Findings Of Fact Introduction Petitioner, Leesburg Regional Medical Center ("Leesburg"), is a 132-bed acute care private, not-for-profit hospital located at 600 East Dixie Highway, Leesburg, Florida. It offers a full range of general medical services. The hospital sits on land owned by the City of Leesburg. It is operated by the Leesburg hospital Association, an organization made up of individuals who reside within the Northwest Taxing District. By application dated August 13, 1982 petitioner sought a certificate of need (CON) from respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), to construct the following described project: This project includes the addition of 36 medical/surgical beds and 7 SICU beds in existing space and the leasing of a CT scanner (replacement). The addition of the medical/surgical beds is a cost effective way to add needed capacity to the hospital. Twenty-four (24) beds on the third floor will be established in space vacated by surgery and ancillary departments moving into newly constructed space in the current renovation project. A significant portion of this area used to be an obstetric unit in the past; and therefore, is already set up for patient care. The 7 bed SICU unit will be set up on the second floor, also in space vacated as a result of the renovation project. Twelve additional beds will be available on the third and fourth floors as a result of changing single rooms into double rooms. No renovation will be necessary to convert these rooms into double rooms. It is also proposed to replace the current TechniCare head scanner with GE8800 body scanner. Based on the high demand for head and body scans and the excessive amount of maintenance problems and downtime associated with the current scanner, Leesburg Regional needs a reliable, state-of-the-art CT scanner. The cost of the project was broken down as follows: The total project cost is $1,535,000. The construction/renovation portion of the project (24 medical/surgical and 7 SICU beds) is $533,000. Equipment costs will be approximately $200,000. Architectural fees and project development costs total $52,000. The CT scanner will be leased at a monthly cost of $16,222 per month for 5 years. The purchase price of the scanner is $750,000 and that amount is included in the total project cost. The receipt of the application was acknowledged by HRS by letter dated August 27, 1982. That letter requested Leesburg to submit additional information no later than October 10, 1982 in order to cure certain omissions. Such additional information was submitted by Leesburg on October 5, 1982. On November 29, 1982, the administrator for HRS's office of health planning and development issued proposed agency action in the form of a letter advising Leesburg its request to replace a head CT scanner (whole body) at a cost of $750,000 had been approved, but that the remainder of the application had been denied. The basis for the denial was as follows: There are currently 493 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district of HSA II. Based upon the HSP for HSA II, there was an actual utilization ratio of existing beds equivalent to 2.98/1,000 population. When this utilization ratio is applied to the 1987 projected population of 156,140 for Lake/Sumter counties, there is a need for 465 medical/surgical beds by 1987. Thus, there is an excess of 28 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district currently. This action prompted the instant proceeding. At the same time Leesburg's application was being partially denied, an application for a CON by intervenor-respondent, Lake Community Hospital (Lake), was being approved. That proposal involved an outlay of 4.1 million dollars and was generally described in the application as follows: The proposed project includes the renovations and upgrading of patient care areas. This will include improving the hospital's occupancy and staffing efficiencies by reducing Med-Surg Unit-A to 34 beds and eliminating all 3-bed wards. Also reducing Med-Surg Units B and C to 34 beds each and eliminating all 3-bed wards. This will necessitate the construction of a third floor on the A wing to house the present beds in private and semi-private rooms for a total of 34 beds. There is also an immediate need to develop back-to-back six bed ICU and a six-bed CCU for shared support services. This is being done to fulfill JCAH requirements and upgrade patient care by disease entity, patient and M.D. requests. Another need that is presented for consideration is the upgrading of Administrative areas to include a conference room and more Administrative and Business office space. However, the merits of HRS's decision on Lake's application are not at issue in this proceeding. In addition to Lake, there are two other hospitals located in Lake County which provide acute and general hospital service. They are South Lake Memorial Hospital, a 68-bed tax district facility in Clermont, Florida, and Waterman Memorial Hospital, which operates a 154-bed private, not-for-profit facility in Eustis, Florida. There are no hospitals in Sumter County, which lies adjacent to Lake County, and which also shares a subdistrict with that county. The facilities of Lake and Leesburg are less than two miles apart while the Waterman facility is approximately 12 to 14 miles away. South Lake Memorial is around 25 miles from petitioner's facility. Therefore, all three are no more than a 30 minute drive from Leesburg's facility. At the present time, there are 515 acute care beds licensed for Lake County. Of these, 493 are medical/surgical beds and 22 are obstetrical beds. None are designated as pediatric beds. The Proposed Rules Rules 10-16.001 through 10-16.012, Florida Administrative Code, were first noticed by HRS in the Florida Administrative Weekly on August 12, 1983. Notices of changes in these rules were published on September 23, 1983. Thereafter, they were filed with the Department of State on September 26, 1983 and became effective on October 16, 1983. Under new Rule 10-16.004 (1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, subdistrict 7 of district 3 consists of Lake and Sumter Counties. The rule also identifies a total acute care bed need for subdistrict 7 of 523 beds. When the final hearing was held, and evidence heard in this matter, the rules were merely recommendations of the various local health councils forwarded to HRS on June 27, 1983 for its consideration. They had not been adopted or even proposed for adoption at that point in time. Petitioner's Case In health care planning it is appropriate to use five year planning horizons with an overall occupancy rate of 80 percent. In this regard, Leesburg has sought to ascertain the projected acute care bed need in Lake County for the year 1988. Through various witnesses, it has projected this need using three different methodologies. The first methodology used by Leesburg may be characterized as the subdistrict need theory methodology. It employs the "guidelines for hospital care" adopted by the District III Local Health Council on June 27, 1983 and forwarded to HRS for promulgation as formal rules. Such suggestions were ultimately adopted by HRS as a part of Chapter 10-16 effective October 16, 1983. Under this approach, the overall acute care bed need for the entire sixteen county District III was found to be 44 additional beds in the year 1988 while the need within Subdistrict VII (Lake and Sumter Counties) was eight additional beds. 2/ The second approach utilized by Leesburg is the peak occupancy theory methodology. It is based upon the seasonal fluctuation in a hospital's occupancy rates, and used Leesburg's peak season bed need during the months of February and March to project future need. Instead of using the state suggested occupancy rate standard of 80 percent, the sponsoring witness used an 85 percent occupancy rate which produced distorted results. Under this approach, Leesburg calculated a need of 43 additional beds in 1988 in Subdistrict VII. However, this approach is inconsistent with the state-adopted methodology in Rule 10- 5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, and used assumptions not contained in the rule. It also ignores the fact that HRS's rule already gives appropriate consideration to peak demand in determining bed need. The final methodology employed by Leesburg was characterized by Leesburg as the "alternative need methodology based on state need methodology" and was predicated upon the HRS adopted bed need approach in Rule 10-5.11(23) with certain variations. First, Leesburg made non-rule assumptions as to the inflow and outflow of patients. Secondly, it substituted the population by age group for Lake and Sumter Counties for the District population. With these variations, the methodology produced an acute care bed need of 103 additional beds within Lake and Sumter Counties. However, this calculation is inconsistent with the applicable HRS rule, makes assumptions not authorized under the rule, and is accordingly not recognized by HRS as a proper methodology. Leesburg experienced occupancy rates of 91 percent, 80 percent and 73 percent for the months of January, February and March, 1981, respectively. These rates changed to 86 percent, 95 percent and 98 percent during the same period in 1982, and in 1983 they increased to 101.6 percent, 100.1 percent and 95.1 percent. Leesburg's health service area is primarily Lake and Sumter Counties. This is established by the fact that 94.4 percent and 93.9 percent of its admissions in 1980 and 1981, respectively, were from Lake and Sumter Counties. Although South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial are acute care facilities, they do not compete with Leesburg for patients. The staff doctors of the three are not the same, and there is very little crossover, if any, of patients between Leesburg and the other two facilities. However, Lake and Leesburg serve the same patient base, and in 1982 more than 70 percent of their patients came from Lake County. The two compete with one another, and have comparable facilities. Leesburg has an established, well-publicized program for providing medical care to indigents. In this regard, it is a recipient of federal funds for such care, and, unlike Lake, accounts for such care by separate entry on its books. The evidence establishes that Leesburg has the ability to finance the proposed renovation. HRS's Case HRS's testimony was predicated on the assumption that Rule 10-16.004 was not in effect and had no application to this proceeding. Using the bed need methodology enunciated in Rule 10-5.11(23), its expert concluded the overall bed need for the entire District III to be 26 additional beds by the year 1988. This calculation was based upon and is consistent with the formula in the rule. Because there was no existing rule at the time of the final hearing concerning subdistrict need, the witness had no way to determine the bed need, if any, within Subdistrict VII alone. Lake's Case Lake is a 162-bed private for profit acute care facility owned by U.S. Health Corporation. It is located at 700 North Palmetto, Leesburg, Florida. Lake was recently granted a CON which authorized a 4.1 million dollar renovation project. After the renovation is completed all existing three-bed wards will be eliminated. These will be replaced with private and semi-private rooms with no change in overall bed capacity. This will improve the facility's patient utilization rate. The expansion program is currently underway. Like Leesburg, the expert from Lake utilized a methodology different from that adopted for use by HRS. Under this approach, the expert determined total admissions projected for the population, applied an average length of stay to that figure, and arrived at a projected patient day total for each hospital. That figure was then divided by bed complement and 365 days to arrive at a 1988 occupancy percentage. For Subdistrict VII, the 1988 occupancy percentage was 78.2, which, according to the expert, indicated a zero acute care bed need for that year. Lake also presented the testimony of the HRS administrator of the office of community affairs, an expert in health care planning. He corroborated the testimony of HRS's expert witness and concluded that only 26 additional acute care beds would be needed district-wide by the year 1988. This result was arrived at after using the state-adopted formula for determining bed need. During 1981, Lake's actual total dollar write-off for bad debt was around $700,000. This amount includes an undisclosed amount for charity or uncompensated care for indigent patients. Unlike Leesburg, Lake receives no federal funds for charity cases. Therefore, it has no specific accounting entry on its books for charity or indigent care. Although Leesburg rendered $276,484 in charity/uncompensated care during 1981, it is impossible to determine which facility rendered the most services for indigents due to the manner in which Lake maintains its books and records. In any event, there is no evidence that indigents in the Subdistrict have been denied access to hospital care at Lake or any other facility within the county. Lake opines that it will loose 2.6 million dollars in net revenues in the event the application is granted. If true, this in turn would cause an increase in patient charges and a falling behind in technological advances. For the year 1981, the average percent occupancy based on licensed beds for Leesburg, Lake, South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial was as follows: 71.5 percent, 58.7 percent, 63.8 percent and 65.7 percent. The highest utilization occurred in January (81 percent) while the low was in August (58 percent). In 1982, the utilization rate during the peak months for all four facilities was 78 percent. This figure dropped to 66.5 percent for the entire year. Therefore, there is ample excess capacity within the County even during the peak demand months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Leesburg Regional Medical Center for a certificate of need to add 43 acute care beds, and renovate certain areas of its facility to accommodate this addition, be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1983.
Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Settlement Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the day of &kvacy , 2010, in Tallahassee, Florida. 1 Filed February 26, 2010 3:40 PM Division of Administrative Hearings. A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF ARCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BYLAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: David W. Nam, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Joanne B. Erde, P.A. Duane Morris LLP 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Suite 3400 Miami, Florida 33131 (U.S. Mail) Donna Holshouser Stinson Broad and Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 P.O. Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (U.S. Mail) Bureau of Medicaid Program Analysis Attn: Michele Hudson, Bureau Chief CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail or electronic transmission on this the f 7,2010. Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 922-5873 : '
The Issue Whether the certificate of need (CON) applications filed by New Port Richey Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Community Hospital of New Port Richey (Community Hospital) (CON No. 9539), and Morton Plant Hospital Association, Inc., d/b/a North Bay Hospital (North Bay) (CON No. 9538), each seeking to replace and relocate their respective general acute care hospital, satisfy, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule criteria.
Findings Of Fact The Parties AHCA AHCA is the single state agency responsible for the administration of the CON program in Florida pursuant to Chapter 408, Florida Statutes (2000). The agency separately reviewed and preliminarily approved both applications. Community Hospital Community Hospital is a 300,000 square feet, accredited hospital with 345 licensed acute care beds and 56 licensed adult psychiatric beds, located in southern New Port Richey, Florida, within Sub-District 5-1. Community Hospital is seeking to construct a replacement facility approximately five miles to the southeast within a rapidly developing suburb known as "Trinity." Community Hospital currently provides a wide array of comprehensive inpatient and outpatient services and is the only provider of obstetrical and adult psychiatric services in Sub-District 5-1. It is the largest provider of emergency services in Pasco County with approximately 35,000 visits annually. It is also the largest provider of Medicaid and indigent patient days in Sub-District 5-1. Community Hospital was originally built in 1969 and is an aging facility. Although it has been renovated over time, the hospital is in poor condition. Community Hospital's average daily census is below 50 percent. North Bay North Bay is a 122-bed facility containing 102 licensed acute care beds and 20 licensed comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds, located approximately one mile north of Community Hospital in Sub-District 5-1. It serves a large elderly population and does not provide pediatric or obstetrical care. North Bay is also an aging facility and proposes to construct a replacement facility in the Trinity area. Notably, however, North Bay has spent approximately 12 million dollars over the past three years for physical improvements and is in reasonable physical condition. Helen Ellis Helen Ellis is an accredited hospital with 150 licensed acute care beds and 18 licensed skilled nursing unit beds. It is located in northern Pinellas County, approximately eight miles south of Community Hospital and nine miles south of North Bay. Helen Ellis provides a full array of acute care services including obstetrics and cardiac catheterization. Its daily census average has fluctuated over the years but is approximately 45 percent. Mease Mease operates two acute care hospitals in Pinellas County including Mease Dunedin Hospital, located approximately 18 to 20 miles south of the applicants and Mease Countryside Hospital, located approximately 16 to 18 miles south of Community and North Bay. Each hospital operates 189 licensed beds. The Mease hospitals are located in the adjacent acute care sub-district but compete with the applicants. The Health Planning District AHCA's Health Planning District 5 consists of Pinellas and Pasco Counties. U.S. Highway 41 runs north and south through the District and splits Pasco County into Sub- District 5-1 and Sub-District 5-2. Sub-District 5-1, where Community Hospital and North Bay are located, extends from U.S. 41 west to the Gulf Coast. Sub-District 5-2 extends from U.S. 41 to the eastern edge of Pasco County. Pinellas County is the most densely populated county in Florida and steadily grows at 5.52 percent per year. On the other hand, its neighbor to the north, Pasco County, has been experiencing over 15 percent annual growth in population. The evidence demonstrates that the area known as Trinity, located four to five miles southeast of New Port Richey, is largely responsible for the growth. With its large, single- owner land tracts, Trinity has become the area's fuel for growth, while New Port Richey, the older coastal anchor which houses the applicants' facilities, remains static. In addition to the available land in Trinity, roadway development in the southwest section of Pasco County is further fueling growth. For example, the Suncoast Highway, a major highway, was recently extended north from Hillsborough County through Sub-District 5-1, west of U.S. 41. It intersects with several large east-west thoroughfares including State Road 54, providing easy highway access to the Tampa area. The General Proposals Community Hospital's Proposal Community Hospital's CON application proposes to replace its existing, 401-bed hospital with a 376-bed state- of-the-art facility and relocate it approximately five miles to the southeast in the Trinity area. Community Hospital intends to construct a large medical office adjacent to its new facility and provide all of its current services including obstetrical care. It does not intend to change its primary service area. North Bay's Proposal North Bay's CON application proposes to replace its existing hospital with a 122-bed state-of-the-art facility and also plans to relocate it approximately eight miles to the southeast in the Trinity area of southwestern Pasco County. North Bay intends to provide the same array of services it currently offers its patients and will not provide pediatric and obstetrical care in the proposed facility. The proposed relocation site is adjacent to the Trinity Outpatient Center which is owned by North Bay's parent company, Morton Plant. The Outpatient Center offers a full range of diagnostic imaging services including nuclear medicine, cardiac nuclear stress testing, bone density scanning, CAT scanning, mammography, ultrasound, as well as many others. It also offers general and specialty ambulatory surgical services including urology; ear, nose and throat; ophthalmology; gastroenterology; endoscopy; and pain management. Approximately 14 physician offices are currently located at the Trinity Outpatient Center. The Condition of Community Hospital Facility Community Hospital's core facilities were constructed between 1969 and 1971. Additions to the hospital were made in 1973, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1992, and 1999. With an area of approximately 294,000 square feet and 401 licensed beds, or 733 square feet per bed, Community Hospital's gross area-to-bed ratio is approximately half of current hospital planning standards of 1,600 square feet per bed. With the exception of the "E" wing which was completed in 1999, all of the clinical and support departments are undersized. Medical-Surgical Beds And Intensive Care Units Community Hospital's "D" wing, constructed in 1975, is made up of two general medical-surgical unit floors which are grossly undersized. Each floor operates 47 general medical-surgical beds, 24 of which are in three-bed wards and 23 in semi-private rooms. None of the patient rooms in the "D" wing have showers or tubs so the patients bathe in a single facility located at the center of the wing on each floor. Community Hospital's "A" wing, added in 1973, is situated at the west end of the second floor and is also undersized. It too has a combination of semi-private rooms and three-bed wards without showers or tubs. Community Hospital's "F" wing, added in 1979, includes a medical-surgical unit on the second and third floor, each with semi-private and private rooms. The second floor unit is centrally located between a 56-bed adult psychiatric unit and the Surgical Intensive Care Unit (SICU) which creates security and privacy issues. The third floor unit is adjacent to the Medical Intensive Care Unit (MICU) which must be accessed through the medical-surgical unit. Neither intensive care unit (ICU) possesses an isolation area. Although the three-bed wards are generally restricted to in-season use, and not always full, they pose significant privacy, security, safety, and health concerns. They fail to meet minimum space requirements and are a serious health risk. The evidence demonstrates that reconfiguring the wards would be extremely costly and impractical due to code compliance issues. The wards hinder the hospital's acute care utilization, and impair its ability to effectively compete with other hospitals. Surgical Department and Recovery Community Hospital's surgical department is separated into two locations including the main surgical suite on the second floor and the Endoscopy/Pain Management unit located on the first floor of "C" wing. Consequently, the department cannot share support staff and space such as preparation and recovery. The main surgical suite, adjacent recovery room, and central sterile processing are 25 years old. This unit's operating rooms, cystoscopy rooms, storage areas, work- stations, central sterile, and recovery rooms are undersized and antiquated. The 12-bay Recovery Room has no patient toilet and is lacking storage. The soiled utility room is deficient. In addition, the patient bays are extremely narrow and separated by curtains. There is no direct connection to the sterile corridor, and staff must break the sterile field to transport patients from surgery to recovery. Moreover, surgery outpatients must pass through a major public lobby going to and returning from surgery. The Emergency Department Community Hospital's existing emergency department was constructed in 1992 and is the largest provider of hospital emergency services in Pasco County, handling approximately 35,000 visits per year. The hospital is also designated a "Baker Act" receiving facility under Chapter 394, Florida Statutes, and utilizes two secure examination rooms for emergent psychiatric patients. At less than 8,000 total square feet, the emergency department is severely undersized to meet the needs of its patients. The emergency department is currently undergoing renovation which will connect the triage area to the main emergency department. The renovation will not enlarge the entrance, waiting area, storage, nursing station, nor add privacy to the patient care areas in the emergency department. The renovation will not increase the total size of the emergency department, but in fact, the department's total bed availability will decrease by five beds. Similar to other departments, a more meaningful renovation cannot occur within the emergency department without triggering costly building code compliance measures. In addition to its space limitations, the emergency department is awkwardly located. In 1992, the emergency department was relocated to the front of the hospital and is completely separated from the diagnostic imaging department which remained in the original 1971 building. Consequently, emergency patients are routinely transported across the hospital for imaging and CT scans. Issues Relating to Replacement of Community Hospital Although physically possible, renovating and expanding Community Hospital's existing facility is unreasonable. First, it is cost prohibitive. Any significant renovation to the 1971, 1975, 1977, and 1979 structures would require asbestos abatement prior to construction, at an estimated cost of $1,000,000. In addition, as previously noted, the hospital will be saddled with the major expense of complying with all current building code requirements in the 40-year-old facility. Merely installing showers in patient rooms would immediately trigger a host of expensive, albeit necessary, code requirements involving access, wiring, square footage, fireproofing columns and beams, as well as floor/ceiling and roof/ceiling assemblies. Concurrent with the significant demolition and construction costs, the hospital will experience the incalculable expense and loss of revenue related to closing major portions, if not all, of the hospital. Second, renovation and expansion to the existing facility is an unreasonable option due to its physical restrictions. The 12'4" height of the hospital's first floor limits its ability to accommodate HVAC ductwork large enough to meet current ventilation requirements. In addition, there is inadequate space to expand any department within the confines of the existing hospital without cannibalizing adjacent areas, and vertical expansion is not an option. Community Hospital's application includes a lengthy Facility Condition Assessment which factually details the architectural, mechanical, and electrical deficiencies of the hospital's existing physical plant. The assessment is accurate and reasonable. Community Hospital's Proposed Replacement Community Hospital proposes to construct a six- story, 320 licensed beds, acute care replacement facility. The hospital will consist of 548,995 gross square feet and include a 56-bed adult psychiatric unit connected by a hallway to the first floor of the main hospital building. The proposal also includes the construction of an adjacent medical office building to centralize the outpatient offices and staff physicians. The evidence establishes that the deficiencies inherent in Community Hospital's existing hospital will be cured by its replacement hospital. All patients will be provided large private rooms. The emergency department will double in size, and contain private examination rooms. All building code requirements will be met or exceeded. Patients and staff will have separate elevators from the public. In addition, the surgical department will have large operating rooms, and adequate storage. The MICU and SICU will be adjacent to each other on the second floor to avoid unnecessary traffic within the hospital. Surgical patients will be transported to the ICU via a private elevator dedicated to that purpose. Medical-surgical patient rooms will be efficiently located on the third through sixth floors, in "double-T" configuration. Community Hospital's Existing and Proposed Sites Community Hospital is currently located on a 23-acre site inside the southern boundary of New Port Richey. Single- family homes and offices occupy the two-lane residential streets that surround the site on all sides. The hospital buildings are situated on the northern half of the site, with the main parking lot located to the south, in front of the main entrance to the hospital. Marine Parkway cuts through the southern half of the site from the west, and enters the main parking lot. A private medical mall sits immediately to the west of the main parking lot and a one-acre storm-water retention pond sits to the west of the mall. A private medical office building occupies the south end of the main parking lot and a four-acre drainage easement is located in the southwest corner of the site. Community Hospital's administration has actively analyzed its existing site, aging facility, and adjacent areas. It has commissioned studies by civil engineers, health care consultants, and architects. The collective evidence demonstrates that, although on-site relocation is potentially an option, on balance, it is not a reasonable option. Replacing Community Hospital on its existing site is not practical for several reasons. First, the hospital will experience significant disruption and may be required to completely close down for a period of time. Second, the site's southwestern large four-acre parcel is necessary for storm-water retention and is unavailable for expansion. Third, a reliable cost differential is unknown given Community Hospital's inability to successfully negotiate with the city and owners of the adjacent medical office complexes to acquire additional parcels. Fourth, acquiring other adjacent properties is not a viable option since they consist of individually owned residential lots. In addition to the site's physical restrictions, the site is hindered by its location. The hospital is situated in a neighborhood between small streets and a local school. From the north and south, motorists utilize either U.S. 19, a congested corridor that accommodates approximately 50,000 vehicles per day, or Grand and Madison Streets, two-lane streets within a school zone. From the east and west, motorists utilize similar two-lane neighborhood streets including Marine Parkway, which often floods in heavy rains. Community Hospital's proposed site, on the other hand, is a 53-acre tract positioned five miles from its current facility, at the intersection of two major thoroughfares in southwestern Pasco County. The proposed site offers ample space for all facilities, parking, outpatient care, and future expansion. In addition, Community Hospital's proposed site provides reasonable access to all patients within its existing primary service area made up of zip codes 34652, 34653, 34668, 34655, 34690, and 34691. For example, the average drive times from the population centers of each zip code to the existing site of the hospital and the proposed site are as follows: Zip code Difference Existing site Proposed site 34652 3 minutes 14 minutes 11 minutes 34653 8 minutes 11 minutes 3 minutes 34668 15 minutes 21 minutes 6 minutes 34655 11 minutes 4 minutes -7 minutes 34690 11 minutes 13 minutes 2 minutes 34691 11 minutes 17 minutes 6 minutes While the average drive time from the population centroids of zip codes 34653, 34668, 34690, and 34691 to the proposed site slightly increases, it decreases from the Trinity area, where population growth has been most significant in southwestern Pasco County. In addition, a motorist's average drive time from Community Hospital's existing location to its proposed site is only 10 to 11 minutes, and patients utilizing public transportation will be able to access the new hospital via a bus stop located adjacent to the proposed site. The Condition of North Bay Facility North Bay Hospital is also an aging facility. Its original structure and portions of its physical plant are approximately 30 years old. Portions of its major mechanical systems will soon require replacement including its boilers, air handlers, and chillers. In addition, the hospital is undersized and awkwardly configured. Despite its shortcomings, however, North Bay is generally in good condition. The hospital has been consistently renovated and updated over time and is aesthetically pleasing. Moreover, its second and third floors were added in 1986, are in good shape, and structurally capable of vertical expansion. Medical Surgical Beds and ICU Units By-in-large, North Bay is comprised of undersized, semi-private rooms containing toilet and shower facilities. The hospital does not have any three-bed wards. North Bay's first floor houses all ancillary and support services including lab, radiology, pharmacy, surgery, pre-op, post-anesthesia recovery, central sterile processing and supply, kitchen and cafeteria, housekeeping and administration, as well as the mechanical, electrical, and facilities maintenance and engineering. The first floor also contains a 20-bed CMR unit and a 15-bed acute care unit. North Bay's second and third floors are mostly comprised of semi-private rooms and supporting nursing stations. Although the rooms and stations are not ideally sized, they are in relatively good shape. North Bay utilizes a single ICU with ten critical care beds. The ICU rooms and nursing stations are also undersized. A four-bed ICU ward and former nursery are routinely used to serve overflow patients. Surgery Department and Recovery North Bay utilizes a single pre-operative surgical room for all of its surgery patients. The room accommodates up to five patient beds, but has limited space for storage and pre-operative procedures. Its operating rooms are sufficiently sized. While carts and large equipment are routinely stored in hallways throughout the surgical suite, North Bay has converted the former obstetrics recovery room to surgical storage and has made efficient use of other available space. North Bay operates a small six-bed Post Anesthesia Care Unit. Nurses routinely prepare patient medications in the unit which is often crowded with staff and patients. The Emergency Department North Bay has recently expanded its emergency department. The evidence demonstrates that this department is sufficient and meets current and future expected patient volumes. Replacement Issues Relating to North Bay While it is clear that areas of North Bay's physical plant are aging, the facility is in relatively good condition. It is apparent that North Bay must soon replace significant equipment, including cast-iron sewer pipes, plumbing, boilers, and chillers which will cause some interruption to hospital operations. However, North Bay's four-page written assessment of the facility and its argument citing the need for total replacement is, on balance, not persuasive. North Bay's Proposed Replacement North Bay proposes to construct a new, state-of-the- art, hospital approximately eight miles southeast of its existing facility and intends to offer the identical array of services the hospital currently provides. North Bay's Existing and Proposed Sites North Bay's existing hospital is located on an eight-acre site with limited storm-water drainage capacity. Consequently, much of its parking area is covered by deep, porous, gravel instead of asphalt. North Bay's existing site is generally surrounded by residential properties. While the city has committed, in writing, it willingness to assist both applicants with on-site expansion, it is unknown whether North Bay can acquire additional adjacent property. North Bay's proposed site is located at the intersection of Trinity Oaks Boulevard and Mitchell Boulevard, south of Community Hospital's proposed site, and is quite spacious. It contains sufficient land for the facilities, parking, and future growth, and has all necessary infrastructure in place, including utility systems, storm- water structures, and roadways. Currently however, there is no public transportation service available to North Bay's proposed site. Projected Utilization by Applicants The evidence presented at hearing indicates that, statewide, replacement hospitals often increase a provider's acute care bed utilization. For example, Bartow Memorial Hospital, Heart of Florida Regional Medical Center, Lake City Medical Center, Florida Hospital Heartland Medical Center, South Lake Hospital, and Florida Hospital-Fish Memorial each experienced significant increases in utilization following the opening of their new hospital. The applicants in this case each project an increase in utilization following the construction of their new facility. Specifically, Community Hospital's application projects 82,685 total hospital patient days (64,427 acute care patient days) in year one (2006) of the operation of its proposed replacement facility, and 86,201 total hospital patient days (67,648 acute care patient days) in year two (2007). Using projected 2006 and 2007 population estimates, applying 2002 acute care hospital use rates which are below 50 percent, and keeping Community Hospital's acute care market share constant at its 2002 level, it is reasonably estimated that Community Hospital's existing hospital will experience 52,623 acute care patient days in 2006, and 53,451 acute care patient days in 2007. Consequently, Community Hospital's proposed facility must attain 11,804 additional acute care patient days in 2006, and 14,197 more acute care patient days in 2007, in order to achieve its projected acute care utilization. Although Community Hospital lost eight percent of the acute care market in its service area between 1995 and 2002, two-thirds of that loss was due to residents of Sub- District 5-1 acquiring services in another area. While Community Hospital experienced 78,444 acute care patient days in 1995, it projects only 64,427 acute care patient days in year one. Given the new facility and population factors, it is reasonable that the hospital will recapture half of its lost acute care market share and achieve its projections. With respect to its psychiatric unit, Community Hospital projects 16,615 adult psychiatric inpatient days in year one (2006) and 17,069 adult inpatient days in year two (2007) of the proposed replacement hospital. The evidence indicates that these projections are reasonable. Similarly, North Bay's acute care utilization rate has been consistently below 50 percent. Since 1999, the hospital has experienced declining utilization. In its application, North Bay states that it achieved total actual acute care patient days of 21,925 in 2000 and 19,824 in 2001 and the evidence at hearing indicates that North Bay experienced 17,693 total acute care patient days in 2002. North Bay projects 25,909 acute care patient days in the first