The Issue This hearing officer appeal under Section 4-505 of the City of Clearwater Community Development Code (Code) is the second of two administrative appeals available to and taken by Appellant, Deborah Groen Sobeleski (Sobeleski) under the Code. The issue in this second appeal is whether to sustain the decision of the City of Clearwater Community Development Board (CDB). The CDB's decision, made under Section 4-504 of the Code, was to allow Sobeleski's earlier Application for Administrative Appeal to the CDB from a Development Order (DO) issued by the City of Clearwater Community Development Coordinator (CDC) to remain on the CDB's consent agenda, which had the effect of denying the Application for Administrative Appeal and confirming the CDC's DO without a quasi-judicial hearing for receipt of additional evidence. The CDC's DO granted, with conditions, the Flexible Standard Development Application filed by Appellee, Christopher Mariani (Mariani, or Applicant), and subsequently amended, for a deviation to allow construction of a dock exceeding the 60-foot maximum length otherwise allowed by the Code.
Findings Of Fact On January 18, 2002, Appellee, Christopher C. Mariani (Mariani, or Applicant), filed a Flexible Standard Development Application for a deviation from Section 3-601.C.1.b.2 of the City of Clearwater Community Development Code (the Code) to allow construction of a 101-foot long dock (98 feet in length with a 3-foot step-down) where 60 feet would be the maximum otherwise allowed by the Code. The deviation from Code apparently was requested because a Pinellas County Department of Environmental Management Water and Navigation Report dated November 26, 2001, stated: Seagrass beds are located along this entire property, and extend out to a maximum of 65 ft. from the seawall in the area of the proposed dock although it becomes sparse at approximately 60 ft. It is the policy of this Department to limit structures over seagrasses to 4 ft. in width and to place the terminal platforms and boat slips beyond the limits of the seagrasses wherever possible. At the time the application was filed, Section 4-505 of the Code provided that, in an appeal to a hearing officer from a decision of the City of Clearwater Community Development Board (CDB), the record before the CDB could be "supplemented by such additional evidence as may be brought forward during the hearing"; and the appellant's burden was to show that the CDB's decision could not be "sustained by the evidence before the board and before the hearing officer." The "City of Clearwater Planning Department Staff Report for 2/14/02 DRC Meeting" recommended flexible standard development approval for a 92-foot long dock.3 The stated "Bases for approval" were: compliance with the flexible standard development criteria under Section 3-601.C.1.g.4 of the Code; compliance with the general applicability criteria under Section 3-913 of the Code; and compatibility with the surrounding area. The Staff Report noted: (1) "there are no navigational concerns with the proposed development"; and (2) "the proposal is more environmentally sensitive than the existing5 dock and constitute an improvement over existing conditions." The Report also stated that, since only one of the three criteria in Section 3- 601.C.1.g. need be met, similarity to surrounding dock patterns was not applicable but that "the proposed dock, as amended, will be similar to surrounding dock patterns." By letter dated March 5, 2002, Mariani amended his application to: decrease the length of the proposed dock to 95 feet; reduce the roof length over the larger capacity boat lift from 48 feet to 38 feet (to match the roof length over the smaller capacity lift); and reduce the total dock square footage to 476.25 square feet versus the 498 feet previously requested. On or about April 14, 2002, Mariani submitted to the City a set of "Dock Plans" for a 92-foot long dock.6 The document included "Diagram A Permittable Construction" and "Diagram B Proposed Construction." The apparent purpose was to contrast the dock Mariani would have been permitted to build in the absence of seagrasses with his proposed dock.7 On May 2, 2002, Section 4-505 of the Code was amended to provide that the appeal hearing before a hearing officer consists solely of reception of the record before the CDB and oral argument and that the burden on appeal to the hearing officer is for "the appellant to show that the decision of the [CDB] cannot be sustained by the evidence before the [CDB], or that the decision of the [CDB] departs from the essential requirements of law." Under the amendment, no other evidence is to be considered.8 By letter dated July 22, 2002, the CDC9 issued a DO stating concurrence with the DRC's "findings." Except for this reference, the record-on-appeal does not contain any evidence of the DRC's recommendation or any written findings by the DRC.10 But the CDC approved Mariani's application, as amended, upon the same "Bases for approval" contained in the "City of Clearwater Planning Department Staff Report for 2/14/02 DRC Meeting," with the following conditions: That a building permit for the proposed dock only be issued concurrently with, or subsequent to, building permit issuance for a principal, residential structure on the site; That the proposed dock be relocated farther east (with the dock head centered on the midpoint of the waterfront property line, as measured at the seawall) and constructed perpendicular to the waterfront property line; That the relocation of the dock meet all criteria under Section 3-601.C.1; and That revised plans reflecting conformance with condition #2 be submitted with the building permit application, to the satisfaction of staff. The DO then stated: "The approval is based on and must adhere to the site plan dated received April 15, 2002, or as modified by condition #2."11 On July 26, 2002, Sobeleski filed an Application for Administrative Appeal to the CDB from the CDC's decision. It included numerous exhibits. It appears that not all of the Application for Administrative Appeal and attachments were presented to the CDB for its consideration on August 20, 2002. One attachment was a letter dated March 27, 2002, from Sobeleski's attorney to the CDC and the City's Land Planner. This letter had 15 exhibits attached, but the CDC removed Exhibits 9-15 from the version of the letter presented to the CDB for its consideration. However, the letter stated that Exhibits 10-15 were attached for "ease of review," and the CDC separately presented copies of the documents contained in Exhibits 12-15 for the CDB's consideration. As for the other exhibits removed from the letter, Exhibit 9 was a computer diskette containing the photographs that were presented to the CDB for its consideration as Exhibits 1-8. Exhibit 10 was a letter dated March 6, 2002, from individuals named Blum to the City Planner stating no objection to the proposed dock. Exhibit 11 was a letter dated March 7, 2002, from Mariani to the CDC responding to opposition from Sobeleski and another individual to the proposed dock. While Exhibit 11 apparently was not presented to the CDB for its consideration, it clearly was adverse to Sobeleski's position and was addressed at length in the letter from Sobeleski's attorney dated March 27, 2002. In On August 20, 2002, the CDB considered the documents described in the immediately preceding Finding, together with a "City of Clearwater Planning Department Summary of Events," dated August 20, 2002, as well as oral presentations by the CDC, counsel for Sobeleski, and counsel for Mariani. The audiotape- recording of the oral presentations reveals that, upon the advice of the CDC and the Assistant City Attorney, the CDB attempted to limit the oral presentations to the question whether the CDB should remove Sobeleski's Application for Administrative Appeal from the CDB's consent agenda so as to cause a quasi-judicial hearing to be conducted, or should leave it on the consent agenda, which would result in upholding the CDC's decision. After being restricted by the CDB from addressing the merits, counsel for Sobeleski argued for a quasi- judicial hearing for reasons of "public policy." The CDB then allowed counsel for Mariani to address the merits in arguing that Sobeleski had made no showing as to why the CDC decision was incorrect so as to justify a quasi-judicial hearing.12 The Assistant City Attorney concurred that some such showing should be necessary to justify removal from the consent agenda. After the oral presentations, the CDB voted to leave Sobeleski's Application for Administrative Appeal on the CDB's consent agenda, thereby upholding the CDC's decision to issue the DO. On August 26, 2002, Sobeleski filed an Appeal Application from the CDB's decision. On September 20, 2002, the City referred the Appeal Application to DOAH under Section 4-505 of the Code. However, the referral letter from counsel for the City stated: Please note that I am not forwarding Exhibits 1-15 to the Appeal Application. Items 1-9 and 12-15 are already of record before the Board and are thus otherwise included. Items 10 and 11 were not of record below and are not being included, on that basis. Although the manner in which the record-on-appeal was prepared made it exceedingly difficult to ascertain, it appears that the referral actually failed to forward the entirety of Exhibit B to the Appeal Application, which consisted of letters from Appellant's counsel dated August 16 and March 27, 2002.13 The documents called "Exhibits" or "Items" in the referral letter actually were Exhibits 1-15 attached to the letter from Appellant's counsel dated March 27, 2002. As previously found, the CDC decided not to present to the CDB all attachments to the letter dated March 27, 2002. See Finding 9, supra. For that reason, the Assistant City Attorney "redacted" the Appeal Application by deleting the items not in fact presented (Exhibits 9, 10, and 11), as well as the items identical to documents separately presented (Exhibits 12-15), to the CDB for its consideration. See Finding 11, supra.14
