Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: Phyllis I. Reaves is now and was at all times material to these proceedings, a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0351816. Annette J. Ruffin is now and was at all times material to these proceedings, a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0076385. From May 2, 1983 to October 18, 1984, Respondent Phyllis I. Reaves was licensed and operating as a real estate salesman in the employ of Respondent Annette J. Ruffin, as broker, c/o International Investment Development Center, Belleair, Florida or Century 21 A Little Bit Country, Brandon, Florida. At all time material hereto, Respondent Phyllis I. Reaves was a licensed mortgage broker in the State of Florida. DOAH CASE NO. 85-1008/1138. COUNT I No evidence was presented concerning the allegations in Count I.. COUNT II No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count II. COUNT III No evidence was presented concerning the allegations of Count III. COUNT IV On June 10, 1983, Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Emmett K. Singleton, as seller to purchase certain real estate through the use of a land trust. The sales contract listed a total purchase price of $67,000. C-21 A Little Bit Country was listed on the contract as escrow agent of the binder deposit. The property had an existing first mortgage of approximately $33,854. Respondent Reaves agreed to assume the new mortgage and requested that Mr. Singleton obtain a second mortgage in the principal amount of $26,400. Reaves agreed to assume this second mortgage amount while allowing Mr. Singleton to keep the proceeds. Mr. Singleton agreed that the balance of the sales price would be paid via a purchase money mortgage to Respondent Reaves in the principal amount of $9,643.99. Respondent Phyllis I. Reaves executed a Hold Harmless and Indemnity Agreement which read as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Emmett K. Singleton harmless and does idemnify him against any future liability or losses related to the mortgage on subject property at 1912 Hastings Drive, Clearwater, Florida." The sales transaction closed on July 7, 1983, and Respondent Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $1,955. The contract provided that the "listing agent agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." The purchase money mortgage note was actually signed by Michael R. Fisher, as trustee, and not by Respondent Reaves. Respondent Reaves requested that Mr. Singleton give her the mortgage payment booklets and she would assume and pay off the existing and second mortgages. Singleton trusted Reaves and relied upon her statements that she would do as she promised. Respondent Reaves failed to assume and pay the notes and mortgages and thereby caused the seller to become delinquent with the lenders. After closing, Respondent Reaves, acting as the owner, obtained tenants for the property and collected rental payments. Respondent Reaves solicited and obtained $3,000 in connection with a lease/option agreement. The lease/option agreement provided that the sales price of the home would be $78,000 in three years. The rent would remain at $495 per month for three (3) years. The agreement further provided that $3,000 per year would be paid for three (3) years which would reflect a total down payment of $9,000. This down payment was considered the "option consideration." The agreement provided that one third of the option money would be returned if the option were not exercised. The tenants paid Respondent Reaves a total of $3,000 of the option consideration. The renters became concerned when they began to receive notices from Freedom Mortgage Company stating that certain mortgages on the home were overdue. The renters did not exercise the option to buy the home. The renter requested, but did not receive, $1,000 of the $3,000 option consideration back from Respondent Reaves. COUNT V On July 6, 1983, Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Stephen B. Barnes, as seller, to purchase certain real estate through the use of a land trust. The property was not listed", but a broker from Tam-Bay Realty approached Barnes and stated that he had a buyer. The purchase and sale agreement provided for a total purchase price of $91,000. The agreement listed "C-21 A Little Bit Country" as escrow-agent for the binder deposit. In addition, the purchase and sales agreement provided that: "Listing agent Tam-Bay agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." The seller agreed that he would allow Respondent Reaves to assume the existing mortgage of approximately $52,990. Mr. Barnes then agreed to obtain a second mortgage in the amount of $18,925. The seller agreed that the balance of the sales price would be paid via a purchase money mortgage in the principal amount of $16,670.91 to be paid by Respondent Reaves. In addition, Mr. Barnes obtained a home improvement loan in the amount of $4,900. According to the agreements between Respondent Reaves and Mr. Barnes, Mr. Barnes was to keep the money obtained by the second mortgage and the home improvement loan. Respondent Reaves agreed to assume the existing mortgage, the second mortgage and the home improvement loan. Respondent Reaves advised Mr. Barnes to state to the lender that the purpose of the loans were for home improvements. Respondent Reaves executed a hold harmless and indemnity agreement which stated as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Stephen. B. Barnes harmless and does indemnify him against any future liability or losses related to the mortgages on property at 13222 - 88 Place North, Seminole, Florida." The sales transaction closed on August 10, 1983, and Respondent Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $2,513.45 and a mortgage brokerage fee of $946.25. Respondent Reaves failed to assume and pay the notes and mortgages and thereby caused the seller to become delinquent with the lenders. COUNT VI On September 3, 1983 Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Floyd and Christine Erwin, as sellers, to purchase certain real estate through the use of a land trust. The contract concerned Floyd and Christine Erwins' home located at 2805 Candlewood Drive in Clearwater, Florida. The purchase and sale agreement provided for a total purchase price of $53,000. The agreement listed C-21 A Little Bit Country as escrow agent for the binder deposit. The agreement further provided that the "listing agent agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." Respondent Reaves agreed to assume the existing mortgages of $16,766.29 and $17,457.94. In addition, the sellers agreed to obtain a new mortgage in the principal amount of $4,900 and a $1,500 personal loan. Upon the advice of Respondent Reaves, the sellers stated to the lender that the purpose of the loans were for home improvements. Respondent Reaves and the sellers agreed that the sellers would keep the money obtained by the loans and that Respondent Reaves would assume the mortgages and make all of the required loan payments. The sellers agreed that the balance of the sales price was to be paid via a purchase money mortgage, payable by Respondent Reaves, in the principal amount of $12,375.77. Respondent Reaves executed a hold harmless and indemnity agreement which stated as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Floyd S. Erwin and Christine E. Erwin harmless and does indemnify them against any future liability or losses related to mortgages or liens on the subject property at 2805 Candlewood Drive, Clearwater, Florida." Floyd and Christine Erwin's home was listed with a broker, and the Erwins understood that Reaves was not their agent. Respondent Reaves told the Erwins that she was representing "some investors." The purchase money mortgage note was actually signed by "Michael R. Fisher, as trustee and not personally." Respondent Reaves made some payments on the purchase money mortgage note which was signed by Michael Fisher. The sales transaction closed on September 23, 1983, and Respondent Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $1,555.50. Respondent Reaves failed to assume and pay the mortgages and notes. Respondent Reaves has not made the payments due on the mortgages and notes and has caused the Erwins to become delinquent with their lenders. COUNT VII The evidence presented concerning Count VII consisted solely of documentary evidence. For reasons enumerated in the Conclusions of Law section, infra, the documents alone are insufficient to establish the basis of any offense. Therefore, a discussion of those documents would serve no useful purpose. COUNT VIII On October 16, 1983, Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Patricia and William Willis as sellers, to purchase certain real estate through the use of land trust. The contract concerned the Willis' home located at 417 North Missouri Avenue, Clearwater, Florida. The purchase and sale agreement provided for a total purchase price of $54,000. The agreement listed C-21 A Little Bit Country as escrow agent for the binder deposit. The agreement further provided that the listing agent ". . . agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." Respondent Reaves and the Willis' agreed that Respondent would assume the existing mortgage of $15,396.52. The sellers agreed to obtain the new mortgage in the principal amount of $34,100. The sellers agreed that the balance of the sales price would be paid via a purchase money mortgage in the principal amount of $8,898.45 to be paid by Respondent Reaves. Respondent Reaves agreed to assume the existing mortgage and the new mortgage in the amount of $34,100 and make all of the required loan payments. Respondent Reaves advised the Willis' to state to the lender that the purpose of the $34,100 mortgage loan was for home improvements. The Willis' applied for the loan but refused to state that the purpose of the loan was for home improvements. Respondent Reaves executed a hold harmless agreement which stated as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Patricia L. Carrah, a/k/a Patricia L. Willis and William Willis harmless and does idemnify them against any future liability for losses