The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if a Petition for Relief is referred to the DOAH for formal hearing based on a Notice of Determination: No Jurisdiction issued by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR resume jurisdiction of the matter and complete the investigation of the Charge of Discrimination, pursuant to Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes, or permit Petitioner to make her election of remedies pursuant to Section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: William R. Amlong, Esquire Amlong & Amlong, P.A. 500 Northeast Fourth Street Second Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-1154 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, et. al. 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Appellant was wrongfully denied a variance of 21.33 feet to construct a second floor deck at 673 Bay Esplanade, Five Palms Motel Condo, Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact John Shaw, a resident of Massachusetts, purchased the condominium for which the variance is here requested in December, 1988 without first visiting the property or inquiring about zoning restrictions. The unit purchased is on the second floor of a two story building earlier converted from a hotel or motel into condominiums. The seller told Shaw he could construct a deck over the existing deck on the ground floor condominium below the unit purchased by Shaw. While the construction of this deck was in progress it was discovered no permit had been pulled for the project and the work was stopped. The subsequent application for a permit was denied because the proposed deck encroached some 21.33 feet into the setback area. The application for a variance was denied by the Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board and this appeal followed. The two buildings comprising this complex were erected many years ago and are non-conforming, i.e., the buildings themselves violate the current Development Code. An existing deck extending into the setback area was constructed on the unit directly below the condominium purchased by Shaw and a similar deck extending to the seawall was constructed on an adjacent building. No permits are on file for those decks. Construction of the proposed deck would improve the livability of the condominium greatly by expanding the area usable for looking seaward. The condominium has been used without this deck for many years. This property is zoned CR-24 and the setback requirement is 25 feet from the water's edge.
The Issue Whether Respondent Petras Jakstas committed the violations alleged in the Termination and Dismissal Notice, and, if so, the appropriate discipline that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The City is a municipality governed by a city council. A city manager oversees the City’s operations. On January 22, 2007, Respondent was hired as a Parks Service Technician I. He successfully completed the Parks Service Technician Apprenticeship Program and was promoted to his current classification of Parks Service Technician II on February 2, 2008. Respondent’s job responsibilities include, but are not limited to, the collection of trash and the emptying of trash receptacles. Respondent is a native of Lithuania. While Respondent does not speak “perfect English,” the record indicates that Respondent speaks and understands English at a level of proficiency which allows him to function in an environment where only English is spoken or written without the necessity of an interpreter. The Clearwater Civil Service Board has adopted rules and regulations which govern the conduct of all City employees. Chapter 13 of the Clearwater Civil Service Board Rules and Regulations (Civil Service Rules) provides the framework for suspending, demoting, and dismissing City employees. Chapter 13, section 6 of the Civil Service Rules, provides that the “City Manager or designee may discharge an employee for one or more of the causes listed under Section 3 of this Chapter or in accordance with the established performance and behavior management program . . . or for other good cause.” On or about March 20, 2018, Respondent received from the City a termination and dismissal notice advising that his employment with the City of Clearwater was being terminated effective “Wednesday, March 21, 2018, at the end of the day.” The notice of termination and dismissal cites the following violations as cause for the termination of Respondent’s employment: Personal Responsibility Standards, We will follow all City policies and procedures. We will comply with all City and our respective Department, division, and section rules and standard operating procedures. We will cooperate and participate in City processes. We will resolve to accept personal accountability and responsibility for our actions. We will perform our work assignments with established standards and comply with written or verbal instruction from the supervisory or management group. Integrity Standards, Violation of the provisions of Chapter 13, Section 3, of the City Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Excellence Standards, We will treat everyone with dignity, respect, and courtesy. We will present a professional image through actions, dress, speech and behavior. We will strive for excellence and continuously learn and make improvements. We will learn from mistakes, modify behavior and recommend procedural changes to improve operations and processes. The notice of termination and dismissal, in addition to the generally referenced “Integrity Standards” violation, also specifically provides that Mr. Jakstas violated Civil Service Rules, chapter 13, section 3, to wit: (b) Failure to perform satisfactorily within established guidelines. (e) Commitment of a flagrant offense, including harassment or discrimination or abusive conduct or language toward coworkers, City officers, or the public. (g) Commitment of or participation in any activity or action which undermines public confidence or otherwise significantly impairs the employees’ ability to perform his/her job productively. (l) Failure to conform to the dictates of corrective action, including but not limited to failure or inability to comply with an agreed upon “development plan,” or when the City believes that an employee is willful in refusing to adhere to established rules, regulations, or guidelines. The gravamen of the charges against Respondent derive from his alleged violation of Civil Service Rules, chapter 13, section 3(b), (e), (g), and (l). The City’s current proceeding against Respondent is as a result of Respondent’s flirtatious statement to a current female City employee, which occurred while Respondent was working under a “Development Plan,” which was implemented because he harassed a former City employee and used City property while doing so. PERFORMANCE & BEHAVIOR MANAGEMENT PROGRAM The City developed its PBMP in order “to provide a method of working with employees whose performance or behavior does not meet the City’s standards.” The philosophy of the program “is based upon the belief that, in most cases, employees can change behavior and improve performance when standards and expectations are clear and when employees are given opportunities to change.” Whenever practicable, “the City will provide intervention, coaching, and corrective guidance or counseling . . . for employees . . . in order to bring their performance or behavior up to standard.” The program recognizes, however, “that some behaviors that are serious and are direct violations of City Policy may warrant immediate disciplinary action up to and including termination.” According to the PBMP manual, there are three categories of performance and behavior: Personal Responsibility, Integrity, and