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has an option to purchase property located at 301-307 Island Way Boulevard, Island Estate, Clearwater, Florida, on which he proposes to construct ten townhouses. Initially Petitioner asked for two variances. The first variance was for 25.12 feet to allow construction on a lot only 124.88 feet wide. This variance was granted for this nonconforming lot. The second variance, for 13.24 feet to allow construction of the ten townhouse complex 12 feet from the side property line, was denied by the Clearwater Code Adjustment Board. The Board concluded the variance requested did not meet the requirements of Section 45.24 of the Clearwater Land Development Code. Petitioner presented evidence that if the lot had been 150 feet wide they would have had 90 feet to build on without requesting any variance. However, since the lot was nonconforming, in order to have 89 feet on which to place the building, the requested variance would be necessary. Petitioner also presented evidence that the construction of ten townhouses on this lot is necessary for the project to be on a solid economic basis. Subsequent to the denial of this variance by the Development Code Adjustment Board, Petitioner submitted plans, which have been approved by the City of Clearwater, to erect nine townhouses on this property without any variance needed. However, these townhouses would be smaller than would be the ten townhouses initially proposed and would provide a lesser return on the capital invested.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner should terminate Respondent from his employment as a deputy sheriff for allegedly engaging in prohibited conduct pursuant to Chapter 89-404, Laws of Florida, as amended by Chapter 90-395, Section 6, Subsection 4, Laws of Florida (the Civil Service Act), and Petitioner's General Order Section 3-1.1, Rule and Regulation 5.2--relating to loyalty, Rule and Regulation 5.4--relating to duties and responsibilities, and Rule and Regulation 5.6-- relating to truthfulness; General Order Section 3-1.3, Rule and Regulation 3.20--relating to reporting procedures for the use of force; and General Order 3-2--relating to ethical requirements.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the Sheriff of Pinellas County and a constitutional officer described in Article VIII, Section 1, Florida Constitution. From sometime in 1989 until the termination of Respondent’s employment on March 14, 2008, Petitioner employed Respondent as a deputy sheriff in the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office (the PCSO). Respondent was last assigned to the courthouse security division of the PCSO. On Saturday, November 3, 2007, Respondent was off-duty and volunteering as one of a number of parents who were supervising several high school bands that were practicing at Clearwater High School (CHS). Three juvenile males on bicycles approached the band practice area. Respondent yelled at them to stop, but did not identify himself as a deputy sheriff. One juvenile stopped. The other two juveniles ignored the commands and proceeded toward the Tarpon Springs Band. One of the riders wore a back pack with a baseball bat attached to the pack. Respondent reasonably believed that the juveniles, who were approximately 16 and 17 years old,1 presented an imminent danger of running into and potentially injuring members of the nearby Tarpon Springs Band. Respondent ran after the juvenile with a bat attached to his pack, grabbed the bat, and separated the juvenile from the moving bicycle. The second juvenile stopped at the point of separation. The juvenile with the baseball bat struck Respondent with his fist, and Respondent delivered a knee-spike2 to the mid- section of the juvenile. The knee-spike disabled the juvenile. The second juvenile was preparing to strike Respondent, when another parent pulled that juvenile away. Petitioner notified Respondent of the charges against him in a memorandum dated March 14, 2008 (the charging document). In relevant part, the charging document alleges in a paragraph entitled “Synopsis” that, during the altercation, Respondent failed to act within the scope of his responsibilities as a deputy sheriff. If that allegation were properly construed to allege that Respondent used excessive force, the fact-finder finds that a preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Respondent is guilty of that charge of misconduct. Respondent acted reasonably during the altercation. Respondent used reasonable force to protect band members from harm, and Respondent used reasonable force to defend himself from a juvenile. The exigencies of the moment did not afford time for Respondent to disclose his employment with the PCSO before taking action he reasonably believed to be necessary to protect members of the Tarpon Springs Band. Respondent cooperated with the police investigation at CHS. CHS is located within the jurisdiction of both the PCSO and the Clearwater Police Department. The Clearwater Police Department responded to the scene and conducted an investigation. The investigation was documented in Clearwater Police Report No. CW07-33468 (the police report). Another allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent was untruthful by deliberately or intentionally omitting or misrepresenting material facts outlining his involvement in the altercation, including a memorandum Petitioner authored on November 5, 2007. The fact- finder finds that a preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Respondent is guilty of this charge of misconduct. It is undisputed that Respondent telephoned Corporal Victor Griffin, Respondent’s immediate supervisor on the evening of November 3, 2007, and reported the altercation in detail, including the attack by the juvenile and Respondent’s use of a knee-spike. Corporal Griffin instructed Respondent to inform Sergeant Edward Marshall, the next in command. Respondent telephoned Sergeant Marshall that night and informed him of the use of force and the details of the incident. At the hearing, Sergeant Marshall had little or no recall of the details of the conversation with Respondent on November 3, 2007. The only credible and persuasive testimony concerning that conversation is the testimony of Respondent. On the evening of November 3, 2007, Sergeant Marshall instructed Respondent to write a memorandum describing the incident and Respondent’s use of force when Respondent returned to work on Monday, November 5, 2007. Sergeant Marshall instructed Respondent to either reference the police report in the memorandum or attach a copy of the police report to the memorandum. Respondent drafted a memorandum on November 5, 2007. The memorandum referred to the police report, and Respondent submitted the memorandum to his supervisor. The police report included a handwritten, detailed description by Respondent of the use of force in the altercation. Petitioner had reasonable access to the police report. The Clearwater Police Department and the PCSO, by agreement, utilize a computerized joint records management system identified in the record as ACISS. Another allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent failed to document the use of force, as required by agency policy. The fact-finder finds that a preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Respondent is guilty of this charge of misconduct. A complete description of the altercation and use of force was attached to the police report. That information fully documented the use of force and was available to Petitioner through ACISS.3 Another allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent compromised the criminal investigation of the altercation by “accessing unauthorized information” and by “interfering with an ongoing investigation.” This allegation is based in substantial part on two undisputed facts that occurred on or about November 5, 2007. First, Respondent obtained a copy of the police report and discovered that the police report listed Respondent as a “victim/suspect.” Suspects are not entitled to a copy of a police report, but law enforcement officers may access the report. Second, Respondent persuaded the property department to change the status of brass knuckles found in a back pack at the scene of the altercation from being held for destruction to being held as evidence, so that the brass knuckles would not be destroyed. The fact-finder finds that a preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that the undisputed actions of Respondent compromised the criminal investigation by accessing unauthorized information and intervening into an investigation in which Respondent was listed in the police report as a suspect. The undisputed actions of Respondent were consistent with the actions of the Clearwater Police Department, and neither action by Respondent compromised the investigation. The investigating officer for the Clearwater Police Department was off-duty on Monday and Tuesday, and she did not return to work until Wednesday, November 7, 2007. When the investigating officer returned to work, her sergeant instructed her to change the police report to list Respondent as a law enforcement officer, to delete his address from the report, and to change the designation of Respondent from a “victim/suspect”4 to a “victim” before finalizing the report. The investigating officer made those changes to the police report by computer entries on November 7, 2007, and those changes were available to the PCSO through ACISS. The sergeant also instructed the investigating officer to change the status of the brass knuckles from being held for destruction to being held as evidence, so that they would not be destroyed. The investigating officer contacted the property department of the PCSO to change the status of the brass knuckles to that of evidence and discovered the property department had already made that change at Respondent’s request. Respondent was entitled to a copy of the report because he was a law enforcement officer and was incorrectly listed on the report as a suspect. The actions of Respondent in changing the status of the brass knuckles so that