related to any mortgages or liens on the subject property " The sales transaction closed on November 23, 1983 and Respondent Phyllis Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $3,213 and a mortgage brokerage fee of $2,216. Respondent Reaves failed to assume the notes and mortgages and thereby caused the sellers to become delinquent with their lenders. COUNT IX No evidence was presented concerning the allegations of Count IX. COUNT X No evidence was presented concerning the allegations of Count X. COUNT XI No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count XI. COUNT XII No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count XII. COUNT XIII No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count XIII. No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count XIV. COUNT XV on January 13, 1984, Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Clifford and Virginia Miner, as sellers, to purchase certain real estate through the use of a land trust. The contract concerned the Miner's home located at 1247 Burma Avenue, Clearwater, Florida. The purchase and sale agreement provided for a total purchase price of $62,000. The agreement listed "C-21 A Little Bit Country" as escrow agent for the binder deposit. In addition, the agreement provided that the listing agent ". . . agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." Respondent Reaves and the sellers agreed that Respondent Reaves would assume the existing mortgage of $34,424.82. Respondent Reaves advised the sellers to obtain a $20,000 second mortgage that she would also assume. The sellers were to obtain the mortgage and keep the money as their equity, and Respondent Reaves was to assume the mortgage and make the payments. The sellers agreed that the balance of the sales price was to be paid via a purchase money mortgage in the principal amount of $6,865.33, payable by Respondent Reaves. Respondent Reaves promised the sellers that she would make all the required loan payments and assume the mortgages. Respondent Reaves executed a hold harmless agreement which stated as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Clifford S. Miner and Virginia N. Miner, his wife, harmless and does idemnify them against any future liability or losses related to any mortgages or liens on the subject property . . . ." The purchase money mortgage note was actually signed by Michael R. Fisher, "as trustee and not personally." Respondent Reaves told Mr. Miner that the hold harmless agreement provided additional assurance that she would personally assume all of the mortgage and loans. The sales transaction closed on January 31, 1984, and Respondent Phyllis Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $1,823.25 and a mortgage brokerage fee of $949.48. Respondent Reaves failed to assume and pay the notes and caused the Miners to become delinquent with their lenders, requiring them to "catch up" on the delinquent loan. COUNTS XVI, XVII AND XVIII. The evidence presented concerning Count XVI, XVII and XVIII consisted solely of documentary evidence. For reasons enumerated in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order, the documents alone are insufficient to establish the basis of any offense. Therefore, a discussion of those documents would serve no useful purpose. COUNT XIX During the later part of 1984, an investigator, representing the Department of Professional Regulation, went to speak to Mrs. Ruffin at her "Little Bit of Country" office concerning this case. The investigator requested that he be provided with the records from all of Respondent Reaves' transactions. Respondent Ruffin stated that she was unaware of the particular real estate transactions in question, but that she would check and provide the records at a later date because she was in the process of moving the location of her office. After subpoena was served, Respondent's counsel provided one of the documents in question. COUNT XX Respondent Ruffin employed Respondent Reaves as a salesman. Respondent Ruffin thought of Respondent Reaves as "an independent contractor." Respondent Reaves decided on her own hours and took care of her own transportation. Respondent Ruffin and Respondent Reaves were on an 85%-15% split fee arrangement. Respondent Ruffin knew that Reaves was interested in "buying a lot of property." Respondent Ruffin was basically aware of the method that Respondent Reaves was using to obtain property. Respondent Ruffin did not feel that the method was wrong, however, she did ask Respondent Reaves to leave employment after she received many calls complaining about Respondent Reaves and information that Respondent was in a "tight financial situation." Respondent Ruffin admitted that she had very little time to provide assistance or guidance to Respondent Reaves. DOAH CASE NO. 85-2454 COUNT I There was no evidence presented concerning the factual allegations of Count I. COUNT II There was no evidence concerning the factual allegations of Count II. COUNT III On October 2, 1984, an investigator, representing the Department of Professional Regulation, went to speak with Respondent Ruffin at her office. The investigator requested certain records relating to Respondent Reaves' transactions concerning the charges herein. Respondent Ruffin stated that she was unaware of the particular real estate transactions in question, but that she would check and provide the records at a later date because she was then in the process of moving her office. After a subpoena was served, Respondent Ruffin's attorney provided one of the documents in question. COUNT IV There was no evidence presented concerning the factual allegations of Count IV of DOAH Case No. 85-2454.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that Respondent Phyllis I. Reaves' license as a real estate salesman be revoked; and, RECOMMENDED that Respondent Annette J. Ruffin be issued a written reprimand and assessed an administrative fine of $500.00. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1986. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8 and 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 16. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Matters not included therein are rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Findings of Fact 20 and 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Findings of Fact 26 and 27. Adopted in Findings of Fact 31 and 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Findings of Fact 37 and 38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 36 and 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 49. Adopted in Findings of Fact 49 and 50. Adopted in Finding of Fact 55. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 58. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gerald Nelson, Esquire 4950 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33809 E. A. Goodale, Esquire 14320 Indian Rocks Road Largo, Florida 33540 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the registration of Thompson be suspended for a period of one year. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Pierce, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Calvin Dawson Thompson Route 1, Box 1075 Oviedo, Florida 32765 =================================================================
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent Diane M. Klein, nee Diane Marie Ballantyne, has been licensed by petitioner as a real estate broker at all pertinent times, holding license No. 0314120. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. On September 22, 1983, Winfield F. Imel signed a contract for sale and purchase of Arrowhead County Club, which is in Broward County, Florida, on conditions including the following: New financing mortgage: this agreement is contingent upon the buyers being able to obtain a new first mortgage. Buyers agree to immediately apply for said mortgage and to pay mortgage loan costs in obtaining same. Broker to receive written mortgage commitment on or before 20 days after acceptance of contract or contract is null and void. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. In this transaction, Ms. Klein represented the owner of the property as a real estate broker. The total purchase price was $1,950,000.00. The seller accepted the offer and executed the contract on September 23, 1982. On September 27, 1982, Mr. Imel signed a check in favor of respondent Klein indicating "ESCROW" and "re golf-COURSE." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. He delivered the check to Ms. Klein as earnest money under the contract he had signed on September 22, 1982. Ms. Klein deposited the check to her escrow account, No. 0002502307 at Florida National Bank, on September 28, 1982. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. Mr. Imel tried to obtain money, to be secured by a new first mortgage, from more than one lender. He approached "a group in Atlanta, IVA," (T.8), Mr. Frank Porter in Phoenix, and Vicars and Associates in Maryland, as well as local banks, including First Fidelity Mortgage Corporation in Palm Beach. Dexter B. Wakefield of First Fidelity Mortgage Corporation advised Mr. Imel in November of 1982 that First Fidelity's efforts to "broker a loan on his behalf for Arrowhead Country Club" (T. 9) had not succeeded. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Mr. Imel sought money from First Fidelity not only in order to purchase the property, but also for "refurbishing." Petitioned's Exhibit No. 4. Be never succeeded in obtaining financing for the acquisition and wrote respondent to that effect, requesting "a full and immediate refund of my deposit in the amount of $5,000.00," on December 7, 1982. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Respondent expressly declined to refund the deposit and has never paid Mr. Imel any of the money. On October 19, 1982, respondent had written a check for $5,000.00 against her escrow account and in favor of "D.K. Operating Acc't." The check was paid October 20, 1982. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. The record does not reveal whether the seller ever asked for or received any money in connection with this transaction. The seller had "agree[d] to pay [respondent] as a fee, the sum of Ninety-Seven thousand and five hundred dollars ($97,500.00) or one-half of the deposits in case same is forfeited by the Buyer Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's license for ninety (90) days. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Diane M. Klein Post Office Box 7193 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida Harold Huff, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: For the period September 1, 1987 through August 31, 1988, Respondent was registered as the principal mortgage broker for the company AFM. Respondent's license number, HT 0010066, and street address, 3200 N. Military Trail, Suite 300, Boca Raton, Florida 33431, were included on the mortgage broker business registration renewal form executed and submitted by Respondent to the Department. AFM's mortgage brokerage registration number was HY0019932. Ronald Mims performed an examination of the AFM business records for a period which included September 1, 1987 through August 31, 1988. One of the loan transactions examined by Mr. Mims pertained to a borrower/applicant named Frazer. The records maintained by AFM related to this transaction contained a good faith estimate, dated April 15, 1988, that was prepared and executed by Darlene M. Mannarino, as the AFM office manager. The file did not contain a copy executed by the borrower. The good faith estimate described in paragraph 2 provided, in part: In compliance with Chapter 494 of Florida Statutes; Lender/Broker hereby acknowledges receipt of an application fee in the amount of $ 300.00 , and agrees that this will be applied towards the settlement charges. If an acceptable commitment is not obtained or loan closing does not occur for any reason, this deposit will not be refunded. A copy of a check in the amount of $300.00 payable to "American Funding1 from Frazer Distributors was included in the AFM-Frazer transaction file. Also included was a loan application executed by Respondent as the AFM interviewer. None of the documents contained in the Frazer file dIsclosed the limits and conditions of recovery from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund (MBGF). Such documents did not disclose the escrow/trust agent if other the payee, American Funding. AFN did not have an escrow/trust account. The good faith estimate for the Frazer transaction provided for an estimated charge of $225.00 for an anticipated appraisal fee. Peter H. Sayles performed an appraisal for the Frazer transaction. The total amount billed to AFM by Sayles for he Frazer account was $350.00. Mr. Sayles was not paid for this work nor for an additional $100.00 due to him from AFM for a Roberts account. Mr. Sayles obtained a default judgment for these amounts in summary claims. Mr. Mims also obtained copies of records maintained by AFM related to a transaction for a borrower/applicant named Neger. A good faith estimate executed by the borrower on October 27, 1987, contained the same language as described in paragraph 3 above. The amount of the Neger deposit, however, was $250.00. The file did not contain a copy of the good faith estimate executed by AFM. The file held a copy of a check dated October 27, 1987, from Daniel Neger to "American Funding" in the amount of $250.00. The Neger loan application was signed by Darlene/Sherin Reynolds as the interviewer for AFM. The Neger documents maintained by AFM did not disclose the conditions or limits for recovery from the MBGF. Additionally, the documents did not disclose the escrow/trust agent for the transaction if other than the payee (American Funding). At the time of this transaction AFM did not maintain an escrow/trust account. At all times material to this case, Darlene Mannarino was not licensed by the Department. Except as noted above, Ms. Mannarino's duties and the type of payment she received for the work she rendered on behalf of AFM are not established by the record in this case. AFM did not maintain a mortgage journal in connection with the loan transactions it processed. Instead, AFM retained records in a card index file for loan applications. The records maintained in the card index file were incomplete and, consequently, inadequate to allow Mr. Mims to track the status and completion of loan transactions processed by AFM.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, enter a final order placing the Respondent licensee on probation for a period of two years. Further, it is recommended that the Department impose an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $1000.00. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 1990. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-0743 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 and 2 are accepted. Paragraph 3 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or unsupported by the record. Paragraph 4 is accepted. Paragraph 5 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 6 is accepted. Paragraph 7 is accepted. Paragraph 8 is rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence. While the Department established that Sayles was not paid for appraisal services rendered, that does not imply nor establish that Respondent misused funds. Whether funds exist from which Sayles could be paid, is unknown. All that is known is that AFM, for whatever reason, did not pay Sayles. Paragraph 9 is rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: The first sentence of paragraph 1 is accepted. The balance of the paragraph is rejected as unsupported by the evidence or irrelevant. Paragraph 2 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 3 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 4 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or argument. Paragraph 5 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric Mendelsohn Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Ill Georgia Avenue, Suite 211 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-5293 Jerald A. Goldstein JERALD A GOLDSTEIN, P.A. 3200 North Military Trail Suite 300 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Mr. William G. Reeves General Counsel The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact This case involves the consideration of the Respondent's attempt to assess documentary stamp tax, penalty and interest on the document which the Petitioner recorded; said document being entitled Mortgage Consolidation, Modification and Extension Agreement. This document is recorded in Book 6855 and page 73, Broward County, Florida, Official Records. The date of recordation was December 30, 1976. By joint stipulation, a copy of the document in question has been admitted as joint Exhibit No. 1 by the parties. The Notice of Proposed Assessment setting forth the amount claimed is found as an attachment to the petition. The date of the assessment is May 18, 1977. The only change in the claim by the Respondent, is the concession by the Respondent that the 100 percent penalty no longer applies and that a 25 percent penalty is now in effect. This change may be found in the letter of the Respondent's attorney dated December 12, 1977, which is admitted and made a part of the record herein and attached hereto. As demonstrated, there is no factual dispute between the parties on the issue of what document or item is being claimed as taxable. The dispute arises over the question of taxability. The respondent claims that the document is taxable under the authority of Section 201.08, F.S. and Rule 12A-4.53, F.A.C. The latter provision is an adaptation of the authority set forth in State, Department of Revenue v. McCoy Motel, Inc., 304 So.2d 440, (1 DCA, Fla 1974). The Respondent's assertion of taxability under the theory in McCoy supra is correct. The correctness of the Respondent's interpretation may be understood by contrasting the facts in the McCoy case with those in the case of sub judice. In the McCoy case, McCoy Motel, Inc., in a promissory note which is referred to as the "first note," promised to pay the sum of $1,850,000 to Keyes-Penn Mortgage Company together with interest. McCoy then paid documentary stamp tax on the full amount of the note. Keyes-Penn Mortgage Company subsequently assigned an undivided 67.57 percent interest in that note to the Monumental Life Insurance company and made a further assignment of 32.43 percent of the interest to the Volunteer State Life Insurance Company. On a later date, McCoy gave a note, referred to as the "second note," to Alison Mortgage Investment Trust in which it promised to pay $3,500,000 together with interest. Alison in return agreed to pay Monumental Life Insurance company, as payee of the "first note," payments on the "first note" when they became due. This agreement to pay Monumental Life Insurance Company was premised upon the expectation that McCoy not be in default under the terms of the first or second note, or the corresponding mortgages which were in support of those notes. In this situation, the first and second notes were secured by mortgages on the same property. The mortgage note between McCoy and Alison Mortgage Investment Trust was what is commonly known as a "wraparound" mortgage. That is to say, the "second note" represented the total indebtedness of the "first note" and an additional sum. McCoy paid documentary stamp tax on $1,650,000 of the second note which represented the total sum of the loan less the amount that had been loaned on the "first note." The State of Florida disagreed with this approach and contended that the full amount of the "second note" should be subject to documentary stamp taxes. The Trial Court rejected the State's position and held that the amount of $1,850,000 was part of a contractual agreement between McCoy and Alison Mortgage Investment Trust in which certain monies were to be paid through Alison to the holder of the first mortgage and that McCoy was not under obligation to pay money within the meaning of Chapter 2011, F.S., and not subject to tax for the amount of the "first note." The Appellate Court rejected this contention and concluded that the full amount of $3,500,000 plus interest was a loan made to McCoy Motel, Inc., with the understanding that McCoy was