Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Gary Dotson, d/b/a Castaway Point, holds outdoor advertising sign permit number 6637-2 authorizing a sign on U.S. 1, 1.3 miles north of SR 516, facing west, in Brevard County, Florida. This location is inside the road right-of-way of the City of Palm Bay. At the time when the subject sign Permit was issued by the Department, the City of Palm Bay had given permission to erect a sign at this location. This permission was for a period beginning on February 15, 1979, and expiring in April of 1980. A sign had been erected at the site where the permit had been issued. This sign was erected by a previous owner, and when the Respondent bought Castaway Point the purchase included the sign. The sign which was authorized by the subject permit was removed by the City of Palm Bay after the City's permission for continued maintenance of this sign had expired. There is presently no authority from the City of Palm Bay for the Respondent to have a sign at the permitted site.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that permit number 6637-2 held by Gary Dotson, d/b/a Castaway Point, for a sign on US. 1, 1.3 miles north of SR 516, facing west, in Brevard County, Florida, be revoked. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Mr. Gary Dotson 3101 Bay Boulevard, N.E. Palm Bay, Florida 32905 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The outdoor advertising sign which is the subject of this proceeding has been erected on a small parcel of land located approximately one-quarter of a mile west of First Street on Rockland Key, next to the southbound lane of U.S. 1, in Monroe County, Florida. This location is outside the city limits of any municipality. On approximately October 1, 1983, Mr. Frank Toppino, who is not a party to this proceeding and who was not presented as a witness at the hearing, leased the subject property to the Pier House Inn and Beach Club for one year. Under the terms of this lease, the Pier House Inn received the right to use the property for an outdoor advertising structure which the parties to the lease contemplated would be constructed there. The Pier House agreed to pay the sum of $950 to Mr. Toppino as rent for the year. In addition, the Pier House agreed to undertake construction of the sign on the land for the benefit of Mr. Toppino, the lessor, after the lease expires. The PIER House received the right to use this land for one year, and the right to place advertising copy of its choice on the face of the outdoor advertising structure for one year. The lease between Mr. Toppino and the Pier House Inn covering the subject property was received in evidence. This lease, and the testimony of the general manager of the Pier House Inn who executed it as lessee, which is detailed above, supports a finding of fact that Mr. Frank Toppino and not the Pier House was the owner of the outdoor advertising structure which is the subject of this proceeding on October 1, 1983. Subsequently, when the Department's Outdoor Advertising Administrator made his inspection of the subject sign, there was no state outdoor advertising permit affixed thereto, and the Department has not issued any permit for this structure. The sign was erected between two other permitted signs, and it is closer than 500 feet to both of these existing and permitted structures. The sign which is the subject of this proceeding is located adjacent to a federal- aid primary highway outside any incorporated city or town. It is visible from U.S. 1, and it is within 660 feet of the edge of the pavement of this highway. The Department's Outdoor Advertising Administrator made a determination that the Pier House Inn was the owner of the sign in question based upon information contained in a Monroe County Building Permit application, and based upon the hearsay information received during telephone conversations. However, this information is controverted by the direct testimony of the general manager of the Pier House Inn which is itself corroborated by the lease between Mr. Toppino and the Pier House which is in evidence. Thus, the testimony received from the Department's witness is not of sufficient quality to support a finding of fact that the Pier House Inn is the owner of the sign in question. Moreover, the Department has the burden of proof on this issue, and the quantity and quality of the evidence presented on the matter of ownership of the subject sign does not carry this burden.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the violation notice issued on December 12, 1983, to the Pier House Inn and Beach Club, be dismissed, without prejudice to the reinstitution of proceedings in which the violation notice is directed to the actual owner of the sign in question. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 23rd day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 H. Ray Allen, Esquire 618 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040
The Issue Whether the Respondent is in violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, for having no identification on the sign, no valid lease for the sign and no current permit tag.
Findings Of Fact A violation notice was issued to the Respondent, Peterson Outdoor Advertising Company, on June 18, 1976, citing a sign located at .23 miles south of John's Road on U.S. 1, with copy "TOBYS". The violation not ice stated that the Respendent was to violation of Section 479.07(4), Florida Statutes, with no current tag, with the lust tag being 1971; Section 479.07(7), Florida Statutes, with no identifier; Section 479.13, Florida Statutes, with no valid lease. The latest permit tag affixed to the sign is dated 1971. A photograph of the sign taken on the 20th of April, 1977, showed that there was no identifier on the sign. An identifier is the imprint showing the owner of the sign. Subsequent to the taking of the photograph, an identifier was added to the sign showing the Respondent as owner. The Respondent entered into evidence an application for outdoor advertising permit dated March 2, 1977. A sign lease agreement was entered into evidence by the Respondent dated the 15th day of February, 1977, alleged to be a lease agreement from the Florida Conference Association of Seventh Day Adventists for a lease for a term of five years beginning January 1, 1973 and expiring December 31, 1977, for the subject billboard sign. There was confusion as to the ownership of the sign and the sign stood without permit tags subsequent to 1971. No application for permitting of the sign was made until the Respondent made an application for a permit as indicated in the foregoing findings of fact in 1977. The proposed Recommended Order of the Respondent has been considered in the preparation of this order.
