Findings Of Fact Respondent administers the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan as a self insurance plan pursuant to Section 110.123(5), Florida Statutes. Prior to October 1 1981, Petitioner was an employee of the Department of Natural Resources. For some period of time, Petitioner purchased coverage under that health insurance plan. When she married an employee of the federal postal service, she dropped her health insurance with the State of Florida, since she preferred health insurance coverage under her husband's Policy with the federal government. Petitioner's employment with the Department of Natural Resources was reclassified so that she became a member of the Senior Management Service during September or October 1981. One of the benefits available to Senior Management Service employees is coverage under the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan free of charge to the employee. In the case of a Senior Management Service employee who accepts coverage under that Plan, the employing agency pays the full premium cost for the employee. On September 18, 1981, Ginger Bailey, an employee in the personnel office of the Department of Natural Resources, typed in the required information on insurance application forms for the various insurance policies available to Petitioner when her Senior Management status became effective on October 1, 1981. Bailey took the application forms to Petitioner, who was too busy at the time to discuss with Bailey the different insurance policies available and the forms themselves. Bailey left the forms with Petitioner. On October 8, 1981, Petitioner went to the personnel office so that Bailey could review with her the insurance benefits available to Senior Management status employees. Bailey explained each available insurance policy to the Petitioner individually and, for each, offered Petitioner an application form already completed by her. Petitioner accepted the offer of State-paid life insurance and disability insurance by signing the application form for such insurance in the acceptance block. When Bailey explained to Petitioner the health insurance, Petitioner commented that she would not need the insurance because her husband's policy was so good. Accordingly, Bailey directed Petitioner's attention to the portion of the application marked in bold letters, "Refusal." Petitioner signed the refusal portion of the application and dated her signature. Bailey struck through the September 18, 1981, date she had previously filled in for Petitioner in the acceptance section of the application. At no time did Bailey or any other agent or employee of the Department of Natural Resources or of the Department of Administration represent or state to Petitioner that she was covered by or was a member of the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan. In June 1982, Petitioner obtained a copy of the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Booklet containing an explanation of benefits effective July 1, 1982. On a sheet of paper, Petitioner typed the name of the Plan, the name and address of the administrator of the Plan, the group number, and the policy number. She taped this slip of paper to the front of the Booklet. During the month of June 1982, Petitioner's husband's 20-year-old daughter was admitted to a hospital. Petitioner showed hospital employees the health insurance explanation Booklet with the information she had placed on the front of it, since she could not "find" her insurance card, and the hospital accepted Petitioner's representations as proof of insurance. Coverage for Petitioner's stepdaughter was no longer available on Petitioner's husband's insurance policy, since she was over 19 years of age. Petitioner submitted a claim form to Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., the administrator of the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan. The claim submitted by Petitioner to the Plan was rejected for lack of coverage. No evidence was presented as to whether a Senior Management Service employee's family members receive free coverage under the State's health insurance plan, and no evidence was presented as to whether Petitioner had any legal or financial responsibility for her adult stepdaughter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's request that she be deemed covered by the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan from and after October 1, 1981, without prejudice to the Petitioner's right to apply, if she desires, for prospective coverage under the Plan in accordance with the Plan's requirements, rules and regulations. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Mary L. Davis Post Office Box 753 Havana, Florida 32333 Kevin X. Crowley, Esquire Department of Natural Resources Douglas Building, Suite 1003 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Administration, enter a final order denying coverage for the orthodontia recommended for Sandra Walsh. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1988.
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement under the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan for $300.00 she spent for chiropractic treatment between 11/16/83 and 01/23/84?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is and has been an employee of the State of Florida for a number of years. In February of 1974, she subscribed to the general group health insurance plan offered by the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan under contract no. 264158282. Blue Cross of Florida Inc. and Blue Shield of Florida Inc. are the designated claims agent/administrator for the general plan and its options/addenda. Petitioner was first treated by Dr. Steven M. Willis, D.C., in January, 1983. She did not initially present to Dr. Willis, a chiropractor, for trauma but for symptoms of chronic sciatica and leg pain. She was treated the remainder of that month for sciatica but did not subscribe to the state group health plan until February 1, 1983. Although her application for chiropractic coverage was not offered or admitted in evidence, Petitioner testified that she answered all questions thereon and Respondent did not affirmatively raise any issues of lack of coverage due to effective date of coverage, or due to addendum changes, or due to concealment or due to fraud