year of operation of its proposed replacement hospital, and 27,334 acute care patient days in the second year of operation. Despite each applicant's current facility utilization rate, Community Hospital must increase its current acute care patient days by 20 percent to reach its projected utilization, and North Bay must increase its patient days by at least 50 percent. Given the population trends, service mix and existing competition, the evidence demonstrates that it is not possible for both applicants to simultaneously achieve their projections. In fact, it is strongly noted that the applicants' own projections are predicated upon only one applicant being approved and cannot be supported with the approval of two facilities. Local Health Plan Preferences In its local health plan for District 5, the Suncoast Health Council, Inc., adopted acute care preferences in October, 2000. The replacement of an existing hospital is not specifically addressed by any of the preferences. However, certain acute care preferences and specialty care preferences are applicable. The first applicable preference provides that preference "shall be given to an applicant who proposes to locate a new facility in an area that will improve access for Medicaid and indigent patients." It is clear that the majority of Medicaid and indigent patients live closer to the existing hospitals. However, Community Hospital proposes to move 5.5 miles from its current location, whereas North Bay proposes to move eight miles from its current location. While the short distances alone are less than significant, North Bay's proposed location is further removed from New Port Richey, is not located on a major highway or bus-route, and would therefore be less accessible to the medically indigent residents. Community Hospital's proposed site will be accessible using public transportation. Furthermore, Community Hospital has consistently provided excellent service to the medically indigent and its proposal would better serve that population. In 2000, Community Hospital provided 7.4 percent of its total patient days to Medicaid patients and 0.8 percent of its total patient days to charity patients. Community Hospital provided the highest percentage and greatest number of Medicaid patient days in Sub-District 5-1. By comparison, North Bay provided 5.8 percent of its total patient days to Medicaid patients and 0.9 percent of its total patient days to charity patients. In 2002, North Bay's Medicaid patients days declined to 3.56 percent. Finally, given the closeness and available bed space of the existing providers and the increasing population in the Trinity area, access will be improved by Community Hospital's relocation. The second local health plan preference provides that "[i]n cases where an applicant is a corporation with previously awarded certificates of need, preference shall be given to those which follow through in a timely manner to construct and operate the additional facilities or beds and do not use them for later negotiations with other organizations seeking to enter or expand the number of beds they own or control." Both applicants meet this preference. The third local health plan preference recognizes "Certificate of Need applications that provide AHCA with documentation that they provide, or propose to provide, the largest percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days in relation to other hospitals in the sub-district." Community Hospital provides the largest percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days in relation to other hospitals in Sub-District 5-1, and therefore meets this preference. The fourth local health plan preference applies to "Certificate of Need applications that demonstrate intent to serve HIV/AIDS infected persons." Both applicants accept and treat HIV/AIDS infected persons, and would continue to do so in their proposed replacement hospitals. The fifth local health plan preference recognizes "Certificate of Need applications that commit to provide a full array of acute care services including medical-surgical, intensive care, pediatric, and obstetrical services within the sub-district for which they are applying." Community Hospital qualifies since it will continue to provide its current services, including obstetrical care and psychiatric care, in its proposed replacement hospital. North Bay discontinued its pediatric and obstetrical programs in 2001, does not intend to provide them in its proposed replacement hospital, and will not provide psychiatric care. Agency Rule Preferences Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.038(6) provides an applicable preference to a facility proposing "new acute care services and capital expenditures" that has "a documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so." As the largest Medicaid provider in Sub-District 5-1, Community Hospital meets this preference better than does North Bay. North Bay's history demonstrates a declining rate of service to the medically indigent. Statutory Review Criteria Section 408.035(1), Florida Statutes: The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed in relation to the applicable district health plan District 5 includes Pasco and Pinellas County. Pasco County is rapidly developing, whereas Pinellas County is the most densely populated county in Florida. Given the population trends, service mix, and utilization rates of the existing providers, on balance, there is a need for a replacement hospital in the Trinity area. Section 408.035(2), Florida Statutes: The availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant Community Hospital and North Bay are both located in Sub-District 5-1. Each proposes to relocate to an area of southwestern Pasco County which is experiencing explosive population growth. The other general acute care hospital located in Sub-District 5-1 is Regional Medical Center Bayonet Point, which is located further north, in the Hudson area of western Pasco County. The only other acute care hospitals in Pasco County are East Pasco Medical Center, in Zephyrhills, and Pasco Community Hospital, in Dade City. Those hospitals are located in Sub-District 5-2, east Pasco County, far from the area proposed to be served by either Community Hospital or North Bay. District 5 includes Pinellas County as well as Pasco County. Helen Ellis and Mease are existing hospital providers located in Pinellas County. Helen Ellis has 168 licensed beds, consisting of 150 acute care beds and an 18-bed skilled nursing unit, and is located 7.9 miles from Community Hospital's existing location and 10.8 miles from Community Hospital's proposed location. Access to Helen Ellis for patients originating from southwestern Pasco County requires those patients to travel congested U.S. 19 south to Tarpon Springs. As a result, the average drive time from Community Hospital's existing and proposed site to Helen Ellis is approximately 22 minutes. Helen Ellis is not a reasonable alternative to Community Hospital's proposal. The applicants' proposals are specifically designed for the current and future health care needs of southwestern Pasco County. Given its financial history, it is unknown whether Helen Ellis will be financially capable of providing the necessary care to the residents of southwestern Pasco. Mease Countryside Hospital has 189 licensed acute care beds. It is located 16.0 miles from Community Hospital's existing location and 13.8 miles from Community Hospital's proposed location. The average drive time to Mease Countryside is 32 minutes from Community Hospital's existing site and 24 minutes from its proposed site. In addition, Mease Countryside Hospital has experienced extremely high utilization over the past several years, in excess of 90 percent for calendar years 2000 and 2001. Utilization at Mease Countryside Hospital has remained over 80 percent despite the addition of 45 acute care beds in April 2002. Given the growth and demand, it is unknown whether Mease can accommodate the residents in southwest Pasco County. Mease Dunedin Hospital has 189 licensed beds, consisting of 149 acute care beds, a 30-bed skilled nursing unit, five Level 2 neonatal intensive care beds, and five Level 3 neonatal intensive care beds. Its former 15-bed adult psychiatric unit has been converted into acute care beds. It is transferring its entire obstetrics program at Mease Dunedin Hospital to Mease Countryside Hospital. Mease Dunedin Hospital is located approximately 18 to 20 miles from the applicants' existing and proposed locations with an average drive time of 35-38 minutes. With their remote location, and the exceedingly high utilization at Mease Countryside Hospital, neither of the two Mease hospitals is a viable alternative to the applicants' proposals. In addition, the construction of a replacement hospital would positively impact economic development and further attract medical professionals to Sub-District 5-1. On balance, given the proximity, utilization, service array, and accessibility of the existing providers, including the applicants, the relocation of Community Hospital will enhance access to health care to the residents. Section 408.035(3), Florida Statutes: The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant's record of providing quality of care As stipulated, both applicants provide excellent quality of care. However, Community Hospital's proposal will better enhance its ability to provide quality care. Community is currently undersized, non-compliant with today's standards, and located on a site that does not allow for reasonable expansion. Its emergency department is inadequate for patient volume, and the configuration of the first floor leads to inefficiencies in the diagnosis and treatment of emergency patients. Again, most inpatients are placed in semi-private rooms and three-bed wards, with no showers or tubs, little privacy, and an increased risk of infection. The hospital's waiting areas for families of patients are antiquated and undersized, its nursing stations are small and cramped and the operating rooms and storage facilities are undersized. Community Hospital's deficiencies will be effectively eliminated by its proposed replacement hospital. As a result, patients will experience qualitatively better care by the staff who serve them. Conversely, North Bay is in better physical condition and not in need of replacement. It has more reasonable options to expand or relocate its facility on site. Quality of care at North Bay will not be markedly enhanced by the construction of a new hospital. Sections 408.035(4)and(5), Florida Statutes, have been stipulated as not applicable in this case. Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes: The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds available for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation The parties stipulated that both Community Hospital and North Bay have available health personnel and management personnel for project accomplishment and operation. In addition, the evidence proves that both applicants have sufficient funds for capital and operating expenditures. Community Hospital proposes to rely on its parent company to finance the project. Keith Giger, Vice-President of Finance for HCA, Inc., Community Hospital's parent organization, provided credible deposition testimony that HCA, Inc., will finance 100 percent of the total project cost by an inter-company loan at eight percent interest. Moreover, it is noted that the amount to be financed is actually $20 million less than the $196,849,328 stated in the CON Application, since Community Hospital previously purchased the proposed site in June 2003 with existing funds and does not need to finance the land acquisition. Community Hospital has sufficient working capital for operating expenditures of the proposed replacement hospital. North Bay, on the other hand, proposes to acquire financing from BayCare Obligated Group which includes Morton Plant Hospital Association, Inc.; Mease; and several other hospital entities. Its proposal, while feasible, is less certain since member hospitals must approve the indebtedness, thereby providing Mease with the ability to derail North Bay's proposed bond financing. Section 408.035(7), Florida Statutes: The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district The evidence proves that either proposal will enhance geographical access to the growing population in the service district. However, with its provision of obstetrical services, Community Hospital is better suited to address the needs of the younger community. With respect to financial access, both proposed relocation sites are slightly farther away from the higher elderly and indigent population centers. Since the evidence demonstrates that it is unreasonable to relocate both facilities away from the down-town area, Community Hospital's proposal, on balance, provides better access to poor patients. First, public transportation will be available to Community Hospital's site. Second, Community Hospital has an excellent record of providing care to the poor and indigent and has accepted the agency's condition to provide ten percent of its total annual patient days to Medicaid recipients To the contrary, North Bay's site will not be accessible by public transportation. In addition, North Bay has a less impressive record of providing care to the poor and indigent. Although AHCA conditioned North Bay's approval upon it providing 9.7 percent of total annual patient days to Medicaid and charity patients, instead of the 9.7 percent of gross annual revenue proposed in its application, North Bay has consistently provided Medicaid and charity patients less than seven percent of its total annual patient days. Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes: The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal Immediate financial feasibility refers to the availability of funds to capitalize and operate the proposal. See Memorial Healthcare Group, Ltd. d/b/a Memorial Hospital Jacksonville vs. AHCA et al., Case No. 02-0447 et seq. Community Hospital has acquired reliable financing for the project and has sufficiently demonstrated that its project is immediately financially feasible. North Bay's short-term financial proposal is less secure. As noted, North Bay intends to acquire financing from BayCare Obligated Group. As a member of the group, Mease, the parent company of two hospitals that oppose North Bay's application, must approve the plan. Long-term financial feasibility is the ability of the project to reach a break-even point within a reasonable period of time and at a reasonable achievable point in the future. Big Bend Hospice, Inc. vs. AHCA and Covenant Hospice, Inc., Case No. 02-0455. Although CON pro forma financial schedules typically show profitability within two to three years of operation, it is not a requirement. In fact, in some circumstances, such as the case of a replacement hospital, it may be unrealistic for the proposal to project profitability before the third or fourth year of operation. In this case, Community Hospital's utilization projections, gross and net revenues, and expense figures are reasonable. The evidence reliably demonstrates that its replacement hospital will be profitable by the fourth year of operation. The hospital's financial projections are further supported by credible evidence, including the fact that the hospital experienced financial improvement in 2002 despite its poor physical condition, declining utilization, and lost market share to providers outside of its district. In addition, the development and population trends in the Trinity area support the need for a replacement hospital in the area. Also, Community Hospital has benefited from increases in its Medicaid per diem and renegotiated managed care contracts. North Bay's long-term financial feasibility of its proposal is less certain. In calendar year 2001, North Bay incurred an operating loss of $306,000. In calendar year 2002, it incurred a loss of $1,160,000. In its CON application, however, North Bay projects operating income of $1,538,827 in 2007, yet omitted the ongoing expenses of interest ($1,600,000) and depreciation ($3,000,000) from its existing facility that North Bay intends to continue operating. Since North Bay's proposal does not project beyond year two, it is less certain whether it is financially feasible in the third or fourth year. In addition to the interest and depreciation issues, North Bay's utilization projections are less reasonable than Community Hospital's proposal. While possible, North Bay will have a difficult task achieving its projected 55 percent increase in acute care patient days in its second year of operation given its declining utilization, loss of obstetric/pediatric services and termination of two exclusive managed care contracts. Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes: The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness Both applicants have substantial unused capacity. However, Community Hospital's existing facility is at a distinct competitive disadvantage in the market place. In fact, from 1994 to 1998, Community Hospital's overall market share in its service area declined from 40.3 percent to 35.3 percent. During that same period, Helen Ellis' overall market share in Community Hospital's service area increased from 7.2 percent to 9.2 percent. From 1995 to the 12-month period ending June 30, 2002, Community Hospital's acute care market share in its service area declined from 34.0 percent to 25.9 percent. During that same period, Helen Ellis' acute care market share in Community Hospital's service area increased from 11.7 percent to 12.0 percent. In addition, acute care average occupancy rates at Mease Dunedin Hospital increased each year from 1999 through 2002. Acute care average occupancy at Mease Countryside Hospital exceeded 90 percent in 2000 and 2001, and was approximately 85 percent for the period ending June 30, 2002. Some of the loss in Community Hospital's market share is due to an out-migration of patients from its service area to hospitals in northern Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties. Market share in Community's service area by out-of- market providers increased from 33 percent in 1995 to 40 percent in 2002. Community Hospital's outdated hospital has hampered its ability to compete for patients in its service area. Mease is increasing its efforts to attract patients and currently completing a $92 million expansion of Mease Countryside Hospital. The project includes the development of 1,134 parking spaces on 30 acres of raw land north of the Mease Countryside Hospital campus and the addition of two floors to the hospital. It also involves the relocation of 51 acute care beds, the obstetrics program and the Neonatal Intensive Care Units from Mease Dunedin Hosptial to Mease Countryside Hospital. Mease is also seeking to more than double the size of the Countryside emergency department to handle its 62,000 emergency visits. With the transfer of licensed beds from Mease Dunedin Hospital to Mease Countryside Hospital, Mease will also convert formerly semi-private patient rooms to private rooms at Mease Dunedin Hospital. The approval of Community Hospital's relocated facility will enable it to better compete with the hospitals in the area and promote quality and cost- effectiveness. North Bay, on the other hand, is not operating at a distinct disadvantage, yet is still experiencing declining utilization. North Bay is the only community-owned, not-for- profit provider in western Pasco County and is a valuable asset to the city. Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes: The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods or energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction The parties stipulated that the project costs in both applications are reasonable to construct the replacement hospitals. Community Hospital's proposed construction cost per square foot is $175, and slightly less than North Bay's $178 proposal. The costs and methods of proposed construction for each proposal is reasonable. Given Community Hospital's severe site and facility problems, the evidence demonstrates that there is no reasonable, less costly, or more effective methods of construction available for its proposed replacement hospital. Additional "band-aide" approaches are not financially reasonable and will not enable Community Hospital to effectively compete. The facility is currently licensed for 401 beds, operates approximately 311 beds and is still undersized. The proposed replacement hospital will meet the standards in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-3.081, and will meet current building codes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Guidelines for Design and Construction of Hospitals and Health Care Facilities, developed by the American Institute of Architects. The opponents' argue that Community Hospital will not utilize the 320 acute care beds proposed in its CON application, and therefore, a smaller facility is a less- costly alternative. In addition, Helen Ellis' architectural expert witness provided schematic design alternatives for Community Hospital to be expanded and replaced on-site, without providing a detailed and credible cost accounting of the alternatives. Given the evidence and the law, their arguments are not persuasive. While North Bay's replacement cost figures are reasonable, given the aforementioned reasons, including the fact that the facility is in reasonably good condition and can expand vertically, on balance, it is unreasonable for North Bay to construct a replacement facility in the Trinity area. Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes: The applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent Community Hospital has consistently provided the most health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent in Sub-District 5-1. Community Hospital agreed to provide at least ten percent of its patient days to Medicaid recipients. Similarly, North Bay agreed to provide 9.7 percent of its total annual patient days to Medicaid and charity patients combined. North Bay, by contrast, provided only 3.56 percent of its total patient days to Medicaid patients in 2002, and would have to significantly reverse a declining trend in its Medicaid provision to comply with the imposed condition. Community Hospital better satisfies the criterion. Section 408.035(12) has been stipulated as not applicable in this case. Adverse Impact on Existing Providers Historical figures demonstrate that hospital market shares are not static, but fluctuate with competition. No hospital is entitled to a specific or historic market share free from competition. While the applicants are located in health planning Sub-District 5-1 and Helen Ellis and the two Mease hospitals are located in health planning Sub-District 5- 2, they compete for business. None of the opponents is a disproportionate share, safety net, Medicaid provider. As a result, AHCA gives less consideration to any potential adverse financial impact upon them resulting from the approval of either application as a low priority. The opponents, however, argue that the approval of either replacement hospital would severely affect each of them. While the precise distance from the existing facilities to the relocation sites is relevant, it is clear that neither applicants' proposed site is unreasonably close to any of the existing providers. In fact, Community Hospital intends to locate its replacement facility three miles farther away from Helen Ellis and 1.5 miles farther away from Mease Dunedin Hospital. While Helen Ellis' primary service area is seemingly fluid, as noted by its chief operating officer's hearing and deposition testimony, and the Mease hospitals are located 15 to 20 miles south, they overlap parts of the applicants' primary service areas. Accordingly, each applicant concedes that the proposed increase in their patient volume would be derived from the growing population as well as existing providers. Although it is clear that the existing providers may be more affected by the approval of Community Hosptial's proposal, the exact degree to which they will be adversely impacted by either applicant is unknown. All parties agree, however, that the existing providers will experience less adverse affects by the approval of only one applicant, as opposed to two. Furthermore, Mease concedes that its hospitals will continue to aggressively compete and will remain profitable. In fact, Mease's adverse impact analysis does not show any credible reduction in loss of acute care admissions at Mease Countryside Hospital or Mease Dunedin Hospital until 2010. Even then, the reliable evidence demonstrates that the impact is negligible. Helen Ellis, on the other hand, will likely experience a greater loss of patient volume. To achieve its utilization projections, Community Hospital will aggressively compete for and increase market share in Pinellas County zip code 34689, which borders Pasco County. While that increase does not facially prove that Helen Ellis will be materially affected by Community Hospital's replacement hospital, Helen Ellis will confront targeted competition. To minimize the potential adverse affect, Helen Ellis will aggressively compete to expand its market share in the Pinellas County zip codes south of 34689, which is experiencing population growth. In addition, Helen Ellis is targeting broader service markets, and has filed an application to establish an open- heart surgery program. While Helen Ellis will experience greater competition and financial loss, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that it will experience material financial adverse impact as a result of Community Hospital's proposed relocation. In fact, Helen Ellis' impact analysis is less than reliable. In its contribution-margin analysis, Helen Ellis utilized its actual hospital financial data as filed with AHCA for the fiscal year October 1, 2001, to September 30, 2002. The analysis included total inpatient and total outpatient service revenues found in the filed financial data, including ambulatory services and ancillary services, yet it did not include the expenses incurred in generating ambulatory or ancillary services revenue. As a result, the overstated net revenue per patient day was applied to its speculative lost number of patient days which resulted in an inflated loss of net patient service revenue. Moreover, the evidence indicates that Helen Ellis' analysis incorrectly included operational revenue and excluded expenses related to its 18-bed skilled nursing unit since neither applicant intends to operate a skilled nursing unit. While including the skilled nursing unit revenues, the analysis failed to include the sub-acute inpatient days that produced those revenues, and thereby over inflated the projected total lost net patient service revenue by over one million dollars.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Community Hospital's CON Application No. 9539, to establish a 376-bed replacement hospital in Pasco County, Sub- District 5-1, be granted; and North Bay's CON Application No. 9538, to establish a 122-bed replacement hospital in Pasco County, Sub-District 5- 1, be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Hauser, Esquire R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Metz, Hauser & Husband, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 505 Post Office Box 10909 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire R. David Prescott, Esquire Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Richard J. Saliba, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Station 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Karen A. Putnal, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP The Perkins House, Suite 200 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Darrell White, Esquire William B. Wiley, Esquire McFarlain & Cassedy, P.A. 305 South Gadsden Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 9992, filed by Sun City Hospital, Inc., d/b/a South Bay Hospital to establish a 112-bed replacement hospital in Riverview, Hillsborough County, Florida, satisfies, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule review criteria for approval.
Findings Of Fact The Parties A. South Bay South Bay is a 112-bed general acute care hospital located at 4016 Sun City Center Boulevard, Sun City Center, Florida. It has served south Hillsborough County from that location since its original construction in 1982. South Bay is a wholly-owned for-profit subsidiary of Hospital Corporation of America, Inc. (HCA), a for-profit corporation. South Bay's service area includes the immediate vicinity of Sun City Center, the communities of Ruskin and Wimauma (to the west and east of Sun City Center, respectively), and the communities of Riverview, Gibsonton, and Apollo Beach to the north. See FOF 68-72. South Bay is located on the western edge of Sun City Center. The Sun City Center area is comprised of the age- restricted communities of Sun City Center, Kings Point, Freedom Plaza, and numerous nearby senior living complexes, assisted- living facilities, and nursing homes. This area geographically comprises the developed area along the north side of State Road (SR) 674 between I–75 and U.S. Highway 301, north to 19th Avenue and south to the Little Manatee River. South Bay predominantly serves the residents of the Sun City Center area. In 2009, Sun City Center residents comprised approximately 57% of all discharges from SB. South Bay had approximately 72% market share in Sun City Center zip code 33573. (Approximately 32% of all market service area discharges came from zip code 33573.) South Bay provides educational programs at the hospital that are well–attended by community residents. South Bay provides comprehensive acute care services typical of a small to mid-sized community hospital, including emergency services, surgery, diagnostic imaging, non-invasive cardiology services, and endoscopy. It does not provide diagnostic or therapeutic cardiac catheterization or open-heart surgery. Patients requiring interventional cardiology services or open-heart surgery are taken directly by Hillsborough County Fire Rescue or other transport to a hospital providing those services, such as Brandon Regional Hospital (Brandon) or SJH, or are transferred from SB to one of those hospitals. South Bay has received a number of specialty accreditations, which include accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), specialty accreditation as an advanced primary stroke center, and specialty accreditation by the Society for Chest Pain. South Bay has also received recognition for its quality of care and, in particular, for surgical infection prevention and outstanding services relating to heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia. South Bay's 112 licensed beds comprise 104 general medical-surgical beds and eight Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds. Of the general medical-surgical beds, 64 are in semi-private rooms, where two patient beds are situated side-by-side, separated by a curtain. Forty-eight are in private rooms. Semi- private rooms present challenges in terms of infection control and patient privacy, and are no longer the standard of care in hospital design and construction. Over the years, SB has upgraded its hospital physical plant to accommodate new medical technology, including an MRI suite and state-of-the-art telemetry equipment. South Bay is implementing automated dispensing cabinets on patient floors for storage of medications and an electronic medication administration record system that provides an extra safety measure for dispensing medications. Since 2009, SB has implemented numerous programmatic initiatives that have improved the quality of care. South Bay is converting one wing of the hospital to an orthopedic unit. In 2001, South Bay completed a major expansion of its ED and support spaces, but has not added new beds. Patients presenting to the ED have received high quality of care and timely care. Since 2009, SB has improved its systems of care and triage of patients in the ED to improve patient flow and reduce ED wait times. Overall, South Bay has a reputation of providing high- quality care in a timely manner, notwithstanding problems with its physical plant and location. South Bay's utilization has been high historically. From 2006 to 2009, SB's average occupancy has been 79.5%, 80.3%, 77.2%, and 77.7%, respectively. Its number of patient discharges also increased in that time, from 6,190 in 2006 to 6,540 in 2009, at an average annual rate increase of 1.9%. (From late November until May, the seasonal months, utilization is very high, sometimes at 100% or greater.) Despite its relatively high utilization, SB has also had marginal financial results historically. It lost money in 2005 and 2007, with operating losses of $644,259 in 2005 and $1,151,496 in 2007 and bottom-line net losses of $447,957 (2005) and $698,305 (2007). The hospital had a significantly better year in 2009, with an operating gain of $3,365,113 and a bottom- line net profit of $2,144,292. However, this was achieved largely due to a reduction in bad debt from $11,927,320 in 2008 to $7,772,889 in 2009, an event the hospital does not expect to repeat, and a coincidence of high surgical volume. Its 2010 financial results were lagging behind those of 2009 at the time of the hearing. South Bay's 2009 results amount to an aberration, and it is likely that 2010 would be considerably less profitable. South Bay's marginal financial performance is due, in part, to its disproportionate share of Medicare patients and a disproportionate percentage of Medicare reimbursement in its payor mix. Medicare reimburses hospitals at a significantly lower rate than managed care payors. As noted, SB is organizationally a part of HCA's West Florida Division, and is one of two HCA-affiliated hospitals in Hillsborough County; Brandon is the other. (There are approximately 16 hospitals in this division.) Brandon has been able to add beds over the past several years, and its services include interventional cardiology and open-heart surgery. However, SB and Brandon combined still have fewer licensed beds than either St. Joseph's Hospital or Tampa General Hospital, and fewer than the BayCare Health System- affiliated hospitals in Hillsborough in total. South Bay's existing physical plant is undersized and outdated. See discussion below. Whether it has a meaningful opportunity for expansion and renovation at its 17.5-acre site is a question for this proceeding to resolve. South Bay proposes the replacement and relocation of its facility to the community of Riverview. In 2005, SB planned to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in Riverview, on a parcel owned by HCA and located on the north side of Big Bend Road between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. SB filed CON Application No. 9834 in the February 2005 batching cycle. The application was preliminarily denied by AHCA, and SB initially contested AHCA's determination. South Bay pursued the satellite hospital CON at that time because of limited availability of intercompany financing from HCA. By the time of the August 2007 batching cycle, intercompany financing had improved, allowing SB to pursue the bigger project of replacing and relocating the hospital. South Bay dismissed its petition for formal administrative hearing, allowing AHCA's preliminary denial of CON Application No. 9834 to become final, and filed CON Application No. 9992 to establish a replacement hospital facility on Big Bend Road in Riverview. St. Joseph's Hospital St. Joseph's Hospital was founded by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegany, New York, as a small hospital in a converted house in downtown Tampa in 1934. In 1967, SJH opened its existing main hospital facility on Martin Luther King Avenue in Tampa, Florida. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., a not-for-profit entity, is the licensee of St. Joseph's Hospital, an acute care hospital located at 3001 West Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard, Tampa, Florida. As a not-for-profit organization, SJH's mission is to improve the health care of the community by providing high- quality compassionate care. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is a Medicaid disproportionate share provider and provided $145 million in charity and uncompensated care in 2009. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is licensed to operate approximately 883 beds, including acute care beds; Level II and Level III neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) beds; and adult and child-adolescent psychiatric beds. The majority of beds are semi-private. Services include Level II and pediatric trauma services, angioplasty, and open-heart surgery. These beds and services are distributed among SJH's main campus; St. Joseph's Women's Hospital; St. Joseph's Hospital North, a newer satellite hospital in north Tampa; and St. Joseph's Children's Hospital. Except for St. Joseph's Hospital North, these facilities are land-locked. Nevertheless, SJH has continued to invest in its physical plant and to upgrade its medical technology and equipment. In February 2010, SJH opened St. Joseph's Hospital North, a state-of-the-art, 76-bed satellite hospital in Lutz, north Hillsborough County, at a cost of approximately $225 million. This facility is approximately 14 miles away from the main campus. This followed the award of CON No. 9610 to SJH for the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital North, which was unsuccessfully opposed by University Community Hospital and Tampa General Hospital, two existing hospital providers in Tampa. Univ. Cmty. Hosp., Inc., d/b/a Univ. Cmty. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., Case Nos. 03-0337CON and 03-0338CON. St. Joseph's Hospital North operates under the same license and under common management. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is also the holder of CON No. 9833 for the establishment of a 90-bed state-of-the-art satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, Riverview, Hillsborough County. These all private beds include general medical-surgical beds, an ICU, and a 10-bed obstetrical unit. On October 21, 2009, the Agency revised CON No. 9833 with a termination date of October 21, 2012. This project was unsuccessfully opposed by TG, SB, and Brandon. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., Case No. 05-2754CON, supra. St. Joseph's Hospital anticipates construction beginning in October 2012 and opening the satellite hospital, to be known as St. Joseph's Hospital South, in early 2015. This hospital will be operating under SJH's existing license and Medicare and Medicaid provider numbers and will in all respects be an integral component of SJH. The implementation of St. Joseph's Hospital South is underway. SJH has contracted with consultants, engineers, architects, and contractors and has funded the first phase of the project with $6 million, a portion of which has been spent. The application for CON No. 9833 refers to "evidence- based design" and the construction of a state-of-the-art facility. (The design of St. Joseph's Hospital North also uses "evidence-based design.") St. Joseph's Hospital South will have all private rooms, general surgery operating rooms as well as endoscopy, and a 10-bed obstetrics unit. Although CON No. 9833 is for a project involving 228,810 square feet of new construction, SJH intends to build a much larger facility, approximately 400,000 square feet on approximately 70 acres. St. Joseph's Hospital Main's physical plant is 43 years old. The majority of the patient rooms are semi–private and about 35% of patients admitted at this hospital received private rooms. Notwithstanding the age of its physical plant and its semi–private bed configuration, SJH has a reputation of providing high quality of care and is a strong competitor in its market. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., has two facility expansions currently in progress at its main location in Tampa: a new five-story building that will house SJH neonatal intensive care unit, obstetrical, and gynecology services; and a separate, two-story addition with 52 private patient rooms. Of the 52 private patient rooms, 26 will be dedicated to patients recovering from orthopedic surgery, and will be large enough to allow physical therapy to be done in the patient room itself. The other 26 rooms will be new medical-surgical ICU beds at the hospital. At the same time that SJH expands its main location, it is pursuing a strategic plan whereby the main location is the "hub" of its system, with community hospitals and health facilities located in outlying communities. As proposed in CON Application No. 9610, St. Joseph's Hospital North was to be 240,000 square feet in size. Following the award of CON No. 9610, SJH requested that AHCA modify the CON to provide for construction of a larger facility. In its modification request, SJH requested to establish a large, state- of-the-art facility with all private patient rooms, and the desirability of private patient rooms as a matter of infection control and patient preference. AHCA granted the modification. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., thereafter planned to construct St. Joseph's Hospital North to be four stories in height. The plan was opposed. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., offered to construct a three-story building, large enough horizontally to accommodate the CON square footage modification. The offer was accepted. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., markets St. Joseph's Hospital North as "The Hospital of the Future, Today." The hospital was constructed using "evidence-based design" to maximize operational efficiencies and enhance the healing process of its residents –- recognizing, among other things, the role of the patient's family and friends. The facility's patient care units are all state-of-the-art and include, for example, obstetrical suites in which a visiting family member can spend the night. A spacious, sunlit atrium and a "healing garden" are also provided. The hospital's dining facility is frequented by community residents. In addition, SJH owns a physician group practice under HealthPoint Medical Group, a subsidiary of St. Joseph's Health Care Center, Inc. The group practice has approximately 19 different office locations, including several within the service area for the proposed hospital. The group includes approximately 106 physicians. However, most of the office locations are in Tampa, and the group does not have an office in Riverview, although there are plans to expand locations to include the Big Bend Road site. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., anticipates having to establish a new medical staff for St. Joseph's Hospital South, and will build a medical office building at the site for the purpose of attracting physicians. It further anticipates that some number of physicians on SB's existing medical staff will apply for privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is the market leader among Hillsborough County hospitals and is currently doing well financially, as it has historically. For 2010, St. Joseph's Hospital Main's operating income was approximately $78 million. Organizationally, SJH has a parent organization, St. Joseph's Health Care Center, Inc., and is one of eight hospitals in the greater Tampa Bay area affiliated with BayCare. On behalf of its member hospitals, BayCare arranges financing for capital projects, provides support for various administrative functions, and negotiates managed care contracts that cover its members as a group. St. Joseph's Hospital characterizes fees paid for BayCare services as an allocation of expenses rather than a management fee for its services. In 2009, SJH paid BayCare approximately $42 million for services. St. Joseph's Hospital is one of three BayCare affiliates in Hillsborough County. The other two are St. Joseph's Hospital North and South Florida Baptist Hospital, a community hospital in Plant City. St. Joseph's Hospital South would be the fourth BayCare hospital in the county. Tampa General The Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, a public body appointed by the county, operated Tampa General Hospital until 1997. In that year, TG was leased to Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc., a non-profit corporation and the current hospital licensee. Tampa General is a 1,018-bed acute care hospital located at 2 Columbia Drive, Davis Island, Tampa, Florida. In addition to trauma surgery services, TG provides tertiary services, such as angioplasty, open-heart surgery, and organ transplantation. Tampa General operates the only burn center in the area. A rehabilitation hospital is connected to the main hospital, but there are plans to relocate this facility. Tampa General owns a medical office building. Tampa General is JCAHO accredited and has received numerous honors. Tampa General provides high-quality of care. Approximately half of the beds at TG are private rooms. Tampa General's service area for non-tertiary services includes all of Hillsborough County. Tampa General is also the teaching hospital for the University of South Florida's College of Medicine. As a statutory teaching hospital, TG has 550 residents and funds over 300 postgraduate physicians in training. Tampa General is the predominant provider of services to Medicaid recipients and the medically indigent of Hillsborough County. It is considered the only safety-net hospital in Hillsborough County. (A safety net hospital provides a disproportionate amount of care to indigent and underinsured patients in comparison to other hospitals.) A high volume of indigent (Medicaid and charity) patients are discharged from TG. In 2009, the costs TG incurred treating indigent patients exceeded reimbursement by $56.5 million. Approximately 33% of Tampa General's patients are Medicare patients and 25% commercial. Tampa General has grown in the past 10 years. It added 31 licensed acute care beds in 2004 and 82 more since SB's application was filed in 2007. In addition, the Bayshore Pavilion, a $300-million project, was recently completed. The project enlarged TG's ED, and added a new cardiovascular unit, a new neurosciences and trauma center, a new OB-GYN floor, and a new gastrointestinal unit. Facility improvements are generally ongoing. Tampa General's capital budget for 2011 is approximately $100 million. In 2010, TG's operating margin was approximately $43 million and a small operating margin in 2011. AHCA AHCA is the state agency that administers the CON law. Jeff Gregg testified that during his tenure, AHCA has never preliminarily denied a replacement hospital CON application or required consideration of alternatives to a replacement hospital. Mr. Gregg opined that the lack of alternatives or options is a relevant consideration when reviewing a replacement hospital CON application. T 468. The Agency's State Agency Action Report (SAAR) provides reasons for preliminarily approving SB's CON application. During the hearing, Mr. Gregg testified, in part, that the primary reasons for preliminary approval were issues related to quality of care "because the facility represents itself as being unable to expand or adapt significantly to the rapidly changing world of acute care. This is consistent with what [he has] heard about other replacement hospitals." T 413. Mr. Gregg also noted that SB focused on improving access "[a]nd as the years go by, it is reasonable to expect that the population outside of Sun City Center, the immediate Sun City Center area, will steadily increase and improve access for more people, and that's particularly true because this application includes both a freestanding emergency department and a shuttle service for the people in the immediate area. And that was intended to address their concerns based upon the fact that they have had this facility very conveniently located for them in the past at a time when there was little development in the general south Hillsborough area. But the applicant wants to position itself for the expected growth in the future, and we think has made an excellent effort to accommodate the immediate interests of Sun City Center residents with their promises to do the emergency, freestanding emergency department and the shuttle service so that the people will continue to have very comfortable access to the hospital." T 413-14. Mr. Gregg reiterated "that the improvements in quality outweigh any concerns that [the Agency] should have about the replacement and relocation of this facility; that if this facility were to be forced to remain where it is, over time it would be reasonable to expect that quality would diminish." T 435. For AHCA, replacement hospital applications receive the same level of scrutiny as any other acute care hospital applications. T 439-40. South Bay's existing facility and site South Bay is located on the north side of SR 674, an east-west thoroughfare in south Hillsborough County. The area around the hospital is "built out" with predominantly residential development. Sun City Center, an age-restricted (55 and older) retirement community, is located directly across SR 674 from the hospital as well as on the north side of SR 674 to the east of the hospital. Other residential development is immediately to the west of the hospital on the north side of SR 674. See FOF 3-6. Sun City Center is flanked by two north-south arterial roadways, I-75 to the west and U.S. Highway 301 to the east, both of which intersect with SR 674. The community of Ruskin is situated generally around the intersection of SR 674 and U.S. 41, west of I-75. The community of Wimauma is situated along SR 674 just east of U.S. Highway 301. South Bay is located in a three-story building that is well–maintained and in relatively good repair. The facility is well laid out in terms of design as a community hospital. Patients and staff at SB are satisfied with the quality of care and scope of acute care services provided at the hospital. Notwithstanding current space limitations, and problems in the ICU, see FOF 77-82, patients receive a high quality of care. One of the stated reasons for replacement is with respect to SB's request to have all private patient rooms in order to be more competitive with St. Joseph's Hospital South. South Bay's inpatient rooms are located within the original construction. The hospital is approximately 115,800 square feet, or a little over 1,000 square feet per inpatient bed. By comparison, small to mid-sized community hospitals built today are commonly 2,400 square feet per inpatient bed on average. All of SB's patient care units are undersized by today's standards, with the exception of the ED. ICU patients, often not ambulatory, require a higher level of care than other hospital patients. The ICU at SB is not adequate to meet the level of care required by the ICU patient. SB's ICU comprises eight rooms with one bed apiece. Eight beds are not enough. As Dr. Ksaibati put it at hearing: "Right now we have eight and we are always short . . . double . . . the number of beds, that's at least [the] minimum [t]hat I expect we are going to have if we go to a new facility." T 198-99 (emphasis added). The shortage of beds is not the only problem. The size of SB's ICU rooms is too small. (Problems with the ICU have existed at least since 2006.) Inadequate size prohibits separate, adjoining bathrooms. For patients able to leave their beds, therefore, portable bathroom equipment in the ICU room is required. Inadequate size, the presence of furniture, and the presence of equipment in the ICU room creates serious quality of care issues. When an EKG is conducted, the nurse cannot be present in the room. Otherwise, there would be no space for the EKG equipment. It is difficult to intubate a patient and, at times, "extremely dangerous." T 170. A major concern is when a life-threatening problem occurs that requires emergency treatment at the ICU patient's bedside. For example, when a cardiac arrest "code" is called, furniture and the portable bathroom equipment must be removed before emergency cardiac staff and equipment necessary to restore the function of the patient's heart can reach the patient for the commencement of treatment. Comparison to ICU rooms at other facilities underscores the inadequate size of SB's ICU rooms. Many of the ICU rooms at Brandon are much larger -- more than twice the size of SB's ICU rooms. Support spaces are inadequate in most areas, resulting in corridors (at times) being used for inappropriate storage. In addition, the hospital's general storage is inadequate, resulting in movable equipment being stored in mechanical and electrical rooms. Of the medical-surgical beds at SB, 48 are private and 64 are semi-private. The current standard in hospital design is for acute care hospitals to have private rooms exclusively. Private patient rooms are superior to semi-private rooms for infection control and patient well-being in general. The patient is spared the disruption and occasional unpleasantness that accompanies sharing a patient room –- for example, another patient's persistent cough or inability to use the toilet (many of SB's semi-private rooms have bedside commodes). Private rooms are generally recognized as promoting quality of care. South Bay's site is approximately 17.5 acres, bordered on all sides by parcels not owned by either SB or by HCA- affiliated entities. The facility is set back from SR 674 by a visitor parking lot. Proceeding clockwise around the facility from the visitor parking lot, there is a small service road on the western edge of the site; two large, adjacent ponds for stormwater retention; the rear parking lot for ED visitors and patients; and another small service road which connects the east side of the site to SR 674, and which is used by ambulances to access the ED. Dedicated parking for SB's employees is absent. A medical office building (MOB), which is not owned by SB, is located to the north of the ED parking lot. The MOB houses SB's Human Resources Department as well as medical offices. Most of SB's specialty physicians have either full or part-time offices in close proximity to SB. Employee parking is not available in the MOB parking lot. Some of SB's employees park in a hospital-owned parking lot to the north of the MOB, and then walk around the MOB to enter the hospital. South Bay's CEO and management employees park on a strip of a gravel lot, which is rented from the Methodist church to the northeast of the hospital's site. In 2007, as part of the CON application to relocate, SB commissioned a site and facility assessment (SFA) of the hospital. The SFA was prepared for the purpose of supporting SB's replacement hospital application and has not been updated since its preparation in 2007. The architects or engineers who prepared the SFA were not asked to evaluate proposed options for expansion or upgrade of SB on-site. However, the SFA concludes that the SB site has been built out to its maximum capacity. On the other hand, the SFA concluded that the existing building systems at SB met codes and standards in force when constructed and are in adequate condition and have the capacity to meet the current needs of the hospital. The report also stated that if SB wanted to substantially expand its physical plant to accommodate future growth, upgrades to some of the existing building systems likely would be required. Notwithstanding these reports and relative costs, expansion of SB at its existing site is not realistic or cost- effective as compared to a replacement hospital. Vertical expansion is complicated by two factors. First, the hospital's original construction in 1982 was done under the former Southern Standard Building Code, which did not contain the "wind-loading" requirements of the present-day Florida Building Code. Any vertical expansion of SB would not only require the new construction to meet current wind-loading requirements, but would also require the original construction to be retrofitted to meet current wind-loading requirements (assuming this was even possible as a structural matter). Second, if vertical expansion were to meet current standards for hospital square footage, the new floor or floors would "overhang" the smaller existing construction, complicating utility connections from the lower floor as well as the placement of structural columns to support the additional load. The alternative (assuming feasibility due to current wind-loading requirements) would be to vertically stack patient care units identical to SB's existing patient care units, thereby perpetuating its undersized and outdated design. Vertical expansion at SB has not been proposed by the Gould Turner Group (Gould Turner), which did a Master Facility Plan for SB in May 2010, but included a new patient bed tower, or by HBE Corporation (HBE). Horizontal expansion of SB is no less complicated. The hospital would more than double in size to meet the modern-day standard of 2,400 square feet per bed, and its site is too small for such expansion. It is apparent that such expansion would displace the visitor parking lot if located to the south of the existing building, and likely have to extend into SR 674 itself. South Bay's architectural consultant expert witness substantiated that replacing SB is justified as an architectural matter, and that the facility cannot be brought up to present-day standards at its existing location. According to Mr. Siconolfi, the overall building at SB is approximately half of the total size that would normally be in place for a new hospital meeting modern codes and industry standards. The more modest expansions offered by Gould Turner and HBE are still problematic, if feasible at all. Moreover, with either proposal, SB would ultimately remain on its existing 17.5-acre site, with few opportunities to expand further. Gould Turner's study was requested by SB's CEO in May 2010, to determine whether and to what extent SB would be able to expand on-site. (Gould Turner was involved with SB's recent ED expansion project area.) The resulting Master Facility Plan essentially proposes building a new patient tower in SB's existing visitor parking lot, to the left and right of the existing main entrance to SB. This would require construction of a new visitor parking lot in whatever space remained in between the new construction and SR 674. The Master Facility Plan contains no discussion of the new impervious area that would be added to the site and the consequential requirement of additional stormwater capacity, assuming the site can even accommodate additional stormwater capacity. This study also included a new 12-bed ICU and the existing ICU would be renovated into private patient rooms. For example, "[t]he second floor would be all telemetry beds while the third floor would be a combination of medical/surgical, PCU, and telemetry beds." In Gould Turner's drawings, the construction itself would be to the left and to the right of the hospital's existing main entrance. Two scenarios are proposed: in the first, the hospital's existing semi-private rooms would become private rooms and, with the new construction, the hospital would have 114 licensed beds (including two new beds), all private; in the second, some of the hospital's existing semi-private rooms would become private rooms and, with the new construction, the hospital would have 146 licensed beds (adding 34 beds), of which 32 would be semi-private. South Bay did not consider Gould Turner's alternative further or request additional, more detailed drawings or analysis, and instead determined to pursue the replacement hospital project, in part, because it was better not to "piecemeal" the hospital together. Mr. Miller, who is responsible for strategic decisions regarding SB, was aware of, but did not review the Master Facility Plan and believes that it is not economically feasible to expand the hospital. St. Joseph's Hospital presented testimony of an architect representing the hospital design/build firm of HBE, to evaluate SB's current condition, to provide options for expansion and upgrading on-site, and to provide a professional cost estimate for the expansion. Mr. Oliver personally inspected SB's site and facility in October 2010 and reviewed numerous reports regarding the facility and other documents. Mr. Oliver performed an analysis of SB's existing physical plant and land surrounding the hospital. HBE's analysis concluded that SB has the option to expand and upgrade on-site, including the construction of a modern surgical suite, a modern 10-bed ICU, additional elevators, and expansion and upgrading of the ancillary support spaces identified by SB as less than ideal. HBE's proposal involves the addition of 50,000 square feet of space to the hospital through the construction of a three-story patient tower at the south side of the hospital. The additional square footage included in the HBE proposal would allow the hospital to convert to an all-private bed configuration with either 126 private beds by building out both second and third floors of a new patient tower, or to 126 private beds if the hospital chose to "shell in" the third floor for future expansion. Under the HBE proposal, SB would have the option to increase its licensed bed capacity 158 beds by completing the second and third floors of the new patient tower (all private rooms) while maintaining the mix of semi-private and private patient rooms in the existing bed tower. The HBE proposal also provides for a phased renovation of the interior of SB to allow for an expanded post-anesthesia care unit, expanded laboratory, pharmacy, endoscopy, women's center, prep/hold/recovery areas, central sterile supply and distribution, expanded dining, and a new covered lobby entrance to the left side of the hospital. Phasing of the expansion would permit the hospital to remain in operation during expansion and renovation with minimal disruption. During construction the north entrance of the hospital would provide access through the waiting rooms that are currently part of the 2001 renovated area of the hospital with direct access to the circulation patterns of the hospital. The HBE proposal also provides for the addition of parking to bring the number of parking spaces on-site to 400. The HBE proposal includes additional stormwater retention/detention areas that could serve as attractive water features and, similar to the earlier civil engineering reports obtained by SB, proposes the construction of a parking garage at the rear of the facility should additional parking be needed in the future. However, HBE essentially proposes the alternative already rejected by SB: construction of a new patient tower in front of the existing hospital. Similar to Gould Turner, HBE proposes new construction to the left and right of the hospital's existing lobby entrance and the other changes described above. HBE's proposal recognizes the need for additional stormwater retention: the stand of trees that sets off the existing visitor parking lot from SR 674 would be uprooted; in their place, a retention pond would be constructed. Approval of the Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD) would be required for the proposal to be feasible. Assuming the SWFWMD approved the proposal, the retention pond would have to be enclosed by a fence. This would then be the "face" of the hospital to the public on SR 674. HBE's proposal poses significant problems. The first floor of the three-story component would be flush against the exterior wall of the hospital's administrative offices, where the CEO and others currently have windows with a vista of the front parking lot and SR 674. Since the three-story component would be constructed first in the "phased" construction, and since the hospital's administration has no other place to work in the existing facility, the CEO and other management team would have to work off-site until the new administrative offices (to the left of the existing hospital lobby entrance) were constructed. The existing main entrance to the hospital, which faces SR 674, would be relocated to the west side of the hospital once construction was completed in its entirety. In the interim, patients and visitors would have to enter the facility from the rear, as the existing main entrance would be inaccessible. This would be for a period of months, if not longer. For the second and third floors, HBE's proposal poses two scenarios. Under the first, SB would build the 24 general medical-surgical beds on the tower's second floor, but leave the third floor as "shelled" space. This would leave SB with a total of 106 licensed beds, six fewer than it has at present. Further, since HBE's proposal involves a second ICU at SB, 18 of the 106 beds are ICU beds, leaving 88 general medical-surgical beds. By comparison, SB currently has 104 general medical- surgical beds, meaning that it loses 16 general medical-surgical beds under HBE's first scenario. In the second scenario, SB would build 24 general medical-surgical beds on the third floor as well, and would have a total of 126 licensed beds. Since 18 of those beds would be ICU beds, SB would have 108 general medical-surgical beds, or only four more than it has at present. Further, the proposal does not make SB appreciably bigger. The second and third floors in HBE's proposal are designed in "elongated" fashion such that several rooms may be obscured from the nursing station's line of sight by a new elevator, which is undesirable as a matter of patient safety and security. Further, construction of the second and third floors would be against the existing second and third floors above the lobby entrance's east side. This would require 12 existing private patient rooms to be taken out of service due to loss of their vista windows. At the same time, the new second and third floors would be parallel to, but set back from, existing semi- private patient rooms and their vista windows along the southeast side of the hospital. This means that patients and visitors in the existing semi-private patient rooms and patients and visitors in the new private patient rooms on the north side of the new construction may be looking into each other's rooms. HBE's proposal also involves reorganization and renovation of SB's existing facility, and the demolition and disruption that goes with it. To accommodate patient circulation within the existing facility from the ED (at the north side of the hospital) to the new patient tower (at the south side of the hospital), two new corridors are proposed to be routed through and displace the existing departments of Data Processing and Medical Records. Thus, until the new administrative office space would be constructed, Data Processing and Medical Records (along with the management team) would have to be relocated off-site. Once the new first floor of the three-story component is completed, the hospital's four ORs and six PACU beds will be relocated there. In the existing vacated surgical space, HBE proposes to relocate SB's existing cardiology unit, thus requiring the vacated surgical space to be completely reconfigured (building a nursing station and support spaces that do not currently exist in that location). In the space vacated by the existing cardiology unit, HBE proposed expanding the hospital's clinical laboratory, meaning extensive demolition and reconfiguration in that area. The pharmacy is proposed to be relocated to where the existing PACU is located, requiring the building of a new pharmacy with a secure area for controlled substances, cabinets for other medications, and the like. The vacated existing pharmacy is in turn proposed to be dedicated to general storage, which involves still more construction and demolition, tearing out the old pharmacy to make the space suitable for general storage. HBE's proposal is described as a "substantial upgrade" of SB, but it was stated that a substantial upgrade could likewise be achieved by replacing the facility outright. This is SB's preference, which is not unreasonable. There have been documented problems with other hospital expansions, including patient infection due to construction dust. South Bay's proposal South Bay proposes to establish a 112-bed replacement hospital on a 39-acre parcel (acquired in 2005) located in the Riverview community, on the north side of Big Bend Road between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. The hospital is designed to include 32 observation beds built to acute care occupancy standards, to be available for conversion to licensed acute care beds should the need arise. The original total project cost of $215,641,934, calculated when the application was filed in October 2007 has been revised to $192,967,399. The decrease in total project cost is largely due to the decrease in construction costs since 2007. The parties stipulated that SB's estimated construction costs are reasonable. The remainder of the project budget is likewise reasonable. The budgeted number for land, $9,400,000, is more than SB needs: the 39-acre parcel is held in its behalf by HCA Services of Florida, Inc., and was acquired in March 2005 for $7,823,100. An environmental study has been done, and the site has no environmental development issues. The original site preparation budgeted number of $5 million has been increased to $7 million to allow for possible impact fees, based on HCA's experience with similar projects. Building costs, other than construction cost, flow from the construction cost number as a matter of percentages and are reasonable. The equipment costs are reasonable. Construction period interest as revised from the original project budget is approximately $4 million less, commensurate with the revised project cost. Other smaller numbers in the budget, such as contingencies and start-up costs, were calculated in the usual and accepted manner for estimated project costs and are reasonable. South Bay's proposed service area (PSA) comprises six zip codes (33573 (Sun City Center), 33570 (Ruskin), 33569 (Riverview), 33598 (Wimauma), 33572 (Apollo Beach), and 33534 (Gibsonton)) in South Hillsborough County. These six zip codes accounted for 92.2% of SB's discharges in 2006. The first three zip codes, which include Riverview (33569), accounted for 76.1% of the discharges. Following the filing of the application in 2007, the U.S. Postal Service subdivided the former zip code 33569 into three zip codes: 33569, 33578, and 33579. (The proposed service area consists of eight zip codes.) The same geographic area comprises the three Riverview zip codes taken together as the former zip code 33569. In 2009, the three Riverview zip codes combined accounted for approximately 504 to 511/514 of SB's discharges, with 589 discharges in 2006 from the zip code 33569. Of SB's total discharges in 2009, approximately 8 to 9% originated from these three zip codes. In 2009, approximately 7,398 out of 14,424 market/service-area discharges, or approximately 51% of the total market discharges came from the three southern zip codes, 33573 (Sun City Center), 33570 (Ruskin), and 33598 (Wimauma). Also, approximately 81% of SB's discharges in 2009 originated from the same three zip codes. (The discharge numbers for SB for 2009 presented by St. Joseph's Hospital and SB are similar. See SB Ex. 9 at 11 and SJH Ex. 4 at 8-9. See also TG Ex. 4 at 3-4.) In 2009, SB and Brandon had an approximate 68% market share for the eight zip codes. See FOF 152-54 and 162-65 for additional demographic data. St. Joseph's Hospital had an approximate 5% market share within the service area and using 2009-2010 data, TG had approximately 6% market share in zip code 33573 and an overall market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 19% and a market share of approximately 23% in zip code 33579. South Bay's application projects 37,292 patient days in year 1; 39,581 patient days in year 2; and 41,563 patient days in year 3 for the proposed replacement hospital. The projection was based on the January 2007 population for the service area as reflected in the application, and what was then a projected population growth rate of 20.8% for the five-year period 2007 to 2012. These projections were updated for the purposes of hearing. See FOF 246-7. The application also noted a downturn in the housing market, which began in 2007 and has continued since then. The application projected a five-year (2007-2012) change of 20.8% for the original five zip codes. At hearing, SB introduced updated utilization projections for 2010-2015, which show the service area population growing at 15.3% for that five-year period. South Bay's revised utilization projections for 2015- 2017 (projected years 1-3 of the replacement hospital) are 28,168 patient days in year 1; 28,569 patient days in year 2; and 29,582 patient days in year 3. The lesser utilization as compared with SB's original projections is partly due to slowed population growth, but predominantly due to SB's assumption that St. Joseph's Hospital will build its proposed satellite hospital in Riverview, and that SB will accordingly lose 20% of its market share. The revised utilization projections are conservative, reasonable, and achievable. With the relocation, SB will be more proximate to the entirety of its service area, and will be toward the center of population growth in south Hillsborough County. In addition, it will have a more viable and more sustainable hospital operation even with the reduced market share. Its financial projections reflect a better payor mix and profitability in the proposed location despite the projection of fewer patient days. Conversely, if SB remains in Sun City Center, it is subject to material operating losses even if its lost market share in that location is the same 20%, as compared to the 30 to 40% it estimates that it would lose in competition with St. Joseph's Hospital South. South Bay's medical staff and employees support the replacement facility, notwithstanding that their satisfaction with SB is very high. The proposal is also supported by various business organizations, including the Riverview Chamber of Commerce and Ruskin Chamber of Commerce. However, many of the residents of Sun City Center who testified opposed relocation of SB. See FOF 210-11. South Bay will accept several preconditions on approval of its CON application: (1) the location of SB on Big Bend Road in Riverview; (2) combined Medicaid and charity care equal to 7.0% of gross revenues; and (3) operating a free- standing ED at the Sun City location and providing a shuttle service between the Sun City location and the new hospital campus ("for patients and visitors"). SB Ex. 46, Schedule C. In its SAAR, the Agency preliminarily approved the application including the following: This approval includes, as a component of the proposal: the operation of a freestanding emergency department on a 24-hour, seven-day per week basis at the current Sun City location, the provision of extended hours shuttle service between the existing Sun City Center and the new campuses to transport patients and visitors between the facilities to locations; and the offering of primary care and diagnostic testing at the Sun City Center location. These components are required services to be provided by the replacement hospital as approved by the Agency. Mr. Gregg explained that the requirement for transport of patients and visitors was included based on his understanding of the concerns of the Sun City Center community for emergency as well as routine access to hospital services. Notwithstanding the Agency statement that the foregoing elements are required, the Agency did not condition approval on the described elements. See SB Ex. 12 at 39 and 67. Instead, the Agency only required SB, as a condition of approval, to provide a minimum of 7.0% of the hospital's patient days to Medicaid and charity care patients. (As noted above, SB's proposed condition says 7.0% of gross revenues.) Because conditions on approval of the CON are generally subject to modification, there would be no legal mechanism for monitoring or enforcement of the aspects of the project not made a condition of approval. If the Agency approves SB's CON application, the Agency should condition any approval based on the conditions referenced above, which SB set forth in its CON application. SB Ex. 12 at 39 and 67. See also T 450 ("[The Agency] can take any statement made in the application and turn that into a condition," although conditions may be modified.1 St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General are critical of SB's offer of a freestanding ED and proposed shuttle transportation services. Other than agreeing to condition its CON application by offering these services, SB has not evaluated the manner in which these services would be offered. South Bay envisions that the shuttle service (provided without charge) would be more for visitors than it would be for patients and for outpatients or patients that are ambulatory and able to ride by shuttle. Other patients would be expected to be transported by EMS or other medical transport. As of the date of hearing, Hillsborough County does not have a protocol to address the transport of patients to a freestanding ED. South Bay contacted Hillsborough County Fire Rescue prior to filing its CON application and was advised that they would support SB's establishment of a satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, but did not support the closure and relocation of SB, even with a freestanding ED left behind. See FOF 195-207. At hearing, SB representatives stated that SB would not be closed if the project is denied. Compliance with applicable statutory and rule criteria Section 408.035(1): The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed The need for SB itself and at its current location is not an issue in this case. That need was demonstrated years ago, when SB was initially approved. For the Agency, consideration of a replacement hospital application "diminishes the concept of need in [the Agency's] weighing and balancing of criteria in this case." There is no express language in the CON law, as amended, which indicates that CON review of a replacement hospital application does not require consideration of other statutory review criteria, including "need," unless otherwise stipulated. Replacement hospital applicants, like SB, may advocate the need for replacement rather than expansion or renovation of the existing hospital, but a showing of "need" is still required. Nevertheless, institution-specific factors may be relevant when "need" is considered. The determination of "need" for SB's relocation involves an analysis of whether the relocation of the hospital as proposed will enhance access or quality of care, and whether the relocation may result in changes in the health care delivery system that may adversely impact the community, as well as options SB may have for expansion or upgrading on-site. In this case, the overall "need" for the project is resolved, in part, by considering, in conjunction with weighing and balancing other statutory criteria, including quality of care, whether the institution-specific needs of SB to replace the existing hospital are more reasonable than other alternatives, including renovation and whether, if replacement is recommended, the residents of the service area, including the Sun City Center area, will retain reasonable access to general acute care hospital services. The overall need for the project has not been proven. See COL 360-70 for ultimate conclusions of law regarding the need for this project. Section 408.035(2): The availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant The "service district" in this case is acute care subdistrict 6-1, Hillsborough County. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-2.100. The acute care hospital services SB proposes to relocate to Big Bend Road are available to residents of SB's service area. Except as otherwise noted herein with respect to constraints at SB, there are no capacity constraints limiting access to acute care hospital services in the subdistrict. The availability of acute care services for residents of the service area, and specifically the Riverview area, will increase with the opening of St. Joseph's Hospital South. All existing providers serving the service area provide high quality of care. Within the service district as a whole, SB proposes to relocate the existing hospital approximately 5.7 linear miles north of its current location and approximately 7.7 miles using I-75, one exit north. South Bay would remain in south Hillsborough County, as well as the southernmost existing health care facility in Hillsborough County, along with St. Joseph's Hospital South when it is constructed. The eight zip codes of SB's proposed service area occupy a large area of south Hillsborough County south of Tampa (to the northwest) and Brandon (to the northeast). Included are the communities of Gibsonton, Riverview, Apollo Beach, Ruskin, Sun City Center, and Wimauma. The service area is still growing despite the housing downturn, with a forecast of 15.3% growth for the five-year period 2010 to 2015. The service area's population is projected to be 168,344 in 2015, increasing from 145,986 in 2010. The service area is currently served primarily by SB, which is the only existing provider in the service area, and Brandon. For non-tertiary, non-specialty discharges from the service area in 2009, SB had approximately 40% market share, including market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 10% (33569), 6% (33578), and 16% (33579). Brandon had approximately 28% of the market in the service area, and a market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 58% (33569), 46% (33578), and 40% (33579). Thus, SB and Brandon have approximately a 61% market share in the Riverview zip codes and approximately a 68% market share service area-wide. The persuasive evidence indicates that Riverview is the center of present and future population in the service area. It is the fastest-growing part of the service area overall and the fastest-growing part of the service area for patients age 65 and over. Of the projected 168,334 residents in 2015, the three Riverview zip codes account for 80,779 or nearly half the total population. With its proposed relocation to Riverview, SB will be situated in the most populous and fastest-growing part of south Hillsborough County. At the same time, it will be between seven and eight minutes farther away from Sun City Center. In conjunction with St. Joseph's Hospital South when constructed, SB's proposed relocation will enhance the availability and accessibility of existing health care facilities and health services in south Hillsborough County, especially for the Riverview-area residents. However, it is likely that access will be reduced for the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area needing general acute care hospital services. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General contend that: (1) it would be problematic to locate two hospitals in close proximity in Riverview (those being St. Joseph's Hospital South and the relocated SB hospital) and (2) SB's relocation would deprive Sun City Center's elderly of reasonable access to hospital services. St. Joseph's Hospital seems to agree that the utilization projections for SB's replacement hospital are reasonable. Also, St. Joseph's Hospital expects St. Joseph's Hospital South to reach its utilization as projected in CON Application No. 9833, notwithstanding the decline in population growth and the proposed establishment of SB's proposed replacement hospital, although the achievement of projected utilization may be extended. There are examples of Florida hospitals operating successfully in close proximity. The evidence at hearing included examples where existing unaffiliated acute care hospitals in Florida operate within three miles of each another; in two of those, the two hospitals are less than one-half mile apart. These hospitals have been in operation for years. However, some or all of the examples preceded CON review. There are also demographic differences and other unique factors in the service areas in the five examples that could explain the close proximity of the hospitals. Also, in three of the five examples, at least one of the hospitals had an operating loss and most appeared underutilized. One such example, however, is pertinent in this case: Tallahassee Memorial Hospital and Capital Regional Medical Center (CRMC) in Tallahassee, which are approximately six minutes apart by car. CRMC was formerly Tallahassee Community Hospital (TCH), a struggling, older facility with a majority of semi-private patient rooms, similar to South Bay. Sharon Roush, SB's current CEO, became CEO at TCH in 1999. As she explained at hearing, HCA was able to successfully replace the facility outright on the same parcel of land. TCH was renamed CRMC and re-opened as a state-of-the-art hospital facility with all private rooms. The transformation improved the hospital's quality of care and its attractiveness to patients, better enabling it to compete with Tallahassee Memorial Hospital. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General also contend that SB's relocation would deprive Sun City Center's elderly of reasonable access to hospital services. When the application was filed in 2007, Sun City Center residents in zip code 33573 accounted for approximately 52% of all acute care discharges to SB and SB had a 69% market share. By 2009, Sun City Center residents accounted for approximately 57% of all SB discharges and SB had approximately 72% market share. Approximately half of the age 65-plus residents in the service area reside within the Sun City Center area. This was true in 2010 and will continue to be true in 2015. The projected percentage of the total population in the Sun City Center zip code over 65 for 2009-2010 is approximately 87%. This percentage is expected to grow to approximately 91% by 2015. Sun City Center also has a high percentage of residents who are over the age of 75. Demand for acute care hospital services is largely driven by the age of the population. The age 65-plus population utilizes acute-care hospital services at a rate that is approximately two to three times that of the age 64 and younger population. South Bay plans to relocate its hospital from the Sun City Center zip code 33573 much closer to an area (Riverview covering three zip codes) that has a less elderly population. Elderly patients are known to have more transportation difficulties than other segments of the population, particularly with respect to night driving and congested traffic in busy areas. Appropriate transportation services for individuals who are transportation disadvantaged typically require door-to- door pickup, but may vary from community to community. At the time of preliminary approval of SB's proposed relocation, the Agency was not provided and did not take into consideration data reflecting the percentage of persons in Sun City Center area who are aged 65 or older or aged 75 and older. The Agency was not provided data reflecting the number of residents within the Sun City Center area who reside in nursing homes or assisted living facilities. In general, the 2010 median household incomes and median home values for the residents of Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Gibsonton are materially less than the income and home values for the residents from the other service areas. Freedom Village is located near Sun City Center and within walking distance to SB. Freedom Village is comprises a nursing home, assisted living, and senior independent living facilities, and includes approximately 120 skilled nursing facility beds, 90 assisted living beds, and 30 Alzheimer's beds. Freedom Village is home to approximately 1,500 people. There are additional skilled nursing and assisted living facilities within one to two miles of SB comprising approximately an additional 400 to 500 skilled nursing facility beds and approximately 1,500 to 2,000 residents in assistant or independent living facilities. Residents in skilled nursing facilities and assisted living facilities generally require a substantial level of acute- care services on an ongoing basis. Many patients 65 and older requiring admission to an acute-care facility have complex medical conditions and co-morbidities such that immediate access to inpatient acute care services is of prime importance. Area patients and caregivers travel to SB via a golf cart to access outpatient health care services and to obtain post-discharge follow-up care. Although there are some crossing points along SR 674, golf carts are not allowed on SR 674 itself, and the majority of Sun City Center residents who utilize SB in its existing location do not arrive by golf cart -– rather, they travel by automobile. The Sun City Center area has a long–established culture of volunteerism. Residents of Sun City Center provide a substantial number of man-hours of volunteer services to community organizations, including SB. Among the many services provided by community volunteers is the Sun City Center Emergency Squad, an emergency medical transport service that operates three ambulances and provides EMT and basic life support transport services in Sun City Center 24-hours a day, seven days a week. The Emergency Squad provides emergency services free of charge, but charges patients for transport which is deemed a non-emergency. Most patients transported by the Emergency Squad are taken to the SB ED. It is customary for specialists to locate their offices adjacent to an acute-care hospital. Most of the specialty physicians on the medical staff of SB have full-time or part-time offices adjacent to SB. The location of physician offices adjacent to the hospital facilitates access to care by patients in the provision of care on a timely basis by physicians. The relocation of SB may result in the relocation of physician offices currently operating adjacent to SB in Sun City Center, which may cause additional access problems for local residents. In 2009, the SB ED had approximately 22,000 patient visits. Approximately 25% of the patients that visit the South Bay ED are admitted for inpatient care. South Bay recently expanded its ED to accommodate approximately 34,000 patient visits annually. The average age of patients who visit the South Bay ED is approximately 70. Patients who travel by ambulance may or may not experience undue transportation difficulties as a result of the proposed relocation of SB; however, patients also arrive at the South Bay ED by private transportation. But, most patients are transported to the ED by automobile or emergency transport. In October 2010, the Board of Directors of the Sun City Center Association adopted a resolution on behalf of its 11,000 members opposing the closure of SB. The Board of Directors and membership of Federation of Kings Point passed a similar resolution on behalf of its members. Residents of the Sun City Center area currently enjoy easy access to SB in part because the roadways are low-volume, low-speed, accessible residential streets. SR 674 is the only east-west roadway connecting residents of the Sun City Center area to I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. The section of SR 674 between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301 is a four-lane divided roadway with a speed limit of 40-45 mph. To access Big Bend Road from the Sun City Center area, residents travel east on SR 674 then north on U.S. Highway 301 or west on SR 674 then north on I-75. U.S. Highway 301 is a two-lane undivided roadway from SR 674 north to Balm Road, with a speed limit of 55 mph and a number of driveways and intersections accessing the roadway. (Two lanes from Balm Road South, then widened to six lanes from Balm Road North.) U.S. Highway 301 is a busy and congested roadway, and there is a significant backup of traffic turning left from U.S. Highway 301 onto Big Bend Road. A portion of U.S. Highway 301 is being widened to six lanes, from Balm Road to Big Bend Road. The widening of this portion of U.S. Highway 301 is not likely to alleviate the backup of traffic at Big Bend Road. I-75 is the only other north-south alternative for residents of the Sun City Center area seeking access to Big Bend Road. I-75 is a busy four-lane interstate with a 70 mph speed limit. The exchange on I-75 and Big Bend Road is problematic not only because of traffic volume, but also because of the unusual design of the interchange, which offloads all traffic on the south side of Big Bend Road, rather than divide traffic to the north and south as is typically done in freeway design. The design of the interchange at I-75 in Big Bend Road creates additional backup and delays for traffic seeking to exit onto Big Bend Road. St. Joseph's Hospital commissioned a travel (drive) time study that compared travel times to SB's existing location and to its proposed location from three intersections within Sun City Center. This showed an increase of between seven and eight minutes' average travel time to get to the proposed location as compared to the existing location of SB. The study corroborated SB's travel time analysis, included in its CON application, which shows four minutes to get to SB from the "centroid" of zip code 33573 (Sun City Center) and 11 minutes to get to SB's proposed location from that centroid, or a difference of seven minutes. The St. Joseph's Hospital travel time study also sets forth the average travel times from the three Sun City Center intersections to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop, as follows: Intersection Using I-75 Using U.S. 301 South Pebble Beach Blvd. and Weatherford Drive 12 min. 17 secs. 14 min. 19 secs. Kings Blvd. and Manchester Woods Drive 15 min. 44 secs. 20 min. 39 secs. North Pebble Beach Blvd. and Ft. Dusquesna Drive 13 min. 15 secs. 15 min. 41 secs. The average travel time from Wimauma (Center Street and Delia Street) to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop was 15 minutes and 16 seconds using I-75 and 13 minutes and 52 seconds using U.S. Highway 301, an increase of more than six minutes to the proposed site. The average travel time from Ruskin (7th Street and 4th Avenue SW) to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop was 15 minutes and 22 seconds using U.S. 41 and 14 minutes and 15 seconds using I-75, an increase of more than five minutes to the proposed site. Currently, the average travel time from Sun City Center to Big Bend Road using U.S. Highway 301 is approximately to 16 minutes. The average travel time to Big Bend Road via I-75 assuming travel with the flow of traffic is approximately 13 minutes. The incremental increase in travel time to the proposed site for SB for residents of the Sun City Center area, assuming travel with the flow of traffic, ranges from nine to 11 minutes. For residents who currently access SB in approximately five to 10 minutes, travel time to Big Bend Road is approximately 15 to 20 minutes. As the area develops, traffic is likely to continue to increase. There are no funded roadway improvements beyond the current widening of U.S. Highway 301 north of Balm Road. Most of the roadways serving Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Wimauma have a county-adopted Level of Service (LOS) of "D." LOS designations range from "A" to "F", with "F" considered gridlock. Currently, Big Bend Road from Simmons Loop Road (the approximate location of SB's propose replacement hospital) to I-75 is at LOS "F" with an average travel speed of less than mph. Based on a conservative analysis of the projected growth in traffic volume, SR 674 east of U.S. Highway 301 is projected to degrade from LOS "C" to "F" by 2015. By 2020, several additional links on SR 674 will have degraded to LOS "F." The LOS of I-75 is expected to drop to "D" in the entirety of Big Bend Road between U.S. Highway 301 and I-75 is projected to degrade to LOS "F" by 2020. The Hillsborough County Fire Rescue Department (Rescue Department) opposes the relocation of SB to Big Bend Road. The Rescue Department supports SB's establishment of a satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, but does not support the closure of SB in Sun City Center. The Rescue Department anticipates that the relocation of SB will result in a reduction in access to emergency services for patients and increased incident response times for the Rescue Department. The Rescue Department would support a freestanding ED should SB relocate. David Travis, formerly (until February 2010) the rescue division chief of the Rescue Department, testified against SB's proposal. The basis of his opposition is his concern that relocating the hospital from Sun City Center to Riverview would tend to increase response times for rescue units operating out of the Sun City Center Fire Station. The term response time refers to the time from dispatch of the rescue unit to its arrival on the scene for a given call. Mr. Travis noted that rescue units responding from the Sun City Center Fire Station would make a longer drive (perhaps seven to eight minutes) to the new location in Riverview to the extent that hospital services are needed, and during the time of transportation would necessarily be unavailable to respond to another call. However, Mr. Travis had not specifically quantified increases in response times for Sun City Center's rescue units in the event that SB relocates. Further, SB is not the sole destination for the Rescue Department's Sun City Center rescue units. While a majority of the patients were transported to SB, out of the total patient transports from the greater Sun City Center area in 2009, approximately one-third went to other hospitals other than SB, including St. Joseph's Hospital, Tampa General, and Brandon. The Rescue Department is the only advanced life support (ALS) ground transport service in the unincorporated areas of Hillsborough County responding to 911 calls. The ALS vehicles provide at least one certified paramedic on the vehicle, cardiac monitors, IV medications, advanced air way equipment, and other services. The Rescue Department has two rescue units in south Hillsborough County - Station 17 in Ruskin and Station 28 in Sun City Center. (Station 22 is in Wimauma, but does not have a rescue unit.) Stations 17 and 28 run the majority of their calls in and around the Sun City Center area, with the majority of transports to the South Bay ED. The Rescue Department had 3,643 transports from the Sun City Center area in 2009, with 54.5% transports to SB. If SB is relocated to Big Bend Road, the rescue units for Stations 17 and 28 are likely to experience longer out-of- service intervals and may not be as readily available for responding to calls in their primary service area. The Rescue Department seeks to place an individual on the scene within approximately seven minutes, 90% of the time (an ALS personnel goal) in the Sun City Center area. Relocation of SB out of Sun City Center may make it difficult for the Rescue Department to meet this response time, notwithstanding the proximity of I-75. A rapid response time is critical to providing quality care. The establishment of a freestanding ED in Sun City Center would not completely alleviate the Rescue Department's concerns, including a subset of patients who may need to be transported to a general acute care facility. There are other licensed emergency medical service providers in Hillsborough County, with at least one basic life support EMS provider in Sun City Center. The shuttle service proposed by SB may not alleviate the transportation difficulties experienced by the patients and caregivers of Sun City Center. Also, SB has not provided a plan for the scope or method of the provisional shuttle services. Six residents of Sun City Center testified against SB's proposed relocation to Riverview, including Ed Barnes, president of the Sun City Center Community Association. Mr. Barnes and two other Sun City Center residents (including Donald Schings, president of the Handicapped Club, Sun City Center) spoke in favor of St. Joseph's Hospital's proposed hospital in Riverview at a public land-use meeting in July 2010, thus demonstrating their willingness to travel to Riverview for hospital services. Mr. Barnes supported St. Joseph's Hospital's proposal for a hospital in Riverview since its inception in 2005, when St. Joseph's Hospital filed CON Application No. 9833 and thought that St. Joseph's Hospital South would serve the Sun City Center area. There are no public transportation services per se available within the Sun City Center area. Volunteer transportation services are provided. In part, the door-to-door services are provided under the auspices of the Samaritan Services, a non-profit organization supported by donations and staffed by Sun City Center volunteers. It is in doubt whether these services would continue if SB is relocated. There is a volunteer emergency squad using a few vehicles that responds to emergency calls within the Sun City Center area, with SB as the most frequent destination. Approval of SB's project will not necessarily enhance financial access to acute care services. The relocation of SB is more likely than not to create some access barriers for low- income residents of the service area. The relocation would also be farther away from communities such as Ruskin and Wimauma as there are no buses or other forms of public transportation available in Ruskin, Sun City Center, or Wimauma. However, it appears that the Sun City Center residents would travel not only to Riverview, but north of Riverview for hospital services following SB's relocation, notwithstanding the fact that Sun City Center residents are transportation- disadvantaged. The Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners recently amended the Comprehensive Land-Use Plan and adopted the Greater Sun City Center Community Plan, which, in part, lists the retention of an acute care hospital in the Sun City Center area as the highest health care planning priority. For Sun City Center residents who may not want to drive to SB's new location, SB will provide a shuttle bus, which can convey both non-emergency patients and visitors. South Bay has made the provision of the shuttle bus a condition of its CON. As noted herein, the CON's other conditions are the establishment of the replacement hospital at the site in Riverview; combined Medicaid and charity care in the amount of 7.0% of gross revenues; and maintaining a freestanding ED at SB. SB Ex. 46, Schedule C. Section 408.035(3): The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant's record of providing quality of care South Bay has a record of providing high quality of care at its existing hospital. It is accredited by JCAHO, and also accredited as a primary stroke center and chest pain center. In the first quarter of 2010, SB scored well on "core measures" used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as an indicator of the quality of patient safety. South Bay received recognition for its infection control programs and successfully implemented numerous other quality initiatives. Patient satisfaction is high at SB. AHCA's view of the need for a replacement hospital is not limited according to whether or not the existing hospital meets broad quality indicators, such as JCAHO accreditation. Rather, AHCA recognizes the degree to which quality would be improved by the proposed replacement hospital -– and largely on that basis has consistently approved CON applications for replacement hospitals since at least 1991. See FOF 64-66. South Bay would have a greater ability to provide quality of care in its proposed replacement hospital. Private patient rooms are superior in terms of infection control and the patient's general well-being. The conceptual design for the hospital, included in the CON application, is the same evidence- based design that HCA used for Methodist Stone Oak Hospital, an award-winning, state-of-the-art hospital in San Antonio, Texas. Some rooms at SB are small, but SB staff and physicians are able, for the most part, to function appropriately and provide high quality of care notwithstanding. (The ICU is the exception, although it was said that patients receive quality of care in the ICU. See FOF 77-82.) Most of the rooms in the ED "are good size." Some residents are willing to give up a private room in order to have better access of care and the convenience of care to family members at SB's existing facility. By comparison, the alternative suggested by St. Joseph's Hospital does not use evidence-based design and involves gutting and rearranging roughly one-third of SB's existing interior; depends upon erecting a new patient tower that would require parking and stormwater capacity that SB currently does not have; requires SB's administration to relocate off-site during an indeterminate construction period; and involves estimated project costs that its witnesses did not disclose the basis of, claiming that the information was proprietary. South Bay's physicians are likely to apply for privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. Moreover, if SB remains at its current site, it is reasonable to expect that some number of those physicians would do less business at SB or leave the medical staff. Many of SB's physicians have their primary medical offices in Brandon, or otherwise north of Sun City Center. Further, many of the specialists at SB are also on staff at Brandon. St. Joseph's Hospital South would be more convenient for those physicians, in addition to having the allure of a new, state-of-the-art hospital. South Bay is struggling with its nursing vacancy rate, which was 12.3% for 2010 at the time of the hearing and had increased from 9.9% in 2009. The jump in nursing vacancies in 2010 substantially returned the hospital to its 2008 rate, which was 12.4%. As with its physicians, SB's nurses generally do not reside in the Sun City Center area giving its age restrictions as a retirement community; instead, they live further north in south Hillsborough County. In October 2007 when the application was filed, SB had approximately 105 employees who lived in Riverview. It is reasonable to expect that SB's nurses will be attracted to St. Joseph's Hospital South, a new, state-of-the-art hospital closer to where they live. Thus, if it is denied the opportunity to replace and relocate its hospital, SB could also expect to lose nursing staff to St. Joseph's Hospital South, increasing its nursing vacancy rate. Section 408.035(4): The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation The parties stipulated that Schedule 2 of SB's CON application was complete and required no proof at hearing. South Bay will not have to recruit nursing or physician staff for its proposed replacement hospital. Its existing medical and nursing staff would not change, and would effectively "travel" with the hospital to its new location. Conversely, the replacement hospital should enhance SB's ability to recruit specialty physicians, which is currently a challenge for SB in its existing facility. The parties stipulated to the reasonableness of SB's proposed staffing for the replacement hospital as set out in Schedule 6A, but SJH and TG contend that the staffing schedule should also include full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) for the freestanding ED that SB proposes to maintain at its existing hospital. This contention is addressed in the Conclusions of Law, concerning application completeness under section 408.037, at COL 356-57. South Bay has sufficient funds for capital and operating expenditures for project accomplishment and operation. The project cost will be underwritten by HCA, which has adequate cash flow and credit opportunities. It is reasonable that SB's project will be adequately funded if the CON is approved. Section 408.035(5): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district The specific area that SB primarily serves, and would continue to serve, is the service area in south Hillsborough County as identified in its application and exhibits. The discussion in section IV.B., supra, is applicable to this criterion and incorporated herein. With its proposed relocation to Riverview, SB will be situated in the most populous and fastest-growing part of south Hillsborough County; will be available to serve Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Wimauma; and will be between seven and eight minutes farther away from Sun City Center than it is at present. However, while the relocated facility will be available to the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area, access for these future patients will be reduced from current levels given the increase in transportation time, whether it be by emergency vehicle or otherwise. Section 408.035(6): The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal Immediate or "short-term" financial feasibility is the ability of the applicant to secure the funds necessary to capitalize and operate the proposed project. The project cost for SB's proposed replacement hospital is approximately $200 million. The costs associated with the establishment and operation of the freestanding ED and other services were not included in the application, but for the reasons stated herein, were not required to be projected in SB's CON application. South Bay demonstrated the short-term financial feasibility of the proposal. The estimated project cost has declined since the filing of the application in 2007, meaning that SB will require less capital than originally forecast. While Mr. Miller stated that he does not have authority to bind HCA to a $200 million capital project, HCA has indicated that it will provide full financing for the project, and that it will go forward with the project if awarded the CON. Long-term financial feasibility refers to the ability of a proposed project to generate a profit in a reasonable period of time. AHCA has previously approved hospital proposals that showed a net profit in the third year of pro forma operation or later. See generally Cent. Fla. Reg. Hosp., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin. & Oviedo HMA, Inc., Case No. 05-0296CON (Fla. DOAH Aug. 23, 2006; Fla. AHCA Jan. 1, 2007), aff'd, 973 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). To be conservative, SB's projections, updated for purposes of hearing, take into account the slower population growth in south Hillsborough County since the application was originally filed. South Bay also assumed that St. Joseph's Hospital South will be built and operational by 2015. The net effect, as accounted for in the updated projections, is that SB's replacement hospital will have 28,168 patient days in year 1 (2015); 28,569 patient days in year 2 (2016); and 29,582 patient days in year 3 (2017). That patient volume is reasonable and achievable. With the updated utilization forecast, SB projects a net profit for the replacement hospital of $711,610 in 2015; $960,693 in 2016; and $1,658,757 in 2017. The financial forecast was done, using revenue and expense projections appropriately based upon SB's own most recent (2009) financial data. Adjustments made were to the payor mix and the degree of outpatient services, each of which would change due to the relocation to Riverview. The revenue projections for the replacement hospital were tested for reasonableness against existing hospitals in SB's peer group, using actual financial data as reported to AHCA. St. Joseph's Hospital opposed SB's financial projections. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert did not take issue with SB's forecasted market growth. Rather, it was suggested that there was insufficient market growth to support the future patient utilization projections for St. Joseph's Hospital South and SB at its new location and, as a result, they would have a difficult time achieving their volume forecasts and/or they would need to draw patients from other hospitals, such as Brandon, in order to meet utilization projections. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert criticized the increase in SB's projected revenues in its proposed new location as compared to its revenues in its existing location. However, it appears that SB's payor mix is projected to change in the new location, with a greater percentage of commercial managed care, thus generating the greater revenue. South Bay's projected revenue in the commercial indemnity insurance classification was also criticized because SB's projected commercial indemnity revenues were materially overstated. That criticism was based upon the commercial indemnity insurance revenues of St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General, which were used as a basis to "adjust" SB's projected revenue downward. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General's fiscal-year 2009 commercial indemnity net revenue was divided by their inpatient days, added an inflation factor, and then multiplied the result by SB's year 1 (2015) inpatient days to recast SB's projected commercial indemnity net revenue. The contention is effectively that SB's commercial indemnity net revenue would be the same as that of St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General. There is no similarity between the three hospitals in the commercial indemnity classification. The majority of SJH's and TG's commercial indemnity net revenue comes from inpatients rather than outpatient cases; whereas the majority of SB's commercial indemnity net revenue comes from outpatient cases rather than inpatients. This may explain why SB's total commercial indemnity net revenue is higher than SJH or TG, when divided by inpatient days. The application of the lower St. Joseph's Hospital-Tampa General per-patient-day number to project SB's experience does not appear justified. It is likely that SB's project will be financially feasible in the short and long-term. Section 408.035(7): The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness South Bay and Brandon are the dominant providers of health care services in SB's service area. This dominance is likely to be eroded once St. Joseph's Hospital South is operational in and around 2015 (on Big Bend Road) if SB's relocation project is not approved. The proposed relocation of SB's facility will not change the geography of SB's service area. However, it will change SB's draw of patients from within the zip codes in the service area. The relocation of SB is expected to increase SB's market share in the three northern Riverview zip codes. This increase can be expected to come at the expense of other providers in the market, including TG and SJH, and St. Joseph's Hospital South when operational. The potential impact to St. Joseph's Hospital may be approximately $1.6 million based on the projected redirection of patients from St. Joseph's Hospital Main to St. Joseph's Hospital South, population growth in the area, and the relocation of SB. Economic impacts to TG are of record. Tampa General estimates a material impact of $6.4 million if relocation is approved. Notwithstanding, addressing "provider-based competition," AHCA in its SAAR noted: Considering the current location is effectively built out at 112 beds (according to the applicant), this project will allow the applicant to increase its bed size as needed along with the growth in population (the applicant's schedules begin with 144 beds in year one of the project). This will shield the applicant from a loss in market share caused by capacity issues and allow the applicant and its affiliates the opportunity to maintain and/or increase its dominant market share. SB Ex. 12 at 55. AHCA's observation that replacement and relocation of SB "will shield the applicant from a loss in market share caused by capacity issues" has taken on a new dimension since the issuance of the SAAR. At that time, St. Joseph's Hospital did not have final approval of CON No. 9833 for the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South. It is likely that St. Joseph's Hospital South will be operational on Big Bend Road, and as a result, SB, at its existing location, will experience a diminished market share, especially from the Riverview zip codes. In 2015 (when St. Joseph's Hospital proposes to open St. Joseph's Hospital South), SB projects losing $2,669,335 if SB remains in Sun City Center with a 20% loss in market share. The losses are projected to increase to $3,434,113 in 2016 and $4,255,573 in 2017. It follows that the losses would be commensurately more severe at the 30% to 40% loss of market share that SB expects if it remains in Sun City Center. St. Joseph's Hospital criticized SB's projections for its existing hospital if it remains in Sun City Center with a 20% loss in market share; however, the criticism was not persuasively proven. It was assumed that SB's expenses would decrease commensurately with its projected fewer patient days, thus enabling it to turn a profit in calendar year 2015 despite substantially reduced patient service revenue. However, it was also stated that expenses such as hospital administration, pharmacy administration, and nursing administration, which the analysis assumed to be variable, in fact have a substantial "fixed" component that does not vary regardless of patient census. South Bay would not, therefore, pay roughly $5 million less in "Administration and Overhead" expenses in 2015 as calculated. To the contrary, its expenses for "Administration and Overhead" would most likely remain substantially the same, as calculated by Mr. Weiner, and would have to be paid, notwithstanding SB's reduced revenue. The only expenses that were recognized as fixed by SJH's expert, and held constant, were SB's calendar year 2009 depreciation ($3,410,001) and short-term interest ($762,738), shown in the exhibit as $4,172,739 both in 2009 and 2015. Other expenses in SJH's analysis are fixed, but were inappropriately assumed to be variable: for example, "Rent, Insurance, Other," which is shown as $1,865,839 in 2009, appears to decrease to $1,462,059 in 2015. The justification offered at hearing, that such expenses can be re-negotiated by a hospital in the middle of a binding contract, is not reasonable. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert opined that SB's estimate of a 30 to 40% loss of market share (if SB remained in Sun City Center concurrent with the operation of St. Joseph's Hospital South) was "much higher than it should be," asserting that the loss would not be that great even if all of SB's Riverview discharges went to St. Joseph's Hospital South. (Mr. Richardson believes the "10 to 20 percent level is likely reasonable," although he opines that a 5 to 10% impact will likely occur.) However, this criticism assumes that a majority of the patients that currently choose SB would remain at SB at its existing location. The record reflects that Sun City Center area residents actively supported the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South, thus suggesting that they might use the new facility. Further, SB's physicians are likely to join the medical staff of St. Joseph's Hospital South to facilitate that utilization or to potentially lose their patients to physicians with admitting privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. Tampa General's expert also asserted that SB would remain profitable if it remained in its current location, notwithstanding the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South. It was contended that SB's net operating revenues per adjusted patient day increased at an annual rate of 5.3% from 2005 to 2009, whereas the average annual increase from 2009 to 2017 in SB's existing hospital projections amounts to 1.8%. On that basis, he opined that SB should be profitable in 2017 at its existing location, notwithstanding a loss in market share to St. Joseph's Hospital South. However, the 5.3% average annual increase from 2005 to 2009 is not necessarily predictive of SB's future performance, and the evidence indicated the opposite. Tampa General's expert did not examine SB's performance year-by-year from 2005 to 2009, but rather compared 2005 and 2009 data to calculate the 5.3% average annual increase over the five-year period. This analysis overlooks the hospital's uneven performance during that time, which included operating losses (and overall net losses) in 2005 and 2007. Further, the evidence showed that the biggest increase in SB's net revenue during that five-year period took place from 2008 to 2009, and was largely due to a significant decrease in bad debt in 2009. SB Ex. 16 at 64. (Bad debt is accounted for as a deduction from gross revenue: thus, the greater the amount of bad debt, the less net revenue all else being equal; the lesser the amount of bad debt, the greater the amount of net revenue all else being equal.) The evidence further showed that the 2009 reduction in bad debt and the hospital's profitability that year, is unlikely to be repeated. Overall, approval of the project is more likely to increase competition in the service area between the three health care providers/systems. Denial of the project is more likely to have a negative effect on competition in the service area, although it will continue to make general acute care services available and accessible to the Sun City Center area elderly (and family and volunteer support). Approval of the project is likely to improve the quality of care and cost-effectiveness of the services provided by SB, but will reduce access for the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area needing general acute care hospital services who will be required to be transported by emergency vehicle or otherwise to one of the two Big Bend Road hospitals, unless needed services, such as open heart surgery, are only available elsewhere. For example, if a patient presents to SB needing balloon angioplasty or open heart surgery, the patient is transferred to an appropriate facility such as Brandon. The presence of an ED on the current SB site may alleviate the reduction in access somewhat for some acute care services, although the precise nature and extent of the proposed services were not explained with precision. If its application is denied, SB expects to remain operational so long as it remains financially viable. Section 408.035(8): The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction The parties stipulated that the costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision, were reasonable. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General did not stipulate concerning the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction, and take the position that SB should renovate and expand its existing facility rather than replace and relocate the facility. Whether section 408.035(8) requires consideration (weighing and balancing with other statutory criteria) of potential renovation costs as alternatives to relocation was hotly debated in this case. For the reasons stated herein, it is determined that this subsection, in conjunction with other statutory criteria, requires consideration of potential renovation versus replacement of an existing facility. St. Joseph's Hospital offered expert opinion that SB could expand and upgrade its existing facility for approximately $25 million. These projected costs include site work; site utilities; all construction, architectural, and engineering services; chiller; air handlers; interior design; retention basins; and required movable equipment. This cost is substantially less than the approximate $200 million cost of the proposed relocation. It was proven that there are alternatives to replacing SB. There is testimony that if SB were to undertake renovation and expansion as proposed by SJH, such upgrades would improve SB's competitive and financial position. But, the alternatives proposed by SJH and TG are disfavored by SB and are determined, on this record, not to be reasonable based on the institutional- specific needs of SB. Section 408.035(9): The applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent Approval of SB's application will not significantly enhance access to Medicaid, charity, or underserved population groups. South Bay currently provides approximately 4% of its patient days to Medicaid beneficiaries and about 1% to charity care. South Bay's historic provision of services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent is reasonable in view of its location in Sun City Center, which results in a disproportionate share of Medicare in its current payor mix. South Bay also does not offer obstetrics, a service which accounts for a significant degree of Medicaid patient days. South Bay proposes to provide 7% of its "gross patient revenue" to Medicaid and charity patients as part of its relocation. South Bay's proposed service percentage is reasonable. Section 408.035(10): The applicant's designation as a Gold Seal Program nursing facility pursuant to s. 400.235, when the applicant is requesting additional nursing home beds at that facility The parties stipulated that this criterion is not applicable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying CON Application No. 9992. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2011.
Findings Of Fact The Parties St. Joseph's is a tertiary care hospital located at 3001 West Buffalo Avenue, Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. There is spatial capacity for 703 beds at St. Joseph's, but only 649 beds are licensed, staffed and in use. It is sponsored by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegheny, and is a subsidiary of a holding company, St. Joseph's Health Care Center, Inc. Without CON approval, St. Joseph's cannot increase licensed bed capacity at its current facility on West Buffalo Avenue, or open the satellite facility which is here at issue. St. Joseph's current service area includes Hillsborough County, particularly the central and northern portions of the County. Occupancy rates for St. Joseph's in medical surgical areas have been approximately 80 percent, and at peak times have exceeded 90 percent. However during the last half of 1986, the occupancy rate fell to 74 percent. St. Joseph's provided 16.8 percent of all Medicaid care in Hillsborough County during 1982-83 and 17 percent during 1983-84. It is second to Tampa General in provision of health care to indigents in Hillsborough County. With the exception of Tampa General, St. Joseph's has the largest Medicaid patient admissions of all Hillsborough County hospitals. In 1986, the bad debt/charity care/Medicaid contractual discount for St. Joseph's was approximately $11.3 million. However, while 6.9 percent of all patient days county wide are Medicaid patient days, St. Joseph's has only 5 percent Medicaid patient days. The cost of indigent care is absorbed and offset by paying patients. St. Joseph's decision to seek approval for a satellite in the Carrollwood area is a wise business decision since there is a high percentage of paying patients residing in that area of Hillsborough County. St. Joseph's has a 23 percent market share of all patient days reported in Hillsborough County, the largest market share for all hospital medical- surgical services provided in the County, and also has the largest market share in the proposed service are of the satellite. Its market share of paying patients is much higher than for Medicaid or indigent patients. However, since 1984 St. Joseph's market share has been declining while Tampa General's has been increasing. A relatively high proportion of admissions at St. Joseph's current facility, over 40 percent, are obtained through its emergency room. The proposed satellite will have an emergency room, but it will not offer the same intensity of services as at the current facility on West Buffalo Avenue. The Department is the state agency with the authority and responsibility to consider CON applications. Intervenor Humana of Florida, d/b/a Tampa Women's Hospital (Humana) owns and operates a 192 bed women's hospital in Tampa, Florida, which includes 96 obstetrical beds. Its occupancy rate in 1986 was approximately 50 percent. Intervenor University Community Hospital (University) is an existing hospital with 404 licensed and 320 operating beds located on East Fletcher Avenue, Tampa, Florida, and offers a full range of acute care hospital services. University is located within the service area of the proposed satellite and has been experiencing a decline in patient days from 109,000 in 1983 to 84,000 in 1986. It has had to reduce its number of employees in the last three years by 15 percent-20 percent. University has a 57 percent occupancy rate. Intervenor Tampa General Hospital (Tampa General) operates a publically supported hospital in Tampa, Florida, providing a full range of acute care services, including obstetrical/gynecological services with 707 licensed and 619 operating beds. Tampa General has CON approval for 1000 beds if it completes planned renovations. It has an occupancy rate of 80 percent-82 percent and is treating 70 percent of all Medicaid patients in Hillsborough County. Tampa General has provided $70 million of indigent care, including $40 million in charity, annually. Carrollwood is within its service and marketing area. Intervenor AMI Town and Country Medical Center (Town and Country) is a 201 bed general acute care hospital located at 6001 Webb Road, Tampa, Florida. Its occupancy rate in 1986 was approximately 46 percent. There is no dispute among the parties regarding the standing of Intervenors in this proceeding. The occupancy rates at University, Town and Country and Humana are substantially below optimal levels, and substantial unused capacity exists at each of these hospitals. St. Joseph's proposed satellite will not offer any services that are not currently available to residents of the proposed service area, and will duplicate services at University, Town and Country, and Carrollwood Community Hospital, as well as services provided at St. Joseph's existing facility. The Application and Project On or about October 15, 1985 St. Joseph's filed with the Department an application for CON 4288. This application sought approval for a 150 bed general acute care satellite hospital in Carrollwood, Hillsborough County, Florida, and proposed the transfer of 150 existing licensed beds from St. Joseph's facility on West Buffalo Avenue, Tampa, to the satellite. The estimated total cost of this project was $16,775,000. Specifically, St. Joseph's proposed the transfer of 96 medical/surgical beds, including ICU, CCU and progressive care beds, 15 obstetrical beds and 39 pediatric beds, including PICU. The Department provided St. Joseph's with an omissions letter on or about November 14, 1985, to which St. Joseph's responded on or about December 30, 1985. By letter dated February 28, 1986, the Department preliminarily denied St. Joseph's application for CON 4288 stating, "The project is not justified by the 1985 District VI Health Plan or the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan." The Department's decision to deny this application was published in Volume 12, Number 11, Florida Administrative Weekly, on March 14, 1986, and St. Joseph's filed its petition for formal administrative hearing on April 4, 1986. On or about February 18, 1987 St. Joseph's and the Department executed a Stipulation and Settlement Agreement which, in pertinent part, provides: DHRS finds and agrees that there is a need for St. Joseph's to relocate and transfer 100 acute-care beds (but not any licensed obstetrical beds) and acute-care services (but not any obstetrical services) from its existing acute-care hospital and construct a 100 bed acute-care satellite hospital in Hillsborough County in light of a balance review of all relevant criteria established by Section 381.494 Florida Statutes, including the levels of indigent and Medicaid care agreed to herein. The project will occur entirely within Hillsborough County and not result in any increase in licensed beds for St. Joseph's. DHRS agrees that a partial approval of the St. Joseph's CON Application will satisfy this need and that said application should be partially approved as hereinbelow further specified ... The agreements and commitments made by DHRS in paragraph 1 above are predicated on commitments made by St. Joseph's concerning its intention to provide certain percentages of Medicaid and indigent care in its proposed satellite hospital and to seek only partial approval of its application as specified herein... St. Joseph's commitments, which are relied upon by DHRS and which shall be set forth as conditions in said CON, are as follows: Not less than 3.5 percent of the total number of admissions at St. Joseph's satellite hospital shall be rendered to Medicaid patients. Not less than 3.0 percent of said total admissions shall be rendered to non-Medicaid "charity/uncompensated" patients whose family income as applicable for the twelve months prior to determination of eligibility is equal to or less than 150 percent of the then current Federal Poverty Guidelines. St. Joseph's shall obtain and retain sufficient information to verify this eligibility determination. The 3.0 percent "charity/uncompensated" patients shall be acknowledged as such at admission, shall not include patients receiving third party payments and shall be in addition to St. Joseph's "bad debt" patients... DHRS specifically recognizes the lengthy history and mission of St. Joseph's in providing extensive indigent care services in Hillsborough County. St. Joseph's agrees to undertake a diligent and good faith effort to encourage physicians on its medical staff to admit and treat Medicaid and charity/uncompensated care patients in such numbers as to comply with the minimum percentages established in paragraph (a)above ... (e) St. Joseph's agrees that it will request at hearing and henceforth seek only partial approval of its proposed CON Application, as follows: The satellite facility shall be reduced in scope from 150 licensed beds to 100 licensed beds. The number of licensed beds to be relocated from the existing St. Joseph's Hospital shall be reduced in scope from 150 licensed beds to 100 licensed beds. None of the licensed beds to be relocated to the satellite hospital shall include licensed obstetrical beds, nor shall the obstetrical services, if any, provided at St. Joseph's existing hospital be relocated to the satellite facility. Labor, delivery and nursery facilities shall be deleted from the satellite hospital. DHRS has consistently maintained the proposed square footage and project cost is inadequate for a 150 bed hospital and more appropriate for a 100 bed hospital. Therefore, the total square footage and total project cost shall remain unchanged... The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement referred to in Finding of Fact 21 was executed following, and in consideration of, additional information prepared and submitted by St. Joseph's to the Department on or about January 30, 1987 and February 9, 1987. At hearing, St. Joseph's and the Department sought partial approval of CON 4288 to conform to the terms of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement. Intervenors opposed such partial approval. The partial approval sought by St. Joseph's and the Department represents an identifiable portion of St. Joseph's original CON application. Originally, St. Joseph's sought approval to transfer 150 acute care beds, including obstetrical, but at hearing St. Joseph's sought approval for a transfer of only 100 acute care beds, without obstetrical. Labor, delivery and nursery facilities have been deleted from the satellite proposal, but total square footage, physical designs and total cost of the project remain the same for the partial approval sought at hearing compared with the original application. The number of operating rooms has also remained the same. The proposed location in Carrollwood, Hillsborough County, remains unchanged. The project at issue in this case is a 100 bed acute care satellite hospital with, 96,500 total gross square footage (965 gross square feet per bed). The schematic plan submitted by St. Joseph's provides for the following beds and includes, but is not limited to, the following facilities: (72 private rooms, 2 Semi-private); pediatric beds (5 private, 5 semi-private), ICU/CCU (9 beds); space for radiology/nuclear medicine, emergency and outpatient services, laboratory, physical therapy, pharmacy, EEG/EKG, inhalation therapy, surgical suite, sterilization suite, cafeteria, laundry, storage, maintenance, chapel, nurses office, and other miscellaneous facilities. Total project costs are estimated at $16,775,000, the same as for the original 150 bed transfer proposal. The land upon which the satellite will be located was purchased for $3 million in cash. The satellite will be able to operate at a higher occupancy level than St. Joseph's existing hospital due to the larger proportion of single bed rooms and less severe cases being treated at the satellite. After review of St. Joseph's original application for the transfer of 150 acute care beds in March 1986, the Department concluded that the proposed gross square footage per bed of 643 was below the standard range of 800-1000 gross square feet per bed, and also that the total project cost estimate of $111,833 per bed was way below the average standard range of $175,000 to $200,000 per bed. After review of the identifiable portion of St. Joseph's application for which approval was sought at hearing, the Department concluded that the total gross square footage of the satellite, square footage per bed, construction estimates, and the total project cost estimates were reasonable and acceptable. The gross square footage was raised from 643 to 965, and the cost per bed was increased from $111,833 to $167,750. The Service Area The area which St. Joseph's proposes to serve with its satellite hospital is the Carrollwood area of northwest Hillsborough County which is located in the Department's District VI. This is the fastest growing area in Hillsborough County, with an average age which is lower than the rest of the County, and an average income level above the County average. Specifically, almost 35 percent of the population in the satellite's proposed primary service area was between 25 and 44 years old in 1980, compared with approximately 28 percent for the County. In the category of 65 years and older, the primary service area had 8.2 percent of its population, while the County had 11.4 percent. A higher percentage of paying patients reside within the proposed service area than for Hillsborough County as a whole. Nevertheless, 6 percent 7 percent of the service area population have incomes below the federal poverty level, compared with 16 percent for the County as a whole. The area is already served by Medicaid providers. St. Joseph's medical roster indicates over 140 of its physicians have offices in the satellite's proposed service area. However, approximately 100 of these physicians are also on the staffs of Intervenors. The site for the satellite was chosen after review of patient origin data and population growth projections for Hillsborough County. St. Joseph's is currently treating at its facility on West Buffalo avenue an average of 64 patients a day who reside within the proposed service area of the satellite and who are not cardiac, cancer or psychiatric patients. St. Joseph's has an average daily census of 519 patients and proposes to serve 64 of these patients, who reside within the satellite's primary service area, at the satellite. Stipulations The parties have stipulated that St. Joseph's is able to provide quality care at the proposed satellite, and also that St. Joseph's is not proposing or relying upon probable economies and improvements in service that may be derived from the operation of joint, cooperative, or shared health care resources, except to the extent that the project includes a satellite facility. Intervenors contend that health services will be most economically provided by not constructing the satellite facility. Finally, the parties stipulate that Section 381.494(6)(c)11., Florida Statutes, relating to the provision of a substantial portion of services or resources to individuals not residing in the service district in which the entities are located, or adjacent thereto, is not applicable in this case. Non-Rule Policy for Bed Transfers The Department currently has no rule governing the transfer of acute care beds. Rule 10-5.011(1)(m), previously Rule 10-5.11(23), does not apply to acute care transfers since it addresses new or additional beds. However, the Department has begun developing a departmental policy for review of acute care transfer applications which do not request additional beds, and is seeking industry and staff input for the concepts expressed in a draft policy. In its current conceptual form, the transfer policy follows the statutory review criteria as they might apply to transfer applications which do not request new beds. The emerging policy, urges review of acute care transfer applications with emphasis upon the following health care planning criteria: reduction of excess beds, better utilization of existing beds, the encouragement of hospital efficiency, improvement of financial and geographic access, the encouragement of quality care, and the encouragement of competition in the hospital industry. St. Joseph's partial approval request was reviewed for conformity with this emerging policy by Robert Sharpe, the Department's Director of Comprehensive Health Planning (the state's chief health planner), who is charged with development of the bed transfer policy. Bed reduction is a key element for consideration in the Department's emerging policy. However, St. Joseph's 79-80 percent occupancy is greater than the Department's 75 percent hospital occupancy threshold contained in the acute care rule (Rule 10-5.011(1)(m)). Application of a bed reduction formula is not reasonable, according to Sharpe, for a facility which is using its beds to a much greater extent than other facilities in the County. The Department's emerging policy would evaluate whether a proposed transfer of beds to a new site would encourage a better use of the beds than at the existing site. The emerging policy contemplates transfers of acute care beds within a single county or subdistrict in an effort to be responsive to the needs of communities. This concept is consistent with the District VI Local Health Plan's stated desire that planning occur on less than a county basis. The Department's emerging policy evaluates the relative efficiency of the hospital proposing a bed transfer. In evaluating the relative charges made by similar Florida hospitals, the Hospital Cost Containment Board has devised hospital groupings for evaluation purposes. Of the 23 hospitals that are characterized as "group nine" hospitals in Florida, St. Joseph's ranks 16th of those 23 and is below the 50th percentile in gross revenues per adjusted admission. This means that St. Joseph's has lower charges per adjusted admission than most of the other comparable hospitals in Florida. Despite the fact that St. Joseph's is a large tertiary facility, Hospital Cost Containment Board data establishes that St. Joseph's is an efficient hospital facility. Another aspect of the Department's emerging policy is that of improving Medicaid and indigent access for patients. Excluding Tampa General, St. Joseph's has more Medicaid patient admissions than all other hospitals in Hillsborough County. During the past four years, St. Joseph's has consistently provided approximately 17 percent of the Medicaid care to hospital patients in Hillsborough County. The Department considers St. Joseph's to be an indigent care facility in Hillsborough County. The Department also considers geographic access when reviewing transfers. The State Health Plan has an objective that 90 percent of the population in an urban area be within 30 minutes drive time to an acute care facility by 1989. The Local Health Plan has concluded that all of Hillsborough County is currently within a 30 minute drive time. The quality of care provided by a facility proposing a transfer is also considered, and the parties have stipulated that St. Joseph's will provide quality health care services. The Department examines the competitive affects of approval of a transfer of acute care beds. In this case, the charge levels, costs per admission, and current inventory of beds at Hillsborough County acute care hospitals were examined. Since St. Joseph's charges and costs are low relative to other hospitals, and since there is an excess of beds in the County, the Department assumed that there would be competition for existing patients, and further concluded that approval of the satellite facility would promote price and non-price competition among hospitals in Hillsborough County. Considering each of the outlined elements of the Department's emerging policy, the state's chief health planner testified that the emerging policy supports the requested approval of an identifiable portion of the St. Joseph's satellite application. Need And Consistency With State and Local Plans Health planning for CON purposes involves the assessment of need on a community-wide, rather, than an institution specific, basis. Planning on less than a county-wide basis is inappropriate in Hillsborough County. In 1986 there was an excess capacity of 1400 acute care beds in Hillsborough County. District VI is overbedded by nearly 700 beds. The Local Health Council projects that in 1992 there will still be a surplus of nearly 800 beds in the County. Since this application proposes the transfer of beds, it neither increases or decreases this excess capacity. The State Health Plan as well as the Department's non-rule policy recommends eliminating excess bed capacity, but this proposal is not consistent with that recommendation. Existing acute care hospitals in Hillsborough County experienced only percent occupancy in 1986, a drop from 71 percent in 1984. Patient days have declined at an average of 2.6 percent per year since 1983 while the population in Hillsborough County actually increased 11.2 percent during this time. In spite of a significant reduction in hospital utilization and average lengths of stay in the area, the number of licensed hospital beds in Hillsborough County increased from 3,028 in 1981 to 3,457 in 1986, an increase of 14.2 percent or 429 beds. The State Health Plan contains a stated goal of 80 percent occupancy by 1989. The Local Health Plan recognizes 80 percent for medical-surgical and ICU/CCU occupancy for all beds in the County and 90 percent occupancy for each institution. Only Tampa General and St. Joseph's are currently achieving these occupancy level goals. In fact, occupancy rates for the five hospitals within, or adjacent to, the proposed satellite's service area range from 40 percent to percent. Based upon review and consideration of the expert testimony and evidence presented at hearing, it is found that an acceptable hospital optimum occupancy rate would be from 75 percent to 85 percent overall, and 90 percent for medical-surgical beds. Of the 649 beds currently at St. Joseph's, on average there are 149 unoccupied beds on any given day. St. Joseph's proposal does not address the key element of the State Health Plan and the Department's non-rule policy which calls for bed reduction when transfers are considered. This failure is particularly significant in view of the substantial overbedding which currently exists in Hillsborough County and which is projected to exist through 1992. To the contrary, the proposal actually would result in a net increase of 3 coronary care unit beds and 3 pediatric intensive care unit beds. The most important stated purpose of the acute care policies in the 1985 District VI Health Plan is "optimizing utilization of existing resources", and this purpose is implemented through a policy that provides, "Suture changes in the hospital facilities and services systems should occur so as to maintain the fiscal and programmatic integrity of all institutions providing a full range of services... " This proposal is inconsistent with this aspect of the Local Health Plan since it does not reduce the number of excess beds, while at the same time it would transfer 100 beds to a predominantly affluent, young and growing area of the County from which St. Joseph's would realize a substantial number of paying, as opposed to indigent or Medicaid, patients. This could reasonably be expected to increase St. Joseph's already very strong patient payor mix, and increase occupancy rates above 80 percent while other facilities are at or below 50 percent. At the same time, this proposal could actually weaken St. Joseph's financial position since its margin of revenue over expenses was 12.5 percent in 1985 and 10 percent in 1986, and the pro forma for the satellite, although overly optimistic as discussed below, shows only a 4.8 percent margin in the second year of operation. Underutilization of existing facilities is not consistent with sound health care planning because it ultimately results in higher costs to patients. Other facilities currently serving the proposed service area will be more likely to achieve optimum occupancy levels if the satellite is not built, than if it is. Another important purpose of the Local Health Plan is "promoting access for the indigent and underserved population to adequate health care," a purpose also stated in the Department's non-rule policy. The service area of the proposed satellite has a median family income of $30,132 which is 26 percent higher than for Hillsborough County as a whole. Locating a hospital in a predominantly affluent area, does not generally increase access for indigents. In fact, by the terms of its Settlement Agreement, St. Joseph's will actually decrease its commitment to Medicaid patients from the current 5 percent to the proposed 3 percent at the satellite. The percentage of charity care to gross revenues at St. Joseph's in 1986 was .6 percent, and was budgeted at .5 percent for 1987. This is not a significant charity commitment in relation to gross revenues, and the satellite proposal will not improve this commitment. The State Health Plan states as an objective achieving a ratio of less than 4.11 beds per thousand by 1989. This proposal does not promote this objective because it does not represent any net reduction in total number of beds. This proposal is also inconsistent with the State Health Plan which recommends a minimum pediatric size of 20 beds since it will have only 18. Need In Relation to Geographic Accessibility According to the 1985 District VI Health Plan, "The geographic distribution of hospital services in Hillsborough County is such that the entire population is within the 30 minute drive time standard of adequate resources." Ernest J. Peters, who was accepted as an expert in traffic engineering, testified that the entire proposed satellite service area is within 30 minutes of at least one existing hospital. The 30 minute drive time standard is set forth as Objective 2.2 in the 1985-87 State Health Plan. Residents of the proposed service area have geographic accessibility to hospital services within a 30 minute drive time. St. Joseph's does not dispute this fact, but rather Barbara Myres-Fernandez, who was not accepted as an expert in traffic studies, testified that at peak travel times the 30 minute standard was exceeded. However, according to Robert Sharpe, the Department's Director of Comprehensive Health Planning, who was accepted as an expert in health care planning, as well as Ward Koutnik and Ernest J. Peters, who were accepted as experts in traffic engineering, all of the proposed service area is within 30 minutes of existing hospital facilities. Peters testified that if the satellite is built, travel times to the nearest hospital would only be improved by 2.77 minutes for Carrollwood residents in 1990. The weighted average travel time, according to Peters, for the entire proposed service area to the nearest acute care hospital is 13.13 minutes, which will only increase to 13.96 minutes in 1990. The evidence therefore establishes that there would be an insubstantial geographic access gain to Hillsborough County residents if the satellite is approved, and in any event need based upon a lack of geographic accessibility has not been established. Need In Relation to Financial Accessibility According to Myres-Fernandez, it is St. Joseph's contention on the issue of accessibility that approval of the satellite will improve financial accessibility to hospital services for indigent and Medicaid patients. In order to maintain its commitment to indigent, Medicare and charity care, St. Joseph's argues it must continue to attract and maintain its market share of private pay patients, and the Carrollwood area provides a growing source of such patients. However, according to St. Joseph's, 64 of the patients to be treated at the satellite are already being treated at West Buffalo Avenue. These 64 do not include cardiac, cancer or psychiatric patients. Therefore, only 16 "new" patients would be served at the satellite if it were to achieve the goal of 80 percent occupancy. Even with St. Joseph's predicted 90 percent occupancy rate, only 26 "new" patients would be served. No evidence was offered to establish that a higher level of indigents should be expected at the satellite hospital than at St. Joseph's existing facility, particularly since in its Agreement with the Department, St. Joseph's has committed to serve a lower percentage of indigents than is presently true at the main facility on West Buffalo. St. Joseph's current payor mix is very favorable, and no reasons have been shown why it should deteriorate in the foreseeable future. In fact, the mix may actually be improving, according to Hospital Cost Containment Board data. Indigent access to health care is not improved by locating a satellite hospital in a predominantly affluent area in which only 6-7 percent of the population is below the poverty level, as compared to 16 percent for the County as a whole. This proposal represents a wise business decision by St. Joseph's because it is an attempt to increase its number of private pay patients. However, it will not improve indigent access. Financial accessibility is a criteria to be evaluated under Section 381.494(6),(c), Florida Statutes, and the Department's non-rule policy. This proposal does not improve access for indigents and therefore is not consistent with this statutory and policy criterion. Availability and Adequacy of Alternatives There are five existing hospitals within, or adjacent to, the proposed service area with substantial unused capacity, including University and Carrollwood Community Hospital which is a 120 bed facility offering general acute care, emergency room and outpatient services. Carrollwood Community Hospital has an occupancy rate of approximately 50 percent, and thus has excess capacity. While one-third of its patients are osteopathic, two-thirds are allopathic; only one-fifth of its physician staff is comprised of osteopaths. The proposed service area of the satellite is within the current service areas of Intervenors. Thus, adequate alternative facilities are available to residents in the Carrollwood area. Since there are existing alternative acute care facilities within thirty minutes of the proposed service area, an ambulatory surgical center might be an appropriate alternative to the satellite proposal. However, St. Joseph's did not explore such an alternative, and presented no evidence to establish the basis for its assertion that this would not be appropriate. Such a facility could maintain and even enhance referral patterns to the main facility on West Buffalo. Additionally, it has not been shown that splitting St. Joseph's 649 beds between two locations will be more efficient than leaving all 649 beds on West Buffalo, and thereby saving the $16,775,000 in capital expense to construct the satellite. Therefore, alternatives to the construction of a satellite facility do exist, and St. Joseph's has not shown that such alternatives are less feasible or less efficient than the satellite proposal at issue. Needs For Special Equipment and Services It has not been established that any need exists within the proposed service area for special equipment and services which this proposal would provide, and which are not reasonably and economically accessible in adjoining areas. Need For Research and Educational Facilities It has not been shown that any need exists in the proposed service area for research and educational facilities which this application would address. Availability of Manpower During the hearing, the parties stipulated to the adequacy of the staffing patterns proposed by St. Joseph's for the 100 bed satellite, and also their ability to recruit and fill those staffing needs. Approval of this satellite would not have an adverse impact on Intervenors' ability to attract or retain qualified staff since the staff for the satellite would be primarily transferred from the West Buffalo Avenue facility along with the transfer of 100 beds. Since 64 patients who reside in the satellite's service area are currently being treated at the West Buffalo Avenue site, staff who serve these patients will be transferred to the satellite when it opens. Additionally, St. Joseph's conducts an extensive recruitment program outside, as well as within, the Hillsborough County area. It is therefore unlikely that staff for the satellite will come in any significant number from any of the Intervenors. It is recognized that there is almost a 20 percent vacancy level for registered nurses in District VI, and a 33 percent vacancy level for critical care nurses. However, St. Joseph's turn-over rate is relatively low, and therefore it is reasonable to expect that the satellite would be staffed predominantly with staff already employed at the West Buffalo location. Availability of Funds St. Joseph's revenues exceeded expenses by $10-$12 million for fiscal year ending June 30, 1986, and it is among the five most profitable hospitals in the State. It has no long term debt, and is the only facility of its size in Florida which has no debt. Financially, St. Joseph's is in an extremely sound position. St. Joseph's has the ability to financially support the satellite facility and to internally finance its construction. Third-party financing is also being considered. However, its operating margin will decrease slightly as a result of the construction of the satellite. Historically, it has realized an operating margin exceeding 10 percent, although it projects a profit margin of slightly under 5 percent for fiscal year 1987. Financial Feasibility St. Joseph's proposed satellite's total gross revenue for the first two years of operation was determined by multiplying the current average bed rate at the facility on West Buffalo by the expected occupancy. Proposed deductions from revenue were also based upon St. Joseph's historical experience. Assumptions utilized to prepare the satellite's pro forma relied upon St. Joseph's historical information, including but not limited to revenues, fixed expenses and variable expenses. St. Joseph's used a patient admission rate of 125 per 1,000, and a proposed average length of stay of 6 days compared with a current average length of stay at the main facility of 7-7.2 days. A basic assumption used by St. Joseph's was that on the first day of operation, 64 patients currently being treated at the main facility who reside in the Carrollwood area, will be transferred to the satellite for treatment, and thereafter an average of 64 of the satellite's beds will be occupied each day by Carrollwood residents who would have sought treatment at the West Buffalo location in the absence of the satellite. St. Joseph's assumed a case mix intensity level of 1.36 for the satellite, compared with 1.46-1.48 at the West Buffalo location. A decrease in the case mix index results in a corresponding decrease in revenues and expenses. Complex hospitalizations receive a high case mix index, and simple procedures receive a low case mix index. St. Joseph's did not conclusively establish that 64 patients presently at the main facility, except for cardiac, cancer and psychiatric patients, who reside in the service area of the satellite could be transferred on the first day of operation, or that this daily census could be maintained. Physician and patient preferences determine where a patient is admitted. Severity of illness or age of the patient are also factors. Admissions through the emergency room, which account for nearly 50 percent of the admissions on West Buffalo, cannot be redirected. It has not been shown that physicians or patients would prefer admission to a satellite, or that the very severe cases or aged patients, as well as emergency room admissions, could be redirected away from the main facility. While the satellite will have an emergency room, the satellite will not be equipped to handle the complexity of cases presently admitted on West Buffalo. Additionally, transferring 64 patients by ambulance on the first day of operation from West Buffalo to the satellite, in the middle of treatment, has not been shown to be reasonable or feasible, or that physicians and patients would tolerate such a procedure. The opening of a satellite usually begins incrementally and gradually while staff becomes familiar with the new facility and equipment. St. Joseph's has not shown that it is feasible to open the satellite with an immediate occupancy of 64 percent on day one, and 82 percent in the first year of operation. Historically, occupancy levels at satellites run between 20 percent-40 percent the first year. Forecasted revenues are unrealistic because St. Joseph's basic assumption about the transfer of 64 Carrollwood residents is unreasonable and unsubstantiated. St. Joseph's has also failed to correctly and fully estimate salary expenses at the satellite because salary estimates do not account for shift and weekend differentials paid to nurses. More than 50 percent of nurses at St. Joseph's receive shift differential pay, which is a 15 percent increase above their base hourly rate. Given the age of the service area population, a more accurate use rate for the satellite would be between 90 and 95 admissions per 1,000 population, rather than the 125 per 1,000 used by St. Joseph's. The lower use-rate reduces the available pool of patients in the service area from 136 estimated by St. Joseph's to 109. 