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CITY OF SUNRISE vs INDIAN TRACE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT AND SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 91-006036 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Sep. 23, 1991 Number: 91-006036 Latest Update: Dec. 13, 1991
Florida Laws (4) 120.57373.019373.219373.223 Florida Administrative Code (1) 40E-2.301
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FLORIDA AUDUBON SOCIETY, FLORIDA KEYS AUDUBON SOCIETY, AND UPPER KEYS CITIZENS ASSOCIATION vs WILLIAM R. CULLEN AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 89-003779 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Key Largo, Florida Jul. 14, 1989 Number: 89-003779 Latest Update: Aug. 22, 1990

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Department of Environmental Regulation (Department) should grant a dredge and fill permit which has been requested by the Respondent, William R. Cullen (Applicant). That proposed permit has been opposed by the Petitioners (who will be referred to collectively as Petitioners for convenience sake).

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency authorized to issue permits pursuant to Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. The Respondent, William R. Cullen, filed an application for a dredge and fill permit to construct a slip marina on June 4, 1985. The original request was subsequently amended to seek approval for a forty-two slip commercial marina. The project site for the Applicant's marina is located at Key Largo, Monroe County, Florida. The site is within Buttonwood Sound, Florida Bay. The property is owned by Mr. Cullen and his family. All of the proposed improvements will be constructed on submerged lands or uplands owned or controlled by the Cullen family. The project site is located within a commercial area of Key Largo and contains frontage on both the water, Buttonwood Sound, and the highway, U.S. Highway 1. The project site has a basin which was created by the excavation of materials used for road construction from the shoreline and the installation of an L-shaped rock jetty which runs roughly perpendicular and then parallel to the shoreline. This jetty was installed during the late 1960s. The water depths within the basin range from 3 feet to approximately 14 feet. The water within the basin is subject to the same tidal considerations as the waters within Buttonwood Sound. There is no interruption of the flow of water in and out of the basin from those waters of the Sound. The water within this basin is within an Outstanding Florida Water as defined in Rule 17-3.041, Florida Administrative Code. The Applicant's plan calls for the excavation of appproximately 30,170 square feet of upland area and the dredging of the existing basin for approximately 18,460 dredged square feet. During the construction phases, the Applicant proposes to install turbidity curtains to limit the adverse effects expected during that time. The improvements are intended to be a permanent alteration to the basin design and will permanently modify the marine life habitat within that basin. The Applicant proposes to remove portions of the existing jetty to allow additional water to flow through the basin unimpeded by the jetty walls. The removal of the jetty walls will expedite the dilution and flushing of potential pollutants from the basin on a tidal frequency. That flushing is purported to assure that the water quality within the basin will not be diminished. However, such pollutants will be flushed into Buttonwood Sound. Stormwater accumulating on the upland project is to flow toward a lower upland area and should not to be dumped into the basin. The proposed marina is to have fueling facilities and the Applicant has agreed to design that system to limit inadvertent spillage. Further, as a condition of the permit, the Applicant has agreed to abide by the Department of Natural Resources' spill contingency plan requirements. The proposed marina is designed to provide portable sewage pumpout facilities for each slip. A permanent pumpout facilities will also be available. The Applicant seeks to attract boats in the range of 30 to 50 feet in length at this facility. While there are a number of other marinas in other areas of Key Largo which might accomodate that size boat, the marinas in the immediate vicinity of this project site are designed for smaller craft. The area within the basin consists of unvegetated bottom, submerged rip-rap, sea grasses, and hardbottom/algae communities--the predominant classifications being the latter two. The deeper hardbottom areas are to be filled and portions of the sea grasses will be dredged in order to configure the proposed docks. Additionally, other sea grass areas will be shaded, and thereby disturbed, by the construction of the docks. There are no historical or archaeological features relevant to the proposed site. The area has not been designated as a critical manatee area, however, manatees do frequent the project vicinity and have been observed feeding immediately adjacent to the basin. The permit proposed for this project requires a water quality monitoring plan. In addition to sampling for coliform, diesel by-products, oils, greases, detergents, oxygen, copper, lead and zinc, the plan requires sampling for aluminum, cadmium, and chromium. The monitoring stations are to be located both within the basin (2 stations) and outside the basin (2 stations). Liveaboards or others continuously docked at the marina will create additional shading which will disrupt and adversely affect the sea grass system. In order to provide access to the marina, the Applicant intends to dredge a channel in an area containing sea grass which is undisputedly within the Outstanding Florida Waters. The Department deemed the subject application was complete on February 23, 1988. The Department did not apply the Keys Rule found in Rule 17-312.400, Florida Administrative Code, to this project. The Department also did not apply the Mitigation Rule found in Rule 17-312.300, Florida Administrative Code, to this project. Michael Dentzau has personally reviewed and processed 250-300 dredge and fill permits during his tenure with the Department. Of those projects he has reviewed, he has not recommended that dense sea grass beds of the type located within this project site be dredged in order to construct a commercial marina. Phillip Edwards was responsible for executing the Intent to Issue in this case. In determining that this project had provided reasonable assurances that water quality standards will not be violated, Mr. Edwards weighed the public interests criteria set forth in Section 403.918, Florida Statutes. Because he received letters purportedly from elected officials, Mr. Edwards presumed that the project was in the public interest. That assumption of fact has not been established by this record. According to Mr. Edwards, the adverse effects expected by this project could be adequately addressed by the permit conditions when weighed against the public interest in favor of the project. Since Mr. Edwards' assumptions as to the public interest in this project have not been established, his conclusion regarding the weight that interest should receive can be given little consideration. The project as proposed by the Applicant will not adversely affect navigation or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The project as proposed by the Applicant will adversely affect fishing or marine productivity within the basin since it will permanently alter the basin biologically by destroying sea grass. The increased boat traffic within the Sound will also detract from the present recreational uses enjoyed by area residents. According to Mr. Edwards, it is very unusual for the Department to issue a permit when sea grasses will be adversely affected. In the 17 years in which he has reviewed permits, only two occasions merited approval when the destruction of sea grasses to the extent in this case would result. Neither of those cases were factually similar to the case at issue. In those cases, however, elected officials advised Mr. Edwards, as he presumed they had here, that there was a public need for the permit. Increased boat traffic will result in increased manatee mortality due to collisions. In order to assure water quality will not be degraded within a marina, the project should have a short flushing time comparable to healthy natural embayments. In this case, the flushing proposed by the Applicant is dependent, in part, on winds which may be inconsistent or relatively minimal during the summer months.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a final order denying the permit requested by the Applicant. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO CASE NOS. 89-3779 et seq. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY PETITIONERS: The first three sentences of paragraph 1 are accepted; the remainder is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 2 is accepted. Paragraph 3 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 4, it is accepted that the Department deemed the application complete on February 23, 1988; otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as argument. With regard to paragraph 5, it is accepted that the habitat within the basin is the same as the habitat throughout Florida Bay and that the basin is not "enclosed" hydrologically; otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as argument or comment. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 are rejected as argument, conclusions of law, or comment. The paragraphs do not recite facts pertinent to this case. Paragraphs 13, 14, and the first two sentences of paragraph 15 are accepted. The remainder of paragraph IS is rejected as argument. The first two sentences of paragraph 16 are accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as comment or argument. Paragraph 17 is accepted. Paragraph 18 is rejected as argument. To the extent that paragraph 19 accurately describes Van de Kreeke's assessment of the report it is accepted; otherwise rejected as irrelevant, comment, argument, recitation of testimony or unsupported by the record. The report upon which comment is directed was not offered in this cause to prove its truth/accuracy. Paragraphs 20 through 22 are rejected as comment, argument, recitation of testimony or unsupported by the record-- see comment to paragraph 19 above. Paragraphs 23 through 26 are accepted. Paragraphs 27 and 28 are rejected as argument, comment, or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 29 and 30 are accepted. Paragraph 31 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 32 and 33 are accepted. Paragraph 34 is rejected as hearsay, irrelevant, or argument. Paragraph 35 is rejected as comment or argument. Paragraph 36 is accepted. Paragraphs 37 through 40 are rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 41 through 43 are accepted. Paragraph 44 is rejected as contrary to the record. Paragraph 45 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 46 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 47 is accepted but is comment. Paragraphs 48 and 49 are accepted. Paragraph 50 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraph 51 is rejected as argument or conclusions of law. The first three sentences of paragraph 52 are accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as argument. The first sentence and that portion of the second sentence of paragraph 53 that ends with the word "authenticity" is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as argument or conclusions of law. Paragraphs 54 and 55 are accepted. Paragraph 56 is rejected as irrelevant or hearsay. Paragraph 57 is rejected as hearsay. Paragraph 58 is rejected as argument, comment, or irrelevant. Paragraphs 59 through 66 are accepted. Paragraph 67 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 68 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 69 and 70 are accepted. Paragraph 71 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraph 72 is rejected as argument. The first sentence of paragraph 73 is accepted; the remainder is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 74 is accepted. Paragraphs 75 through 77 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 78 and 79 are accepted. Paragraph 80 is rejected as repetitive. With the inclusion of the words "and hardbottom and algae" paragraph 81 is accepted. Paragraph 82 is accepted. Paragraph 83 is accepted. Paragraph 84 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. 5l. Paragraphs 85 through 89 are accepted. With the substitution of the word "not" for the word "ever" in the last sentence of paragraph 90, it is accepted. Paragraphs 91 through 94 are accepted. Paragraph 95 is rejected as not supported by the record or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 96 through 100 are accepted. Paragraph 101 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraphs 102 through 106 are rejected as argument, comment, or irrelevant. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraph 1 is accepted. Paragraph 2 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The waters within the basin are of the same origin as they were prior to the creation of the jetty; no artificial body of water was created. With regard to paragraph 3 it is accepted that the jetty was constructed in the late 1960s. Paragraph 4 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 5 it is accepted that that is the applicants proposal no conclusion as to the likelihood of that is reached. Paragraph 5 is accepted. Paragraph 6 is accepted. Inevitably, however, spills will occur and must be considered as an adverse affect of the project. Paragraph 7 is accepted. Paragraph 8 is rejected as unsupported by competent evidence or contrary to the weight of the evidence presented. Paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraph 11 is accepted but is inadequate to offset the adverse affects to manatees. Paragraph 12 is accepted but is inadequate to limit the adverse affects to sea grass. Paragraph 13 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 14 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 15 is accepted. Paragraph 16 is accepted. Paragraphs 17 and 18 are accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE APPLICANT: Paragraphs 1 through the first sentence of paragraph 6 are accepted. The second sentence of paragraph 6 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 7 through Il are accepted. Paragraph 12 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 13 through the first sentence of paragraph 17 are accepted. The remainder of paragraph 17 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraph 19 is rejected as unsupported by the record or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 20 is accepted. Paragraphs 21 through 26 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 27 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or unsupported by competent evidence. The first sentence of paragraph 28 is accepted, the remainder rejected as speculative, comment, or unsupported by the record. The first sentence of paragraph 29 is accepted, the remainder rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 30 is accepted. Paragraph 31 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 32 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 33 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 34 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 35 is accepted; however, sea grasses not disturbed by dredging will still suffer adverse affects from shading and silting. Paragraph 36 is accepted but see comment to paragraph 35 above. Paragraph 37 is accepted. Paragraph 38 is accepted. Paragraph 39 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 40 is accepted. Paragraph 41 is accepted. Paragraph 42 is accepted. Paragraph 43 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 44 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 45 is accepted but it should be noted that is not the extent of the proposal. Paragraph 46 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 47 is accepted. Paragraph 48 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 49 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Pamela Presnell Garvin Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Charles Lee Florida Audubon Society 1101 Audubon Way Maitland, Florida 32751 Robert Routa P.O. Box 6506 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6506 Linda McMullen McFARLAIN, STERNSTEIN, WILEY & CASSEDY, P.A. 600 First Florida Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.68267.061
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HELICOPTER APPLICATORS, INC. vs COASTAL AIR SERVICE, INC., AND SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 18-004498BID (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Aug. 28, 2018 Number: 18-004498BID Latest Update: Dec. 14, 2018

The Issue Whether the South Florida Water Management District’s (“District”) intended award of a contract for aerial spraying services, granular application services, and aerial transport services, to Coastal Air Services, Inc. (“Coastal”), is contrary to the District’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or the bid specifications; and, if so, whether the decision was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.