obligated to pay back that amount to Alison Mortgage Investment Trust. Therefore, an excise tax was due on the full amount. This conclusion by the Appellate Court was reached on the basis of an examination of the terms and conditions of the second note which set forth the amount of payment, the amount of interest, and the steps to be taken in the event of default on the payments by McCoy. The Appellate Court held that this obligation to pay the $3,500,000 plus interest was not an executory, contingent or conditional agreement between the parties. Further, the Court held that the documentary stamp tax would be due regardless of whether a part or all of the obligation of a renewal note was subjected to the conditions of Chapter 201., F.S., under an original note. The exception to that ruling, the Court stated, would be if it was a renewal within the meaning of Section 201.09, F.S., which would exempt it from taxation. The McCoy "second note" was not found to be one of the exempt categories. It was not found to be exempt because it was felt that it was not a reiteration of the original note, but was an enlargement of the original contract and obligation, thereby precluding any exemption. The underlying theory of the Court in its holding in McCoy, supra, is grounded on the Court's opinion that the liability to pay documentary stamp tax and the amount of the tax to be paid shall be determined by the form and face of the instrument and not by proof of extrinsic facts. In the present case, Lake Taft Village, Inc. was obligated to pay two first mortgages on separate parcels of land. The initial first mortgage holder was Southport American National Bank, to whom Lake Taft Village, Inc. owed $150,000 under the terms of the note and mortgage. The second parcel was mortgaged to a group known as "Curcie Brothers." This group was owed $450,000 under the terms and conditions of the note and mortgage. Lake Taft Village, Inc. decided to sell the property covered by the two first mortgages. The purchaser of that property was the Petitioner, The Lakes of Pembroke Pines, Inc. At the closing, The Lakes of Pembroke Pines, Inc. paid $970,000 by making a $60,000 down payment and assuming the two mortgages in the amount of $150,000 and $450,000. In addition, Lake Taft Village, Inc. took back a second mortgage for $310,000 from The Lakes of Pembroke Pines, Inc. This second mortgage was a purchase money mortgage and was subordinate on the entire property, encumbered by the two first mortgages. However, before this second mortgage was recorded, the seller and Petitioner entered into an agreement whose terms and conditions are found in the Joint Exhibit No. 1, which is the subject of the dispute. As stated before, this document is entitled Mortgage Consolidation, Modification and Extension Agreement. The document is in fact a "wraparound" mortgage. The reason that it is considered to be a "wraparound" mortgage may be found in the examination of the document itself. The document consolidates the preexisting first mortgages, in which Southport American National Bank and "Curcie Brothers" are the mortgagees, with the second mortgage held by Lake Taft Village, Inc. Moreover, it establishes an interest rate for the payment from the Petitioner to Lake Taft Village, Inc., in addition to the schedule of payments of interest and principle. It also establishes the method by which parcels of property which are encumbered by one of the two first mortgages may be released by the holder of the "wraparound" mortgage. The holder of that mortgage initially was Lake Taft Village, Inc. This provision pertains to the amount of the $150,000 mortgage held by Southport American National Bank. The terms of the document call for the Lake Taft Village, Inc. to pay the first mortgage holder "Curcie Brothers" in lieu of payments by the Petitioner who has assumed that mortgage. Other terms of the document pertain to prepayment of the first mortgages by Lake Taft Village, Inc.; matters to be considered in the event of defaults on the terms of the "wraparound" and numerous other clauses agreed to by the parties in the mortgage consolidation. One further significant item within the document, pertains to the satisfaction agreement between the Petitioner and Lake Taft Village, Inc., in which Lake Taft Village, Inc. is allowed to pay off the first mortgages and be entitled to the assignment of those first mortgages instead of a satisfaction. The terms in the the document clearly indicate that Lake Taft Village, Inc. and the Petitioner are agreeing to modify the conditions under which the Petitioner assumed the two first mortgages at the closing with Lake Taft Village, Inc. It also indicates that there is a consolidation of the responsibilities which the Petitioner has under the assumption of two first mortgages, into an integrated arrangement to pay those mortgages and the amount of $310,000 which constitutes the amount of money owed under the second mortgage held by Lake Taft Village, Inc. The terms of the "wraparound" mortgage being separate and apart from the terms of the assumption of the two first mortgages, and the conditions set forth in the second mortgage to Lake Taft Village, Inc.; it is the Petitioner's responsibility to pay documentary stamp tax on these written obligations, in accordance with Section 201.08, F.S. The exception being if the "wraparound" mortgage constitutes a renewal of the existing promissory note within the meaning of Section 201.09, F.S. It does not constitute a renewal for the existing promissory note, because it is an enlargement of the terms and conditions of the assumption of first mortgages and notes, by changing their terms and consolidating them with the second mortgage held by Lake Taft Village, Inc. Therefore, a comparison of the McCoy "wraparound" mortgage and that of the Petitioner shows them to be sufficiently similar in nature to make the authority set forth in McCoy, supra, applicable. Under that statement of authority, the authority of Section 201.08, F.S. and Rule 12A-4.53, F.A.C., the Petitioner owes documentary stamp tax, penalty and interest. The amount of documentary stamp tax is $1,365. The penalty is 25 percent of that amount, in keeping with the concession set forth in the December 12, 1977, letter of the Respondent's attorney and the interpretation of the undersigned, which is to the effect that a 25 percent penalty shall be imposed for all proposed assessments not final on July 1, 1977. This is in keeping with the provisions of Section 201.17, F.S., as amended by Chapter 77-281, Laws of Florida. This penalty is subject to further reduction if a compromise is entered into between the parties. Interest should be charged at 1 percent per month from the beginning date, in keeping with terms and conditions of Section 201.17, F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the proposed assessment of May 18, 1977, be upheld, in that the documentary stamp tax in the amount of $1,365 be upheld and that a penalty in the amount of 25 percent or such lesser amount as compromised by the parties be assessed together with interest. Done and Entered this 6th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Norman N. Zipkin, Esquire 225 Northeast 35th Street Miami, Florida 33137 Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 194, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioners are entitled to recover against the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund and, if so, the priority of payment to be applied to their claim. A secondary issue is whether claimants who gave notice prior to Petitioners are entitled to payment or whether they have waived or abandoned their claims.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations filed by the parties and the documentary evidence, I make the following findings of fact: The Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund (the "fund") was created in 1977 to provide recovery for any person who meets all of the conditions prescribed in Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. The Department is charged to disburse the fund according to Section 494.044, Florida Statutes. Section 494.043, Florida Statutes, (Supp.1986) provides: Any person who was a party to a mortgage financing transaction shall be eligible to seek recovery from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund if: The person has recorded a final judgment issued by a Florida court of competent jurisdiction in any action wherein the cause of action was based on s. 494.042(2); The person has caused to be issued a writ of execution upon such judgment and the officer executing the same has made a return showing that no personal or real property of the judgment debtor liable to be levied upon in satisfaction of the judgment can be found or that the amount realized on the sale of the judgment debtor's property pursuant to such execution was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has made all reasonable searches and inquiries to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possesses real or personal property of other assets subject to being sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment, and by his search he has discovered no property or assets or he has discovered property and assets and has taken all necessary action and proceedings for the application thereof to the judgment, but the amount thereby realized was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has applied any amounts recovered from the judgment debtor, or from any other source, to the damages awarded by the court. The person, at the time the action was instituted, gave notice and provided a copy of the complaint to the division by certified mail; however, the requirement of a timely giving of notice may be waived by the department upon a showing of good cause; and The act for which recovery is sought occurred on or after September 1, 1977. Recovery of the increased benefits allowable pursuant to the amendments to s. 494.044 which are effective October 1, 1985, shall be based on a cause of action which arose on or after that date. The requirements of paragraphs (1)(a),(b),(c),(d), and (e) are not applicable if the licensee