Findings Of Fact Petitioner, J. R. Brooks and Sons, Inc. (Brooks), is in the business of selling agricultural products. Its offices are located in Homestead, Florida. Respondent, Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. (Fair Chester), is a licensed agriculture dealer under Chapter 604, Florida Statutes. Its offices are in Mamaroneck, New York. As a licensed agriculture dealer, respondent is required to file a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department) to insure payment of any indebtedness to persons selling agricultural products to Fair Chester. In this regard, it has filed a $50,000 surety bond underwritten by respondent, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford). Between February and April, 1984, Brooks sold six shipments of `Pony Limes" to Fair Chester for a price of $25,039. Shortly thereafter, Fair Chester experienced financial problems and was unable to pay Brooks and other trade creditors. Because of this the creditors formed a committee in an effort to secure payment of their claims. A composition agreement was eventually drawn whereby the unsecured trade creditors agreed to settle, release and discharge in full their claims against Fair Chester on condition that each creditor signing the agreement be paid one-third of its claim "in full payment and settlement thereof, and provided further that 95 percent or more in dollar amount of all the debtor's unsecured trade creditors accepted the terms and provisions in writing on or before November 13, 1984. On or about September 2, 1984, Brooks filed a complaint against respondents with the Department which was pending when the offer to participate in the composition agreement was made. Brooks initially refused to accept the composition agreement. Because Brooks' acquiescence was necessary in order to achieve the 95 percent participation, Fair Chester, through its counsel advised Brooks by letter dated November 1, 1984 that its "acceptance of the Composition Agreement . . . shall be without prejudice to the complaint against (respondents) before the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services of the State of Florida." After receiving this letters Brooks agreed to execute the agreement and did so on November 7, 1984. Accordingly, it is found that it was the intention of the parties to allow Brooks to maintain the action herein. Thereafter, in accordance with the agreement, Fair Chester issued a check in the amount of $7,449.66 to Brooks on November 9, 1984, which represented one-third of its total claim. 1/ The check was endorsed by Brooks and deposited in its bank account. It has never rescinded that agreement. The letter of November 1, 1984, was not disclosed by Fair Chester to Hartford or any other trade creditor who executed the agreement. However, there was no effort on the part of Brooks to have the letter remain secret.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of lawn, it is RECOMMENDED that the complaint of J. R. Brooks and Sons, Inc. a against respondents be DISMISSED with prejudice, and its claim against them DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is engaged in the cattle business and sells its cattle to buyers from Florida and from outside Florida. All cattle are sold f.o.b. Clewiston and transportation to destination is paid for by the purchaser. It is the treatment of the sales as instate sales of cattle sold and transported to other states by contract carrier that is the issue in these proceedings. Respondent contends that these sales are instate sales but Petitioner contends that these sales are out-of-state sales for the purpose of computing the income derived from Florida operations pursuant to the provisions of Sections 214.71, 214.72 aud 214.73, Florida Statutes. Had the cattle been picked up by a common carrier for shipment outside Florida, Respondent could have held the sale to be an out-of-state sale for the purpose of computing the Petitioner's income tax. Because the cattle were picked up by contract carrier, Respondent determined the sale to be instate and directed its auditors to so conclude on all audits. This directive was determined to be a rule in case No. 78-1891R and invalid because not promulgated pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 210, Florida Statutes.
The Issue The four count Administrative Complaint presents the following issues: Whether Mr. Burgess is guilty of concealment, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2007).2 Whether Mr. Burgess operated as a broker without being the holder of a valid and current license as a broker in violation of Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes and, therefore, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Whether Mr. Burgess failed to ensure his brokerage corporation had a current registration with the Department in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-5.019, and, therefore, in violation of Section 475.25(1), Florida Statutes. Whether Mr. Burgess is failed to account or deliver to the Bells any property or assets which has come into his hands and is not his property and which he is not entitled to retain, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Clear and convincing evidence establishes the following findings of fact: The parties agree that Mr. Burgess is now, and has been at all times material to this case, a Florida licensed real estate broker, holding license number 701456. Mr. Burgess's business relationship with Willis C. and Nell F. Bell (the Bells) began in 2002 and 2003. In those years he served as realtor in selling a duplex and buying a house located at 42 East Drive, North Miami Beach, Florida. Later the Bells paid Mr. Burgess $1,000 to assist with re-financing the house. In the following years, Mr. Burgess borrowed money from the Bells. The Bells knew little about real estate and the real estate business. They trusted and relied upon Mr. Burgess, and he knew that. Mr. Burgess entered into a contract with the Bells to sell a townhouse located at 648 Northeast Second Street, Homestead, Florida. The contract is titled “Exclusive Right of Sale Listing Agreement” and dated October 3, 2006. The contract identifies Mr. Burgess as an “Authorized Listing Associate or Broker.” It gives Mr. Burgess the exclusive right to sell the Bells’ property and obligated him to market and sell the property. The contract identifies the sale price as $310,000.00. The contract term is October 3, 2006 to April 3, 2007. The first sentence of the contract identifies the parties as the Bells (Sellers) and Mr. Burgess and World Realty (Brokers). Mr. Burgess signed it as “Authorized Listing Associate or Broker.” The signature area identifies the Brokerage Firm Name as Beachfront Realty, Inc. The Bells purchased the Homestead townhouse at Mr. Burgess’s urging. He convinced the Bells that buying the Homestead townhouse was a good real estate investment. Mr. Burgess also loaned the Bells $3,000 or $3,500 to help them purchase the property. Mr. Burgess did not succeed in finding buyers for the