Excellence. As to each, the manual notes that: These categories are based on employees’ willingness or ability to meet standards of behavior or performance. Willingness refers to the employees’ decision to meet expectations, follow rules and policies, and perform work that meets efficiency and quality standards. Ability refers to the employees’ capability and skills in performing job tasks. The first two categories, Personal Responsibility and Integrity, are considered “will do” categories because they typically involve situations wherein the employee has a choice and makes a decision about whether or not to meet the standards. The third category, Excellence, is considered a “can do” category, because it most often refers to a situation where the employee is not able to perform up to standard because of a lack of resources, skill, or capability. City of Clearwater expectations for each of these three categories are stated below. Personal Responsibility (“Will Do” Issues) City of Clearwater employees will be held personally accountable for the actions they take in meeting the customer service needs of the City and the community the organization serves. Employees are expected to take full responsibility for their conduct and job performance and exhibit commitment to fulfilling their responsibilities to the best of their ability. Integrity (“Value and Ethics” Issues) As public employees representing the citizens of Clearwater, employees are expected to commit to the highest standards of personal and professional integrity. The City expects employees to communicate openly and continually demonstrate honesty, fairness, and respect for others. Employees should do what is ethically appropriate. Employees are expected to adhere to City policies. Excellence (“Performance/Can Do” Issues) City of Clearwater employees have an obligation to provide the highest quality of service and results to our customers. This commitment to excellence involves developing the job knowledge and skills needed to perform the tasks required and to continually improve the City’s ability to meet the needs of the community we serve. The PBMP manual generally lists 75 Personal Responsibility Standards, 14 Integrity Standards, and 41 Excellence Standards. Regarding the Integrity Standards, the PBMP manual notes in bold print that “immediate formal discipline, up to and including termination, may be recommended” for a violation of these standards. The PBMP manual does not set forth any such illumination for the other standards. As previously noted, certain PBMP standards are referenced in the termination and dismissal notice provided to Respondent by the City. THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN The initial step of PBMP entails supervisor coaching and counseling of employees as a strategy for helping employees to meet supervisor, department, or City expectations or standards. In instances where an employee has committed a serious offense of the PBMP standards and expectations, the City may place an employee on a development plan, a decision-making leave without pay, or both. On October 23, 2017, Respondent was placed on decision-making leave without pay for the two-day period of October 24 and 25, 2017. On October 26, 2017, when Respondent returned to work he was placed on a development plan. Both actions resulted from an incident involving former City employee Ms. Kelsey Souto. Ms. Souto previously worked for the City, and during the course of her employment Respondent developed a physical attraction to her. There is no evidence suggesting that Ms. Souto was in any way interested in Respondent. Sometime around the early part of 2017, Ms. Souto relocated from Florida to Idaho. The undisputed evidence is that Respondent tracked Ms. Souto’s whereabouts and began to send her letters, jewelry, and at one point, he even mailed her a rooster. Ms. Souto found Respondent’s behavior to be extremely upsetting as evidenced by the Petition for Protective Order that she swore- out against Respondent wherein she requested, on or about August 24, 2017, that the District Court for the State of Idaho enjoin Respondent from engaging in “malicious harassment, stalking, [and] telephone harassment.” On September 28, 2017, Respondent submitted to the City a request for vacation days and included therewith a notice of hearing regarding the Protective Order that was filed against him by Ms. Souto. The hearing was scheduled for September 29, 2017. Respondent attended the hearing in Idaho and “agreed to entry of a protection order.” The exact date is not clear from the record, but it is undisputed that sometime between September 28, 2017, and October 26, 2017, the City learned two things from Respondent. First, the City learned that Respondent used a City of Clearwater Parks and Recreation envelope to mail a letter to Ms. Souto as part of his campaign of harassment against her; and second, the City learned the full details of Respondent’s harassment activities directed towards Ms. Souto. Given this information, on October 26, 2017, the City, pursuant to its PBMP, placed Respondent on a written development plan. The development plan contains a section titled “Specific Examples of Behavior or Performance Observed (completed by Supervisor).” In this section, Respondent’s supervisor noted the following with respect to the circumstances surrounding Respondent’s interaction with Ms. Souto: Approximately one year ago, your manager was contacted by the owners of the beach concessions, Mr. and Mrs. Chandler, to inform him that you were showing an interest in one of their workers, but she was not interested in you. You were persistent with this female and you had sent her a gift of a wedding ring by mail. When the Chandlers contacted your manager, they stated they did not want to make a formal complaint with the City, but wanted to speak with you about the situation and return the ring. The City has learned that despite this female moving out of state, you have continued to pursue her. On Thursday, September 28, 2017, you turned in a vacation request to your supervisor along with a notice of hearing for a protection order filed against you in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho. This protection order was filed by the female who formerly worked for a beach concessions and it cited malicious harassment, stalking, telephone harassment as the reasons for her petition to the court. The petitioner described in the protection order that she met you while she worked as a manager at Barefoot Beach House on Clearwater Beach. She explained that City employees were provided free soft drinks by an established lease agreement and you as well as other City employees, would go to the restaurant for that reason. She further explained that beginning approximately five years ago, you would regularly bring her candy, gifts, and treats and she would often politely decline your offerings or put them out for all her employees. She stated that you would come in several times throughout your workday waiting in long lines, just so that she could wait on you. The petitioner stated that she moved to Idaho in 2016 and somehow you obtained her contact information on-line and you began sending her certified letters about every other month. Additionally, she said at Christmas time she received a diamond ring and gold necklace from you of which she returned to you. Most recently, on August 23, 2017, she stated that she received notification from the post office that you had sent her a live rooster as she recognized your handwriting on the notice and card. She further described that you sent her emails and text messages, so she blocked your phone number. On October 4, 2017, your supervisor was provided a copy of a City of