The Issue Whether Weston Professional Title Group, Inc. (Respondent) committed the violations alleged in Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times, Petitioner has been the entity of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to regulate title insurance agencies. At all times relevant to this proceeding Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a title insurance agent in the State of Florida. As of the formal hearing, Respondent had ceased its operations due to the lack of business. Petitioner's investigation of Respondent was initiated by a complaint from a man named Robert Anderson. Mr. Anderson represented to Petitioner that he discovered that his name and address had been used as the buyer of the two residences discussed above. Respondent was the title and settlement agent for both transactions. The Collonade Drive transaction settled on November 14, 2006, with disbursement of the funds on November 16, 2006. The Vignon Place transaction settled and the funds were disbursed on December 15, 2006. Mr. Anderson reported to Petitioner his belief that his identity had been stolen by a person named Pamela Higgins. Mr. Anderson reported to Petitioner that he had not participated in either transaction, and asserted that he did not sign any of the documents that purport to contain his signature as the buyer. Respondent was required to comply with the provisions of RESPA in completing the HUD-1 for the Collonade Drive closing and the Vignon Place closing. RESPA required that disbursements at closing be consistent with the HUD-1 as approved by the parties to the transaction and by the lender. COLLONADE DRIVE CLOSING On September 15, 2006, Robert Anderson (or someone impersonating Mr. Anderson) signed a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" (Collonade contract), agreeing to buy the Collonade Drive property from Mark Mariani and Kathy Mariani, for the purchase price of $1,375,000.00. The Collonade contract reflected that a deposit had been made to "FLORIDA TITLE & ESC." in the amount of $5,000 with an additional deposit of $5,000 to be made within ten days. Two loans with separate mortgages constituted the financing for the purchase of the Collonade Drive property. The first mortgage was $962,500.00. The second mortgage, as reflected on the HUD-1 Settlement Statement with the disbursement date of November 14, 2006, was $263,430.08.3/ First Magnus Financial Corporation, an Arizona corporation, was the lender for both loans. Agents of America Mortgage Corp. served as the mortgage broker for the transaction. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, an employee of Agents of America Mortgages, signed Mr. Anderson's loan application as the "interviewer." The following was a special clause of the Collonade contract: "BUYER AGREES TO PAY FOR TITLE INSUANCE [sic] FEE ONLY (LINE 1108 OF SELLERS' SETTLEMENT STATEMENT), ONLY [SIC] IF SELLERS AGREE TO USE BUYER'S TITLE COMPANY OF CHOICE. BUYER IS A LICENSED FLORIDA REAL ESTATE AGENT." Petitioner established that Robert Anderson was not a licensed Florida real estate agent. The Collonade contract represented that there were no real estate brokers representing either party. On or about November 1, 2006, Respondent received a "Request for Title Commitment" from Claudit Casanova, a mortgage broker with Agents of America Mortgage Corp., for the Collonade Drive transaction. This was a revised request. The first request had been sent to Respondent on or about October 3, 2006. A copy of the Collonade contract had been forwarded to Respondent with the first request. In connection with the Collonade Drive transaction, Respondent prepared two HUD-1s,4/ each of which was approved by the parties and the lender.5/ The first HUD-1 had an anticipated closing date of November 14, 2006. That HUD-1 was revised in response to the lender's instruction to move the disbursement date from November 14, 2006, to November 16, 2006. The revision of the HUD-1 slightly reduced the amount of cash the buyer needed to close as a result of interest beginning to run on the loans as of November 16 instead of November 14. This was a mail-away closing, in that a packet of the documents the buyer was to sign was sent to someone named Laurie Martin at a title agency in Glendale, Arizona. Ms. Marrero testified she mailed the packet pursuant to instructions without specifying who gave her those instructions. The packet of documents was returned to Respondent, with signatures purporting to be Mr. Anderson's. Laurie Martin appears to have served as the notary public when the documents were signed. The transaction closed pursuant to the revised HUD-1 with the disbursement date of November 16, 2006, which, as approved by the parties and the lender, reflected that the sellers were to receive $477,884.93 upon closing. Upon closing, Respondent drafted a check in the amount of $477,884.93 made payable to the sellers. The sellers voided the check and based on instructions from the sellers, Ms. Marrero redistributed the sellers' proceeds by wire transfer as follows: $116,112.85 to sellers; $170,250.00 to Pamela Higgins; and $191,508.08 to Unlimited Advertising USA. Fourteen dollars were spent on wire transfer charges. The actual disbursement of the seller's proceeds was inconsistent with the HUD-1 and unknown to the buyer and the lender. Respondent violated the provisions of RESPA by disbursing the proceeds of the sale in a manner that was inconsistent with the HUD-1. $195,000 DEPOSIT The Collonade contract reflected that a $5,000 deposit had been made to "Fla. Title & Esc." required for the buyer to pay an additional deposit of $5,000 within ten days. There was no evidence establishing any relationship between Respondent and "Fla. Title & Esc." Both HUD-1s for the Collonade Drive transaction reflected that the buyer had provided to the sellers a deposit in the amount of $195,000. These HUD-1s, reflecting that the sellers were holding a deposit in the amount of $195,000, were approved by the parties and the lender. Ms. Marrero testified that she was instructed to include the $195,000 deposit on the HUD-1s without specifying who gave her those instructions. Ms. Marrero did not attempt to verify that the $195,000 deposit was actually being held by the sellers. FRAUD Petitioner alleged that the Collonade Drive transaction was fraudulent. Mr. Wenger's testimony, based in part on reports of mortgage fraud prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, supported that allegation. Other evidence supporting that allegation included the following facts The first mortgage quickly went into foreclosure; A mailing address given for Robert Anderson did not (as of April 19, 2011) exist. The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Claudia Rodriguez, a former Florida title agent whose license had been suspended by Petitioner for failing to disburse in accordance with HUD statements and disbursing on uncollected funds; The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Juan Carlos Rodriguez (the person who supposedly took the credit application from Robert Anderson); The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Agents of America Mortgage Corporation (the mortgage broker for the Collonade closing. Juan Carlos Rodriguez supposedly notarized the document authorizing disbursement of part of the sellers' proceeds to Pamela Higgins. Mr. Anderson's purported signatures on different documents are inconsistent. The address for Mr. Anderson as it appears on the HUD- 1 Settlement Statements is 14233 W. Jenan Drive, Surprise, Arizona. Prior to the closing Ms. Marrero sent by Federal Express a copy of the unexecuted closing documents to "Pam Higgins c/o Robert S. Anderson" 12211 N. 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona. Following the closing, Ms. Marrero sent a copy of the closing documents by Federal Express to Robert S. Anderson, at the address 12211 N. 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona. Ms. Marrero testified that she acted on instructions in sending the two packages, without identifying who gave her those instructions. There was no evidence that anyone employed by Respondent knew anyone connected to this transaction prior to being asked to provide a title commitment. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent had anything to do with the buy-sell agreement between the buyer and the sellers or the efforts by Mr. Anderson (or the person or persons impersonating Mr. Anderson) to obtain financing for the purchase. While there was significant evidence that the Colonnade Closing was a fraudulent transaction, there was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent was complicit in that fraud. VIGNON COURT CLOSING On a date prior to November 6, 2006, Maribel and Timothy Graves signed a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" offering to sell their Vignon Court residence to Robert Anderson for the purchase price of $1,975,000.00. Mr. and Mrs. Graves were represented by counsel during this transaction. The copy of the contract admitted into evidence had not been signed by Mr. Anderson and did not bear a legible date. The contract provided an acceptance date of November 6, 2006. The fully executed contract was not admitted into evidence. On October 4, 2006, Claudit Casanova of Agents of America Mortgage requested Respondent to provide a title commitment for the Vignon Court transaction. In that request, the sales price was stated as being $1,975,000; the loan amount was $1,481,250 and the mortgagee was American Brokers Conduit. Preferred Properties, Int., Inc., was listed as being the real estate broker for the transaction. Respondent prepared a HUD-1 for the Vignon Court transaction that reflected a closing and disbursement date of December 15, 2006. DEPOSIT The unexecuted (by the buyer) and undated copy Purchase Agreement required a deposit of $100,000 at the time of acceptance with an additional $50,000 being due within ten days thereafter. There was no evidence as to the terms of the completely executed Purchase Agreement. Line 201 of the HUD-1 reflected a deposit of $250,000 paid on behalf of the buyer. Respondent did not verify that deposit had been made. The HUD-1 specified that the deposit was being held by the sellers. The buyer, sellers, and lender approved the HUD-1, which reflected the existence of a deposit of $250,000, prior to closing. GASPARE VALENTINO On December 6, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Graves entered into a "Joint Venture and Property Resale Agreement" (Resale Agreement) pertaining to the sale of the Vignon Court residence with Gaspare Valentino. On February 5, 2002, Gaspare Rino Valentino was issued a license by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation of the type "Real Estate Broker or Sales" and of the rank "Sales Associate." That license was valid at the times relevant to this proceeding. Paragraph 2 of the Resale Agreement provides as follows: (2) SALE EFFORTS: CONTRACT PROCEEDS. Valentino agrees to use reasonable efforts to obtain a third party purchaser (a "Purchaser") for the Property. Valentino is not required to advertise the Property or list the Property for sale, but shall have such right to do so. Valentino does not guaranty [sic] the procurement of a Purchaser. The parties agree that the intention is for Valentino to secure a Purchaser who will pay a purchase price sufficient in order to (i) satisfy the existing debt upon the Property, (ii) pay ordinary and reasonable closing costs of the transaction, (iii) generate a net proceeds [illegible] to Owner not less than ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000); and (iv) generate such further sums beyond the foregoing in order to pay Valentino a fee for services rendered as set forth in this Agreement. In accordance with such understanding, Owner agrees to enter into and fully execute a Contract for Purchase and Sale with a Purchaser procured by Valentino which is consistent with the terms set forth in this Agreement, including without limitation, a designated sales price which enables Owner to receive at closing a net proceeds sum equal to ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000) (the "Owner's Sale Proceeds") after payment of the Property Sale Expenses, hereinafter defined as set forth in Paragraph 3. Owner agrees that any net sales proceeds in excess of the Owner's Sale Proceeds shall be payable to Valentino (the "Excess Proceeds Fee), as Valentino's fee for the efforts of Valentino as set forth herein. Paragraph 3 (i) of the Resale Agreement reiterates that after the payment of the "Property Sale Expenses" as follows: Owner shall receive the Owner Sale Proceeds consisting of exactly ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000) from the net sales proceeds . . . Paragraph 3 (ii) of the Resale Agreement reiterates that after the payment of the "Property Sale Expenses" and the "Owner Sale Proceeds": Valentino shall receive the Excess Proceeds Fees, constituting all remaining net sales proceeds in excess of the Owner Sale Proceeds, as a fee for services rendered by Valentino pursuant to this Agreement. Paragraph 7 of the Resale Agreement is as follows: 7. Licensed Agent: Valentino represents and discloses that Valentino is a licensed real estate agent in the State of Florida. Notwithstanding such, Valentino is individually entering into this Agreement using his own resources to assist Owner in the improvement and sale of the Property, and as such is a principal in this transaction earning the Excess Proceeds Fee. The parties acknowledge that Valentino is an investor in this transaction and as such at closing is entitled to and shall receive the Excess Proceeds Fee as set forth in Section [Paragraph] 3(ii) of this Agreement. Under RESPA, Section 700 of a HUD-1 is appropriately used for reporting the payments for commissions to real estate salesmen and/or brokers as part of the "Settlement Charges." Such payments can also be reported under Section 1300 ("Additional Settlement Charges"), if the payments are appropriately labeled. Respondent reflected the payment of $527,656.92 as "Payoff" to Gaspare Valentino at line 1307 of Section 1300." Prior to closing the buyer, sellers, and lender had approved the HUD-1 for the Vignon Court transaction. The lender was aware of the Resale Agreement. Mr. Marrero is an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida. Mr. Marrero construed the payments to Mr. Valentino to be other than a real estate commission. Although it is clear that Petitioner considers that payment to Mr. Valentino to be a real estate commission, the terms of the Resale Agreement entitled Mr. Marrero to treat that payment as being to an investor. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent erroneously stated the payment to Mr. Valentino on the HUD-1. SURETY BOND As a condition of licensure, a title agency is required to provide to Petitioner a $35,000 security deposit or a $35,000 surety bond. In connection with its application for licensure on August 29, 2002, Respondent filed the required surety bond with Petitioner. The bond was issued by Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland with bond number 133046577. On July 14, 2004, Petitioner received from Respondent a surety bond issued by Western Surety Company in the amount of $35,000, effective as of August 29, 2004. The bond number was 69728435. On May 28, 2010, Petitioner received a letter from his surety dated May 24, 2010, which advised that bond number 69728435 would be voided or cancelled as of August 29, 2010. That letter of cancellation showed a copy being furnished to Respondent at the address "1820 North. Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite 105, Weston, Florida 33326." On June 11, 2010, Petitioner advised Respondent by letter sent to "1820 North Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite. 105, Weston, Florida 33326" that it had received the cancellation letter. The letter stated, in part, as follows: If we do not receive a replacement bond within 30 days of the dated letter, we will forward your file to the appropriate division for disciplinary action. If you do not plan to continue transacting business and wish to terminate your license, you must submit a request to us immediately. Prior to May 24, 2010, Respondent moved its offices from 1802 North Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite 105, Weston, Florida, to Suite 304 of the same building. Mr. Marrero testified that he had no recollection of receiving the letters cancelling the surety bond or the letter from Petitioner dated June 11, 2010. Respondent was without a surety bond between August 29, 2010, and November 18, 2010. Petitioner did not establish that Respondent's failure to maintain it surety bond during that period was willful within the meaning of section 626.8437(9). No prior disciplinary action has been brought against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of subsections 626.8473(2) and (4) as alleged in Count I of the Amended AC; and guilty of failing to maintain a surety bond as required by section 626.8418(2) in violation of section 626.8437(1), as alleged in Count III of the Amended AC. It is further recommended that the final order find Respondent not guilty of all other violations alleged in the Amended AC. For the violations found as to Count I, it is recommended that Respondent's licensure be suspended for a period of six months. For the violations found in Count III, it is recommended that Respondent's licensure be suspended for a period of three months. It is further recommended that the periods of suspension run concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2012