and on the basis of Petitioner's exhibits as a whole, I find that she acquired chiropractic coverage during a period of open enrollment and that from February 1, 1983 on, the plan took her as it found her and provided complete chiropractic coverage. In dispute in this cause are a series of chiropractic treatments and charges incurred by the Petitioner with Dr. Willis. Claims for the following dates of treatment were made in the name of a health care provider, Robert G. Hildreth, D.C." Dr. Hildreth made the formal claims upon Petitioner's assignment to the Centerville Road Chiropractic Clinic in which both chiropractors are partners. There is no dispute that the following treatments were rendered by Dr. Willis and properly assigned for payment by Petitioner: 11/16/83 - $20.00 12/21/03 - $6.44 11/22/83 - $20.00 12/29/83 - $20.00 11/28/83 - $20.00 01/03/84 - $20.00 12/05/83 - $20.00 01/06/84 - $20.00 12/09/83 - $20.00 01/13/84 - $20.00 12/14/83 - $20.00 01/17/84 - $20.00 12/19/83 - $20.00 01/19/84 - $20.00 12/21/83 - $20.00 01/23/84 - $20.00 Claims for some or all of these treatments/amounts were submitted by the chiropractors a number of times and rejected by Blue Cross/Blue Shield as the state administrator a number of times. Petitioner conceded at hearing that the 12/21/83 charge in the amount of $6.44 was properly rejected for lack of coverage of supplies costs. The first rejection of some of the other charges was for failure of the doctors' bookkeeper to include the correct diagnosis and procedure codes on the claims forms. This was corrected and resubmitted and thereafter all of the charges for treatment were rejected (either together or piecemeal) for payment upon grounds that 26 visits had already been paid for and that after the maximum number of 26 visits has been paid the state plan pays for no more chiropractic visits. Blue Cross/Blue Shield resumed paying for chiropractic treatment for the chronic back and leg problems on 1/27/84. In light of Blue Cross/Blue Shield's earlier response, Petitioner and Dr. Willis concluded that this must be because a new year was beginning and a new 26 visits would be paid annually. However, Respondent stipulated at hearing, that although private Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance plans may have such a maximum, the state plan has no such 26 visits annual maximum. Petitioner and Dr. Willis questioned Blue Cross/Blue Shield about its 26 visit annual maximum reason for rejection, so Blue Cross/Blue Shield sent a "review sheet" asking Dr. Willis to justify his diagnosis and treatment. His justification was supplied on the review sheet (R-1) dated February 27, 1984. After review, Blue Cross/Blue Shield advised Petitioner and Dr. Willis that payment for these treatments had been determined not to be "medically necessary" by its chiropractic board of review. Petitioner responded with a timely request for Section 120.57(1) hearing. Petitioner eventually paid for the treatments in question out of her own pocket. In support of her position that her treatments (all of which may be generically described as "spine adjustments") are "medically necessary, Petitioner offered the testimony of Dr. Willis, the treating chiropractor. In addition to relating facts, I find Dr. Willis by education, training, and experience is capable of giving expert opinions in the field of chiropractic medicine. Dr. Willis testified that he first saw Petitioner on 1/12/83 for sciatic pain in both legs. After taking a complete history revealing previous orthopedic treatment locally with Dr. Haney and previous podiatric treatment locally with Dr. Merritt, treatment with another doctor in Orlando and with another podiatrist in Texas, Dr. Willis initially diagnosed acute lumbosacral neuralgia and treated Petitioner 3 times per week for 6 weeks. He opined that Petitioner's case was unusual in that Petitioner wanted to remain as athletically active as possible, including but not limited to running 10-50 miles per week and participating in a number of sports. Dr. Willis subsequently revised his diagnosis to make it bilateral sacrilization at the L-5/S-1 vertebrae, anterior gravitational syndrome and hyperimbrication at the L4/L5 vertebrae. Put into laymen's terms, Petitioner's L-4 / L-5 vertebrae do not have full range of motion and this results in Petitioner's low back pain at that level. In Dr. Willis' opinion, due to a congenital abnormality, in Petitioner, her condition is not fully correctable. On 4/5/83, Petitioner came to Dr. Willis with back pain which he diagnosed as the result of a trauma occurring as a result of weight lifting Petitioner had done on 4/4/83, and subsequently she suffered a trauma to the unstable back while windsurfing. On 10/28/83, Petitioner reported pain in the medial aspect of her left foot which Dr. Willis diagnosed as tendonitis. In January, 1984 he referred her to Dr. Merritt, a local podiatrist for a severe left shin/ankle/ metatarsal problem. These various diagnoses, treatments, and referrals, are important to the instant issue involving spine adjustment treatments between 11/16/83 and 01/23/84 for chronic back pain at L-4 through S- 1 because they serve to illustrate diagnosis and treatment differences between trauma situations and continuing treatment for exacerbations of the chronic back and foot/leg problems for which cost of treatment reimbursement is sought. "Apparently, however, there was no problem with payment of any fees charged until 11/16/83 (the twenty-seventh visit in 1983), and clearly payments resumed as soon as the calendar rolled over to 1984. Dr. Willis further diagnosed concluded that there is pedal instability of Petitioner's foot resulting in ankle and shin problems and that these problems in turn create an imbalance; the imbalance in turn causes great wear and tear in the lumbar (low back) region. The low back is again exacerbated by increased periods of activity. During these periods of exacerbation he treats Petitioner's chronic back pain with spine adjustments. There may be long periods between exacerbations when treatments are not necessary. It is for the periods of exacerbation that the treatments in question were administered and for which Petitioner seeks reimbursement. Although Dr. Willis conceded on cross-examination that frequency of treatment in a case like Petitioner's is a matter