published in the Florida Administrative Weekly its preliminary decision to approve CON no. 7700. In the same batch as the instant case, Cedars Healthcare Group (Cedars), also in district 11, applied to add adult psychiatric beds to Cedars Medical Center through the delicensure of an equal number of adult psychiatric beds at Victoria Pavilion. Cedars holds a single license for the operation of both Cedars Medical Center and Victoria Pavilion. As in this case, the Agency gave notice of its intent to grant the CON application. Although this "transfer" was initially challenged, it was subsequently dismissed. Although filed at the same time (and, therefore, theoretically within the same batch), the Cedars CON application and the Miami Heart CON application were not comparatively reviewed by the Agency. The Agency determined the applicants were merely seeking to relocate their own licensed beds. Based upon that determination, MH's application was evaluated in the context of the statutory criteria, the adult psychiatric beds and services rule (Rule 59C-1.040, Florida Administrative Code), the district 11 local health plan, and the 1993 state health plan. Ms. Dudek also considered the utilization data for district 11 facilities. Mount Sinai timely filed a petition challenging the proposed approval of CON 7700 and, for purposes of this proceeding only, the parties stipulated that MS has standing to raise the issues remaining in this cause. Mount Sinai's existing psychiatric unit utilization is presently at or near full capacity, and MS' existing unit would not provide an adequate, available, or accessible alternative to Miami Heart's proposal, unless additional bed capacity were available to MS in the future through approval of additional beds or changes in existing utilization. Miami Heart's proposal to establish twenty adult general inpatient psychiatric beds at its Miami Heart Institute south campus was made in connection with its application to delicense twenty adult general inpatient psychiatric beds at its north campus. The Agency advised MH to submit two CON applications: one for the delicensure (CON no. 7474) and one for the establishment of the twenty beds at the south campus (CON no. 7700). The application to delicense the north campus beds was expeditiously approved and has not been challenged. As to the application to establish the twenty beds at the south campus, the following statutory criteria are not at issue: Section 408.035(1)(c), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (m), (n), (o) and (2)(b) and (e), Florida Statutes. The parties have stipulated that Miami Heart meets, at least minimally, those criteria. During 1993, Miami Heart made the business decision to cease operations at its north campus and to seek the Agency's approval to relocate beds and services from that facility to other facilities owned by MH, including the south campus. Miami Heart does not intend to delicense the twenty beds at the north campus until the twenty beds are licensed at the south campus. The goal is merely to transfer the existing program with its services to the south campus. Miami Heart did not seek beds from a fixed need pool. Since approximately April, 1993, the Miami Heart north campus has operated with the twenty bed adult psychiatric unit and with a limited number of obstetrical beds. The approval of CON no. 7700 will not change the overall total number of adult general inpatient psychiatric beds within the district. The adult psychiatric program at MH experiences the highest utilization of any program in district 11, with an average length of stay that is consistent with other adult programs around the state. Miami Heart's existing psychiatric program was instituted in 1978. Since 1984, there has been little change in nursing and other staff. The program provides a full continuum of care, with outpatient programs, aftercare, and support programs. Nearly ninety-nine percent of the program's inpatient patient days are attributable to patients diagnosed with serious mental disorders. The Miami Heart program specializes in a biological approach to psychiatric cases in the diagnosis and treatment of affective disorders, including a variety of mood disorders and related conditions. The Miami Heart program is distinctive from other psychiatric programs in the district. If the MH program were discontinued, the patients would have limited alternatives for access to the same diagnostic and treatment services in the district. There are no statutes or rules promulgated which specifically address the transfer of psychiatric beds or services from one facility owned by a health care entity to another facility also owned by the same entity. In reviewing the instant CON application, the Agency determined it has the discretion to evaluate each transfer case based upon the review criteria and to consider the appropriate weight factors should be given. Factors which may affect the review include the change of location, the utilization of the existing services, the quality of the existing programs and services, the financial feasibility, architectural issues, and any other factor critical to the review process. In this case, the weight given to the numeric need criteria was not significant. The Agency determined that because the transfer would not result in a change to the overall bed inventory, the calculated fixed need pool did not apply to the instant application. In effect, because the calculation of numeric need was inapplicable, this case must be considered "not normal" pursuant to Rule 59C-1.040(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The Agency determined that other criteria were to be given greater consideration. Such factors were the reasonableness of the proposal, the ability to afford access, the applicant's ability to provide a quality program, and the project's financial feasibility. The Agency determined that, on balance, this application should be approved as the statutory and other review criteria were met. Although put on notice of the other CON applications, Mount Sinai did not file an application for psychiatric beds at the same time as Miami Heart or Cedars. Mount Sinai did not claim that the proposed delicensures and transfers made beds available for competitive review. The Agency has interpreted Rule 59C-1.040, Florida Administrative Code, to mean that it will not normally approve an application for beds or services unless the statutory and rule criteria are met, including the need determination criteria. There is no list of circumstances which are routinely considered "not normal" by the Agency. In this case, the proposed transfer of beds was, in itself, considered "not normal." The approval of Miami Heart's application would allow an existing program to continue. As a result, the overhead to maintain two campuses would be reduced. Further, the relocation would allow the program to continue to provide access, both geographically and financially, to the same patient service area. And, since the program has the highest utilization rate of any adult program in the district, its continuation would be beneficial to the area. The program has an established referral base for admissions to the facility. The transfer is reasonable for providing access to the medically under-served. The quality of care, while not in issue, would be expected to continue at its existing level or improve. The transfer would allow better access to ancillary hospital departments and consulting specialists who may be needed even though the primary diagnosis is psychiatric. The cost of the transfer when compared to the costs to be incurred if the transfer is not approved make the approval a benefit to the service area. If the program is not relocated, Medicaid access could change if the hospital is reclassified from a general facility to a specialty facility. The proposed cost for the project does not exceed one million dollars. If the north campus must be renovated, a greater capital expenditure would be expected. The expected impact on competition for other providers is limited due to the high utilization for all programs in the vicinity. The subject proposal is consistent with the district and state health care plans and the need for health care facilities and services. The services being transferred is an existing program which is highly utilized and which is not creating "new beds." As such, the proposal complies with Section 408.035(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization, and adequacy of like and existing services in the district will not be adversely affected by the approval of the subject application. The proposed transfer is consistent with, and appropriate, in light of these criteria. Therefore, the proposal complies with Section 408.035(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The subject application demonstrates a full continuum of care with safeguards to assure that alternatives to inpatient care are fully utilized when appropriate. Therefore, the availability and adequacy of other services, such as outpatient care, has been demonstrated and would deter unnecessary utilization. Thus, Miami Heart has shown its application complies with Section 408.035(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Miami Heart has also demonstrated that the probable impact of its proposal is in compliance with Section 408.035(1)(l), Florida Statutes. The proposed transfer will not adversely impact the costs of providing services, the competition on the supply of services, or the improvements or innovations in the financing and delivery of services which foster competition, promote quality assurance, and cost-effectiveness. Miami Heart has taken an innovative approach to promote quality assurance and cost effectiveness. Its purpose, to close a facility and relocate beds (removing unnecessary acute care beds in the process), represents a departure from the traditional approach to providing health care services. By approving Miami Heart's application, overhead costs associated with the unnecessary facility will be eliminated. There is no less costly, more efficient alternative which would allow the continuation of the services and program Miami Heart has established at the north campus than the approval of transfer to the south campus. The MH proposal is most practical and readily available solution which will allow the north campus to close and the beds and services to remain available and accessible. The renovation of the medical surgical space at the south campus to afford a location for the psychiatric unit is the most practical and readily available solution which will allow the north campus to close and the beds and services to remain available and accessible. In totality, the circumstances of this case make the approval of Miami Heart's application for CON no. 7700 the most reasonable and practical solution given the "not normal" conditions of this application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order approving CON 7700 as recommended in the SAAR. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 5th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4755 Note: Proposed findings of fact are to contain one essential fact per numbered paragraph. Proposed findings of fact paragraphs containing multiple sentences with more than one statement of fact are difficult to review. In reviewing for this case, where all sentences were accurate and supported by the recorded cited, the paragraph has been accepted. If the paragraph contained mixed statements where one sentence was an accurate statement of fact but the others were not, the paragraph has been rejected. Similarly, if one sentence was editorial comment, argument, or an unsupported statement to a statement of fact, the paragraph has been rejected. Proposed findings of fact should not include argument, editorial comments, or statements of fact mixed with such comments. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner, Mount Sinai: Paragraphs 1 through 13 were cited as stipulated facts. Paragraph 14 is rejected as irrelevant. With regard to paragraph 15 it is accepted that Miami Heart made the business decision to move the psychiatric beds beds from the north campus to the south campus. Any inference created by the remainder of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 16 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 17 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraph 19 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 20 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 21 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 22 is accepted. Paragraph 23 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 24 is accepted. Paragraph 25 is rejected as repetitive, or immaterial, unnecessary to the resolution of the issues. Paragraph 26 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 27 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 28 is accepted but not relevant. Paragraphs 29 and 30 are accepted. Paragraphs 31 through 33 are rejected as argument, comment or irrelevant. Paragraph 34 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 35 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact, or irrelevant as the FNP was not in dispute. Paragraph 36 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 37 is rejected as repetitive, or comment. Paragraph 38 is rejected as repetitive, comment or conclusion of law, not fact, or irrelevant. Paragraph 39 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 40 is accepted. Paragraph 41, 42, and 43 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence and/or argument. Paragraph 44 is rejected as argument and comment on the testimony. Paragraph 45 is rejected as argument, irrelevant, and/or not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 46 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 47 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 48 is rejected as comment, argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 49 is rejected as comment on testimony. It is accepted that the proposed relocation or transfer of beds is a "not normal" circumstance. Paragraph 50 is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 51 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 52 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 53 is rejected as argument, comment or recitation of testimony, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 54 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 55 is rejected as irrelevant, comment, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 56 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 57 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 58 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 59 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 60 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 61 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 62 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 63 is accepted. Paragraph 64 is rejected as irrelevant. Mount Sinai could have filed in this batch given the not normal circumstances disclosed in the Miami Heart notice. Paragraph 65 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 66 is rejected as comment or irrelevant. Paragraph 67 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 68 is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 69 is rejected as argument, comment or irrelevant. Paragraph 70 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, Agency: Paragraphs 1 through 6 are accepted. With the deletion of the words "cardiac catheterization" and the inclusion of the word "psychiatric beds" in place, paragraph 7 is accepted. Cardiac catheterization is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 8 is accepted. The second sentence of paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence or an error of law, otherwise, the paragraph is accepted. Paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraphs 11 through 17 are accepted. Paragraph 18 is rejected as conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraphs 19 and 20 are accepted. The first two sentences of paragraph 21 are accepted; the remainder rejected as conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 22 is rejected as comment or argument. Paragraph 23 is accepted. Paragraph 24 is rejected as argument, speculation, or irrelevant. Paragraph 25 is accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, Miami Heart: Paragraphs 1 through 13 are accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 14 is accepted; the remainder is rejected as contrary to law or irrelevant since MS did not file in the batch when it could have. Paragraph 15 is accepted. Paragraph 16 is accepted as the Agency's statement of its authority or policy in this case, not fact. Paragraphs 17 through 20 are accepted. Paragraph 21 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 22 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 23 through 35 are accepted. Paragraph 36 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraphs 37 through 40 are accepted. Paragraph 41 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence to the extent that it concludes the distance to be one mile; evidence deemed credible placed the distance at two miles. Paragraphs 42 through 47 are accepted. Paragraph 48 is rejected as comment. Paragraphs 49 through 57 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 R. Terry Rigsby Geoffrey D. Smith Wendy Delvecchio Blank, Rigsby & Meenan, P.A. 204 S. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lesley Mendelson Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration 325 John Knox Road, Suite 301 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4131 Stephen Ecenia Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Suite 420 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Eugene W. Williams, II, is an osteopathic physician licensed in Florida, and was so licensed at all times relevant to this proceeding. His address is 4394 Palm Beach Boulevard, Fort Myers, Florida 33905. On June 21, 1979, Sue Riley presented herself to Respondent for treatment of a fractured left distal radius. Respondent ordered arm elevation and ice bag treatment to reduce the swelling. The next day, he set the arm in a cast and performed a closed reduction. The injured arm was initially x-rayed at the hospital emergency room on June 21, 1979, and was not x-rayed again until July 5, 1979, when Respondent noted that the fracture was not closed. He then referred the patient to an orthopedic specialist. The testimony of Petitioner's expert witness indicated that a second X ray should have been taken after casting rather than two weeks later to insure that the fracture was, in fact, closed. Without such an X ray, Respondent could not be certain that the fracture was closed initially or that it had not reopened. Respondent's testimony and that of two other experienced physicians established that it is not uncommon to omit the X ray immediately after casting. In their view, no X ray is needed for ten days to two weeks provided the fracture appears to have been closed and properly aligned. Respondent's testimony established that all indications were favorable following casting and that he did not believe an X ray was needed for ten days to two weeks.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Second Amended Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED THIS 14th day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James B. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 JulieAnn Ricco, Esquire 1655 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard Suite 106, Forum III West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy J. Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Certificate of Need Application No. 8614, filed by Vencor Hospitals South, Inc., meets, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule criteria. Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration relied upon an unpromulgated and invalid rule in preliminarily denying CON Application No. 8614.
Findings Of Fact Vencor Hospital South, Inc. (Vencor), is the applicant for certificate of need (CON) No. 8614 to establish a 60-bed long term care hospital in Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), the state agency authorized to administer the CON program in Florida, preliminarily denied Vencor's CON application. On January 10, 1997, AHCA issued its decision in the form of a State Agency Action Report (SAAR) indicating, as it also did in its Proposed Recommended Order, that the Vencor application was denied primarily due to a lack of need for a long term care hospital in District 8, which includes Lee County. Vencor is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Vencor, Inc., a publicly traded corporation, founded in 1985 by a respiratory/physical therapist to provide care to catastrophically ill, ventilator-dependent patients. Initially, the corporation served patients in acute care hospitals, but subsequently purchased and converted free-standing facilities. In 1995, Vencor merged with Hillhaven, which operated 311 nursing homes. Currently, Vencor, its parent, and related corporations operate 60 long term care hospitals, 311 nursing homes, and 40 assisted living facilities in approximately 46 states. In Florida, Vencor operates five long term care hospitals, located in Tampa, St. Petersburg, North Florida (Green Cove Springs), Coral Gables, and Fort Lauderdale. Pursuant to the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, filed on October 2, 1997, the parties agreed that: On August 26, 1996, Vencor submitted to AHCA a letter of intent to file a Certificate of Need Application seeking approval for the construction of a 60-bed long term care hospital to be located in Fort Myers, AHCA Health Planning District 8; Vencor's letter of intent and board resolution meet requirements of Sections 408.037(4) and 408.039(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59C-1.008(1), Florida Administrative Code, and were timely filed with both AHCA and the local health council, and notice was properly published; Vencor submitted to AHCA its initial Certificate of Need Application (CON Action No. 8614) for the proposed project on September 25, 1996, and submitted its Omissions Response on November 11, 1996; Vencor's Certificate of Need Application contains all of the minimum content items required in Section 408.037, Florida Statutes; Both Vencor's initial CON Application and its Omissions Response were timely filed with AHCA and the local health council. During the hearing, the parties also stipulated that Vencor's Schedule 2 is complete and accurate. In 1994, AHCA adopted rules defining long term care and long term care hospitals. Rule 59C-1.002(29), Florida Administrative Code, provides that: "Long term care hospital" means a hospital licensed under Chapter 395, Part 1, F.S., which meets the requirements of Part 412, Subpart B, paragraph 412.23(e), [C]ode of Federal Regulations (1994), and seeks exclusion from the Medicare prospective payment system for inpatient hospital services. Other rules distinguishing long term care include those related to conversions of beds and facilities from one type of health care to another. AHCA, the parties stipulated, has no rule establishing a uniform numeric need methodology for long term care beds and, therefore, no fixed need pool applicable to the review of Vencor's CON application. Numeric Need In the absence of any AHCA methodology or need publication, Vencor is required to devise its own methodology to demonstrate need. Rule 59C-1.008(e) provides in pertinent part: If no agency policy exists, the applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict, or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Vencor