Clearwater Parks and Recreation envelope [which] shows you used City material to mail her a certified letter on August 15, 2016. When meeting with your Director, you admitted to using City materials for personal use and acknowledged it was a bad thing to do however; you did not take full responsibility of the seriousness of your inappropriate behavior and conduct which led to the protection order filed against you, stating that you “were only trying to have fun. Based on the information involving Ms. Souto, the City specifically identified in Respondent’s development plan certain standards and expectations that Respondent had not met, including the following: “We will treat everyone with dignity, respect, and courtesy; [w]e will present a professional image through actions, dress, speech and behavior; and [w]e will learn from mistakes, modify behavior and recommend procedural changes to improve operations and processes.” Reference in the development plan to these specific standards and expectations, as well as inclusion of an extensive narrative regarding his harassment of Ms. Souto, put Respondent on notice that future instances of conduct of a similar nature would not be in compliance with the terms of his development plan. The development plan contains a signature line where the employee is to sign. Below the employee’s signature line is the following statement: “My signature indicates I have read and understand the Development Plan outlined above, and agree to comply with all City standards and policies, although I may not agree that a violation has occurred.” Respondent signed the development plan on October 26, 2017. The development plan notes that its duration is for six months. In addition to signing the development plan, Respondent also wrote the following on the plan: “I will not misuse City prop[erty] again. No mean no! Sorry I recognize my fault! I will make better choices in my life. I recognize my fault.” SEA BLUES FESTIVAL On Saturday, February 24, 2018, Respondent was working at the Sea Blues Festival, which is a cultural event sponsored by the City. Madai Gutierrez, who is employed by the City as a recreation specialist, also worked the festival on that date. Ms. Gutierrez’ job responsibilities involve overseeing matters related to patron ticketing and gate operations. Her job duties do not include overseeing or otherwise supervising Respondent or workers who are similarly classified. Ms. Gutierrez’s credibly testified that on the day in question, while in the backstage area of the festival, Respondent summoned her to the area where he and a coworker were picking up trash. Ms. Gutierrez, thinking that Respondent had an inquiry about a matter pertaining to the event, walked over to Respondent where he told her, “You’re so beautiful. You have the eyes like an eagle.” Respondent’s statement to Ms. Gutierrez was a discourteous statement that lacked dignity and respect, the statement failed to comport with the development plan goal of maintaining a professional image through “speech,” and by making the statement, Respondent demonstrated a failure to modify his behavior as required by the development plan. Respondent’s statement to Ms. Gutierrez was sufficiently similar in character to the conduct Respondent displayed towards Ms. Souto. Mr. Gutierrez testified that Respondent’s statement made her feel “weird and creepy,” and she immediately left the area after hearing the same and went to her ticketing trailer. On the day of the incident, Ms. Gutierrez reported Respondent’s conduct to her supervisor. On Monday, February 26, 2018, she then prepared a written statement detailing her interaction with Respondent. Respondent admits that he spoke to Ms. Gutierrez but states that it “was about work.” (Tr. 200:9) In further explaining himself, Respondent testified, “I told them that I never said in this way and -- and that we were talking about -- strictly about work.” (Tr. 200:16-18). In this statement, Respondent is referring to his conversation with Ms. Gutierrez on February 24, 2018. At the time of his interaction with Ms. Gutierrez, Respondent was still working under the limitations of the development plan and this would certainly provide sufficient motivation for Respondent to not be truthful regarding his interaction with Ms. Gutierrez. Ms. Gutierrez testified that on occasion she will instruct a City worker whose job includes responsibility for trash collection to empty an overflowing trash receptacle. However, Ms. Gutierrez specifically testified with clarity and certainty that at no time during the Sea Blues Festival did she ever instruct Respondent, or any other trash worker, to empty a trash can. Ms. Gutierrez’s testimony regarding what was said to her by Respondent is found to be more credible than Respondent’s denial. Respondent’s assertion that he had a “work-related” conversation with Ms. Gutierrez on February 24, 2018, is not credible and is rejected. I NEED AN INTERPRETER Respondent claims that the City knew that he needed a language interpreter but failed to provide one during the discipline determination meeting resulting from the incident involving Ms. Gutierrez. The job position occupied by Respondent is covered by the Agreement between City of Clearwater, Florida, and Communications Workers of America, Local 3179 (Fiscal Years 2017–2018) (collective bargaining agreement). Article 11, section 4 of the collective bargaining agreement provides, in part, that “[w]henever an employee who is a Union member is noticed of any meeting that could result in discipline, the employee will be granted a minimum of two (2) business days before the meeting to arrange for Union representation.” The right to union representation at any such meeting is commonly referred to “Weingarten” rights. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). On March 7, 2018, the City informed Respondent that a discipline determination meeting was scheduled for March 14, 2018, to discuss the alleged incident involving Ms. Gutierrez and its possible impact on his continued employment with the City. Respondent attended the meeting along with his union representative Phil Hughes of the Communications Workers of America. There are no provisions in the Civil Service Rules, the PBMP manual, or the collective bargaining agreement, which require the City to provide a foreign language interpreter for an employee who is represented by his union at a disciplinary meeting. Respondent cites no authority in support of his contention that the City was obligated to provide him with such services and furthermore there is no factual basis in the record otherwise indicating that Respondent even requested such services from the City once the current termination and dismissal proceedings commenced.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of the City of Clearwater enter a final order terminating Mr. Jakstas’ employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward C. Castagna, Jr., Esquire Castagna Law Firm, P.A. Suite 702 611 Druid Road Clearwater, Florida 33756 (eServed) Owen Kohler, Esquire City of Clearwater 112 South Osceola Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33756 (eServed) Nichole A. Kerr, Esquire Castagna Law Firm, P.A. Suite 702 611 Druid Road Clearwater, Florida 33756 Ted Starr, Esquire Starr Law Offices 8181 U.S. Highway 19 North Pinellas Park, Florida 33781 Rosemarie Call, City Clerk City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33758-4748