Findings Of Fact The Parties The District is an independent taxing authority created pursuant to section 373.069, Florida Statutes, with the authority to contract with private entities to maintain real property controlled by the District. See § 373.1401, Fla. Stat. HAI is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 1090 Airglades Boulevard in Clewiston, Florida. Coastal is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 7424 Coastal Drive in Panama City, Florida. The RFB On February 7, 2018, the District issued the RFB, soliciting bids for qualified respondents to provide the following: [F]urnish all labor, equipment, perform data entry and perform all operations for spraying of aquatic, ditchbank and invasive vegetation by helicopter and provide aerial flight services for site inspection and plant surveys. Both HAI and Coastal submitted timely bids, which the District deemed responsive and responsible under the terms of the RFB. The District deemed Coastal the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for aerial spraying, granular application, and aerial transport services. The District deemed HAI the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for spot spraying services. On May 11, 2018, the District posted its Notice of Intent to Award the respective contracts to Coastal and HAI. HAI challenges the award to Coastal because it is not a responsible bidder under the terms of the RFB. HAI’s challenge focuses on two items required to document the bidder’s responsibility to perform the requested services. First, the RFB requires the bidder to provide at least two helicopters certified pursuant to 14 CFR Part 133, Rotocraft External-Load Operations; and 14 CFR Part 137, Agricultural Aircraft Operations (Part 137 Certificate). Second, the RFB requires the bidder to demonstrate its ability to obtain required insurance coverage. Part 137 Certificate HAI contends that Coastal’s bid does not meet the responsibility provisions of the RFB because it did not include sufficient Part 137 Certificates for its subcontractor, HMC Helicopters (“HMC”). HAI contends the Part 137 Certificates are required to expressly state that aircraft are certified to dispense economic poisons. Petitioner’s argument fails for three reasons. First, the RFB does not require the bidder’s Part 137 Certificate to expressly endorse aircraft to dispense economic poisons.3/ Second, assuming the express endorsement was required, the requirement does not apply to HMC. The RFB defines the term “Bidder” and “Respondent” as “[a]ll contractors, consultants, organizations, firms or other entities submitting a Response to this RFB as a prime contractor.” (emphasis added). In its bid, Coastal is listed as the prime contractor, and HMC as a subcontractor. The RFB requires each Respondent to list at least two aircraft which are Part 133 and 137 certified. The requirement applies to Coastal as the primary contractor, not to its subcontractor. Coastal’s bid listed five aircraft with both Part 133 and 137 Certificates, actually exceeding the requirement for two such certified aircraft. Third, assuming an express endorsement for dispensing economic poisons was required, and that the requirement applied to HMC, HMC’s Part 137 Certificate documents HMC’s authority to dispense economic poisons. Pursuant to 14 CFR 137.3, “Agricultural aircraft operation” is defined as follows: [T]he operation of an aircraft for the purpose of (1) dispensing any economic poison, (2) dispensing any other substance intended for plant nourishment, soil treatment, propagation of plant life, or pest control, or (3) engaging in dispending activities directly affecting agriculture, horticulture, or forest preservation, but not including the dispensing of live insects. To obtain a Part 137 Certificate, the operator must pass a knowledge and skills test, which includes the safe handling of economic poisons and disposal of used containers for those poisons; the general effects of those poisons on plants, animals, and persons and precautions to be observed in using those poisons; as well as the primary symptoms of poisoning in persons, appropriate emergency measures in the case of poisoning, and the location of poison control centers. See 14 CFR § 137.19. However, if the operator applies for a Part 137 Certificate which prohibits dispensing of economic poisons, the applicant is not required to demonstrate the knowledge and skills listed above. See Id. HMCs’ certificates do not contain an express prohibition against dispensing economic poisons. The authorization for HMC’s aircraft to dispense economic poisons is inherent in its Part 137 Certificate. Coastal’s bid meets the solicitation requirement for at least two aircraft with Part 137 Certificates. Insurance Requirements The RFB requires each Respondent to “provide evidence of the ability to obtain appropriate insurance coverage.” Respondents may meet the insurability requirement by having their insurance agent either (1) complete and sign an insurance certificate which meets all of the requirements of Exhibit H to the RFB; or (2) issue a letter on the insurance agency’s letterhead stating that the Respondent qualifies for the required insurance coverage levels and that an insurance certificate meeting the District’s requirements will be submitted prior to the execution of the contract. In response to this requirement, Coastal submitted a letter from Sterlingrisk Aviation, dated March 6, 2018, stating, “All required coverage amounts are available to Coastal Air Service, Inc. to fulfill the requirements of this contract.” In the Re: line, the letter refers to the specific RFB at issue in this case. Coastal also submitted a certificate of insurance from Sterlingrisk Aviation demonstrating the levels of insurance coverage in effect at the time the bid was submitted, although the coverages are less than the amounts required under the RFB.4/ HAI takes issue with Coastal’s evidence of ability to obtain the required coverage because the letter from Sterlingrisk does not state “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Based on the totality of the evidence, the undersigned infers that Sterlingrisk’s letter omits the language that a certificate “will be provided” prior to contract execution, because Sterlingrisk will issue an insurance certificate only when Coastal applies, and pays the premium, for the increased coverage limitations. The letter from Sterlingrisk substantially complies with the insurance requirements of the RFB, and constitutes competent, substantial evidence of Coastal’s ability to obtain the required insurance coverage. HAI introduced no evidence that Coastal obtained an economic advantage over HAI by failing to include language from its insurance agent that “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Instead, HAI argued that by failing to enforce that provision of the RFB, the District cannot ensure the winning bidder will be responsible to undertake the contract. HAI argued that the District’s failure to adhere to this RFB requirement may create inefficiencies that “would result in the event that Coastal were unable to obtain the required insurance coverage” before execution of the contract. Coastal’s bid documents its eligibility for insurance coverage in the amounts required by the RFB. If Coastal does not provide said certificates, it will not be qualified for final execution or issuance of the contract.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order dismissing Helicopter Applicator, Inc.’s Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2018.