property. Mr. Burgess proposed to the Bells that they rent the property. He repeatedly offered to locate a tenant for them. For some time the Bells resisted the idea because of concerns about wear and tear and possible damage to a new townhouse. Finally they agreed. Mr. Burgess identified a tenant, Ms. Kenya Horne. He repeatedly told the Bells that Ms. Horne’s occupation and lease of the townhouse were dependent on approval to participate in a government rent support program. Mr. Burgess prepared and the Bells executed a lease with Ms. Horne for the period beginning October 8, 2007 and ending September 30, 2008. It provided for lease payments of $1,300.00 per month and a security deposit of $1,300.00. Mr. Burgess signed the lease as a witness. But the Bells told Mr. Burgess that they did not want Ms. Horne to take possession of the townhouse until they met and approved her. Mr. Burgess agreed. He repeatedly assured the Bells that he would not give Ms. Horne possession of the property until they had met and approved of her. Also Mr. Burgess repeatedly advised the Bells that Ms. Horne had not moved into the property because she could not obtain needed approval for rent assistance. These assurances were false. Despite his repeated assurances and statements, Mr. Burgess gave the tenant possession of the property. She lived there four or five months. During the same time period, while the tenant occupied the property, Mr. Burgess was telling the Bells that Ms. Horne had not obtained rent assistance and that renting the property to her was not going to work. He never told the Bells that the tenant moved in. And he never gave the Bells any rental payments or a deposit or made any arrangements for them to receive rental payments or a deposit. Uneasy about matters, the Bells traveled with Laurence Linder, a friend who was a real estate broker and insurance salesman, to Homestead to inspect the townhouse. They found that the property had been occupied and damaged. The damage included holes in several walls and fire damage in the kitchen. The stove and microwave were destroyed. The carpet was damaged. The Bells called Mr. Burgess from the townhouse and asked him how the property was. Mr. Burgess did not know that the Bells were at the townhouse. He told them it was in fine shape. When the Bells told Mr. Burgess that they were in the townhouse, he broke down and cried and admitted he had let somebody live there without telling them. When the Bells confronted Mr. Burgess with his actions and the damage, Mr. Burgess admitted deceiving the Bells about the tenant and her occupation of the townhouse. He promised to make restitution for the damage. Mr. Burgess signed a document titled Remedy of Rental. In it he agreed to do the following: Pay the City of Homestead’s final outstanding utility bill of $1,700 on or before March 14, 2008. Pay the Bells $4,600 to repair damage and an additional $2,000. Pay the Bells $5,200.00, the rental amount from October 2007 to January 2008, on or before April 11, 2008. Pay all amounts by certified or cashiers check. Mr. Burgess did not make any of the payments agreed to in the Remedy of Rental.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Triple M Packing, Inc. (Triple M) is in the business of selling produce, particularly tomatoes from its principal business address of Post Office Box 1358, Quincy, Florida. The Respondent, Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. (Fair Chester), is primarily engaged in the business of packaging, distributing and brokering tomatoes in the New York City metropolitan area. It purchases produce from various sellers around the country in tomato-producing areas for resale at markets in the New York City area. Since it is a licensed agricultural dealer, the Respondent is required under the pertinent provisions of Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, to file a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department), designed to guarantee payment of any indebtedness to persons selling agricultural products to the bonded dealer to whom the dealer fails to make accounting and payment. Fair Chester has thus obtained a 50,000 surety bond which is underwritten by its Co-Respondent, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford). During the 1984 growing season, the Petitioner sold certain shipments of tomatoes to the Respondent for a price of $12,276. Thereafter, curing middle-to-late 1984, the Respondent Fair Chester, found itself in straitened financial circumstances such that it was unable to pay its various trade creditors, including the Petitioner. In view of this, various creditors at the behest of a lawyer retained by Fair Chester, eventually entered into a composition agreement, whereby the unsecured trade creditors agreed to settle, release and discharge in full their claims against Fair Chester on the condition that each creditor signing that agreement be paid thirty-three and one-third percent of its claim. It was determined that the composition agreement would be operative if the trade creditors representing 95 percent or more in dollar amount of all unsecured debts accepted the terms and provisions of that composition agreement on or before November 13, 1984. All the Respondent's unsecured trade creditors were contacted and ultimately those representing more than 95 percent of the outstanding creditor claims against Respondent accepted the terms and provisions of the composition agreement by the deadline. A document indicating acceptance by the Petitioner was signed by one Robert Elliott, purportedly on behalf of the Petitioner, Triple M Packing, Inc. In this connection, by letter of November 13, 1984 (Respondent's Exhibit 4) Attorney Howard of the firm of Glass and Howard, representing the Respondent, wrote each trade creditor advising them that the required acceptance by 95 percent of the creditors had been achieved, including the acceptance of the agreement signed and stamped "received November 8, 1984" by Robert Elliott, sales manager of Triple M. In conjunction with its letter of November 13, 1984, Glass and Howard transmitted Fair Chester's check for one-third of the indebtedness due Triple M or $4,092. The Petitioner's principal officer, its president, Kent Manley, who testified at hearing, acknowledged that he received that letter and check, but he retained it without depositing it or otherwise negotiating it. In the meantime, on October 29, 1984 a complaint was executed and filed by Triple M Packing, Inc. by its president, Kent Manley, alleging that $12,276 worth of tomatoes had been sold to Respondent on June 13, 1984 and that payment had not been received. The purported acceptance of the composition agreement executed by Robert Elliott, sales manager, was not executed until November 8, 1984 and the check for $4,092 in partial payment of the Triple M claim was not posted until November 13, 1984. Mr. Manley's testimony was unrefuted and established that indeed Mr. Elliott was a commissioned salesman for Triple M, was not an officer or director of the company and had no