The Issue The issue in this appeal is whether the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board denying Petitioner's application for variances for certain signage on his property is supported by the evidence in the record, or whether it departs from the essential requirements of law. See Section 137.014(f)(3), City of Clearwater Land Development Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of certain property located at 1923-1943 U.S. Highway 19 North, Clearwater, Florida (Section 05-29-16, M&B 23.05). This property is zoned CC (Commercial Center), and is the site of a strip shopping mall. On or about March 23, 1989, Petitioner applied for three variances for the subject property, as follows: 243 square feet to permit a total of 411 square feet of property identification signage; 13.5 feet in height to permit a 33.5 foot high pole sign; permission for a roof mounted sign. The Development Code Adjustment Board denied Petitioner's application for variances on April 13, 1989, and Petitioner timely filed this appeal of the Board's decision. Under the provisions of the City of Clearwater Land Development Code applicable to the Petitioner's property, only 168 square feet of property identification signage and pole signs not to exceed 20 feet in height would be allowed without a variance, and roof signs of any kind are prohibited unless a variance has been granted. Several months prior to Petitioner's filing for these variances, a roof sign was erected on the building located on the subject property. This roof sign consists of individual letters spelling "Harbor Square", which is the name of this shopping mall. The letters are from 3 feet, to 4 feet 9 inches in height, and span a distance of 34 feet 9 inches in width. The roof sign replaced a property identification sign at the right of way which previously carried the name of the shopping center, but the space on the pole sign previously used to identify the mall was not eliminated. That space is now used to identify a uniform business in the mall. Petitioner is seeking these after the fact variances to authorize the roof sign which has already been erected, and to approve the height of an existing pole sign. An enforcement action initiated by the City is pending this variance determination. Tenants in the Harbor Square mall testified that the change in signage has made the mall more visible and accessible, and several of their customers have commented that their businesses are now easier to find. The tenants feel that this change in signage will benefit their businesses financially. The Development Code Adjustment Board has previously granted variances from the signage limitations imposed by the Code, but the evidence produced at hearing indicates that none of these variances were granted after the fact. The two variances which were approved for roof signs were based upon a finding of conditions unique to the property which created a hardship for the applicant. In both instances, the Board found that the applicant had not created his own hardship, but that it arose from the size or positioning of the property involved in each application. In this case, nothing unique about the property can be found. The applicant has caused his own problems by allowing a sign to be erected without first obtaining a permit or variance. The Petitioner urges that it was the responsibility of his sign contractor to obtain all necessary permits or variances, and that the contractor did not inform him that a variance was necessary before he erected the sign. However, neither the sign contractor nor the Petitioner himself was present to testify, and therefore, there can be no finding with regard to his credibility, or with regard to whatever arrangement he had with the contractor. In any event, as the property owner seeking a variance, Petitioner has failed to establish any basis for a finding of a hardship or circumstance unique to his property, other than the fact that he allowed this sign to be erected without obtaining the necessary approvals from the City.
Findings Of Fact On the evening of February 7, 1978 Officer Di Stasio stopped a vehicle driven by Michael Gross in the City of Clearwater. The primary reason for stopping this vehicle was that Gross had exited onto the main street from a side street and nearly collided with the car driven by Di Stasio. After stopping the vehicle Di Stasio questioned the driver regarding the registration of the vehicle, among other things, and although Gross could not produce the registration he did produce a Bill of Sale for the vehicle dated in 1976. Gross told Di Stasio that the car had been registered in his wife's name, that they were in the process of getting a divorce, and the registration was probably in the mail to him. The tag was from Kentucky, was bent and rusty, and was secured to the vehicle by wire. In lieu of citing Gross for driving with an invalid tag Di Stasio removed the tag from Gross's car and advised Gross that it was unlawful to drive the vehicle without a valid tag. Di Stasio subsequently threw the tag in the trash and made no report of the incident. The Clearwater police had a book showing the various states' automobile tags and expiration dates of these tags. Had Di Stasio radioed in for this information he would have learned that the tag on Gross' car had not expired. Police officers had been instructed regarding the existence of the book but Di Stasio apparently missed the training session when this Information was disseminated. The following morning on February 8, 1978 Gross appeared at the police station to inquire what he needed to do to drive his car. He related the instance of the previous evening to Captain Enlow of the Clearwater Police and when the latter could find no report of the incident called Gross at his home to come down to the police station. Di Stasio advised Captain Enlow that he thought the tag was invalid and therefore he removed it from the car. Although the tag had a `77 decal on it information in the police station indicated the tag was valid until March, 1978. Di Stasio took Gross to the tag office in the courthouse where he was able to obtain a temporary tag for the vehicle. As a result of Officer Di Stasio removing the tag and failing to maintain custody of the tag as required by police regulations he was suspended without pay for three days. Subsequent inquiries to Kentucky confirmed that the car was properly registered to Michael Gross and that the tag on the vehicle was a valid tag on February 8, 1978. Respondent's primary explanation for removing the tag from the vehicle was that Gross told him the tag had been placed on the vehicle to come to Florida and that it did not belong to the car. Gross was not a witness at this hearing and this testimony was rebutted by information in Exhibit 6 received from the Lexington, Kentucky Police. In defense of his actions in not securing the tag as required by Rule 73 when it came into his possession, Respondent produced several witnesses who testified that they had been instructed not to bring in partly filled beer cans or to remove whiskey from a motor vehicle when the driver was apprehended. None of these witnesses recalled any specific instance where a tag had been removed from a vehicle and not accounted for pursuant to Rule 73. Respondent contended that a police officer is given wide latitude to exercise discretion in the handling of property and as an example cited the instances when children's toys are left in the street and the police do not take this property into custody. The principal exception to the rule that property coming into the possession of a police officer is to be turned in to the property office involves the handling of alcoholic beverages which is not evidence.