Recommendation Remove the subject sign inasmuch as the sign is illegal and in violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William D. Rowland, Esquire 115 East Morse Boulevard Post Office Box 539 Winter Park, Florida 32789
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's predecessor in interest leased property along the I-275 in October 1973 (Exhibit 3) and erected an outdoor advertising sign thereon. One witness testified that at the time this sign was erected in 1973 there was no other sign within 500 feet of this sign. The sign was erected within the city limits of Tampa, Florida and no permit other than a city building permit was required for this sign. In 1974 DOT required permits for all signs including those located within city limits, but no fee was collected for the permits issued for signs within the city limits. This regulation was not enforced by DOT until 1976- 1978, although in 1974 DOT had advised sign owners that permits were required for all signs and how they were to apply for permits for those signs located within the city limits (Exhibit 4). In 1975 National Advertising Company, in accordance with DOT instructions for obtaining permits for signs located in incorporated areas, submitted a renewal application in which it listed the sign located within 500 feet of Petitioner's sign (Exhibit 5). When no permit was issued by DOT, National Advertising Company, by letter dated September 1, 1977 (Exhibit 6), called to DOT's attention that they had not been issued permits for signs within city limits for which they had applied. Application for a sign permit for their sign along the I-275 located within 500 feet of Petitioner's sign was submitted by National Advertising Company on 31 March 1980 (Exhibit 7) and approved by DOT. This application showed the sign to have been erected prior to 1972. At this hearing Petitioner introduced as Exhibit 1 a copy of an Advertising Sign Permit application dated 9-1-76 executed by its predecessor in title, Martin Outdoor Advertising Company. The only indication on this application that it was received by Respondent is a received stamp dated April 15, 1980. During the period 1976-1979 considerable confusion existed in the outdoor sign industry respecting permits for signs and particularly for those signs located within city limits despite notification to sign companies (Exhibit 4). In an effort to clarify the situation, Respondent sent out circulars with the annual renewal notices advising all sign owners that signs along Interstate and Federal Aid Primary Highways within incorporated towns and cities required permits. In the circular dated December 18, 1978 (Exhibit 8), sign owners were told to submit applications for all unpermitted signs prior to February 17, 1979, and that failure to do so could result in the removal of the unpermitted signs. This was followed up by another circular dated October 31, 1979 (Exhibit 9) in which the deadline for applying for permits for those unpermitted signs was extended to January 1, 1980. Neither of these circulars which were enclosed with renewal notices were delivered by Petitioner's mail room to Petitioner's real estate section. Instead, they were forwarded to accounting with renewal notices. Upon an inspection of signs along the I-275 in March 1980, Petitioner's sign was observed without a permit and in violation of the spacing requirements. Notice of alleged violation dated 3 April 1980 was forwarded to Petitioner (Exhibit 10). Petitioner then applied for a permit for the sign which was disapproved and request for this hearing followed.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Transportation's Notice of Denied Application for an outdoor advertising permit at State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, Leon County, issued to Lamar of Tallahassee on May 30, 2008, should be upheld pursuant to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes,1/ or whether the sign should be permitted as a nonconforming sign as defined by Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is a state agency empowered to regulate outdoor advertising signs along the interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems of Florida pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Lamar is licensed to engage in the business of outdoor advertising within the state of Florida pursuant to Section 479.04, Florida Statutes. Lamar owns a V-shaped sign located on certain real property at 1940 Thomasville Road in Tallahassee. Thomasville Road is also known as State Road 61. Lamar does not own the real property, but has the right to erect and maintain its sign on the property under a lease that Lamar executed with the landowner in 1998. Lamar's sign was erected in 1998, with the approval of the City of Tallahassee. The sign is located on the southwest corner of the intersection of Thomasville and Betton/Bradford Road, behind the Southern Flooring showroom. The east side of the sign face is within 660 feet of and visible to State Road 61. State Road 61 is a federal-aid highway and thus a "controlled road" subject to the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the east side of the sign requires a permit from the Department. The west side is visible only to Bradford Road and does not require a permit from the Department. On February 10, 2008, Lisa Adams, an outdoor advertising inspector conducting an annual inventory on behalf of the Department, identified the subject sign as an unpermitted sign that is visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams completed a Department compliance checklist stating that the sign was possibly illegal because it lacked a Department permit and the east side of the sign was visible from State Road 61. On April 22, 2008, the Department issued a notice of violation stating that the sign was illegal and must be removed within 30 days of the date of the notice, pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. Lamar did not file a request for hearing in response to the notice of violation, and does not contest the notice of violation in this proceeding. On May 16, 2008, Lamar filed an Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit for the sign. The Department reviewed the application and issued a Notice of Denied Application on May 30, 2008. The application was denied because the sign site does not meet the spacing requirements of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes, in that it is closer than 1,000 feet from another permitted sign owned by Lamar. The other permitted sign was built in 1979. The 1,000 foot spacing requirement has been in the statute at all times since the 1998 construction of the sign at issue in this proceeding, meaning that it could never have met the spacing requirement of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes. Myron Laborde was Lamar Advertising Southeast's regional manager in 1998 when the sign was built. His area of authority included Tallahassee. Mr. Laborde testified that in 1998 the view of the sign from State Road 61 was obstructed by several palm trees, some scrub oaks, and a very tall tallow tree. Some of these trees were removed when Southern Flooring took over and remodeled the old Helms Exterminators building at 1940 Thomasville Road about four years ago. Mr. Laborde testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees, but only "if you . . .turn your head 90 degrees" while driving north on State Road 61. Loyd Childree has been the vice-president and general manager of Lamar of Tallahassee since 2003. Mr. Childree testified that the renovations to the Helms Exterminators building began some time after March 2005, and that the building's size was nearly doubled to accommodate the Southern