authority to bind the company by his execution of the composition of creditors agreement. Mr. Manley acted in a manner consistent with Elliott's status as a commissioned salesman without authority to bind the Petitioner corporation since, upon his receipt of the "one- third settlement" check with its accompanying letter, he did not negotiate it, but rather pursued his complaint before the Department. In fact, in response to the Department's letter of December 20, 1984 inquiring why the complaint was being prosecuted in view of the purported settlement agreement, Mr. Manley on behalf of Triple M Packing, Inc. by letter of December 28, 1984, responded to Mr. Bissett, of the Department, that he continued to hold the check and was not accepting it as a final settlement. Thus, in view of the fact that the complaint was filed and served before notice that 95 percent of the creditors had entered into the composition agreement and never withdrawn, in view of the fact that on the face of the complaint Robert C. Elliott is represented as a salesman indeed, for an entity known as "Garguilo, Inc.," and in view of the fact that Mr. Manley as president of Triple M, retained the check without negotiating it and availing himself of its proceeds, rather indicating to the Department his wish to pursue the complaint without accepting the check as settlement, it has not been established that the Respondent, Fair Chester, was ever the recipient of any representation by Manley, or any other officer or director of the Petitioner corporation, that it would accept and enter into the above-referenced composition of creditors agreement. It was not proven that Triple M Packing, Inc. nor Mr. Manley or any other officer and director either signed or executed the composition agreement or authorized its execution by Robert C. Elliott. Respondent's position that Mr. Manley and Triple M acquiesced in the execution of the settlement agreement by Elliott and the payment of the one-third settlement amount by the subject check has not been established, especially in view of the fact that the complaint was filed after Attorney Howard notified Triple M of Respondent's settlement offer and prior to notice to Triple M that the settlement agreement had been consummated by 95 percent of the creditors and prior to the sending of the subject check to Triple M. Mr. Manley then within a reasonable time thereafter, on December 28, 1984, affirmed his earlier position that the entire indebtedness was due and that the settlement had not been accepted.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, the evidence of record and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. pay Triple M Packing Company, Inc. $12,276. In the event that principal fails to or is unable to pay that indebtedness, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company should pay that amount out of the surety bond posted with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearings Hearings 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Kent Manley, Jr. Post Office Box 1358 Quincy, Florida 32351 P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 16th day of September, Arthur Slavin, Esquire BLUM, HAIMOFF, GERSEN, LIPSON, GARLEY & NIEDERGANG 270 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10016 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Joe W. Kight Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =========================================================== ======
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing the following facts were found: At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate salesman having been issued license No. 0325539. On September 24, 1984, at Respondent's request, Petitioner placed Respondent's license in an inactive status and on the day of the hearing Respondent's license was still in an inactive status. During the latter part of June or July, 1983, Respondent and his wife Merie Klink talked to George Anna Davis (Davis) in regard to renting or selling her home. Legally described as: Lot 15, Block G, Geneva Heights, as per Plat Book 2, Page 122 of the Public Records of Sarasota County, Florida. The mailing address of the Davis' property is 1804 Edmondson Road, Nokomis, Florida 33555. As a result of this conversation, Davis decided to sell rather than to rent her home and entered into a multiple listing with Venice Area Multiple Listing Service, Inc., with Respondent's broker, Ronald W. Morrison of Century 21 First Realty of Venice, Inc., as the listing Realtor, which was accepted on August 8, 1983. On October 11, 1983, Jan Leather and Janet Adams submitted an offer on the property to Davis which she refused. Davis then made a counter-offer which was refused by Jan Leather and Janet Adams. At the time of the hearing, Davis did not recollect the offer or counter-offer being made. During the term of the listing Respondent mowed the grass, made minor repairs, and generally kept the Davis property clean without any compensation from Davis. On November 2, 1983, Respondent received an offer on the Davis property from Andrew G. Szilay and Lillian Green Szilay (Szilay). The Szilay offer provided for a total purchase price of $23,000, payable $3,000 in cash and $20,000 by note secured by a purchase money mortgage based on 30 year amortization with interest at the rate of 11 percent per annum to balloon in 3 years. There was no provision for the assumption of the John Falls mortgage in the sum of $3,500 by the Szilays and the Szilays assumed that this mortgage would be paid off by Davis at closing and that they would get a clear title. The Szilay offer was communicated to Davis by Respondent on November 2, 1983 and Davis informed Respondent that she needed to talk to her son before making a decision. Respondent called Davis again on November 3, 1983 but she had not made a decision and asked that Respondent call her back on Sunday morning, November 6, 1983 and that she would have made a decision on the offer by that time. During this conversation, Respondent reminded Davis that she had to accept the Szilay offer by noon, November 7, 1983 or it would be withdrawn. On November 4, 1983, Respondent received an offer on the Davis property from Walter E. Armstrong and Lula Mae Armstrong (Armstrong). The Armstrong offer provided for a $22,500 purchase price, payable $5,000 cash, assumption of the John Falls' mortgage in the sum of $3,500 by Armstrong and a $14,000 note secured by a purchase money mortgage to Davis with interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum to balloon in 5 years. Respondent attempted to contact Davis on November 4, and 5, 1983, but was unable to contact Davis until Sunday, November 6, 1983, and at that time informed Davis of the Armstrong offer. The record is clear that Respondent received and informed Davis of the Szilay offer before receiving the Armstrong offer. During the telephone conversation on Sunday, November 6, 1983, Respondent informed Davis of the Armstrong offer and asked Davis to write down the details of both offers so that