The Issue The issue presented is whether the Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(a) and Secton 475.25(3), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Nettie Byer, was employed by Continental Marketing Services from November 3, 1975, until March 31, 1976, as a broker salesman. The deposition of Maureen Palloti was received into the record subject to the objections ruled on in the Hearing Officer's Order heretofore entered in the record. The testimony of Edward Nadelman was received. Nadelman stated that he was contacted by telephone by a person who represented that she was Nettie Byer. The caller stated that she was with Continental Marketing Services, a real estate sales organization. The caller further represented that if Nadelman paid a $350 advance fee, Continental Marketing Services would list Nadelman's property advertising it widely within the United States and abroad, selling it for several times what Nadelman paid for the property. Nadelman subsequently received a copy of that advertisement for his property. Nadelman's property was not sold. The deposition of Maureen Palloti reflects that Mrs. Palloti and her husband were contacted by a caller who identified herself as Nettie Byer. The caller made representation similar to those made to Edward Nadelman. As a result, the Pallotis entered into a listing agreement with Continental Marketing Services, paid an advance listing fee, and subsequently received a proof of an advertisement of their property. Evidence was presented that Nadelman's and the Pallotis' property was not worth the price suggested by the caller as the price at which the property could be sold. However, no guarantees of sale were made by the caller. No evidence was introduced that the individual who called Edward Nadelman or that the individual who called the Pallotis was the Respondent, Nettie Byer. No evidence was introduced that the Respondent had any knowledge of the business activities of Continental Marketing Services. No evidence was introduced that Continental Marketing Services did not perform in accordance with the listing contracts with the Pallotis or with Nadelman.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the license of Nettie Byer as a broker salesman. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of March, 1979. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530,Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. KIlausner, Esquire 28 W. Flagler Street, Suite 804 Miami, Florida 33130 Mark A. Grimes, Staff Attorney Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Sections 475.426(1)(a) and 475.25(1)(a), (b), and (e), Florida Statutes, 1/ by: acting as a broker; failing to deposit money in escrow; committing fraud, deceit, or dishonesty; and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate sales person under license number 0585127. In September, 1992, Respondent's real estate license had lapsed. It was renewed on October 22, 1992. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a sales person at 457 Loma Bonita Drive, Davenport, Florida. Respondent is a British citizen doing business in Florida. Respondent owns 50 percent of the outstanding stock of Newbay Florida Associates ("Newbay") and Newbay Properties of Central Florida, Inc ("Newbay Properties"). Mr. Paul Chandler is a British citizen confined to a wheelchair by osteogenesis imperfecta, a bone disease. Mr. Chandler was injured in an automobile accident by a drunken driver in 1989. As a result, Mr. Chandler was awarded a jury verdict of $600,000. From the net proceeds of the jury verdict, Mr. Chandler purchased four houses in Florida from Respondent. The houses were for Mr. Chandler and members of his family who have disabilities similar to Mr. Chandler's. 2/ Mr. Chandler paid the remainder of his jury award, approximately $225,000, to Respondent to purchase a furniture franchise. The franchise was to be operated as Flamingo Interiors, Inc. ("Flamingo"), in Kissimmee, Florida. In September, 1992, Respondent and Mr. Chandler negotiated and executed a Franchise Rights Agreement (the "agreement"). The agreement identifies Mr. Chandler as the "franchisee" but otherwise conceals material facts and contains misrepresentations, false promises, false pretenses, and amounts to dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device. The agreement illustrates Respondent's fraud and breach of trust in a business transaction. The agreement contains the name "NEWBAY FLORIDA ASSOCIATES" across the top of the front page of the document. However, the agreement identifies the "franchisor" as Flamingo Interiors of Wells, Somerset, England. The agreement requires Flamingo Interiors to perform numerous obligations. The obligations include: setting up a retail store; providing all necessary training, licensing, qualifications, visas, and inventory; conveying an exclusive area of operation within an "eight (8) miles radius from the Newbay office;" and establishing the location and size of the retail store at the discretion of Newbay. The agreement represents that Newbay owns 25 percent of the outstanding stock in Flamingo Interiors. However, the agreement conceals Flamingo Interiors' place of formation, organization, and current status, and conceals Newbay's authority, or lack of authority, to bind Flamingo Interiors to the obligations of the franchisor in the agreement. Respondent is the only signatory to the agreement other than Mr. Chandler. Respondent signed the agreement on behalf of Newbay. No one from Flamingo Interiors is a signatory to the agreement. The purchase price under the agreement requires Mr. Chandler to deposit $45,000 upon execution of the agreement. The balance of $180,000 is to be paid by December 31, 1992. Mr. Chandler paid the $225,000 required under the agreement in three checks made payable to "Newbay Clients Account." Respondent represented that the amounts paid by Mr. Chandler would be held in the escrow account of Newbay Properties until the obligations of the franchisor were completed in accordance with the terms of the agreement. All negotiations were conducted in the offices of Newbay Properties. Newbay Properties had no escrow account. Respondent failed to place the $225,000 paid to him by Mr. Chandler into any escrow account. The obligations of the franchisor were never satisfied, in whole or in part. Neither Respondent, Newbay, nor Flamingo Interiors made any attempt to obtain performance of the obligations of the franchisor. After repeated efforts and requests by Mr. Chandler, Respondent failed to account for or return Mr. Chandler's money. Respondent never explained his failure to return the money deposited with Respondent by Mr. Chandler.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(k), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.42(1)(a); guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b); and revoking Respondent's real estate sales license. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February 1995.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Marinatown Realty, Inc., is a corporate real estate broker, holding license number 0208680 and located at 3440 Marinatown Lane, Northwest, North Fort Myers, Florida. Marinatown Realty is a wholly owned subsidiary of Seago Group, Inc., a publicly held land development and rental corporation whose president is Thomas P. Hoolihan. In late 1977, Hoolihan met L. E. Hutchinson, the complainant in this case, through another broker for whom Hutchinson at the time was employed. In December, 1977, Hoolihan and Hutchinson discussed the marketing of two condominium projects being developed by Hoolihan and reached an oral agreement whereby Hutchinson would be paid $18,000 in salary with a 1 1/2 percent commission on all sales. When the condominium units were completed and mostly sold, the parties' employment agreement was revised in late December, 1979. Under the new agreement, Hutchinson was to receive $30,000 a year salary, commissions on the remaining condominium units that had not yet closed and any commissions on outside property listings neither owned nor controlled by Seago. In return for the $30,000 guarantee, Hutchinson was to forego commissions on future properties owned or controlled by Seago Group, Inc. During the period from 1977-1978 when Hutchinson was receiving $18,000 plus a 1 1/2 percent commission, sales were handled through Lee Hutchinson Realty, Inc., which