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TAMCO ELECTRIC, INC. vs PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 13-002153BID (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Jun. 13, 2013 Number: 13-002153BID Latest Update: Nov. 13, 2013

The Issue Whether Respondent's action to reject all bids submitted in response to ITB 13-803-206, relating to the removal and replacement of the public address system at Pinellas Park High School, is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, as alleged in the Amended Petition.

Findings Of Fact On March 4, 2013, ITB was issued by Respondent for work related to the removal and replacement of the public address system at Pinellas Park High School in Largo, Florida. According to the Special Conditions portions of the ITB, the "scope" of the project is to "[p]rovide labor and materials to remove and replace the auditorium sound system as per plans and specifications by Keane Acoustics, Inc." The ITB was assigned bid number 13-803-206 by Respondent. Bids for the contract were to be submitted to Respondent by 3:00 p.m., April 11, 2013. Bids for the project were timely received from two companies. The first company, Becker Communications, Inc., d/b/a BCI Integrated Solutions (BCI), submitted a bid in the amount of $130,756.66. Petitioner submitted a bid in the amount of $116,000.00. There is a section of the ITB titled "special conditions." The special conditions provide in part that "[t]his is an ALL or NONE bid [and] [t]he entire contract shall be awarded to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder meeting the specifications." On April 22, 2013, Respondent posted a notice advising of its intent to award the contract to BCI. Although Petitioner submitted the lowest bid, Respondent determined that Petitioner's bid was non-responsive because the bid failed to include "proof of 5 years [of] experience with this type of work" as required by the special conditions of the ITB. Petitioner interpreted this provision as requiring five years of experience as a certain type of general contractor, which Petitioner had, whereas Respondent intended for the ITB to convey that five years of experience related to the removal and installation of audio equipment was the desired type of experience. Petitioner's failure to respond to the ITB in the manner contemplated by Respondent was a technical, nonmaterial irregularity.1/ Numbered paragraph six of the General Terms & Conditions of the ITB provides in part that Respondent "expressly reserves the right to reject any bid proposal if it determines that the . . . experience of the bidder, compared to work proposed, justifies such rejection." On April 24, 2013, Petitioner provided to Respondent a notice advising of its intent to protest the award of the contract to BCI. On May 3, 2013, Petitioner filed its formal protest challenging Respondent's intended action of awarding the contract to BCI. Petitioner's formal protest enumerated several grounds. Of particular concern to Respondent were Petitioner's assertions that the ITB was "inconsistent with Florida law since bidders [were] not required to submit a List of Subcontractors by the time of opening bid"2/ and that provisions of the ITB were ambiguous with respect to the type of experience required to qualify for bidding.3/ Prior to receiving Petitioner's protest, Respondent was unaware of the fact that its bid specifications governing the disclosure of subcontractors did not comply with Florida law. Upon consideration of Petitioner's grounds for protest, Respondent determined that the ITB, as alleged by Petitioner, failed to comply with section 255.0515, Florida Statutes (2012),4/ and that there was ambiguity in the language regarding the experience requirements for bidders.5/ Respondent refers to the problems with the ITB as "procedural errors." These procedural errors will be referred to herein as "irregularities" as this term is more in keeping with the nomenclature of this area of jurisprudence. Given the ITB's irregularities, Respondent decided to reject all bids. In explaining Respondent's rationale for rejecting all bids, Michael Hewett, Respondent's Director of Maintenance,6/ testified that "the [irregularities] were such that [they] potentially could give an unfair advantage to one bidder over another." As for the issue related to the requirements of section 255.0515, Mr. Hewett explained that neither of the two bidders submitted a listing of subcontractors. It would have been competitively disadvantageous to BCI if Petitioner were able to successfully argue that BCI should be disqualified for failing to provide a listing of subcontractors when Petitioner also failed to provide such listing. During the same approximate time that the ITB in the present case was issued, Respondent issued an ITB for nearly identical work to be performed at one of its other facilities (Palm Harbor). In all material respects, the Palm Harbor ITB was identical to the one at issue herein. Unlike the present case, BCI was the sole bidder for the Palm Harbor project and this distinguishing fact reasonably explains why Respondent did not reject BCI's bid for the Palm Harbor Project even though the ITB therein was plagued with the same irregularities found in the present case.7/

Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Pinellas County School Board enter a final order finding that the rejection of all bids submitted in response to ITB 13-803-206 was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, and dismissing Tamco Electric, Inc.'s instant protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2013.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57255.0515
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ALAN TAYLOR vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 95-005623BID (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 21, 1995 Number: 95-005623BID Latest Update: Jan. 26, 1996

Findings Of Fact By Invitation to Bid for Existing Facilities, Lease Number 730:0181 (ITB), Respondent invited interested persons to submit bids for the lease of office space in Naples. The ITB requires the bidder to submit various documentation with the bid. The ITB states: "In order for a bid to be accepted, the items 1 through 8 must be included in the bid proposal." Items 4 demands: "Floor Plan showing present layout with dimensions. See paragraph 9b of Bid Submittal Form." Item 5 requires "Square footage calculations. See paragraph 9c of Bid Submittal Form." The ITB adds: "Items 9 through 17 must be included, if applicable." Item 12 is "Authorization for corporation to conduct business in Florida." Item 13 is a "Certification Letter from an HVAC maintenance contractor on age and condition of system." The ITB includes a Bid Submittal Form in blank, which each bidder was to complete in order to submit a bid. Paragraph 1 of the Bid Submittal Form states: Net square footage required: 6,442+ 3 percent, (acceptable range 6,442 to 6,635 square feet) measured in accordance with the Standard Method of Space Measurement (Attachment A). Note: Rest rooms and mechanical rooms are not included in calculating net rentable square footage. BIDDER RESPONSE: Net square feet proposed . (Space offered must be within the 3+ percent required.) Paragraphs 9b and 9c of the Bid Submittal Form provide: As part of the bid submittal, bidders are to provide: b) A scaled (1/16" or 1/8" or 1/4" = 1'0" preliminary floor plan showing present configurations with measurements. The final floor plan will be as described in the specifications. c) A scaled site layout showing present location of building(s), location, configura- tion and number of parking spaces assigned to the Department, access and egress routes and proposed changes. This is to be drawn to scale. Final site layout will be a joint effort between the Department and Lessor, so as to best meet the needs of the Department. In response to the ITB Petitioner timely submitted a bid for 6635 net rentable square feet. Petitioner's bid contained all required scaled plans. In response to Item 13 Petitioner's bid stated that all air conditioning units would be replaced with specified units, thus rendering Item 13 inapplicable. Respondent determined that Petitioner's bid was responsive and conceded the same at the hearing. Respondent correctly characterized as a minor irregularity the omission of documentation of Petitioner's corporate status because the omission gave Petitioner absolutely no competitive advantage. The only other bid submitted in response to the ITB was from Gulf Atlantic, which was for office space in the vicinity of the office space bid by Petitioner. Respondent also determined the timely submitted Gulf Atlantic bid to be responsive. Although charging more rent than the rent charged in Petitioner's bid, the Gulf Atlantic bid narrowly defeated Petitioner's bid in the evaluation process by 10.5 points out of a total of 377.5 points. Accepting the recommendation of the evaluators, Respondent published its notice of intent to award the bid to Gulf Atlantic, and Petitioner timely filed its notice of intent to protest and written protest. The Gulf Atlantic bid was for "+/-6,442" square feet. The attached floor plans are not correctly scaled. Careful analysis of the floor plans reveals that the actual square footage of the bid space is well under 6442 square feet. As confirmed by Gulf Atlantic's representative on the morning of the hearing, the Gulf Atlantic bid is for 5757.6 net rentable square feet. The Gulf Atlantic bid also lacks the required HVAC certification. The shortage of nearly 700 square feet of office space and the absence of an HVAC certification letter are material variances from the ITB. Both items confer upon Gulf Atlantic substantial competitive advantages by allowing it to bid substantially less office space than required of other bidders and allowing it to ignore the requirement of a representation as to the working condition of the HVAC system. These material variances render the Gulf Atlantic bid unresponsive.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order rejecting the bid of Gulf Atlantic as nonresponsive and awarding the lease contract to Petitioner based on its bid. ENTERED on December 20, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1995. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1 (first two sentences): adopted or adopted in substance. 1: (remainder): rejected as irrelevant. 2: adopted or adopted in substance. 3: rejected as irrelevant. 4: adopted or adopted in substance. 5: adopted or adopted in substance, except as to dishonest. 6 (first two and fourth sentences): adopted or adopted in substance. 6 (third sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence as to intentional disregard of the minus sign. 7: adopted or adopted in substance. 8-16: rejected as subordinate. 17: adopted or adopted in substance with a further reduction for mechanical space. 18: rejected as subordinate. 19-20: adopted or adopted in substance, except as to dishonest and with the addition of illegal. 21-22: rejected as subordinate. 23-26: rejected as unnecessary. 27-32: adopted or adopted in substance. 33-45: rejected as unnecessary. 46: rejected as repetitious. 47: adopted or adopted in substance. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 1 (remainder): rejected as irrelevant. 2-6 (first sentence): rejected as unnecessary. 6 (second sentence)-9: adopted or adopted in substance. 10(a): adopted or adopted in substance as to Petitioner; rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence as to Gulf Atlantic. 10(b) (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance as to Gulf Atlantic; rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence as to Petitioner. 10(b) (second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence; the determination that the Gulf Atlantic bid was responsive was illegal. 11(a) (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance as to Gulf Atlantic; rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence as to Petitioner. The same ruling applies to the third sentence insofar as it applies to Gulf Atlantic; the omission of an HVAC certification from the Gulf Atlantic bid was not a minor irregularity. 11(a) (remainder except for third sentence as to Gulf Atlantic): adopted or adopted in substance. 11(b): adopted or adopted in substance as to Gulf Atlantic; rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence as to Petitioner. 12-13 (first sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 13 (remainder)-14: rejected as unnecessary. The only determination by Respondent of the Gulf Atlantic bid that is crucial to this recommended order is the illegal determination that the Gulf Atlantic bid was responsive. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Rebecca A. O'Hara G. Steven Pfeiffer Apgar, Pelham & Pfeiffer 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301 Tom Barnhart Assistant General Counsel Office of General Counsel P.O. Box 6668 Tallahassee, FL 32314-6668

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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CLOSE CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 09-004996BID (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Sep. 14, 2009 Number: 09-004996BID Latest Update: Jul. 13, 2011

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Close Construction, Inc. (Petitioner), (Close) was the lowest responsive and responsible bidder in the Request For Bid (RFB) Number 6000000262, whether the subject contract should be awarded to the Petitioner, and, concomitantly, whether the Respondent agency's decision to award the contract to the Intervener, Worth Contracting, Inc. (Worth) was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary or capricious.