Respondent could discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each offer with Davis. After some discussion Davis could not make up her mind and asked Respondent to call her back later. Upon calling Davis back later that Sunday, November 6, 1983, Davis advised the Respondent that she preferred the Szilay offer because of the 11 percent interest and the three year balloon feature, as opposed to the 10 percent interest and five year balloon feature of the Armstrong offer. Respondent instructed Davis to send a telegram accepting the Szilay offer. On that same day, Respondent advised Louise Levering the real estate salesperson who was handling the Armstrong offer, that Davis preferred the Szilay offer and why Davis preferred it and that Davis was going to accept the Szilay offer. Later that same day, Armstrong made a counter-offer increasing the interest rate to 11 percent and with the note to balloon at 3 years. The Armstrong counter-offer was communicated by Leverling to Respondent who in turn communicated the Armstrong counter-offer to Davis on the same day (November 6, 1983) which was later confirmed in writing. Again, the Respondent asked Davis to write down the details of each offer and counter-offer and Respondent explained the comparative features of them to Davis. One of the things pointed out to Davis, by Respondent, was that the Szilay offer would require Davis to satisfy the John Falls' mortgage in the sum of $3,500, producing no cash to Davis at the closing, while the Armstrong offer would give her substantial cash at closings which she wanted. At this point, since no telegram had been sent, Davis decided to accept the Armstrong offer instead of the Szilay offer and advised Respondent that she would send a telegram to that effect on Monday, November 7, 1983. On Monday, November 7, 1983, a telephone call to the Century 21 office confirmed that a telegram had been received from Davis accepting the Szilay offer. The telegram was later reduced to writing. Respondent then called Davis to see if there was a mistake and Davis advised Respondent that she had gotten confused. Again Respondent explained both offers to Davis and she agreed that the Armstrong offer would be better for her. On November 8, 1983, Respondent received a telegram from Davis accepting the Armstrong offer. The Armstrong contract was mailed to Davis for signature on November 9, 1983. Norwood Gay the Attorney closing the transaction, corresponded with Davis on November 18, 1983, and in accordance with that correspondence, Davis executed a closing statement, a warranty deed, and an owner's affidavit and forwarded the documents to Norwood Gay for the closing. The transaction closed in a routine manner with exception that an inspection of the improvements on the property revealed visible evidence of wood destroying organism known as dry-rot in various locations around the house. The Respondent notified Davis of this prior to closing, and Davis authorized a repair escrow of $500. The closing took place on December 5, 1983 and Norwood Gay forwarded to Davis the net check less escrow and the other closing documents. Norwood Gay later sent Davis the net of the repair escrow, which she accepted. While Davis in a letter to Petitioner implies that respondent dropped the price of the home by $1,500 and sold it to a close friend, the Armstrongs, the testimony of both the Respondent and his wife and the Armstrongs that they had not known each other before this transaction and had only met the morning of the hearing, went unrebutted. Also, the evidence shows that there was only $500 difference in the purchase price of the two offers. While Davis had previously listed her house with another agency to be sold "as is", the record is clear that this matter was discussed with Davis by the Respondent and that Davis understood that the property would be listed as needing "tender loving care" (TLC). The Respondent received $441.15 as a listing commission on the Armstrong sale. Had the Szilay offer been closed rather than the Armstrong offer, the Respondent would have received approximately $377.00 as a listing commission. The record is clear that Respondent discussed the advantages and disadvantage of both the Szilay and Armstrong offers prior to Davis making a final decision to accept the Armstrong offer. There was no credible evidence that Davis was pressured by the Respondent to accept the Armstrong offer or that the Respondent informed Davis that the Szilays: (a) were unreliable; (b) not financially able to handle the payments, or (c) that they had withdrawn their offer.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of laws recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding the Respondent not guilty of the violations as charged in Count I and Count II of the Administrative Complaint and that Count I and Count II of the Administrative Complaint be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 12th day of July, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur Shell, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 William R. Hereford, Esquire 1233 South Tamiami Trail Sarasota, Florida 33579 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Mr. Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Fl 32301
Findings Of Fact Arvin C. Moore was a registered real estate broker from January 3, 1977, and active firm member of Real Estate 3 Incorporated, a registered corporate broker with an address registered with the Petitioner Commission as Route 2, Box 59B, Chipley, Florida 32428. Prior to January 3, 1977, Alvin C. Moore was a registered real estate salesman, registered as of September 2, 1975. Regarding the allegations that Respondent Moore was an officer of American Universal Investment Corporation at the time he acted as broker in the Tew transaction, the evidence presented showed that Moore resigned as president of American on April 29, 1977. Negotiations with the purchaser Tew began in the summer of 1977, and the contract between American and Tew was entered into on or about July 20, 1977. Moore was made vice president of American on November 3, 1977, some time after Tew had advised that he did not wish to complete the purchase. The evidence shows that Moore advised Tew that the property in which Tew was interested was owned by members of his family. Whether the corporation was identified as a closely-held corporation is not relevant, because Moore had advised Tew of his potential personal interest in the transaction. Moore advised Tew, after Tew expressed an interest in the property, that he would see for what price his family would be willing to sell the property. Moore advised Tew that the family would sell eleven (11) acres for $9,900. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Moore told Tew that American's cost was $900 per acre, and that this was a misrepresentation concerning the facts of the sale. The evidence shows that the seller, White, received $36,000 from the sale of the property to American; however, American paid $4,000 in brokerage fees to Moore. American's cost was $40,000. The parcel contained approximately fifty-eight (58) acres, but this included approximately eight (B) acres of public roads. In addition some of the land was so low that it was not usable. Depending upon what cost and acreage figures were used, the price per acre varied from $620 to approximately $900 per acre. Moore was representing American in this transaction and, as a real estate broker, was permitted to present the property in its best light. Representing the purchase price as $900 is not a misrepresentation but mere puffing. Moore's sole duty to Tew was to deal at arm's length with him. No evidence exists that Moore did not deal at arm's length with Tew. Further, concerning the representations regarding the cost paid by American, it is noted that these representations are irrelevant to Tew's right to reject the tendered offer from American. No evidence was presented that Tew was induced into the contract by the representation that American paid $900 per acre for the property. American tendered a written contract to White on September 23, 1976, which was rejected. However, this contract became the basis for further negotiation which resulted in an oral contract for sale between American and White. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine when this contract was consummated; however, negotiations of certain details continued until after the Tew/American contract was executed. These negotiations between American and White included an arrangement for White to transfer the the eleven (11) acre parcel which Tew was purchasing directly to Tew and convey the remainder to American, avoiding a dual transfer and dual taxation. The Complaint alleges that Moore misrepresented the contract to Tew because American did not have title to or an assignable interest in the property. The facts show that a contract did exist between White and American, and that White concurred in the transfer to Tew. Although this oral contract was not legally enforceable, as agent for American Moore was aware that the oral contract was sufficient for American and that American was acting in reliance on its oral contract with White in making on offer to Tew. The contract between American and Tew was a valid enforceable written contract notwithstanding whether American had or obtained title to the White property. Tew could have sued for damages if American had not obtained the property, or for specific performance had American acquired the property and refused to transfer it to Tew. Tew's interests were not jeopardized under the contract. Although Moore's duty to American is not at issue, Moore's duty did not extend to protecting American from its own acts. Moore had no duty to advise Tew that the oral contract for purchase was not enforceable. The evidence shows that Tew accepted the contract for purchase and sale for eleven (11) acres at $9,900 and was satisfied with this transaction until his sister-in-law advised him that one of White's agents had told her American had purchased the property for approximately $500 per acre. At this point, Tew sought to withdraw from the contract. This explains the origin of Tew's complaint against Moore and Tew's interest in the outcome, because the American/Tew contract contained a default clause. Clearly, Tew defaulted on the contract by refusing to go through with it when American stood ready to convey the property to him. Moore deposited the $1,000 deposit check he received from Tew to the escrow account of the Washington County Abstract Company, a title company located and doing business in the State of Florida.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no formal action be taken against the Respondents, Arvin C. Moore and Real Estate 3 Incorporated. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day off October, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Russell A. Cole, Jr., Esquire 206 East Iowa Avenue Bonifay, Florida 32425
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's real estate broker's license application should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Rhonda S. Dietz, is a 36-year-old woman who currently holds a real estate sales associate's license. She was first licensed by the State of Florida in December 2001 and has held her license in good standing since that time. At the time Petitioner obtained her sales associate license, she disclosed in her application that she had a criminal background. That background included two grand larcenies, possession of a controlled substance, failure to appear, violation of probation, and obtaining property with a worthless check. Each of the offenses will be further discussed below. Despite the criminal history, Respondent approved Petitioner's sales associate's license, and Petitioner has been selling real estate for the past six years. In 2006, Petitioner first applied for a real estate broker's license. Petitioner maintains that in her 2006 application, she disclosed each of the aforementioned events in her criminal history.1 Nonetheless, her application was denied. In May 2007, Petitioner again filed an application for a real estate broker's license. That application clearly contained documentary evidence of her entire criminal history. The events in that history are hereby discussed: The first grand larceny in Petitioner's background was related to the purchase of goods from a K-Mart in 1994 with a bad check belonging to a roommate. Upon discovering the check was bad, Petitioner immediately turned herself in, made restitution, and paid court costs. She was sentenced to five years' probation for that charge. The second grand larceny involved allegations in 1994 by Petitioner's then-current roommates that Petitioner stole property from them when she moved out of the residence. Although Petitioner denied the charge because the claim was merely retaliation by her roommates for moving out, she agreed to a plea bargain at the advice of counsel. Again, she was given five years' probation and made to pay restitution. In 1998, Petitioner was charged with possession of a controlled substance: a vial of testosterone and some pain pills. She explained that these drugs came from a pharmacy where she was working. The pharmacy specialized in treatment of AIDS patients. She had the drugs in her possession so she could turn them over to a medical group that could disperse them to AIDS patients. The pharmacy supported Petitioner and paid for her defense against the possession charge. Petitioner was sentenced to 24 months' probation, court costs, and 50 hours of community service for that charge. Petitioner also had a probation violation in 1998 for failing to appear and for failing to pay a fine related to one of the aforementioned charges. She did not pay the fine due to lack of funds. She failed to appear due to lack of notice. She was placed on ten months' house arrest for the violation of probation. Petitioner met all other conditions of her probation and has not had any criminal activity since the charges listed above. She does not deny the