of chiropractic judgment and also that opinions among health care providers and especially chiropractors may differ as to whether the treatments he has provided to Petitioner are medically necessary or not, he states emphatically that in his professional opinion they are medically necessary. Upon consideration of all the testimony and evidence, I find the treatments between 11/16/83 and 01/23/84 to be remedial as opposed to merely palliative in nature due to the considerable instability of both the back and foot which continued to be exacerbated by Petitioner's particular lifestyle. Both Petitioner and her doctor testified that chiropractic treatment sessions in her case have always included preventive counselling as well as therapeutic treatment. The goal of such counselling is to substitute non-exacerbating or less-exacerbating recreational activities for those Petitioner would otherwise pursue (i.e. weight training and swimming in place of running and wind surfing).
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order finding Petitioner's treatments in question "medically necessary and ordering the plan administrator (Blue Cross/Blue Shield) to reimburse her $300.00 therefor (amount claimed less the admittedly "not covered" $6.44 supplies charge on 12/21/83.). DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Dara Houliston 2308 Notley Court Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner's claim for medical expenses from August 6, 1982 through February 27, 1983 should be approved, pursuant to the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan. Petitioner appeared at the hearing accompanied by legal counsel. The Hearing Officer thereupon explained his rights and procedures to be followed in the administrative hearing. Petitioner acknowledged that he understood his rights and elected to represent himself. Petitioner testified in his own behalf at the hearing and the parties stipulated to the introduction of Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2. A late filed exhibit, Respondent's Exhibit 3, was also admitted in evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of one witness, William R. Seaton, Benefit Analyst for the Respondent's Bureau of Insurance.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Thomas J. Appleyard, III, is a former state employee who retired with disability in 1976 as a result of cardiac disease. At the time Petitioner retired, he maintained coverage in the state Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan under which the Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. serves as the administrator of the plan for the state. Petitioner also receives disability benefits under the Medicare program for medical expenses. (Testimony of Petitioner) The State Group Health Self Insurance Plan provides in Section X, COORDINATION OF BENEFITS, that if an insured has coverage under Medicare, the benefits payable under the state plan will be coordinated with similar benefits paid under the other coverage to the extent that the combination of benefits will not exceed 100 percent of the costs of services and supplies to the insured. Paragraph D of Section X provides that the state plan will be the secondary coverage in such situations and will pay benefits only to the extent that an insured's existing insurance coverage does not entitle him to receive benefits equal to 100 percent of the allowable covered expenses. This provision applies when the claim is on any insured person covered by Medicare. (Testimony of Seaton, Respondent's Exhibit 3) Petitioner was hospitalized at the Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center on three occasions in 1982-33. His Medicare coverage paid all but $261.75 of the hospital expenses. In February 1983, Petitioner also incurred medical expenses to his cardiologist, Dr. J. Galt Allee, in the amount of $248.33. Petitioner was originally denied his remaining hospital expenses by the administrator of the state plan under the erroneous belief that he was receiving regular Medicare benefits for persons over the age of 65. In addition, Dr. Allee's bill was only partially paid by Medicare, subject to the receipt of additional information from the physician. Payment under the state plan was limited to an amount sufficient to reimburse petitioner 100 percent of the amount originally allowed by Medicare. (Testimony of Seaton, petitioner, Respondent's Exhibit 1, 3) Respondent does not receive information on claims filed under the state plan until contacted by an employee. In February 1984, Petitioner requested assistance from William R. Seaton, Benefit Analyst, of Respondent's Bureau of Insurance, regarding his difficulties in receiving proper claims payments. Seaton investigated the matter with the Insurance administrator for the state, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Florida, and discovered that the latter had not coordinated the hospital expense balance with Medicare. They thereafter did so and as of the date of hearing, there was no longer a balance due to Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center. Seaton also gave written instructions to Blue Cross to review all of Petitioner's claims and make sure that they were paid properly, and to install controls on his and his wife's records. (Testimony of Petitioner, Seaton, Respondent's Exhibit 1-2) The full claim of Dr. Allee had not been paid by Medicare since it had been awaiting requested additional in formation from the physician. Such information was provided after a personal visit had been made to Dr. Allee by Seaton and Medicare then recognized additional eligible expenses. However, a balance of $36.00 is still owed to the physician due to the fact that Blue Cross/Blue Shield had not received the necessary payment information from Medicare as of the day before the hearing. (Testimony of Seaton, Respondent's Exhibit 1) Section XVII of the state's Group Health Self Insurance Plan benefit document provides that an employee who wishes to contest decisions of the state administrator considering the employee's coverage under the plan may submit a petition for a hearing for consideration by the Secretary of Administration. (Respondent's Exhibit 3)