Findings Of Fact The South Florida Water Management District is a public corporation authorized under Chapter 373, Florida Statutes. It issued a request for bids for the refurbishment and automation of certain facilities in Broward County, Florida. Close is a construction company duly authorized to do business in the state of Florida. It was one of the bidders on the procurement represented by the subject request for bids and is the Petitioner in this case. This dispute had its beginnings on June 5, 2009, when the Respondent issued RFB number 6000000262. The RFB solicited construction services for the refurbishment and automation of two facilities in Broward County. The procurement would involve the installation of new direct-drive electric pumps at the Respondent's G-123 Pump Station in Broward County, along with the construction of an equipment shelter and the replacement of a retaining wall with a poured concrete retaining wall, as well as refurbishment of "pump flap gates." The RFB also requested construction services for the replacement of gates at the Respondent's S-34 water-control structure in Broward County. Both facilities would thus be automated so that they can be remotely operated from the Respondent's headquarters in West Palm Beach. After issuance of the RFB, two addenda were supplied to vendors and were posted. The first addendum was posted on or about June 19, 2009, concerning a change in specifications for flap gates and is not the subject of this dispute. Addendum No. Two was electronically posted on or about June 30, 2009. It amended the technical specifications of the RFB by deleting Section 11212 regarding measurement of payment of electric motors/belt-driven axial flow pumps. That addendum also added a new measure and payment to Subpart 1.01 of the technical specifications to provide for an owner-directed allowance of $40,000.00 to provide for the potential need for certain electrical utility work to be done by FPL in order to complete the project. Addendum No. Two added an additional term to the RFB in providing that the $40,000.00 allowance price "Shall be added to the other costs to complete the bid." The second Addendum also stated, "The allowance price shall be used at the discretion of the District and, if not used, will be deducted from the final Contract Price." That addendum also directed bidders to replace the original Bid Form 00320-2, which had been enclosed with the RFB, with a new Bid Form, 00320R1-2. The new Bid Form is identical to the original form except that the schedule of bid prices contained in paragraph four, on page 003201-2, was altered to itemize the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance. The original form had contained a single line for the bidder's lump sum bid price, whereas the revised form provided for a lump sum bid amount to be itemized and a base bid amount, which required the bidder to enter on the form the amount of its bid, then add the discretionary cost amount and write the sum of those two numbers on a third line. In paragraph four of the new bid form there is re- printed language concerning the use of the discretionary allowance which appeared on the face of Addendum No. Two. Other than the change to paragraph four and the alteration of the page numbers to include an "R" in the page number, the revised bid form is identical to the original bid form. The other bid documents were not altered in any manner by Addendum No. Two. The deadline for bid submissions was Thursday, July 9, 2009, at 2:30 p.m. The Petitioner timely submitted its bid to the District. In submitting its bid however, the Petitioner used the original bid form which had been enclosed with the RFB. The bid form submitted was an exact copy of the bid form furnished by the District which Close had printed from the electronic copy of the RFB received from the District. The Petitioner did not substitute the revised bid form, attached to Addendum No. Two, for the original form in submitting its bid. The Petitioner's bid was deemed non-responsive by the District and was rejected on the basis that Close had failed to submit the bid on the revised form required by Addendum No. Two. Thereafter, the District, at its August 13, 2009, meeting, approved award of the bid to Worth. The intent to award was posted electronically on or about August 14, 2009. The persuasive evidence establishes that Close received both addenda to the bid documents. It was aware of the Addendum No. Two, and it accounted for all of the changes to the technical specifications made in both addenda in the preparation of its bid. The evidence shows that Close was aware of the $40,000.00, owner-directed cost allowance and that it incorporated it in the formulation of its total bid price. Thus, Close's final bid amount was $3,751,795.00. That number included the $40,000.00 cost allowance at issue, added to the bid documents by Addendum No. Two. The internal bid work sheets, prepared by personnel of Close, identified and itemized the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance as a component of the final bid price. The persuasive evidence thus establishes that Close's final bid amount did include the $40,000.00 cost allowance. Moreover, the written notes of witness Christopher Rossi, the estimator for Close, show the $40,000.00 amount as an "FPL Allowance." Both Mr. Rossi and Mr. Boromei, the Vice President for Close, who prepared the bid, explained that the $40,000.00 was understood by Close to be a cost allowance, that it would only be charged to the District to the extent that it was actually used, at the District's discretion. If it were not used, it was to be deducted from the overall contract price. Addendum Two specifically provides that the discretionary cost allowance was to be used only at the discretion of the District and that the unused portion would be deducted from the contract amount. When Close submitted its bid it mistakenly submitted it on the original bid form and failed to exchange the bid forms as directed in Item Two of Addendum No. 2. In paragraph one of both bid forms, however, the bidder is required to specifically fill out, acknowledge and identify all addenda. By doing so the bidder expressly agrees to build the project in conformance with all contract documents, including all addenda, for the price quoted in the bid. Close completed this paragraph, specifically identified both Addendum One and Addendum Two, and specifically agreed to strictly conform, in performance of the work to the plans, specifications and other contract documents, including Addendum Nos. One and Two. Paragraph one was not changed by the addition of Addendum No. Two and it is identical in both the original and the revised forms at issue. Paragraph one of the original and the revised bid forms constitutes an agreement by the bidder to perform and construct a project "in strict conformity with the plans, specifications and other Contract Documents. . . ." The addenda are part of the contract documents and are expressly referenced as such in this agreement. Both bid forms, the original and the revised, include paragraph eight, which clearly states that the bidder will post a bid bond to secure and guaranty that it will enter into a contract with the District, if its bid is selected. Paragraph eight was unchanged by Addendum No. Two and its terms are identical in both Bid forms at issue, including the form that Close signed and submitted as its bid. The persuasive evidence shows that in submitting its bid, whether on either form, Close committed itself to the identical terms as set forth in the identical contract documents agreed to by Worth and the other bidders. The evidence established that Close intended to bind itself to the terms of the RFB, and all terms of Addendum No. Two, including the discretionary cost allowance term. Close considered itself bound to enter into a contract for the price of its bid if selected by the District. It likewise considered that the price of its bid, would only include the cost allowance if the discretionary allowance was implemented by the District. Upon the opening of the bids, the firm of Cone and Graham, Inc., was identified as the lowest bidder. Cone and Graham's bid was in the amount of $2,690,000.00. Close was the second lowest bidder, with a bid of $3,751,795.00. The third lowest bidder was Worth Contracting, Inc., with a bid of $3,898,410.00. Cone and Graham was allowed to provide additional information and to even meet with some District staff following the opening of its bid. The additional information it was allowed to provide concerned technical specifications of the pumps proposed in its bid. Through this verification process conducted with the Agency, Cone and Graham ultimately convinced the District to permit them to withdraw its bid without forfeiting their bid bond. This left the Petitioner, Close, the lowest bidder, at $146,615.00 less than the bid submitted by Worth, the initially-awarded bidder. Close's bid, upon review, was rejected as non- responsive due to its failure to exchange the original Bid form with the revised Bid form, as indicated above, in spite of the fact that Close had also agreed to adhere to the entirety of Addendum No. Two on the face of the Bid form. Thus the recommended award to Worth for the above-referenced additional amount of bid price was adopted by the District, engendering this protest. James Reynolds, the Contracts Specialist for the District, conceded that it was apparent on the face of Close's bid that a mistake had been made in the use of the original form, rather than the revised form. He conceded there was an inconsistency between Close's clear acknowledgement of and agreement to the terms of the contract documents, which expressly included Addendum No. Two and Close's apparent mistaken use of the original Bid form. Under the express terms of Article 19.03 of the RFB, "The Bid shall be construed as though the addendum(a) have been received and acknowledged by the bidder." Mr. Reynolds admitted, however, that he did not apply the terms of Article 19.03 of the RFB in his review of Close's bid and did not construe the bid in the manner provided in the RFB to resolve the apparent inconsistency. He reasoned that Close had used the wrong bid form and looked no further. The District's Procurement Manual provides a procedure whereby a bidder may correct inadvertent mistakes in its bid. Under the terms of Chapter 5-5 of that manual, where the District knows or has reason to conclude, after unsealing of bids, that a mistake may have been made by a bidder, the District "shall request written verification of the bid." In such a circumstance the bidder "shall be permitted the opportunity to furnish information in support of the bid verification as long as it does not affect responsiveness, i.e., the bid substantially conforms to the requirements of the RFB as it relates to pricing, surety, insurance, specifications and any other matter unequivocally stated in the RFB as determinant of responsiveness." See Joint Exhibit 7,6 pages 61 and 62, in evidence. Mr. Reynolds admitted in his testimony that he did not follow the procedure set forth in the manual for verifying a bid because, in his view, that would be allowing an impermissible supplementation of Close's bid. Ms. Lavery, in her testimony, in essence agreed. The Procurement Manual expressly required the District, upon recognizing the mistake and an inconsistency apparent on the face of Close's bid, to verify that bid and to provide Close with the opportunity to furnish information in support of bid verification. Thus, by the express terms of the manual, a bidder must be given an opportunity to clarify mistakes. The Procurement Manual expressly permits a bidder under these circumstances to correct any "inadvertent, non- judgmental mistake" in its bid. Chapter 5 of the Manual provides that "a non-judgmental mistake" is a mistake not attributable to an error in judgment, such as mistakes in personal judgment or wrongful assumptions of contract obligations. Inadvertent technical errors, such as errors of form rather than substance, are considered non-judgmental errors." See Joint Exhibit 7, page 62, in evidence. It is patently apparent that Close's use of the original bid form, inadvertently, while also unequivocally acknowledging and agreeing to the entirety of Addendum No. Two, represented a non-judgmental mistake. Both of the District witnesses, however, testified that the policy regarding mistakes was not followed and Close was not given an opportunity under the District's policy to provide additional information to support verification of the bid. Although Close failed to substitute the revised Bid form for the original Bid form, as called for by Addendum No. Two, its bid was substantively responsive to the technical specifications and requirements of the RFB, and the irregularity is technical in nature. The parties stipulated that the use of the original form, rather than the revised bid form, was the sole basis for Close being determined to be non-responsive by the Agency. In accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-7.301, in Chapter 5 of the District's Procurement Manual, the District reserves the right to waive minor irregularities in a bid. A material irregularity is defined by the District's policy as one which is not minor in that it: (a) affects the price, quality, time or manner of performance of the service such that it would deprive the District of an assurance that the contract will be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to the specified requirements; (b) provides an advantage or benefit to a bidder which is not enjoyed by other bidders; or (c) undermines the necessary common standards of competition. See Joint Exhibit 7, page 58, in evidence. The preponderant, persuasive evidence shows that the irregularity in Close's bid did not affect the price of the bid or truly deprive the District of assurance that the contract would be entered into and performed according to all the terms of the RFB, including addenda. The evidence established that Close actually included the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance in its final bid price. It merely did not show it as a separate itemization, because it did not use the revised form providing that itemization line. The fact that the discretionary allowance was itemized in the revised bid form, as part of the bid amount, does not equate to an effect on the contract price as a result of Close's using the original Bid form. Close's error, by mistakenly submitting its bid on the original bid form, did not alter the price of its bid. The evidence clearly established that the bid price for Close's bid would be the same regardless of which form it used. Moreover, the preponderant, persuasive evidence establishes that the use of the original Bid form by Close did not deprive the District of assurance that the contract would be performed in accordance with the all bid documents. Close's bid, secured by its bid bond, clearly acknowledged and agreed to the express terms of Addendum No. Two in their entirety, which included the terms under which the discretionary cost allowance could be applied. Close considered itself bound to the terms of the RFB and assured the Agency that it was so bound by the written acknowledgement and agreement it submitted to the Agency as part of its bid, concerning the elements of Addendum No. Two. The evidence demonstrated that Close understood that the $40,000.00 amount was a discretionary cost allowance and that Close would not be entitled to it unless the District decided to use it. Despite the opinion of Agency witnesses to the contrary, the error in Close's bid was a technical one and non- material because it did not confer a competitive advantage upon Close. Close's use of the wrong form did not alter the price of its bid. Its mistake in the use of the original bid form could only change the relative, competitive positions of Close and Worth if the amount of the discretionary cost allowance was greater or equal to the difference between those two bids, i.e., the $146,650.00 amount by which Worth's bid exceeded the bid of Close. 1/ The bid of Worth exceeds Close's bid by an amount far greater than the amount at issue in the discretionary cost allowance identified in Addendum No. Two and expressly itemized in the revised Bid form, i.e. $40,000.00. The District contends that Close gained some competitive economic advantage over other bidders by having the means by which it could optionally withdraw its bid, based upon alleged non-responsiveness, in not substituting the revised Bid form which would contain the itemization of the $40,000.00 cost allowance. It is difficult to see how it could gain a competitive advantage versus other bidders through some perceived ability to deem itself non-responsive, at its option, and withdraw its bid, thus denying itself the contract. The competitive bidding laws are designed to prevent a firm from gaining a competitive advantage in obtaining a contract versus the efforts of other bidders, not in depriving itself of the opportunity to get the work. Moreover, concerning the argument by the District that this may confer the advantage to Close of allowing it to withdraw its bid at its option and still obtain a refund of its bid bond; even if that occurred, it would not confer a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other bidders. It would merely involve a potential pecuniary advantage to Close's interest, versus that of the Agency itself, which obviously is not a bidder. Moreover, it should again be pointed out that Cone and Graham was allowed to provide additional information concerning its bid elements, and even to meet with the District staff, following the opening of the bids. It was then allowed to withdraw its bid without forfeiting its bid bond. If the District had inquired, by way of verification of Close's bid, as to whether the discretionary cost amount was included in it's bid, that inquiry does not equate to allowing Close to unlawfully supplement its bid. Indeed, if in response to such an inquiry, Close announced that the discretionary allowance was not included in its bid, its bid at that point would be materially non-responsive to the specifications. If Close was then allowed to supplement its bid by changing its price to add the allowance, such would indeed be an unfair competitive advantage and a violation of law on the part of Close and the Agency. The evidence does not show that such happened or was proposed by any party. If a verification inquiry had been made and Close announced that, indeed, its bid price did include the subject discretionary cost allowance, without further response to the specifications being added, then no competitive advantage would be afforded Close and no legal violation would occur. In fact, however, as pointed out above, the verification request, pursuant to the District's policy manual, was never made. This was despite the fact that the District's witness, Mr. Reynolds, acknowledged that the use of the original bid form was an apparent mistake on the face of the bid, when considered in conjunction with Close's express agreement to construct the project in strict conformance with all contract documents, and particularly with regard to Addenda Numbers One and Two. The non-judgmental mistake, involving use of the original bid form in lieu of the revised bid form, could have been easily clarified by a verification inquiry. That policy was not followed, based solely on the fact that the wrong bid form was used, even though the preponderant, persuasive evidence shows that in all material and substantive respects the bid was a conforming, responsive bid and included in its price the discretionary cost allowance. The preponderance of the evidence shows that the mistaken use of the original Bid form was a non- material irregularity under the District's policies and the terms of the RFB. The District's actions in failing to uniformly apply its own bid verification policy when, in fact, it had allowed verification to one of the other bidders, and when, according to its own witness, it perceived an apparent mistake, was clearly erroneous. It is true that Close may not supplement its bid by changing material terms, but it is permitted to verify whether, in light of the mistaken use of the original Bid form, its bid price, as submitted, included the $40,000.00 discretionary allowance or not. Providing such "yes or no" type of additional information in order to clarify, and only clarify, information already submitted in the bid, in response to an inquiry by the District does not constitute "supplementation" of the bid for purposes of Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2008). NCS Pearson, Inc. v. Dept of Education, 2005 WL 31776, at page 18 (DOAH, Feb. 8, 2005). Even without verification of the bid, the bid on its face agrees to compliance with all terms and specifications, including Addendum No. Two. It is thus determined that there is no material irregularity. The bid submitted by Close does not afford it any competitive advantage vis-à-vis the other bidders and it is responsive.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the South Florida Water Management District, awarding the subject contract for RFB 6000000262 to the Petitioner herein, Close Construction, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2010.