existence of her prior criminal history and has not attempted to hide it from Respondent. When Petitioner applied for a broker's license in 2005, she filed an application that included her criminal history. The application disclosed all of the charges addressed above. Respondent confirmed the charges by referring to a Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) report. When Petitioner re-applied in 2007, she personally obtained a FDLE report on her criminal background, which she submitted along with her application. Again, she listed all of her prior history in the application. There is no competent evidence to suggest otherwise. Since the time of her last criminal charge, Petitioner has been gainfully employed. She has worked in an office doing medical billing, in a pharmacy, and as a real estate agent. In her current position, she has been entrusted with large sums of money for clients. She has had no adverse employment actions taken against her. Her co-workers state that she has good moral character and is trustworthy. Petitioner has passed the classroom work needed to become a broker; her application for licensure will complete that process. Meanwhile, she continues to sell real estate and is involved in an investor monitoring program. The broker's license will simply allow Petitioner to make a career move by expanding her capabilities in the area of real estate sales. Respondent did not call any witnesses at the final hearing and did not refute or rebut the facts as stated by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission granting Petitioner's application for a real estate broker's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2007.
Findings Of Fact On June 6, 1975, respondent entered into a written agreement with John R. Lovett, III, a real estate salesman. Among other things, this agreement provided: When Salesman performs any service whereby a commission is earned, the commission when collected, shall be divided between the Broker and Salesman in the manner as set out in Schedule attached hereto, or the office policy manual of the broker. The agreement also specified that a [s]alesman's right to commissions or divisions thereof, which accrued prior to the termination of this contract shall not be divested by the termina- tion hereof. The parties stipulated that no written schedule or office policy manual ever existed but that, under an oral agreement between respondent and Mr. Lovett, respondent would have paid Mr. Lovett $441.00 if he had been employed when the Oliver-Kelly transaction closed and had otherwise performed the duties of a listing salesman. Mr. Lovett and respondent never discussed what would happen as to listing commissions when he left her employ. While employed by respondent, Mr. Lovett obtained for the firm the exclusive right to sell a home belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Oliver. Thereafter, Mr. Lovett facilitated execution of a contract between the Olivers and the Kellys in which the Kellys agreed to buy the house for $34,000.0 "contingent upon purchaser qualifying for a VA insured loan in the amount specified." On August 11, 1975, the property was appraised at less than $34,000.00; and a "VA insured loan in the amount specified" proved unavailable to the Kellys. About the time this contract fell through, Mr. Lovett said he was going to Mt. Dora to look for work. The last week of August, 1975, Mr. Lovett spent in Orlando looking for a job. At the end of the week, Mr. Lovett returned to respondent's office, cleaned out his desk and announced that he was leaving. Respondent heard him say this before she left town for a long weekend. The following Tuesday, when the office reopened after Labor Day, respondent wrote petitioner, advising that Mr. Lovett was no longer associated with her as of the date of the letter. Mr. Oliver, who had moved to Georgia, returned to Brevard County for the Labor Day weekend and contacted respondent's office. Respondent's son, who was working as a real estate salesman for his mother, reopened discussions with the Kellys. As a result, the Kellys agreed a second time to buy the Olivers' house, this time at a price of $31,500.00. This second agreement, styled an "Amendment" (sic) to the first contract, was reduced to writing and signed by the principals on August 30, 1975. This second agreement provided that respondent's office be paid a commission of $2,205.00. The transaction closed the following month. Respondent originally refused Mr. Lovett's demands for commissions on account of the Oliver-Kelly sale. After Mr. Lovett left respondent's office, however, respondent paid him both listing and sales commissions on account of another transaction which closed before he left respondent's employ. After Mr. Lovett enlisted the aid of petitioner, respondent paid Mr. Lovett $220.00 in settlement of his claim for the listing commission on account of the Oliver- Kelly sale.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint against respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Charles Holcomb, Esquire Post Office Box 1657 Cocoa, Florida 32922
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated and it is found in (a) through (d) below: Respondent, Bruce Leazenby, is a licensed real estate broker having been issued License No. 0198529. Last known address is 130 Mandalay Road, Punta Gorda, Florida 33950. Respondent, M&M Realty, Inc., is a corporate broker having been issued License No. 0133397. Last known address is 301 West Marion Avenue, Punta Gorda, Florida 33950. At all times material herein, Respondent, M&M Realty, Inc., was a licensed real estate broker engaging in real estate activities at the address stated above. At all times material herein, Respondent, Bruce Leazenby, was the sole active broker of and for Respondent, M&M Realty, Inc., and responsible for his individual acts and of said corporation by being its active broker. On August 18, 1980, Mr. Orville S. Logsdon entered into a Management Compensation Agreement with M&M Realty, Inc. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 2). Under that agreement, Mr. Logsdon agreed to act as manager of M&M Realty and to supervise and organize the sales personnel. In exchange, Mr. Logsdon was to be compensated as follows: Manager shall receive ten percent of the commissions received, by Realtor, as a result of Real Estate transactions. Compensation shall begin with commissions received at closing as a result of Real Estate sales contracts written after August 18, 1980. Realtor shall make pay ments to Manager quarterly, beginning September 30, 1980, and at the end of each quarter thereafter, for the term of this agreement. Manager shall receive, on his individual transactions, a total of seventy percent (70 percent) of the commissions received by Realtor; Realtor shall receive thirty percent (30 percent). (See Petitioner's Exhibit 2). Mr. Logsdon continued as manager with M&M Realty, Inc. until August, 1981. His leaving resulted in part from an argument which arose after Mr. E. M. Leazenby, President of M&M Realty, informed Mr. Logsdon that they needed to discuss the commissions he had been receiving. At the time Mr. Logsdon left M&M Realty, he had been paid all commissions due him on sales and listings in which he was personally involved as a real estate salesman. Prior to his leaving M&M Realty, a dispute had arisen between Mr. Logsdon and M&M Realty as to the compensation Mr. Logsdon was due under the Management Compensation Agreement. Mr. Logsdon's interpretation of the agreement was that his compensation would be 10 percent of all commissions coming to M&M Realty. Mr. Logsdon further contended that the 10 percent override applied to all transactions including his individual transactions where he received 70 percent of the commissions received by the realtor. This would essentially give Mr. Logsdon 80 percent of the commissions coming to the realtor in Mr. Logsdon's individual transactions. This interpretation of the Management Compensation Agreement conflicts with Paragraph 2 of the agreement which provides that M&M Realty would receive 30 percent of the commission coming to M&M Realty on Mr. Logsdon's individual transactions. At the time he left M&M Realty, Mr. Logsdon claimed he was owed approximately $4,070.00 based upon a work sheet he had been given by Bruce Leazenby sometime prior to his leaving. Mr. Logsdon had made no effort to independently determine what amount, if any, he was due as compensation. Shortly after Mr. Logsdon left M&M Realty, a final audit was performed by Deloris Leazenby of the year August, 1980, to August, 1981, to determine what amount was due Mr. Logsdon as compensation as manager. During the course of the audit, it was discovered that Mr. Logsdon had been overpaid during the year on several transactions. The numbers in Petitioner's Exhibit 3, the worksheet provided to Mr. Logsdon prior to his leaving, were also discovered to be inaccurate. The figures in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 do not comport with the percentages reflected in the contract. A copy of the spread sheet prepared by M&M Realty in the course of the final accounting was provided to Mr. Logsdon. This occurred within a short time after Mr. Logsdon left M&M Realty. Mr. Logsdon made no response whatsoever to the spread sheet which reflected that he was due some $271. There was no further discussion between the parties prior to a complaint being filed with DPR sometime after the spread sheet was provided to Mr. Logsdon. There was no further demand by Mr. Logsdon for any further accounting. There was also a dispute as to the terms of the contract itself. This dispute involved a question of whether the 10 percent override applied to transactions handled by the broker, Bruce Leazenby or his mother, Deloris Leazenby. Although Mr. Logsdon testified there had been no modifications to that agreement, there had been at least three modifications to the agreement subsequent to its execution. First, Mr. Logsdon had agreed to waive the requirement for regular quarterly payments in order to help M&M Realty through an extended period of cash flow problems. Secondly, Mr. Logsdon agreed to a deduction of $20.00 from each of his commissions to help M&M Realty defray the cost of a computer. Finally, there were deductions for insurance from commissions. These insurance deductions were not addressed in the Management Compensation Agreement. Additionally, Logsdon had been overpaid the 10 percent fee on numerous transactions prior to March 31, 1981, the earliest date on Petitioner's Exhibit 3, and had also been overpaid on certain commissions during the course of the year. In summary, it cannot be determined from this record the specific amount of compensation due Mr. Logsdon, if any. It is clear, however, that the amount due, if any, is substantially less than the $4,070 claimed by Mr. Logsdon at the time he left M&M Realty, Inc. Prior to and subsequent to Mr. Logsdon leaving M&M Realty, there was a good faith reasonable dispute between Mr. Logsdon and M&M Realty as to the amount of compensation Mr. Logsdon was due as manager under the contract. Prior to his leaving M&M Realty, Mr. Logsdon was made aware that there was a dispute as to how much compensation he was to receive for being manager. He had been paid all commissions he was due as a salesman. There was no evidence of any trick, scheme, device or other dishonest acts on the part of Respondents, Bruce Leazenby or M&M Realty, Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED: That the Respondents be found not guilty of Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint and that such complaint therefore be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 John S. Dzurak, Esquire 306 East Olympia Avenue Post Office Box 400 Punta Gorda, Florida 33951 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact As the parties stipulated, DOR "seeks to lease warehouse and office space in the City of Tallahassee in a privately owned building, and issued a request for proposals ('RFP') to seek competitive proposals. Four offerors responded with proposals; three of these were deemed responsive by the Department, and were evaluated by the Department on a variety of weighted evaluation criteria, only one of which was rental rate. . . . The Department proposes to award the lease to the Fregley/Oertel/Skelding Partnership ('F/O/S')." North of Gun Club, South of Springsax By unrecorded warranty deed dated January 2, 1989, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, Richard L. Pelham, individually, conveyed to petitioner Equity Resources, Inc., property fronting on Springhill Road in Tallahassee, Florida, on which a warehouse stands. The north boundary of petitioner's property inter-sects the western edge of the Springhill Road right-of-way at a point south of the intersection Springsax Street (which is a paved road) forms when it dead ends into Springhill Road. Petitioner's property does not abut the intersection. The distance between the northeast corner of petitioner's property and the Springsax Street intersection was variously put at "a few feet," (T.189), 100 feet, 100 to 200 feet, and 335 feet. The south boundary of petitioner's property intersects the western edge of the Springhill Road right-of-way at a point some distance north of the intersection between Springhill Road and a dirt road known as Gun Club Road. Specifications Disseminated Richard L. Pelham, who is president of petitioner Equity Resources, Inc., read in the newspaper about respondent's intention to lease office and warehouse space. At his request, Karen Allen, an employee of Universal Equities, Inc., another company with which Mr. Pelham is affiliated, picked up a copy of the request for proposal and bid proposal submittal form at a DOR office. The request for proposal and bid proposal submittal form package which Ms. Allen picked up included a paragraph describing the geographical boundaries of the service area in which DOR hoped to lease space. The paragraph states: Space to be located within or abutting the boundaries starting at the corner