they were listed as evidence was consistent with the actions of the Clearwater Police Department. Respondent did nothing on November 5, 2007, that the Clearwater Police Department did not do on November 7, 2007. If the investigating officer were to have returned to work on Monday, November 5, 2007, it is reasonable to conclude that the Clearwater Police Department would have provided a copy of the police report to Respondent, because Respondent would not have been listed as a suspect, and the Department would have changed the status of the brass knuckles so that they were being held as evidence. The investigating officer and her sergeant concluded the altercation was a matter of mutual combat and did not refer the case for prosecution by the state attorney. The nascence of the charges against Respondent emerged from two events. First, the mother of the two juveniles filed a complaint of excessive force against the PCSO. Second, when the investigating officer discovered that Respondent had already persuaded the property department to change the status of the brass knuckles, so that they would not be destroyed, the Clearwater Police Department complained to the PCSO about a deputy sheriff allegedly interfering with evidence. As a result, Petitioner initiated an administrative investigation that led to this proceeding. The penultimate allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent provided confidential information regarding an open criminal case to another suspect. It is undisputed that when Respondent discovered on November 5, 2007, that he was listed as a suspect in the police report, Respondent told the parent that had prevented the second juvenile from attacking Respondent that the parent was also listed in the report as a suspect. The disclosure by Respondent was immaterial and had no impact on a pending criminal investigation. The Clearwater Police Department classified the altercation as mutual combat and did not refer the case for prosecution. The final allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent failed to advise his supervisors of material facts regarding his “involvement in the ongoing . . . criminal investigation” and “subsequent actions” that Respondent took. The distinction, if any, between “involvement in the ongoing investigation” and “subsequent actions” is unclear to the fact-finder because the charges deal with Respondent’s actions during a pending investigation. The charges of misconduct do not address Respondent’s “subsequent actions” after the investigation was completed and case was closed. The investigating officer did not inform Respondent when she responded to the scene on November 3, 2007, that she was listing Respondent as a suspect. She did not decide to list Respondent as a suspect until she prepared her report that evening, long after Respondent had completed his written report that was included with the police report and had left the scene. Respondent did not learn that he was a suspect until Respondent obtained a copy of the police report on November 5, 2007. After obtaining a copy of the police report, Respondent talked to Lieutenant Rachel Hughes of the Courthouse Security Division at the PCSO and another of Respondent’s supervisors. Significant variation exists in the separate accounts of the conversation between Respondent and Lieutenant Hughes. The testimony of Lieutenant Hughes is inconsistent, self- contradictory, and less than credible and persuasive. The only credible and persuasive testimony concerning the conversation is the testimony of Respondent. During the conversation between Respondent and Lieutenant Hughes, Respondent expressed his displeasure at being listed in the police report as a suspect, stated that he would like to complain to someone at the Clearwater Police Department, and asked if Lieutenant Hughes knew anyone there. Lieutenant Hughes suggested that Lieutenant James Steffens at the Clearwater Police Department is a “good guy.” Before contacting Lieutenant Steffens, Respondent called the property department and identified himself as “Milewsky from over at the courthouse.” Respondent did not disclose that he was a suspect in the case involving the brass knuckles. Respondent knew or should have known that the property department employee reasonably believed that the call and request was related to official business. Lieutenant Larry Smith was in charge of the property department at the time and testified at the hearing. The property department would not have enhanced the status of the brass knuckles at the request of someone who was listed as a suspect in the police report. The failure to disclose to the property department that Respondent was a suspect in the case is not alleged in the charging document, and the ALJ cannot find Respondent guilty of a charge not alleged in the charging document. The relevant language in the charging document is confined to an allegation that Respondent failed to advise his “supervisors” of his “involvement in the ongoing . . . investigation” and his “subsequent actions.” Those assigned to the property department are not “supervisors” of Respondent. Respondent next telephoned Lieutenant Steffens of the Clearwater Police Department to discuss the fact that Respondent was listed as a suspect in the police report. Respondent and Lieutenant Steffens disagree over material details of the conversation, including the issue of whether Respondent requested Lieutenant Steffens to change the police report to delete Respondent’s name as a suspect. The fact-finder resolves the disparity in testimony between Respondent and Lieutenant Steffens against Respondent. The testimony of Lieutenant Steffens is the only credible and persuasive testimony concerning the conversation between the two men. Respondent did not want to remain listed as a suspect, but denied that the purpose of his call to Lieutenant Steffens was to have the report changed to delete his status as a suspect. Respondent insisted that his telephone call to Lieutenant Steffens was “unrelated” to changing his designation as a suspect. The testimony of Lieutenant Steffens was plausible, credible, and persuasive. Lieutenant Steffens recalled that Respondent advised Lieutenant Steffens that a Clearwater Police Department investigation contained erroneous information, and Respondent sought to get the error corrected “as soon as possible.” After emphasizing Respondent’s seniority and the lack of experience of the investigating officer, who was a rookie, Respondent stated that he did not want to make a complaint against the investigating officer, but just wanted the report changed so that Respondent was listed solely as a victim in the report. Respondent asked Lieutenant Steffens if they could get that done as quickly as possible. Lieutenant Steffens sent a message by email in this regard to Sergeant Wilton Lee, the supervisor for the investigating officer, asking Sergeant Lee to telephone Respondent. Sergeant Lee did not return to work until Wednesday, November 7, 2007. Before Lieutenant Steffens heard from Sergeant Lee, Lieutenant Steffens received a voice mail from Respondent inquiring as to why nothing had been done yet on the case. Lieutenant Steffens also received a telephone call from another suspect. Lieutenant Steffens telephoned Sergeant Lee directly about the inquiries. When Sergeant Lee reported to work on November 7, 2007, the police report was waiting for his approval. Sergeant Lee telephoned Respondent, whom Sergeant Lee knew to be a deputy sheriff, and agreed that Respondent should not be listed in the police report as a suspect. Respondent failed to advise his supervisors of two forms of involvement in the investigation. First, Respondent failed to advise his supervisors of his involvement in the enhancement of the brass knuckles from that of waiting for destruction to that of evidence. Second, Respondent failed to advise his supervisors of his efforts to change the police report to delete his name as a suspect. A preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the failures described in the preceding paragraph violate requirements for loyalty and truthfulness. Those requirements are described in General Order 3-1.1 and Rules and Regulations 5.2 and 5.6. The Progressive Discipline Worksheet assigns 75 Progressive Discipline Points for violations of all of the charges in the charging document. However, a preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that Respondent is guilty of violating only two of the six charges of misconduct described in the synopsis in the charging document. The Worksheet does not delineate the points assigned to each charge, and Petitioner has not promulgated intelligible standards that enable the fact- finder to determine the points that should be allocated to the two violations committed by Respondent. No aggravating factors are evidenced in this proceeding. Respondent has no prior discipline during his 19 years of experience with the PCSO. The culpable actions of Respondent did not result in physical or financial harm to a member of the public or members of either the PCSO or the Clearwater Police Department. The culpable actions of Respondent did not compromise an ongoing criminal investigation. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that termination of employment is a reasonable penalty. Untruthfulness and disloyalty are serious offenses but, absent any aggravating circumstances, a reasonable penalty is suspension without pay beginning on March 14, 2008, and reinstatement to the former position of employment immediately upon the entry of a final order.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings of this Recommended Order; suspending Respondent’s employment without pay from March 14, 2008, to the date of the final order; and returning Respondent to his former position of employment as of the date of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2008.