held license number 0182945. In early 1979, Marinatown Realty was incorporated to market Seago's real estate inventory, to identify and list outside properties and to act as a management agent for purposes of renting condominium units previously sold in recent projects. When Marinatown Realty was formed, the complainant became its active broker. While employed as the broker for Marinatown and receiving $30,000 a year as a salaried employee, Hutchinson held two other broker's licenses, one as L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., and another as L. E. Hutchinson. In January, 1980, Hoolihan agreed to pay a $15,000 bonus to Hutchinson in lieu of a salary increase. Since at that time sales were minimal, Hoolihan decided to pay the bonus in installments as sales occurred. Because Hutchinson left in May, 1980, he received only $10,000 of the bonus which represented moneys previously paid. On April 23, 1980, Hutchinson and Chuck Bundschu, a licensed real estate broker, negotiated and obtained a sales contract between Hancock Harbor Properties, Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Seago Group, Inc., seller, and Frank Hoffer, buyer and licensed real estate broker, in which Hoffer offered to purchase approximately 3.16 acres of unimproved acreage for $500,000. Thomas P. Hoolihan, general partner of Hancock Harbor, executed the contract on behalf of the partnership. Prior to presenting the contract to Hoolihan, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hutchinson decided on a 30 percent, 40 percent 30 percent respective co- brokerage split on the $50,000 commission due on the sale of the Hancock Harbor Property. The co-brokerage fee split was typed on the bottom of the contract submitted to Hoolihan and was signed by the three brokers. The commission due to Hutchinson was made payable to L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. On April 25, 1980, the contract with the original co-brokerage split was presented to Hoolihan who refused to agree to its co-brokerage split provision. In the presence of Hutchinson, Hoolihan informed Bundschu and Hoffer that he would not pay a commission to Hutchinson because he was a salaried employee of the Seago Group and not entitled to a commission on the sale of this property. Accordingly, the co-brokerage fee provision of the executed contract was never signed by the seller, Thomas P. Hoolihan. Instead, on April 25, 1980, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hoolihan agreed to a split of $20,000 to Hoffer and $15,000 to Bundschu in lieu of the split specified on the bottom of the contract. At the closing on July 18, 1980, which was held at Coastland Title Company, a closing statement was prepared which shows that real estate commissions were disbursed to Chuck Bundschu Realty, Inc. ($15,000), Marinatown Realty, Inc., ($15,000) and Hoffer's firm, Landco, Inc., ($20,000). The checks were written and disbursed following a conversation between an official of Coastland Title Company and Hoolihan in which Hoolihan informed the official that Hutchinson was a Seago employee and he would not agree to pay a $15,000 commission to him under such circumstances. On July 18, 1980, a check for $15,000 was issued by Coastland Title Company to Marinatown Realty, Inc. The $15,000 represented Hutchinson's share of the co-brokerage agreement. When received on July 18, 1980, by Billie Robinette, the broker for Marinatown Realty, the check was signed over by her to Seago Group, Inc., since in her opinion it did not represent commissions earned by Marinatown Realty. The oral agreement between Hutchinson and Hoolihan was to terminate at the end of April, 1980, or approximately five days after the Hoffer contract was presented. Hoolihan offered to renew the contract without a provision for a guaranteed salary because Marinatown Realty had been consistently losing money since its incorporation. On May 6, 1980, Hoolihan received a letter of resignation from Hutchinson and concluded that his offer had been rejected. In early May, 1980, Hoolihan received a call from Ms. Robinette, who had been employed as Hutchinson's secretary, regarding filling the open brokerage position at Marinatown Realty, Inc. Hoolihan discovered from Ms. Robinette that Hutchinson had paid himself 50 percent of the commissions due Marinatown Realty, Inc., for the management of condominium rentals. After examining the check stubs from Marinatown's bank account, Hoolihan took personal possession of all the books and records of the company and had the office locks changed. When he examined the books and records of the realty company, Hoolihan realized that his assumption that Hutchinson Realty, Inc., became inactive when Marinatown Realty, Inc. was formed in January, 1979, was erroneous and that Hutchinson had operated his own realty company, L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., while employed by Marinatown Realty, Inc. Although he held multiple licenses, Hutchinson denied that a conflict ever existed between his duties to Marinatown Realty, Inc., and his own company, L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. When questioned during the final hearing regarding how he decided where to list properties while he was the broker for both companies, the following exchange occurred between Hutchinson and counsel for Marinatown Realty, Inc.: Q Let me ask you, Mr. Hutchinson, how would it be decided when you were to go out and list property as to whether or not that property would be listed under Marinatown Realty or L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc.? Who would make that determination? A I would. Q Solely on your own? A I had no contract with anyone. I had nothing in writing to direct me where to place any business. Q So this would be solely your decision as to how you would list the property? Either Marinatown Realty or L. E. Hutchinson Realty? A If I secured the listing it was my dis- cretion as to where I listed the real estate. I had the choice of one of two companies. * * * Q If you were to list property in my hypo- thetical with Marinatown Realty, is it not a fact that they would receive, and being Marinatown Realty, would receive one half of the commission and you, as the broker, would receive the other half? A That was what I did. Q So it would certainly be beneficial to Seago to have you list as much property as you could with Marinatown Realty because they, in fact, owned the stock with Marinatown Realty, is that not true? A Yes, sir. Q When you would list property with L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., would you do this with the full knowledge, consent and permission of Marinatown Realty, Inc.? A Yes, sir. Q How would you say that you gave full consent when you just testified that it was solely up to you as to how you would list property? A If I solely decided, I give my consent. I don't have anybody else to answer to. (T. pp. 108-110) During the period that Hutchinson was a broker for Marinatown Realty and L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Hutchinson believed his primary duty was toward his own company as illustrated by the following exchange between counsel for Respondent and the complainant: Q It's a fair statement to say that you, as a broker for Marinatown Realty, Inc. didn't make a whole lot of money for Marinatown Realty, did you? A I didn't run the P & L statement. Q I'm asking you as being the broker. You didn't make a lot of money for Marinatown Realty, Inc., did you? A I made as much money for them as I did for the responsibility. Q Well, did L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. make a lot of money during that period of time? MR. FERNANDEZ: Objection as to relevancy, this whole line of questioning. MR. NEEL: Your Honor, it isn't. It's germaine. HEARING OFFICER: Objection overruled. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, the question? Q Did L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. make a lot of money during this period of time? A That's relative. Q In comparison to what money Marinatown Realty made? A Yes, sir, because L. E. Hutchinson Realty had a thirty thousand retainer that was coming in up until April 30th. Q From Seago? A Certainly. Q So L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. made a lot more money than Marinatown Realty, Inc., didn't they? A That's the way its supposed to work. Q And, again, it was at your sole dis- cretion as to how you would list the properties; under which principal. A Yes, but I asked for a specific con- tract and never got it. (T. pp. 124-125) The Administrative Complaint in this case was filed on July 22, 1981. The preliminary investigative report compiled by Robert Corno, DPR Investigator, was filed on September 24, 1981 and the final investigative report was filed on September 30, 1981. The following is a synopsis of the investigator's findings and recommendation: That the COMPLAINANT [Hutchinson] worked for the SUBJECT [Hoolihan] and their contractual agreement was verbal. COMPLAINANT was paid on a salary/commission basis by companies of which SUBJECT is Chief Officer. That the COMPLAINANT filed civil action suit against SUBJECT in this case and it was dismissed with prejudice. That prior investigation by the DPR re- commended that no action be taken against the SUBJECT in this case. That two weeks after this investigation was undertaken, an Administrative Com- plaint was being filed by the DPR against the SUBJECT. That the existing BROKER for MARINATOWN REALTY, INC. was not involved in this case, and that since the time of the above referenced transaction, the SUBJECT has acquired his BROKER'S license #020462 which had no effect in this case. That conflicting statements by inter- viewers, namely former and present em- ployees and other agents involved in this case revealed that there is a reasonable doubt for probable cause against the SUBJECT. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) As noted by Investigator Corno, this was the second time Marinatown Realty had been investigated in relation to this case. In both instances a recommendation that no action be taken against the Respondent was apparently made. At the final hearing on December 1, 1981, counsel for the Department saw the complete investigative report, including the investigator's recommendation of a lack of probable cause, for the first time. Count II of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Hutchinson is entitled to compensation for services rendered on the following sales contracts: Seago Group, Inc. as seller, to Michael T. and Judith Marchiando as buyers, Seago Group, Inc. as seller, to John E. and Charlotte A. Ferguson as buyers, and Seago Group, Inc. as sellers, to Kenneth J. Dawson as buyer. In regard to the first transaction, the Marchiandos were personal friends of the son-in-law of Seago's major shareholder, Mr. R. Berti. Hutchinson's role in this transaction was limited to preparing the contract and mailing it to the Marchiandos for signature. Hutchinson had no part in selling this property and never met the Marchiandos. The sale of the Ferguson's arose in a manner similar to the Marchiandos. Mr. Ferguson is the manager of a Detroit company owned by Mr. Berti. Similarly, Mr. Dawson works for Mr. Berti in Detroit as an accountant. These sales were made by Mr. Berti and Hutchinson furnished administrative assistance by completing the contracts and sending them to these individuals for signature. Under the terms of the agreement between Hoolihan and Hutchinson, a commission was not due on these properties to Hutchinson since these were not outside listings and his agreement with Hoolihan did not contemplate that commissions be paid in such situations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed against Marinatown Realty, Inc. be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Xavier J. Fernandez, Esquire NUCKOLLS JOHNSON & FERNANDEZ Suite 10, 2710 Cleveland Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901 James A. Neel, Esquire 3440 Marinatown Lane, N.W. Fort Myers, Florida 33903 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issue for determination at final hearing was whether Florida Diesel Truck and Industrial, Inc., has standing to protest the termination of its franchise agreement with Mitsubishi Fuso Truck of America, Inc.
Findings Of Fact William Dowdy is the President and owner of Florida Diesel Truck and Industrial, Inc. (Petitioner). He owns all of the stock and controls the day- to-day operation of the business. Dowdy bought out his family members' interest in the business. Petitioner is primarily engaged in industrial, marine and agricultural parts and service. Dowdy has been working with Petitioner as an administrator for approximately 20 years. He joined Petitioner in 1973 in the accounting office when it was Florida Diesel and Marine Service and was primarily engaged in marine repairs. Dowdy has no actual, hands-on repairing experience with Petitioner of any significance. In 1989, Mitsubishi Fuso Truck of America, Inc. (Intervenor), was searching for new dealerships, so it initiated contact with Dowdy. Intervenor's branch manager had numerous conversations, regarding a truck franchise, with Dowdy. At that time, Petitioner had two locations: one in Riviera Beach and one in Ft. Pierce. The Riviera Beach location was the original facility, the larger of the two locations, and the main office. As a result of the talks, in October 1989, Petitioner applied for a dealership. In December 1989, Petitioner entered into an Interim Sales and Service Agreement (Interim Dealer Agreement) with Intervenor, which was the dealership franchise agreement. The Interim Dealer Agreement was for a one-year period (December 1989 to December 1990) only. In order to become an authorized dealer, Petitioner had to comply with the Interim Dealer Agreement. A term and condition made a part of the Interim Dealer Agreement and incorporated by reference as "Exhibit B" was that Petitioner would "show a growth rate in the areas of net worth, working capital, retail sales, parts sales, service sales, and show a positive trend towards profitability at the end of this interim agreement." Also, a development plan was entered into setting forth, among other things, an annual minimum sales objective of 25 units or vehicles for 1990. Petitioner's interim dealership was located at its Ft. Pierce location. Intervenor provided the trucks, through its credit plan, and Petitioner purchased the parts. As a dealer, Petitioner needed a salesperson but did not have one. Dowdy decided that Petitioner's branch manager in Riviera Beach would double as a salesperson for the dealership in Ft. Pierce. In addition to handling parts and service at the Riviera Beach location, the branch manager was also now a truck and parts salesperson. Needing a full-time salesperson for the dealership, Dowdy continued to search for a salesperson. Sometime within the contract year, Petitioner hired a full-time salesperson. The salesperson had no truck sales experience but did have automobile sales experience and local contacts which Petitioner felt was an asset. However, because his sales were lacking, the salesperson was replaced. Intervenor provided Petitioner with assistance during its year of operation. Intervenor's district sales manager met periodically with Dowdy, visited the dealership frequently, assisted with sales and made contacts with customers and potential customers. In December 1990, at the end of its first year of operation as a dealer, Petitioner received written communication from Intervenor regarding deficiencies, among other things, in the submission of monthly financial statements and the timely payment of accounts. Notwithstanding, in December 1990, Intervenor renewed the Interim Dealer Agreement for a second year from December 1990 to December 1991. Petitioner's profit trend did not indicate to Intervenor that it should offer Petitioner a three-year dealer contract as opposed to a one-year interim dealer contract. During the second contract period, Petitioner continued to have a salesperson problem. Petitioner replaced its salesperson with someone who had truck sales experience. However, the new salesperson was not selling a satisfactory number of trucks, so he was dismissed. Again, Petitioner's branch manager in Riviera Beach became the Ft. Pierce dealership salesperson. Additionally, in the second contractual year, on more than one occasion, Petitioner received written communication from Intervenor regarding submission of monthly financial statements and timely payment of accounts. Finally, in December 1991, Intervenor notified Petitioner by written communication that payment for parts shipment would be thereafter on a C.O.D. basis. In January 1992, Intervenor again renewed the Interim Dealer Agreement for a third year from January 1992 to January 1993. Prior to the renewal, Intervenor discussed increased truck sales with Petitioner and both agreed that increased trucks sales were necessary. A term and condition made a part of the Interim Dealer Agreement and incorporated by reference as "Exhibit B" was that Petitioner agreed to [S]ell a minimum of fifteen (15) units during the term of this contract. [S]ubmit monthly financial statements. [P]ay monthly parts account according to MFTA [Intervenor's] terms. Prior to the third contractual year, Dowdy had been having