Flooring showroom. Mr. Childree testified that a lot of trees were removed during the renovation, including palm trees and a "canopy-type tree" about 25 to 30 feet tall with a full crown similar to that of an oak. Mr. Childree testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees. Mr. Childree further stated that Lamar markets the sign to advertisers based on the traffic counts from Bradford Road, not those from State Road 61. Ms. Adams, the inspector who identified the possible illegality of the sign, has worked for the Department's contractor, TBE Group, since August 2004. Her job is to conduct an inventory of permitted signs on controlled roads such as State Road 61 and determine which unpermitted signs are visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams inventoried State Road 61 in 2005, 2006 and 2007 without identifying Lamar's sign as an unpermitted sign visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams testified that her predecessor in the position inventoried State Road 61 every year since Lamar's sign was erected and never identified the sign as one visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams testified that she might have seen the sign in a previous year but did not identify it as illegal because she believed it had "on-premise" advertising, i.e., it advertised Southern Flooring. With certain restrictions, a sign erected on the premises of a business establishment that bears advertising for that establishment is exempt pursuant to Section 479.16(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. Adams frankly conceded that she was speculating and that her memory was unclear as to whether she had seen and noted this sign in past years. In any event, Lamar's log of advertisers showed that Southern Flooring never advertised on the sign. Lynn Holschuh is the Department's state outdoor advertising administrator, and had held this position since 1992. Ms. Holschuh testified that State Road 61 has been inventoried by an outdoor advertising inspector every year since Lamar's sign was erected in 1998. None of the inspectors noted the visibility or possible illegality of the sign until Ms. Adams noted the sign on February 12, 2008. Ms. Holschuh lives in Tallahassee and has driven on State Road 61 hundreds of times over the years. In her deposition, she testified that she believed the sign was not visible when it was built, and only became visible from State Road 61 when a third party removed the obstructing trees. The testimony of Mr. Laborde, Mr. Childree, and Ms. Holschuh was credible and uncontroverted as to the history of the sign. It is found that the sign was not visible from State Road 61 when it was erected in 1998, but that it became visible from State Road 61 when trees were removed by the landowner during renovations to the old Helms Exterminators building at some point after March 2005. Lamar's sign, now visible from State Road 61, is subject to the Department's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 479.01, Florida Statutes, because State Road 61, as a federal- aid primary highway, is a "controlled road" under the statute. A sign visible from a controlled road must carry a Department permit. Lamar contends that the facts of this case establish that its sign meets the definition of a "nonconforming sign" set forth in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes: "Nonconforming sign" means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. Lamar's sign was not visible from State Road 61 in 1998 and therefore was "lawfully erected" in terms of the Department's licensing requirements. Lamar contends that the removal of trees by a third party constituted "changed conditions" that rendered the sign out of compliance with state law, and that the sign is therefore a nonconforming sign under Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes. The Legislature has provided no definition of the term "changed conditions," and the Department has no rule to provide interpretive guidance to the words of the statute. On September 17, 2008, Lamar filed a motion for leave to amend its petition for hearing in this case to challenge the Department's alleged interpretation of the phrase "due to changed conditions" as an unadopted rule. In particular, Lamar alleged that the Department was applying an unadopted rule limiting "changed conditions" to those initiated by a government agency. On September 19, 2008, the Department filed an unopposed motion to remand the case to the agency. The motion was granted on September 22, 2008. In the Florida Administrative Weekly dated November 26, 2008 (vol. 34, no. 48, p. 6228), the Department published a Notice of Development of Proposed Rule, with the following preliminary text of an amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: 14-10.006 Additional Permitting Criteria. Each application for an outdoor advertising sign permit shall meet the requirements of Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S. In addition, an application must comply with the requirements of the agreement between the state and the United States Department of Transportation referenced in Section 479.02(1), F.S., which have not been duplicated in Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S., or superseded by stricter provisions in those statutes. The requirements are: through (8) No change. (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means only the actions of a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., which includes for example: Rezoning of a commercial area, reclassifying a secondary highway as a primary highway, or altering a highway's configuration causing a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. (Emphasis added) Ms. Holschuh testified that this draft rule language was written in direct response to Lamar's allegation that the Department's denial of its application was based on an unadopted rule. On December 16, 2008, the Department held a workshop on the draft rule. At the workshop, the Florida Outdoor Advertising Association ("FOAA") submitted the following suggested draft language for subsection (9) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means, and shall include, any of the following: An action taken by a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., such as the rezoning of a parcel of property fro commercial to noncommercial, reclassifying a secondary highway to a primary highway, altering a highway's configuration, or the taking of any other action within the powers of such governmental entity which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction; The action of a third party, who is not the owner of a preexisting sign, relating to modifications to the topography, vegetation, buildings or other physical characteristics of the property upon which the sign is located, or the property surrounding the sign, which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. an act of God which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. The Department rejected the FOAA's proposed language, and ultimately abandoned the effort to adopt a rule defining the term "changed conditions." On September 18, 2009, the Department filed a motion with DOAH to reopen this case and proceed to a fact-finding hearing regarding its proposed rejection of Lamar's application. In her deposition, Ms. Holschuh testified that the rulemaking effort was abandoned because the language proposed by the FOAA made it clear that it would be "nearly impossible" to arrive at a definition that would cover "every situation that might arise for when an existing sign might suddenly become visible." Ms. Holschuh testified in deposition that it is now the Department's policy to review these matters on a