Findings Of Fact On April 22, 1994, Respondent, Southwest Florida Water Management District (SFWMD), published proposed amendments to Rule 40D-4.051 in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 20, Number 16, at page 2450. The portions which are the subject of this proceedings are as follows: * 40D-4.051 Exemptions <<(1) Exemptions are found in>> [[The following activities are exempt from permitting under this chapter: The activities specified in]] Sections 373.406, Florida Statutes. (2)-(7) No Change. * Note: In the above quotation, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. On May 13, 1994, Petitioner, Gerald A. Robbins, filed a Petition to Challenge Proposed Rule 40D-4.051. On May 20, 1994, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition to Challenge Proposed Rule 40D-4.051. In its rule challenge, Petitioner requests that 40D-4.051(1) be rewritten as follows: "Exemptions are as found in Sections 373.406 AND 403.927 Florida Statutes." On July 1, 1994, Respondent withdrew its proposed amendment to Subsection (1) of Rule 40D-4.051. The following Notice of Withdrawal appeared in Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 20, No. 26: Southwest Florida Water Management District RULE TITLES: RULE NOS.: Exemptions 40D-4.051(1) NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL Notice is hereby given that the above proposed rule amendment, published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 20, Number 16, on Page 2450, April 22, 1994, have (sic) been withdrawn. This is the sole subsection being withdrawn from rulemaking pursuant to Section 120.54(13)(b), Florida Statutes. The remainder of the proposed amendments to Section 40D-4.051, Florida Administrative Code remains subject to Section 120.54(1), Florida Statutes. By Order dated June 28, 1994, the portion of Petitioner's rule challenge relating to Rule 40D-4.051(7) was dismissed. Petitioner appealed the Order to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Gerald A. Robbins v. Southwest Florida Water Management District, Case No. 94-1717. The court denied Petitioner's Petition for Review of Non-Final Administrative Action by Order dated October 10, 1994.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Gregory B. Taylor, violated the attendance policy of the St. Johns River Water Management District, the Respondent (District) thereby subjecting himself to a one day suspension.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed by the District as a customer service technician II. He has worked for the District for seven years and is assigned to the Division of CIS. He is supervised by Robert Green, and Robert Green's supervisor, the Division Director, Martin Barnes. The District has policies that govern work place conduct including attendance and leave. The District routinely informs employees of these policies that govern their workplace conduct through orientation meetings and discussions with supervisors. The policies are posted on the District's internet website and the Petitioner is aware of where to find these policies, by his own admission. The attendance policy provides that employees must be present on their job for the scheduled hours and the established workday and workweek unless absence from duty has been approved by the appropriate supervisor. Mr. Green testified that he has reviewed the District's attendance policies with the Petitioner. Concerning annual leave, the attendance policy provides that "except in emergencies, annual leave must have supervisory approval before being taken." District policy as to sick leave provides that sick leave shall only be used with prior supervisory approval. The District classifies absences as either planned or unplanned. Planned absences are those that are approved in advance, and unplanned are those for which prior approval has not been obtained. Each District work unit, including CIS, establishes practices to implement the means of obtaining prior approval for planned absences and reporting of unplanned absences. The policy for CIS employees for reporting unplanned absences is to contact the supervisor. If the employee cannot contact that supervisor then the employee is to contact the Division Director, Assistant Department Director, or Department Director, in that order of priority. Each District work unit may impose specific requirements with regard to the reporting of unplanned absences for the purposes of correcting behavior. The District written attendance policy provides that: If a department/office director determines that an employee is excessively absent based on a pattern of absences, such as regular absence on the day proceeding or following the employee's regular days off; . . . [or] continual use of sick leave as it is accrued . . .; the department/office director may take action to control such excessive absences. Such action may be taken only after the absences have been discussed with the employee and the plan to control the absences has been reviewed by the office of human resources. In December 2004, after several discussions and meetings with the Petitioner and after consulting with the District's office of Human Resources, Robert Green gave the Petitioner a memorandum regarding his attendance. The memorandum restated the attendance policy and, in order to control the Petitioner's excessive absences and failure to contact his supervisors regarding unplanned absences, the memorandum instructed the Petitioner to notify Mr. Green, or if Mr. Green was not available, the three other staff members at progressively higher supervisory levels, mentioned above. The memorandum explicitly instructed the Petitioner to contact the supervisors by phone. A little more than a month later, at the end of January 2005, Mr. Green conducted the Petitioner's annual performance evaluation. The "additional comments" section of that evaluation, before the space for the supervisor's and employee's signatures includes the following statement: hroughout this evaluation period I have counseled [Petitioner] on his tardiness during his scheduled working hours. Mr. Green testified that, in addition to the statement above, he counseled the Petitioner during the evaluation regarding the Petitioner's tardiness and failure to notify his supervisors when he was out and reiterated that the notification was to be made by phone. In February 2005, less than two weeks after the evaluation, and after additional unplanned absences and tardiness following the December 2004 memorandum, Mr. Green provided the Petitioner with a memorandum related to the Petitioner's tardiness and unplanned absences. This memorandum noted that an excessive number of unplanned absences and tardiness had become apparent and set forth 22 unplanned absences--the majority of which immediately preceded or followed regular scheduled days off. In addition, the memorandum reiterated that the Petitioner's habitual tardiness was unacceptable and provided examples. The memo concluded with the following paragraph, which re-stated the plan to control the Petitioner's excessive absences: You are expected to adhere to your regular work schedule. If you cannot, effective February 14th, at the beginning of your workday, you will notify me or Martin Barnes, Division Director of Computer Information Systems by phone when you will be absent or more than seven minutes late to work. Voice mail or e-mail is not an appropriate notification. Continued tardiness and unplanned absences will lead to disciplinary action. The Petitioner testified that he received the instruction, both in writing and orally, to call Mr. Green or Mr. Barnes. On November 4 and 7, 2005, a Friday and a Monday, the Petitioner was sick. On both days he failed to contact either Mr. Green or Mr. Barnes by phone. The Petitioner testified that upon his return to work, Mr. Green told him that he, Green, "appreciated" the fact that the Petitioner called the help desk when he was sick, and the Petitioner asserts that meant that Mr. Green approved of calling the help desk rather than Mr. Green. Mr. Green testified that he did say that he appreciated that the Petitioner had at least called in and then added that he made that statement after he stated that it was inappropriate to call someone other than him, and before telling the Petitioner (again) that notification should be made to Mr. Green directly. Mr. Green never communicated to the Petitioner, in a memo or otherwise, that the requirement that the Petitioner called his supervisors to report or request unplanned absences no longer applied to the Petitioner. Mr. Green established that the requirement that the Petitioner call in is consistently interpreted and applied throughout the CIS management. The Petitioner testified that he called in sick on November 4 and November 7 at 7:00 a.m. so that he could immediately return to resting. There was no testimony that the Petitioner called in later on either day and Mr. Green testified that neither he nor any other supervisor was contacted by the Petitioner. The Petitioner testified that he had, previous to November 4, 2005, attempted to call Mr. Green early in the morning and had been unsuccessful, implying that he did not call either Mr. Green or Mr. Barnes because they are not available by phone at 7:00 a.m. in the morning. Mr. Green attempted to call the Petitioner back when the Petitioner had been unable to reach him by phone in the early morning hours. Mr. Green is required to always have his cell phone on. He told the Petitioner that he was available by cell phone. Martin Barnes, Mr. Green's supervisor, confirmed that he requires Mr. Green to keep his cell phone on and with him at all times. At 7:00 a.m. Mr. Green is on his way to work and available at that time. The Petitioner admitted that he had never called Mr. Barnes's cell phone. Mr. Barnes testified that his office phone is forwarded to his cell phone so that he is available almost 24 hours a day. The Petitioner's normal work day concludes at 4:00 p.m. On November 22, 2005, the Petitioner sent an e-mail to a group of recipients, "IR Management," that included Martin Barnes, the CIS Division Director, and Kevin Brown, Mr. Barnes supervisor, requesting authorization to leave work early. The Petitioner made his request at 2:17 p.m. and left work at 3:15 p.m. In between the time that the