The Issue The principal issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement under the State of Florida Group Health Insurance Plan for certain health care expenses she has incurred since she became a State employee and enrolled in the Plan. The Petitioner contends that she is entitled to reimbursement and to attorney's fees. The Respondent contends that the Petitioner is entitled to neither. The central factual dispute is whether the Petitioner's claim for benefits is barred by the provision in the Plan which excludes benefits for pre-existing conditions during the first 365 days of participation in the Plan. At the formal hearing in this case, the Petitioner testified on her own behalf and also presented the testimony of Donald M. Whitley, II, Ph.D. The Respondent presented the testimony of Mr. William Seaton. Both parties offered exhibits. Also, the parties stipulated to the filing of the transcript of the deposition of F. A. Munasifi, M.D., as a late-filed exhibit. Subsequent to the hearing both parties filed proposed recommended orders, which have been carefully considered during the preparation of this recommended order. Specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by both parties are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this recommended order.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Findings based on admissions Petitioner, Terri J. Ganson, (hereinafter "Petitioner" or "Ganson") enrolled in the State of Florida Group Health Insurance Plan (hereinafter "Plan") in January, 1986, and has been validly enrolled as a member in good standing since said date. The pre-existing condition exclusion appears as Subsection VIII.C. of the State Employees Group Self-Insurance Document and provides: For any accident or illness for which an insured received diagnostic treatment or received services within three hundred and sixty-five (365) consecutive days prior to the effective date of coverage, no payment will be allowed for services related to such accident or illness which are received during the three hundred and sixty-five (365) conse- cutive days subsequent to the effective date of coverage; however covered services related to such accident or illness which are received after three hundred and sixty-five (365) consecutive days of coverage are cover- ed by the plan. The Plan, at Subsection I.AE., defines "illness" as follows: "Illness" means physical sickness or disease, pregnancy, bodily injury, congenital anomaly or mental or nervous disorder. Illness for the purposes of this Plan shall entitle an insured to benefits for any medically nece- ssary services related to elective surgical procedures performed by a physician for the purpose of sterilization. By the terms of the Plan, the pre-existing condition paragraph of the Plan applied to claims filed by Petitioner for treatments received during the period from February 1, 1986, until January 31, 1987. Those claims submitted by Petitioner or on Petitioner's behalf for reimbursement under the Plan which were denied on the basis of the pre-existing condition exclusion and which are the subject of this dispute amount to a total of $5,682.15 for services provided by the following providers in the respective amounts shown: a. TMRMC $2,352.65 b. Dr. Shamis $225.50 c. Dr. Munasifi $50.00 d. Biomedical Ref. $50.00 e. Dr. Whitley $3,000.00 The services received by Petitioner for which reimbursement is in dispute were services actually received by Petitioner, Petitioner was charged for such services in the aggregate amounts specified, such services were medically necessary treatments, such services were rendered for the treatment of bipolar disorder, and such services were otherwise covered by the Plan. Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for the amount of the charges for such services, without limitation or exclusion, if said condition for which services were rendered did not constitute a pre-existing condition (i.e., an "accident or illness" for which Petitioner "received diagnostic treatment or received services within three hundred and sixty-five days prior to . . ." her enrollment in the Plan. Findings based on the testimony and the exhibits Prior to her enrollment in the Plan, the Petitioner had been diagnosed as having situational depression, for which she had received treatment prior to her enrollment in the Plan. Part of that treatment occurred within three hundred sixty-five days immediately preceding Petitioner's enrollment in the Plan. Prior to her enrollment in the Plan, the Petitioner had never been diagnosed as having bipolar affective disorder. Prior to her enrollment in the Plan, the Petitioner had never been treated for bipolar affective disorder. Bipolar affective disorder is believed to be caused by a deregulation of the chemical neurotransmitters in the brain. The primary treatment modality for bipolar affective disorder is the administration of lithium carbonate. The administration of lithium carbonate is specific for bipolar affective disorder and the use of lithium carbonate is one of the main differences between treatment for bipolar affective disorder and the type of depression for which Petitioner was treated prior to her enrollment in the Plan. Behavioral therapy may also be of assistance in the treatment of the symptoms of bipolar affective disorder, as it is in the treatment of the symptoms of other conditions which cause depression. Situational depression and bipolar affective disorder are separate and distinct conditions; they are not the same condition. Specifically, the former is not an earlier stage of the latter. The fact that both conditions have certain common symptoms (i.e., periods of depression) does not mean that they are the same condition.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend the entry of a Final Order to the following effect: Reimbursing the Petitioner for her medical expenses in the amounts stipulated to by the parties, namely, $5,682.15; and Denying the Petitioner's claim for attorney's fees in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 87-1654 The following are my specific rulings on all of the findings of the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Findings proposed by Petitioner: Paragraph 1 (including subparts [a] through [f]): Accepted. Paragraphs 2 and 3: Rejected as unnecessary details in light of admitted facts. Paragraphs 4 and 5: Accepted in substance with most details omitted as unnecessary. Paragraph 6: First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as unnecessary details. Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14: Rejected as unnecessary details in light of admitted facts. Paragraphs 15, 16, 17, and 18: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 19: First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 20 and 21: Accepted. Paragraphs 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 29: First sentence accepted in substance. Remainder of this paragraph rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 30, 31 and 32: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 33, 34, and 35: Rejected as unnecessary details in light of admitted facts. Paragraphs 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 47, 48, 49, 50, and 51: Rejected as consti-tuting summaries of argument rather than proposed findings of fact. Findings proposed by Respondent: Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3: Rejected as unnecessary details in light of admitted facts, with exception of proposed finding regarding effective date of coverage. Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Accepted in substance with unnecesary details deleted. Paragraph 8: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 9 and 10: Rejected as unnecessary details in light of the admitted facts and also as not entirely consistent with the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 11: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 12: Accepted in substance as to date of first diagnosis. Rejected insofar as it suggests that Dr. Munasifi "refused" to make a particular statement. Paragraph 13: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 14: Accepted as to nature of diagnosis. The remainder is rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 15: First sentence is accepted. Second sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Third and fourth sentences are rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 16 and 17: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 18: Rejected as irrelevant and as an over- simplification which suggests an inference not warranted by the greater weight of the evidence. Final unnumbered summary paragraph: Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than proposed findings of fact and, in any event, as subordinate and unnecessary details. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth D. Kranz, Esquire Eric B. Tilton, P.A. P. O. Drawer 550 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 =================================================================
The Issue Whether the State of Florida through its Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan is responsible for paying medical expenses incurred by Petitioner's newborn child where Petitioner had only individual coverage in effect at the time of that child's birth?
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida makes available to its employees several group insurance programs. In the area of health insurance, employees may choose to participate in the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan, or they may enroll in a number of different HMOs depending upon the county in which each employee resides. The State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan (hereinafter "the Plan") is a plan of self insurance established by the State, specifically described in a Benefit Document, and administered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield. In addition to the provisions of the Plan embodied in the Benefit Document, the self insurance plan is regulated by those rules contained in Chapter 22K, Florida Administrative Code. If an employee voluntarily chooses to participate in the Plan, the State as the employer contributes to the employee's costs by paying a portion of the premium for each employee. HMOs wishing to capture a portion of the State employee insurance market may participate in bidding procedures whereby the winner(s) can offer insurance to State employees in particular geographical locations. Winning HMOs must comply with many of the rules and provisions involved in the Plan but are still able to establish additional benefits and requirements for coverage. If an employee voluntarily chooses to participate in an HMO insurance program, the State will assist with the employee's costs by contributing to that employee's insurance premium expense. At the time that they commence employment with the State, employees may elect to participate in the Plan, in one of the HMOs approved for that particular geographical location, or may choose to not participate in any of the voluntary insurance programs offered through the State. Thereafter, employees may only join one of the insurance programs or switch between programs during an annual open enrollment period. An employee may purchase individual coverage, insuring only himself or herself, or an employee may purchase family coverage, insuring that employee and one or more of his or her eligible dependents. During an open enrollment period, an employee may switch between individual coverage and family coverage for the following year. Under the State Plan, there is an exception to the restriction that employees may only change coverage and health plans during the open enrollment period. An employee having individual coverage may change to family coverage within 31 days after the date of acquisition of any eligible dependent. In that event, coverage for the eligible dependent does not relate back to the date of acquisition but rather will commence on some future date following the payment of the additional premium required for the additional family coverage. Similarly, an employee with only individual coverage may begin family coverage prior to acquiring eligible dependents and may obtain coverage for those dependents effective on the actual date the dependent is acquired by making application in time for a complete month's premium to be deducted prior to the first day of the month during which the dependent(s) will be acquired. In other words, payment must be made prior to the acquisition of an eligible dependent and the change to family coverage with its increased premium must be made prior to the acquisition of the dependent in order that coverage can be effective as of the date of