CFR (4) 14 CFR 13314 CFR 13714 CFR 137.1914 CFR 137.3 Florida Laws (10) 120.56120.569120.57120.573120.60120.68373.069373.119373.1401373.427 Florida Administrative Code (3) 28-106.11128-106.20128-106.301
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EVERGLADES SURVEYING JOINT VENTURE vs SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 02-001610 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Apr. 18, 2002 Number: 02-001610 Latest Update: Oct. 22, 2002

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for certification as a minority business enterprise should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this licensing dispute, Respondent, South Florida Water Management District (District), has proposed to deny an application of Petitioner, Everglades Surveying Joint Venture (Everglades), for certification as a minority business enterprise (MBE) under the District's Supplier Diversity & Outreach Program (Program). If the application is approved, Petitioner would be listed on the District's contract solicitation and vendor lists as a minority contractor. In its proposed agency action, as later amended, the District contends that the application should be denied because: the minority owner fails to meet the criteria in Rule 40E-7.653(5) and (6), Florida Administrative Code; the documents provided by Petitioner "do not support that the day- to-day operations are controlled by the minority applicant, nor is there evidence that the minority applicant possesses the authority to direct the management and policy of the business"; the minority business does not meet the size standard of a small business as required by Section 288.703, Florida Statutes; and the minority owner does not possess the necessary license to qualify the firm in its area of specialty as required by Rule 40E-7.653(5), Florida Administrative Code. In simpler terms, the District has contended that Petitioner's application is deficient in the areas of "management and control, the size standards[,] and the licensure." Petitioner disputes these allegations and contends that it meets all criteria for certification. As to the remaining requirements for certification in Rule 40E-7.653(4), (7), (8), and (9), Florida Administrative Code, the parties have stipulated that all of these criteria have been satisfied. The Minority Owner's Corporate Structure Ray J. Berryman, an Asian-Pacific American, is the minority owner seeking certification. Mr. Berryman is a professional engineer who has been in the engineering and surveying business for almost forty years. After working with other engineering firms for over a decade, in 1975 he started his own firm in California. At that time, the firm was known as Berryman & Stevenson, but its name was later changed to BSI Consultants, and then to Berryman & Henigar, Inc. The firm provides civil engineering and surveying services to public agencies on the West Coast. In 1994, Mr. Berryman acquired a Florida corporation known as Henigar & Ray, Inc., which was engaged in the business of providing surveying and civil engineering services. Although the company initially operated under the name of Henigar & Ray, Inc., doing business as Berryman & Henigar, in 1998 Mr. Berryman changed its name to Berryman & Henigar, Inc. (BHI), the same name as the California corporation. Mr. Berryman serves as director, chief executive officer, and operating manager of BHI. The firm's headquarters are in Orlando, and it has branch offices in Jacksonville, Tallahassee, Tampa, Ocala, and West Palm Beach. In March 1994, Mr. Berryman formed a Nevada holding company known as Berryman & Henigar Enterprises (BHE), in which he owns 77.5 percent of the stock and serves as chairman of the board and chief executive officer. BHE owns all of the stock in Berryman & Henigar, Inc. (the California corporation); Berryman & Henigar, Inc. (the Florida corporation); Employment Systems, Inc., a "staff easing company" incorporated in California in 1992; BHE Technical Staffing, a Nevada corporation; and Therapy Network, a Nevada corporation. However, BHE Technical Staffing and Therapy Network are no longer in business. Consolidated financial statements are issued for all of the companies. BHE was formed for the purpose of serving as a vehicle "to allow a relationship to exist" between the Florida and California corporations. After BHE was formed, Mr. Berryman changed the name of both the Florida and California firms (Henigar & Ray, Inc., and BSI Consultants, respectively) to Berryman & Henigar, Inc., one a Florida corporation, the other a California corporation, so that he could have "the strength, if you will, of both companies with a similar name." Except for a few administrative personnel, BHE has no other employees and it performs no professional services. Besides being the owner of BHE and the wholly-owned subsidiaries named above, Mr. Berryman also is a majority owner of at least one affiliated company known as GovPartner, a California firm providing "e-Government solutions for cities, courts, and governmental agencies." Whether Mr. Berryman controls other affiliated companies was not disclosed at hearing. Other MBE Certifications In June 1996, or before the District had a rule on MBE certifications, Henigar & Ray, Inc., doing business as Berryman & Henigar, applied with the District for certification as a MBE to provide civil engineering, surveying, environmental sciences, and construction management services. The application was approved, and a one-year certification was issued. The District then changed from a one-year to a three-year certification, and after an application for recertification was filed in 1997, Henigar & Ray, Inc., was reissued a certification that expired in 2000. By then, the District had adopted a rule which required, among other things, that the minority owner have a professional license in all fields in which the certification was granted. Through what the District calls an "error" or oversight, it failed to note that Mr. Berryman did not hold a professional surveyor's license, and it erroneously continued to certify BHI in the area of surveying. On August 26, 1999, the firm was given "graduated" status, which meant that it was no longer eligible for continued participation in the District's Program as a prime contractor due to the business having a net worth of more than $3 million and/or an average net income of $2 million after federal taxes for the preceding two years. However, the firm could still be counted (as a subcontractor) towards a prime contractor's goal attainment. In November 2000, the firm, then known as BHI, again applied for recertification as a registered vendor. The application was approved on March 1, 2001, for another three-year period, this time in the areas of surveying, civil engineering, and construction management. Whether BHI is still in the graduated status is not known. Besides holding MBE status with the District, BHI has been certified as a MBE with several local governments in Florida, including the City of Tampa, City of Orlando, Tampa Port Authority, and Orange County. Copies of BHI's applications filed with those governmental entities have been made a part of this record. The Joint Venture As an Asian-Pacific American, Mr. Berryman qualifies for minority status. Although not disclosed by the parties, but presumably because BHI has graduated status, and cannot serve as a prime contractor, or because its certification as a MBE in