94 Assumptions based on historical data from the main facility are inappropriate for developing the satellite's pro forma because the satellite will treat less complex cases than the main facility, and the age and income levels in the satellite's service area are significantly different from the County as a whole. Rather than a case mix index of 1.36, an average satellite and community hospital case mix index is 1.00. Using a corrected case mix index of 1.00 rather than 1.36, results in a projected loss for the satellite rather than a profit in its second year of operation. Because construction and operation of the satellite will reduce St. Joseph's overall operating margin below 5 percent-6 percent, which is a minimum standard, St. Joseph's will be less able to provide charity, indigent and Medicaid care after construction of the satellite than it is currently. Impact On Health Care Costs St. Joseph's proposal to spend approximately $16 million on construction of the satellite to serve from 16 to 26 "new" patients could reasonably be expected to adversely affect health care costs. This is exacerbated by the shelled-in space at both the satellite and the existing facility. The size of the satellite was not reduced when beds were reduced from 150 to 100, and the St. Joseph's architect testified there is enough square footage to add back the 50 beds. Despite St. Joseph's assertions that it will not increase rates to subsidize the satellite as a business investment in its own future, it appears reasonable to expect that rates would have to be increased if St. Joseph's is to maintain its historical profit margin, and to offset its failure to properly project salaries, use rates and the case mix index at the satellite. The satellite will continue to lose money through its second year of operation, and this would have to be recouped through increased charges, or reduced profit margins, which could then be expected to result in a reduced ability to fund charity, indigent and Medicaid patients. Project Costs Construction cost estimates are reasonable. The estimated cost for fixed equipment for a 150 bed satellite facility was reduced by $250,000 to reflect the decrease cost of moving 50 beds and the obstetrical surgical suite. This $250,000 savings provides an inflationary contingency in case of construction delays, and while it does increase construction costs from $9,650,000 to 9,900,000, it does not have a negative impact on the appropriateness of the proposed construction costs. Equipment cost estimates as well as total project cost estimates, with the exception of salary estimates, are reasonable. Admitting Practices St. Joseph's has a written admissions policy which requires that it receive patients regardless of their ability to pay. There is no evidence that St. Joseph has ever denied admission to any patient in a life threatening situation. It is standard practice at St. Joseph's to request a deposit on admission and to inform patients that arrangements for payment can be made upon discharge. However, inability to pay the deposit or to make financial arrangements does not result in a patient being denied admission. Patients who are unable to pay are sometimes admitted at St. Joseph's through, the emergency room when a physician sends such patients to the emergency room. Effect On Competition Enhancement of future competition is a factor which is considered under the Department's non-rule transfer policy There is substantial competition among acute care hospitals in Hillsborough County which are currently engaged in aggressive marketing campaigns. Dominance by one provider in a market can be anti-competitive, and at the present time St. Joseph's is the dominant provider for paying patients in Hillsborough County. The current market shares for hospitals already serving the satellite's proposed service area are: St. Joseph's - 33.45 percent; University - 28.92 percent; Town and Country - 17.72 percent; Tampa General - 11.06 percent; and Carrollwood Community - 8.86 percent. The satellite will allow St. Joseph's market share to increase and possibly approach 40 percent. Such market dominance is not consistent with a competitive market. St. Joseph's increase in market share will take patients away from the other hospitals now serving the Carrollwood area, particularly University which receives almost 38 percent of all its patients from this area. University is already projecting an operating loss for fiscal year 1987 of $563,000. Tampa General is a disproportionate provider of indigent services in the County. The Local Health Plan has as one of its objectives protecting such providers of indigent care. Tampa General lost $12 million in fiscal 1983, and in order to improve its financial condition embarked on a $160 million renovation and building effort. It is now indebted to bondholders in that amount. Tampa General's payor mix has begun to improve, and it is actively marketing in the proposed service area. Approval of this project will not further the Local Health Plan objective of protecting disproportionate indigent providers, because it will result in the loss to Tampa General of a significant number of paying patients.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order denying St. Joseph's application for CON 4288 for the establishment of a satellite hospital with the transfer of 100 acute care beds. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on St. Joseph's Proposed Findings of Fact are as follows: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact86. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 38, 54. Adopted in Findings of Fact 38, 6, 70, 54. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as irrelevant and not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 38, 70. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 30-34. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 108. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 41-43. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as speculative, irrelevent and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 21, 23, 50. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Rejected in Findings of Fact 59, 68. Rejected in Findings of Fact 65, 71, 97, 106. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 18, 21, 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 32, 67, but rejected in 89, 90. Adopted in Findings of Fact 32, 67. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Rejected as not based competent substantial evidence, and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. 62-63. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 64-65. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Rejected in Findings of Fact 11, 72. Rejected in Findings of Fact 65, 72. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. 70-71. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as unnecessary and not based competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 70. Rejected as irrelevant and speculative. 75-76. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 77-78. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected in Findings of Fact 59, 60, 68, 70, 95. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 70. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. 83-91. Rejected in Findings of Fact 7, 105 and otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44 104-105. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Rejected in Findings of Fact 47, 106, 107, 108. Adopted in Finding of Fact 48. 111-122. Rejected in Findings of Fact 63, 64, 65, and otherwise irrelevant and cumulative. Rejected in Findings of Fact 68, 70, 71. Adopted in Findings of Fact 29, 70. Adopted in Finding of Fact 78. Adopted in Finding of Fact 78. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 80. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 81. 131-133. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 134. Adopted in Findings of Fact 78, 83, 98, 99. 135-138. Rejected in Findings of Fact 50, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 71, 108. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 59, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and not based competent substantial evidence. 141-146. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. 147. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 148. Rejected in Findings of Fact 50, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 71, 108. Rejected in Finding of Fact 75. Rejected in Finding of Fact 73. Rejected in Findings of Fact 72-75. 152-153. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 89, 90 but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 154-155. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 72. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 107. Rejected as unnecessary and speculative. Rejected in Findings of Fact 87, 89. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 166-169. Rejected as irrelevant. 170-171. Rejected in Finding of Fact 106. 172. Rejected as unnecessary. 173-174. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence and irrelevant. 175. Rejected as unnecessary. 176-177. Adopted in Finding of Fact 82. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 82. Adopted in Finding of Fact 83. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected in Findings of Fact 91-94. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 83. Rejected in Findings of Fact 84-95. 185-189. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 85 but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected in Finding of Fact 97. Adopted in Finding of Fact 85. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 194-195. Rejected in Finding of Fact 92. 196-197. Rejected as unnecessary. 198. Adopted in Finding of Fact 85. 199-200. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 86 and rejected in Finding of Fact 93. Adopted in Finding of Fact 86. Adopted in Finding of Fact 87. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 89, 90, 91. Adopted in Finding of Fact,.88. Adopted in Finding of Fact 88, but rejected in Finding of Fact 94. Adopted in Finding of Fact 88. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 89. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of fact 43. 213-217. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. 218. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 97, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 219-220. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 98. 224-233. Missing. Adopted in Finding of Fact 98. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 24, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 236-241. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 96. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 245-246. Adopted in Finding of Fact 100. 247. Adopted in Finding of Fact 102. 248-250. Adopted in Findings of Fact 100, 101. 251. Adopted in Findings of Fact 100-102. 252-253. Adopted in Finding of Fact 101 Adopted in Finding of Fact 102. Adopted in Findings of Fact 100-102. 256-259. Rejected as cumulative. 260. Rejected as irrelevant. Rulings on Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Rulings on University Community Hospital's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 20. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 49. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 20. Adopted in Findings of Fact 37, 48. Adopted in Findings of Fact 50, 56. Adopted in Findings of Fact 51, 52, 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 59. Adopted in Finding of Fact 61. 13-14. Rejected as unnecessary. 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 58, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 16-17. Adopted; in Findings of Fact 63-65. 18. Rejected as irrelevant 19-21. Adopted in Findings of Fact 68-71. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Findings of Fact 72, 76, 77, 104. Adopted in Findings of Fact 56, 81. Adopted in Findings of Fact 80, 81 and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 27-35. Adopted in Findings of Fact 85-94 but otherwise rejected, as cumulative and unnecessary. 36-38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 85, 94. 39-40. Adopted in Findings of Fact 88, 94. Adopted in Finding of Fact 94. Adopted in Finding of Fact 92. Adopted in Finding of Fact 73. 44-49. Adopted in Findings of Fact 96, 97 but otherwise rejected as cumulative, irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 105. Adopted in Finding of Fact 69. Adopted in Finding of Fact 69, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 68, 95, 97. Adopted in Finding of Fact 60. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Findings of Fact 38, 50. Adopted in Finding of Fact 55, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. 63-65. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 104. Adopted in Finding of Fact 105. Adopted in Findings of Fact 82, 83. Adopted in Finding of Fact 105. 70-71. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. 72. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 106, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 73-76. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 96, 97, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 95, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 91, 97, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1,1, 107. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. 82-84. Adopted-in Finding of Fact 107, but otherwise rejected as cumulative. Rulings on Tampa General's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 33, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 8-9. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 1, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 12-13. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 82, 83, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 29, 57, 69, 105. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10, 72. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 72. Adopted in Findings of Fact 49, 50. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 72, but otherwise rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. 25-26. Rejected as irrelevant. 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 28-35. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 17, 21, 24, 25, 28, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 83, 97. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 35. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 39-44. Adopted in Findings of Fact 63-65, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 45-51. Adopted in Findings of Fact 66-71, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 52-55. Adopted in Findings of Fact 36, 38, 50, 56, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12, 104. Adopted in Findings of Fact 14, 16, 72, 106. Adopted in Finding of Fact 106. Adopted in Findings of Fact 105, 106, 107. Adopted in Finding of Fact 108. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 74. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 64-65. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 74, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16 Adopted in Finding of Fact 73. 68-69. Rejected as unnecessary and without specific citations to the record. 70-73. Adopted in Findings of Fact 91, 94, 95, 97, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 81, 97. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 57, but otherwise rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 107. 77-83. Adopted in Finding of Fact 108, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and irrelevant. Rulings on Town and Country's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-3. Introductory matters. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Findings of Fact 24, 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 12-16. Adopted in Findings of Fact 87, 89, 90. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 18-24. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. 25-26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 67, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 27. Rejected as without citation to the record and cumulative. 28-37. Adopted in Findings of Fact 86, 93, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. 38-39. Adopted in Findings of Fact 106-108. Rejected as without citation to record and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15, 50, 51. 42-44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 51. Adopted in Finding of Fact 52. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 12, 38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 13, 72. 48. Rejected as without citation to the record and unnecessary 49-51. Rejected as unnecessary and not based on competent substantial evidence Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. Rejected as without citation to the record and unnecessary. 54-55. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. 56. Adopted in Finding of Fact 54. 57-58. Adopted in Finding of Fact 58. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 60. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 60. 63-64. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 29, 70. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in Findings of Fact 71, 95. 68-70. Adopted in Findings of Fact 45, 63-65. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 103-108. 73-74. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 75-77. Adopted in Findings of Fact 82, 83. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 82. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 105. Adopted in Finding of Fact 82. Rejected in Finding of Fact 99. 85-92. Rejected in Finding of Fact 98, and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 93-96. Rejected in Finding of Fact 99, and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 97. Rejected as unnecessary. 99-103. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 104-105. Adopted in Findings of Fact 95, 97, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 95. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 95. Adopted in Finding of Fact 97. Adopted in Findings of Fact 95, 97. 111-114. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 115-116. Adopted in Finding of Fact 97, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 117. Rejected as without citations to the record. 118-119. Adopted in Finding of Fact 88. 120-122. Adopted in Finding of Fact 94. 123. Rejected as cumulative and without citations to the record. 124-128. Adopted in Finding of Fact 92, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 129-130. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 131-133. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 134. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Rulings on Humana's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. 8-10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 11-12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 13-14. Rejected as cumulative. 15-17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. Adopted in Findings of Fact 53, 54. Adopted in Finding of Fact 51. 20-21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 52. Adopted in Finding of Fact 51. Adopted in Finding of Fact 55. 24-41. Adopted in Findings of Fact 45, 63-65, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. 42-46. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 59. 50-51. Adopted in Finding of Fact 60. 52. Rejected as unnecessary. 53-55. Adopted in Findings of Fact 85-95, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 56-57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 90. 58-66. Adopted in Findings of Fact 86, 93, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 67-71. Adopted in Findings of Fact 87, 89, 90, 91. Adopted in Finding of Fact 88. Rejected in Finding of Fact 88. Rejected as cumulative. 75-77. Adopted in Finding of Fact 94, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 78-81. Adopted in Finding of Fact 92. 82-85. Rejected as unnecessary. 86-92. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 97, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 93-94. Adopted in Finding of Fact 82, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 95. Adopted and Rejected in part in Findings of Fact 4, 12. 96-97. Adopted in Findings of Fact 105, 106, 107. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 61. 100-101. Adopted in Findings of Fact 63-65. 102. Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. 103-104. Rejected as cumulative. 105-107. Adopted in Findings of Fact 57, 107, 108. 108-109. Adopted in Finding of Fact 60. 110-114. Adopted in Findings of Fact 82, 83, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 108. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. 118-119. Adopted in Finding of Fact 62. 120-121. Adopted in Findings of Fact 72-75. 122. Adopted in Findings of Fact 50, 56. 123-125. Rejected in Finding of Fact 28 and as not based competent substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Ivan Wood, Esquire WOOD, LUCKSINGER & EPSTEIN The Park in Houston Center 1221 Lamar Street, Suite 1400 Houston, Texas 77010 Howard J. Hochman, Esquire Southeast Financial Center 200 S. Biscayne Blvd, Suite 3700 Miami, Florida 33131 James C. Hauser, Esquire Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John Radey, Esquire 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 1000 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Cynthia Tunnicliff, Esquire Post Office Box 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Douglas L. Mannheimer, Esquire Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Michael J. Cherniga, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact North Ridge is a 396 bed short term general acute care hospital located in Broward County, Florida. The ownership of North Ridge changed on September 3, 1985, and the fiscal year was changed from September 30th to August 31st. NRGH Ex. 1, p. 4; NRGH Ex. 2. North Ridge is an investor owned hospital owned by American Medical International, Inc. NRGH Ex. 2. Staff of the HCCB conducts the review of budgets and budget amendments using certain screens and guidelines, T. 21,27, as well as the hospital's 1984 and 1986 budgets. T. 26, 104. In reviewing a budget or a budget amendment, the staff of the HCCB follows certain internal procedures consisting of several steps of review. A budget or amended budget (which, unless stated otherwise, will be deemed to be the same for purposes of this order) is first stamped with the date it is received. T. 21-22. It is then given to Aldric Borders, Regulatory Analyst Supervisor, who distributes budgets to analysts, including Melvin Austin, who is under the supervision of Mr. Borders, and is a Regulatory Analyst II. T. 22, 21, 434. This is not controlled by the hospital. The process thus begins with the date the budget is received and date stamped, although actual substantive review cannot begin until the budget reaches an analyst. The analyst checks the documents to see that they are "in order" and begins the review process. Preliminary findings and recommendations are the end result of the work of the analyst. T. 25-6. A proposed budget amendment is reviewed using the same internal procedures used to review a budget, but the amended budget is not sent to TMIC for generation of computer printouts. T. 24-5. The staff of the HCCB has an internal goal of 25 days within which staff attempts to send out to the hospital their preliminary findings and recommendations. T. 27. It is not clear whether the 25 day period is calculated from the date that the amended budget is received by the HCCB or the date that staff determines the amendment to be complete. T. 27, 104. The 25 days includes approval by James Bracher, Executive Director of the HCCB. T. 27- The 25 day period is only a staff goal, and is not contained in rule or statute. T. 91-2. The HCCB received the proposed amendment filed by North Ridge on December 16, 1985. T. 31; NRGH Exhibit 2; T. 202. The amended budget requested a gross revenue per adjusted admission of $7,569. T. 272. A few days later, North Ridge received NRGH Exhibit 4, which is a letter from the HCCB stating that the amended budget report was "incomplete, nonconforming, and not verifiable." The letter (dated December 17, 1985, from John Pattillo, Chief Financial Analyst) asked North Ridge to complete the enclosed wcrksheets and return it as soon as possible, and mentioned instructions included. Attached was an instruction form to complete worksheet C2A. T. 202. Upon receipt of this letter, Richard Wichmann, Hospital Financial Manager for the Petitioner, called the HCCB and spoke to Pace Allen, who was then employed by the HCCB, asking him how to complete the form. T. 202. On January 13, 1986, Mr. Wichmann wrote to Mr. Allen enclosing worksheet C2A which had been completed in response to the December 17, 1985, letter from Mr. Pattillo. NRGH Exhibit 5. It is stipulated that worksheet C2A was submitted to the HCCB on January 13, 1986. Worksheet C2A was developed to provided a logical, consistent manner for hospitals to provide data that staff of the HCCB would need to help them analyze a proposed budget amendment. The form was first developed just shortly before it was required of North Ridge, in late 1985. The form has been changed several times, but generally is being consistently applied by the HCCB to all hospitals seeking to amend their budgets. There is no evidence that the form is a part of the Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual. The form is the subject of a proposed rule. T. 410-11. Thus, the letter of Mr. Pattillo on December 17, 1985, requiring that North Ridge submit a completed form C2A was based upon incipient and evolving policy of the HCCB to require such forms when proposed budget amendments are received. There was no evidence that the policy is unreasonable in any respect, and it is the conclusion of the Hearing Officer that the policy is in fact reasonable. The North Ridge amended budget was first assigned to Nancy Speccia, who began the review process. T. 435. Ms. Speccia then left her position with the HCCB, T. 436, and on about January 31, 1986, the proposed amended budget was assigned by Aldric Borders to Melvin Austin for review. Id. T. 92. Ms. Speccia's work was not sufficiently complete at this point to allow the issuance of preliminary findings and recommendations. T. 436. The only reason for delay between early January and early February 1986 was that Ms. Speccia had been originally assigned to the amended budget and had left the HCCB without completing the analysis. T. 206-7. On February 11, 1986, Mr. Wichmann met with Aldric Borders and Melvin Austin at the offices of the HCCB in Tallahassee. T. 204. If staff of the HCCB had completed the preliminary findings and recommendations based upon the information available to staff as of the beginning of the meeting on February 11, 1986, staff would have recommended denial of the proposed amendment by North Ridge. T 441. During this meeting, there was a discussion of the increase in the amended budget from the original budget of gross revenue per adjusted admission and the change in case mix. T. 440, 36, 39, 41. The change in gross revenue in the amended budget was not based upon a change in rates or charges to patients, but was based solely upon a change in case mix. T. 205. During the meeting on February 11, 1986, the HCCB staff asked Mr. Wichmann to provide additional information concerning the change in case mix. T. 43. The only witness who asserted that interest expense was discussed at the meeting on February 11th was Mr. Borders. T. 440. Mr. Borders, however, did not testify that the staff of the HCCB at the February 11th meeting requested that Mr. Wichmann supply additional information concerning interest expense. See T. 441. Mr. Borders simply testified that "we wanted some details on that," but he did not say that he asked Mr. Wichmann for those details. T. 441. Indeed, Mr. Borders denied that he himself had "made a request of the hospital regarding the hospital's interest expense." T. 471. Mr. Austin did not testify that he had asked Mr. Wichmann to supply information concerning interest expense at the February 11th meeting. Thus, it is concluded that the only additional information that Mr. Wichmann was asked to gather and submit as of February 11, 1986, was information concerning case mix. This conclusion is further Supported by the pattern of very prompt responses by Mr. Wichmann with respect to all other requests for information. It is inferred that Mr. Wichmann would have also promptly supplied interest expense information had anyone asked him for such information at the February 11th meeting. At the meeting on February 11, 1986, Mr. Austin requested that North Ridge take some action to alter the 120-day period. T. 44. As will be discussed ahead, all parties at the meeting were aware of the fact that nearly 60 days had already elapsed since the proposed amended budget was first received by the HCCB, and Mr. Wichmann expressed his concerns about this lapse of time. T. 206. In response to the request from Mr. Austin, Mr. Wichmann sent Mr. Austin a letter dated February 13, 1986, NRGH Exhibit 6. T. 207-8. The letter in its entirety states: Per our conversation on Tuesday, February 11, 1986, this letter is to request a waiver of the 120 day approval period for the above provider until documentation is provided to your satisfaction of the the above provider until documentation is provided to your satisfaction of the narrative. My understanding is that once the above information is supplied to your satisfaction, the 120 day period will begin when received. If this is not correct, please notify me immediately. Prior to writing the letter of February 13, 1986, Mr. Wichmann did not consult with an attorney. T. 253. At the time of writing the letter, Mr. Wichmann said that he did not know what a "waiver" was. T 207. It is unclear from the question whether Mr. Wichmann was referring to the ordinary meaning of the word or the legal concept. Mr. Wichmann did not remember a lot of the discussion of the "waiver" (except the part about the budget being returned, discussed ahead), and there appears to have been very little discussion among Mr. Wichmann, Mr. Austin, and Mr. Borders concerning the details of the "waiver." T 442-3. On February 14, 1986, Mr. Austin received NRGH Exhibit 6, T. 45. The letter was copied to Mr. Borders by Mr. Austin, but was not shown to the HCCB Executive Director, Mr. Bracher at that time. T. 45-6. Mr. Bracher was unaware of any requested or allegedly granted waiver until early April of 1986. Hearing Officer Exhibit 1 (Prehearing Stipulation), p. 2. No written acknowledgment of acceptance of any requested or offered waiver of the 120-day period was ever sent by the Hospital Cost Containment Board or its staff to North Ridge, and the question of whether North Ridge was requested to provide the staff with a waiver of the 120-day period, or in fact had offered to granted any such waiver, was never presented to the Board for approval or consideration. Id. Mr. Wichmann was never told by the HCCB whether his letter of February 13, 1986, had been approved. T. 216. Mr. Austin did, however, tell Mr. Wichmann on February 14, 1986, that the letter was "what he had wanted." T. 216. That was the last that Mr. Wichmann heard from the HCCB regarding his letter. Id. 14, 1956, Mr. Wichmann had no further communication with the staff of the HCCB or the HCCB concerning the issue of waiver contained in his letter of February 13, 1986. T. 240, 247. Mr. Austin testified that "case mix was a major thrust at the meeting" on February 11, 1986. T. 41. He also testified that after leaving the meeting on February 11, 1986, we all discovered the problem in that we would probably need more information regarding the case mix data." T. 37-8. Mr. Austin further testified that the purpose of the requested "waiver" was "to get the proper documents to evaluate the hospital amendment" with respect to case mix. T. 42-3. In the same passage, Mr. Austin mentions evaluation of the case mix data, but does not appear to envision the "waiver" as clearly covering evaluation time. The entire passage is as follow: Well, we talked about getting a 120-day waiver notice, and the reasons behind that was based on the hospital requesting sending in their amendment based on case mix. We would need more time to -- to get the proper documents to evaluate the hospital amendment, but -- and by having the 120-day waiver notice, perhaps time constraints would not be a factor in trying to evaluate the information properly. T. 42-3 (E.S.) Mr. Borders similarly limited his characterization of the purpose of the requested "waiver" to a period of time for North Ridge to submit additional information: To the best of my knowledge, we told Mr. Wichmann that if North Ridge, in order for us to make a valid review of his 1986 amended budget, that a waiver would be-- if he wanted to submit to us additional information concerning justification for the budget, then a waiver would be in line. T. 469. (E.S.) In summary, both Mr. Austin and Mr. Borders were given full opportunity to characterize what they understood to be the purpose of the requested "waiver." Both focused primarily upon the time needed for North Ridge to submit additional case mix information. Neither clearly stated that the "waiver" was intended to cover time for staff to evaluate the new information. Neither clearly stated that intended to cover time for staff to evaluate the new information. If either Mr. Austin or Mr. Borders had clearly stated that the "waiver" was needed for a time to evaluate the case mix information, they then would also have had to have established in their testimony a clear event--such as the completion of such evaluation, or the completion of the evaluation coupled with a favorable recommendation or request for more data--as the end of the period under "waiver." It must therefore be concluded that Mr. Austin and Mr. Borders intended the requested "waiver" to cover only the time required for North Ridge to submit additional case mix data as requested at the February 11, 1986, meeting. Mr. Wichmann similarly understood the purpose of the requested "waiver" to be to allow time for North Ridge to submit additional data concerning case mix. T. 246. He also testified: During our meeting at the staff office on February 11, 1986, discussed North Ridge's amended budget, I was asked by Mr. Austin to submit a waiver to the Board, or to himself for North Ridge's amended budget because he believed that the amended budget was, the narrative was not complete and needed more information on case mix. T. 563-64. Finally, and most persuasive, the "waiver" letter sent by Mr. Wichmann only mentions waiver "until the documentation is Provided to your satisfaction." The letter also states that "and the above information is supplied to your satisfaction, the 120 day period will begin when received." The last two words are critical, for it is evident that Mr. Wichmann intended the 120-day period to be again fully operative as of the date of receipt of the information, not the date of "satisfaction." It is therefore concluded that the purpose of the requested "waiver" was to give North Ridge time to submit additional information concerning case mix. The purpose was not to give the staff of the HCCB a specified additional time to evaluate new data as to case mix. At the meeting on February 11, 1986, Mr. Austin, Mr. Borders, and Mr. Wichmann all thought that the 120-day period had already started to run with respect to the proposed amended budget of North Ridge, and the meaning of the "waiver" letter of Mr. Wichmann must be construed with this fact in mind. Mr. Wichmann stated this as he testified as to the purpose he intended in