acquisition. During open enrollment periods, all employees (even those not currently participating in any of the insurance programs offered by the State) are given summary information regarding the various programs in which they are being given an opportunity to participate. Brochures giving summarized comparisons of the Plan and the relevant HMOs are provided to all employees. Employees are advised, if they have questions regarding the Plan, to contact their personnel officer or the Division of State Employees' Insurance. After the employee makes a selection as to which health plan he or she wishes to participate in, if any, the employee will subsequently receive more detailed information about that plan. For example, an employee choosing to participate in the Plan will subsequently receive a copy of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Brochure. The first page of that Brochure specifically advises the employee that the brochure does not include all of the provisions, definitions, benefits, exclusions, and limitations of the Plan. The Brochure specifically advises the employee that it is a summary of the benefits and that any questions the employee might have should be presented to the employee's agency personnel offices or the Office of State Employees' Insurance, and provides that latter office's address and telephone numbers. The Plan itself is a lengthy document which is not distributed to each individual employee but rather is made available to each agency's personnel office for reference by any interested employee. Under the Plan, a woman with individual coverage is entitled to maternity or pregnancy benefits. As part of those benefits, charges for "well baby care," i.e., the charges for the nursery for the baby, are covered under the Plan as part of the maternity benefit of the mother. In well-baby care, charges are not incurred by the baby as a separate patient. On the other hand, if a baby is ill and is admitted to the hospital as a patient in its own right, well-baby care coverage does not apply, and family coverage must be in effect or the infant will be an uninsured individual under the State Plan. The Dade County Public Defender's Office has approximately 265 employees. Faith Quincoses, an Administrative Assistant in that office, began her employment there in 1981 when the office had approximately 165 employees. As the number of office personnel increased, it was determined that someone within that Office should be responsible for employee benefits. That assignment was given to Quincoses, who at the time had duties related to payroll. Quincoses had no training in employee benefits, particularly employee insurance benefits, prior to her assuming responsibility for those duties at the Dade County Public Defender's Office. After she assumed those duties, the Public Defender's Office provided her with no training, and that office did not send her to any of the training sessions regularly conducted by Respondent for employees with and without personnel duties, including those seminars related to employee insurance benefits. When Quincoses would receive informational brochures and memoranda from Respondent regarding employee insurance benefits, she would read them but intentionally did not study them. She did not believe it was her responsibility to assist employees in selecting a particular insurance plan, or in advising employees as to which plan best met that employee's needs, or in answering any specific questions regarding coverage that any employee may have other than routine questions. Although many, if not most, of the informational brochures received from time to time by Quincoses advised employees (including Quincoses) to contact the Division of State Employees' Insurance with any questions regarding benefits and coverage, Quincoses did not contact that office when she had questions about the several insurance plans offered by the State to its employees. She very seldom contacted the Division of State Employees' Insurance to ask questions; rather, she discussed insurance benefits and coverage questions on an almost daily basis with a payroll clerk who worked for the Justice Administrative Commission, an agency belonging to the judicial branch of government with no responsibility or authority for administering the various insurance programs for state employees. Although Quincoses knew that she did not posses a copy of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan and had never read a copy, she made no effort to obtain a copy other than to once request a copy from the payroll clerk she daily contacted at the Justice Administrative Commission. When told by that payroll person that she did not have a copy of the Plan, Quincoses made no further efforts to obtain a copy and never requested a copy from the Division of State Employees' Insurance. Quincoses knew she was not an insurance expert and did not feel the need to become one. She believed that her responsibilities regarding the various insurance programs made available to employees by the State of Florida was to simply disseminate information provided to her, fill out the appropriate forms for payroll deductions, answer routine questions, and refer specific questions to the Division of State Employees' Insurance. She rightfully believed that each employee's decision as to which of the individual plans that employee should select was the employee's responsibility. Petitioner Annemarie Harris is an attorney employed as an Assistant Public Defender by the Dade County Public Defender's Office since October, 1983. As a new employee, she chose to enroll in one of the group health insurance programs approved by the State. She chose to join an approved HMO plan rather than enroll in the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan. Thereafter, and up through December of 1987, each year during the open enrollment period, Petitioner chose to participate in one of the approved HMOs rather than the State's Self Insurance Plan. In December of 1987, the contract between the HMO of which Petitioner was a member and the State of Florida was being terminated, and Petitioner therefore had the option of selecting to participate in one of the other group health insurance programs offered through the State of Florida. In December of 1987, Petitioner was three months pregnant. Her baby was due