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the decision of the Planning and Zoning Board denying Petitioner's application for conditional use approval should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact On or about February 16, 1990, the Petitioner filed an application for conditional use approval with the Respondent seeking permission to operate a personal watercraft rental business at a motel and restaurant located at 601 South Gulf View Boulevard on Clearwater Beach. According to the application, the Petitioner proposes to rent two "Hobie cat" catamaran sailboats, and four to ten "wave runners". The Petitioner proposes that the vessels would be escorted westward, north of and parallel to, the marked boat channel in Clearwater Pass, then northwestward to open waters where, according to Petitioner, a "safewatch and service unit of nonpropeller power" would "monitor" customer activities. The subject property is located between South Gulf View Boulevard and Clearwater Pass, west of the Clearwater Pass Bridge, and is comprised of two zoning districts, an upland portion that is zoned CR-28, or Resort Commercial "Twenty-eight", and a beach front portion that is zoned OS/R, or Open Space/Recreation. Clearwater Pass separates Clearwater Beach and Sand Key Islands, and is the only open access between Clearwater Harbor and the Gulf of Mexico. A convenience store is located north of the property, and hotels are located east and west of the property. At the hearing before the Respondent's Planning and Zoning Board on March 13, 1990, the Planning and Development Department recommended denial of the application. In its written report to the Board, the planning staff based its recommendation upon the recommendations of the City's Harbormaster and Marine Advisory Board, which in turn were based upon concerns for safety due to the heavy boat traffic in the Clearwater Pass channel and at jetties along the southern end of Clearwater Beach and the northern end of Sand Key, all of which are located in the vicinity of the subject property. Based upon the testimony of Harbormaster Bill Held, it is found that state and federal approval of markers to mark off a private corridor in Clearwater Pass to accommodate Petitioner's proposed activities would be unlikely. During the hearing before the Board, the Board heard testimony from several persons in opposition to this application based upon concerns regarding the safety of swimmers due to careless operation of similar types of vessels, and strong currents in Clearwater Pass. At the conclusion of the public hearing, the Board discussed the application prior to voting. Members of the Board expressed concerns regarding public safety due to the dangerous condition of the area. The Board then voted unanimously to deny the application. Subsequently, the Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal, resulting in this case. During this final hearing, Ronald Hollins, President of Gulf Fun, Inc., and agent for the Petitioner, testified that his proposed business would operate seven days a week, from sunrise to sunset, or approximately twelve hours daily. Petitioner testified that his personal watercraft rental vessels would be escorted during trips both from the subject property westward to the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and also during return trips, and that a "safety service" boat would monitor the rental vessels while in operation, with the escort boat and the "safety service" boat being in radio contact with a base unit at the motel property. The rental vessels would be prohibited from crossing Clearwater Pass to the south side of the boat channel, and would be limited to an area of operation bounded on the south by Clearwater Pass and on the north by Pier 60 on Clearwater Beach. Petitioner proposes to employ only three or possibly four employees to operate the escort boat, the "safety service" boat, and the base location, to rent the personal watercraft vessels, show a video tape and give a safety booklet to customers, as well as to otherwise supervise the rental vessels during the approximately 84 hours per week that his business would be in operation. Petitoner has never operated a similar business. Based upon the testimony of Richard Howard, captain of a charter boat which regularly goes in and out of Clearwater Pass, it is found that personal watercraft vessels frequently present a hazard to navigation due to the manner in which they are customarily operated. Specifically, personal watercraft operators in Clearwater Pass engage in practices such as towing swimmers on inner tubes, purposely spraying water at boats, and jumping the wakes of boats in the Pass. The activities proposed by Petitioner would exacerbate the insufficient clearance between boats in the channel, boats anchored at the beach, and swimmers, and would, therefore, be inappropriate in Clearwater Pass. The currents in Clearwater Pass are found to be dangerous to boaters on a regular basis, based on the testimony of Arnold Abramson, bridge tender at the Clearwater Pass bridge and Harbormaster Bill Held. A significant number of personal watercraft operators do not demonstrate an understanding of the rules of navigation, or of the currents in the Pass. Based on the testimony of Marine Patrol Office Bill Farias, it is found that the lack of apparent common sense which is frequently demonstrated by personal watercraft operators in Clearwater Pass creates a dangerous condition for others. A common practice is to jump the wake of boats, which results in a loss of control in mid-air. The jetty at the western end of Clearwater Pass obscures vision, making it difficult for incoming boaters to see personal watercraft in the vicinity of the motel, and also making it difficult for personal watercraft operators to see incoming boats. There is another boat rental operation in the area of this subject property, located at the Hilton Hotel, but this existing operation predates the adoption of the Clearwater Land Development Code. The Clearwater Pass bridge had 12,000 drawbridge openings in the past year, and is one of the busiest in Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Frank A. Caluwe, Jr., was employed on a noncontractual basis by Respondent, South Florida Water Management District, during the period from April 8, 1974 through August 4, 1982. From August, 1981 until his termination, Caluwe held the position of water management engineer III. At all times relevant hereto, Richard A. Rogers, director of the Resource Control Department, was overall supervisor or department head. Charles Alan Hall served as his direct, day-to-day supervisor. Petitioner transferred into the Resource Control Department in 1977. He was eventually promoted to a supervising professional engineer I class in 1979 by Rogers and Hall. Caluwe's job evaluations received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 17 reflected outstanding and excellent ratings and included such glowing descriptions of his work performance as "excellent" and "well organized", and as having "a very good handle on all phases of the work". He received an excellent rating from Rogers and Hall as late as November, 1981. Rogers first began experiencing what he described as "difficulties" with Caluwe around 1980 when Caluwe went to lunch with several of his subordinates and did not return to work the rest of the afternoon. He did not take leave for his absence. Although Rogers claimed the employees were on a "drinking spree," this was not confirmed. Caluwe did not receive any disciplinary action for this "incident", although several months later Hall expressed displeasure with his absence. There was no evidence that any of the other employees in the group received any type of oral or written disciplinary action for their absences. Several other "problems" occurred during his employment tenure including unsuccessful attempts in 1980 to utilize law books at the agency's law library for personal use, admonishments for having too many incoming personal calls on his telephone during office hours