Florida Laws (3) 1.01120.569120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 40E-7.301
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M K MECHANICAL, INC. vs PALM BEACH COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 93-000933BID (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Feb. 22, 1993 Number: 93-000933BID Latest Update: Aug. 19, 1993

Findings Of Fact Facts based on stipulation These proceedings concern Petitioner's Bid Protest in connection with that certain project known as Chiller Installation, Glades Campus, Project NO. 9237, PBCC No. 6812. Petitioner has taken all steps necessary to perfect its bid protest in a timely manner and has standing to bring this bid protest. Petitioner and Respondent met and were unsuccessful in an attempt to resolve the bid protest as required by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. M. K. Mechanical, Inc., a Florida corporation, is a State of Florida Certified Mechanical Contractor and as such was a "Qualified Bidder." The original specifications for the subject project contained few electrical specifications and were silent as to how an electrical contractor was to be licensed. The bid was due on Tuesday, January 12, 1993, at 2:00 p.m. On Friday, January 8, 1993, at 3:42 p.m., via facsimile transmission, M. K. Mechanical, Inc., received supplementary electrical specifications, thirty (30) pages in length. Contained in these supplementary specifications, for the first time, was a requirement that the electrical subcontractor had to be "locally" licensed. M. K. Mechanical, Inc.'s, primary place of business is in Edgewater, Volusia County, Florida. M. K. Mechanical, Inc.'s, submitted bid was proper in all respects other than an electrical subcontractor's name was not given, instead "to be determined" was inserted. M. K. Mechanical, Inc., submitted the lowest bid. Electrical subcontractor is a "major" subcontractor on this project. The sole basis for the decision by Respondent that Petitioner's bid was "non-responsive" was the failure to list an electrical subcontractor. Additional facts regarding bid specifications The bid specifications include the requirement that bidders list all "major subcontractors" and that the category of "major subcontractors" includes electrical subcontractors. Section 5.2.1 of the Contract Documents within the Bid Specifications provides as follows: Unless otherwise required by the Contract Documents or the Bidding Documents the Contractor at the bid opening shall furnish to the Owner and Architect Form 00420, a written list of the major Subcontractors; Site Utilities, Structural Concrete, Masonry, Structural Steel & Steel Joists, Plumbing, HVAC, Electrical and Roofing, who he proposes to use on this work.