to be born approximately June 20, 1988. Petitioner was, therefore, very interested in the most extensive coverage which she could obtain for her maternity benefits. Petitioner advised Quincoses that her expected delivery date was June 20, 1988, and that she wished her newborn to be covered by the insurance policy to be selected by Petitioner. Quincoses advised Petitioner that the baby's expenses would be covered if Petitioner added the newborn baby to Petitioner's coverage within 31 days after the date the baby was born. Quincoses did not advise Petitioner that waiting until after the baby's birth would mean that the baby would not be an individual insured until after Petitioner had paid the premium in time for the baby to be added as an insured by the first day of a month subsequent to the baby's birth, since Quincoses did not understand that distinction. The information Quincoses gave Petitioner was wrong and is not contained in any of the written materials describing the Plan which had been transmitted by the State to Quincoses or Petitioner, and is contrary to the information contained in Chapter 22K, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner then conducted her own investigation of which health plan she wished to choose by asking her friends that worked in the Public Defender's Office about their personal experiences. Further, as Petitioner testified at the final hearing in this cause, Petitioner's husband strongly insisted that she choose the State's Self Insurance Plan in which Plan he had previously participated as a State employee and with which he therefore had some familiarity. Petitioner did not contact the Division of State Employees' Insurance regarding her specific questions and specific situation, did not consult the Benefit Document itself and did not--although both she and her husband are attorneys--consult the rules and regulations regarding coverage contained within Chapter 22K, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner voluntarily selected the State's Self Insurance Plan and purchased only individual coverage, insuring herself at a lower premium than family coverage which would have covered the newborn infant as of the date of the baby's birth. It is unknown whether Petitioner relied solely on the advice of Quincoses in choosing to purchase individual coverage rather than family coverage, whether Petitioner relied instead on the advice she obtained from questioning her friends or whether she relied upon her husband's desires, in choosing to participate in the State Plan or in choosing to purchase only individual coverage. Although the basis for Petitioner's decision is unknown, her intentions at the time are clear. She planned to, and took steps to, initiate the paperwork necessary to switch to family coverage and pay the additional premium required early enough so that insurance for the baby would be in place on June 1, 1988, prior to the baby's expected arrival date. During April of 1988, Petitioner caused Quincoses to begin filling out the appropriate forms so that Petitioner would have family coverage in place as of June 1, 1988. Since Quincoses had earlier advised Petitioner that Petitioner could switch to family coverage after the baby's birth (which would make the baby's coverage effective subsequent to the baby's birth) but Petitioner chose instead to attempt to convert to family coverage prior to the baby's birth (which was contrary to Quincoses' advice and would have established coverage immediately upon the baby's birth), it can be reasonably inferred that Petitioner understood that the difference between converting to family coverage prior to the baby's birth rather than subsequent to the baby's birth involved the sole issue of the date on which the baby's coverage would become effective. Although Quincoses initiated the paperwork to have family coverage in place for Petitioner prior to the baby's birth expected to occur on June 20, 1988, Petitioner experienced complications with her pregnancy causing the baby to be delivered prematurely on April 24, 1988, prior to Petitioner signing and processing the paperwork started by Quincoses. Almost immediately after the baby's birth, the baby was transferred from the hospital in which her mother was a patient to another hospital where the baby was admitted as a separate patient. The baby remained in that hospital for some time, incurring medical expenses of approximately $180,000.00. Petitioner's medical expenses were paid by the Plan pursuant to her individual coverage. The baby's medical expenses were submitted to the Plan. Petitioner's claim for payment of the baby's medical expenses was denied for the reason that the baby was admitted to a different hospital than the mother as a separate patient but was not an insured under any insurance policy as of the date of the baby's birth, the date on which the baby commenced incurring her own personal medical expenses. When Petitioner converted her individual coverage to family coverage subsequent to the baby's birth, her claims for payment of the baby's medical expenses incurred subsequent to the date upon which the baby became an insured under the State Plan were denied since they arose from a condition pre-existing the date of commencement of insurance coverage. On April 24, 1988, Petitioner's newborn child was not an insured under the State Plan since Petitioner only had individual coverage on that date.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's claims for payment of medical expenses incurred by Petitioner's newborn baby which are the subject of this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of October, 1989. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO 88-5519 Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 1-4, 7-9, 15-18, 34, 35, 37, 38, and 40-42 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 5, 6, 10-12, 21, and 33 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 13, 14, 39, 44, and 45 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues for determination herein. Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 19 and 22-25 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, argument of counsel, or conclusions of law. Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 20, 26-31, and 43 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration herein. Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact numbered 32 has been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the totality of the evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact numbered 36 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues involved herein. Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 1-5, 7-18, the second 19-24, the first 27, the second 26, the second 27, and 28 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 6, the first 19, 25, and the first 26 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues required to be determined in this proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: James N. Hurley, Esquire William P. Harris, Jr., Esquire Mitchell, Harris, Horr & Associates 2650 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33137-4590 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration Office of the General Counsel 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 A. J. McMullian, III Interim Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 =================================================================
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in the State of Florida's group health insurance plan.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Judy Stahl began her employment with the State of Florida as a public assistance specialist with the Department of Children and Families on October 4, 1991. She began participating in the State's group health insurance program on December 1, 1991. Petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment by the State on November 28, 2002, for personal reasons. In her letter of resignation she stated that it was her intention to again seek employment with the State after the personal situation which caused her to resign was concluded. Premiums for the State's group health insurance are paid one month in advance. Therefore, Petitioner's coverage under the State's group health insurance program continued through the end of December 2002. In January 2003, the State's Division of State Group Insurance notified Petitioner of her right to elect continuation coverage under the federal Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) and the federal Public Health Services Act (PHSA). Petitioner so elected and continued her participation in the State's group health insurance under COBRA for the maximum period of 18 months that was available to her. Her continuation coverage expired June 30, 2004. In May 2004 the State's Division of State Group Insurance notified Petitioner that her continuation coverage would soon expire and further advised her of her right to convert her insurance coverage to a private, individual policy. Petitioner exercised her option to convert to a private policy, effective July 1, 2004. In March 2005 the Florida Division of Retirement sent Petitioner an Estimate of Retirement Benefits. The Estimate contained the comment that: "As a result of a review of accounts for terminated members, it was determined that you are eligible for retirement benefits." The Estimate form was accompanied by a pamphlet explaining the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan. It was also accompanied by information on the State Employees' Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) health plan. The retirement pamphlet included the information that health insurance was available to retirees; however, the health insurance information advised that health insurance was only available to certain retirees. Petitioner concluded that if she retired, she could obtain cheaper health insurance from the State than from her private provider. This was the first time that Petitioner considered the possibility of retirement. Petitioner thereafter made many telephone calls to the Department of Children and Families, to the Division of Retirement, to the Division of State Group Insurance, and to People First, inquiring about retirement and insurance. These telephone inquiries were the first time she mentioned to any State employee or representative that she was interested in retiring. At the end of March 2005 she made the decision to retire and submitted her application for retirement benefits. Her effective retirement date was April 1, 2005. At the time Petitioner filed her application for retirement, she was no longer participating in the State's group health insurance program. At the time she filed her application for retirement, she was no longer participating in continuation coverage pursuant to COBRA. She was insured under a private policy. At the time of her initial enrollment in the State group health insurance program, Petitioner signed a new enrollee form that, inter alia, advised her that eligibility and enrollment were governed by the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 22K-l. During her employment she also enrolled in supplemental dental insurance. That enrollment application form notified Petitioner that any changes in enrollment or coverage are governed by the federal Internal Revenue Code and the Florida Administrative Code. Throughout her employment and at the time that she terminated her employment, she completed Annual Benefits Open Enrollment forms, which also notified her that any changes in enrollment or coverage are governed by the Internal Revenue Code and the Florida Administrative Code. While employed by the Department of Children and Families, Petitioner was provided with copies of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Booklet and Benefit Document. Those booklets describe eligibility for participation to include employees, certain retirees, and COBRA participants. They also describe termination of coverage due to termination of employment and describe continuation coverage and conversion coverage. At the time Petitioner retired, she was not a State employee; she was a former State employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner is not eligible to participate in the State's group health insurance program. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark J. Berkowitz, Esquire Mark J. Berkowitz, P.A. 524 South Andrews Avenue, Suite 200N Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Sonja P. Matthews, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Tom Lewis, Jr., Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