used a numeric need analysis which is identical to that prepared by the same health planner, in 1995, for St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc. (St. Petersburg). The St. Petersburg project proposed that Vencor would manage the facility. Unlike the current proposal for new construction, St. Petersburg was a conversion of an existing but closed facility. AHCA accepted that analysis and issued CON 8213 to St. Petersburg. The methodology constitutes a use rate analysis, which calculates the use rate of a health service among the general population and applies that to the projected future population of the district. The use rate analysis is the methodology adopted in most of AHCA's numeric need rules. W. Eugene Nelson, the consultant health planner for Vencor, derived a historic utilization rate from the four districts in Florida in which Vencor operates long term care hospitals. That rate, 19.7 patient days per 1000 population, when applied to the projected population of District 8 in the year 2000, yields an average daily census of 64 patients. Mr. Nelson also compared the demographics of the seven counties of District 8 to the rest of the state, noting in particular the sizable, coastal population centers and the significant concentration of elderly, the population group which is disproportionately served in long term care hospitals. The proposed service area is all of District 8. By demonstrating the numeric need for 64 beds and the absence of any existing long term care beds in District 8, Vencor established the numeric need for its proposed 60-bed long term care hospital. See Final Order in DOAH Case No. 97-4419RU. Statutory Review Criteria Additional criteria for evaluating CON applications are listed in Subsections 408.035(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, and the rules which implement that statute. (1)(a) need in relation to state and district health plans. The 1993 State Health Plan, which predates the establishment of long term care rules, contains no specific preferences for evaluating CON applications for long term care hospitals. The applicable local plan is the District 8 1996-1997 Certificate of Need Allocation Factors Report, approved on September 9, 1996. The District 8 plan, like the State Health Plan, contains no mention of long term care hospitals. In the SAAR, AHCA applied the District 8 and state health plan criteria for acute care hospital beds to the review of Vencor's application for long term care beds, although agency rules define the two as different. The acute care hospital criteria are inapplicable to the review of this application for CON 8614 and, therefore, there are no applicable state or district health plan criteria for long term care. (1)(b) availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization and adequacy of like and existing services in the district; and (1)(d) availability and adequacy of alternative health care facilities in the district. Currently, there are no long term care hospitals in District 8. The closest long term care hospitals are in Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Fort Lauderdale, all over 100 miles from Fort Myers. In the SAAR, approving the St. Petersburg facility, two long term care hospitals in Tampa were discussed as alternatives. By contract, the SAAR preliminarily denying Vencor's application lists as alternatives CMR facilities, nursing homes which accept Medicare patients, and hospital based skilled nursing units. AHCA examined the quantity of beds available in other health care categories in reliance on certain findings in the publication titled Subacute Care: Policy Synthesis And Market Area Analysis, a report submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, on November 1, 1995, by Levin-VHI, Inc. ("the Lewin Report"). The Lewin Report notes the similarities between the type of care provided in long term care, CMR and acute care hospitals, and in hospital-based subacute care units, and subacute care beds in community nursing homes. The Lewin Report also acknowledges that "subacute care" is not well-defined. AHCA has not adopted the Lewin Report by rule, nor has it repealed its rules defining long term care as a separate and district health care category. For the reasons set forth in the Final Order issued simultaneously with this Recommended Order, AHCA may not rely on the Lewin Report to create a presumption that other categories are "like and existing" alternatives to long term care, or to consider services outside District 8 as available alternatives. Additionally, Vencor presented substantial evidence to distinguish its patients from those served in other types of beds. The narrow range of diagnostic related groups or DRGs served at Vencor includes patients with more medically complex multiple system failures than those in CMR beds. With an average length of stay of 60 beds, Vencor's patients are typically too sick to withstand three hours of therapy a day, which AHCA acknowledged as the federal criteria for CMR admissions. Vencor also distinguished its patients, who require 7 1/2 to 8 hours of nursing care a day, as compared to 2 1/2 to 3 hours a day in nursing homes. Similarly, the average length of stay in nursing home subacute units is less than 41 days. The DRG classifications which account for 80 percent of Vencor's admissions represent only 7 percent of admissions to hospital based skilled nursing units, and 10 to 11 percent of admissions to nursing home subacute care units. Vencor also presented the uncontroverted testimony of Katherine Nixon, a clinical case manager whose duties include discharge planning for open heart surgery for patients at Columbia-Southwest Regional Medical Center (Columbia-Southwest), an acute care hospital in Fort Myers. Ms. Nixon's experience is that 80 percent of open heart surgery patients are discharged home, while 20 percent require additional inpatient care. Although Columbia-Southwest has a twenty-bed skilled nursing unit with two beds for ventilator-dependent patients, those beds are limited to patients expected to be weaned within a week. Finally, Vencor presented results which are preliminary and subject to peer review from its APACHE (Acute Physiology, Age, and Chronic Health Evaluation) Study. Ultimately, Vencor expects the study to more clearly distinguish its patient population. In summary, Vencor demonstrated that a substantial majority of patients it proposes to serve are not served in alternative facilities, including CMR hospitals, hospital-based skilled nursing units, or subacute units in community nursing homes. Expert medical testimony established the inappropriateness of keeping patients who require long term care in intensive or other acute care beds, although that occurs in District 8 when patients refuse to agree to admissions too distant from their homes. (1)(c) ability and record of providing quality of care. The parties stipulated that Vencor's application complies with the requirement of Subsection 408.035(1)(c). (1)(e) probable economics of joint or shared resources; (1)(g) need for research and educational facilities; and (1)(j) needs of health maintenance organizations. The parties stipulated that the review criteria in Subsection 408.035(1)(e), (g) and (j) are not at issue. (f) need in the district for special equipment and services not reasonably and economically accessible in adjoining areas. Based on the experiences of Katherine Nixon, it is not reasonable for long term care patients to access services outside District 8. Ms. Nixon also testified that patients are financially at a disadvantage if placed in a hospital skilled nursing unit rather than a long term care hospital. If a patient is not weaned as quickly as expected, Medicare reimbursement after twenty days decreases to 80 percent. In addition, the days in the hospital skilled nursing unit are included in the 100 day Medicare limit for post-acute hospitalization rehabilitation. By contrast, long term care hospitalization preserves the patient's ability under Medicare to have further rehabilitation services if needed after a subsequent transfer to a nursing home. (h) resources and funds, including personnel to accomplish project. Prior to the hearing, the parties stipulated that Vencor has sufficient funds to accomplish the project, and properly documented its source of funds in Schedule 3 of the CON application. Vencor has a commitment for $10 million to fund this project of approximately $8.5 million. At the hearing, AHCA also agreed with Vencor that the staffing and salary schedule, Schedule 6, is reasonable. (i) immediate and long term financial feasibility of the proposal. Vencor has the resources to establish the project and to fund short term operating losses. Vencor also reasonably projected that revenues will exceed expenses in the second year of operation. Therefore, Vencor demonstrated the short and long term financial feasibility of its proposal. needs of entities serving residents outside the district. Vencor is not proposing that any substantial portion of it services will benefit anyone outside District 8. probable impact on costs of providing health services; effects of competition. There is no evidence of an adverse impact on health care costs. There is preliminary data from the APACHE study which tends to indicate the long term care costs are lower than acute care costs. No adverse effects of competition are shown and AHCA did not dispute the fact that Vencor's proposal is supported by acute care hospitals in District 8. costs and methods of proposed construction; and (2)((a)-(c) less costly alternatives to proposed capital expenditure. The prehearing stipulation includes agreement that the design is reasonable, and that proposed construction costs are below the median in that area. past and proposed service to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Vencor has a history of providing Medicaid and indigent care in the absence of any legal requirements to do so. The conditions proposed of 3 percent of total patient days Medicaid and 2 percent for indigent/charity patients proposed by Vencor are identical to those AHCA accepted in issuing CON 8213 to St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc. Vencor's proposed commitment is reasonable and appropriate, considering AHCA's past acceptance and the fact that the vast majority of long term care patients are older and covered by Medicare. services which promote a continuum of care in a multilevel health care system. While Vencor's services are needed due to a gap in the continuum of care which exists in the district, it has not shown that it will be a part of a multilevel system in District 8. (2)(d) that patients will experience serious problems obtaining the inpatient care proposed. Patients experience and will continue to experience serious problems in obtaining long term care in District 8 in the absence of the project proposed by Vencor. Based on the overwhelming evidence of need, and the ability of the applicant to establish and operate a high quality program with no adverse impacts on other health care providers, Vencor meets the criteria for issuance of CON 8614.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue CON 8614 to Vencor Hospitals South, Inc., to construct a 60-bed long term care hospital in Fort Myers, Lee County, District 8. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Kim A. Kellum, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Geoffrey D. Smith, Esquire Blank, Rigsby & Meenan, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the methodology for grouping hospitals adopted by the HCCB pursuant to Sections 4D- 1.03, 4D-1.12(1) and 4D-1.12(2), F.A.C., constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as being arbitrary or capricious? Mercy has also raised one issue as to whether the grouping methodology is violative of constitutional guarantees of administrative equal protection and due process. This issue, however, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