Recommendation On the basis of all the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Palm Beach Community College enter a Final Order in this case denying the protest of the Petitioner, M. K. Mechanical, Inc., and awarding the contract in Project No. 9237, PBCC No. 6812 to the Intervenor, Hill York Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Sid C. Peterson, Jr., Esquire DeLoach & Peterson, P.A. Post Office Box 428 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 33170 James M. Adams, Esquire Gibson & Adams, P.A. Post Office Box 1629 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 Herbert L. Dell, President Hill York Corporation Post Office Box 350155 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33335 The District Board of Trustees Palm Beach Community College 4200 Congress Avenue Administration Building Lake Worth, Florida 33461 Attention: Mr. Dick Jones

Florida Laws (2) 120.53255.0515
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COS AND PALMER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AND OVERLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY vs. SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 85-002044BID (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-002044BID Latest Update: Jul. 09, 1985

Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. The South Florida Water Management District (hereinafter "District") advertised for bids on Contract No. M-0137, Bid No. B-85-91, for the construction of a structure maintenance facility. The Specifications and Contract Documents for the project required that bidders submit a "Base Bid," which related to the essential components of the project, and three "add alternates," which related to additional items that the District might contract for over and above the Base Bid. The Notice To Contractors regarding this project included the following language: The right is reserved, as the interest of the District may require, to reject any or all proposals, to waive any informality in the proposal, or to readvertise for other or future proposals. Paragraph 2 of the Instructions To Bidders includes the following language: "The intent of the Proposal Form is to secure a price, based on unit prices, for the work described in the Contract. . . ." (emphasis added) Paragraph 4 of the Instructions To Bidders reads as follows: The District reserves the right to reject any and all proposals (i) when such rejection is in the interest of the District; (ii) if such proposal is void per se; or (iii) if the proposal contains any irregularities, PROVIDED, however, that the District reserves the right to waive any irregularities and to accept the lowest responsible bidder's proposal determined by the Engineer on the basis of the gross sum for which the work will be performed, arrived at by a correct computation of the base bid plus the alternate bid item or items selected by the District. Bid items will be considered by the District on the has is of budgetary capability. (First emphasis in original; second emphasis added.) Paragraph 5 of the Instructions To Bidders reads as follows: Proposals will be considered irregular if they show omissions, unauthorized alterations of form, additions not called for, conditional or unauthorized alternate bids, or other irre- gularities of any kind; also if the unit prices are unbalanced either in excess of or below the reasonable cost analysis values, or incomplete in any manner, including failure to bid on all items on the bid form. Paragraph 8 of the Instructions To Bidders reads as follows: No proposal can be withdrawn after it is filed unless the Bidder makes his request in writing to the District prior to the time set for the opening of bids, or unless the District fails to accept it within sixty (60) days after the date fixed for opening bids. Paragraph 10 of the Instructions To Bidders reads as follows: No interpretation of the meaning of the Plans, Specifications or other Contract Documents will be made to any Bidder orally. Every request for such interpretation should be in writing addressed to the Engineering & Construction Division, South Florida Water Management District, 3301 Gun Club Road, Post Office Box V, West Palm Beach, Florida, zip code 33402, and to be given consideration must be received at least Ten (10) calendar days prior to the date fixed for the opening of bids. Any and all such interpretations and any supplemental instructions will be in the form of written Addenda to the Specifications which, if issued, will be mailed by registered mail to all prospective bidders (at the respective addresses furnished for such purposes) not later than Five (5) calendar days prior to the date fixed for the opening of bids. Failure of any bidder to receive any such Addendum of interpretation shall not relieve any bidder from any obligation under his bid as submitted. All addenda so issued shall become part of the Contract Documents. The bid items are described in Section 01021 of the Specifications and Contract Documents. Subsection 1.01 of that Section describes what is included in the Base Bid as follows: The Base Bid includes all work shown on the plans and called for in the specifications for: Structure Maintenance Facility, complete. Building utilities including all rough-in required for alternate bid items whether or not alternate bids are accepted. Site work including utilities. All other costs of the project not attributable to Items 1 thru 3 above or Alternate Bid Nos. 1 thru 3 below. Subsection 1.02 of Section 01021 describes what is included in Alternate Bid No. 1 as follows: In the Base Bid all structural supports to receive the monorail trolley beams and hoists are included. Alternate No. 1 includes all work shown on the plans and called for in the specifications for two 15 ton capacity monorail hoists and trolley beams complete and operational. Work includes all final utility connections to points indicated on drawings, shipping, unloading at site, installation and final check-out and instruction to owner on operation of equipment as well as all other costs not attributable to items previously mentioned. Subsection 1.03 of Section 01021 describes what is included in Alternate Bid No. 2 as follows: In the Base Bid all mechanical and electrical rough-in is to be provided for the two offices and the toilet and locker rooms above. Alternate No. 2 includes all costs over the Base Bid for completing the offices, toilets and locker rooms including all plumbing and lighting fixtures, partitions, lockers finishes, structure and metal stair as indicated and specified in the applicable sections of these specifications. Subsection 1.04 of Section 01021 describes what is included in Alternate Bid No. 3 as follows: The Base Bid includes all site grading to finish elevations indicated. Alternate No. 3 includes all costs over the Base bid for providing subsurface preparation and asphaltic concrete paving to finish elevations indicated as described in Section 02513 for all areas where asphaltic concrete paving is shown. In September of 1984 the District had received bids for a similar project. Similar contract documents and bid forms were used for the project. Cox & Palmer Construction Company, Overland Construction Company, Inc., and Booth Construction, Inc., all submitted bids on the September 1984 project. All of the bids submitted on the September 1984 project, including the Booth bid, were submitted on an add alternates" basis. All of the September 1984 bids were rejected. A total of seven bidders submitted bids on the instant project. With the exception of Booth Construction, Inc., all of the bidders on the instant project calculated their bids on an "add alternates" basis. It was the clear intent of the architecture firm that prepared the Specifications and Contract Documents that the bids should be submitted on an add alternates" basis. There were no irregularities in the bidding process regarding the instant project prior to the opening of the first bid. At the duly appointed time a representative of the District began the process of opening and announcing the amounts of the bids. The first bid to be opened was the bid submitted by Overland Construction Company, Inc. The amounts bid by Overland were as follows: Base Bid $ 378,800 Alternate No. 1 64,000 Alternate No. 2 18,000 Alternate No. 3 11,200 Immediately after the announcement of the amounts bid by Overland, Mr. York, the Director of the District's Engineering and Construction Division, asked, "Is that an add-on or deduct?" Someone in the audience answered that it was an "add-on" bid. Mr. Gerachi, on behalf of Booth, promptly stated that the alternates should have been bid as "deducts". A general discussion ensued among members of the audience regarding whether the alternates should have been bid as "add-on" or "deducts." In order to continue with the bid opening process and to restore order in the room, a representative of the District announced that the matter would be resolved when the bids were tabulated and another representative of the District began the process of opening the rest of the bids. The bid submitted by Booth Construction, Inc., was the fourth bid to be opened. The amounts written on the Booth bid were as follows: Base Bid $ 396,586 Alternate No. 1 54,072 Alternate No. 2 14,597 Alternate No. 3 9,185 Immediately after the amounts of the Booth bid were announced, Mr. Alvin Booth, president of Booth Construction, Inc. stood up and stated that the Booth bid had been calculated on the basis of "deduct" alternates. The essence of his statement was that in calculating the amount of his company's Base Bid he had added to the base bid the sum of the three alternate bids with the understanding that the amounts shown for any of the three alternates would be deducted from his Base Bid if the District decided not to award a contract for one or more of the alternates. This statement following the opening of the Booth bid was the first time that anyone on behalf of Booth had made a specific unambiguous statement to representatives of the District responsible for this bidding process regarding the manner in which the Booth bid was calculated. 1/ The bid submitted by Cox & Palmer Construction Company was opened after the Booth bid. The amounts bid by Cox & Palmer were as follows: Base Bid $ 392,225 Alternate No. 1 38,770 Alternate No. 2 19,200 Alternate No. 3 11,456 The bid submitted by Booth Construction, Inc., was prepared by both Vincent Gerachi, an estimator and project manager employed by Booth Construction, Inc., and by Alvin Booth, president of Booth Construction, Inc. Mr. Gerachi has been an estimator on construction projects for approximately 12 years. Mr. Booth has been in the construction business for approximately 30 years and has had his own construction company for about 18 years. Both Mr. Gerachi and Mr. Booth were uncertain whether the alternate bids were supposed to be bid as "add-ons" or as "deducts." Neither of them attempted to do anything to resolve their uncertainty until the morning of the very day on which bids were to be submitted. On that morning Mr. Gerachi called a representative of the District to ask whether the bid should be prepared with the alternate bids calculated as "add-ons" or as "deducts." Mr. Gerachi spoke to Mr. Brown at the District, who suggested that Mr. Gerachi call the architecture firm that had prepared the Specifications and Contract Documents. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 10 of the Instructions To Bidders (see paragraph 6 of these findings of fact, above), it is a customary practice of the trade for bidders to communicate directly with project architects to resolve any uncertainties in the Specifications and Contract Documents. Indeed, it is generally understood in the trade that it is the duty of the bidder to communicate with the project architect to seek resolution of any ambiguities. Mr. Gerachi tried to reach the project architect by telephone, but was unable to reach him because the architect had already left his office to drive to the bid opening. Mr. Gerachi did not have an opportunity to talk to the architect prior to filing the Booth Construction bid because the architect did not come into the bid opening room until about one minute after 2:00 p.m. Mr. Gerachi talked to Mr. and Mrs. Booth before turning in the Booth bid. Mr. Gerachi prepared the Booth bid with the alternate bids calculated as "deducts" from the Base Bid. In other words, the amount of the Base Bid on the Booth bid included the sum of the three alternate bids, which alternate bids were also separately stated on the Booth bid. Alvin Booth participated in the preparation of the bid and was aware of the manner in which the Booth bid was calculated before the bid was submitted to the District. Even though the Base Bid on the Booth bid is in the amount of $396,586, it was the intention of Booth Construction, Inc., to bid $318,732 for the work described as being within the scope of the Base Bid. The reason for the higher amount being entered for the booth Base Bid is that Vincent Gerachi and Alvin Booth misinterpreted the Specifications and Contract Documents and added to the Booth Base Bid the sum of the Booth bids on each of the three Alternate Bids. 2/ This misinterpretation of the Specifications and Contract Documents was caused by the culpable negligence or willful inattention of Vincent Gerachi and Alvin Booth. After all of the bids were opened a representative of the District announced that the District would consider the matter and notify all bidders of its decision at a later date. Thereafter the District, having concluded that Booth Construction, Inc., had acted in good faith and that the irregularities in the form of its bid were "minor irregularities," decided to treat the oral statements by Mr. Gerachi and Mr. Booth as amendments to the Booth bid, to treat the Booth Base Bid as being $318,732, and to award a contract to Booth Construction, Inc., for the Base Bid and Alternate No. 1 in the amount of $372,804, calculated as follows: $318,732 (Amended Booth Base Bid) 54,072 (Booth Alternate No. 1 Bid) $372,804 (Total Contract) Booth Construction, Inc., has the ability to perform the contract and can perform the contract for the proposed contract amount of $372,804. Booth Construction, Inc., is a responsible bidder. The District estimate of the cost of the work covered by the Base Bid and Alternate No. 1 was $329,000. There are no irregularities in the bid submitted by Cox & Palmer Construction Company. Cox and Palmer Construction Company is a responsible and responsive bidder. The bid submitted by Cox & Palmer is the lowest responsive bid for the combination of the Base Bid and Alternate No. 1. 3/ The foregoing findings of fact include the substance of the majority of the findings proposed by the parties, although I have rejected a number of unnecessary details and editorial comments in the parties' proposals. Any proposed findings which are not incorporated in the foregoing findings are rejected on the grounds of not being supported by competent substantial evidence or as being contrary to the weight of the persuasive evidence.

Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend that the South Florida Water Management District enter a Final Order to the following effect: Concluding that the irregularities in the Booth Construction, Inc., bid may not be waived and that the bid will be considered, as submitted, to be a Base Bid in the amount of $396,586; Concluding that in view of the foregoing treatment of the Booth bid, the bid of Palmer & Cox Construction Company is found to be the lowest responsive bid for the Base Bid plus Alternate No. 1; Concluding that the District will accept the bid of Palmer & Cox Construction Company and enter into a contract with Palmer & Cox Construction Company consistent with the amounts bid by Palmer & Cox Construction Com- pany for the Base Bid and Alternate No. 1; and Concluding that the petition of Overland Construction Company, Inc., is dismissed for lack of standing. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of July, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1985.

Florida Laws (4) 1.011.021.04120.57
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GREENHUT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES, 92-001297BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 24, 1992 Number: 92-001297BID Latest Update: Jun. 04, 1992

The Issue The issue for consideration herein is whether the Respondent's proposed award on BID No. HSMV - 90022010 to Dunn Construction Company, Inc., should be upheld.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department was the state agency responsible for the solicitation of bids for and award of contracts for the construction of state buildings in Florida. Both Greenhut and Dunn are qualified contractors who are certified to bid on state construction contracts in general and this procurement in particular. In December, 1991, the Department issued an advertisement for bids for the project in issue herein, the construction of the Kirkman Complex Addition Data Center in Tallahassee, Florida. According to the Advertisement for Bids, all bids "must be submitted in full accordance with the requirements of the Drawings, Specifications, Bidding Conditions and Contractual Conditions, which may be examined and obtained ..." from the Department's designated architect/engineer, Clemons, Rutherford and Associates, Inc. in Tallahassee. Section B-21 of the request for proposals (invitation to bid) reads, in pertinent part: The recommendation for contract award will be for the bidder qualified in accordance with Section B-2 and submitting the lowest bid provided his bid is responsible and it is in the best interest of the Owner to accept it. The Owner reserves the right to waive any informality in bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the owner. Bids received on this project were originally scheduled to be opened and read aloud on January 15, 1992 with the tabulation and Bid Award Recommendation to be posted the following days at the location where the bids were opened. The proposal as originally issued called for the submittal of a Base Bid with four Alternates, 1a, 1b, 2, and 3. Alternate 1a was a deduct for merely extending the existing Johnson Controls System to incorporate the new work instead of providing a totally new and independent control system. Alternate 1b called for adding furniture and landscaping for certain of the rooms shown on the drawings; Alternate 2 called for adding a "shelled" fourth floor as described in the proposal; and Alternate 3, as originally issued, called for: Add a complete fourth floor as indicated in drawings including the finished interior partitions with full HVAC, Plumbing and Electrical Service. Include furniture and landscaping for rooms 414 and 419. (Includes items in Alternate No. 2) As a result of questions received from prospective bidders at the pre-bid conference which indicated some confusion as to the meaning and intent of the Department regarding Alternate No. 3, by letter to all prospective bidders, dated January 8, 1992 the Department's architect indicated: Alternate #3 shall be the fourth floor complete, as shown on drawings, which includes items in Alternate #2. Addendum #1 to the request for bids, dated January 10, 1992, clarified Item 1-3.6), PROPOSAL FORM, of the PROJECT MANUAL to ADD to "Alternate #3", "(Include items in Alternate #2)". Item #2-1 of Addendum #2, dated January 16, 1992, deleted the sentence changed by Item #1- 3.6, and revised the sentence to read as follows: This includes any items required in addition to Alternate #2 to complete the remainder of the work for the Fourth Floor. Information contained at the beginning of each Addendum calls the bidders' attention to the change and indicates that failure to incorporate it may result in disqualification. The due date for bids was extended at the instance of the Department. Both Petitioner and Intervenor submitted bids for this project as did several other concerns on January 23, 1992. Greenhut's base bid was $4,139,000 with a deduct of $63,600 for Alternate 1a, and additions for Alternates 1b, 2, and 3 of $69,500, $239,000, and $209,000 respectively. Greenhut's total bid, therefore, through Alternate 3, was $4,592,900. Dunn's base bid was $4,079,000 with a zero deduct for Alternate 1a, and additions for Alternates 1b through 3 of $67,000, and $428,000. Dunn's total bid, therefore, was $4,574,000 for a difference of $18,900. Greenhut's bid was submitted on a form which provided for the base bid, the deduct for 1a, and the additions for 1b. 2 and 3 with the figure for 3 being those costs in addition to those identified in Dunn's bid was submitted on a prior form which provided for a base bid, a 1a deduction if any, (there was none), and additions for 1b, 2, and 3 with the figure for 3 including the figure listed for 2. An initial review of Dunn's bid form, then, showed a base bid of $4,079,000, no 1a deduction, a 1b addition of $67,000, a 2 addition of $311,000, and a 3 addition of $428,000. This letter figure included the $311,000 figure for Alternate 2, which should have been deducted from the bid during tabulation. When the bids were opened on January 23, 1992 by Mr. Everline, each figure on each bid was read off and listed on the bid tabulation form in the appropriate area. No attention was given at that time to the appropriateness or correctness of the figures listed on each bid form, nor was any attention paid to any other technical requirement of the procurement. This was merely a transfer of figures from the bid form to the tabulation form, and when this was done, Mr. Everline announced to all in attendance, including many contractor representatives, that the "apparent low bidder" was Greenhut. In arriving at that conclusion, Mr. Everline added all of Dunn's figures together without deducting the $311,000 listed for Alternate 2, a figure which was included in the $428,000 figure listed for Alternate 3. This resulted in an incorrectly large total bid for Dunn. Sometime later that day, a representative of Dunn contacted Mr. Everline to indicate that Dunn had inadvertently bid on the wrong form which precipitated its misleading presentation. Mr. Everline properly declined to discuss the matter and referred the Dunn representative to the Department's legal counsel. Sometime thereafter, when the bids had been tabulated and reviewed for responsiveness and legal qualification of bidders, Mr. Everline suggested to representatives of DHSMV that in order to forestall a protest, only so much of the project as extended through Alternate 2 be awarded. DHSMV officials, however, had sufficient funds available for the entire project, including some additional funds, if necessary, for cabling, and insisted they wanted the entire project awarded. The Department's legal counsel, upon review of the situation, concluded that the Dunn's actual bid intent was clear to include the amount listed for Alternate 2 within that listed for Alternate 3, and not to consider the two as additives to each other. It further concluded that Dunn's use of the improper form on which to submit its bid was immaterial and afforded it no improper competitive edge over other bidders. Therefore, it was concluded that Dunn was the low responsive bidder and, on February 4, 1992, the Department issued a Notice of Award to Dunn. Thereafter, Greenhut filed its Petition For Hearing taken as a protest to the award. Both the Department and Dunn agreed that Greenhut had standing to protest the award and that the protest was timely filed. It is so found.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of General Services enter a Final Order in this case dismissing the protest of Greenhut Construction Company, Inc., in regard to the proposed award of contact in bid number HSMV - 90022010 to Dunn Construction Company, Inc. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 21st day of April, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-1297 BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. - 9. Accepted. Accepted. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 22. Accepted and incorporated herein. Argument and not Finding of Fact except for 1st sentence which is accepted. & 25. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. - 3. Accepted. 4. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. & 8. Accepted. 9. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. Irrelevant but accepted as true. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Irrelevant but accepted as true. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Irrelevant. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. FOR THE INTERVENOR: Accepted. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 15. Accepted. 16. - 19. Accepted. 20. & 21. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 24. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Emmanuel, Esquire 30 South Spring Street Post Office Drawer 1271 Pensacola, Florida 32596 Sylvan Strickland, Esquire Suite 309, Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Harry R. Detwiler, Jr., Esquire 315 S. Calhoun Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald W. Thomas Executive Director Department of General Services Suite 307, Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Susan Kirkland General Counsel Department of General Services Suite 309, knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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STATE PAVING CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 87-003848BID (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003848BID Latest Update: Oct. 01, 1987