surveying may be taken away, Mr. Berryman desires to become a District MBE through another legal entity and provide surveying services as a prime contractor on the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Project (CERP) now being undertaken by the District. Before filing his application, Mr. Berryman considered three options: filing as a corporation, a partnership, or a joint venture. He chose a joint venture since it gives the entity "the ability to have control outside of a corporate board." According to Mr. Berryman, even though the joint venture is theoretically controlled by a control board, under the make-up of the venture established here, that board can only represent "what Berryman & Henigar, Inc. commands and requires it to represent." Mr. Berryman also desired to have other members in the joint venture who would "provide a unique geographical location for projects being performed by [CERP]," and thus enhance its "probability of obtaining work through the District as a minority." To this end, Everglades was formed as a joint venture pursuant to a Joint Venture Agreement (Agreement) executed on October 12, 2001. So that Everglades would have a "formidable surveying company that would be able to win work," its members included BHI; GCY, Inc. (GCY), a Florida corporation providing surveying services; Jeffrey C. Cooner and Associates, Inc. (Cooner), a Florida corporation providing surveying services; and Southern Mapping Technology, Inc. (Southern Mapping), a Florida surveying corporation. According to the Agreement, the ownership of the joint venture is as follows: BHI - 51 percent GCY - 16.33 percent Cooner - 16.33 percent Southern Mapping - 16.33 percent Mr. Berryman opted for BHI to have 51 percent ownership in the joint venture so that he would control the entity. At the same time, however, he desired to give the other participants as much ownership as possible without giving up control. The Agreement establishes a Board of Control (Board) which has the responsibility and authority for the conduct and management of Everglades to approve and execute contracts, formulate and determine the policies of Everglades, approve consultants and subcontractor agreements, approve budgets and schedules, determine the allocation of work among members of Everglades, and decide all other matters necessary to its operations. After the joint venture's formation, five individuals were appointed to the Board: Mark A. Stokes and Steve Sharpe, both BHI employees appointed by Mr. Berryman; George C. Young, Jr., of GCY; Jeffrey C. Cooner of Cooner; and James S. Richmond of Southern Mapping. All members of the Board are non-minorities. In response to the District's proposed denial of the application, in May or June 2002, or six or seven months after it was filed, Mr. Berryman assumed a seat on the Board, replacing Mr. Sharpe.1 However, because of a District policy that no amendments to an application will be considered after the application is filed, the District has not taken into account this change in the Board's membership. Petitioner has not challenged the use of that policy. Paragraph 4.3 of the Agreement provides that the Board "shall reach decisions by simple majority vote of total votes cast. BHI shall cast 51 votes; GCY shall cast 16 votes; Cooner shall cast 16 votes; and Southern Mapping shall cast 16 votes." Thus, BHI has ultimate control over all of Everglades' decisions. At the same time, however, there is nothing in the Agreement which says that the Board must consult with Mr. Berryman, and obtain his approval, before a decision is taken. Rule 40E-7.653(5) Criteria Paragraph (5) of the rule requires, among other things, that the applicant establish that the minority owner "possess[es] the authority to control and exercise dominant control over the management and daily operations of the business." The District contends that Mr. Berryman does not exercise such control since he does not sit on the Board, Mr. Stokes and Mr. Sharpe, both non-minorities, are the individuals who actually cast votes on behalf of BHI, and nothing in the Agreement requires Mr. Stokes and Mr. Sharpe to consult with Mr. Berryman before they make a decision. In reality, Mr. Berryman has absolute control over all of the decisions made by Mr. Stokes, who occupies one of the two BHI seats on the Board. This was confirmed by Mr. Stokes at the hearing and was not contradicted. Even if Mr. Sharpe (who has been replaced by Mr. Berryman) were still on the Board, he would be subject to the same constraints. This is because Mr. Berryman has made it clear that he would quickly replace any BHI Board member who did not vote in accordance with his wishes. Since BHI (and Mr. Berryman) effectively controls the joint venture through 51 percent of the Board's voting power, it is found that the minority owner exercises dominant control over the management and daily operations of the joint venture, as contemplated by the rule. Rule 40E-7.653(6) Criteria Subparagraphs (6)(c) and (d) of the rule require that the applicant establish that "the net worth of the business concern, together with its affiliates, does not exceed five (5) million [dollars]," and that it "employs two- hundred (200) or fewer permanent, full-time employees," respectively. In determining the net worth, the same rule provides that the District shall "consider the most recent federal tax returns or annual financial statements for the business." After concerns were raised by the District over BHI's net worth and number of permanent employees, BHI filed a letter with the District on April 2, 2002, indicating that it had 118 full-time employees and a negative net worth of $1,460,176.00. On June 6, 2002, its counsel also filed an affidavit by BHE's Controller, together with consolidated financial reports for the year ending March 29, 2002, reflecting a negative net worth of $1,293,435 for BHE and all of its subsidiaries, including BHI. Counsel also provided an affidavit by the BHE Benefits Coordinator listing 96 full-time BHI employees as of May 17, 2002. In separate documents submitted earlier by the other joint venture participants, the net worth and number of permanent, full-time employees of each of those participants were as follows: GCY - $553,000.00 and 25 employees as of November 30, 2001; Cooner - $300,000.00 and 8 employees as of December 31, 2001; and Southern Mapping - $527,000.00 and 6 employees as of December 31, 2001. While the fiscal years of the participants are not identical, collectively these figures produce a total positive net worth of all Everglades members (including BHE, the parent of BHI) of $86,565.00 and less than 200 full-time employees at or about the date the application was filed. Despite this showing by Everglades that it met the net worth and size thresholds for a MBE, over the past two years BHI has made a number of filings with the District and other governmental entities which caused the District to doubt the veracity of the numbers submitted by Everglades and to ultimately deny the application. For example, in its application for recertification filed with the District in November 2000, BHI reflected that it then had a positive net worth of $1,013,790.00 and 305 full-time employees. In a Statement of Intent to Perform as a MBE Subcontractor dated October 23, 2001, BHI indicated that its net worth was $1,012,979.00 and that it employed 102 permanent employees. Almost identical numbers were shown in other