or registrant upon which the claim is sought has filed for bankruptcy or has been adjudicated bankruptcy; however, in such event the claimant shall file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings and shall notify the department by certified mail of the claim by enclosing a copy of the proof of claim and all supporting documents. Pertinent to this case, Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1986) Provides: Any Person who meets all of the conditions Prescribed in s 494.043 may apply to the department for payment to be made to such person from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund in the amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or judgments or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages. As to claims against any one licensee or registrant, payments shall be made to all persons meeting the requirements of s. 494.043 upon the expiration of 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received by the department. Persons who give notice after 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received and who otherwise comply with the conditions precedent to recovery may recovery from any remaining portion of the $100,000 aggregate, in an amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages, with claims being paid in the order notice is received until the $100,000 aggregate has been fully disbursed. * * * (3) Payments for claims shall be limited in the aggregate to $100,000, regardless of the number of claimants involved, against any one mortgage broker or registrant. If the total claims exceed the aggregate limit of $100,000, the department shall prorate the payment based on the ratio that the person's claim bears to the total claims filed. The first notice received by the Department alleging a claim against Barry Koltun or Oakland Mortgage Company was filed on August 13, 1984. This notice was filed on behalf of John and Mary Ahern. The Department utilized this notice in computing the two-year period addressed in Section 494.044(1), Florida Statutes. For purposes of recovery from the fund, the individual mortgage broker (Koltun) and the company qualified by the broker (Oakland) are treated as one. Petitioners filed an initial notice of their claim against the fund on October 16, 1985. This claim was asserted against Oakland Mortgage Company, Barry Koltun and Robert Tamarro. On January 23, 1987, the Department issued a "Notice of Intent to Grant or Deny Payment from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund Re Oakland Mortgage Company." This notice outlined the status of some thirteen claims which had given notice of their civil actions against the licensee within the two year period. Two claimants, Kusich and Szafran, had provided all documentation required by Section 494.043, Florida Statutes; consequently, they were approved for payment. The Petitioner's claim was denied because they had allegedly failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes and had failed to do so prior to August 12, 1986 (the end of the two year period). The Petitioners timely filed a petition for formal Chapter 120 proceedings challenging the Department's denial of their claim for payment. Subsequent to January 23, 1987, Petitioners completed the conditions precedent for recovery and submitted all documentation required to satisfy the requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. On July 6, 1987, the Department received notice and a claim from the Intervenors. This claim satisfied the requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. Of the thirteen original claims filed, only two claimants (Kusich and Szafran) completed all conditions of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes, on or before August 12, 1986.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, enter a Final Order finding the claims of Rusich and Szafran eligible for payment, and that the claim of Petitioners be evaluated as part of the second class established in Section 494.044(1), Florida Statutes, DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Zeigler, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. Suite 1010, Monroe Park Tower 101 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul C. Stadler, Jr., Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Division of Finance Suite 1302 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Joseph Degance, Esquire 1995 East Oakland Park Boulevard Suite 101 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Jack F. Weins, Esquire Boca Bank Building Suite 200 855 South Federal Highway Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Morey Udine, Esquire 3111 University Drive Suite 425 Coral Springs, Florida 32065-6930 Hon. Gerald Lewis Department of Banking and Finance Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 =================================================================
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Office is the state agency responsible for regulating mortgage brokerage and mortgage lending and for licensing mortgage brokers. §§ 494.0011(1); 494.0033(2), Fla. Stat. License revocation and criminal prosecution The Office's predecessor, the Department of Banking and Finance ("Department"), issued a mortgage broker's license to Mrs. Comas in 1997. Mrs. Comas worked as a mortgage broker with Miami Mortgage Lenders until 1999, when she left her employment with that company after she was involved in what will be referred to as "the Sipple transaction." The Department initiated disciplinary action against Mrs. Comas's mortgage broker's license, and, because Mrs. Comas stipulated to the material facts of the Sipple transaction, an informal administrative hearing was held before a hearing officer appointed by the Department. The Department entered a final order revoking Mrs. Comas's mortgage broker's license on June 25, 2001, which was upheld on appear by the Third District Court of Appeal in Comas v. Department of Banking and Finance, 820 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). The material facts of the Sipple transaction and the basis for the revocation of Mrs. Comas's mortgage broker's license were set out by the district court in Comas, which quoted the Final Order with approval, as follows: "Appellant's conduct in altering a customer check, depositing it in her personal account, and later writing a letter to the customer on company letterhead falsely stating that the funds were in the hands of the title company jeopardized not only the customer, but also her employer and the title company. This conduct violates the numerous statutory provisions referenced in the Final Order, casts considerable doubt on either Appellant's competence, integrity, or both, and clearly warrants license revocation." Criminal charges were filed against Mrs. Comas as a result of her actions in the Sipple transaction. The information filed against Mrs. Comas, and all counts thereof, was dismissed by order of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, in April 2002. Denials of applications for licensure as a mortgage broker subsequent to revocation In October 2002, Mrs. Comas applied for licensure as a mortgage broker. The Office notified her that it intended to deny her application in a Notice of Denial dated March 17, 2003. Mrs. Comas requested an administrative hearing, and the case was transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case No. 03-1738. A recommended order was entered on September 30, 2003, in which the administrative law judge found that Mrs. Comas failed to establish that she was rehabilitated and recommended that Mrs. Comas's application be denied. The Office entered a final order in which it adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the recommended order, and denied Mrs. Comas's application for licensure as a mortgage broker. Among the findings of fact made in the Recommended Order in DOAH Case No. 03-1738 and adopted in the Office's Final Order was a finding that Mrs. Comas had failed to make restitution to the owner of Miami Mortgage Lenders, who had paid Ms. Sipple the monies that Mrs. Comas had improperly deposited in her personal account. On March 10, 2006, Mrs. Comas again applied to the Office for licensure as a mortgage broker. In a Notice of Denial of Application dated November 9, 2006, the Office notified Mrs. Comas that it intended to deny her application. Mrs. Comas did not request an administrative hearing, and the Office entered a final order denying the application on December 18, 2006. The Office incorporated into the final order the factual bases set forth in the November 9, 2006, Notice of Denial of Application, which were virtually identical to the factual bases set forth in paragraphs a. through d. of the Notice of Denial at issue herein. RPM Lenders, Inc. and related companies In 1997, Mrs. Comas and her husband, Rolando Comas, founded RPM Lenders, Inc. ("RPM Lenders"). Mrs. Comas worked as a mortgage broker with RPM Lenders from the time she left her employment at Miami Mortgage Lenders in 1999 until her mortgage broker's license was revoked in 2001. Mrs. Comas continued working for RPM Lenders after her mortgage broker's license was revoked in 2001.2 RPM Lenders shared office space with RPM Systems, a computer company which set up computer networks and distributed computers, and it also shared office space with RPM Loans and Realty, which was created in 1999 or 2000 to handle real estate transactions. On or about December 29, 2003, Mr. Comas and Mrs. Comas, on behalf of RPM Lenders, signed a Stipulation and Consent that was incorporated into a final order entered by the Office on December 30, 2003. In the Stipulation and Consent, it was recited that Mrs. Comas was the sole owner and president of RPM Lenders until May 14, 2003. In paragraph 6.1.1 of the Stipulation and Consent, Mrs. Comas agreed that she would "not become a mortgage broker, principal broker, principal representative, owner, officer or director of R.P.M. Lenders, Inc." From 2004 through April 17, 2008, Mrs. Comas was the corporate secretary for RPM Lenders until it ceased business in 2007, when its name was changed to ROC Lenders, Inc. ROC