Findings Of Fact On or about June 3, 1987, DOT advertised that it would receive bids on State Project No. 97870-334, etc. in Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties to improve portions of the Florida Turnpike. On June 24, 1987, bids were received by DOT from Gilbert, State Paving and Archer Western Contractors. The apparent low bidder at bid opening on June 24, 1987, was Gilbert and State Paving was apparent second low bidder. DOT was informally advised by John Beck, an attorney representing State Paving, that Gilbert's bid was believed to be unbalanced and the appropriate officials referred the issue to the DOT Bureau of Estimates to look into the low bid to see if it was unbalanced to the detriment of the State. Review of the Gilbert bid began with an internal analysis of the bid prices in comparison to the DOT Estimate of the Work. All bid prices above or below a certain percent of the engineer's estimate of costs were prepared in a computer printout and those items were checked by the consultants on the project. Basically, the major items in the project, which comprises some 400 bid items, were broken down to 10 groupings and the bids for each item in these groups was prepared for the three bidders and tabulated in Exhibit 2. The DOT Technical Committee reviewed the bids and concluded there was no unbalancing in Gilbert's bid which was detrimental to the State. This recommendation was approved by the Awards Committee which had also been furnished the information in Exhibit 2 by the consulting engineer for the project. Based upon this information, the Awards Committee concluded that the awards should go to Gilbert as no unbalancing detrimental to the State was found. Specification made a part of all DOT bid proposals provide that DOT may reject an unbalanced bid. As a matter of policy, DOT only rejects unbalanced bids deemed contrary to the interests of the State. Bids may be unbalanced in numerous ways. One significant method is known as front loading where the bidder submits a high bid for the work to be done at the beginning of the project such as clearing and grubbing and low bids for the work done later in the project. If successful in getting the award, this bidder would have excess profits on the clearing and grubbing which could draw interest while the less profitable later work was being done. Another variant is to study the plans and specifications to see if the quantities listed in the bid proposal are accurately reflected in the plans and specifications. If not, those items for which the bid proposal shows more than the plans and specifications reasonably required can be bid low, and for those items by which the bid proposal shows less than actually will be required can be bid high. Since the contractor is paid by the units used, those excess units at a higher price would result in more profit for the contractor yet allow him to submit an overall lower bid. For example, if the bid proposal contains two similar items for which the request for proposal estimates 100 each will be required, and the bidder concludes that only 50 will be required at Site A and 150 at Site B, he submits a low bid for Site A and a high bid for Site B. If the fair price for these units is $10 each, and the bidder bids $5 per unit for Site A or $500, and $15 for Site B or $1500, the total bid price is $2000, but if the bidder only installs 50 at Site A he would be paid $250 and install $150 at Site B for which he would be paid $2250. His total compensation would be $2500. In competitively bid contracts, such as the instant project, contractors modify their prices by taking a calculated risk that certain items bid on will not need to be accomplished and submit a nominal bid of $1 or 1 cent for such an item. By definition, such a bid is unbalanced, but if the item so bid has to be provided, the contractor has to provide this service at the bid price. The only evidence submitted by Petitioner tending to show Gilbert's bid was unbalanced to the detriment of the State was testimony, objected to and sustained, that the plans and specifications showed more of certain units would be needed than the estimated quantities on the bid proposal, which constituted the basis for the bids submitted. Such evidence constitutes a challenge to the bid specifications and is untimely. Gilbert's witness who prepared the bid submitted by Gilbert adequately explained the basis for bids submitted by Gilbert on the challenged items. The document entitled "This is Not an Addendum," clearly states on its face that "an addendum may follow containing the following information." No bids are solicited thereby and for no item contained thereon is the State obligated to contract. This document was provided all bidders before bids were open and no unfair advantage to anyone or detriment to the State was shown. In a project containing some 400 bid items, many modifications of the contract during construction is required to cover unforeseen circumstances that arise. While it would be better to get competitive bids on every bit of work done on this project, in this imperfect world unforeseen items will appear. The document complained of attempts to alert the bidders to some anticipated work not foreseen when the bid proposal was prepared, but it is not a part of the bid solicitation.

Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-25.024
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PHILIP J. PROCACCI AND WHARTON INVESTMENT GROUP, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, DONALD J. CERLANEK, AND SUZANNE CASEY, 90-002459BID (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Apr. 24, 1990 Number: 90-002459BID Latest Update: Sep. 27, 1990

The Issue The issues are 1) Whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) properly rejected all bids on Lease Bid No. 590:2133, and 2) Whether either Petitioner is entitled to award of Lease Bid No. 590:2133 as the lowest and best responsive bidder.

Findings Of Fact On October 16, 1989, HRS issued an Invitation to Bid (ITB) on Lease Bid No. 590:2133 for 43,634 net square feet of office space in Ocala, Marion County, Florida. The bid package contained specifications, evaluation criteria, and numerical weight to be assigned to each criteria. The bid package indicated the area of emphasis placed on the facility by HRS which focused on client safety, public access, availability of public transportation, and parking. The emphasis on each area was indicated by the weighted points to be given in each area. On January 24, 1990, HRS received bids from both Wharton and Curtis. Both bids were responsive. Curtis submitted the apparent low bid and Wharton submitted the apparent second lowest bid. Curtis, as Trustee, is the owner of the property which is presently occupied by HRS in Ocala, Florida. The lease on these premises was awarded in 1980 and expires in 1990. Curtis purchased the leasehold in April of 1988 while HRS was a tenant and subject to the existing lease. Philip J. Procacci is the President of Procacci Development which is the general partner in Wharton Investment Group. The actual bids submitted were not offered into evidence by any party in this proceeding. Susanne Casey, the District Administrator of HRS District 3, is ultimately responsible for the leasing of all HRS facilities in the district, including facilities in Marion County. Casey appointed a bid evaluation committee to review and evaluate the responsive bids based on the criteria stated in the bid package. The committee was to make a recommendation regarding the lowest and best bidder. Before the bids were opened, the bid evaluation committee met and agreed upon objective parameters for each of the evaluation criteria. These parameters established standards against which each committee member could independently evaluate and award points on each bid. The evaluation criteria in the bid package assigned points in three major categories: associated fiscal costs, location, and facility. Associated fiscal coasts were further broken down into (a) rental rates for the basic lease term, (b) rental rates for optional renewal terms, and (c) associated moving costs. The maximum points available in each of these categories were fixed in the bid package and could not be altered by the committee. These criteria are standard in a lease procurement through out the state. State regulations require that all bids for lease space in the state evaluate rental rates using present value methodology. See Rule 13M-1.029, Florida Administrative Code. This means that the proposed rental rates in all bids are calculated to present value dollars for the purpose of comparison. The Department of General Services has a computer program, the sole function of which is to calculate the present value of the rental rates. The program has nothing to do with the assignment of points under the criteria, but is used as a tool to allow comparison of the bids. The present value of the Curtis bid was $662,464 lower than the present value of the Wharton bid. The rental rates were awarded points under criterion 1a of associated fiscal costs. The committee awarded the full 20 points to Curtis and awarded 5 points to Wharton. The committee members awarded these points in accordance with the standards and formula they had agreed on prior to the bid opening. The formula the committee used was not the more commonly used formula, but it was reasonable and rational and it was fairly applied to the bids in this case. There is no rule or policy of HRS or of the Department of General Services (DGS) that mandates that a particular formula be used in awarding points for the rental rate criterion 1a. There is a formula that HRS and DGS recommend as guidance of a methodology that is appropriate and reasonable, but the recommendation is not binding on the committee or on the District Administrator. There was another criterion of associated moving costs considered as part of the associated fiscal costs. Each committee member awarded 10 points to Wharton and 8 points to Curtis on this item. Wharton received 10 points because it sent a letter with its bid in which it offered to pay all moving costs incurred by HRS in a move to its building. Curtis received 8 points because HRS already occupied two of its buildings and would have limited moving costs in moving into the two additional buildings included in its bid. The bid specifications and bid package contained no indication that a bidder could offer to pay all moving costs as part of its bid. In fact, Wharton submitted its letter offering to pay all moving costs as a result of its discussion with one committee member, T.C. Little. Mr. Little is also the General Services Manager for HRS District 3 and is involved with all bids in the district. Mr. Little interpreted the bid specifications to permit such an offer even though the bid specifications were silent on the issue. At page 5 of the bid package, it is clearly stated that questions concerning the bid are to be directed to the project contact person. It further states: Any questions which might be prejudicial to other bidders will be answered in writing in the form of a clarification to the bid and will be sent to all prospective bidders. On that same page, the bid specifications address proposal of alternatives by stating: For evaluation purposes each bid submitted will be evaluated as to adherence to the specifications requested. If a bidder desires to propose alternatives to the specified specifications, he/she may do so by attaching a sheet to the bid submittal document titled Alternatives. However, these alternatives will not be presented to the bid evaluation committee for use in comparison of bids and can only be considered after an award of bid is made. The project contact person was Donald J. Cerlanek and any request for clarification should have been addressed to him and not to Mr. Little. Mr. Little's gratuitous advice and interpretation of the bid specifications made to Wharton and not to all bidders was incorrect, violated the terms of the bid specifications, and was improper. The bid specifications do not permit an offer to pay all moving costs to be considered in the award of points under the associated moving costs criteria. Such an offer can only be considered as an alternative proposal and cannot be considered by the bid evaluation committee in comparing the bids. Under the standards established by the committee, Wharton should have received 5 points on the associated moving costs criterion instead of 10 points. The committee members individually evaluated each bid and awarded points within the parameters they had established. Except for the incorrect award of points on the associated moving costs criteria, the scoring method and award of points by each committee member was rationally and reasonably related to the relative importance of each criterion as established in the bid package and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Each committee member came to the conclusion that the Curtis bid was the lowest and best based on the award of points in each member's independent evaluation. On February 13, 1990, they recommended in writing that Curtis be awarded the bid. On February 19, 1990, the District Administrator adopted the committee's recommendation and reported the recommendation to Steven Gertel, the assistant staff director for HRS Facilities Services in the Office of General Services. On March 7, 1990, Mr. Gertel sent a memo to the District Administrator. The memo said: Review of the bid evaluation committee's recommendation has disclosed that the committee used a non-standard method of evaluating present value of rental rate for the lease term. Please provide an explanation of this variation to accepted practice. In fact, the committee used the established DGS formula to calculate the present value of rental rates. However, the committee used its own formula to award points based on the present value of rental rates. There was nothing impermissible about the committee's actions or formula. Because of a fear of a bid protest, Ms. Casey, the District Administrator, sent a notice rejecting all bids on the project. No other reason was articulated for rejecting all bids. The fear of a bid protest is not a legally sufficient reason to reject all bids, particularly because it is not stated in the bid specifications and is based on speculation about a future event which may never occur. HRS did reserve the right to reject all bids in the bid package, but it may not do so for an improper purpose. Fear of a bid protest is not a proper purpose. Wharton alleged and attempted to show some level of collusion between Curtis and Mr. Cerlanek of HRS. While Mr. Curtis had several contacts with Mr. Cerlanek about the project, such contacts are not per se inappropriate because Mr. Cerlanek is the District 3 Lease Coordinator and is the proper person to discuss future projects with potential bidders. No competent, substantial evidence was presented to show that Mr. Cerlanek discussed anything that was not public record or anything that gave Mr. Curtis any advantage in the bid process. Mr. Cerlanek did not tell Mr. Curtis what would be in the bid package or what would be needed to insure award of the bid to Curtis.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order awarding the bid in Lease No. 590:5133 to Gail Curtis, as Trustee, as the lowest and best bidder. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NOS. 90-2459BID AND 90-2666BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Wharton 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-4(5) and 19(27). 2. Proposed findings of fact 1, 5, 11-17, 20, 29, 30, 38, 39, 45, 46, 51, and 57 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. 3. Proposed findings of fact 6, 8-10, 18, 21, 24, 25, 27, 31-34, 37, 40-44, 48- 50, 52, and 55 are irrelevant. Proposed findings of fact 7, 28, 56, 58, and 59 are unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. Proposed findings of fact 22, 23, 26, 35, 36, 38, 47, 53, and 54 are mere summaries of testimony and are not appropriately framed as proposed findings of fact. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Curtis, as Trustee Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 4(11), 7&8(13), 9(14), and 15(25). Proposed findings of fact 1-3, 5, 6, 10-12, and 16-26 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 13, 14, and 27-29 are unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: Part I paragraphs 2(1&2), 3(4), 4(8), 5(30), Part II paragraphs 2(1&2), 3(3), 4(4), 5(8), 6(9), 8(10), 19(25), and 20(26). Proposed findings of fact Part I paragraphs 1 and 6 and Part II paragraphs 1, 7, 9, 10, 12-18, and 21-24 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 11 is irrelevant. Copies furnished to: Robert A. Sweetapple Attorney at Law 465 East Palmetto Park Road Boca Raton, FL 33432 Harry R. Detwiler, Jr. Attorney at Law Holland & Knight Post Office Drawer 810 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Gloria Fletcher Attorney at Law 515 North Main Street, Ste. 300 Gainesville, FL 32607 Frances S. Childers District Legal Counsel Department of HRS 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32609 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57255.25
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DERICK PROCTOR vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 93-000263F (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 25, 1993 Number: 93-000263F Latest Update: Oct. 04, 1994