filings made with the District on November 1, 2001, April 18, 2002, May 24, 2002, and May 31, 2002. However, in a Statement of Intent to Perform as a MBE Subcontractor executed by a BHI corporate officer (Mr. Stokes) on June 18, 2002, and filed with the District, the net worth of BHI was shown as $4,106,000.00 and the number of permanent, full-time employees was given as 350. Assuming these latter figures are accurate, Everglades would have a total net worth exceeding $5 million and more than 200 full-time, permanent employees, both of which exceed the thresholds permitted by the rule. In addition, on April 3, 2000, BHI filed certification documents with Orange County reflecting that it had 305 full-time employees and a positive net worth of $123,415.00. Identical figures were reflected in a filing made with the City of Tampa on April 3, 2002. In contrast, in a MBE certification filing made with the City of Orlando on May 20, 2002, which included net worth and number of employees for the latest three-year period, BHI represented that it had 97 employees in the years 2000, 2001, and 2002, and that its net worth for those years was a negative $898,676.00, a negative $1,376,645.00, and a negative $1,586,216.00, respectively. To add to the confusion, in an undated document filed with the City of Tampa, BHI indicated that it had 345 full-time employees and 35 part-time employees. However, in a June 12, 2002, filing with the Tampa Port Authority, BHI indicated that it had 116 full-time employees and a negative net worth of $1,586,216.00. Mr. Berryman conceded that the different filings were "embarrassing" and confusing, and he attributed them to mistakes by careless or untrained in-house personnel. As to the document reflecting a net worth of BHI in excess of $4 million, it was established that a secretary erroneously filled out the document and Mr. Stokes hurriedly signed it without verifying the numbers. Mr. Berryman also maintained that the numbers submitted by BHI to the District in the April 2, 2002, letter, as supported by the financial reports and affidavits filed on June 6, 2002, are the most accurate reflection of its net worth and number of employees. This assertion is accepted since all of the filings over the years (except the one on June 18, 2002) have consistently indicated that the net worth of BHI is far less than the $5 million threshold. Moreover, the more credible evidence supports a finding that the number of permanent, full-time employees of BHI and the other joint venture participants is less than 200. Based on these considerations, it is found that Everglades meets the net worth and employee thresholds prescribed by the rule. Professional Licensure Requirement Rule 40E-7.653(5), Florida Administrative Code, requires that the minority owner (Mr. Berryman) seeking certification "be the license holder, or the professional license holder" in the specialty for which certification is sought. Here, Everglades seeks to provide surveying services. The application filed with the District identified five BHI individuals who had professional surveying licenses which authorized the work, all non-minorities. Mr. Berryman was not identified as being one of them. The rule itself is clear and unambiguous and requires no interpretation. Since its adoption in late 1996, the District has consistently construed it to mean just what it says -- that in order for a minority owner to be certified, the owner must have a professional license in the area being certified. This interpretation of the rule was not shown to be unreasonable or clearly erroneous. Therefore, because Everglades intends to provide surveying services, Mr. Berryman, as the minority owner, must hold a surveyor's license under Chapter 472, Florida Statutes, in order to qualify as a MBE. While it is true that Mr. Berryman is a registered professional engineer (under Chapter 471, Florida Statutes) in the State of Florida (as well as 3 other states), and he can perform almost all of the surveying services under his engineering license,2 he does not hold a Florida surveyor's license, as required by the rule. While this result may seem unfair and based on highly technical grounds, it is consistent with the plain requirements of the rule.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order denying the application of Everglades Surveying Joint Venture for certification as a minority business enterprise. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 2002.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57288.703471.005
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CAROL D. WHEELER vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 91-002364 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 19, 1991 Number: 91-002364 Latest Update: Dec. 16, 1991

The Issue Whether Petitioner abandoned her position of employment with Respondent and resigned from the career service.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) at South Florida State Hospital (SFSH) as a Human Services Worker I, a career service position. Petitioner was absent without authorized leave or explanation on February 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13, 1991. Petitioner was not at work on February 11 and 12, 1991, but those were scheduled days off. On February 13, 1991, David A. Sofferin, Hospital Administrator at SFSH, notified Petitioner by letter that DHRS had no choice but "... to consider you to have abandoned your Human Services Worker I position and resigned from the State of Florida Career Service at South Florida State Hospital. ..." This letter also advised Petitioner of her right to challenge this action. Petitioner wrote DHRS a letter which was received by DHRS on February 25, 1991. In this letter Petitioner admitted that she had violated the personnel rules and asked for a second chance. Petitioner's letter stated that she had been abducted by a boyfriend on February 11, 1990 (sic), 1/ and taken to Bradenton. The letter did not attempt to explain her absences on February 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. 1991. Petitioner was provided a copy of DHRS' Employee Handbook on April 20, 1990. Petitioner had been previously advised of Respondent's attendance policies and she had been previously reprimanded for failing to adhere to those policies. The following is found on page 13 of the Employee Handbook under the paragraph entitled "Absences": If you expect to be absent from work for any reason, you must request leave from your supervisor as much in advance as possible, so that suitable disposition of your work may be made to avoid undue hardship on fellow employees and clients. As soon as you know you will be late or absent from work you must notify your supervisor. Absences without approved leave is cause for disciplinary action. If you are absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned. (Emphasis added.) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over this matter. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: An employee who is without authorized leave of absence for 3 consecutive workdays shall be deemed to have abandoned the position and to have resigned from the career service . ... . The foregoing rule creates a rebuttable presumption. DHRS has established that Petitioner was absent without authorized leave so that she is rebuttably presumed to have abandoned her position of employment and to have resigned from the career service. Petitioner has failed to rebut that presumption.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Petitioner, Carol Wheeler, has abandoned her position of employment with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and which further finds that she has resigned from the career service. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of November, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1991.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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HENRY DAVIS vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 05-003532RU (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 23, 2005 Number: 05-003532RU Latest Update: Feb. 01, 2006