Findings Of Fact Introduction. The HCCB and Its Hospital Grouping Function. The HCCB was formed pursuant to Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1979). The HCCB was created pursuant to the specific authority of Section 395.503, Florida Statutes (1979), in order to further the accomplishment of legislative intent contained in Section 395.5025, Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.): It is the intent of the Legislature to assure that adequate health care is affordable and accessible to all the citizens of this state. To further the accomplishment of this goal, the Hospital Cost Containment Board is created to advise the Legislature regarding health care costs; inflationary trends in health care costs; the impact of health care costs on the state budget; the impact of hospital charges and third-party reimbursement mechanisms on health care costs; and the education of consumers and providers of health care services in order to encourage price competition in the health care marketplace. The Legislature finds and declares that rising hospital costs and cost shifting are of vital concern to the people of this state because of the danger that hospital services are becoming unaffordable and thus inaccessible to residents of the state. It is further declared that hospital costs should be contained through improved competition between hospitals and improved competition between insurers, through financial incentives which foster efficiency instead of inefficiency, and through sincere initiatives on behalf of providers, insurers, and consumers to contain costs. As a safety net, it is the intent of the Legislature to establish a program of prospective budget review and approval in the event that competition-oriented methods do not adequately contain costs and the access of Floridians to adequate hospital care becomes jeopardized because of unaffordable costs. As a part of its responsibilities the HCCB is required, "after consulting with appropriate professional and governmental advisory bodies and holding public hearings, and considering existing and proposed systems of accounting and reporting utilized by hospitals," to specify a uniform system of financial reporting for hospitals. Section 395.507(1), Florida Statutes Suppl.) to: In order to allow "meaningful comparisons" of data reported by hospitals under the uniform system of financial reporting, the HCCB is required by Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.) to group hospitals according to characteristics, including, but not limited to, a measure of the nature and range of services provided, teaching hospital status, number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff, percentage of Medicare inpatient days, average daily census, geographical differences, and, when available, case mix. In providing for grouping of hospital, the HCCB is required to establish ten general hospital groups and additional speciality groups "as needed." Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). No hospital group can contain fewer than five hospitals, however. Id. Grouping is to be provided by rule. Id. Pursuant to Section 395.509(1), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), every Florida hospital is required to file its budget with the HCCB for "approval." The budget is required to be filed on forms adopted by the HCCB and based on the uniform system of financial reporting. Section 395.507(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). To determine whether a hospital's budget is to be approved, all hospitals in Florida are to be placed in groups. A hospital's budget is then compared to the budgets of the hospitals assigned to its group. Hospital groups for this purpose are established pursuant to Section 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The provisions of Section 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), are identical to Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). In determining whether a hospital's budget is to be approved, Section 305.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), establishes two initial "screens" which a hospital must meet based upon the hospital's gross revenue per adjusted admission. The term "gross revenue" is defined as: the sum of daily hospital service charges, ambulatory service charges, ancillary service charges, and other operating revenue. Gross revenues do not include contributions, donations, legacies, or bequests made to a hospital without restriction by the donors. Section 395.502(11), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). "Adjusted admission" is defined by Section 395.502(1), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), as: the sum of acute admissions and intensive care admissions divided by the ratio of inpatient revenues generated from acute, intensive, ambulatory, and ancillary patient services to gross revenues. Gross revenues per adjusted admission (hereinafter referred to as "GRAA") is therefore the total hospital ambulatory and ancillary service charges and other operating revenue for all acute and intensive care admissions divided by the ratio of inpatient revenues from acute, intensive, ambulatory and ancillary patient services to gross revenue; or, stated more simply , inpatient revenue per admission. The "screens" which must be met in order for a hospital's budget to be approved upon initial determination are: (1) the hospital's GRAA must not be in the upper 20th percentile of the hospitals within its group; and (2) the rate of increase in a hospital's GRAA as contained in its current budget compared to the hospital's GRAA as reported in its most recently approved budget must not exceed a "maximum allowable rate of increase" if the hospital's GRAA is in the 50th to 79th percentile of the hospitals in its group. If a hospital's GRAA is in the 49th percentile or less of the hospitals in its group, its budget is automatically approved. In determining whether a hospital's GRAA fails the screens, Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), provides: Percentile values for gross operating revenue per adjusted admission shall be determined monthly by the board for each group established pursuant to s. 395.507(2) by ranking projected gross operating revenues per adjusted admission contained in the most recently approved or submitted budgets for the hospitals in each group, including any hospital that is contesting its grouping assignment. In determining the applicability of paragraph (a) or paragraph (b), the board shall consider the basis of the projections by the hospital, including consideration of the following factors: any increase in patient admissions caused by the creation of preferred provider organizations or health maintenance organiza- tions, population increases, changes in the hospital case mix or in services offered, changes in technology, or other similar factors. If a hospital's GRAA fails either of the screens (its GRAA is in the upper 20th percentile of its group or its GRAA rate of increase is excessive and its GRAA is in the 50th to 79th percentile of its group) that hospital's budget must be reviewed by the HCCB "to determine whether the rate of increase contained in the budget is just, reasonable, and not excessive." Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). Pursuant to Section 395.509(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), the HCCB is authorized, if it first determines under Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), that the hospital's rate of increase is not just, reasonable and not excessive, to amend or disapprove any hospital's budget which does not meet the two screens of Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), to establish a rate of increase which is "just, reasonable, and not excessive." The HCCB's authority under Section 395.509(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), applies only if the HCCB first complies with the following pertinent provisions of Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.): The board shall disapprove any budget, or part thereof, as excess that contains a rate of increase which is not necessary to maintain the existing level of services of the hospital or, if the hospital increases its existing level of services, any amount not necessary to accomplish that increase. In making such deterioration . . . the board shall consider the following criteria: The efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy of the services and facilities provided by the hospital. The cost of providing services and the value of the services to the public. The ability of the hospital to improve services and facilities. The ability of the hospital to reduce the cost of services. The ability of the hospital to earn a reasonable rate of return. The accuracy of previous budget submissions by the hospital compared to the actual experience of the hospital the The number of patient days reimbursed by Medicare or Medicaid. The number of patient days attributable to the medically indigent. The research and educational services provided by the hospital if it is a teaching hospital. The projected expenditures or revenues for or from construction of facilities or new services which are subject to regulation under s. 381.494 may not be included in the budget of a hospital until the construction or services are approved or authorized by the state health planning agency. The cost of opening a new hospital, for first 3 years. The Challenged Rules. In carrying out its duty to establish a uniform system of financial reporting, the HCCB adopted Section 4D- 1.03, F.A.C., which provides: The Board, pursuant to Section 395.505, Florida Statutes, hereby adopts and establishes a uniform system for hospitals to file the prior year audited actual data report, the interim report of financial and statistical information. This system is described and the forms, instructions, and definitions therefor are contained in the Board's publication entitled Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual. The Chart of Accounts adopted pursuant to Section 395.507(1), Florida Statutes, and this Chapter 4D-1, and as hereafter modified, shall be utilized by each hospital for submitting the prior year audited actual data report, the interim report and the budget report. In order to determine whether a hospital's budget should be automatically approved under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), the HCCB adopted Section 4D-1.12, F.A.C. Sections 4D-1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C., provide: The staff shall review the budget report based upon the hospital's ranking for gross revenue per adjusted admission within its group and upon its rate of change in gross revenue per adjusted admission in the proposed budget as required in Section 395.507(6), Florida Statutes, and the most recently Board approved budget. As part of the budget report review process, groupings of hospitals shall be established according to the characteristics and methodology as outlined in Chapter V, Section B, Hospital Unit Uniform Reporting System Manual and as outlined in Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes. Percentile values for gross revenue per adjusted admission shall be determined monthly for each group by ranking projected gross revenue per adjusted admission contained in the most recently approved or submitted budgets for the hospitals in each group, including any hospital that is contesting its grouping assignment. 