case-by- case basis. However, she also testified that the Department, as a matter of "policy," continues to limit its consideration of "changed conditions" to actions taken by a governmental entity. The Department bases this limitation on the examples provided by 23 C.F.R. § 750.707(b), defining "nonconforming signs" for purposes of the Federal Highway Administration: A nonconforming sign is a sign which was lawfully erected but does not comply with the provisions of State law or State regulations passed at a later date or later fails to comply with State law or State regulations due to changed conditions. Changed conditions include, for example, signs lawfully in existence in commercial areas which at a later date become noncommercial, or signs lawfully erected on a secondary highway later classified as a primary highway. Ms. Holschuh stated that the Department's policy was applied to Lamar in the instant case, and would continue to be applied in the future unless some "extraordinary circumstance" in a specific case led the Department to revisit the policy. At the final hearing, Ms. Holschuh backed away somewhat from her flat statement that the Department's "policy" was to limit consideration of changed conditions to those caused by government action. She stated that FOAA's proposed rule language caused the Department to reconsider its position that governmental action should be the exclusive reason for granting a permit for "changed conditions," and testified that the Department will consider other circumstances in its case-by-case review of permit applications. Ms. Holschuh testified that, under the facts presented in this case, the Department would deny the permit because there is DOAH case law on point for the proposition that tree removal does not constitute "changed conditions," and because broadening the definition of "changed conditions" to include the situation presented by this case would open up the process to abuse. Ms. Holschuh testified, at more than one point in the proceeding, that the Department would have very likely granted the permit had the trees been removed by the Department rather than the private landowner. She gave no indication that Section 479.105(1)(e), Florida Statutes, or any other statute would prevent the Department from granting the permit for Lamar's nonconforming sign, should the Department find that the sign fell into nonconformity due to "changed conditions." The DOAH case law cited by Ms. Holschuh is Lamar of Tallahassee v. Department of Transportation, Case Nos. 08-0660 and 08-0661 (DOAH September 15, 2008), discussed more fully in the Conclusions of Law below. Ms. Holschuh testified that Lamar's sign is not located in a Department right-of-way and is not a hazard to the public in its current location.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation denying the application of Lamar of Tallahassee for a state sign permit for a location described as State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, in Leon County, Florida (Application Number 57155). DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2010.
The Issue Whether the subject outdoor advertising signs are illegal because they were erected without state permits from Petitioner. Whether the subject signs should be removed. Whether Petitioner is equitably estopped to assert that the signs are illegal and should be removed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and maintains an outdoor advertising sign located adjacent to Interstate 95 on Northwest 6th Court, which is between Northwest 75th Street and Northwest 76th Street, Miami, Dade County, Florida. For ease of reference, this sign will be referred to as the Interstate 95 sign. The Interstate 95 sign has two facings, each of which is visible from Interstate 95. The Interstate 95 sign is located within 147 feet of the right-of-way of Interstate 95. Respondent owns and maintains an outdoor advertising sign located adjacent to Interstate 395 at the corner of Northwest 14th Street and Northwest 1st Court, Miami, Dade County, Florida. For ease of reference, this sign will be referred to as the Interstate 395 sign. The Interstate 395 sign has two facings, each of which is visible from Interstate 395. The Interstate 395 sign is located within 240 feet of the right- of-way of Interstate 395. Eugene A. (Andy) Hancock, Jr., is the President of the corporate Respondent and, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, controlled the activities of Respondent. Mr. Hancock caused the corporate Respondent to lease the respective properties on which the subject signs are located in November 1998. He thereafter caused the corporate Respondent to erect the two double-faced signs at issue in this proceeding. The subject signs were constructed during September and October 1999. Each sign was constructed without a state permit from Petitioner. Each sign is within the permitting jurisdiction of Petitioner. Mr. Hancock testified that his company did not apply for permits from Petitioner because of a conversation he had with Bernard Davis, a former outdoor advertising administrator for Petitioner. Mr. Hancock testified that Mr. Davis represented to him that his company would not need permits from Petitioner if it had permits from the City of Miami. This testimony is rejected. 3/ Respondent has applied for state sign permits for the subject signs. Permits for these signs have not been issued because of their proximity to existing, permitted signs. 4/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that the subject signs are illegal and must be removed pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2001.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Empire Outdoor Advertising, Inc., is the owner of a sign located on the westbound or north side of Northwest 54th Street approximately 20 feet east of Northwest 12th Avenue, in Dade County, Florida. Northwest 54th Street is also designated as State Road 25A. The Respondent's sign is a structure or billboard designed to advertise or inform, and its copy is visible from the main traveled way of the adjacent roadway of State Road 25A or Northwest 54th Street. At the site where the Respondent's sign is located, State Road 25A or Northwest 54th Street is a part of the federal- aid primary highway system, and this roadway is open to the public for vehicular traffic. The Respondent's sign is located within 660 feet from the nearest edge of the pavement of State Road 25A. The Respondent's sign is situated within 500 feet from another outdoor advertising structure on the same side of the highway. These two signs face in the same direction and are both visible to westbound traffic on the north side of State Road 25A or Northwest 54th Street. The Respondent's sign has affixed to it copy which advertises Kraft Barbecue Sauce. This structure does not fall within any of the exceptions to the statutory licensing requirements set forth in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes, and it must have a state sign permit. The Respondent has not applied for an outdoor advertising permit from the Department, and no such permit has been issued by the Department for the subject sign.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter its Final Order finding the Respondent's sign which is the subject of this proceeding to be in violation of the applicable statutes and rules, and ordering its removal. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 25th day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 L. Martin Reeder, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 2637 Palm Beach, Florida 33480
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner’s applications for a State sign permit should be granted.