financial difficulty, due to his purchase of his family members' interest in Petitioner. However, during the third contractual year, the financial difficulties worsened with the absence of a salesperson which lead to disappointing truck sales. In March 1992, Intervenor's credit department denied approval for the shipment of a vehicle to Petitioner's dealership because Petitioner had not submitted to Intervenor the 1991 year-end financial statement and monthly financial statement and had not paid prior interest charges. Additionally, in June 1992, Intervenor notified Petitioner by written communication that its floor plan insurance premium was past due, i.e., Petitioner had not paid the premium on its inventory. Also, in May 1992, because of financial concerns, Petitioner sold its Riviera Beach location. Since Petitioner had no full-time salesperson for its Ft. Pierce location, Petitioner's former branch manager, who had remained with the new Riviera Beach owners, agreed to continue to sell trucks for it. This arrangement continued for approximately two or three months before Petitioner's former branch manager severed his salesperson relationship. Petitioner was without a salesperson. The absence of a salesperson continued to plague Petitioner, which affected its sales and in return, its finances. In or around late August 1992, Intervenor's district sales manager who had been working with Petitioner during each of the yearly contractual periods, initiated the subject of Petitioner resigning its dealership. They engaged in several discussions on the subject of resignation; however, during those discussions, the subject of Intervenor terminating the dealership franchise came up. On or about August 31, 1992, Intervenor's district sales manager prepared a letter of resignation for Dowdy's signature. Even though the resignation letter was dated August 31, 1992, it was not presented to Dowdy for his signature until September 11, 1992, when the manager visited Petitioner in Ft. Pierce. On September 11, 1992, Dowdy reviewed the resignation letter, and after discussing it with the sales manager, he signed the letter and had it witnessed. That same day, Intervenor's district sales manager notified Intervenor's manager of dealer operations, who was located at its home office in New Jersey, of the resignation letter being signed, and when he returned to his office in Orlando, the district sales manager gave the resignation to the Regional Vice-President. Prior to signing the resignation letter, on or about September 3, 1992, Petitioner, with Intervenor's assistance, transferred two of its trucks to another dealer in Broward County. On September 15, 1992, Petitioner, by fax transmission, submitted its tool inventory to Intervenor, and shortly thereafter, Intervenor repurchased the tools from Petitioner. In a letter dated September 14, 1992, Intervenor notified Dowdy that it had accepted his "voluntary resignation" of the dealership, and included a proviso that the effective date of the franchise termination was October 11, 1992, 30 days from the date of resignation. The letter was mailed from Intervenor's home office in New Jersey. The Interim Dealer Agreement provides that any notice to be given under the agreement may be delivered, as it pertains to the case at hand, to the party of the agreement if a sole proprietor, to an officer of the party if a corporation, or may be given by sending the notice by registered mail or tested telex addressed to the principal office of the interim dealer or to Intervenor's principal office. It provides further that notice given as indicated is considered given when delivered or mailed. Intervenor's Dealer Sales and Service Agreement Standard Provisions (Standard Provisions) was incorporated by reference and made a part of the Interim Dealer Agreement. Section X.A. of the Standard Provisions provides that a dealer may terminate the agreement upon 30 days prior written notice to Intervenor. Further, Section X.C. provides that the date of the notice of termination is the date of mailing. Shortly after signing the letter of resignation, individuals wishing to invest in Petitioner's truck dealership contacted Dowdy. After receiving positive assurances from the investors, Dowdy attempted to rescind the resignation. He forwarded a witnessed letter dated September 18, 1992, to Intervenor by fax transmission requesting that his "voluntary resignation be abated." At that time, he had not received Intervenor's letter of September 14, 1992. By certified letter dated October 2, 1992, Intervenor notified the State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) of Petitioner's "voluntary resignation" of its dealership. In response to Dowdy's letter of September 18, 1992, by letter dated October 9, 1992, Intervenor refused to abate Petitioner's resignation and treated his letter of September 18, 1992, as an application for a new franchise. Intervenor indicated in its response that it was not interested in a new franchise. On October 21, 1992, Dowdy sent a letter by fax transmission to Intervenor's CEO regarding the resignation letter and his (Dowdy's) plan to reorganize the dealership. The CEO contacted Dowdy the same day by telephone and discussed the low and decreasing market for truck sales in the Ft. Pierce area and whether Dowdy had been coerced or forced to sign the letter of resignation. Responding to the inquiry of coercion or being forced, Dowdy responded that he was neither coerced nor forced to sign the letter of resignation. Subsequently, however, in a letter dated October 28, 1992, Dowdy informed Intervenor's CEO, among other things, that Intervenor terminated the dealership and that he was requesting a hearing before the DHSMV for unfair cancellation. By letter dated October 28, 1992, Dowdy requested such a hearing from DHSMV. By letter dated November 9, 1992, Dowdy informed the DHSMV that, among other things, he had signed the "voluntary resignation" prepared by Intervenor, but later changed his mind and requested Intervenor to cancel the "voluntary resignation" on September 18, 1992. By certified letter, dated November 12, 1992, the DHSMV notified Dowdy that its determination was that he lacked standing to protest a termination and that he had 21 days from the service of that letter to request a formal hearing. Dowdy received the DHSMV's letter on November 18, 1992. On December 9, 1992, Dowdy forwarded a letter, bearing the same date, by Federal Express to the DHSMV requesting a formal hearing, which was received by the DHSMV on December 10, 1992.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order denying Florida Diesel Truck and Industrial, Inc.'s, request for an unfair cancellation hearing in that it lacks standing for such a request. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of March 1994. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March 1994.
Findings Of Fact Lamar submitted a permit application for a location 120 feet west of Hickory Avenue, in Bay County, Florida, on the south side of U.S. 98, on November 25, 1985, and resubmitted that application on December 16, 1985. On January 8, 1986, DOT denied the application solely because of spacing conflicts with permit Nos. AD089-10 and AD090-10 held by Headrick. That denial was made in a Memorandum of Returned Application. The Memorandum of Returned Application contained the following statement: PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT IF YOU BELIEVE YOUR APPLICATION HAS BEEN INAPPROPRIATELY DENIED, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REQUEST AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING UNDER SECTION 120.57, FLORIDA STATUTES, WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE. THE SUBMITTED HEARING REQUEST SHALL GIVE A BRIEF STATEMENT SETTING FORTH THE REASON(S) FOR REVIEW. SUCH HEARING REQUEST MUST BE FURNISHED TO: THE CLERK OF AGENCY PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 605 SUWANNEE STREET, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 Lamar requested an administrative hearing by letter dated March 13, 1986. On March 12, 1986, Headrick applied for a permit for a sign to be located on the south side of U.S. 98, 285 east of Hickory Avenue, in Bay County, Florida. By letter dated March 31, 1986, the Headrick application was returned unapproved because of a pending administrative hearing requested by Lamar concerning the location of permits AD089-10 and AD090-10. This letter did not advise Headrick of its rights to an administrative hearing. Headrick did not request a hearing for these applications. Lamar applied for a permit for a sign location on the south side of U.S. 98, 120 feet west of Hickory Avenue, in Bay County, Florida, again on March 13, 1986. A Memorandum of Returned Application, dated April 3, 1986, was sent to Lamar, denying the application because of a spacing conflict with Permits AD089-10 and AD090-10 located 100 feet westerly of Hickory Avenue on the eastbound (south) side of U.S. 98. This Memorandum contained the same language as that set forth above and, by letter dated April 18, 1986, Lamar requested an administrative hearing. This request resulted in Case No. 86-1707T herein. Another case, with DOT as Petitioner, Headrick as Respondent, and Lamar as Intervenor, Case No. 85-4165T, resulted in a Final Order dated September 2, 1986, revoking Permits AD089-10 and AD090-10. The Final Order was based upon findings that Headrick was advised on August 9, 1985, by the property owner, that the property was being sold and that Headrick had thirty (30) days to remove its sign. Further, by letter dated October 17, 1985, the property owner advised DOT that Headrick no longer had a valid lease for the signs and the signs had been removed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the December 16, 1985, application filed by Lamar Advertising company for a location on the south side of U.S 98, 120 feet west of Hickory Avenue, in Bay County, Florida, be GRANTED. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1043T The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Lamar Advertising Company Each of the following proposed findings are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(1); 3(2); 4(2); 5(2); 6(1); 7(3); 8(3); 9(1 and 3); and 10(4). Proposed finding of fact 11 is rejected as unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Transportation 1. Each of the following proposed findings are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(3); and 4(4). Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Intervenor, Headricks Outdoor Advertising 1. Each of the following proposed findings are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(2); 2(2); 3(2); 4(1); 5(1); and 6(4). COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara W. Palmer, Esquire Beggs & Lane 700 Blount Building Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576 Vernon L. Whittier, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William G. Warner, Esquire 565 Harrison Avenue Post Office Drawer 335 Panama City, Florida 32402 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwanne Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether the Outdoor Advertising Permits AG820-2 and AG821-2 issued to Respondent, Headrick Outdoor Advertising, (Headrick) should be revoked because Headrick no longer has the permission of the property owner to maintain the subject sign at that location. The Department of Transportation (DOT) presented the testimony of Jack Culpepper and Phillip N. Brown, together with four exhibits admitted into evidence. Headrick presented the testimony of James K. Baughman and had one exhibit admitted into evidence. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the parties agreed that their proposed orders would be filed ten (10) days following filing of the transcript. The transcript was filed on April 22, 1982. Both parties have failed to file proposed orders within ten days following filing of the transcript. Accordingly, this Recommended Order is entered without consideration of any proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law proposed by the parties.
Findings Of Fact Headrick Outdoor Advertising is the holder of permits AG820-2 and AG821-2 located on U.S. 29, three miles north of Alternate 90, in Escambia County, Florida. These permits were originally issued to Western Gate Sign Company in 1982. The permits were subsequently purchased by Headrick Outdoor Advertising. On November 20, 1985, DOT received a letter from Frances E. Hampton, the owner of the property on which the signs had been placed, indicating that the lease with Western Gate Sign Company was signed by an unauthorized person and that a subsequent lease dated October, 1984, had been entered into with Franklin Sign Company. Upon receipt of this letter, DOT wrote a letter to Headrick Outdoor Advertising, giving Headrick thirty days to show cause why its permits should not be revoked because they did not have the continuing permission of the owner. In response to that letter, Headrick requested this formal administrative hearing. Headrick did not present any evidence to DOT prior to this proceeding or in this proceeding which established any continuing permission of the owner. Headrick did introduce a document entitled Land Lease Agreement between Frances E. Hampton and Headrick to erect a sign in the subject location. However, this document contained no date and it therefore cannot be determined when the lease was entered into and the time periods covered by the lease. By Mr. Baughman's own admission, Headrick does not currently have permission of the landowner, having released the landowner from all leases during the pendency of this case. The lease agreement which Headrick introduced was admittedly not signed until some time in 1986.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that permits AG820-2 and AG821-2 be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 James K. Baughman, Sr. Headrick Outdoor, Inc. 808 Brainerd Street Pensacola, Florida 32503 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, based on conduct set forth hereinafter in detail, unlawfully withdrew and transferred monies from an escrow account and is therefore guilty of fraud, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, or breach of trust and conversion within the purview of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) At the final hearing, Petitioner called Donald Lloyd, Respondent, Donald Reda and Kenneth Viviano as its witnesses. Petitioner offered Exhibits 1 through 7 which were received into evidence. Respondent called no witnesses and offered Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 4 which were received into evidenced.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, posthearing memoranda and the entire record complied herein, I hereby make the following relevant findings of fact. By its administrative complaint filed herein on July 29, 1981, Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent as licensee and against his license as a real estate salesman. During times material herein, Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman and has been issued license No. 0188032. During times material herein, Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc., was a Florida licensed real estate corporate broker with its offices located at 3300 NE 33rd Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida corporate entity was licensed under that name on October 12, 1979. The predecessor entity was known as Lloyds' of Lauderdale, Inc., and had its escrow account at Gulfstream Bank H.A., formerly known as Gulfstream American Bank and Trust Company H.A., formerly known as American National Bank and Trust Company of Fort Lauderdale, which account number was 005-1-00160-3. Upon obtaining the change of name, i.e. Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc., the successor entity maintained the same escrow account number at the same bank and continued using the checks on that account bearing its former name, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc. During times material herein, Respondent was a salesman associated with Century 21 and was an authorized signatory on the above-referred escrow account. Respondent was also a stockholder, officer and director of Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc. Respondent was also the owner of an unrelated business known as Brewer's Care Center, which in turn operated a motel located in Georgia. During times material, Respondent owned a one-third (1/3) interest in Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc. On February 3, 1981, Respondent issued a check, No. 79-228, drawn on the Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc., escrow account, payable to Brewer's Care Center in the amount of $11,903.12. Approximately fifteen days later, on February 18, 1981, Respondent issued another check, No. 79-223, drawn on the above-referenced escrow account payable to Brewer's Care Center in the amount of $2,500. On March 3, 1981 Respondent verbally authorized the Gulfstream Bank to withdraw $399.66 from the referenced escrow account to pay interest on loan No. 59-004-00-058-3866-4. Also, on March 18, 1981 Respondent verbally authorized the withdrawal of $799.32 to be applied against the same loan. Neither of the above-referenced checks or verbal loan authorizations were, in any wise, connected