Petitioner made his request and the time he left, the Petitioner was away from his desk and unavailable by e-mail. Robert Green was not working at the District that day. Accordingly, the next person to whom the Petitioner was directed to seek approval for leave was Martin Barnes. Shortly after the Petitioner sent the e-mail, Kevin Brown replied by e-mail. Rather than grant permission, the body of the message stated: "Please address this with Martin." Mr. Brown's instruction to contact Mr. Barnes was given even though the e-mail Brown received was also clearly addressed to other members of "IR Management," including Mr. Barnes. The Petitioner did not call Mr. Barnes by phone. Rather, the Petitioner stated, "I knew in my mind that I had already contacted Martin Barnes concerning this and that I had not been notified by anyone in management saying this would be unacceptable." The Petitioner's unilateral use of a negative notice procedure directly conflicts with specific instruction he received to contact supervisors by phone. It also is not in compliance with the instruction, provided after the Petitioner had already e-mailed Mr. Barnes, that he address leaving work early with Mr. Barnes. Although the Petitioner referred to other e-mails that purportedly evidenced use of this procedure by the Petitioner and other employees, he failed to produce any such e-mails or any corroborating evidence. The testimony of Ms. Hudson and Mr. Green was that phoning was the only acceptable method of communicating for the Petitioner. Further, the phone requirement was the result of a plan to control the Petitioner's tardiness and excessive absences, not directed toward the issue of other employees' attendance. The District's disciplinary action policy describes "absence without authorized leave" as: Failure to obtain prior approval for absence from work, except in the case of an emergency; failure to notify the proper supervisor in a timely or appropriate manner of intended absence from work; or obtaining leave based on a misrepresentation. On December 8, 2005, the Petitioner was provided with a letter from the District's executive director that informed him that the District intended to suspend him for one day without pay for being absent without leave. The letter, dated December 7, 2005, indicated that the intended suspension was based on the District's findings that: (1) the Petitioner failed to properly report his absence from work on two consecutive work days (November 4 and November 7) and that (2) the Petitioner failed to properly secure authorization to leave work early (on November 22). The District's director of human resources established that either of these two bases would serve independently as a basis for the disciplinary action taken. The Petitioner was notified in the letter that he could request a pre-determination conference for the purpose of presenting information to the executive office that would support a decision not to suspend the Petitioner, before a final decision was made regarding the intended disciplinary action. The Petitioner did not request a pre-determination conference. On December 27, 2005, the Petitioner was provided with the second letter from the District's executive director informing the Petitioner that, given the facts recited in the December 7, letter and given that the Petitioner had not taken the opportunity to be heard as to those facts, that he would be suspended for one day. That letter also stated that the Petitioner had the right to appeal the executive director's decision through the administrative hearing process pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Under the District's disciplinary action policy, the failure to properly notify the appropriate supervisor of an intended absence, in this case either because the employee is sick or seeks approval for leaving his work station early, constitutes an absence without authorized leave. The appropriate discipline level for being absent without leave ranges from reprimand to dismissal. The District has terminated employees for repeated occurrences of absence without leave. The District tends to take the least severe disciplinary action needed to correct behavior. However, when an employee's behavior does not respond, the severity of the discipline is progressively increased. Under District practice, violations of District policies are considered cumulative. All previous disciplinary actions, whether for the same or a different violation, are considered in determining which disciplinary action to impose. The Petitioner has a previous reprimand in his personnel file for insubordination. The Petitioner has also been counseled by memo, evaluation, and meetings before November 2005, regarding his lack of adherence to District attendance policy. Both the history of counseling and informal corrective action for the particular behavior, absence without authorized leave, and the previous formal reprimand for an unrelated violation were considered in determining the appropriate level of disciplinary action in the case at bar. When asked what remedy he sought the Petitioner at the hearing stated: "I only ask that the disciplinary action be removed from my personnel file." The Petitioner did not identify an applicable exemption from Florida's broad public records laws or document retention schedules that would support the removal of an agency's final action from the agency's files.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the St. Johns River Water Management District enter a final order suspending the Petitioner from work for one day without pay. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Kirby Green, Executive Director St. Johns River Water Management District 4049 Reid Street Palatka, Florida 32177-2529 Gregory B. Taylor Post Office Box 1514 Palatka, Florida 32178-1514 William Abrams, Esquire St. Johns River Water Management District 4049 Reid Street Palatka, Florida 32177-2529
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for certification as a minority business enterprise should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this licensing dispute, Respondent, South Florida Water Management District (District), has proposed to deny an application of Petitioner, Everglades Surveying Joint Venture (Everglades), for certification as a minority business enterprise (MBE) under the District's Supplier Diversity & Outreach Program (Program). If the application is approved, Petitioner would be listed on the District's contract solicitation and vendor lists as a minority contractor. In its proposed agency action, as later amended, the District contends that the application should be denied because: the minority owner fails to meet the criteria in Rule 40E-7.653(5) and (6), Florida Administrative Code; the documents provided by Petitioner "do not support that the day- to-day operations are controlled by the minority applicant, nor is there evidence that the minority applicant possesses the authority to direct the management and policy of the business"; the minority business does not meet the size standard of a small business as required by Section 288.703, Florida Statutes; and the minority owner does not possess the necessary license to qualify the firm in its area of specialty as required by Rule 40E-7.653(5), Florida Administrative Code. In simpler terms, the District has contended that Petitioner's application is deficient in the areas of "management and control, the size standards[,] and the licensure." Petitioner disputes these allegations and contends that it meets all criteria for certification. As to the remaining requirements for certification in Rule 40E-7.653(4), (7), (8), and (9), Florida Administrative Code, the parties have stipulated that all of these criteria have been satisfied. The Minority Owner's Corporate Structure Ray J. Berryman, an Asian-Pacific American, is the minority owner seeking certification. Mr. Berryman is a professional engineer who has been in the engineering and surveying business for almost forty years. After working with other engineering firms for over a decade, in 1975 he started his own firm in California. At that time, the firm was known as Berryman & Stevenson, but its name was later changed to BSI Consultants, and then to Berryman & Henigar, Inc. The firm provides civil engineering and surveying services to public agencies on the West Coast. In 1994, Mr. Berryman acquired a Florida corporation known as Henigar & Ray, Inc., which was engaged in the business of providing surveying and civil engineering services. Although the company initially operated under the name of Henigar & Ray, Inc., doing business as Berryman & Henigar, in 1998 Mr. Berryman changed its name to Berryman & Henigar, Inc. (BHI), the same name as the California corporation. Mr. Berryman serves as director, chief executive officer, and operating manager of BHI. The firm's headquarters are in Orlando, and it has branch offices in Jacksonville, Tallahassee, Tampa, Ocala, and West Palm Beach. In March 1994, Mr. Berryman formed a Nevada holding company known as Berryman & Henigar Enterprises (BHE), in which he owns 77.5 percent of the stock and serves as chairman of the board and chief executive officer. BHE owns all of the stock in Berryman & Henigar, Inc. (the California corporation); Berryman & Henigar, Inc. (the Florida corporation); Employment Systems, Inc., a "staff easing company" incorporated in California in 1992; BHE Technical Staffing, a Nevada corporation; and Therapy Network, a Nevada corporation. However, BHE Technical Staffing and Therapy Network are no longer in business. Consolidated financial statements are issued for all of the companies. BHE was formed for the purpose of serving as a vehicle "to allow a relationship to exist" between the Florida and California corporations. After BHE was formed, Mr. Berryman changed the name of both the Florida and California firms (Henigar & Ray, Inc., and BSI Consultants, respectively) to Berryman & Henigar, Inc., one a Florida corporation, the other a California corporation, so that he could have "the strength, if you will, of both companies