Lenders, Inc., never did any business, but Mrs. Comas nonetheless continued to serve as that company's corporate secretary until her name was deleted as the corporate secretary pursuant to a filing with the Florida Secretary of State dated April 17, 2008.3 At the times material to this proceeding, Mrs. Comas managed RPM Lenders, RPM Loans and Realty, and RPM Systems. Her title with RPM Lenders and RPM Loans and Realty was "Finance Manager," and her duties included the general daily management responsibilities of an office manager, such as ensuring that office equipment was repaired and maintained and ordering office supplies, as well as duties that included customer support, marketing and advertising, developing and implementing quality control procedures, preparing financial statements, handing accounts receivable and accounts payable, reconciling all bank accounts, reviewing all funded files, and attending all of the closings. Mrs. Comas was paid a management fee for her services as Financial Manager and Office Manager for RPM Lenders and RPM Loans and Realty. In providing customer support for RPM Lenders and RPM Loans and Realty, Mrs. Comas responded to customer complaints on behalf of the brokers employed by those companies, reviewing files and attempting to resolve problems and disagreements between customers and brokers. RPM Loans and Realty was created in 1999 or 2000 "for realty purposes," and Mrs. Comas began working with RPM Loans and Realty as a real estate associate beginning in March 1999. Mrs. Comas continued to work with RPM Loans and Realty both as manager and as a real estate associate up to the time of the final hearing.4 Rehabilitation As part of her practice as a real estate associate, Mrs. Comas accepts deposits from buyers and transmits them to title companies.5 Mrs. Comas's license as a real estate associate was current at the time of the final hearing, and it has never been the subject of disciplinary action. In a letter dated November 12, 2008, to Sherry Sipple, the person whose check Ms. Comas altered and deposited in her personal bank account, Mrs. Comas denied having altered the check, stating that her name was placed on the check by someone else. Mrs. Comas did not mention in the letter her depositing Ms. Sipple's check in her personal bank account, and Mrs. Comas blamed Ms. Sipple and Ms. Sipple's brother for what she called a "misunderstanding," stating that, because Ms. Sipple and Ms. Sipple's brother went to the closing on the subject property without Mrs. Comas, she was unable to deliver to the title company the money Ms. Sipple had entrusted to her. Mrs. Comas apologized to Ms. Sipple "for what happened," but then asked that she give Mrs. Comas's attorney a "statement of acceptance of this BIG MISUNDERSTANDING."6 Mrs. Comas telephoned Mark Mazis, her employer at Miami Mortgage Company, and apologized to him for "what happened."7 Mrs. Comas acknowledged in her testimony at the final hearing that she did something wrong, although she insisted that she did not intend to steal Ms. Sipple's money by placing it in her personal bank account but intended only to expedite Ms. Sipple's closing. Since her license was revoked in 2001, Mrs. Comas has contributed to charities and attends church approximately twice a month. Summary The Sipple transaction The evidence presented by the Office in the form of the opinion of the Third District Court of Appeal in Comas v. Department of Banking and Finance establishes conclusively that, in 1999, Mrs. Comas committed fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, or incompetence in a mortgage financing transaction; that Mrs. Comas failed to deliver funds to her customer that Mrs. Comas was not entitled to retain; and that Mrs. Comas misappropriated the customer's check by depositing it in her personal account. Untruthful testimony in DOAH Case No. 03-1738 The evidence presented by the Office is not sufficient to support a finding of fact that Mrs. Comas gave untruthful testimony in a previous administrative proceeding. In the Notice of Denial dated August 6, 2008, the Office stated as one of the factual grounds for its denial of Mrs. Comas's application for a mortgage broker's license that Mrs. Comas had testified untruthfully at the final hearing in DOAH Case No. 03- 1738. This allegation was apparently based on several findings of fact in the Recommended Order which were referenced in the Office's Proposed Recommended Order in the instant case, as follows: At the July 23, 24[, 2003] formal hearing three issues were litigated — Mrs. Comas’s claims about the circumstances of the Sipple transaction, Mrs. Comas’s claim that she had paid restitution, and her claim that she had apologized to the victims, Sherry Sipple (now Sherry Mercugliano) and Marc Mazis. (Exhibit Q) On these three claims, Mrs. Comas’s testimony conflicted with that of the victims. (Id.) The Administratively [sic] Law Judge weighed the conflicting testimony and determined: 18. Through the time of the hearing, Comas falsely claimed the transaction failed because Sipple was dissatisfied with the interest rate Comas was able to obtain. This testimony is rejected in favor of Sipple's much more convincing explanation that she rejected the balloon payment Comas proposed, insisting upon the fixed rate which she had required from the beginning. * * * 20. For all of the trouble Comas caused Sipple and Mazis, she has never apologized to them. Although Comas testified to the contrary on that point, her self- serving testimony is not credible. * * * 22. Taking into account the entire record, and having had the opportunity to view the demeanor, credibility, ability to perceive facts, knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the events to which they testified, and motive to testify, of each of the witnesses in close and stressful quarters, the conclusion is inescapable that the victims' version of events is entirely consistent with the truth. To the extent that victims' recollections or characterizations of material events differ from those of Comas and her witnesses, the testimony of the victims is credited. (Emphasis added.) (Id.) Consequently, Petitioner made false claims and testified untruthfully at the July 23-24, 2003 formal hearing. The discussions in the quoted paragraphs are not findings of fact regarding the truth or falsity of Mrs. Comas's testimony. Rather, the Administrative Law Judge was assessing the quality and quantity of the evidence presented by the parties as a predicate to making findings of fact regarding the issue of whether Mrs. Comas had established rehabilitation. The Administrative Law Judge's assessment that Mrs. Comas's testimony was not as credible or as persuasive as the conflicting testimony of other witnesses was an assessment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses made by the Administrative Law Judge in order to determine which conflicting testimony and evidence is the more persuasive. Although the Administrative Law Judge included in paragraph 18 of the Recommended Order in DOAH Case No. 03-1738 a statement that Mrs. Comas made a "false" claim in her testimony, it is clear from a reading of the entire paragraph that the Administrative Law Judge found Ms. Sipple's version of the events more credible. Indeed, an Administrative Law Judge would be acting improperly if he or she were to make a finding of fact that a party's or witness's testimony was untruthful or false because the truth or falsity of evidence is not at issue in an administrative proceeding. Such a finding would amount to a finding that the party or witness had committed perjury, which cannot be litigated in an administrative forum but is, rather, subject to criminal prosecution. See Ch. 837, Fla. Stat. The Office's denials of Mrs. Comas's applications for licensure subsequent to the revocation of her license The evidence presented by the Office establishes that it denied Mrs. Comas's applications for licensure as a mortgage broker in 2003 and 2006. The 2003 denial was based on a Final Order in which the Office, adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Recommended Order in DOAH Case No. 03- 1738, found that Mrs. Comas had failed to establish that she had rehabilitated herself since the license revocation. The 2006 denial referenced, among other grounds, the denial of her application for licensure in 2003 for fraud and dishonest dealing. The Office's denials of Mrs. Comas's previous applications for licensure cannot, however, serve as an independent basis for denial of the application at issue herein. Were the previous denials sufficient of themselves to provide a basis for denying Mrs. Comas's future applications, the Office could perpetuate the denial of Ms. Comas's future applications indefinitely without regard to any efforts of Mrs. Comas to prove herself entitled to licensure. Mrs. Comas's service as an officer of RPM Lenders The evidence presented by the Office is sufficient to establish that Mrs. Comas violated a final order of the Office by serving as an officer of RPM Lenders and its successor company, ROC Lenders, Inc., subsequent to signing a stipulation in December 2003 averring that she would not serve as a corporate officer of RPM Lenders. Mrs. Comas's role in responding customer complaints about the service provided by mortgage broker employed by RPM Lenders does not, however, rise to the level of acting as an officer of the corporation.8 Rehabilitation The evidence presented by Mrs. Comas is not sufficient to establish that she has rehabilitated herself in the 10 years that have elapsed since the Sipple transaction. Although she attends church and contributes to charities, she presented no evidence of any other community service. The lack of any disciplinary action against her real estate associate's license since it was issued is a factor in Mrs. Comas's favor, but she failed to present any evidence regarding the number of real estate transactions she handles, and it was, therefore, not possible to assess the frequency with which she handled the funds of others in the context of real estate transactions. Other than her testimony about the November 2008 conversation with Mr. Mazis, Mrs. Comas presented no evidence with respect to her apology to him or to any acknowledgment she made to him that she had acted improperly in the Sipple transaction. Mrs. Comas's letter of apology to Ms. Sipple consisted primarily of her attempts to cast her actions in the Sipple transaction in a light favorable to herself, to excuse her actions as efforts to assist Ms. Sipple, and to blame others, including Ms. Sipple, for the incident. Although Mrs. Comas expresses remorse for what happened, she does not accept responsibility for her actions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation enter a final order denying the application of Marta Comas for licensure as a mortgage broker pursuant to Section 494.0033(4), Florida Statutes, for the acts specified in Section 494.0041(2)(b), (f), (h), (i), (j), (p), (q), and (u)2., Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2009.