of U.S. 90 W. and Capital Circle Southwest (263) proceed South on Capital Circle to Orange Avenue to Springhill Road, South on Springhill to Springsax, East on Springsax to Northridge Road, South on Northridge to Ridge Road, East on Ridge Road to State Road 61 (Crawfordville Hwy), North on SR 61 to U.S. 27, North on U.S. 27 to West Tharpe Street, West on Tharpe Street to Capital Circle NW, south on Capital Circle to Tennessee Capital Boulevard, Southwest on Tennessee Capital Boulevard to U.S. 90 and East on U.S. 90 to Capital Circle Southwest (263). (See Map Attachment B) Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, p. 8. Devoid of any markings purporting to represent boundaries, the map attached to the bid package Ms. Allen picked up depicted much of Tallahassee, including large areas outside the boundaries the quoted paragraph specified. Many of the request for proposal and bid proposal submittal form packages DOR distributed did include maps on which the area described in paragraph 14A on page eight was outlined. The map in the master package showed boundaries, but they had to be replicated manually on copies. For outlining, DOR employee(s) used an implement that leaves a yellow mark which most copying machines do not reproduce. Mr. Pelham asked Richard Gardner, who may or may not have been at the time an officer or employee of Equity Resources, Inc. (T.62), but who testified he was an officer as of the time of the hearing (T.63), to attend a preproposal conference. Mr. Gardner did attend without, however, taking with him either the request for proposal and bid proposal submittal form package Ms. Allen had obtained or his eyeglasses. After the conference concluded, he asked for a copy of the request for proposal and bid proposal submittal form package. Michael S. Partin, a senior management analyst for DOR, asked another DOR employee to make a copy. When this effort proved unsuccessful (the paper jammed and half pages were produced), he did it himself. After consulting the master bid package, Mr. Partin used a yellow marker to outline on the map he gave Mr. Gardner the area described in the request for proposals. Confusion Feigned Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 is a copy of a map included in a bid package as Attachment B to a request for proposals. On it, somebody has drawn, with a yellow marker, a boundary that differs from the boundary drawn on the master map, but only in the vicinity of petitioner's property: instead of tracing Springhill Road south to Springsax Street and turning east, the boundary represented on Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 proceeds south on Springhill Road, past petitioner's property, to Gun Club Road, and turns east there. Mr. Gardner testified that Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 was the map given to him as part of the package he received after the preproposal conference. But Mr. Partin's contrary testimony that Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 is not the map he gave Mr. Gardner has been credited. The map he gave Mr. Gardner "look[ed] like [Petitioner's] Exhibit No. 5." T.166. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5 unambiguously depicts the boundary turning east from Springhill Road onto Springsax Street, in complete consonance with the verbal description. Mr. Gardner also testified that he understood from discussions with Mr. Partin that the boundary went south to Gun Club Road before turning, but this testimony has not been credited. Both Mr. Partin and Barbara Foster Phillips, who was present during the conversation, testified that nothing that was said could reasonably have been understood to mean this. The latter account has been accepted as truthful. Mr. Pelham's testimony that he relied on (a) map(s) as establishing (a) boundar(ies) inconsistent with the boundary clearly described in paragraph 14A on page eight of the request for proposal has not been credited. After determining the location of petitioner's property, DOR did not evaluate petitioner's proposal further, even though petitioner offered to lease space for significantly less than any other offeror, and even though petitioner's property was closer to other DOR facilities than many points within or abutting the boundaries set out in the request for proposals. Surprise at Hearing On the master map itself, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, because of the width of the marker as it turned the corner from Springhill Road onto Springsax Street, yellow extends down Springhill Road far enough south of Springsax Street that at least some of petitioner's property fronts on the yellowed portion of Springhill Road. Not until final hearing, however, did any bidder see the master map.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That respondent reject petitioner's proposal for lease No. 730:0106 as nonresponsive. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 4 and 13 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 have been rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 5 and 6, no bidder saw the "master map" before the final hearing in the present case. Although the breadth of the marker yellowed Springhill Road below the intersection with Springsax Street, the turn onto Springsax Street is unambiguously depicted on the master map. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3, unavailability of the legal description was not proven. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 11 and 14, the lease was to last five, not ten years. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 through 20, 22, 23, and 25 through 29 have been adopted, in substance. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 3, the evidence did not establish that DOR "determined a boundary area they felt offered the optimum number of properties." With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 21, Pelham testified both that the property did and that it did not abut the intersection. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 24, the distance depends on the method of measurement. With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 30 and 31, Mr. Partin's subjective views are immaterial. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 4, 7 through 13 and 16 through 24 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to intervenor's proposed findings of fact Nos. 5 and 6, Mr. Partin's subjective intent is immaterial. With respect to intervenor's proposed findings of fact Nos. 14 and 15, the distance depends on the method of measurement. Copies furnished: Gene T. Sellers, Esquire Department of Revenue Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 William A. Friedlander, Esquire Equity Resources, Inc. 424 East Call Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Oertel/Fregley/Sheldon Partnership 2700 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, FL 32301 J. Thomas Herndon Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 William D. Moore, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