12. Sections 4D-1.03 and 4D-1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C., are the rules challenged by Mercy. These rules, as quoted herein, were effective as of November 5, 1984. The rules were originally adopted effective June 30, 1980. The rules were amended to their present wording in response to "major" legislation enacted in 1984 which amended Part II, Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983), and granted authority to the HCCB for the first time to approve, disapprove or amend hospital budgets under certain circumstances. Chapter 79-106, Laws of Florida. The challenged rules essentially provide that the HCCB, when grouping of hospitals for purposes of the uniform system of financial reporting and for purposes of reviewing and comparing budgets to determine if they should be automatically approved under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), will apply the grouping methodology outlined in Chapter V, Section B of the Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual (hereinafter referred to as the "Manual"). Section 4D-1.18, F.A.C., also adopted effective November 5, 1984, incorporates by reference the Manual within each rule in Chapter 4D-1, F.A.C., which references the Manual. This rule has not been challenged in this proceeding. The Hospital Grouping Methodology and Its Development. Generally, Chapter V, Section B of the Manual, sets out the objective of the grouping methodology, the procedure for forming groups, a list of the variables considered in forming groups and the weight to be accorded each variable. The goals of the grouping methodology, as provided in the Manual, are to "facilitate comparison of hospitals with similar patient mix and market conditions" and to "develop groups of sufficient size . . . to assure statistically valid comparisons." Based upon the procedure for forming groups contained in the Manual, hospitals are grouped into nine, non-teaching, short-term hospital groups, one Major teaching hospital group and a number of specialty hospital groups. It is the method of grouping hospitals into nine short-term hospital groups which is at issue in this proceeding. Assignment of hospitals to the nine short-term hospital groups is accomplished through the use of the "McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm included in the cluster analysis t computer program package CLAN developed by T.D. Klastorin and Robert Ledingham (June, 1980 version)." A clustering analysis is a method of grouping a set of objects (in this case, hospitals) into relatively homogeneous groups. The goal of a clustering algorithm is to minimize the differences between the members of the group. The objects are grouped based upon a set of variables which are considered significant for purposes of comparing the objects. In order to account for the significance of each variable, the variables are weighted. The variables have a numerical score and after weighing, the weighted sum of the variables for each object is compared and the objects are grouped based upon their variable scores. There are a number of clustering algorithms which can be used to group hospitals. The HCCB chose to use the "McQueen's K-means" clustering algorithm. The use of McQueens K-means clustering algorithm has not bean challenged in this proceeding. Nor does the evidence establish that the selection of McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm is arbitrary and capricious. The clustering algorithm is performed by computer. The computer program utilized by the HCCB to perform the algorithm is called "CLAN" and was developed by T.D. Klastorin and Robert Ledingham. The evidence at the hearing supports a finding that the selection of this computer program is reasonable. Once hospitals are grouped, they are notified of their group designation and allowed to request reconsideration of their group assignment. The request must made within thirty days after notification. Following the creation of the HCCB in 1979, Price Waterhouse & Company was engaged by the HCCB as a consultant to assist in still establishing an appropriate hospital grouping methodology. The HCCB also created an advisory committee to assist the HCCB and Price Waterhouse & Company in developing the grouping methodology. This committee, designated as the Technical Advisory Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "TAC") was comprised of individuals from the hospital industry and academia and certified public accountants. The TAC worked with Price Waterhouse & Company in developing the grouping methodology and the uniform reporting system. Because of time constraints, the TAC's involvement with evaluating the methodology was limited. The HCCB ultimately decided to pattern the grouping methodology it adopted after the grouping methodology then being used by the State of Washington, as recommended by Price Waterhouse & Company. The Washington system was not adopted exactly; a number of changes to Washington's methodology were made to the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB. Mercy has proposed several findings of fact beginning on page 35 and ending on page 38 of its proposed order concerning the "Differences in Washington Hospital Characteristics and Grouping Methodology Model." Those proposed findings of fact can be and are hereby disposed of by the following finding of fact: because of differences in the hospital industries of the States of Florida and Washington and other differences between the two States, Florida's grouping methodology cannot be justified solely on the basis that Washington's grouping methodology was used as a starting point in developing Florida's grouping methodology. Those differences, however, do not support a finding of fact that Florida's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious since the Washington system was not adopted without substantial modifications, including a reduction of Washington's eighteen variables initially to fourteen and ultimately to seven, and the use of unequal weighting of the variables. The TAC reviewed and discussed the grouping methodology initially approved by the HCCB prior to its approval. Some of Mercy's witnesses, who were members of the TAC, indicated during their testimony that the TAC never decided anything because no "vote" was ever taken of TAC members and that the TAC did not advise the HCCB but instead advised the staff of the HCCB. Their testimony in this regard has been given little weight. The fact that no formal "vote" was taken of TAC members does not mean that the TAC did not take a position on matters it discussed. The consensus of the TAC could be, and was, gleaned from its discussions. The staff of the HCCB in fact reported decisions of the TAC to the HCCB verbally and by minutes of TAC meetings. Although the accuracy of staff's reports was sometimes questioned, no question was raised about whether TAC had taken positions. The fact that the HCCB staff reported TAC actions to the HCCB also disputes the testimony to the effect that TAC did not advise the HCCB but instead advised the staff of the HCCB. While it may be true that TAC did not deal directly with the HCCB, its analysis was reported, to the HCCB. The HCCB ultimately adopted rules effective June 30, 1980, which incorporated by reference to the Manual, the general outline of the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB. The TAC ceased to exist following adoption of the HCCB's initial rules. Two new advisory committees were formed: a Technical Advisory Panel (hereinafter referred to as "TAP") on grouping and a TAP for financial analysis. The grouping TAP was made up of individuals from the hospital industry. The grouping TAP met in November and December of 1980 and reviewed the results of test runs of the grouping methodology initially adopted by the HCCB. The results of the initial run were described as "bizarre." This run used equal weighting of the variables. Equal weighting was abandoned and three to four more test runs were made and reviewed by the grouping TAP. After each run the variable weights were adjusted until the results appeared to be "reasonable." The HCCB also established a committee consisting of members of the HCCB designated as the Research and Development Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "R & D Committee"). The R & D Committee reviewed the results of test runs and also found the final groups reasonable. The HCCB met in January, 1981, and adopted the grouping methodology with the adjusted variable weights arrived at as a result of the test runs for use in establishing hospital groups for use in 1981. The grouping methodology was reviewed every year after its initial adoption in 1980. The methodology was reviewed by the HCCB, HCCB's staff, the TAP's and the R & D Committee each year. Throughout the period from 1980 to the present, criticisms of the grouping methodology have been made. Some of these criticisms were agreed with and others were rejected by the HCCB or its staff. Following review of the grouping methodology by the TAP's and the R & D Committee in 1981, the original fourteen variables were reduced to eight. In January, 1982, the weight of one of the variables was changed and one variable was replaced by another variable. In December, 1982, a variable was deleted; seven variables remained. In 1983, clustering analysis was limited in its application to the formation of short-term acute care general hospital groups. In 1984, following the significant amendment of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983), the HCCB adopted the present challenged rules. The rules were effective November 5, 1984. The only change in the grouping methodology approved by the HCCB was the substitution of the Florida price level index variable for percent of population over age 65. The weight assigned to the Florida price level index was the same as the weight that had been assigned to the percent of population over age 65. The changes made to the grouping methodology in 1984 were first suggested by the staff of the HCCB to the grouping TAP in June of 1984. The grouping TAP met on July 11, 1984 and considered and discussed the proposed changes. A number of problem areas were discussed. Although no test run results were presented at this TAP meeting, they were provided to TAP members before the HCCB adopted the grouping methodology changes. Concerns about the geographic or exogenous variables expressed at the grouping TAP meeting suggested a belief that too much or too little emphasis was being placed on geographic considerations. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact beginning on page 33 and ending on page 35 of its proposed order concerning the significance of the changes made by the Legislature in 1984 to Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983). Those proposed findings of fact essentially deal with the fact that the powers of the HCCB after the 1984 amendments may have a more significant impact on hospitals and that, therefore, the grouping methodology is of greater interest to hospitals. Mercy's proposed findings of fact are not, however, relevant in determining whether the challenged rules are arbitrary and capricious. The fact that the effect of the grouping methodology on a hospital may now be different does not mean that the use of the grouping methodology, as modified after the 1984 legislative changes to the law, which was developed when the purpose of grouping was different, is not an appropriate methodology. The evidence does not support such a conclusion. Therefore, to the extent that Mercy's proposed findings of fact under Section II, A, of its proposed order have not already been made, they are rejected as unnecessary. Mercy and the HCCB have proposed findings of fact as to whether Mercy has ever questioned the HCCB's grouping methodology since it was first adopted prior to instituting this proceeding. Those proposed findings of fact are not deemed relevant in determining whether the grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. If the grouping methodology is in fact arbitrary and capricious, the fact that Mercy did not challenge the methodology when it was first adopted will not make it any less arbitrary and capricious today. Mercy's Challenge. A. Introduction. Mercy is a not-for-profit, general acute care hospital with 550 licensed beds located in Dade County, Florida. Mercy has raised a number of points in this proceeding and its proposed order in challenging the rules in question. All of those points, according to Mercy, prove that the rules are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. In determining whether the facts support such a conclusion, the following standard must be kept in mind: [I]n a 120.54 hearing, the hearing officer must look to the legislative authority for the rule and determine whether or not the proposed rule is encompassed within the grant. The burden is upon one who attacks the proposed rule to show that the agency, if it adopts the rule, would exceed its authority; that the requirements of the rule are not appropriate to the ends specified in the legislative act; that the requirements contained in the rule are not reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation or that the proposed rule or the requirements thereof are arbitrary or capricious. A capricious action is one which is taken without thought or reason or irrationally. An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic or despotic. Administrative discretion must be reasoned and based upon competent substantial evidence. Competent substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Agrico Chemical Company v. State, Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 74 (1979). Additionally, the following must be kept in mind: The well recognized general rule is that agencies are to be accorded wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies' general statutory duties. . . . An agency's construction of the statute it administers is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous. . . . Where, as here, the agency's interpretation of a statute has been promulgated in rulemaking proceedings, the validity of such rule must be upheld if it is reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation interpreted and it is not arbitrary and capricious. The burden is upon petitioner in a rule challenge to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the rule or its requirements are arbitrary and capricious. . . . Moreover, the agency's interpretation of a statute need not be the sole possible interpretation or even the most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible interpretations. Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The witnesses who testified in this proceeding who were accepted as experts were qualified in a number of different areas. Those witnesses qualified as experts in statistical analysis or related areas and health care finance rendered opinions as to the appropriateness of the HCCB's grouping methodology. The method of grouping hospitals adopted by the HCCB is a statistical method. Therefore, the determination of whether the HCCB's methodology is arbitrary and capricious depends largely upon whether the methodology is statistically sound. Mercy and the HCCB therefore presented the testimony of witnesses qualified in the area of statistics: Rick Zimmerman, Ph.D., an expert in statistical analysis and social science statistics (for Mercy), and Duane Meeter, Ph.D., an expert in economics and applied statistical analysis and Frank Fox, Jr., Ph.D., an expert in applied statistics (for the HCCB). All three witnesses were knowledgeable and credible. Dr. Zimmerman testified that the HCCB's grouping methodology was "clearly inappropriate." Dr. Zimmerman's opinion was based upon a three step analysis in which he determined: (1) whether the variables selected by the HCCB are appropriate; (2) whether the weights assigned to the variables by the HCCB are appropriate; and, (3) the effect changing the variables and/or weights would have on hospital groups. The results of Dr. Zimmerman's analysis, which formed the basis for his opinion that the HCCB's grouping methodology is not appropriate, are discussed, infra. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact in its proposed order concerning the credibility of Dr. Meeter's and Dr. Fox's testimony. Some of those proposed findings of fact have been considered in determining the weight given to their testimony. Both Dr. Meeter and Dr. Fox were, however, knowledgeable and credible. In addition to the opinion of its statistical expert, Mercy presented the testimony of three witnesses who were accepted as experts in health care finance: Messrs. Lawrence R. Murray, Jerry A. Mashburn and Anthony Krayer. All three are certified public accountants. All testified that it was his opinion that the HCCB's grouping methodology was arbitrary. The bases for their opinions are discussed, infra. Selection of "Seed" Hospitals. In order to use a clustering algorithm, a starting point is needed; the first object (hospital) to be placed in each group must be selected. The first objects selected are called "seed" objects. Mercy has attached the HCCB's method of selecting the nine "seed" hospitals in initially performing the McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm. Mercy has proposed the following findings of fact with regard to this point: While none of the parties challenged the use of McQueen's and the CLAN program, no support was offered during the hearing for the method by which the HCCB had selected the nine seed hospitals as initial clustering points. The HCCB's own statistician criticized the HCCB's selection method. The Rankis-Zimmerman report indicates that the final groupings based upon the HCCB's seed hospitals were vastly different than groupings based upon the utilization of seed hospitals selected on a statistical basis. Both the HCCB's and Mercy's statisticians proposed statistically sound methods for selecting seed hospitals, which had not been employed by the HCCB in the Grouping Methodology. [Citations omitted] These proposed findings of fact are not relevant to this proceeding. The burden is on Mercy to show that the selection of "seed" hospitals was arbitrary and capricious; the HCCB is not required to show "support" for its method of selecting the seed hospitals. Additionally, whether there are other methods of selecting seed hospitals is not the test. The HCCB's interpretation of the statute need not be the sole interpretation or even the most desirable one; it only needs to be within the range of possible interpretations. Durrani, supra. Therefore, even if the Rankis-Zimmerman report does indicate that the final groupings of hospitals of the HCCB were vastly different than groupings based upon other methods of selecting seed hospitals, it does not automatically follow that the HCCB's method of selecting seed hospitals was not "within the range of possible interpretations. The weight of the evidence does not prove that the HCCB's method of selecting seed hospitals was arbitrary and capricious. Selection of the Variables. In delegating legislative authority to the HCCB to establish a grouping methodology, the Legislature provided that the following relevant characteristics are to be taken into account: A measure of the nature and range of services provided; Number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff; Percentage of Medicare inpatient days; Average daily census; Geographic differences; and Case mix, "when available." In response to the Legislature's mandate, the HCCB has adopted seven variables or characteristics. The variables selected by the HCCB include five hospital- specific (endogenous) variables and two geographic (exogenous variables). The variables are as follows: Endogenous Variables: Average occupied beds. Available services. Physician mix. Number of residents. Percent Medicare days. Exogenous Variables: Florida price level index. Personal income. The following findings of fact are made with regard to each of the specific characteristics required to be taken into account by the Legislature and the variables adopted by the HCCB: 1. A measure of the nature and range of services provided. The HCCB has provided in the Manual that "available services" or a service index will be considered. The specific services considered are listed on Table B, Chapter V, of the Manual. Table B also weights or provides a score for each of the various services listed. Each hospital gets the specified score if it has a particular service available. The available services listed are based upon a survey of hospital administrators and chief financial officers in New York, New York, made in the 1970's. Problems with the list of available services have been pointed out to the HCCB and its staff. The primary problem is that the volume of services provided is not taken into account. The problems with the service index, however, relate to the fact that the service index is a proxy for case mix. To date, there is no alternative available which would be a better proxy for case mix. The Legislature contemplated this fact by providing that a measure of the services provided by a hospital will be considered and that case mix will be taken into account "when available." Therefore, while there are "problems" with the service index, consideration of available services is mandated by the Legislature and there are no acceptable alternatives available use for by the HCCB. 2. Number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff. 52. The HCCB has provided that a physician specialties mix be considered in grouping hospitals. This physician specialties mix is based upon a list of twenty- six specialties for which a hospital gets a single credit for each specialty available regardless of the number of physician specialists available in each specialty or the volume of patients admitted by a physician. 52. Like the service index, the physician specialties mix is a proxy for ease mix and has problems associated with its use. Also like the service index, consideration of this factor is mandated and there are no acceptable alternatives available for use by the HCCB. 3. Percentage of Medicare inpatient days. 53. The HCCB has provided that "percentage Medicare days be considered in grouping hospitals. Consideration of this variable has not been shown to be arbitrary and capricious. 4. Average daily census. 53. The HCCB has provided that "average occupied beds" is to be considered in grouping hospitals. It does not appear that this variable's use was proper, as discussed, infra. 5. Geographic differences. The HCCB has provided that geographic differences be considered in grouping hospitals by providing for the inclusion of the Florida price level index, by county, and median income, by county, as variables to be considered. The only thing that the evidence established with regard to these variables was that they are not "very good" predictors, that "if" they are intended as a measure of input prices they are "poor substitutes," and that there may be "better" measures of the cost of doing business. The evidence does not, however, show that the use of these variables is arbitrary and capricious. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact concerning geographic influences in part II, H of its proposed order. The proposed findings of fact begin on page 29 and end on page 33. Most of these proposed findings of fact are not made in this Final Order because they are not deemed relevant or material and are unnecessary to the resolution of this proceeding. The proposed findings of fact contained in part II, H of Mercy's proposed order purportedly show that the HCCB has inadequately accounted for geographic influences. The evidence does establish that the financial characteristics of Florida hospitals and GRAA are affected by the geographic location of a hospital. This is especially true in Florida because of the impact on parts of the State from tourism, language barriers, the number of elderly residents, the available labor markets, and competition. It is also true that the combined weights of the two geographic variables the HCCB has selected for consideration in the grouping methodology--the Florida price level index and median income--is only one-seventh of the combined weights of all the HCCB's variables. It is also true that the grouping methodology results in hospitals from different areas of the State being grouped together, i.e., Mercy's hospital group includes twenty- three hospitals, four of which are located in Dade County and three of which are located in Escambia County. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the HCCB has been arbitrary and capricious in designating only two variables to take into account geographic differences between hospitals. The evidence also does not support a conclusion that it was not proper for the HCCB to limit the weight of the geographic variables to one-seventh of the total weight of the variables. Nor does the evidence demonstrate that the inclusion of hospitals from different areas of the State in the same group is not a proper result just because geographic influences are important. The fact that a large percentage of Dade County and south Florida hospitals do not qualify for automatic approval of their budgets under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), because they are in the upper 20th and the upper 50th to 79th percentiles does not necessarily prove that geographic influences have not been adequately accounted for either, as suggested be Mercy on page 30 of its proposed order. The evidence simply does not support such a conclusion. Nor does it necessarily follow that because Dade County hospitals are "efficient" in the minds of some of Mercy's witnesses and yet are unable to achieve automatic approval of their budgets that the grouping methodology does not adequately account for geographic influences, as suggested by Mercy on pages 30 and 31 of its proposed order. First, the Legislature has provided that factors other than geographic differences are to be considered, which the HCCB has provided for. It may therefore be that some Dade County hospitals do not achieve automatic approval of their budgets because of the other variables. The fact that not all Dade County hospitals fail to achieve automatic approval of their budgets supports such a conclusion. Also, even though a hospital's budget is not automatically approved it does not necessarily mean that it is considered inefficient. If that were the case, its budget would probably be subject automatically to amendment or disapproval. That is not the case. If a hospital's budget is not automatically approved its budget is subject to further review under Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). It may still be determined that the hospital is "efficient" based upon this review. The Legislature, in enacting Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, did indicate that it intended to promote competition and efficiency among hospitals in order to contain hospital costs. Section 395.5025, Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The grouping methodology and, in particular, the comparison of hospitals' GRAA under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), does not alone achieve that intent. Therefore the opinion of several of Mercy's witnesses that Dade County hospitals and in particular, Mercy, are efficient does not support a conclusion that the methodology is arbitrary and capricious or that geographic influences are not adequately considered. On pages 31 and 32 of its proposed order, Mercy suggests that Dade County hospitals only compete with other Dade County hospitals and therefore grouping hospitals from all sections of the State is illogical. In support of this suggestion, Mercy proposes findings of fact to the effect that the HCCB has recognized that consumers are interested in comparing hospital charges on a regional basis and has provided information about hospital cost on a county-by- county basis in the past. Mercy's proposed findings of fact are not accepted for essentially the same reasons that its proposed findings of fact with regard to the efficiency of hospitals were rejected. These proposed findings of fact do not support a finding that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious or that geographic differences have not been adequately taken into account. Mercy's has also proposed findings of fact with regard to geographic differences to the effect that after the Legislature specifically required that "geographic differences" be considered in an amendment to Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1981), in 1982, the HCCB has not added any additional geographic factors to be considered. Although no additional geographic variables have been added, geographic variables have been reviewed and have been changed since 1982. More importantly, these proposed findings of fact do not prove that the existing variables are not adequate. 6. Case Mix. 66. Case mix is to be taken into account "when available." The evidence does not establish that case mix is available at this time. 7. Other variables. The HCCB is not limited to a consideration of the factors which the Legislature specifically provided are to be considered. Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The only other variable the HCCB has provided for consideration is "number of residents." No evidence of significance concerning this variable was presented at the hearing. There was testimony at the hearing that there are other variables which would be appropriate for consideration in grouping hospitals. The evidence does not, however, establish that failure to consider other variables means that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious. Dr. Zimmerman opined that he had determined that the variables selected by the HCCB were not appropriate. Dr. Zimmerman based his opinion upon the fact that he had conducted a "multiple regression analysis." According to Dr. Zimmerman, a "multiple regression analysis is a statistical procedure used to evaluate the relationship of a given set of independent, predictor variables (the HCCB's seven variables) to a single dependent variable (GRAA)." Based upon his application of multiple regression analysis, Dr. Zimmerman concluded that three of the variables used in the HCCB's grouping methodology are not statistically significant predictors of GRAA: available services, average occupied beds and median income. Two of these variables (available services and average occupied beds) are required by Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), to be taken into account in the grouping methodology. These Sections also require that geographic factors, which median income is, be taken into account. This does not, however, mean that median income must be included as a variable by the HCCB. Dr. Meeter testified that the statistical significance of the HCCB's variables can be determined by the use of "log transformation." Based upon Dr. Meeter's use of log transformation, median income and available services are statistically significant variables; average occupied beds is not statistically significant. Although the HCCB was required to include "average daily census" as a factor in grouping hospitals, the HCCB was not required to use "average occupied beds." Based upon Dr. Zimmerman's and Dr. Meeter's testimony, the use of average occupied beds as a variable was not proper. Whether the use of available services and median income as variables was proper depends upon whether log transformation is a proper method of determining the statistical significance of variables. Although the evidence on this question was in conflict, it appears that the use of log transformation was proper. The inclusion of available services and median income is therefore not arbitrary and capricious. A second problem with the variables used by the HCCB suggested by Dr. Zimmerman involves the correlation between the seven predictor variables or "multicollinearity." The existence of multicollinearity can invalidate a clustering program. Dr. Zimmerman determined that the correlation between the physician mix, available services and average occupied beds variables and between the Florida price level index and median income variables is large enough that there is a "potential" problem. Dr. Zimmerman's determination that there is a "potential" problem was made through two techniques. He first used "paired correlation." Based upon paired correlation, Dr. Zimmerman used a "rule of thumb" that a paired correlation of 0.7 or higher should be looked at closer. Finding a paired correlation between physician mix, available services and average occupied beds of .74 and between the Florida price level index and median income of .71, Dr. Zimmerman then calculated "R squared" to determine if a potential problem did in fact exist. Dr. Zimmerman indicated that the calculation of R squared is the most highly recommended method of determining if multicollinearity is a problem but agreed there are other methods of making such a determination. Dr. Meeter indicated that Dr. Zimmerman's rule of thumb that based upon paired correlations of 0.7 or higher indicates the problem should be looked at more closely is too strict. Other than Dr. Zimmerman's "experience" (which according to Dr. Zimmerman, consisted of a class he took), Dr. Zimmerman did not cite any authority which supported his rule of thumb. The only other source Dr. Zimmerman referred to--the "SPSS" manual--only indicates that the .82-1.0 range indicates that extreme collinearity exists. Another problem raised by Dr. Meeter with Dr. Zimmerman's conclusions as to multicollinearity, involves the use of "variance inflation factors" (hereinafter referred to as VIF is another technique used by statisticians to determine if multicollinearity is a problem. Dr. Zimmerman did not look at VIF. VIF can be determined by transforming R squared: VIF 1/1- R2. A VIF in excess of 5 or 10 is an indication that multicollinearity exists. One source quoted by Dr. Meeter even indicates that a much higher VIF is necessary to conclude that multicollinerity exists. Transforming Dr. Zimmerman's R squared calculations indicates that VIF is in excess of 5 in only one instance. As discussed more fully, infra, Dr. Zimmerman used a number of alternative methods of grouping hospitals which he designated as "Schemes." Based upon Dr. Zimmerman's "Scheme 3," Dr. Zimmerman found an R squared value of .819. The VIF for an R squared value of .819 is in excess of 5. Scheme 3, however, is not an application of the HCCB's grouping methodology; it is a grouping methodology in which the variables are assigned different weights. As indicated by Dr. Meeter, the weights used in grouping can effect the correlation of the variables. Therefore, the fact that Scheme 3 indicates a possible multicollinearity problem does not prove that multicollinearity is in fact a problem with the HCCB's grouping methodology. Based upon the foregoing it is found that multicollinearity does not exist sufficiently to conclude that the variables used by the HCCB are arbitrary and capricious. Dr. Zimmerman only testified that there was a "potential" problem. Additionally, although multicollinearity may invalidate a clustering program, the evidence does not prove that the HCCB's clustering program is in fact invalid because of any existing "potential" problem. In light of the foregoing findings of fact, it is clear that the HCCB's variables are appropriate with the exception of average occupied beds. The fact that this one variable is not statistically significant, however, does not by itself support a finding that the grouping methodology is inappropriate. The Lack of Testing of the Grouping Methodology. A third