drafting his letter of February 13, 1986: The intent was to stop the clock and start it again on March 4th when the narrative had been received by the staff. T. 246. In response to a question as to why the 120-day period should not begin with March 4, 1986, Mr. Wichmann further testified: Because on December 16, 1985, I submitted North Ridge amended budget complete, conforming and verifiable. T. 244. Similarly, as set forth above, on page 42 of the transcript, Mr. Austin had described the purpose of the waiver and used the phrase "time constraints" in that context. He then was asked what he had meant by "time constraints," and he answered: Well, in terms of getting--once a budget amendment is received and getting approved by the Board, there is 120 days, and based the time that the amendment was received and the time--at that point in time, we were already at February 11th and we were nowhere near recommending any approval or disapproval. So that's why we requested the 120-day waiver notice. T. 43. (E.S.) Moreover, the following testimony confirms that at the meeting on February 11, 1986, Mr. Austin thought that the 120-day period had already started to run: Q. Did you make a statement to anyone that you would send the budget back? A. Yes, I did. Q. What was the circumstance of making that statement? A. That was the circumstances of the hospital not justifying their budget amendment . . . . It had nothing to do with a waiver notice. Q. What did you tell Mr. Wichmann? A. That the hospital's amendment was not justified, and that the fact that the amendment had been in-house since December the 16th, and the mere fact that proper justification had not been received, and in order to avoid time constraints, and in order to allow the hospital to justify the budget, I felt, and my supervisor felt that a waiver notice would be best for both parties involved here. And that is to give the hospital time to submit justification and to allow time constraints on staff's part to avoid the time constraints. T., 638-9. (E.S.) Mr. Borders also believed at the February 11, 1986, meeting that the 120-day period had started to run. He characterized the circumstances surrounding that meeting as follows: Well, we were into February, and the budget had come in December, and we still didn't have enough information in which to evaluate it, and to give him a positive recommendation, which was what he was seeking. At that time, we discussed the 120-day waiver, and what that would do would allow him more time to get us additional information, and also keep us from running out of the -- keep the 120 days from running out on us while the budget was in-house. T. 442. (E.S.) It is true that Mr. Borders also testified that "we" told Mr. Wichmann that: . . . we needed a waiver that would allow us time to evaluate his analysis, and that the 120 days wouldn't start until we received sufficient documentation of his budget. T. 443. (E.S.) One cannot conclude, however, from this testimony that Mr. Borders did not think that the 120-day period had not already started to run by February 11, 1986. First, if Mr. Borders had actually thought that the 120-day period had not already started, he would have had no reason to ask for a "waiver." He simply would have asked for agreement that the period would begin at some future date. Second, the testimony conflicts with what Mr. Borders said on page 442 of the transcript, set forth above. Mr. Wichmann understood from his meeting with Mr. Austin and Mr. Borders that if he did not agree to an alteration of the 120-day period (a "waiver"), the proposed amended budget of North Ridge would be returned to him as if it had never been filed. T 205. Mr. Wichmann heard Mr. Austin tell him this. Id. Mr. Austin testified that he did not connect "waiver" and his statement that the budget would be returned to Mr. Wichmann. T 637. He admitted, however, that he did not tell Mr. Wichmann that he would send the proposed budget amendment back to North Ridge. T. 638. He testified that the statement about sending the budget back was made in connection with the perceived failure of North Ridge as of February 11, 1986, to "justify" its amendment to the Satisfaction of Mr. Austin, and that "in order to allow the hospital to justify the budget, I felt, and my supervisor felt that a waiver notice would be best for both parties Involved here." T. 638. The manner in which Mr. Austin combined the concepts of "justification of the budget, the "waiver notice," and the statement, admittedly made, that the budget would be "sent back" leads to the conclusion that in context, the implication was left with Mr. Wichmann that the budget would have been sent back to Mr. Wichmann if he had not submitted additional information and provided a "waiver notice." Mr. Borders apparently did not understand the Implications of what Mr. Austin said, since Mr. Borders testified that he did not hear it and would have Corrected Mr. Austin if it had been said. T. 441-2. On about March 4, 1986, Mr. Wichmann hand delivered to Mr. Austin NRGH Exhibit 7, which is a letter of the same date from Mr. Wichmann to Mr. Austin conveying additional information concerning case mix. T. 46-7. During the period from February 11, 1986, to March 4, 1986, Mr. Austin was waiting for additional information to justify the increase in case mix, and Mr. Austin characterized the March 4, 1986, letter as "a better narrative trying to support their amendment." T. 47-8. On March 4, 1986, Mr. Wichmann also met with Mr. Austin and spent additional time explaining case mix changes. T. 219. Upon receipt of the case mix information, Mr. Austin again began to review the amended budget. T. 48. On March 10, 1986, North Ridge received another request from the staff of the HCCB for additional information relating to case mix which had previously been provided. Although this information was provided to staff on March 13, 1986, on about March 12, 1986, Mr. Austin told Mr. Wichmann that the information concerning case mix was acceptable. T. 220. On March 5, 1986, Mr. Bracher, Executive Director of the HCCB wrote to Rudy Noriega, Acting Chief Executive Officer of North Ridge. NRGH Exhibit 8. The first two paragraphs of that letter stated: A preliminary review of the first request to amend the 1986 approved budget has been completed for North Ridge General Hospital. It is concluded that the first request to amend is not complete, conforming and verified based or the lack of information discussed below. The 120 day review period cannot begin until additional data is received. (E.S.) The letter does not mention NRGH Exhibit 4, which was dated December 17, 1986, and advised that the amended budget was not complete, conforming, or verifiable due to a lack of worksheet C2A. The March 5, 1986, letter from Mr. Bracher is concerned solely with obtaining "information regarding the hospital's actual experience for this year, and its' [sic] projected revenues for the remainder of the year." NRGH Exhibit 8. (E.S.) The letter is not concerned with case mix information as had been discussed with Mr. Borders and Mr. Austin on February 11, 1986, but, rather, sought entirely new information. Since the letter of March 5, 1986, was aimed at gathering actual historical data from that portion of the 1986 fiscal year which had already elapsed, it included within as item 17 on page 2 a request for the 1986 actual operating experience for "interest expense." On March 13, 1986, Mr. Wichmann responded to the letter of Mr. Bracher of March 5, 1986, and supplied the fiscal year 1986 actual experience data by cost center as requested. NRGH Exhibit 9. On page two of that exhibit Mr. Wichmann provided Mr. Austin with the actual interest expense that had been incurred by North Ridge from September 1, 1985 to December 31, 1985, which was $2,533,311. If one were to assume that the interest expense was to remain the same throughout the fiscal year, the projected interest expense would be 4 times that amount, or $10,133,244. On March 19 and 25, 1986, additional refinements in previously submitted case mix information was discussed between staff and representatives of North Ridge. Additional case mix data was sent by North Ridge to the board on April 7, 1986. Prehearing stipulation. On April 1, 1986, Mr. Pattillo, Chief Financial Analyst for the HCCB, who wrote the letter of December 17, 1985, NRGH Exhibit letter to Mr. Noriega again stating that the amended budget report was "incomplete, nonconforming, or not verifiable," this time a result of the amended budget having been entered into the computer. NRGH Exhibit 10. Mr. Noriega (L was requested to enter changes on the computer printout which needed changing, and to return the signed copy to the HCCB. Id. The information requested by Mr. Pattillo did not concern case mix. On April 7, 1986, Edward F. Kipp, Chief Financial Officer of North Ridge, responded to NRGH Exhibit 10, the letter of April 1, 1986, providing the information that had been requested by Mr. Pattillo. NRGH Exhibit 11. On April 17, 1986, Mr. Wichmann sent a letter to Allen Pearman, deputy director of research for the HCCB, with additional case mix information requested by Mr. Pearman as a result of an earlier meeting with Mr. Wichmann. T. 222-5; NRGH Exhibit 12. On April 23, 1986, Mr. Austin wrote to Don S. Steigman, Chief Executive Officer of North Ridge, requesting that North Ridge complete the attached MDC report and provide certain other information with respect to case mix. NRGH Exhibit 13. Mr. Wichmann responded by sending the information contained in NRGH Exhibit 14, which was received by the HCCB on May 5, 1986, and concerned only case mix information. See also T. 49-50. In the first week of May 1986, the HCCB staff determined, based upon all information submitted by North Ridge, that North Ridge had justified the amended gross revenue per adjusted admission based on the change to case mix. T. 50-1. This occurred upon receipt of information concerning MDC's, T. 51, which is contained in NRGH Exhibit 14. During the first two weeks of May, 1986, Mr. Austin spoke to Terry Richardson about Mr. Austin's concern that interest expense was not appropriate in the amended budget. T. 55. This was the first time that Mr. Austin had considered interest expense as an issue. T. 55. Mr. Austin was in the process of drafting a version of the staff preliminary findings and recommendations during the first two weeks of May, and had written it approving the change to gross revenue per adjusted admission, but was uncertain about the interest expense. T. 56. Mr. Austin sent his draft of preliminary findings and recommendations to Mr. Borders on May 14, 1986, T. 54, and the draft disapproved the amended budget. T. 53. The basis for disapproval was not disapproval of case mix or gross revenue per adjusted admission. T. 56. On about May 9, 1986, Mr. Richardson told Mr. Wichmann that the HCCB staff would recommend approval of the amended budget with respect to the case mix issue. At the same time Mr. Richardson told Mr. Wichmann that staff would be recommending a reduction of the amended budget for all long-term interest expense in excess of the 80th percentile of their hospital group. T. 227. This was the first time that anyone from the HCCB had informed North Ridge that interest expense was a problem. T. 229. Until about May 9, 1986, the only issue had been case mix. Id. During this same conversation, Mr. Richardson made a request to Mr. Wichmann for information concerning interest expense. The request was not made in writing, and the testimony of Mr. Richardson and Mr. Wichmann as to what was requested evidences misunderstanding of what Mr. Richardson may have intended. The problem arises because Mr. Richardson could have asked Mr. Wichmann for information concerning the current actual interest expense of North Ridge, or how the budgeted interest expense was projected, or both. Mr. Richardson's testimony on this point is not clear. He was asked by counsel "what did you ask of Mr. Wichmann" and responded "we asked him how the interest expense for the hospital was calculated." T. 406. It would appear from this answer that Mr. Richardson meant how was the budgeted expense projected, but it also could have meant how was the actual current Interest expense calculated. The matter is further confused by the next question asked. Mr. Richardson was directed to the precise place in the amended budget which contains the budgeted interest expense, and was asked: "Did you ask Mr. Wichmann to submit justification regarding that figure?" (E.S.) T. 406. Justification implies having a basis in fact, and a basis in fact would involve the current actual interest expense. Mr. Richardson replied: "We asked him to submit the method of calculation of that figure for purposes of determining whether it was justifiable." T. 406-7. (E.S.) It must be concluded from Mr. Richardson's testimony that Mr. Richardson intended to ask Mr. Wichmann to justify the projected interest expense in the budget, which would include both the method of calculation of the budgeted figure and the actual current interest expense. It also must be concluded from the above testimony that Mr. Richardson did not clearly communicate his intention to Mr. Wichmann. Mr. Wichmann understood Mr. Richardson's request to be concerned only with substantiation of actual current interest expense. T. 227-8. Mr. Wichmann understood Mr. Richardson to have said that the amended budget would be approved if North Ridge could substantiate the actual current interest expense incurred. Id. Mr. Wichmann did not understand that Mr. Richardson had requested or intended that North Ridge present information concerning how the budgeted interest expense had been calculated. T. 257. In an attempt to comply with this request, Mr. Wichmann contacted Arthur Andersen & Company to have them substantiate what would be North Ridge's actual interest expense, and to show what the interest expense would be based on external forms of financing. T. 231, 256. Had he understood that Mr. Richardson wanted to know how the amended budgeted interest expense had been calculated, Mr. Wichmann would have provided that information. T. 261-2. NRGH Exhibit 15 is the information provided to Mr. Wichmann from Arthur Andersen & Co. in response to Mr. Wichmann's request, and this was submitted to the HCCB on May 19, 1986. T. 231, 57. At the time of delivery of this document, Mr. Wichmann spoke to Mr. Austin and Mr. Borders to explain what he thought Arthur Andersen & Co. had presented. T. 254. Mr. Wichmann also told Mr. Austin that he thought that the interest expense was 10 per cent of the $85 million which had been paid by AMI for the hospital. T. 255-6. Upon review of NRGH Exhibit 15, the HCCB staff concluded that NRGH exhibit 15 " . . . did not in detail justify how the interest expense was calculated." T. 61. (E.S.) The May 14, 1986, draft of preliminary findings and recommendations did not reduce the amended budget due to interest expense, but was simply negative in tone on this issue. T. 63. That draft did not go any further than Mr. Borders. Id. On May 23, 1986, Mr. Austin told Mr. Wichmann that the interest expense had not been substantiated and that staff intended to recommend that the amended budget be reduced due to the interest expense. T. 232. This recommendation was put into written form as preliminary findings and recommendations and sent by Mr. Austin to Mr. Borders and Mr. Bracher, Executive Director, recommending that the interest expense in the amended budget of North Ridge be reduced back to the group 80th percentile level. T. 64-5, 233. This recommendation was disapproved, however, by Mr. Bracher, and Mr. Bracher directed that the reduction focus upon the operating margin of North Ridge. T. 65-6, 233-5. Mr. Bracher disapproved the preliminary findings and recommendations on Thursday, May 28, 1986, and the disapproved document was received by Mr. Borders and Mr. Austin on Friday, May 29, 1986. T. 67-8. Mr. Austin then told Mr. Wichmann that the basis for the recommendation of staff to reduce the amended budget of North Ridge was not interest expense, but was operating margin. T. 69, 236. He also told Mr. Wichmann that staff approved the case mix change. Id. Mr. Austin then prepared another version of the preliminary findings and recommendations and sent that forward for staff review. T70. This document was ultimately approved by Mr. Bracher and became the final staff version of the staff preliminary findings and recommendations which is NRGH Exhibit 1, T. 71, and is dated June 12, 1986. It was received by Mr. Wichmann the next day. T. 236-7. As of the date of this recommended order, there has been no final order of the Hospital Cost Containment Board approving or disapproving the proposed amended budget of North Ridge. In view of the foregoing findings of fact and the conclusions of law which follow, findings of fact concerning the substantive issues in this case pertaining to the proposed amended budget are not necessary. However, since the budget review process is necessarily compressed into such a short period of time, the following findings of fact will nonetheless be made for the record. The following facts are part of the prehearing stipulation: North Ridge has submitted sufficient justification of a change in case mix to establish that the hospital's requested GRAA of $7,569 appears to be reasonable and justified considering the noted change in North Ridge's cardiac patients. As a result, the Hospital has met its burden of proof regarding case mix. The statewide average operating margin for proprietary hospitals in Florida, based upon 1984 actual data, is 13.3 percent. The operating margin requested by North Ridge in its FY 1986 amended budget after application of the base year adjustment is 4.5 percent. The State of Florida has not obtained a waiver allowing state regulation of Medicare and Medicaid revenues. The Hospital Cost Containment Board does not at the current time have a definition for "reasonable rate of return." North Ridge General Hospital's original FY 1986 budget was approved by the Board for gross revenue per adjusted admission (GRAA) of $7,122. T. 42, 452. The original budget was criticized by staff with respect to four issues, but the amended budget was not criticized by staff on these issues, T. 348-9 After approval of the FY 1986 budget, North Ridge filed its corrected FY 1986 budget. T. 453. The corrected budget conformed the budget to all reductions made in the approved budget, including the base year adjustment. T. 452-3. As previously found as fact, the proposed amended budget requested a GRAA of $7,569. It also requested a net revenue per adjusted admission (NRRA) of $5,684. T. 272-3. Interest expense was not a basis for recommendation of reduction of the proposed amended budget in the preliminary findings and recommendations issued by the HCCB staff on June 13,1986. See findings of fact 43; T. 472. It is not reasonable or proper to calculate interest expense on capital. Interest expense must be calculated on debt. T. 528. North Ridge asserts that the interest expense is reasonable because it was a result of the purchase of the hospital by American Medical International, Inc. North Ridge asserts that there is no equity in the budgeted debt. T. 147. If it was a reasonable projection of debt expense, then the amount of $8.5 million interest expense would be reasonable based on 10 percent interest. T. 546. The intercompany interest rate of American Medical International, Inc., which is the rate AMI charges its affiliates for the cost of capital, is 10 percent. T. 148, 150. North Ridge actually calculated its projected interest expense for its proposed amended budget using the 10 percent rate and a debt amount asserted to be $84,977,800. Citizens Ex. 5. The debt amount is asserted to consist of $28,840,800, a mortgage assumed from a commercial bank, $36,750,000, a note issued to the former owner of North Ridge, $17,037,000, an amount due for redemption of preferred stock, and $2,350,000, an amount associated within the company for "domestic development," which was labeled legal, accounting, and related company acquisition costs. Citizens Ex. 5; NRGH Ex. 15. All of these items were associated with the acquisition of North Ridge by AMI. If all of these were legitimate projections of debt when the proposed amended budget was prepared, and do not contain equity, then the budgeted interest expense of $8.5 million is reasonable pursuant to the testimony of Pace Allen, T. 546, and John Hutchins, T. 151-2. The analysis of the reasonableness of the budgeted interest expense performed by Mr. Hutchins, NRGH Ex. 15, is based upon debt information available September 2, 1985, the beginning of the fiscal year for 1986. T. 147; NRGH Ex. 15. The note payable, in the amount of $36,750,000, had no stated interest rate, and was to be paid off on February 28, 1986, by North Ridge or by AMI on behalf of North Ridge. T. 148, 181. It was refinanced on February 28, 1986, by A-I and reflected in the "intercompany financing account" of North Ridge. NRGH 15, p. 2; T. 572. Mr. Hutchins imputed a reasonable rate of interest to the note. T. 148. The preferred stock was redeemed prior to June 30, 1986. T. 572. It had a mandatory redemption date of June 26, 1986, and a mandatory redemption amount of $17,888,550. T. 148; NRGH Ex. 15, p. 2. The unaudited balance sheet for North Ridge for the period ending June 30, 1986, showed only $28,135,803 as long term debt, Citizens Ex. 6, because the note and preferred stock were paid or redeemed prior to June 30,1986. T. 572. The June 30, 1986, balance sheet of North Ridge contains an item "intercompany accounting" under capital. North Ridge put on no evidence to show that this term should be considered to be debt, or that it was carried as capital on this balance sheet by mistake. The item usually is carried above capital. T. 556. At 10 percent interest, the interest on the item shown as long term debt, $28,135,803, would be $2,013,503. T. 529. For the period ending June 30, 1986, the unaudited statement of income and expenses of North Ridge showed $6,673,686 as "cost of capital." Citizens Ex. 7. This figure could include any number of things, including the cost of floating bonds or interest. T. 534. If it was all interest expense, extrapolated for the full fiscal year, the interest expense would be about $8,000,000. Id. There is no evidence in the record to show what the "cost of capital" item is in fact. The interest expense in the approved 1986 budget was about $41,000. T. 440-1. None of the three methods used in NRGH Ex. 15, prepared by Arthur Andersen & Co., were used by North Ridge to calculate projected interest expense for the proposed amended budget. T. 180; Citizens Ex. 5. North Ridge did not present evidence to explain the amount of $2,350,000 shown on Citizens Ex. 5 for "domestic development." T. 176 The proposed interest expense of $8.5 million is about twice that of the amount of the 80th percenti1e for hospitals in North Ridge's group. T. 115. The interest expense could be less by $4,100,000 to equal the 80th percentile. Citizens Ex. 2. The percentile is calculated by comparing interest expense to total operating expense. HCCB Ex. 1. At the 50th percentile, the interest expense of North Ridge would be $2,286,909. Id. North Ridge has failed to justify the reasonableness of the interest expense that it projected in its proposed amended budget filed December 16, 1985. Mr. Hutchins, for Arthur Andersen & Co., testified as an expert, but his report disclaims any opinion as to the "elements" of his report, which include the propriety of treating the various amounts as proper projected debt at the time the proposed amended budget was filed. NRGH Ex. 15. The disclaimer is due to the fact that Mr. Hutchins did not do an examination in accordance with generally accepted auditing principles. Id. North Ridge put on no direct testimony or evidence to show to whom the $36.7 million note was payable, why it bore no interest, when it was due, and who paid it off. It would appear from the fact that it was completely paid on February 28, 1986, by "refinancing" and thereafter was reflected in the "intercompany financing account," see finding of fact 56 above, it would appear that AMI paid it off in cash. This action should have been foreseen when the proposed amended budget was prepared in December 1985. There is no evidence when the preferred stock was redeemed. Page 2 of the Arthur Andersen & Co. report states that management intended to refinance the obligation to redeem the preferred stock, but this statement is hearsay and is not further explained by direct evidence as to when the refinancing would occur. It might not have occurred until June 26, 1986. There is no evidence to explain why the preferred stock caused an interest expense prior to redemption. Further, North Ridge did not attempt to explain the "cost of Capital" item on Citizens Ex. 7, despite the testimony that this item did not necessarily contain interest expense. Nor did North Ridge credibly prove that it was proper to project an interest expense on the $2,350,000 it labeled "domestic development." In the absence of credible expert opinion as to the factual basis of all these "elements" and absent direct evidence from North Ridge, other than hearsay contained in NRGH Ex. 15, a finding of fact cannot be made that these were reasonable projections of reasonably ascertainable amounts of interest expense as of the time the proposed amended budget was prepared. Since the debt to an outside bank in the amount of about $28 million is still shown by implication as long term debt as of June 30, 1986, and since 10 percent interest is a reasonable rate of interest, the proper interest rate for the proposed amended budget of North Ridge should be at least $2,013,503, which is quite close to the 50th percentile for its group. Staff of the HCCB and the Public Counsel propose that the interest rate be reduced to the 80th percentile of the group by subtraction of $4,100,000 from allowed interest. Citizens Exhibit 2. This in effect acknowledges $4,400,000 as proper interest expense in the amended budget. Given the possibility that some interest was paid prior to redemption of the preferred stock and payment of the note, see finding of fact 28, and upon consideration of there commendations of staff, it is concluded that reduction of the interest expense by $4,100,000 would be reasonable. Operating margin is the difference between a hospital's operating expenses and its net operating revenues, divided by net operating revenues to obtain a percentage. T. 77. The statewide operating margin for proprietary hospitals in Florida based on 1984 actual data is 13.3 percent. See finding of fact 47. As requested in its amended budget after application of the base year adjustment, the operating margin of North Ridge is projected for FY 1986 to be 4.5 percent. Id. The operating margin is 7.4 percent without the base year adjustment. T.273. The operating margin in the 1986 approved budget was 1.5 percent. T. 286. A proposed increase in operating margin can be analyzed for reasonableness by comparison to the statewide average for like hospitals and by comparison to the previous operating margin for the hospital concerned. T. 116- In most cases in the past, the HCCB had made the comparison only to the statewide average. T. 329. Compared only to the statewide average of 13.3 percent for proprietary hospitals, the proposed operating margin of 4.5 percent is very reasonable. Comparison of the proposed increase in operating margin to the prior operating margin in the hospital's budget is an appropriate comparison, but some care must be taken when the Initial operating margin approaches zero. It is misleading to use the "percentage of the increase" method in this circumstance since an increase, as here, from 1.5 percent to 4.5 percent, is mathematically an increase of 200 percent when compared to the original amount, but really is quite small, only 3 percent. T. 328-9. Staff of the HCCB did not consider the statewide operating margin average to be a relevant basis for comparison for an amended budget, T. 118, add did not do so in this case. T. 121. Staff asserted that the foregoing is a policy of the HCCB in reviewing amendments to budgets. T. 120. The policy is not contained in a rule or statute. T. 120. There is no specific evidence in the record to justify the policy. The policy is reasonable on its face an initial means to identify the nature of increases proposed in a budget amendment, but it is facially unreasonable to stop at that point and not analyze the basis for increases. A hospital should not be barred from correcting errors in their budgets. A primary reason that the projected operating margin of North Ridge is only 4.5 percent is due to the interest expense of $8.5 million. If the interest expense projected were at the group 50th percentile, the operating margin would be 12.8 percent. HCCB Ex. 1; T. 98. This interest expense would be $2,286,909, which is substantially the same as the interest expense of $2,013,503 for the commercial mortgage loan. It should be noted that the operating margin of 4.5 percent and 12.6 percent both contain the base year adjustment T. 98-9; finding of fact 47. As discussed above, North Ridge has not proved by credible evidence that as of the time of preparing the proposed amended budget, there was a basis for expecting that an interest expense of $8.5 million would actually be incurred for the entire year. Clearly it was known that the preferred stock was to be redeemed by June 1986 and the $37 million note was to be completely paid by the end of February, 1986. If, thereafter, North Ridge's interest expense is merely a payment of interest to American Medical International, which owns North Ridge, this is a payment on capital, and should not be deducted from operating revenue as an operating expense to calculate operating margin. T. 536-7. There really is no clear evidence in this record to prove conclusively that North Ridge has been paying AMI interest at about a 10 percent rate, but it appears that some sort of inter- company transaction of this sort is occurring. T. 294. Thus, for the portion of the year that such interest was paid to AMI rather than to an outside entity, those amounts (whatever they may be) should not be considered to be a deduction from operating revenue to calculate operating margin. There is evidence concerning other factors that could be used to justify an increase in operating margin. Of these, the only one applicable is the need to purchase capital equipment. Operating margin is a source of funds for capital equipment. T. 284. North Ridge's approved 1986 budget and the amended budget contain the same equipment expenditure projections. T. 288-9. The operating margin in the approved budget was 1.5 percent. T. 286. This margin was not felt to be sufficient by Mr. Wichmann to purchase the capital equipment planned in the approved budget. T. 286, 289. The increase in case mix may be a reason for needing more capital in the amended budget, and thus a greater operating margin, but the record is not clear on this point. T 287. Increased services would require a greater operating margin if increased capital was associated with the increased services. T. 287. An insufficiency of supplies would be a reason to increase operating margin. T287. There is no evidence that North Ridge's supplies are inadequate. T 287. The amended budget does not project a higher level of services for the service index than did the 1986 approved budget. T. 525. In the short run, deferred income taxes could be used as a source of funds, as could depreciation, T. 289-90, and these funds could be used to purchase capital equipment. T. 524. Staff of the HCCB currently uses an incipient and evolving policy to require that benefits that a hospital may receive from a reduction in Medicare contractual allowances, which results in Increased revenues from the federal government, be passed on to non-Medicare patients by "netting out" these benefits against any increase proposed by the hospital in its budget or amended budget. T 416. The policy was first mentioned in March at the Board meeting to Venice Hospital T. 413-7, 582. The policy was not "applied" except as a basis for a critical public comment. The hospital's proposed amendment did not propose a change in gross revenue. T, 414. The reduction in the contractual adjustment referred to in the testimony is the difference between the Medicare contractual adjustment in the 1986 original budget and the proposed budget amendment. A Medicare contractual adjustment is the amount of shortfall in Medicare reimbursement which is written off by the Hospital. The amount of reduction in contractual adjustment in this case is $3,152,818. T. 80. The proposed amendment to the 1986 budget also has $171,203 of additional revenue over costs to private payors compared to the approved 1986 budget. T. 79-80. The sum of these two amounts, which is $3,324,021, ultimately has a positive effect on operating margin. T. 490. Staff of the HCCB recommends that the $3,324,021 be passed on as a benefit to private paying patients by a reduction in net revenues and gross revenues. T. 79-17; Citizens Ex. 2. The amount of $3,324,021 discussed in the last paragraph is exactly the difference between the operating margin in the 1986 approved budget (corrected) and the proposed amended budget. T. 492, 455. The Medicare contractual adjustment of $3,152,818 was caused by an increase in the hospital's case mix, T. 312-3, and the Medicare prospective payment system of reimbursement for Medicare patients has impacted both case mix and contractual adjustment. Id. Under the perspective payment system, it is the policy of the federal government that a hospital may keep the excess of reimbursement if more than costs, but the hospital is at risk if costs exceed the payment. T. 321-2. Medicare pays a flat amount per case, and cases are weighted for determining the amount of payment into types called diagnostic related groups, or DRG's. T. 315. The percentage of fixed payment patients at North Ridge is 73.3 percent. T. 170. The percentage of Medicare patients days is 67.1 percent. NRGH Ex. 1. The State of Florida, has not obtained a waiver allowing state regulation of Medicare and Medicaid revenues. Prehearing Stipulation. A hospital could reduce its net revenues by the amount of the contractual adjustment by giving that amount away, T. 167, or by some combination of actions which amounts to the same thing: lowering rates for private payment patients and performing more indigent care. See T. 387. The testimony that a hospital has no method to do this is rejected. See T. 167. It would appear that North Ridge has 26.7 percent of its patients days that are not Medicare patient days that could be involved in the lowering or waiving of charges. See finding of fact 94. The corrected budget as approved by the HCCB for FY 1986 contains a base year adjustment of $1,662,632, and the proposed amended budget does not. T. 484, 314. There is no clear or competent evidence as to precisely how the corrected budget distributed the base year adjustment, but since the adjustment is a result of statute and only effects net revenues, it ultimately must reduce net revenues by this amount. T. 386. Lawrence R. Murray testified for North Ridge as an expert in hospital finance and accounting and third-party reimbursement matters including Medicare and Medicaid. T. 301. Mr. Murray argued that the similarity between the dollar amounts relating to the contractual adjustment (about $3 million) and the differences between the operating margin in the corrected budget and the proposed amended budget (see findings of facts 79 and 80) meant that the contractual adjustment recommendations of the staff of the HCCB were really recommendations to reduce the operating margin of North Ridge by that amount. T. 596-7. He then reasoned that the operating margin in the corrected budget already had the base year adjustment made but the proposed amended budget did not, and this was partially the cause of the increase in operating margin. He concluded that if the operating margin of North Ridge should be reduced by the amount of the contractual adjustments, then the amount of the reduction should be reduced by first subtracting the base year adjustment. Id. The problem with the argument is that the reduction recommended by the staff of about $3 million is premised upon this amount being a change entirely in contractual adjustments, not a change in operating margin. Since admittedly the proposed amended budget has not had the base year adjustment made, that adjustment has to be made at some time, and it is proper to do it as shown on Citizens Ex. 2. The similarity between the contractual adjustment figure and the difference in operating margins appears to be caused by the fact that operating revenues rose by $1.6 million (to $72.6 million from the corrected budget revenues of $71 million) and this amount is the amount of the base year adjustment. T. 453-4. The difference in revenues less deductions between the corrected budget (with the base year adjustment) and the proposed amended budget (without the base year adjustment) is $4.6 million. Id. The corrected budget with the base year adjustment had gross revenues of $71 million and deductions of $51 million, and the proposed amended budget had gross revenues of $72.6 million and deductions of $15 million. Cost shifting is the shifting of a cost from one payor to another who presumably did not incur the cost. As such, it results in higher costs to the payor to whom the cost is shifted. The contractual adjustment in the instant case is the result in an increase in reimbursement of costs which results in higher net revenues for Medicare patients. T. 187. A requirement to lower revenues for private payment patients in the same amount results in a lower cost to these patients, and thus is the opposite in effect of cost shifting as defined above. T. 536. In its preliminary findings and recommendations, staff applied a methodology to calculate how a predetermined reduction in gross revenue would be applied to net revenue. NRGH Exhibit 1; T. 82. This methodology uses a fixed percentage based upon the amended budget ratio of net to gross revenues. Id. There is a conflict in the record as to whether staff of the HCCB purposes to apply this method to North Ridge, although it appears from representations of counsel as well as proposed finding of fact 27 that staff clearly proposes not to apply this method to North Ridge. T. 17,425-6. The fixed percentage method of calculating from gross to net revenues does not properly consider payor mix and should not be used in this case because it is inaccurate. T. 169-70. Administrative, courtesy and policy discounts include discounts to clergymen, physicians, employees, and employee dependents, and discounts to health maintenance organizations and preferred provider organizations. T. 179. About 1.8 percent of total patient days are represented by these discounts. NRGH Exhibit 16. Indigent and charity care represents the amount of revenue that is written off by a hospital to indigent care. T. 179. About 4.4 percent of total patient days are represented by indigent care. NRGH Exhibit 16. About 67.1 percent of total patient days of North Ridge come from Medicare. NRGH Exhibit 16. North Ridge thus has about 73.3 percent of its patients as fixed payment patients. T. 170; NRGH Exhibit 16. If the Contractual adjustment net revenues are to be shifted as a benefit to non-fixed payment patients, the percentage of those patients so benefiting is 26.7 percent. If there is to be a reduction in net revenues due to the contractual adjustment issue, the total amount of the reduction would be $3,324,021, which is a reduction of $344 per adjusted admission for net revenues. Citizens Exhibit 2. The proper method of converting a net revenues reduction for contractual adjustments to a gross revenue figure, using the fixed payment patients percentage, is found on Citizens Exhibit 2. T. 513. This exhibit correctly projects admissions using actual admissions projected for the year. T. 515. However, the percentage to be used should be 73.3 percent fixed payment patients. This method accurately takes into account the fixed price payor mix by calculating the GRAA reduction from the NRAA reduction by dividing the percentage of non-Medicare and Medicaid patient days by total patient days. Thus, the reduction in NPAA as shown on Citizens Exhibit 2 of $344 is correct if there is to be a reduction for contractual adjustments, but the reduction in GRAA should be $1288, which is $344 divided by 26.7 percent. T. 190. Citizens Exhibit 2 blends the proposed amended budget with actual experience for the fiscal year. T. 514. It is not a new policy to do this. T. 542. The policy is also contained in a proposed rule 27J-1.0205(3), which was officially recognized, and is made Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1. The proposed rule does not prohibit blending in this case. There was no explicit evidence offered to substantiate the reasonableness of this policy, but the policy is facially reasonable given the obvious fact that a projected budget, including an amendment in midyear, should be based on the most recent historical data for making the projection Mr. Murray's testimony did not demonstrate that the policy is unreasonable. Moreover, none of the hospital budgets mentioned by Mr. Murray involved a reduction in contractual adjustment for Medicare. T. 641. 