Findings Of Fact No dispute exists that DOT is the State agency responsible for regulating outdoor advertising signs located within 660 feet of the State Highway system, interstate, or federal-aid primary system in accordance with Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Mr. Monsalve wishes to place two advertising signs within 660 feet of Interstate 95 and visible to Interstate 95. The advertising signs require a permit. On or about June 16, 2008, Mr. Monsalve filed two applications, completing DOT’s forms titled “Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit” (Application), with DOT for outdoor advertising signs. The two applications indicated the same location for the outdoor advertising but with different height, width, and total square feet: one was a height of 4 feet, width of 60 feet, and 240 total square feet, and the other was a height of 12 feet, width of 12 feet, and 144 total square feet. The two Applications were assigned Application numbers 57196 and 57197, respectively. The location for the proposed outdoor advertising signs is 299 Southwest 17 Road in Miami, Florida, near Interstate 95, North of Southwest 3rd Avenue. Mr. Monsalve owns the property on which the advertising signs are to be located. The Application contained a section titled “Local Government Permission.” The section provided that it was to be completed by the appropriate local government official or that a “written statement indicating that the sign complies with all local government requirements” may be submitted or, “for a proposed sign location, a copy of the building permit issued by the local government may be submitted.” The section was neither completed by the local government official nor was a written statement submitted indicating that the signs comply with all local government requirements. However, Mr. Monsalve submitted a 1999 building permit from the local government. The local government was the City of Miami. The 1999 building permit was issued by the City of Miami on July 13, 1999, to Hampton Inn for a commercial painted wall sign, located at 299 Southwest 17 Road. The building permit was issued Permit Number SG 99-5011166. The Folio Number, i.e., Property ID Number, on the 1999 building permit is No. 01-4138-002-0020. Mr. Monsalve owns the property for which the 1999 building permit was issued for the advertising sign. The property is the same property identified on his Application, assigned Application number 57197. DOT requires that, in order for a building permit to constitute “local government permission,” the permit must have been issued within six months of the date of an application for an outdoor advertising sign. The 1999 building permit submitted by Mr. Monsalve was beyond the six-month time period of the date of Application number 57197. Furthermore, by letter dated June 25, 2008, the City of Miami notified DOT that the 1999 building permit no longer had legal status due to the City of Miami changing its laws regarding billboards and that Mr. Monsalve did not have local government permission.3 The evidence demonstrates that the 1999 building permit did not constitute local government permission. The evidence failed to demonstrate that Mr. Monsalve had obtained local government permission. In March 2004, DOT issued a permit to the Hampton Inn for an outdoor advertising sign on Mr. Monsalve’s property. The permit was issued Tag Number CA179, and the sign was built on August 19, 2004. The permit information provides, among other information, that the location of the outdoor advertising sign was located 0.040 miles North of Southwest 3rd Avenue and that the sign was 144 square feet. Hampton Inn and Mr. Monsalve entered into an agreement/contract for Hampton Inn to lease outdoor advertising space from Mr. Monsalve at 299 Southwest 17 Road, Miami, Florida. A Second Lease Agreement between Mr. Monsalve and the Hampton Inn indicates in provision numbered one that the lease agreement was extended until March 31, 2007. The evidence demonstrates that, subsequent to March 31, 2007, the lease of the space by the Hampton Inn continued on a month-to-month basis and that the last time that Mr. Monsalve received payment for the monthly lease was in March 2008. The location for the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179 is the same location of Mr. Monsalve’s proposed outdoor advertising sign in Application number 57197. In June 2008, the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, was transferred from Hampton Inn to Outlook Media using DOT’s form titled “Outdoor Advertising Permit Transfer Request.” The permit is considered by DOT to be currently active. The location for Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57197 is currently permitted to Outlook Media due to the transfer of outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179 to Outlook Media. The distance between the proposed sign in Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57196 and the space in the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, is less than 1500 feet. The evidence demonstrates that the sign in Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57197 conflicts with the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, in that the two are the same location. Mr. Monsalve believed that he, as the property owner, owned the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, as well. He did not agree for the permit to be transferred. Mr. Monsalve was not aware that the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, had been transferred by Hampton Inn to Outlook Media. The evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he owned or did not own the permit or that his permission was required for the permit to be transferred. Mr. Monsalve did not agree to lease the space for the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media. Mr. Monsalve notified DOT that a problem existed between him and the City of Miami regarding obtaining local government permission and requested DOT to put his Application on “Hold” in order to provide him with time to resolve the problem. He also notified DOT regarding his dispute with the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media. DOT is unable to place applications on hold but is required to act on applications within 30 days. Also, Mr. Monsalve notified the City of Miami, among other things, of his dispute with the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media, and that he did not give Outlook Media permission to erect a sign on his property for which the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, was issued. By Notice of Denial issued on July 3, 2008, DOT notified Mr. Monsalve that his Applications were denied for the following reason: Other: No statement from the appropriate local governmental official indicating that the agency or unit of local government will issue a permit to the applicant upon approval of the state permit application by the Department (Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes). On July 15, 2008, DOT issued an amended Notice of Denial, notifying Mr. Monsalve that his Applications were denied for the following reasons: Sign does not meet spacing requirements (1500’ for interstates . . .) s.479.07(9)(a)1.