Florida Laws (7) 120.52120.54120.56120.57120.595120.68760.10
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SAVE THE MANATEE CLUB, INC., vs SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT AND HIDDEN HARBOR LAND DEVELOPMENT, 01-003109 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Aug. 08, 2001 Number: 01-003109 Latest Update: Jan. 28, 2002

The Issue The preliminary issue in this case is whether the South Florida Water Management District (District) has jurisdiction over the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing (Petition) filed by the Save the Manatee Club (Club)--i.e., whether the Petition was timely or, if not, if the District has jurisdiction under principles of equitable tolling or excusable neglect.

Findings Of Fact On October 11, 1999, Hidden Harbor filed with the District an application for an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) to construct and operate a surface water management system serving a proposed residential development in Lee County, Florida. In January 2001, the Club sent an email to the Florida Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) stating that it was concerned about Hidden Harbor's Application No. 991011- 13, as it might impact an area the Club would like to see as a manatee sanctuary, and was requesting copies of all FWCC documents relating to the permit. FWCC forwarded a copy of this email to the District on January 19, 2001. At the time, the Club's internet website gave the address of its main office in Maitland, Florida, as the Club's official mailing address. On April 9, 2001, the Club opened a Southwest Florida regional satellite office in Estero, Florida, and installed Laura Combs as Regional Coordinator in charge of that office. Responsibility for monitoring the Hidden Harbor application was delegated to Combs and the satellite office. Nonetheless, the Club's website continued to give the address of its main office in Maitland, Florida, as the Club's official mailing address. Combs's prior work experience with the Club was as assistant director of governmental relations in Tallahassee, Florida. In that position, she tracked legislation and actions of the Governor and Cabinet that were of interest to the Club. She had no role in the filing of petitions for administrative hearings on actions of governmental agencies. Combs's education included a bachelor's degree in English and a master's degree in urban and regional planning. She did not have specific legal education in the filing of petitions for administrative hearings on actions of state governmental agencies. On May 30, 2001, the District mailed to the Club at its Maitland office address a letter enclosing the "District's staff report covering the [Hidden Harbor] permit application [No. 991011-13]" and notifying the Club that the "recommendations as stated in the staff report [to grant the attached draft permit] will be presented to our Governing Board for consideration on June 14, 2001." The Club also was advised: Should you wish to object to the staff recommendation or file a petition, please provide written objections, petitions and/or waivers (refer to the attached "Notice of Rights") to [the District's deputy clerk]. The "Notice of Rights" addresses the procedures to be followed if you desire a public hearing or other review of the proposed agency action. You are advised, however, to be prepared to defend your position regarding the permit application when it is considered by the Governing Board for final agency action, even if you agree with the staff recommendation, as the Governing Board may take final agency action which differs materially from the proposed agency action. The Notice of Rights stated that it was intended to conform to the requirement of Section 120.569(1), Florida Statutes, to "inform the recipient of any administrative hearing or judicial review that is available under this section [120.569(1)], s. 120.57 or s. 120.68." It cautioned: Please note that this Notice of Rights is not intended to provide legal advice. Not all the legal proceedings detailed below may be an applicable or appropriate remedy. You may wish to consult an attorney regarding your legal rights. The Notice of Rights included a section entitled "Petition for Administrative Proceedings," which stated in pertinent part: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the South Florida Water Management District's (SFWMD) action has the right to request an administrative hearing on that action. The affected person may request either a formal or an informal hearing, as set forth below. A point of entry into administrative proceedings is governed by Rules 28-106.111 and 40E-1.511, Fla. Admin. Code, (also published as an exception to the Uniform Rules of Procedure as Rule 40E-0.109), as set forth below . . .. Formal Administrative Hearing: If a genuine issue(s) of material fact is in dispute, the affected person seeking a formal hearing on a SFWMD decision which does or may determine their substantial interests shall file a petition for hearing pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. or for mediation pursuant to Section 120.573, Fla. Stat. within 21 days . . . of either written notice through mail or posting or publication of notice that the SFWMD has or intends to take final agency action. Pertinent to this case, the Notice of Rights included a verbatim reproduction of Florida Administrative Code Rule 28- 106.201, addressing required contents of a petition to initiate proceedings involving disputed issues of material fact. Rules 28-106.111, 40E-1.5111, and 40E-0.109 were not reproduced in the Notice of Rights. It is not clear from the evidence when the letter dated May 30, 2001, with attachments (the Notice Correspondence), was received in the Club's Maitland office. It was not date-stamped, as time-sensitive correspondence normally would be. Apparently, it was decided to forward the Notice Correspondence to the new satellite office in Estero for handling. Combs received the forwarded Notice Correspondence in early June 2001. This was the "first time [Combs] had been through this type of process." Combs reviewed the Notice Correspondence, eventually focusing on paragraph 1.a. of the "Petition for Administrative Proceedings" section of the Notice of Rights. She did not read any of the cited statutes and rules except for the rules reproduced verbatim as part of the Notice of Rights. Combs made conflicting statements regarding her understanding of the District's administrative process. However, it appears that she understood that the Club could file a petition within 21 days of receipt of the Notice Correspondence, or within 21 days of the "final" action of the District's Governing Board. She testified that, because