with a similar name." Except for a few administrative personnel, BHE has no other employees and it performs no professional services. Besides being the owner of BHE and the wholly-owned subsidiaries named above, Mr. Berryman also is a majority owner of at least one affiliated company known as GovPartner, a California firm providing "e-Government solutions for cities, courts, and governmental agencies." Whether Mr. Berryman controls other affiliated companies was not disclosed at hearing. Other MBE Certifications In June 1996, or before the District had a rule on MBE certifications, Henigar & Ray, Inc., doing business as Berryman & Henigar, applied with the District for certification as a MBE to provide civil engineering, surveying, environmental sciences, and construction management services. The application was approved, and a one-year certification was issued. The District then changed from a one-year to a three-year certification, and after an application for recertification was filed in 1997, Henigar & Ray, Inc., was reissued a certification that expired in 2000. By then, the District had adopted a rule which required, among other things, that the minority owner have a professional license in all fields in which the certification was granted. Through what the District calls an "error" or oversight, it failed to note that Mr. Berryman did not hold a professional surveyor's license, and it erroneously continued to certify BHI in the area of surveying. On August 26, 1999, the firm was given "graduated" status, which meant that it was no longer eligible for continued participation in the District's Program as a prime contractor due to the business having a net worth of more than $3 million and/or an average net income of $2 million after federal taxes for the preceding two years. However, the firm could still be counted (as a subcontractor) towards a prime contractor's goal attainment. In November 2000, the firm, then known as BHI, again applied for recertification as a registered vendor. The application was approved on March 1, 2001, for another three-year period, this time in the areas of surveying, civil engineering, and construction management. Whether BHI is still in the graduated status is not known. Besides holding MBE status with the District, BHI has been certified as a MBE with several local governments in Florida, including the City of Tampa, City of Orlando, Tampa Port Authority, and Orange County. Copies of BHI's applications filed with those governmental entities have been made a part of this record. The Joint Venture As an Asian-Pacific American, Mr. Berryman qualifies for minority status. Although not disclosed by the parties, but presumably because BHI has graduated status, and cannot serve as a prime contractor, or because its certification as a MBE in surveying may be taken away, Mr. Berryman desires to become a District MBE through another legal entity and provide surveying services as a prime contractor on the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Project (CERP) now being undertaken by the District. Before filing his application, Mr. Berryman considered three options: filing as a corporation, a partnership, or a joint venture. He chose a joint venture since it gives the entity "the ability to have control outside of a corporate board." According to Mr. Berryman, even though the joint venture is theoretically controlled by a control board, under the make-up of the venture established here, that board can only represent "what Berryman & Henigar, Inc. commands and requires it to represent." Mr. Berryman also desired to have other members in the joint venture who would "provide a unique geographical location for projects being performed by [CERP]," and thus enhance its "probability of obtaining work through the District as a minority." To this end, Everglades was formed as a joint venture pursuant to a Joint Venture Agreement (Agreement) executed on October 12, 2001. So that Everglades would have a "formidable surveying company that would be able to win work," its members included BHI; GCY, Inc. (GCY), a Florida corporation providing surveying services; Jeffrey C. Cooner and Associates, Inc. (Cooner), a Florida corporation providing surveying services; and Southern Mapping Technology, Inc. (Southern Mapping), a Florida surveying corporation. According to the Agreement, the ownership of the joint venture is as follows: BHI - 51 percent GCY - 16.33 percent Cooner - 16.33 percent Southern Mapping - 16.33 percent Mr. Berryman opted for BHI to have 51 percent ownership in the joint venture so that he would control the entity. At the same time, however, he desired to give the other participants as much ownership as possible without giving up control. The Agreement establishes a Board of Control (Board) which has the responsibility and authority for the conduct and management of Everglades to approve and execute contracts, formulate and determine the policies of Everglades, approve consultants and subcontractor agreements, approve budgets and schedules, determine the allocation of work among members of Everglades, and decide all other matters necessary to its operations. After the joint venture's formation, five individuals were appointed to the Board: Mark A. Stokes and Steve Sharpe, both BHI employees appointed by Mr. Berryman; George C. Young, Jr., of GCY; Jeffrey C. Cooner of Cooner; and James S. Richmond of Southern Mapping. All members of the Board are non-minorities. In response to the District's proposed denial of the application, in May or June 2002, or six or seven months after it was filed, Mr. Berryman assumed a seat on the Board, replacing Mr. Sharpe.1 However, because of a District policy that no amendments to an application will be considered after the application is filed, the District has not taken into account this change in the Board's membership. Petitioner has not challenged the use of that policy. Paragraph 4.3 of the Agreement provides that the Board "shall reach decisions by simple majority vote of total votes cast. BHI shall cast 51 votes; GCY shall cast 16 votes; Cooner shall cast 16 votes; and Southern Mapping shall cast 16 votes." Thus, BHI has ultimate control over all of Everglades' decisions. At the same time, however, there is nothing in the Agreement which says that the Board must consult with Mr. Berryman, and obtain his approval, before a decision is taken. Rule 40E-7.653(5) Criteria Paragraph (5) of the rule requires, among other things, that the applicant establish that the minority owner "possess[es] the authority to control and exercise dominant control over the management and daily operations of the business." The District contends that Mr. Berryman does not exercise such control since he does not sit on the Board, Mr. Stokes and Mr. Sharpe, both non-minorities, are the individuals who actually cast votes on behalf of BHI, and nothing in the Agreement requires Mr. Stokes and Mr. Sharpe to consult with Mr. Berryman before they make a decision. In reality, Mr. Berryman has absolute control over all of the decisions made by Mr. Stokes, who occupies one of the two BHI seats on the Board. This was confirmed by Mr. Stokes at the hearing and was not contradicted. Even if Mr. Sharpe (who has been replaced by Mr. Berryman) were still on the Board, he would be subject to the same constraints. This is because Mr. Berryman has made it clear that he would quickly replace any BHI Board member who did not vote in accordance with his wishes. Since BHI (and Mr. Berryman) effectively controls the joint venture through 51 percent of the Board's voting power, it is found that the minority owner exercises dominant control over the management and daily operations of the joint venture, as contemplated by the rule. Rule 40E-7.653(6) Criteria Subparagraphs (6)(c) and (d) of the rule require that the applicant establish that "the net worth of the business concern, together with its affiliates, does not exceed five (5) million [dollars]," and that it "employs two- hundred (200) or fewer permanent, full-time employees," respectively. In determining the net worth, the same rule provides that the District shall "consider the most recent federal tax returns or annual financial statements for the business." After concerns were raised by the District over BHI's net worth and number of permanent employees, BHI filed a letter with the District on April 2, 2002, indicating that it had 118 full-time employees and a negative net worth of $1,460,176.00. On June 6, 2002, its counsel also filed an affidavit by BHE's Controller, together with consolidated financial reports for the year ending March 29, 2002, reflecting a negative net worth of $1,293,435 for BHE and all of its subsidiaries, including BHI. Counsel also provided an affidavit by the BHE Benefits Coordinator listing 96 full-time BHI employees as of May 17, 2002. In separate documents submitted earlier by the other joint venture participants, the net worth and number of permanent, full-time employees of each of those participants were as follows: GCY - $553,000.00 and 25 employees as of November 30, 2001; Cooner - $300,000.00 and 8 employees as of December 31, 2001; and Southern Mapping - $527,000.00 and 6 employees as of December 31, 2001. While the fiscal years of the participants are not identical, collectively these figures produce a total positive net worth of all Everglades members (including BHE, the parent of BHI) of $86,565.00 and less than 200 full-time employees at or about the date the application was filed. Despite this showing by Everglades that it met the net worth and size thresholds for a MBE, over the past two years BHI has made a number of filings with the District and other governmental entities which caused the District to doubt the veracity of the numbers submitted by Everglades and to ultimately deny the application. For example, in its application for recertification filed with the District in November 2000, BHI reflected that it then had a positive net worth of $1,013,790.00 and 305 full-time employees. In a Statement of Intent to Perform as a MBE Subcontractor dated October 23, 2001, BHI