The Issue The issue in this cause is whether costs and attorney's fees are due Petitioner, hereinafter PROCTOR, from Respondent, hereinafter HRS, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as a result of Division of Administrative Hearings Case Number 91-5963-BID, and, if so, the amount of costs and fees.

Findings Of Fact The petition for fees and costs herein is brought exclusively under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and relates back to a bid protest wherein PROCTOR and TCC #3 LTD., INC., hereafter TCC, were the only bidders on HRS lease 590.236. PROCTOR was the protestant/Petitioner and TCC was the apparent successful bidder/Intervenor in Derick Proctor v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. HRS' Invitation to Bid (ITB) for lease 590:236 required bidders to submit evidence of control of the property being offered, including the parking areas. Evidence of control could take the form of a deed for the property, an option to purchase the property, or a lease or option to lease showing a right to sublease. TCC did not submit a document labelled "deed," "option to purchase," "lease," or "option to lease" with its bid. TCC submitted as its evidence of control a contract for sale and purchase of the property with Hernando Plaza, Ltd., executed by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves to be general partners of the limited partnership. At all times material, the actual record title of the property submitted by TCC for the bid was in the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation. At the times of the bid opening, evaluation, and August 27, 1991 notice of intended award, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with an entity other than the record owner. Up to then, at least, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as being the owner of the property. The ITB did not require an abstract of title to be submitted with the bid. HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contained provisions for future disclosures from successful bidders. Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS' ITB attempted at the time to protect HRS by requiring successful bidders to post an irrevocable letter of credit to be forfeited in the event a successful bidder could not perform and for future disclosures concerning the chain of title. (See the recommended order in the underlying case). HRS accepted the contract to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza, Ltd. as TCC's required evidence of control, believing it to constitute an option to purchase. (See Findings of Fact 15-17 infra, this final order). On August 27, 1991, PROCTOR received from HRS a notice of intent to award the bid to TCC. This notice constituted the "window" for protests, if any, to be filed. PROCTOR then timely filed a notice of intent to protest and a formal written protest of the award to TCC. The filing of this protest resulted in an automatic suspension of the bid solicitation and contract award process and referral of the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.53(5)(c), Florida Statutes. This protest formed the basis of the underlying bid case, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. No later than the time of the Prehearing Order of September 23, 1991 in Case No. 91-5963BID, the law firm of Gibbs and Rudzik had made known to the hearing officer and counsel for both PROCTOR and HRS its retention as counsel for TCC. TCC moved for leave to intervene in a motion filed September 30, 1991, which was granted in an order of October 4, 1991. In a letter of October 10, 1991, counsel for PROCTOR made counsel for HRS aware of a question of whether TCC could obtain good title to the property. Counsel for PROCTOR proposed in a letter of October 14, 1991 to counsel for HRS that HRS reject both PROCTOR's and TCC's bids and rebid the lease, but this letter was primarily devoted to determining if HRS wished to interpose a new defense that PROCTOR's bid was unresponsive. In the instant fees and costs case, PROCTOR relies on its October 14, 1991 letter as the point from which HRS should have acted to avoid incurring attorney's fees and costs. After the receipt of the two letters, HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract but proceeded to formal hearing on October 30, 1991. PROCTOR and HRS share the mutual impression that had HRS accepted PROCTOR's proposal to reject both bids, HRS would have to have allowed TCC an opportunity to protest that decision. At the final hearing in Case No. 91-5963BID, evidence was offered that Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had a conditional option to purchase the property from the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. However, it was not established at the hearing that the conditions of the option had been fulfilled or that TCC or Hernando Plaza, Ltd. could otherwise gain good title to the property through a valid option. It was concluded as a matter of law in Case No. 91-5963BID, that on its face, the ITB stated that control could be evidenced merely by attachment of an "option to purchase," that the ITB stated no further requirements concerning the internal provisions of the option to purchase, and that TCC's conditional contract for purchase constituted a conditional option to purchase. The conditions of the option to purchase and the chain of title, among myriad other matters were subjects of proof at the formal hearing. The conditions of the option to purchase and various complicated real property concepts arising from recorded and unrecorded parts of the chain of title constituted the thrust of the recommended order's assessment that TCC's "control" was speculative only. It is here noted that the totality of the "chain" of title might have been unavailable even by "abstract" due to the lack of recordation of some documents. The lengthy formal hearing adduced evidence concerning the factual issue of whether or not the conditional option to purchase was between TCC and an entity which had such a sufficiently unequivocal interest in the proposed property that it could convey title to TCC in time for TCC to fulfill its obligations under its proposed lease to HRS. There is no evidence that HRS knew of these problems on August 27, 1991, when it gave notice of its intent to award the bid to TCC. Hernando Plaza, Ltd. was the entity with which TCC had contracted. At formal hearing, TCC relied on the legal concept that all interests in the property had merged in the non-title holder, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. This concept, together with recorded and unrecorded elements in the chain of title which were presented at formal hearing, were determined in the recommended order to be too "speculative" on the issue of TCC's control. However, it was also found, upon evidence submitted at formal hearing, that TCC's bid contained no other material deviations from the requirements of the ITB, that the signator of TCC's bid had sufficient status to submit the bid for the TCC corporation, and that TCC's signator could not submit the bid as an agent of the owners of the real property. TCC and its bid signator had never purported to have submitted the bid on behalf of the owners of the real property. (See the recommended order of the underlying bid case.) These issues were raised by PROCTOR and they addressed more than just the facial compliance of TCC's original bid documents which was all HRS had to consider when it made its initial decision in favor of TCC and against PROCTOR. However, the recommended order found HRS to have materially deviated in a number of ways from the bid process in its initial evaluation of PROCTOR's bid, not the least of which was determining that PROCTOR had complied with the ITB requirements for demonstrating control. All such evaluation flaws had been committed by HRS in favor of PROCTOR. Both TCC's and PROCTOR's bids were ultimately found to be unresponsive in the recommended order entered on December 20, 1991. The recommended order also found both had standing to be involved in the bid protest and formal hearing. The recommended order recommended rejecting both bids and readvertising the ITB. The Final Order of HRS entered on January 20, 1992 dismissed PROCTOR's protest on the basis that he lacked standing to protest, as his bid was unresponsive, and awarded the bid to TCC. HRS did not give PROCTOR notice that his bid was not responsive until it issued its Final Order. The Final Order of HRS was appealed to the First District Court of Appeals by PROCTOR. The First District Court of Appeals entered an order on June 22, 1992 finding PROCTOR had standing and remanding the case back to HRS for the purpose of a decision of the issue of whether TCC's bid was also unresponsive. On July 27, 1992, HRS entered its Amended Final Order determining both bids to be unresponsive and that the lease should be relet for bids. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the Amended Final Order of HRS in a per curiam opinion without discussion on October 13, 1992. HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract until after this per curiam opinion. No motion for rehearing was filed with respect to either of the First District Court of Appeals' orders entered June 22 or October 13, 1992, nor was any notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court filed. PROCTOR did file a motion for rehearing solely on the court's denial of PROCTOR's motion for appellate fees. Mandate was issued by the Clerk of the First District Court of Appeals on December 3, 1992. HRS entered an Order Directing Release of Bid Protest Cost Bond on December 18, 1992, in which HRS stated: Petitioner, Derick Proctor, has prevailed in the above styled bid protest. Petitioner's domicile and principal place of business is Vero Beach, Florida. Petitioner has one employee. Petitioner is a sole proprietorship. Petitioner's net worth does not exceed $2,000,000.00. HRS was not a nominal party in the underlying bid case. HRS did not initially challenge PROCTOR's "small business party" status in this instant fees and costs proceeding. Therefore, that allegation of the fees and costs petition is not at issue. Also, Petitioner's "small business party" status is now stipulated to exist. The parties have stipulated that the maximum statutory fee is $15,000.00 and that $15,000.00 is a reasonable fee if an award of attorney's fees is due. HRS has not protested or objected to the amount of costs claimed, $411.25, if costs are due.

Florida Laws (4) 120.53120.57120.6857.111
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ADLEE DEVELOPERS, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 92-002798BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida May 06, 1992 Number: 92-002798BID Latest Update: Jul. 31, 1992

The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Respondent's intended award of a lease for office space to Intervenor, Anthony Abraham Enterprise, is arbitrary and capricious and whether the proposal of the Petitioner, Adlee Developers, the current lessor, is responsive.