point raised by Mercy is entitled "Lack of Testing" in its proposed order and includes several proposed findings of fact on pages 17 and 18 of Mercy's proposed order. Mercy has essentially proposed findings of fact that: (1) it had been recommended to the HCCB when it originally adopted its grouping methodology in 1980 that a statistician be hired to test the grouping methodology; (2) that the failure to do so had been criticized in the past; that it had been recommended that the HCCB obtain assistance of individuals knowledgeable in Florida hospital characteristics to evaluate the grouping process but had failed to do so; (4) that the HCCB had not, until just prior to the hearing of this case, hired a statistician; (5) that the HCCB has not used multiple regression analysis or within-cluster co- variance weighting; and, (6) that the State of Washington's State Hospital Commission has employed a statistician to test its methodology and has effectively been advised by individuals knowledgeable with Washington's hospital characteristics. These proposed findings of fact do not establish that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious even if they were all correct findings of fact. All that these proposed findings of fact show is that the HCCB may not have gone about the adoption of its grouping methodology in the most appropriate manner. Any such shortcomings, based upon 20/20 hindsight, in the manner in which the methodology was adopted do not prove that the grouping methodology itself is not appropriate. Additionally, the evidence does not support all of these proposed findings. In particular, as was discussed, supra, the HCCB did in fact look to individuals knowledgeable in Florida hospital characteristics to evaluate its grouping methodology. The Weight of the Variables. The most significant and troublesome challenge made by Mercy to the HCCB's grouping methodology involves the weights assigned to the variables considered in grouping hospitals. The weights assigned by the HCCB to the seven HCCB variables are: Variable Weight Endogenous: Average occupied beds. 1.0 Available services. 2.0 Physician mix. 0.5 Number of residents. 0.5 Percent Medicare days. 2.0 Exogenous: Florida price level index. 0.5 Personal income. 0.5 The determination of whether the weights selected by the HCCB are arbitrary and capricious depends largely upon the evidence presented at the hearing by those witnesses knowledgeable in the field of statistics. Three witnesses were qualified as experts in statistically related fields. All three were well qualified in their fields and were credible and persuasive. According to Dr. Zimmerman, "the weights used currently by the HCCB are clearly inappropriate." In Mercy exhibit 17, Dr. Zimmerman reaches the following conclusion with regard to the HCCB's variable weights: These weights clearly do not reflect the relationship of the various variables to GRAA and thus appear as arbitrary and inappropriate for use in clustering hospitals on the basis of cost-related variables. Dr. Zimmerman's opinion is based upon the use of "multiple regression analysis," which, according to Mercy exhibit 17, "assesses the relationship of each of the predictor variables to the dependent measure (GRAA)." The evidence, however, does not support a finding of fact that multiple regression analysis is the only statistically valid method of establishing weights to be used in clustering analysis. In fact, there are a number of statistically valid methods of establishing variable weights. One of those acceptable methods is the "subjective" method which was used by the HCCB. Doctors Meeter and Fox substantiated this finding of fact. The use of the subjective method involves the participation of individuals knowledgable in the Florida hospital industry in reviewing and commenting on the weights used. The evidence clearly supports a finding that individuals with such knowledge participated in the process of developing the HCCB's grouping methodology including the selection of variable weights. Even one of Mercy's witnesses provided testimony which supports this conclusion: Mr. Kenneth G. McGee testified that "[i] t was just a trial and error process of changing weights until we ended up with something that people considered more reasonable than what had been produced in the past." Mercy has questioned Dr. Meeter's testimony with regard to the use of the subjective method of weighting variables based upon a number of proposed findings of fact. First, Mercy has proposed findings of fact to the effect that Dr. Meeter indicated that the subjective method is "bad" if not carefully applied. What Dr. Meeter actually said was that any method should be applied carefully. Secondly, Mercy has proposed a finding of fact that in a book relied upon by Dr. Meeter in rendering his opinion about the subjective method--John Hardigan's 1975 book, Clustering Algorithms--the author describes the subjective method as an "unsatisfactory" one. What Dr. Meeter's testimony proves is that Hardigan's comment was a tongue- in-cheek comment that there are several appropriate methods of weighting variables all of which are unsatisfactory, including regression analysis (used by Dr. Zimmerman) and the subjective method (use by the HCCB). Dr. Meeter also relied upon other statistical literature in rendering his opinion as to the use of the subjective method in determining variable weights. Finally, Mercy has suggested that Dr. Meeter did not undertake any independent "statistical" analysis which would support his opinions. Based upon the nature of Dr. Meeter's testimony, it does not appear that such a statistical analysis is a prerequisite to concluding that the use of the subjective method is an acceptable method of determining variable weights. Mercy has proposed a finding that the subjective method of weighting is inappropriate based upon Dr. Zimmerman's testimony. Dr. Zimmerman was asked the following questions and gave the following responses concerning the subjective method: Q Now, in your understanding of how the Board arrived at its weights, is it your opinion that that is totally inappropriate methodology for clustering? Yes or no or maybe? A I am looking to counsel for counsel here. MR. PARKER: Do you understand the questions? THE WITNESS: I do understand the question. And let me give you my full answer as I best understand it. The weights -- and I think what I have commented on at great length -- the weights used by the Hospital Cost Containment Board are clearly on statistical grounds inappropriate. There's no question about that. BY MR. COLLETTE: Now, on these clustering grounds, you testified as to your familiarity with clustering grounds, on clustering grounds, are they totally inappropriate? A If the question is -- I wouldn't say that. Hearing that there is no objection, I will continue. I would rule out the use of a purely subjective weighting scheme as a final solution for cluster analysis. I think it might be one that would be considered at a very early step, but never used, as kind of a preliminary idea. However, I would clearly rule out the use of a purely subjective weighting scheme as something to be proud of and actually put into application. So, if that means yes to your question, I guess yes in that specific way. Dr. Zimmerman's responses are not totally clear with regard to whether the subjective method is, in his opinion, an acceptable method of determining variable weights. Nor would his response, if totally clear, overcome the weight of the evidence in support of a conclusion that the HCCB's method of determining variable weights is not arbitrary and capricious. Alternative Methods of Grouping Hospitals. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact under a section of its proposed order entitled "Alternative Variables and Weights Indicated by Statistical Analyses." Pages 22 to 29 of Mercy's proposed order. Some of the proposed findings included therein have been dealt with in other portions of this Final Order, including those findings of fact dealing with the use of multiple regression analysis and multicollinearity. In Dr. Zimmerman's report (Mercy exhibit 17) and during his testimony a number of alternative methods of grouping hospitals were tested and evaluated. Dr. Zimmerman concluded that a number of these alternative methods would be preferable to the methodology adopted by the HCCB. Dr. Zimmerman tested twelve different methods (referred to as "Schemes" by Dr. Zimmerman): the HCCB's, the State of Washington's and ten other methods which used some or all of the seven variables designated by the HCCB. Scheme 3 used all seven variables selected by the HCCB but with different weights. Dr. Zimmerman rejected this scheme because of multicollinearity. In Scheme 4, Dr. Zimmerman used only the four variables which he found to be statistically significant: physician specialties mix, number of residents, percent Medicare days and the Florida price level index. Dr. Zimmerman recognized that this Scheme was not acceptable because of the statutory mandate as to the types of factors which must be taken into account. In order to recognize the requirement of Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), that certain variables be taken into account and to alleviate the purported multicollinearity problem, Dr. Zimmerman combined the variables he considered highly correlated into two "scales." "Scale 1" combined physician specialties mix, available services and average occupied beds and "Scale 2" combined the Florida price level index and median income. The weights assigned to these scale were based upon the weights Dr. Zimmerman felt were more appropriate as discussed, supra. Dr. Zimmerman then used multiple regression analysis and a variety of combinations of variables and Scales in Schemes 6-12. Of these Schemes, Dr. Zimmerman testified that Schemes 6 and 10 were preferable, if Scheme 4 could not be used. Scheme 6 involved the use of all of the variables: percent Medicare days, number of residents and Scales 1 and 2. Scheme 10 involved the use of all of the variables except median income: percent Medicare days, number of residents, the Florida price level index and Scale 1. Dr. Zimmerman compared the results of using the HCCB's grouping methodology to the results from using Schemes 3,4,6 and 10. The results showed that more Dade County hospitals had GRAA's, in comparison to the hospitals in the resulting groups under Schemes 3,4,6 and 10, which would result in automatic approval of their budgets than under the HCCB's methodology. Mercy's position within its group also improved as a result of using Schemes 3,4,6 and 10. These proposed findings of and Mercy's proposed findings of fact concerning alternatives considered by Dr. Meeter do not prove that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. As found, supra, six of the seven variables selected by the HCCB are reasonable. The weights assigned to those variables have also been found to be reasonable and Mercy's suggested findings of fact with regard to multicollinearity have been rejected. Mercy has failed to prove that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, any alternative methods or Schemes and the results of using such methods cannot and do not overcome such findings. Conclusions. Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the bases for the opinions that the HCCB's grouping methodology is inappropriate are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Dr. Zimmerman's opinion, which was based upon a number of conclusions, was only supported by the fact that one of the variables selected by the HCCB is not proper. The evidence, however, does not support a finding that this fact alone means that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is inappropriate. The facts do not support a conclusion that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious.