and discussing nonworking matters with other employees, "negative" comments to two subordinates during a 1981 intra-agency election, and an alleged failure to return a long-distance telephone call to someone seeking information. However, no formal disciplinary action was taken against Petitioner for any of these actions, and his personnel file reflects no written comments. He also sued the agency twice, once in 1977 over an insurance claim, and a second time in 1980 concerning a cash award he claimed was due for making a suggestion. However, this action did not result in any written or oral warnings from his superiors. In May, 1981, Hall, Rogers and Caluwe met to discuss a transfer from a supervisory position (supervisor of water permit section) to a water management engineer III, which was a staff position. Although Caluwe admitted he was "burned out" in his supervisory role, he protested being demoted to a staff position and requested he be given an engineer IV slot. Notwithstanding his request he was demoted to the lower position. On March 17, 1982, an annual agency meeting was held at which time the agency executive director spoke to all employees. Prior to that time an undated memorandum was posted on the agency's bulletin board "urging" all employees to attend. Another memorandum dated March 1, 1982, which rescheduled the meeting to another date, simply advised members of Caluwe's department when the talk was to be held, but made no mention regarding attendance. Caluwe did not attend the meeting because he did not consider it to be mandatory. He based this conclusion upon the fact that the memorandum urged vis a vis required attendance, and because other employees had missed the meeting in prior years. He conceded, however, that it was "implied" from the memorandum that he attend the meeting. Respondent construed the memorandum to mean that attendance was compulsory, and that "everybody (was) expected to attend." Whether this specific meaning was ever conveyed to all employees, including Caluwe, before the meeting was not disclosed. During the annual agency meeting Caluwe remained working in his office. While there, an unidentified member of the public approached a temporary receptionist seeking information concerning a problem. The receptionist in turn went to Caluwe seeking his aid in responding to the inquiry. Caluwe responded, "I don't know. That's not my job. Pat Gleason's group handles that." Out of "curiosity", the receptionist reported his comments to a department head, who in turn told Rogers. Neither the receptionist nor the member of the public were identified, and neither appeared and testified at the final hearing. Whether or not the receptionist suffered "abuse" as a result of this as the agency claims was not confirmed. Rogers, Hall and Caluwe met on March 18 concerning his absence from the annual meeting and the "incident" with the receptionist. On March 22 Caluwe was given a written warning and assigned 25 disciplinary points for being guilty of a Category 2e offense under the agency's Corrective Action-Procedure Index and Corrective Action-Policy. The Index and Policy "defines appropriate corrective actions for resolving performance problems and violations of rules of conduct" by agency employees. In short, it represents the agency's written code of conduct for employees. A 2e offense is defined therein as a "(f)ailure to follow authorized instructions." In conjunction with the written warning, Caluwe was also given a memorandum prepared by Rogers on March 19 which explained in greater detail the conduct that precipitated the disciplinary action. In the memorandum Rogers referred to a number of things which prompted the disciplinary action, including the "incident" with the receptionist, the missed meeting, and Caluwe's apparent use of the telephone for personal use during the meeting as reported by the temporary receptionist. However, since the 25 points were given to Caluwe for failing to follow authorized instructions, it is found that disciplinary action was taken because he failed to attend the annual meeting. On March 29, 1982, Caluwe wrote a fourteen-page letter to Rogers giving his version of what occurred on March 17, and explaining in great detail other "incidents" that had occurred during the preceding eighteen months, Attached to the letter were 23 exhibits. Among other things, Caluwe accused Hall and Rogers of "improper conduct and abuse of authority" in handling the other incidents that had previously arisen. He also criticized their ability to manage and communicate with employees. The letter indicated that copies of the same were being mailed to each member of the agency's governing board, its Executive Director, Deputy Director, and Records Clerk, and an outside attorney. Rogers accepted the letter as merely being a response to his memorandum of March Caluwe was not disciplined for this action. On March 31, 1982 Caluwe wrote a two-page letter to the members of the governing board of the agency and enclosed his March 29 letter and exhibits previously sent to Rogers. In his March 31 letter, Caluwe stated, among other things, that management "occupie(d) a position of trust", that it had "breached this trust", that it "rule(d) by intimidation and fear and not in the spirit of cooperation", and urged the board members to conduct an independent investigation of his "allegations". A copy of this letter was also furnished an outside attorney. On May 13, 1982 Caluwe sent another letter to the members of the governing board in which he inquired as to the status of the investigation he had called for in his letter of March 31. Caluwe also raised allegations concerning the agency's general counsel, and claimed the general counsel had "used sick leave for purposes other than for which it was intended (and) falsified his bi-weekly time reports and received pay and benefits for periods he was absent from work", and that the problem was created because his leave slips had been approved by the agency's deputy executive director. That complaint is now the subject of a Florida Commission on Ethics proceeding. Caluwe had previously brought this subject to Rogers' attention sometime in 1980. There was no evidence his to the reaction, if any, by the members of the governing board to this letter or the one previously sent on March 31. Caluwe did not furnish his supervisors a copy of the letter but did copy the records clerk of the agency. Neither Rogers nor the agency personnel director received copies of the same until late July, 1982. In June, 1982 Caluwe contacted reporter for the Miami Herald to disclose the fact that the chairman of the agency's governing board had been involved in selling insurance to the board. On June 22, 1982 outside counsel for the agency wrote the agency's personnel director telling him, among other things, that it would call the director the next day concerning Caluwe and provide him "with language to be included in a letter of termination." It also referred to a need to review in detail "SFWMD's termination, grievance, and personnel policies to make sure that Caluwe's discharge, and the procedures used to implement the discharge, comport with due process." At this point, then, the agency had decided to terminate Caluwe. On July 21, 1982 Caluwe again wrote a letter to the members of the governing board. The text of the letter is set out below: To members of the Governing Board of the South Florida Water Management District: You are to be congratulated for your unity in not addressing controversial topics. It's an unfortunate situation when special interests are put ahead of the public trust that has been vested in you. The only reasonable conclusion that I can reach is that you condone poor management and theft. Perhaps some