with any real estate transactions from which monies were held in escrow by the Respondent. The verbal withdrawals and checks, either authorized or drawn by the Respondent, reduced the escrow account by a sum of approximately $15,602.10 and depleted the account to such an extent that Century 21, Lloyds of Lauderdale, Inc. was unable to meet demands for the return of the escrow funds held in trust (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1). Respondent took the position that the monies represented by the payments of the two checks made payable to Brewer's Care Center were repayments of loans and that he was unaware that the accounts which the checks were drawn against were, in fact, escrow accounts. In this regard, evidence reveals that the Respondent suffered a heart attack during November of 1980 and his health regressed to the degree that he was placed in the intensive care unit at a hospital in Cleveland, Ohio for an extended period of time. At the conclusion of the Petitioner's case in chief, Respondent's counsel filed an ore tenus motion to continue the subject hearing until the following day. The undersigned afforded Respondent's counsel an opportunity to submit, for the record, his basis for the continuance. However, that motion was denied based on the numerous continuances which had been previously granted by the undersigned to Respondent's counsel (See Order dated November 16, 1982 - Copy attached).
The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation properly denied Petitioner’s permit application for a proposed outdoor advertising sign to be erected adjacent to US 98, 0.817 miles west of State Road 87, in Santa Rosa County, Florida, pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 3, 1998, Lamar submitted an application for new sign permits for a proposed outdoor advertising sign along US Highway 98, 0.817 miles west of State Road 87 in Navarre, Santa Rosa County, Florida (new permits) to DOT. The new permits were to be located within 2000 feet of existing permitted signs for which Lamar already possessed permits (the existing permits). The existing permit numbers were AE682-6 and BL256-35. Santa Rosa County’s Land Development Code Section 8.07.00 provides that no off-premise advertising sign, such as involved here, can be located within 2000 feet of any other off-premise sign on the same side of the street right-of- way. Since Lamar's existing permitted sign and the proposed location of the new permitted sign was within 2000 feet of each other, Lamar wished to cancel the existing permits conditioned upon the approval of the new permits. The practice is known as conditional cancellation. Prior to and during 1998, DOT had an established non- rule policy of conditional cancellation for existing sign permits. Conditional cancellation could occur when applying for new permits that would potentially conflict with existing permits. An applicant could simultaneously submit a cancellation certification for the existing permits together with the application for new permits. The old permits would not be canceled until new permits were issued. The exact process for requesting a conditional cancellation was not shown to be uniform throughout the state. However, the policy of allowing conditional cancellations to be made by permittees was accepted statewide. The policy and process for conditional cancellation are now codified in Rule 14-10.004, Florida Administrative Code, after the application in this case had been processed. In this case and in conjunction with the submission of Lamar's new permit application, Lamar submitted a copy of the cancellation certification for its existing permitted signs to the regional District Three DOT office in Chipley, together with its application for the new permits. Simultaneously, on April 3, 1998, Lamar submitted the original cancellation certification to the central office of DOT. The instructions on the certification of cancellation require the cancellation form to be submitted to the Tallahassee office of DOT. Neither the cancellation form nor letter from Lamar indicated that the cancellation was conditional. There was no place on the form to make such an indication. Lamar had been following the above-filing practice when requesting conditional cancellation since 1995. Because of its practice Lamar believed that it had properly notified DOT that cancellation of its existing permits was conditioned upon approval of its application for new permits. Lamar never considered that one office of DOT might not know what occurred at another office of DOT or that one office of DOT might not communicate with another office of DOT. On the other hand, the regional office of DOT in Chipley only recognized that an applicant had requested a conditional cancellation of existing permits when the original and not a copy of the cancellation form was submitted with the application for new permits. Lamar was unaware of the distinction between the filing of an original cancellation form with its application and the filing of a copy of the cancellation form with its application. More importantly, this distinction was not a rule and does not appear to have been communicated to anyone save the officials at the Chipley office of DOT. Consequently, Lamar relied on its established practice when seeking a conditional cancellation. A practice that DOT had recognized on earlier conditional cancellations by Lamar. Lamar reasonably believed, based on its previous experience with the policy of conditional cancellation, that existing permits would not be cancelled until the new permits were granted. Shortly after the filing of Lamar’s application, District Three returned Lamar's permit application without action because it was incomplete. The application was not considered filed by DOT because it was incomplete and the entire application package, including the copy of the cancellation form was returned to Lamar. The application was not logged into the Department’s computer. The Chipley office, even though it knew the old permits were to be cancelled, did not notify the Tallahassee office of the return of Lamar’s application or the lack of approval of that application. On April 7, 1998, the Tallahassee office of DOT processed the cancellation form it had received from Lamar on the existing permits. The existing permits were cancelled and the cancellation was logged into the Department’s computer. Because the Department did not follow its policy of conditional cancellation on which Lamar had relied for a number of years and the Department had knowledge of Lamar’s application for new permits which clearly conflicted with the cancelled permits, the existing permits should not have been cancelled and should have remained in effect since the application had not been approved by DOT. The fact that the knowledge resided in different offices of DOT is irrelevant. On April 10, 1998, Bill Salter Advertising (Salter) submitted an application for sign permits. The proposed sign would be located 0.36 miles west of State Road 87 on the same side of US 98 as the existing permit location for Lamar. The Salter permits would be within 2000 feet of Lamar’s existing permits and not be approved by DOT if the existing Lamar permits were still in effect. On May 6, 1998, Lamar resubmitted its complete application for the new permits. Upon inspection of the site for Lamar’s new permits, it was discovered that a spacing conflict existed with the Bill Salter application site. On May 10, 1998, DOT tentatively denied Salter’s application for incorrect information on the sketch of the site it had submitted with its application. On May 28, 1998, Salter amended its application with a corrected site sketch. By letter dated June 5, 1998 the Department advised Lamar that its application would be held pending resolution of the prior application filed by Salter. On June 26, 1998, DOT granted Salter’s application. On July 6, 1998, permits BU595-55 and BU596-55 were issued to Salter. On August 26, 1998, DOT denied Lamar’s applications. The denial was based on Section 479.15, Florida Statutes, which prohibits DOT from granting a permit which would conflict with a county ordinance such as the Santa Rosa County Land Development Code sign spacing requirements. No other basis for denial of the subject permits exists.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation reinstate the Lamar Advertising Company’s existing permits AE682-6 and BL256-35. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: G. R. Mead, II, Esquire Clark, Partington, Hart, Larry Bond, Stackhouse & Stone 125 West Romana Street, Suite 800 Pensacola, Florida 32591-3010 Sheauching Yu, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