Findings Of Fact The parties agreed that on April 7, 1991, the Department issued an Invitation to Bid entitled, "Invitation To Bid For Existing Facilities State Of Florida Lease Number 590:2286, Dade County" This procurement was for the provision of 30,086 net rentable square feet to be used for office space in Dade County. A 3% variance was permitted. The facility was to house the District's Aging and Adult Services office which has been a tenant in Petitioner's building for several years and remained there during the pendancy of this protest process. According to the published advertisement, a pre-proposal conference was to be held on April 22, 1991, with all bids due by the bid opening to be held at 10:00 AM on May 30, 1991. The pre-bid conference was conducted by Philip A. Davis, then the District's facilities service manager and included not only a written agenda but also a review of the evaluation process by which each responsive bid would be examined. Petitioner asserts that the potential bidders were told, at that conference, that annual rental increases for the ten year lease period could not exceed five per cent (5%) and claims that Abraham's bid exceeded those guidelines. Thorough examination of the documentary evidence presented and the transcript of the proceedings, including a search for the reference thereto in Petitioner's counsel's Proposed Findings of Fact, fails to reveal any support for that assertion as to an increase limitation. The ITB for this procurement, in the section related to the evaluation of bids, indicated that pursuant to the provisions of Sections 5-3 and 5-11 of HRSM 70-1, dealing with the procurement of leased space, the responsive bids would be reviewed by an evaluation committee which would visit each proposed facility and apply the evaluation criteria to it in order to determine the lowest and best bidder. The evaluation criteria award factors listed in the ITB defined a successful bid as that one determined to be the lowest and best. That listing of evaluation criteria outlined among its categories associated fiscal costs, location, and facility. As to the first, the committee was to look at rental rates for both the basic term of the lease and the optional renewal period. The rates were to be evaluated using present value methodology applying the present value discount rate of 8.08% and rates proposed were to be within projected budgeting restraints of the Department. The total weight for the rental rate category was to be no more than 40 points with 35 points being the maximum for the basic term and 5 points for the option. Evaluation of the location was to be based on the effect of environmental factors including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the operations planned therefor. This included the proximity of the facility to a preferred area such as a co-location, a courthouse, or main traffic areas. This item carried a maximum weight of 10 points. Also included in location were the frequency and availability of public transportation, (5 points); the proximity of the facility to the clients to be served, (5 points); the aesthetics of not only the building but the surrounding neighborhood, (10 points); and security issues, (10 points). The third major factor for evaluation was the facility itself and here the committee was to examine the susceptibility of the offered space to efficient layout and good utilization, (15 points), and the susceptibility of the building, parking area and property as a whole to possible future expansion, (5 points). In that regard, the Bid Submittal Form attached to the ITB called for the successful bidder whose property did not have appropriate zoning at the time of award to promptly seek zoning appropriate to the use classification of the property so that it might be used for the purposes contemplated by the department within 30 days. In the event that could not be done, the award could be rescinded by the department without liability. The committee could award up to 100 points. The basic philosophy of this procurement was found in paragraph 1 of the Bid Award section of the ITB which provided: The department agrees to enter into a lease agreement based on submission and acceptance of the bid in the best interest of the department and the state. After the bid opening, three of the four bids received, excluding Petitioner's which was initially determined to be non-responsive, were evaluated by the Department's bid evaluation committee according to the above point system which allowed no discretion or deviation from the formula in comparing rental rates between bidders. Once Petitioner's bid was thereafter determined to be responsive, it, too was evaluated by the committee. At this second evaluation session, relating to Adlee's bid only, the committee scored the bid and added its scores to the original score sheets upon which the other three bidders' scores had been placed. Abraham had the lowest rental rates for the basic term of the lease and received the maximum award of 35 points for that category while Adlee received points. Abraham received an additional 2.29 points for the optional period rates while Adlee got 0. In the other categories, "location" and "facility", which comprised 60% of the points, Adlee's facility was routinely rated superior to Abraham's except for the area related to susceptibility for future expansion in which Abraham was rated higher by a small amount. Overall, however, Adlee was awarded 620.41 points and Abraham 571.03 points and as a result, Adlee was rated by the committee to be the lowest and best bidder. RCL, another bidder, was rated second, with Abraham third and DCIC fourth. Thereafter, the committee chairman, Mr. VanWerne, forwarded the new (and complete) evaluation results to the District Administrator on June 14, 1991 by an addendum dated June 27, 1991 which recommended award of the bid to Petitioner, Adlee Developers. No award was made at the time. Several factors not pertinent to the issues here caused that delay. Among the major of these was pending legislation which would have transferred the operation needing this space to another agency. This transfer was never consummated, however. On or before March 20, 1992, the new District Administrator, Mr. Towey, who had been appointed to his office in December, 1991, and who was made aware that this procurement had not been finalized, requested all available material on it so that he could study it and make his decision based on his own review of the submission. As a part of his determination process, he visited and inspected both the Adlee and the Abraham sites. One of the factors he considered was what appeared to be the significant monetary discrepancy between the two pertinent bids. Initial calculations indicated that Abraham's bid was approximately $835,000.00 lower than Adlee's over the ten year basic term of the lease. This amount was subsequently determined to be somewhat lower but the discrepancy is still significant. Nonetheless, because of that difference, Mr. Towey called a meeting with the members of the evaluation committee which had evaluated the bidders and had recommended Adlee. His stated reason for calling that meeting was to allow him to hear their reasons for rating the submissions as they had done and to take that information into consideration when he made his final decision. None of the committee members who testified at the hearing at Petitioner's behest indicated any feelings of pressure or intimidation by Mr. Towey. During his meeting with the committee members, Mr. Towey went over several of the evaluation criteria award factors to determine the committee's rationale. Of major importance was the issue of cost, of the availability of the facility to transportation to and from the building, employee security and the ability to control access to the facility, and the availability of on-site parking without cost to both employees and clients. It appears the Adlee facility is a multistory building with some parking available on site and would be easier to control. In addition, it is closer to public transportation access points. There is, however, some indication that on-site parking for clients would not be free and the closest free parking is some distance away. According to Adlee's representative, this matter would not be a problem, however, as adequate, free on site parking, which apparently was not initially identified as a problem, could be provided in any new lease. The Abraham facility is a one story building surrounded by on-site parking. In that regard, however, at hearing, Petitioner raised the claim that the Abraham site did not, in actuality, provide adequate parking because the zoning requirements of the City of South Miami, the municipality in which the facility is located, did not permit the required number of parking spaces to accommodate the prospective need. Petitioner sought and received permission to depose the Building and Zoning Director for the city, Sonia Lama, who ultimately indicated that the Abraham site was grandfathered in under the old zoning rule and, thereby, had adequate parking available. In any case, had this not been true, under the terms of the ITB, any zoning deficiencies could have been corrected after award, or the award rescinded without penalty to the Department. After the meeting with the committee, Mr. Towey indicated he would probably go against the committee's recommendation. One of his reasons for doing so, as he indicated to them, was the appearance certain amenities in the facility would give. In the period between the time the committee met and Mr. Towey was ready to decide, there were several newspaper articles published in the Miami area which were negative in their approach to Department leasing policies and this publicity had an effect on him. In his response to a reporter's question, in fact, Mr. Towey indicated he would not permit the lease of any property which contained such amenities while he was District Director. There is some evidence that the wet bar referred to here was a sink and counter used by agency employees to make coffee. However, before making his decision, Mr. Towey also met with Herbert Adler of Adlee. Mr. Towey advised him he was concerned about the fact that the Adlee property provided a wet bar, a private bathroom and some other amenities in that suite of offices occupied by the Department. Mr. Towey was adamant in his public and private pronouncements on the subject that there would be no such amenities in HRS offices in his District while he was in charge. At the meeting in issue, Mr. Adler made it very clear he was willing to remove all the offending amenities to bring the space into conformity with Mr. Towey's standards. Mr. Towey obviously took Adler at his word as he did not consider this matter to be an issue when he evaluated the bids. Based on his independent evaluation of the proposals, and considering all the pertinent factors, Mr. Towey decided not to concur with the committee's recommendation and instead recommended to the Department's Office of General Services that the bid be awarded to Abraham. Because his recommendation differed from that of the evaluation committee, under the provisions of Section 5-13, HRS Manual 70-1, he was required to forward additional justification for his position. In his forwarding memorandum dated March 20, 1992 to Mr. King Davis of the Department's Office of General Services, Mr. Towey listed as his reasons for disagreement with the committee's recommendation, (1) the lower term cost of Abraham's bid, (2) his opinion that the one story floor plan of Abraham was more convenient and accessible to clients, and (3) the provision for ample free parking at the Abraham site as opposed to the limited parking at the Adlee building. Petitioner claims that Mr. Towey's justification for disagreement was improper because, (a) the rental difference he cited was not based on the ITB formula and did not consider the difference in square footage offered; (b) the rental rate comparison compared a proposed lease with an existing lease, not with a proposal; and (c) the reference to on-site parking referred to the situation under the existing lease with Adlee and not to what could occur under a new lease. The major factor in Mr. Towey's decision was the price differential between the two offerings. While the difference may not have been as great as presented initially by the department staff, even taken in its most conservative light of about half that amount, and considering the appropriate figures, the difference was still considerable and significant. In the continuing period of budgetary austerity under which state operations have been and must continue to be conducted, the financial consideration loomed large in his thinking. As for the parking situation, no change for the better was provided for in Adlee's proposal and even if it were, it was but one of several factors. When Mr. Towey's March 20, 1992 memorandum in justification of his disagreement was evaluated at the Office of General services, it was determined that his decision was rational and objectively justified. Thereafter, by letter dated April 2, 1992, the Office of General Services authorized District 11 to award the lease to Abraham and this decision was transmitted to all responsive bidders by letter dated April 7, 1992. It was this action which prompted Petitioner's protest.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the protest by Adlee Developers, Inc., of the award of procurement No. 590:2286 to Anthony Abraham Enterprises. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-2798 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted that the pre-bid conference was held but reject the finding that a 5% limit was mentioned. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted except for the next to last sentence which is rejected. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but not probative of any material issue. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 30. Rejected. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. - 5. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. & 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 25. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Melinda S. Gentile, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell 200 East Broward Blvd. P.O. Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Paul J. Martin, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol - Suite 1501 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Peter W. Homer, Esquire Greer, Homer & Bonner, P.A. 3400 International Place 100 S.E. 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 John Slye General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk DHRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57571.03
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