indicated that its net worth was $1,012,979.00 and that it employed 102 permanent employees. Almost identical numbers were shown in other filings made with the District on November 1, 2001, April 18, 2002, May 24, 2002, and May 31, 2002. However, in a Statement of Intent to Perform as a MBE Subcontractor executed by a BHI corporate officer (Mr. Stokes) on June 18, 2002, and filed with the District, the net worth of BHI was shown as $4,106,000.00 and the number of permanent, full-time employees was given as 350. Assuming these latter figures are accurate, Everglades would have a total net worth exceeding $5 million and more than 200 full-time, permanent employees, both of which exceed the thresholds permitted by the rule. In addition, on April 3, 2000, BHI filed certification documents with Orange County reflecting that it had 305 full-time employees and a positive net worth of $123,415.00. Identical figures were reflected in a filing made with the City of Tampa on April 3, 2002. In contrast, in a MBE certification filing made with the City of Orlando on May 20, 2002, which included net worth and number of employees for the latest three-year period, BHI represented that it had 97 employees in the years 2000, 2001, and 2002, and that its net worth for those years was a negative $898,676.00, a negative $1,376,645.00, and a negative $1,586,216.00, respectively. To add to the confusion, in an undated document filed with the City of Tampa, BHI indicated that it had 345 full-time employees and 35 part-time employees. However, in a June 12, 2002, filing with the Tampa Port Authority, BHI indicated that it had 116 full-time employees and a negative net worth of $1,586,216.00. Mr. Berryman conceded that the different filings were "embarrassing" and confusing, and he attributed them to mistakes by careless or untrained in-house personnel. As to the document reflecting a net worth of BHI in excess of $4 million, it was established that a secretary erroneously filled out the document and Mr. Stokes hurriedly signed it without verifying the numbers. Mr. Berryman also maintained that the numbers submitted by BHI to the District in the April 2, 2002, letter, as supported by the financial reports and affidavits filed on June 6, 2002, are the most accurate reflection of its net worth and number of employees. This assertion is accepted since all of the filings over the years (except the one on June 18, 2002) have consistently indicated that the net worth of BHI is far less than the $5 million threshold. Moreover, the more credible evidence supports a finding that the number of permanent, full-time employees of BHI and the other joint venture participants is less than 200. Based on these considerations, it is found that Everglades meets the net worth and employee thresholds prescribed by the rule. Professional Licensure Requirement Rule 40E-7.653(5), Florida Administrative Code, requires that the minority owner (Mr. Berryman) seeking certification "be the license holder, or the professional license holder" in the specialty for which certification is sought. Here, Everglades seeks to provide surveying services. The application filed with the District identified five BHI individuals who had professional surveying licenses which authorized the work, all non-minorities. Mr. Berryman was not identified as being one of them. The rule itself is clear and unambiguous and requires no interpretation. Since its adoption in late 1996, the District has consistently construed it to mean just what it says -- that in order for a minority owner to be certified, the owner must have a professional license in the area being certified. This interpretation of the rule was not shown to be unreasonable or clearly erroneous. Therefore, because Everglades intends to provide surveying services, Mr. Berryman, as the minority owner, must hold a surveyor's license under Chapter 472, Florida Statutes, in order to qualify as a MBE. While it is true that Mr. Berryman is a registered professional engineer (under Chapter 471, Florida Statutes) in the State of Florida (as well as 3 other states), and he can perform almost all of the surveying services under his engineering license,2 he does not hold a Florida surveyor's license, as required by the rule. While this result may seem unfair and based on highly technical grounds, it is consistent with the plain requirements of the rule.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order denying the application of Everglades Surveying Joint Venture for certification as a minority business enterprise. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 2002.
The Issue Whether Rule 27G-1.06(2) and Rule 27G-1.08(4), Florida Administrative Code, or either of them, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact The parties have stipulated that Fairfield Communities, Inc. (Fairfield) has the requisite standing to challenge the rule provisions at issue and that Friends of Fort George, Inc., (Friends), Florida Wildlife Federation (FWF) and Florida Audubon Society (Audubon) have standing to participate as intervenors in support of these rule provisions. The Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) is the state agency that promulgated the challenged rules. The Fort George DRI case, No. 86-4127, began on August 1, 1986, when the Department of Community Affairs took an appeal of the development order entered by the City of Jacksonville on June 12, 1986 on grounds The MLUP does not accurately show or locate the DER jurisdictional line on the western side of the island from which buffer areas required by the ADO are to be measured . . . The MLUP does not properly or accurately depict or locate buffer areas surrounding the sloughs on the western side of Fort George Island. Exhibit B to the Prehearing Stipulation. Together with others, the Intervenors in the present case filed, in the Fort George DRI case, No. 86-4127, a motion to intervene as of right and request for consideration of additional issues on August 7, 1986. The intervenors in No. 86-4127 sought consideration of a wide range of issues in the Fort George DRI case, including questions concerning Blue Pond, the perimeter buffer zone, the interior habitat, weirs, berms, dikes and hydraulic connections, the adequacy of the water supply, the effect of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission's disapproval, the placement of various boundaries, and whether "Fairfield has failed to provide adequate protection of the microclimate and ecology of the Rollins Bird and Plant Sanctuary as mandated by the ADO . . ." Exhibit C to the Prehearing Stipulation. In filing their motion to intervene as of right and request for consideration of additional issues in No. 86-4127, Friends, Audubon and FWF expressly relied on Rule 27G-1.06, Florida Administrative Code. The portion under challenge here provides: (2) Motions to intervene filed with the Commission within 30 days of the filing of a notice of appeal may request the Commission to consider issues raised in the record below but not raised by the parties to the appeal. Rule 27G-1.06, Florida Administrative Code. In the order of transmittal, entered in No. 86-4127 on October 15, 1986, FLWAC denied consideration of every issue raised by the intervenors, except for the issue concerning the Rollins Bird and Plant Sanctuary, and added a related issue, also concerning the Rollins Bird and Plant Sanctuary, citing Rule 27G- 1.08, Florida Administrative Code. The portion of that rule under challenge here provides: Within 60 days of receipt of a notice of appeal, the Commission shall meet to review the issues raised by the parties. If the Commission determines that an issue of statewide or regional importance was not raised by the parties but is necessary to its disposition of the appeal, the Commission shall specify said issue and shall specify whether the issue shall be the subject of review based on the record made below, additional evidence or a combination thereof. New issues shall not be raised by the parties or other persons after this Commission meeting. At this meeting, the Commission may also dispose of procedural motions, including motions to intervene, which have been filed within 30 days of the filing of the notice of appeal. Rule 27G-1.08, Florida Administrative Code. Fairfield, as the applicant for the development order in No. 86- 4127, questions FLWAC's authority to promulgate rules that allow FLWAC to consider issues not raised by the party who took the DRI appeal, whether sua sponte or on motion of an intervenor.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner in this action is the City of Clearwater, Florida, a municipality in the State of Florida which provides governmental services to the citizens within that community, to include police protection. It has among other powers, the power to hire and dismiss employees and in keeping with that authority, the City has enacted Ordinance No. 1831, pursuant to Chapter 21153, Special Laws of Florida, 1941. This ordinance deals with a career civil service system for employees of the City of Clearwater and it sets forth the rights which an employee would have if that employee had been accused of misconduct. A subunit within the City of Clearwater is the Clearwater Police Department which has rules and regulations which would apply to the employees within that Department. This case concerns charges placed by the Petitioner, City of Clearwater, against the Respondent, Danny Fivecoat, who held the position of Sergeant in the Clearwater Police Department on July 25, 1980. Those charges placed under the terms and conditions of a "Termination Dismissal Notice" which may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence, set forth the accusations as alluded to in the Issues statement of this Recommended Order. The termination and dismissal notice was placed against the Respondent on December 15, 1980, when he was relieved as a police officer and dismissed from employment with the City of Clearwater. This action was taken in keeping with the authority of City of Clearwater Ordinance No. 1831 and pursuant to Rule 14, Section 6, Civil