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the incidents involved herein, the Respondent, Jerry L. Daniel, was licensed as a real estate broker in Florida under license number 365403. Petitioner, Division of Real Estate (Division), is and was the state agency charged with the responsibility for governing the conduct of real estate brokers in Florida. On August 19, 1984, and for several years prior thereto, Doteileen Mariner owned a three bedroom home located at 1260 Schenly Street, Port Charlotte, Florida. The property was encumbered by a first mortgage held by the First Federal Savings and Loan Association in Punta Gorda, Florida. Sometime during 1983 she decided to sell this property and made inquiries toward that end. She was first contacted by Roger King, a real estate agent, with a view toward purchasing her property and in August, 1984, Mr. King presented her with a contract to buy the property. King and the Respondent, who were purchasing it together, were to assume the existing first mortgage and give her a second, balloon, mortgage in the amount of $23,000.00 for five years with a $5,000.00 down payment and payment of interest only thereafter until the end of the period of the mortgage. Mrs. Mariner agreed to this proposal and signed a contract for sale which reflected a total purchase price of $69,500.00 on or about August 22, 1984. She was not given a copy of the contract at that time, however, and Petitioner's Exhibit 2, which purports to be a contract for the sale of the property, bearing her signature and that of the Respondent, dated August 22, 1984, reflects a total purchase price of $74,900.00 with $18,900.00 paid as deposit, and a new mortgage of $56,000.00. According to Mrs. Mariner, these were not the figures which appeared on the contract she signed. At the same time, Mrs. Mariner also signed an addendum to the original contract, dated August 21, 1984, one day prior to the contract which it purports to supplement, which is also signed by Respondent and Mr. King and which reveals that the existing first mortgage on $29,335.00 was to be paid at closing; that the seller, Mrs. Mariner, was to receive $5,000.00 in cash at closing; and that a second mortgage for $23,000.00 would be held for 60 months with interest payments at 10% per year to be made monthly in the amount of $191.67 each. Mrs. Mariner received the $5,000.00 down payment but did not receive the $18,900.00 deposit and, to the best of her recollection, did not agree to a new first mortgage being substituted for the existing first mortgage she had with First Federal. Respondent, on the other hand, indicates he made very clear to Mrs. Mariner, and the documentation which he admits to signing reflects, that the original first mortgage was to be paid off and a second first mortgage for a larger amount substituted therefor. Examination of the contract shows it has been modified by alteration of the figures thereon. When this is done is not known. Mrs. Mariner moved out of the property the next day after the contract was signed and at the closing, held in September, 1984, was given an envelope with certain documents in it which included a second mortgage on the property in the amount of $23,000.00 signed by both Respondent and Mr. King on September 24, 1984. This second mortgage included a clause which subordinated it to the new first mortgage on the property which was dated July 25, 1985, nine months subsequent to the date of the second mortgage. Mrs. Mariner did not examine the documents at that time but accepted her $5,000.00 down payment and left the area. She assumed the property was transferred and, in fact, received her monthly interest payments on time for several years. However, after a period of time, the payments stopped and after several months of trying unsuccessfully to reach Respondent, she finally contacted him and arranged to come back to Florida to meet with him. When she met with Respondent, he indicated he was having financial difficulties and was unable to make the monthly payments. However, he offered to deed her property back to her and to convey to her two other properties he owned, both of which were encumbered by substantial first mortgages. Both had some equity in them which, he claims, when added to the equity in her original property, would be adequate to make her whole and enable her to avoid any financial loss on her part. On July 10, 1986, Respondent executed a Quit Claim Deed to Mrs. Mariner for the property which she originally owned. This deed showed a first mortgage of $58,000.00 compared to the $29,355.00 first mortgage she originally had. Therefore, as a result of her dealings with the Respondent, she had her property back temporarily, had received $5,000.00 in cash, and had received some monthly payments of $191.67 each. She also had an indebtedness of approximately $30,645.00 more than she had when she met Respondent and because of her inability to make the payments on the new first mortgage, lost the property to foreclosure. Respondent and Mr. King arranged for interim financing on the Mariner property at a high rate of interest with a temporary lender until such time as they could arrange new first mortgage financing. This was done several months later and Respondent encumbered the property with a new mortgage in the amount of $58,400.00. That new first mortgage, dated June 25, 1985, was made payable to Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association and was recorded in the public records of Charlotte Count, Florida on July 2, 1985, prior to the recordation of the original second mortgage, dated September 24, 1984, which Respondent and King had given to Mrs. Mariner. It should also be noted that this second mortgage, dated September 24, 1984, reflects at the bottom of page 1, "subject to and inferior to that certain mortgage to Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association dated June 25, 1985 [sic], filed July 2, 1985 sic; recorded in Official Records Book 823, page 779 of the Public Records of Charlotte County, Florida in the original principal amount of $58,400.00." Respondent has not explained how a mortgage executed on September 24, 1984 can refer to as existing and legitimately be made subordinate to a first mortgage which did not come into existence until 9 months later. He claims total ignorance of how that happened. He assumed that since all documents were turned over to the title company at the time of closing, the second mortgage would be recorded at that time. This testimony is ingenuous and unbelievable. Mrs. Mariner received approximately $3,200.00 in interest payments from Respondent in addition to the $5,000.00 down payment. In the Spring of 1986, she was served with a summons for foreclosure of the first mortgage on her property. She has now lost the property and the difference between her equity in it at the time of sale to Respondent and the Deposit she received. Petitioner has alleged that Mrs. Mariner's loss was approximately $39,000.00. The exact amount of loss is irrelevant. What is pertinent is not the loss to Mrs. Mariner but whether Respondent's conduct here constitutes misconduct and it obviously does. Respondent denies any responsibility for this situation. He claims he was approached by Roger King in 1984 with the opportunity to buy Mrs. Mariner's property. At the time, he was involved in investing in family homes owning two or three at that time and up to twenty to thirty thereafter. At the time of this transaction, he had had only one other deal with Mr. King who had done the negotiations for the purchase of the Mariner property and drafted the documents. Respondent, however, is the only buyer listed on the contract though King appears as a mortgagor on the second mortgage. Mr. Daniel claims he saw Mrs. Mariner first at the closing at Federal Title Insurance Company on September 24, 1984. He relates that the contract for the purchase of the property and the addendum were signed prior to closing and he was not present at the time Mrs. Mariner signed them. He claims not to know who got her to sign them. Respondent claims, however, that he explained all the provisions of the transaction to Mrs. Mariner prior to the closing including the fact that her existing first mortgage would be paid off; that a new first mortgage in a higher amount would be placed on the property; and that the mortgage she was holding would be subordinate to the new first mortgage. She denies this. He asserts that he took out 90 day interim financing arrangement with Family Credit at a higher interest rate for the sole purpose of allowing the deal to close so that Mrs. Mariner could be on her way to Delaware. His assertions of concern for Mrs. Mariner's welfare are not believable. Respondent claims he told Mrs. Mariner at closing that her second mortgage would not be recorded until after permanent financing through a new first mortgage was secured and that the new institutional mortgage would be superior to hers. She does not recall this, however, but her testimony was so indefinite, vague, and unsure, it is difficult to determine what Mrs. Mariner was told. As was found before, his contention is unworthy of belief. Respondent also contends that the rental income from the property was supposed to be between $700.00 and $800.00 per month