of you have committed acts similar to these and that's why you cannot afford to get involved. Well you are involved! It's satisfying to note the courts have held directors personally liable in civil actions and that penalties are not limited to compensatory damages but that punitive damages can be assessed. It's also interesting to note that you may be found culpably negligent in permitting acts like these to occur. Since you have been unwilling to do your own house cleaning, I have decided to help you in this matter. I think it would be an excellent idea if the citizens of South Florida had an opportunity to see how the South Florida Water Management District has acted in favoring special interests. When this happens you will not honestly be able to say, "we didn't know". One member of the Board responded by letter dated July 23, 1982 that she considered it inappropriate for Caluwe to write directly to board members and instructed him to use channels that were provided for handling complaints. She added that Caluwe's letter struck her as being "offensive". The letter made no direct reference to Rogers and Hall, and they were not furnished a copy. However, on July 26 Rogers was given a copy of the letter. On July 30, 1982 Rogers sent Caluwe a memorandum in which he informed Petitioner that his employment was being terminated at 5:00 p.m. on August 4, 1982, and not to report to work after July 30. In brief, the reasons given for Caluwe's termination were (a) his "uncooperativeness shown a co-worker" on March 19, and his "failure to respond to a request for information from a member of the public", which collectively constituted a 2e offense for which he was previously assigned 25 points on March 19, 1982; (b) his letter to Rogers on March 29, 1982 which alleged poor management, illegal activity and unfair treatment to Caluwe, and which "personally attacked and insulted Charles Hall and (Rogers)"; (c) his letter of July 21 to the board which contained "inflammatory, threatening, and abusive language" and which constituted Category 2h and 3a offenses for which he received 75 points in total, and an additional 25 points which was given for the same letter by virtue of Caluwe's "failure to follow promulgated grievance and complaint procedures'; 3/ (d) the accumulation of a total of 125 points since March 19 which was in violation of Section E.1.d. of the Corrective Action Policy; and (e) "actions" which interfered with Rogers' ability to maintain internal discipline", made it impossible to work with (Caluwe)", made it "impossible to transfer (him) to a different Department", which "interfered with (his) performance of assigned duties", and which showed a "tendency on (his) part to make untrue and misleading statements." A Category 2h offense is defined in the Policy-Index as the "(u)se of abusive language to a co-worker" while a Category 3a offense is defined as the "(u)se of abusive or threatening language to the public, or use of threatening language to a co-worker." Category 2e offenses carry the imposition of 25 points for each violation. Fifty points are assigned for a violation of a Category 3 offense. Section E.1.d, of the Policy-Index provides that "(a) total of 100 points in effect may be cause for termination." The Policy-Index requires that "(c)orrective action shall be taken as soon as possible, but not more than five working days from the time the supervisor becomes aware of the incident." The memorandum of July 30, 1982 was followed by a letter to Caluwe on August 5 from Rogers which confirmed that his employment had been terminated. The letter also instructed Caluwe on the time limitations for filing a request for an administrative hearing. Thereafter, a timely request for a hearing was filed. The agency adopted an "Employee grievance Procedure" on July 15, 1977. Its purpose was to allow all employees the opportunity to quickly and fairly resolve a grievance." The Procedure provides a specified procedure for hearing and resolving various types of complaints from employees, including a hearing by an Employee Relations Committee (ERC), a further review by the unit manager or department director, a second hearing by a Grievance Review Board, and a final decision by the agency's executive director. According to the agency's personnel director, the agency has fired employees in one of two ways in the past: (a) when the employe has accumulated more than 100 disciplinary points under the Policy-Index, and (b) when the employee has committed certain acts, irrespective of the Policy-Index. Thus, it contends the agency may, at its discretion, determine whether to terminate an employee by assessing points under the Policy-Index or by merely giving notice to the employee even though he has accumulated no points under its written code of conduct. Even though an employee has accumulated over 100 points, the agency may not necessarily fire an employee. For example, on one occasion an employee accumulated 135 points but was not fired. In the case at bar, the agency considered Caluwe's 125 points to be incidental to his termination, and viewed his supervisor's inability to work with him, his letter writing activities and prior "incidents" to be the major concern and basis for the termination. Whether the District had a policy of terminating an employee whenever his actions made it impossible to transfer him to another department or whenever a supervisor could not work with an employee was not disclosed. It was also not disclosed whether all employees, including Caluwe, were aware of such policies, and the ramification for violating the same. There was no evidence as to the reason for such policies, the types of proscribed conduct within each policy, and the authority for adopting the same. Caluwe blamed his firing primarily on the fact that he had prompted an investigation of the agency's general counsel, who was a long-time District employee. He acknowledged he failed to use the Employee Grievance Procedure when he wrote directly to the members of the governing board, but claimed the ERC was ineffective in dealing with management problems. Caluwe did not dispute that he missed the annual meeting, and wrote the letters in question; however, he contends they do not justify the disciplinary action imposed by the District.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that all charges against Petitioner be dismissed except for one Category 2e offense for which 25 points should be imposed. It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be reinstated in the position of water management engineer III retroactive to August 4, 1982 and that he be given full back pay between that date and the date of reinstatement. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 8th day of June, 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1983.