the Notice Correspondence did not bear a date-stamp, it was unclear when the first 21-day time period began or ended; as a result, she decided to wait until the District's Governing Board took "final" action and file a petition within the second 21-day time period. Combs appeared at the meeting of the District's Governing Board on June 14, 2001, and spoke in opposition to issuance of the draft permit. Notwithstanding the Club's opposition, the Governing Board decided to issue the draft permit. Combs does not have authority to file petitions for administrative hearings on District actions. She consulted with her supervisor, Patricia Thompson, and they made a recommendation to the Club's governing board, which has ultimate authority to file petitions. Prior to Combs's involvement in the Hidden Harbor application, the Club had staff legal counsel, who could be consulted with respect to the filing of petitions and would advise the Club's governing board. However, the Club did not have staff legal counsel at the time of Combs's involvement and through the time of filing of this petition. (The Club now again has staff legal counsel.) Neither Combs nor Thompson saw any need to consult an attorney. It is not clear when the recommendation of Combs and Thompson was presented to the Club's governing board or when the Club's governing board made its decision to file the Petition. Neither Thompson nor any member of the Club's governing board (nor anyone else who may have participated in the decision to file the Petition) testified. Several (according to Combs, approximately 12) times after the District's Governing Board's meeting on June 14, 2001, Combs telephoned the District's offices to obtain a copy of the District's Governing Board's "final" action when it was reduced to writing. It is not clear from the evidence why several telephone calls were required. Eventually, on June 26, 2001, Combs received a copy of the permit issued to Hidden Harbor; there was no Notice of Rights attached. On July 17, 2001, the Club filed its Petition challenging the permit issued to Hidden Harbor. In the meantime, Hidden Harbor had obtained a final development order from Lee County in reliance on the Club's failure to petition for an administrative hearing. The Club is not a newcomer to Florida's administrative process. It can be officially recognized that the Club has participated in numerous proceedings before DOAH. At least one of those cases involved issues similar to those presented for determination in this case. See Conclusion of Law 32, infra.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order dismissing the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _________________________________ J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Cindy L. Bartin, Esquire Post Office Box 861118 St. Augustine, Florida 32086 Martha M. Collins, Esquire 233 3rd Street North, Suite 100 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Keith W. Rizzardi, Esquire South Florida Water Management District 3301 Gun Club Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-3089 Frank R. Finch, Executive Director South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4680

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.573120.68373.427
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MARTIN COUNTY AND SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT vs. PAL-MAR WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 78-000312 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-000312 Latest Update: May 21, 1979

Findings Of Fact Pal-Mar has filed application No. 29454 pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, requesting approval for a surface water management system known as Phase III of Pal-Mar Water Management District, to serve approximately 3,600 acres of residential land in Martin County, Florida. The project discharges to C-44, the St. Lucie canal. SFWMD's staff report recommends approval be granted for the proposed water management system based on considerations of water quality, rates of discharge, environmental impact and flood protection. Approval is subject to certain conditions which are not material to the instant cause. As background material to the staff report, the staff makes reference to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers report entitled "Survey-Review Report of Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project, Martin County," dated September 22, 1967. The Corps of Engineers' report was not used in the decision-making process but rather was included in the staff report to provide a comprehensive overview. Whether the Corps of Engineers' plans were ever implemented would not affect the recommendations of the staff. The land in question is currently zoned "IZ" (interim zoning) according to Martin County's zoning regulations. In this category, if the neighborhood is predominantly one classification of usage, then the zoning director is to be governed by the regulations for that class of usage in determining the standard zoning regulations to be applied to the interim zoning district. If no trend of development has been established in the neighborhood, the minimum standards of the R2 single family zoning district are to be complied with. Rule 16K-4.035, Florida Administrative Code, entitled Basis of Review of Applications for Construction of Works, provides in Section (2) that all applications such as the instant one shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of the district's "Basis Of Review For Construction Of Surface Water Management Systems Serving Projects With Two Or More Acres Of Impervious Area Within The South Florida Water Management District - December, 1977." The Basis of Review provides in Part VI that before an application will be considered for the issuance of a permit, the proposed land use must be "compatible with the applicable zoning for the area." The evidence indicates that the land in question has a history of agricultural use. However, the evidence also discloses that far from being a trend towards agricultural use there is a trend away from it. A major portion of the neighboring lands will be devoted to Phases I, II, IV and V, of the Pal-Mar Water Management District. According to Florida Land Sales Board registrations, the land in question is subdivided into one-half acre, one acre, 1.4 acre and two acre lots. The average project density is one lot per acre. In addition, there is some mobile home usage within neighboring areas. If there is a trend, it is toward R2 zoning type usage. SFWMD's staff concluded that the proposed land use was compatible with the applicable zoning for the area. Martin County has failed to establish that such compatibility does not exist. In the Redraft of Order Permitting Change of Plan of Reclamation and Change of Name dated November 4, 1969, the Honorable C. Pfeiffer Trowbridge, Circuit Court Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Martin County, observes that the Petitioner in that case (herein Pal-Mar) "permanently and irrevocably withdrew its application to drain into the St. Lucie canal thereby removing all reasons for objections" to the proceedings in Circuit Court. However, there is no evidence to indicate that there exists a prohibition against drainage into the St. Lucie canal or that Judge Trowbridge's order is intended to preclude approval of Pal-Mar's present application.

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