102. Pace Allen testified as an expert in hospital accounting and finance. T. 505. Mr. Allen's testimony with respect to Citizens Exhibits 1 and 2 was concerned primarily with calculation methods. Mr. Allen did not perform an independent analysis of the reasonableness of North Ridge's proposed amended budget, T. 540, and did not compare interest expense to other hospitals. T. 544. Mr. Allen had not express an opinion as to what the final GRAA and NRRA should be. T. 560. Citizens Exhibit 2, however, shows as a result a GRAA of $6224 which was verified by Mr. Murray. T. 625. It appears that the GRAA at the 50th percentile for North Ridge's group is $6422. NRGH Ex. 1. A GPAA of $6224 is less than the approved budget for 1986 of North Ridge. There is no rule to provide standards for determining the justification and extent to which a decrease in contractual adjustments for Medicare should be passed on to non-Medicare patients by decreasing gross revenue per adjusted admission. Further, in the case at bar, the HCCB has not presented evidence to justify the application of the policy in the case at bar. While it is true that application of the policy will lower the operating margin of North Ridge to about 6 percent, there is no explanation in the record why that is the correct figure for North Ridge. It cannot be assumed to be the correct figure since the statewide average operating margin for proprietary hospitals is 13.3 percent. It is true that there is some evidence that North Ridge does not need an increase in operating margin for capital needs associated with case mix change, or to purchase supplies, or to provide new services. There is also some evidence that North Ridge may need an increased operating margin for capital equipment. But the evidence on the whole is insufficient to determine whether this means windfall profits to North Ridge or simply an Increase of reimbursement that is in whole or in part reasonably necessary to reimburse actual costs for services.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Hospital Cost Containment Board enter its Final Order confirming that the proposed amended budget of North Ridge General Hospital for fiscal year 1986 has been approved in its entirety by operation of law. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of August, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2412H Pursuant to section 120.159(2), Fla. Stat. (1985) the following are specific rulings upon all proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties which have been rejected in this recommended order, using the same numbers used by the parties. Findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: The finding is not necessary. The finding is not necessary. The finding is not necessary. The finding is a matter of law. The finding is not necessary. 9. The second sentence is a matter of law. It is not clear whether staff considers the 25 day--period to start with receipt of the budget or substantive review. The first sentence is thus rejected. The finding is a matter of law. 21. The last clause of the sentence is irrelevant. 25. The second sentence is irrelevant. 36. This finding is rejected because the exhibit did not explain the basis of the interest expense as found in the findings of fact. This finding is irrelevant. This finding is irrelevant. 56. The last sentence is a matter of law. The first sentence is a matter of law, as is the second sentence. This finding is irrelevant since Petitioner admits there was a valid partial waiver. This finding is legally incorrect since the amended budget would be complete, conforming, and verifiable on the 40th day from receipt, absent a valid notice within the 40 day period to the contrary which remained uncorrected. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Rejected as explained in detail in the findings of fact. Rejected in detail in the findings of fact. While it is true that interest expense is a fixed cost, the failure of North Ridge to explain the expense makes this finding irrelevant. Irrelevant. Rejected as stated in the findings of fact for lack of evidence. The first sentence is rejected since Arthur Andersen & Co. only "obtained information," and the basis was uncorroborated hearsay. T. 147. The last sentence is rejected for lack of supporting evidence. Rejected because not supported by competent evidence. 91. The last sentence is not relevant since a policy may properly be applied the first time in this ease. 92-100. No ruling has been made upon these proposed findings of fact since the recommended orders relies upon other issues, making these findings unnecessary. 105. The second sentence is rejected in finding 85. 107. The second sentence is rejected as a matter of law, not fact. 111. Rejected in finding of fact 88. The third and fourth sentences are rejected as being irrelevant. There was no proof of this policy or any reliance on it by the Board, and thus this is irrelevant. 116. Irrelevant. Rejected as not supported by persuasive evidence. Rejected with respect to interest expense. No ruling was made with respect to contractual adjustments or operating margin. Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: 2. The lack of worksheet C2A has been found as a fact, but there is no evidence in the record to find as fact that the amendment "could not be properly analyzed" without additional information. Staff could have analyzed what they had and recommended disapproval based on what they had. 4. There is no evidence in the record that there was a "paucity of supporting documentation." It is true that Mr. Austin and others felt they needed more information to give a favorable recommendation. The last phrase of the second sentence is rejected since it implies that something other than case mix information was discussed at the February 11, 1986, meeting. The evidence is not sufficient to make that finding. The last phrase of the second sentence is rejected since the evidence does not show that the "waiver" was discussed in the context of allowing staff time to analyze the amendment. 9. The last sentence is rejected since the evidence does not show that staff asked Mr. Wichmann at the February 11, 1986, meeting to supply any information except case mix. The last phrase of the second sentence is rejected because the evidence does not show that the "waiver" was discussed in the context of allowing staff time to evaluate the amendment. The fifth sentence is rejected because there is no evidence that the purpose of the "waiver" was clearly discussed with Mr. Wichmann, at least in terms of how the "waiver" would operate. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Wichmann was told that "the 120 days would not start until sufficient documentation was received by the Board." The last sentence is rejected because Mr. Wichmann only testified that he did not remember much about the discussion concerning "waiver" except that the budget would be returned to him. The second and third sentences have been partially rejected since what Mr. Austin did tell Mr. Wichmann could reasonably have been interpreted by Mr. Wichmann as saying that without the waiver and the new information, the budget would be returned. The ultimate conclusion of this proposed finding is rejected because not supported by the weight of credible evidence. As discussed in the findings of fact, neither Mr. Austin nor Mr. Borders clearly or credibly testified that it was clearly understood by Mr. Wichmann that his "waiver" letter was intended to erase the first 58 days of the 120-day period which had elapsed. Moreover, neither Mr. Austin nor Mr. Borders clearly testified that they understood the "waiver" to include time for them to evaluate the new information concerning case mix. But more important, Mr. Wichmann's letter clearly did not grant time to evaluate. The period would start running again as of the date of receipt of the information once "satisfaction" had been achieved. Regardless of what Mr. Austin or Mr. Borders wanted, they got only what the letter says. Finally, with regard to specific proposed findings in this paragraph, Mr. Wichmann did not testify that he did not know the "ordinary" meaning of the word waiver. He was not asked that. It is unclear from the question whether the legal meaning, which was clearly at issue at the time of the question, or the ordinary" meaning, was meant by the question. The failure of Mr. Wichmann, Mr. Austin, and Mr. Borders to clarify what was desired and what was intended by the letter of February 13, 1986, is perhaps true, and if pursued as a finding of fact, could result in a finding that there was never a meeting of the minds, and hence, no waiver at all. This finding, however, is rejected, by findings of fact 12-23. Reading the Health Care Access Act is irrelevant since the statute does not define "waiver" or "extension," and Mr. Wichmann admittedly had no advice from a lawyer when he wrote his letter. Finally, the failure of Mr. Wichmann to explain the contents of his letter to the staff of the HCCB is wholly irrelevant. He ended the letter with the sentence "If this is not correct, please notify me immediately." The burden of clarifying ambiguities in the letter was on the staff of the HCCB, not Mr. Wichmann. The fifth and sixth sentences are rejected because Mr. Wichmann did not repudiate his letter, and the meaning of his letter has previously been discussed and found as fact. The eighth and ninth sentences are irrelevant. The rules of the HCCB do not prohibit submission of additional information after a budget is "filed," and it would be completely unreasonable to preclude a continuing exchange of information in an effort to resolve budget issues in free form action without the necessity of a formal administrative hearing. Moreover, the power of staff, pursuant to rule 4D-1.014, to ask for more information, as previously discussed above, has nothing to do with whether a budget has been "filed" so as to commence the 120-day period. The Legislature surely did not intend that the 12-day period be postponed indefinitely by staff through unending requests for information. The eleventh through fourteenth sentences are rejected as matters of law. The first sentence is rejected in the conclusions of law. See the last sentence of the immediately preceding paragraph also. The last sentence is also rejected for the reasons stated in the conclusions of law, paragraph 33. The facts proposed in this paragraph are irrelevant. Mr. Wichmann failed to submit information concerning the original budget compared to the amended budget, staff should have immediately recommended disapproval of the North Ridge amendment, thus allowing enough time for a section 120.57(1) hearing and a final order by the Board. Moreover, staff already had the original budget in its files, so it is unclear what Mr. Wichmann's asserted "failure" was. Finally, case mix was the central focus, and case mix was in fact approved by staff. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that Mr. Wichmann's attempt to "disassociate the budget amendment request from the original budget submission" had anything to do with the issues in this case, if it occurred at all. This finding is rejected because it is irrelevant. The second sentence is an issue of law. The second sentence is an issue of law. The sixth sentence through the end are irrelevant. 28. The last two sentences are rejected because contrary to the evidence. 35. Irrelevant. Findings of fact proposed by the Intervenor: 8. It is unclear from the testimony whether the 25 day goal is commenced by the filing of the budget or the day when substantive review begins, and therefore the finding as stated categorically is rejected. This finding is irrelevant, although it is true and provides background information. The phone call was not in writing and was not within the 40 days from receipt of the budget amendment by the HCCB. This finding is also irrelevant for the reasons stated in the last paragraph. 29. This finding is rejected for the reasons stated in finding of fact 12, and also 11, 17, and 18. The portion of this proposed finding concerning "time to analyze further justification and further evaluate the requested amended budget" is rejected in findings of fact 17-20. This proposed finding is rejected in finding of fact 22. This proposed finding is essentially rejected in finding of fact 23. 40. The second sentence is rejected because the question did not use the word "ordinary" and Mr. Wichmann could easily have thought counsel meant some legal definition. 55. This proposed finding is essentially rejected in findings of fact 37 and 38. 64. Irrelevant. 72-78. Rejected because cumulative. The ultimate finding is accepted and adopted. 79. The last two sentences are rejected as hearsay. 82-84, 88-91. Irrelevant and cumulative. 108. Rejected because the evidence is not sufficient. 122-123. Rejected in favor of the percentages found from other evidence in the record. 124. Cumulative and unnecessary. 128 The amount of GRAA proposed cannot be found for lack of supporting calculations or facts in the record. Irrelevant. Irrelevant since this legal issue has not been reached in this order. Rejected as an issue of law. Rejected as specified in detail in the findings of fact. Rejected as specified in detail in the findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis Ashley Billingsley, Esquire Hospital Cost Containment Board Woodcrest Office Plaza, Building L, Suite 101 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Ralph Haben, Jr., Esquire Steven T. Mindlin, Esquire 306 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jack Shreve, Public Counsel John Knight, Esquire Office of Public Counsel 202 Blount Street 624 Fuller Warren Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Bracher, Secretary Executive Director Hospital Cost Containment Board Woodcrest Office Plaza 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact Crisis Stabilization Units The Legislature dealt comprehensively with the subject of mental health when it enacted Chapter 394, Florida Statutes, in 1971. The Act is officially known as the Florida Mental Health Act, and popularly known as the Baker Act. The Act established programs in the Department to reduce the occurrence, severity, duration and disabling aspects of mental, emotional, and behavioral illness or disorders. The Department was directed to "coordinate the development, maintenance, and improvement of [mental health] receiving and community treatment facilities within the programs" of HRS districts in Florida. The Legislature also required that "the least restrictive means of intervention [i.e., treatment] be employed based on the individual needs of each patient within the scope of available services." Sections 394.451 and 394.453, Florida Statutes (1971). 1/ Mental health services provided by community treatment facilities under the Baker Act may include emergency screening services, mobile crisis response teams, crisis stabilization units, short-term residential treatment centers which provide inpatient care and short-term hospitalization in a psychiatric hospital or psychiatric unit. Long term psychiatric hospitalization is not funded with Baker Act appropriations. Community treatment facilities provided most of their care by purchasing services from hospitals prior to 1979. The rates paid for those hospitalization services had been increasing constantly. Most inpatient psychiatric hospitals now charge patients $300-400 per day. Crisis stabilization units (CSU) were developed as a less costly alternative to psychiatric hospitalization. A CSU was designed to provide treatment to help the individual through an immediate psychiatric crisis, to provide a rapid assessment of the client's needs, and direct the client to appropriate programs, which could include inpatient pay hospital care, if necessary. The time required to stabilize a patient in a psychiatric crisis, to evaluate the patient and determine the most appropriate and least restrictive treatment program is generally about 14-15 days. Short-term residential treatment is provided as an alternative to psychiatric hospitalization for those needing therapy for up to 90 days. Some community treatment facilities established their own inpatient hospital programs about the time CSUs were first established. These psychiatric hospitals are regulated in the same manner as other specialty hospitals under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes. Once a community treatment facility had the approval to establish a hospital, that hospital obtained the ability to bill "third parties," usually insurance companies, for the psychiatric crisis stabilization services they provided. These facilities are able to use that reimbursement to offset, to some extent, any losses incurred in treating Baker Act patients. Most policies of health insurance will not provide reimbursement for crisis stabilization care provided by a CSU, such as South County. On the other hand, Medicaid will not reimburse a free-standing psychiatric hospital such as 45th Street for its services. When CSUs were first organized, they were not regulated by the state. As with hospitals, the size of a CSU is measured by its number of approved beds. Sections 394.878(4) and 395.003(4), Florida Statutes. After their establishment, some units sacrificed quality of care in order to minimize costs, and as a result the Legislature established a program of departmental licensure and regulation for CSUs in 1985. Under those statutes, a CSU may not be licensed for more than 30 beds. South County is licensed as a CSU. HRS District IX includes Palm Beach County. The 45th Street Mental Health Center operates in a portion of Palm Beach County. It was one of the community treatment facilities which established a hospital under Chapter 395, which had 44 beds. It can treat psychiatric patients as inpatients, but as a matter of fact it operates almost solely as a CSU. It takes all indigent patients in psychiatric crises who are brought to them by the police or others, without regard to the patient's ability to pay for the services it renders to them. Licensed CSU facilities, such as South County, also take all patients bought to them. Recently, 45th Street Mental Health Center also licensed a CSU at its hospital with 16 beds. The Legislature has recognized the value of crisis stabilization beds in providing quality, low-cost treatment to citizens suffering from acute bouts of mental illness. It has not, however, directed or specifically funded the establishment of crisis stabilization beds in every HRS district. The Legislature has funded and directed the establishment of a specific number of crisis stabilization unit beds in some HRS districts. These are known as "appropriated beds." The Department also has had the authority to devote some of the money generally appropriated for Baker Act services to establish crisis stabilization beds where it believes they are needed. These are generally known as "unappropriated beds," because they have not been established by specific legislative direction and funding. The Department usually distinguishes between in-patient psychiatric treatment and CSU treatment. CSU beds, short-term residential treatment beds, and in-patient psychiatric hospital beds are usually treated as separate points on the continuum of services available to those with psychiatric problems. Ordinarily, hospital beds are used for longer-term care of patients whose psychiatric illness is such that confinement is the least restrictive means to provide the patient necessary mental health services. A CSU ordinarily limits itself to helping the patient get over his current crisis, evaluating a patient after stabilization, and referring the patient to some other provider for long- term care. The referral may be to out-patient counseling for mild cases of mental illness, to day treatment, to a short-term residential treatment facility, up to hospitalization in a psychiatric unit for serious mental illness. Legislatively appropriated CSU beds are licensed as CSU beds, and not as inpatient psychiatric hospital beds. Appropriated and unappropriated CSU beds are funded at different rates depending on whether or not they were legislatively established, and when they came into existence. The price level adjustment made available in specific appropriation 895 was a legislative effort to reduce the disparity in funding of CSU beds around Florida, since all provide similar services. The Florida Council for Community Mental Health (Florida Council) represents most community treatment facilities before the Legislature. Increased funding for acute Baker Act services, which include CSU beds and inpatient hospital beds, has been a high priority issue for the Florida Council for several years. In 1987, the Florida Council surveyed CSUs to determine their costs for providing services, as distinct from their reimbursement rates. The Florida Council did not obtain additional funding in the 1987 legislative session. In preparation for the 1988 legislative session, the Florida Council conducted a second survey. This survey also distinguished between CSU and in- patient hospital beds, and was intended to gather information on both of those Baker Act services for use in its lobbying activities. The Florida Council summarized the survey results in a chart identified as "Crisis Stabilization Unit Deficiency Distribution" and "Inpatient Baker Act Hospital Deficiency Distribution" (Exhibit 30). The Florida Council's survey results categorized 45th Street as an inpatient hospital, and calculated its reimbursement as $59 per bed per day, but its costs as $160 per bed per day. The reimbursement rate was so low that it was incurring an operating deficit. Independent of the Florida Council's efforts, the Department wanted to identify the Baker Act services that it purchased with public funds throughout the state, and to determine what the Department was paying for those services. The program office in Tallahassee conducted a telephone inventory of CSU beds, by contacting each of the Department's district offices. In response to the survey, the Department's District IX reported sixteen unappropriated CSU beds at South County and no CSU beds, appropriated or unappropriated, at 45th Street. All of 45th Street's inpatient services were reported as "other Baker Act services" in that survey. The survey did not ask District IX officials whether the beds at 45th Street functioned as CSU beds rather than as psychiatric hospital beds. Departmental administrators ultimately produced a spread sheet based on the information derived from its informal, internal telephone survey. It showed 52 unappropriated CSU beds in District IX, which included beds at South County, but none at 45th Street's inpatient psychiatric hospital. 45th Street's beds were shown in a spreadsheet column entitled "number [of] mental health center in-patient beds". (Exhibit 1, Attachment 1, Col. 23.). No funding deficiency was identified by the Department for 45th Street's beds on the spreadsheet. During 1989, the Department's central office was notified that the Legislature might be able to appropriate as much as $2.2 million more for Baker Act services, and the Department was requested to suggest appropriate uses for those funds. The administrators in the Department's central office created a document entitled "Funds needed to increase all CSU beds to $113 per day, Baker Act Funds" (Exhibit 8). The methodology employed by the administrator to produce that spreadsheet did not include any data for inpatient hospital beds; it included only licensed CSU beds. It therefore did not include any of 45th Street's inpatient beds but did include money to increase reimbursement for the 52 unappropriated CSU beds at South County. The Department based its calculations on an estimated split of 75 percent/25 percent in the use of Baker Act funds for the state as a whole between CSU services (75 percent), and other services, including emergency screening, mobile crisis response teams, short- term residential services and inpatient services (25 percent), for fiscal year 1987-88 (the most recent data available). The 25 percent includes inpatient psychiatric hospitalization services which can be provided to clients needing them after stabilization in a CSU. In its calculations, the Department's central office reduced the $2.2 million which the appropriations committee staff had indicated might be available by $717,590 which was needed to increase the funding level for previously appropriated CSU beds to the target level of $1i3 per bed per day. The remaining funds would not be enough to fund all unappropriated CSU beds in the state at the target level of $113 per bed per day, so a plan was devised to prorate the remaining amount over the unappropriated CSU beds. The prorated share for District IX was .2723 of the available funds, which would equal $403,636. These internal calculations made by the Department's central office included no money for 45th Street's inpatient beds. The Department's calculations were ultimately delivered to appropriations staff at the Legislature. This information was not broken down by agency within each district (Tr. 55). The 1989-90 General Appropriations Act appropriated $2 million (not the anticipated $2.2 million) in specific appropriation 895 for crisis stabilization unit beds. $717,590 was allocated for appropriated CSU beds in the same manner suggested by the Department to legislative staff. The remaining $1,282,410 was divided among unappropriated CSU beds. This is 29 percent of the money needed to bring all unappropriated beds up to $113 per bed per day. While the allocations made in the General Appropriations Act are similar to those suggested by the Department (Finding 17), it is impossible to determine from the language in specific appropriation 895 whether the members of the Legislature intended to adopt the methodology implicit in the Department's suggested pro rata distribution. The text of the appropriation proviso does not speak to the distribution of funds within a district. The application of the Department's pro rata formula does yield the same increases specifically allocated by the proviso language to each HRS district. It is by no means clear, however, that the use of that suggested percentage figure for each district was also meant to serve as an appropriation to each CSU provider in each district of the amount of money which can be found in the workpapers prepared by the HRS central office, but which were never sent to the Legislature. For District IX, the pro rata share of .2723 would yield $349,179, the amount which is contained in the proviso language for District IX. The evidence offered fails to prove that the Legislature had any specific will as to the distribution of the monies among providers within a district. The Legislature's focus, to the extent it can be discerned from the proviso language itself, appears to have been the funding of CSU services, without regard to licensure status of those providing the services. The beds at 45th Street provide CSU services. Proviso language for specific appropriation 895 states that the entire $2 million would be used for a "price level increase directly relating to the operation of CSU beds, and not to other Baker Act support services". The proviso language requires the Department to insure that the contracts with providers identify the amounts associated with the operation of CSU beds, as opposed to emergency screening and "other Baker Act services". Chapter 89-253, Law of Florida, specific appropriation 895. Specific appropriation 895 also allocated $291,404 to "community mental health centers that operate licensed psychiatric hospital beds" from general revenue to reimburse them for assessments paid to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund. That portion of the proviso language was vetoed by the Governor, and is not significant here. The meaning of the proviso language actually included in specific appropriation 895 has been subjected to varying interpretations, and as would be expected, South County advances the interpretation which would grant it the greatest funding. Actual Distribution of Funds in District IX After the Department received the proviso language for specific appropriation 895, all districts were sent a memorandum (including attachments) which required them to establish a plan for spending the funds made available under specific appropriation 895. The plan each district submitted to the Department was known as its "CSU -Deficiency Funding Distribution Plan". In the Department's memo, Assistant Secretary Ivor Groves stated "this analysis addresses only the funding levels of CSU beds and does not speak to increasing the funding levels of SRT [short-term residential treatment] beds or inpatient beds operated by community mental health centers". (Exhibit 1, pg. 3). The memo noted that funds would be allocated based upon the 75/25 ratio of CSU bed funding to funding for other services, and the memorandum specifically requested information on each district's suggested formula for the equitable distribution of funds to providers which operated unappropriated CSU beds. Each district was asked to identify the amount of money it paid to contractors providing CSU beds. The districts reported separately amounts paid to contractors for "other Baker Act services," which would have encompassed inpatient services. After receiving the Department's memorandum about the CSU price level increase, the program supervisor for District IX handling mental health programs was concerned that the memorandum did not appear to permit funding for inpatient beds from the $2 million special appropriation. She consulted with the Department's program office and local legislators, 2/ and determined that the distinction between CSU beds, and the in- patient beds operated by 45th Street was irrelevant in District IX. This was so because although 45th Street was licensed as an inpatient psychiatric hospital, the beds located at 45th Street functioned as crisis stabilization beds. There is no crisis stabilization unit in the catchment area for District IX other than the 45th Street Mental Health Center. The police and others bring people suffering acute psychiatric crisis to 45th Street for the purpose of crisis stabilization, and ultimate referral to appropriate psychiatric treatment. Generally, 45th Street does not utilize its beds as inpatient short-term psychiatric hospital beds. Instead, they operate exactly as the crisis stabilization unit beds operated by other providers, such as South County, under their CSU licensure under Chapter 394. 45th Street's Baker Act-funded inpatient hospital beds serve as crisis stabilization unit beds. 45th Street was also in need of the special price level increase monies to permit it to continue to operate those beds as the crisis stabilization beds for its catchment area. 45th Street is not the only facility which operates short-term psychiatric beds as crisis stabilization unit beds. It is, however, the only facility licensed as a short-term psychiatric hospital whose reimbursement rates were so low that it already did not recover at least $113 per patient per day for crisis stabilization services. Thus, it is the only facility licensed as a short-term psychiatric hospital under Chapter 395 which would stand to gain any additional funding under specific appropriation 895. In order to deal with this unique circumstance in District IX, a district program supervisor struck out the term "CSU beds" in the form attached in Assistant Secretary Ivor Groves' memorandum (Finding 22), and substituted the all- encompassing term "Baker Act beds" when calculating the CSU deficiency funding distribution plan for District IX. She included in that calculation the funding of the short-term psychiatric inpatient beds at 45th Street, as well as other licensed CSU beds operated by other providers in District IX. In order to determine the increases necessary to bring all "Baker Act" beds up to the same reimbursement rate per bed per day, the District IX mental health program supervisor had to determine the rate at which District IX reimbursed each provider for the CSU services it made available to the Department. She did so by dividing the number of Baker Act patient days for each agency for the previous year into 75 percent of the Baker Act funds the agency received from the Department that year. The .75 multiplier was used to reflect the statewide 75/25 split in the use of Baker Act funds (see Finding 16 above). In performing this calculation for South County, the Department included all Baker Act funds South County had received. When performing the calculation for 45th Street, the Department did not include all funds that 45th Street had received that year; this had the effect of lowering the rate of reimbursement per bed per day computed under the formula, which in turn had the effect of requiring greater allocations of the deficiency appropriation to 45th Street for fiscal year 1989-90 in order to bring it up to the same reimbursement rate received by other providers, such as South County. The funds excluded from 45th Street's calculation were: a special allocation the Department made to it to reduce the $150,000 operating deficit incurred in a prior period. This was not money used to provide Baker Act services during 1988-89, was not recurring money and was properly excluded; $258,776 45th Street had received for CSU beds newly appropriated for 45th Street that year, even though those beds had not yet been opened, (only $59,000 actually was used for start-up costs, the rest also was applied toward 45th Street's operating deficit). The start-up costs were not recurring, and were properly excluded; and any "profits" from third party reimbursement that may have been paid to 45th Street due to its ability to be reimbursed by third party insurers. The amount of such reimbursement, if any, was not proven at the hearing. 45th Street had provided 10,845 days of CSU services for eligible Baker Act patients in 1988-89; its total reimbursement was $619,326. This was multiplied by .75 (see finding 16), to estimate the total CSU reimbursement it had received. This in turn was divided by the 10,845 patient days to yield a reimbursement rate of $42.42 per bed per day in fiscal year 1988- 89. This is obviously a rough approximation of the reimbursement rate, but the methodology used is reasonable. When District IX calculated its distribution of the $349,179 available to providers of CSU services, the District included 30 beds at 45th Street in the formula, even though 45th Street had 44 beds. The volume of its services was such that 45th Street did fill 30 beds all year with Baker Act CSU patients. The Department's distribution of the CSU deficiency money in District IX does permit patients treated in licensed psychiatric inpatient beds at 45th Street to be billed for in- patient services if they have insurance, but will also consider them CSU patients if they are receiving treatment under the Baker Act. There is no proof, however, that any significant number of patients the police or others bring to 45th Street for crisis stabilization have private insurers which 45th Street can bill. No evidence of any such reimbursement was introduced at the hearing. South County complains that the Department's "functional" interpretation, which treats 45th Street's beds as CSU beds, is improper because it did not use this interpretation when it provided data to legislative staff, and that the Department has never utilized this interpretation in any rule, policy or procedure. The record does not indicate that any other CSU deficiency appropriations have been made, however, so there has been no occasion for the Department to face this question before. It is not surprising that no prior rule, policy or procedure dealt with this issue. In addition, the data provided to legislative staff was necessarily general data. Legislative staff sought and received a suggested plan for distribution of funds among districts, not among providers. The Department's suggestion was never intended to account for special or unique situations, such as that in District IX, where 45th Street, while licensed as an inpatient psychiatric hospital, functions as a crisis stabilization unit, but received such a low reimbursement rate per patient per day that it was operating in a deficit. The Department's interpretation means that South County, which has 31 percent of the CSU beds in District IX, will receive only 7 percent of the deficiency appropriation, while 45th Street will receive 83 percent of the deficiency funding. This results from the low reimbursement rate which 45th Street has been receiving, and is consistent with the legislative intent to try to raise all providers of CSU services toward the goal of reimbursement at the rate of $113 per bed per day. 45th Street will receive $68.83 per bed per day under the Department's distribution plan. The Indian River Community Mental Health Center received none of the CSU deficiency distribution funds, because it already was receiving more than $86 per bed per day. After the issue of the Department's interpretation of the proviso language came up, both parties attempted to obtain correspondence from the members of the appropriations committees in the House and Senate giving their view of the proper interpretation of the proviso language. The positions expressed in these letters are irreconcilable. These after-the-fact statements from individual legislators lack evidentiary value.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's challenge to the disbursement of monies in District IX under Specific Appropriation 895 of the 1989-90 General Appropriations Act for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 28th day of March, 1990. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 1990.