The Issue The issues in this bid protest are whether, in making a preliminary decision to award a staff augmentation contract, Respondent acted contrary to a governing statute, rule, policy, or project specification; and, if so, whether such misstep(s) was/were clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact The parties' Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation2 and the evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Request for Proposals On July 26, 2001, the District issued Request for Proposals C-11940 (the "RFP"). The purpose of the RFP, as set forth on page one thereof, was to solicit technical and cost proposals from qualified respondents [for a staff augmentation contract.3] The South Florida Water Management District (District) is interested in establishing a single qualified information systems/technology contracting firm to provide the services defined herein on an as-needed basis. Contingent upon the responses received as a result of this Request for Proposals (RFP), the District will determine which respondent meets the required standards and qualifications through an evaluation process. The Vendor meeting the required standards and qualifications will be determined to be “pre-qualified” to provide information systems/technology services to the District. The deadline for submission of proposals in response to the RFP was Monday, August 27, 2001 at 2:30 p.m. Section 1.12 of the RFP, which is relevant to this protest, stated as follows: REJECTION OF RESPONSES The District reserves the right to reject any and all responses when such rejection is in the District's interests. Minor irregularities contained in a response may be waived by the District. A minor irregularity is a variation from the solicitation that does not affect the price of the contract or does not give a respondent an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other respondents, or does not adversely impact the interests of the District. The District further reserves the right to cancel this solicitation at any time if it is in the best interest of the District to do so. Section 1.13 of the RFP stated, in pertinent part:
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the District enter a Final Order that declares DUA’s proposal to be materially non-responsive and, accordingly, rescinds the proposed award to DUA. In addition, while recognizing that the choice of remedies for invalid procurement actions is within the agency’s discretion, it is nevertheless recommended that, rather than reevaluate or reject all responsive proposals, the District award the contract to the highest-ranked responsive proposer, Syslogic. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2002.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Sammie Rayner, Respondent, was employed by the City of Clearwater as a customer service representative in the utility department. On February 11, 1992, Respondent needed to take her daughter to Seminole High School for a test and mentioned this to Joyce Griesel, Senior Customer Service Representative. The only city employees in the customer service section with authority to grant Respondent permission to leave the building on February 11, 1992, were John Scott, Utility Consumer Response Manager and Tim Bissonnette, Customer Service Supervisor. On the afternoon of February 11, 1992, Bissonnette was out of the office attending a conference; however, Scott was available. Bissonnette was Respondent's immediate supervisor, and Scott was over Bissonnette. Prior to October 1991, the Senior Customer Service Representative had authority to allow customer service representatives to leave the building for short periods. However, because of an incident in October 1991, this authority was removed from the Senior Customer Service Representative, and all employees were advised of the changed policy. Although Respondent denies that she was told that only Scott and Bissonnette could grant permission to leave the building, she did ask if Bissonnette was available before she departed the office around 3 p.m., on February 11, 1992. Respondent also contends that she asked Giesel for permission to leave, but Giesel denies that she gave such authorization, knowing full well that she had no such authority. Respondent was not given permission to leave the building on February 11 by Giesel.
The Issue The amount of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded to Petitioner, Palafox, LLC (“Petitioner” or “Palafox”), and against Respondent, Carmen Diaz (“Respondent”), in the underlying administrative matter as a sanction pursuant to section 120.595, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida limited liability company and was the applicant for the Permit challenged in Case No. 19-5831. Respondent is the owner of Lot 18, Block A, of the Palafox Preserve Subdivision, and was the Petitioner in Case No. 19-5831. Petitioner was represented by the firm of Carlton Fields, P.A. (“the Firm”), in Case Nos. 19-5831 and 20-3014F. Petitioner’s counsel and paralegal with the Firm spent 392.4 hours litigating both the underlying substantive case and entitlement to attorney’s fees, for a total of $123,763.50 in fees, broken down as follows: Name Hours Rate Subtotal W. Douglas Hall 171.8 $382.50 $65,713.50 James E. Parker-Flynn 197.4 $270.00 $53,298.00 Christine Graves .3 $382.50 $ 114.75 Kimberly Pullen 22.9 $202.50 $ 4,637.25 The hourly rates shown above were discounted by approximately 10 percent of the standard rates charged by the Firm at the time this matter originated. Furthermore, over the course of representing Palafox in this matter, the Firm discounted a number of its bills as a courtesy because of the amount of time required to litigate the matter and to adjust for potential overlap among attorneys working on the case. Those courtesy adjustments totaled $7,437.45. Applying that discount to the total fees shown above, the total amount of attorney’s fees incurred by Palafox in litigating this matter is as follows: Total Unadjusted Attorney’s Fees $123,763.50 Less Courtesy Adjustments $ 7,437.45 Total Adjusted Attorney’s Fees $116,326.05 In addition to attorney’s fees, Palafox incurred the following taxable costs and expenses: Court Reporter - Diaz Depo. $ 564.28 JSB-Advantage Court Reporters - Carswell Depo. $ 1,032.48 Phipps Reporting - DOAH Transcript -Day 1 $ 1,605.67 Phipps Reporting - DOAH Transcript -Day 2 $ 542.52 WSource Group, LLC (1/8/20-1/27/20) $ 3,987.50 WSource Group, LLC (2/6/20-2/20/20) $ 9,652.50 Total Taxable Costs $ 17,384.95 Additionally, Palafox is seeking the costs incurred by its expert, Mr. Varn, up through and including the final hearing. Mr. Varn’s hourly rate for his work on this case was $250, and, including the final hearing, he spent 9.8 hours on the case. The total cost for his services was $2,450.00. Palafox is seeking a total of $136,161.00 in fees and costs. Mr. Varn testified that both the rates charged by Palafox, and the hours Palafox’s counsel spent on the matter, were reasonable and consistent with the rates charged and time spent for similar work by other attorneys in the area. His opinion was supported by detailed time records kept by Palafox’s counsel, who confirmed that the fee statements were reviewed and periodically adjusted as necessary to account for potential overlap and duplication of effort among the attorneys working on the case, or if it appeared the bill simply needed to be reduced. Respondent stipulated that Mr. Varn is an attorney with sufficient qualifications to render an opinion regarding the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to Palafox in this proceeding. Respondent did not object to the rates charged by the Firm, and did not challenge any of the Firm’s time entries, fees, or costs. The number of hours set forth above by the attorneys and the paralegal working on this case were reasonable, the rates charged were reasonable, and the costs expended by Palafox were reasonable.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Carmen Diaz, pay to Palafox its reasonable attorney’s fees and taxable costs in the amount of $136,161.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Nicholas D. Fugate, Esquire Nicholas D. Fugate, P.A. Post Office Box 7548 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 James E. Parker-Flynn, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Brett J. Cyphers, Executive Director Northwest Florida Water Management District 81 Water Management Drive Havana, Florida 32333-4712 W. Douglas Hall, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jefferson M. Braswell, Esquire Braswell Law, PLLC 116 Northeast 3rd Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601