&2., FS In conflict with permitted sign(s), tag #(s) CA 179 held by Outlook Media of South Florida, LLC . . . Sign/location does not comply with all local government requirements . . . s.479.07(3)(b), FS Other: The building permit submitted with the application is not in compliance with local governmental requirements. No evidence was presented to demonstrate that a determination had been made as to what Mr. Monsalve’s legal rights are as the owner of the property regarding his lease agreement/contract with the Hampton Inn and the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179; and regarding the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Andres Monsalve’s application for an outdoor advertising sign permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2008.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether six outdoor advertising sign permits previously issued to Petitioner should be reinstated; or, if not, whether new permits should be issued for the six advertising facings (two on each of three sign structures) in Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact In June 1982, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.5 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 6868 issued by the City of Clearwater (the City), on October 22, 1981, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AF604 and AF605 issued by DOT on November 18, 1981. In January 1983, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.4 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 10406 issued by the City on October 15, 1982, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers A1288 and A1289 issued by DOT on December 20, 1982. On or about July 1, 1984, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.3 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number SN - 24060117 issued by the City on June 6, 1984, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AM631 and AM632 issued by DOT on January 12, 1984. National maintained the three outdoor advertising billboard structures, containing six advertising faces, as identified in Findings of Fact numbers 1, 2 and 3, above (the "subject sign structures"), in the same condition as they were when erected. Following the lawful erection of the subject sign structures, National paid DOT the required annual permit fees through the year 1995, which allowed National to maintain and operate the subject sign structures through December 31, 1995. In March of 1995, DOT notified National that it was dropping state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory because DOT had no jurisdiction over the segment of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, adjacent to which the subject sign structures were located. The evidence was that DOT did so by serving on National a "Notice of Violation," citing DOT's lack of jurisdiction. The "Notice of Violation" gave National the opportunity to request an administrative hearing to contest DOT's action. National had no reason to question DOT's position on the jurisdictional issue but rather relied upon DOT's determination that DOT did not have jurisdiction in March of 1995. National chose not to request a hearing. The evidence was not clear as to when the DOT lost, or believed it lost, jurisdiction; the evidence also was not clear whether the DOT ever had, or believed it ever had, jurisdiction. At the time DOT dropped state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory, DOT did not refund any permit fees to National, including the permit fees which National had paid for the 1995 calendar year. Consequently, permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 were fully paid through December 31, 1995. On November 2, 1995, the section of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, along which the subject sign structures are located became part of the National Highway System (NHS), and became jurisdictional for the purpose of permitting outdoor advertising billboard structures. On August 26, 1996, Kenneth M. Towcimak, as Director of DOT's Office of Right of Way, issued a memorandum to all District Outdoor Advertising Administrators addressing implementation of outdoor advertising control over roadways which were previously uncontrolled by DOT, and which became designated as part of the NHS on November 28, 1995. The Towcimak memorandum of August 26, 1996, required notification by registered mail, with return receipt requested, to all owners of such outdoor advertising billboard structures, that they must obtain state permits by January 1, 1997. There was no evidence as to whether DOT ever notified National by registered mail, with return receipt requested, that National was required to obtain state permits by January 1, 1997, for the subject sign structures. National filed six applications for the subject sign structures on or about December 29, 1997 (one for each of the two sign facings on each sign structure). On the part of the forms asking for the location of the sign, the six applications described the location of the signs, respectively, as: "Reinstated State Tag # AF 604-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AF 605-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 631-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 632-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AI 288-10"; and "Reinstated State Tag # AI 289-10." The applications contained copies of the permits previously issued by DOT for the operation and maintenance of the subject sign structures, copies of Landowner's permission and copies of City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures. Although the applications included copies of the City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures, DOT knew that the City no longer considered the sign structures to be legal under the City's code. In 1989, the City amended its code to place limitations on the size (height and area) and concentration (one per lot) of signs in the locations of the subject sign structures. The subject sign structures exceeded at least some of the new limitations; however, the code amendment provided for a seven-year "amortization" period, until January 19, 1996, during which the signs would be permitted as legal, non-conforming signs. At the end of the "amortization" period, the signs no longer were legal under the City code. Some of the information on National's six applications was incorrect or incomplete. But all of the incorrect or incomplete information could easily have been remedied, and "incorrect information" is not the real basis upon which DOT gave notice of intent to deny the applications. The real basis for the notice of intent was the illegality of the sign structures under the City code. On or about November 22, 1999, National filed with DOT a Petition for Reinstatement for each of the three signs (each petition seeking reinstatement of the two permits for the two advertising facings for each sign structure) under Section 479.07(8)(b)1-3, Florida Statutes (1999). On January 31, 2000, DOT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Petition for Reinstatement as to each of the three such petitions filed by National.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Transportation enter a final order denying National's petitions for reinstatement and National's applications for new sign permits. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Aileen Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact On November 3, 1982, outdoor advertising sign permits AR946-06 and AK947-06 were issued by the Department of Transportation to Sandy Advertising Company. The permits were for a location on the west (north) side of U.S. Highway 90 approximately two miles east of its intersection with U.S. Highway 29 within the city limits of Pensacola, Florida. Sandy Advertising Company transferred those permits to Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. Annual renewal payments have been made each year in a timely manner by Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. No permit tags have been displayed at the Lamar sites and no sign has been built or maintained at the Lamar sites since issuance of the permits. Without having submitted an application for a permit to the Department of Transportation, Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc., obtained a building permit from the City of Pensacola for the erection of an outdoor advertising sign located in Escambia County approximately 3,790 feet east of State Road 296 on the north side of U.S. Highway 90. Pursuant to the building permit, Outdoor Media erected a sign at that location. The sign had an east and a west face and was less than 500 feet from the site for which permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 were issued. Each face of the sign required a separate permit from the Department of Transportation. Learning of the erection of Outdoor Media's sign, the Department notified Petitioner to remove it. Instead Outdoor Media applied for two sign permits for each face of the sign. On August 8, 1988, the Department of Transportation received Petitioner's applications for a state outdoor advertising permit. The applications were for each face of the sign located on U.S. 90 (Scenic Highway), a federal aid primary highway in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. The applications were denied on the ground that two other permits, permit AK946- 06 and permit AK947-06, had been issued to Lamar Advertising of Pensacola, Inc., for a location on the same side of the highway within one thousand feet of Petitioner's site. The spacing impediment caused by the earlier permits is the sole basis for denial of Petitioner's permit applications by the Department of Transportation. Petitioner meets all other permit requirements. In 1984, the legislature extensively revised Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. See Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida. Of particular concern in this proceeding are the changes to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, and whether those changes apply to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The revisions to this section introduced very specific tag display as well as sign erection and maintenance requirements for all permits. The revisions increased the fee schedules and provided that all permits expire annually on January 15. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, as amended states in part: (5)(a) For each permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal permit tag. The permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway; and it shall be attached in such a manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit will become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit will be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. (b) If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued must apply to the department for a replacement tag. Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permit is valid only for the location specified in the permit. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfer fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction is $100. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other persons in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (8)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits which were issued to him prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags which are not renewed shall be returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If a permittee has not submitted his fee payment by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a notice of violation to the permittee, requiring the payment of the permit fee within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due or, in the alternative to these payments, requiring the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his sign should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit will be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement will be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does not respond to the notice of violation within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (9)(a) A permit shall not be granted for any sign for which a permit had not been granted by the effective date of this act unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway. One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway. The minimum spacing provided in this paragraph does not preclude the permitting V-type, back-to-back, side- to-side, stacked, or double-faced signs at the permitted sign site. A permit shall not be granted for a sign pursuant to this chapter to locate such sign on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, which sign: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if outside an incorporated area; Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. The effective date(s) of the amendments to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, is stated in Section 27 of Law 84-227. Section 27 specifically and explicitly made permits issued prior to June 30, 1984 subject to the new provisions of Law 84-227. Section 27 states: This act shall take effect October 1, 1984, except that the amendments to Section 479.07 F.S. shall take effect July 1, 1984; however, any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. In spite of the language of Section 27, it is DOT's interpretation that for permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, permittees are not required to display tags within thirty (30) days and erect signs within 270 days as provided in Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 1984. DOT nonetheless requires pre-1984 permits to comply with Sections 479.07(5)(b) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes. While DOT's interpretation is not in writing and has not been promulgated as a rule pursuant to Sections 120.54 or 120.55, Florida Statutes, it is applied statewide and has been held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule in Case NO. 5227R, Final Order issued December 29th, 1988. DOT relies upon the definition of "non-conforming" signs given in Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes. Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes, states in part: `Nonconforming sign' means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. [Emphasis supplied.] 