which would have been sufficient to pay not only the monthly payment on the first mortgage but also the interest payment on the second mortgage. However, these expectations were not realized and he received only rental income of $550.00 per month which was sufficient to pay only the first mortgage. Because of financial reverses he was having at the time with some of his commercial properties, which put him in a poor cash flow position, he stopped making payments on both the first and second mortgages early in 1986 and subsequently lost Mrs. Mariner's property to foreclosure. Respondent overlooks the fact that the lower rental he obtained, $550.00 per month, was more than sufficient to cover the $191.67 per month owed to Mrs. Mariner and still return him a substantial return on his investment of $5,000.00 if he had been a legitimate investor in rental property. It is obvious from the evidence that Respondent had far more in mind than that reasonable return. Respondent contends it was never his intention not to pay Mrs. Mariner. However, Respondent bought a piece of property which had a current first mortgage of $29,335.00. He replaced that with a new first mortgage of $58,400.00 which gave him a cash surplus of approximately $27,000.00. The second mortgage which he owed to Mrs. Mariner was for $23,000.00, well below the amount he had received in cash as a result of the refinancing. It is clear that Respondent took this money and failed to pay Mrs. Mariner even though there were adequate funds available from the refinancing to do so. It is clear that he intended for her to be in a subordinate position and that he intended to make, and did make, a substantial amount of money out of the transaction. He tried to deed Mrs. Mariner's property back to her, along with two other properties in which he had equity, to reduce her loss, but she refused his offer. His financial difficulties resulted in his going into bankruptcy through which he lost his entire financial base. Since his bankruptcy, Respondent has been employed as a broker/manager at the Bee Ridge office of Schlott Realtors and as a part of his duties, is responsible for hiring, training, and supervising sales associates. Larry D. Romito, manager and president of the Florida division of Schlott Realty, learned of the Respondent from two or three of his existing sales associates who spoke highly of him. As a result of their recommendations, Mr. Romito sought Respondent out and spent a substantial amount of time with him before offering him a job with the company. During more than fifteen hours of interview time, Respondent spoke quite frankly about his financial difficulties and their effect on him as well as what led up to them. Since Respondent has come with the company, his performance has been exemplary. He has been involved in excess of one thousand transactions and his leadership has been remarkable. There are nine managers in the company and Respondent is to be recognized as the number one manager of all divisions at the next award period. Mrs. Romito has found Respondent to be very objective and reliable and has had no questions with regard to Respondent's honest or integrity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a real estate broker be revoked and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00 but that the revocation be suspended for a period of three years under such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of March, 1989 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4573 The following constituted my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER; Accepted and incorporated herein Rejected. At the time in issue, Respondent's license was issued c/o Jerry Daniels Realty, not Schlott Of Florida. Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein except for that statement that the new first mortgage was concealed from Federal Savings and Loan Association of Punta Gorda. Rejected as a restatement of testimony which is accurately recited. Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein FOR THE RESPONDENT; Accepted in so far as it indicates the contract was drafted by someone other than Mrs. Mariner and that the contract and addendum were signed at her house. Accepted and incorporated herein Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Mrs. Mariner denies being told recording her mortgage was being withheld. Rejected as a restatement of testimony. Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein First sentence accepted and incorporated herein. Second sentence not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of the testimony. Accepted and incorporated herein COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Dana J. Watts, Esquire 700 Sarasota Way Sarasota, Florida 34236 Kenneth A. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether the application of the Respondent Melvin Haber for a mortgage broker's license should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Melvin Haber applied for registration as a mortgage broker by filing an application for registration as a mortgage broker on December 20, 1976. On January 14, 1977, Petitioner issued to Respondent its Notice of Intent to Deny Respondent's Application for registration as a mortgage broker. The reasons for such denial were set forth in an accompanying document entitled "Administrative Charges and Complaint." Petitioner Division of Finance had determined that Respondent Melvin Haber did not meet the proper qualifications necessary to be licensed as a mortgage broker and that he had, through Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, charged and received fees and commissions in excess of the maximum allowable fees or commissions provided by the Florida Statutes; and although he had stated otherwise on his application, Respondent in fact had been charged in a pending lawsuit with fraudulent and dishonest dealings; and had demonstrated a course of conduct which was negligent and or incompetent in the performance of acts for which he was required to hold a license. By letter dated January 19, 1977, to Mr. Joseph Ehrlich of the Comptroller's Office, Tallahassee, Florida, Petitioner received a request from the Respondent Melvin J. Haber in which he acknowledged receipt of his rejection for mortgage broker's license and stated, "I received notice today of my rejection for my mortgage broker's license. I would, therefore, withdraw my application and re- quest return of $75.00 as I will not answer the rejection as I can't afford an attorney at this time." A Special Appearance to Dismiss Complaint was entered on February 11, 1977. The grounds are as follows: "1. The Department of Banking and Finance does not have jurisdiction over this Respondent. There is no jurisdiction in any administrative proceeding over this Respondent. There is no pending application for any mortgage broker's license by this Respondent. The application originally filed for the mortgage broker's license was withdrawn on January 19, 1977. A copy of the letter withdrawing application is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The proceedings are moot and would serve no useful purpose. Permitting this tribunal to proceed on a non-existent request for broker's license would deny to the Respondent due process of law, equal protection of the law, and his rights under the State and Federal Constitutions applicable thereto." On March 4, 1977, the Division of Administrative Hearings received a letter from Eugene J. Cella, Assistant General Counsel, Office of the Comptroller, State of Florida, requesting a hearing in this cause be set at the earliest practical date, and enclosed in the letter requesting a hearing was a copy of the Division of Finance's Administrative Complaint and a copy of the Respondent's Special Appearance to Dismiss the Complaint. A hearing was set for April 22, 1977, by notice of hearing dated March 30, 1977. A letter was sent by Irwin J. Block, Esquire, informing the attorney for the Petitioner that the Respondent "intends to permit the matter to proceed solely upon the written Special Appearance to Dismiss Complaint heretofore filed." Evidence was submitted to show that between May 29, 1973 and continuing through November 25, 1976, Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation and Melvin Haber as Secretary/Treasurer charged and received fees and commissions in excess of the maximum allowed fees or commissions in violation of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code. Respondent's application for registration as a mortgage broker indicated that Petitioner was not named in a pending lawsuit that charged him with any fraudulent or dishonest dealings. However, on August 5, 1976, a suit was filed in Dade County, Florida, which charged the Petitioner and others with fraud in violation of the Florida Securities Law. The application was filed by Respondent, was processed by Petitioner and a Notice of Intent to Deny Respondent's Application for Registration was filed together with Administrative Charges and Complaint. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction upon request of a party for a hearing once an application has been received and the Division has investigated and fully considered the application and issued its Notice of Intent to Deny and filed a Complaint on the applicant. In this cause the question of whether the applicant is entitled to a refund of fees also must be resolved. An orderly procedure to finalize the resolution of the issues is desirable and necessary. The Proposed Order filed by the Petitioner has been examined and considered by the Hearing Officer in the preparation of this order.
Recommendation Deny the application of applicant Melvin Haber for a mortgage broker's license. Refund the Seventy-Five Dollar ($75.00) fee Respondent paid upon filing the application. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of May, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard E. Gentry, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Legal Annex Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Irwin J. Block, Esquire Fine, Jacobson, Block, Goldberg & Semet, P.A. 2401 Douglas Road Miami, Florida 33145