Service Rules of Clearwater, Florida. Subsequently, the Respondent attempted to explain and answer the charges and specification placed against him, but the explanation and answer were found to be insufficient by the appointing authority, City Manager, City of Clearwater, Florida, and pursuant to the terms and conditions of City of Clearwater Ordinance No. 1831, Section 2-38, the Respondent requested a formal hearing to be held before the Division of Administrative Hearings. That formal hearing was held in keeping with the terms of the aforementioned ordinance and the agreement between the City of Clearwater and the Division of Administrative Hearings to provide a Hearing Officer for these matters. See also Subsection 120.65(6), Florida Statutes. The hearing in this cause was conducted on March 25, 1981. In July, 1980, while employed as a sergeant in the Clearwater Police Department, the Respondent was assigned as supervisor of a TAC unit. Within that unit were five (5) or six (6) subordinate officers to the Respondent. One of the duties of the TAC unit in July, 1980, concerned an effort to ascertain the identity of a person or persons who were suspected of committing the felony offenses of burglary and arson at a commercial premises now known as Gulf Branch Saloon and formerly known as Bobby Sands 60. This bar was located on State Road 60 within the corporate limits of the City of Clearwater, Florida. To apprehend the offenders, Fivecoat established a surveillance network in the area of the bar location. The rough details of that network may be seen as Employee's Exhibit No. 6, admitted into evidence, which is a sketch, not to scale, depicting surveillance locations in July, 1980, and in particular, on July 25, through July 27, 1980. The numbers 1, 2 and 3 depict surveillance points of members of the TAC unit who were on foot. The word van indicates the location of the command post of the surveillance unit and in addition, there were two unmarked automobiles that were east and west of the location of the bar. These locations are not depicted with any particularity. The primary surveillance was being conducted by the three individuals shown by the numbers on Employee's Exhibit No. 6, with the idea being that from the three locations, the entire bar area could be surveilled. The van served as a command post and a rallying point for the officers on the surveillance team and was used as a location for taking breaks and meals while on the surveillance assignment. Those persons in the outlying surveillance posts would come to the van to take breaks and to have their meals after being relieved by Respondent and an Officer Adamson. Officer Adamson was assigned to drive the van and to assist Sergeant Fivecoat. The van itself was not equipped as a police unit per se, it was unmarked and did not have police emergency lights or sirens or communications equipment and was not designed for pursuit responsibility, although it had been used as mobile surveillance and on occasion, Officer Adamson had attempted to use it as a pursuit vehicle. The Respondent did not find it to be an appropriate pursuit vehicle, he did, however, feel that it could be used as mobile surveillance and as an apparatus for blocking suspects who were fleeing a scene of a crime in an automobile. The van had two front seats and other additional seating that had been placed there by arrangement of members of the TAC unit and it contained bicycles to be utilized for transportation in the area of a surveillance setting. The van was not primarily used for the surveillance, but it did allow a view of the west side of the subject bar and this observation was principally the assignment of Officer Adamson. On the evening of July 25, 1980, prior to setting up the surveillance operation alluded to herein, the Respondent and members of his unit went to a local restaurant in Clearwater, Florida, to have dinner and to discuss the plans of operation for that evening. While at the restaurant, the Respondent and one Kim Dubois, an employee in the State Attorney's Office which has jurisdiction in Clearwater, Florida, engaged in a conversation through which the woman Dubois determined that the surveillance activities were ongoing, specifically that the Respondent could be found in the parking lot of the Western Sizzler on State Road 60 later on that evening. In the course of this conversation, Fivecoat let it be known that it would be acceptable for Dubois to come to the stakeout and carry on a conversation while the surveillance was ongoing. Between 2:45 A.M. and 3:00 A.M., on July 26, 1980, Kim Dubois and one Diana Scanlan, another employee of the same State Attorney's Office, went to the location of the van in the Western Sizzler parking lot. At that time, the surveillance operations had been underway for a period of approximately an hour and forty-five minutes. The two women sat in their automobile and talked to Sergeant Fivecoat and Officer Adamson who were seated in the van. Fivecoat was on the passenger side of the van. At times the women were outside their car talking to the officers who remained in the van. Other officers who were on the surveillance team came to the van while the women were present and Officers other than Adamson and Fivecoat entered into conversation with the women. The two women remained in the area of the van engaging in a conversation until around 5:00 to 5:30 A.M., at which point they left the area of the surveillance and the members of the surveillance team left shortly thereafter. Nothing other than the conversation between the women and Respondent and other members of his team took place and no burglary or other incident occurred which required police intervention. Neither Fivecoat nor other members of his team asked the women to leave the area of their surveillance. While these events were going on, cars were operating on State Road 60 and at times, other persons were in the parking lot of the Western Sizzler eating establishment. None of the officers were wearing police uniforms on this occasion nor were they in uniform on the night of July 26, 1980, in the early morning hours of July 27, 1980. Again, in the early morning hours, around 2:45 to 3:00 A.M., July 27, 1980, the women came to the location of the van in the parking lot of the Western Sizzler where the Respondent and Officer Adamson were located. The surveillance team members were located in approximately the same positions as depicted in Employee's Exhibit No. 6. Initially, the women sat in their car and talked to the Respondent and Officer Adamson who were seated in the van, until the police officers ran out of soft drinks and the women departed and brought soft drinks back to the police officers in the van. The drinks were given to the officers and the women were allowed in the van, into the back part of that vehicle. While they were inside, the side cargo door remained open and no other matters transpired between the women and the police officers other than conversation between them. Sergeant Fivecoat never indicated that the women should not be in the van and the women were lead to believe that it was acceptable for them to be inside. The women remained in the van for approximately an hour and left the scene of the surveillance around 5:00 to 5:30 A.M. and the Respondent and members of his team concluded the surveillance shortly thereafter. Again, the pattern of traffic on State Road 60 and in the Western Sizzler parking lot was essentially the same as the evening and morning before and no criminal violation occurred which required the action of the police officers in the TAC unit. Had such activity occurred as was the expectation of sergeant Fivecoat, the members of the TAC team outside the van proper would have been primarily responsible for enforcement and he and Adamson were mostly responsible for relieving those officers during breaks. Nonetheless, Sergeant Fivecoat was the overall supervisor and responsible for the surveillance operation in question. On the second night and morning, other officers came to the van and entered into conversation with the women. On the second morning and evening, neither Sergeant Fivecoat nor any members of the TAC unit asked the women to leave the area of the surveillance. Sergeant Fivecoat knew that the presence of the two women at the TAC command post was in violation of the prohibition against their presence as set out in Rule 23, Rules and Regulations of the City of Clearwater Police Department.
Recommendation The Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 5, admitted into evidence, is a compilation of fitness reports and other items related to the Respondent's performance as a police officer. These items are taken from the personnel file of the Respondent as administered by the Petitioner. With the exception of the incident occurring in June, 1977, related to a liaison of a sexual nature between the Respondent and a female which occurred in the months of March or April, 1977, for which the Respondent was given a ten-day suspension, the Respondent has not been disciplined in the past and has an acceptable record. The details of the other disciplinary action may be found in the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. The actions of Sergeant Fivecoat, as set forth in this Recommended Order, related to the incident involving the two civilian females is reprehensible and having occurred with the knowledge of Sergeant Fivecoat that he was committing a violation is inexcusable. Nonetheless, it is not of such magnitude that it would warrant the ultimate imposition of the penalty of dismissal as would be contended for by the City Manager, City of Clearwater. Likewise, the recommendation of demotion from Sergeant to patrolman and a five (5) day suspension as made by the interim Police Chief would seem too lenient. Under the circumstances, the recommendation herein would be that Sergeant Danny J. Fivecoat be reduced in grade to patrolman and be suspended for a period of thirty (30) days to run from the entry of a final order in this cause. 1/ DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 1981.