1/ DOT does not rely upon the exceptions listed in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 84-227. The exceptions are numerous, but do not specifically enumerate "Pre-July 1, 1984 permits." It is DOT's view that permits issued before July 1, 1984, are valid with or without a sign being erected or tags maintained or displayed. These "secret signs" can only be discovered after the application is submitted and DOT checks its computer records. The effect of DOT's interpretation is that pre- 1984 outdoor advertising sign permits can exist into perpetuity without the holder thereof ever erecting a sign or posting a metal tag as long as the permittee renews its permit. This interpretation is directly opposed to the legislature's purpose in enacting the 1984 amendments, i.e., the prevention of advertisers stockpiling unused sites and permits. Moreover, this interpretation is contrary to the pre- or post-1984 statutory language and is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute. DOT bases it's interpretation on the ground that the constitution prohibits the retroactive application of the 1984 amendments to permits existing prior to the effective date of those amendments. DOT did not offer any evidence as to the accuracy of its view on the requirements of the constitution. Failing such evidentiary support, DOT has failed to carry its burden of proof when utilizing an unpromulgated rule on a case by case basis. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this cause. Section 120.57(1) Florida Statutes. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, was amended by Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida, to require that parties obtaining outdoor advertising permits post their permit tags within thirty (30) days and erect their signs within two hundred seventy (270) days or their permits would automatically become void. The amendment became effective July 1, 1984. The amendment also expressly and explicitly provided for treatment of pre-July 1, 1984 permits by stating" . . . any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. Section 479.01(12) only makes exceptions for nonconforming "signs lawfully erected." Section 479.07(9)(c) only provides that nothing in subsection (9), pertaining to spacing requirements or permitting of new signs after July 1, 1984, may be construed to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of the Act to become nonconforming. See the definition of "sign" contained in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes, and of "erect" contained in Section 479.01(4), Florida Statutes. However, in spite of the clear language of the statutes, DOT interprets the term "permitted signs" as including permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, but which have no sign erected on the site. DOT has placed an interpretation upon the statutes that is not apparent from their language. The plain language of Sections 479.01(12) and 479.07(9)(c) only applies to signs which have been constructed on the permit site. The sections do not apply where no sign has been constructed. Since no signs were ever erected on the sites covered by permit AK946-06 and AK947-06 neither Section 479.01(12) nor 479.07(9)(c) applies to Lamar's permits. Further, DOT interprets the amendment to Section 479.07, now codified as Section 479.07(5)(a), requiring permit display and sign erection within a specified time period, to be applicable only to permits initially issued after the effective date of July 1, 1984. The agency has not enforced that subsection against preexisting permits and renewals of such preexisting permits, irrespective of whether or not a sign has ever been erected on the permitted site. However, the agency has applied and enforced against preexisting permits all other portions of the amendments, including but not limited to the mandatory recurring uniform annual January 15 renewal date and increased renewal fee with regard to preexisting permits. The agency has taken this approach on the grounds that the constitution prohibited the amendment from being applied retroactively to such preexisting permits. In Administrative Case NO. 88-5227R, this interpretation was held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule. However, agencies have the choice of properly promulgating rules and applying them with the full force and effect of law or of fully explicating those policies by demonstrating the policies' reasonableness and factual accuracy on a case by case basis in Section 120.57 proceedings. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Amos v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 444 So.2d (Fla, 1st DCA 1983); Gulf Coast Home Health Services Of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 513 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). As noted earlier, the sole reason for DOT's policy was that it was required by the constitution. Such a bare bones claim as "the constitution requires it" is tantamount to the claim that was asserted in Florida Cities Water Company v. Florida Public Service Commission, 384 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1980) that a previous statutory interpretation was "wrong as a matter of law." In Florida Cities, no record foundation was made for the non-rule policy being followed in that case. The Florida Supreme Court held that such a rationale was not sustainable absent adequate record support for the application of non-rule agency policy. In this case, DOT has failed to affirmatively show the reasonableness and factual accuracy of the policy that sign permits which were issued prior to July 1, 1984, should not be subject to Section 479.07(5), Florida Statutes, enforcement and should be treated as if they constituted, erected and maintained signs for purposes of Section 479.07(9), Florida Statutes. It is doubtful that DOT could ever show the accuracy of its view of the constitution. The case law in the area clearly establishes that permits such as these are not property in the constitutional sense. Such permits do not confer any right, estate or vested interest, and are revocable at the will of the legislature. Such permits are also subject to new permit conditions. State ex rel First Presbyterian Church of Miami v. Fuller, 187 So. 148 (Fla. 1939); City of Miami Beach v. Deauville Operating Corp., 129 So.2d 185 ( Fla. 3d DCA 1961) and Kawasaki of Tampa, Inc. v. Calvin, 348 So.2d 897 ( Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Moreover, the 1984 amendments to Chapter 479 do not require retroactive application to be applied to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The new permit conditions were applicable only upon the expiration of the old permits on January 15. Thereafter, the new permit conditions applied to the renewal. Therefore, since Lamar did not build any signs on the sites covered by either permit AK946-06 or AK947-06 within 270 days of its first renewal after the effective date of the statutory revisions to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and has not posted the required tags at the sites, permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 are void and cannot be used as a basis for denying Petitioner's sign applications. As in Florida Cities, having failed to establish the reasonableness and accuracy of its policy, the foregoing policy cannot form the basis of the permit denials. This is especially true in light of the fact that DOT's policy ignores the clear language of the statutory amendments.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order voiding Permits AK946-06 and AK947-06, held by Respondent, Lamar Advertising Company, Inc., and granting the applications of Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1990.
