The Issue Whether or not Petitioner (complainant) is entitled to recover $10,134.72 or any part thereof against Respondents dealer and surety company.
Findings Of Fact This cause is governed by the four corners of the November 2, 1993 complaint. It involves only two loads out of twenty loads of potatoes. Petitioners are growers of potatoes and qualify as "producers" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondent A.F. Business Brokerage is a broker-shipper of potatoes and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. A.F. Business Brokerage, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of brokering (purchasing and re-selling) potatoes and operates under one or more of the following names: A.F. Business Brokerage, Inc., Washburn Corp., and/or Ben Albert Farms. The contract at issue herein listed the name of the broker as "Albert Farms d/b/a Washburn Corporation." Payments made by the Respondent broker to Petitioner for potatoes received under the terms of the contract were in the form of checks drawn on the account of A.F. Business Brokerage, Inc. For purposes of this litigation, "Albert Farms d/b/a Washburn Corporation," and "A.F. Business Brokerage, Inc." will be considered as describing the same party. Although Titan Indemnity Company received notice of the filing of Petitioner's Complaint and failed to request a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S., no evidence or admission was presented at formal hearing which would permit a finding that Titan Indemnity Company was surety for Respondent A.F. Business Brokerage at all times material. That is not to say that Titan Indemnity is found not to be the surety for Respondent A.F. Business Brokerage. The foregoing finding only means that this case in the administrative forum cannot resolve the issue of indemnity as between Respondents because insufficient evidence on that issue has been presented, and it may be necessary for that issue to be litigated in Circuit Court pursuant to the surety contract/bond, if any. On or about December 28, 1992, Petitioner and Respondent broker confirmed in writing the terms of a telephoned agreement, whereby Petitioner agreed to sell and the broker agreed to purchase twenty truckloads of potatoes. The agreement/contract, prepared by Respondent broker was titled "Standard Confirmation of Sale". It specified in pertinent parts: "Unless the seller or buyer makes immediate objection upon receipt of his copy of this Standard Confirmation of Sale, showing that contract was made contrary to authority given the Broker, he shall be conclusively presumed to agree that the terms of sale as set forth herein are fully and correctly stated. Sale made (F.O.B. or Delivered): F.O.B. Special Agreement, if any: Potatoes shipped are for potato chipping and must cook on arrival to be subject to this agreement. This confirmation is issued and accepted in agreement with, and subject to the rules and regulations and definitions of terms as recognized and approved by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture under the Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act. *4 Truckloads chipping potatoes, April $7.75 FOB 16 Truckloads chipping potatoes, May, June $7.00 FOB *Loads not shipped by seller in April apply to May, June portions of agreement." (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Under Section 672.319 F.S., The Uniform Commercial Code, the abbreviation "F.O.B." means "free on board" and is interpreted differently, dependent upon what words follow the abbreviation. Regardless of what words follow the abbreviation, the term "F.O.B." places shipping responsibility and shipping costs upon a "seller" as opposed to the one accepting delivery, the ultimate buyer. Testimony and arguments by the parties at formal hearing and in their respective proposals suggest that if "F.O.B." had been used by itself, in place of the word "delivered," and without more, the contract would have signified that sale herein occurred at the time of pickup in the field by the broker/shipper, and that title to the produce would have transferred from the producer to the broker/shipper at that point in time as opposed to title transferring at the time the broker/shipper delivered the produce to its ultimate destination. However, here, the Respondent broker elected the term "F.O.B." and rejected the term "Delivered," and also added the requirement that the potatoes cook to chips at their destination. Petitioner made potatoes available for pick up by the broker at Petitioner's fields beginning in May, 1993 in accord with the contract and the price specified therein. Without incident, the broker picked up and accepted the first eighteen loads of potatoes which it had agreed to purchase. All arrangements for shipment of the potatoes at issue were controlled and paid for by the Respondent broker. These arrangements made and controlled by the Respondent broker included the method of transportation, the exact date when the potatoes would be picked-up from Petitioner's fields, the place to which the potatoes ultimately would be transported, and the time during which the potatoes would remain "in transit". This unilateral control by the broker suggests that the parties were treating the potatoes as if title thereto had passed to Respondent broker when it picked them up in Petitioner's field and clearly shows that the broker had control over what condition the potatoes were in when they reached the retailer at their ultimate destination. As of the time Petitioner began to honor the contract by making potatoes available for pick up by the broker, Petitioner could have sold potatoes on the "open market" for $25.00 per hundred-weight instead of the $7.00 per hundred-weight called for under the terms of the contract. Nonetheless, Petitioner honored its contract with Respondent broker by making potatoes available to the Respondent broker and by reserving a sufficient amount of Petitioner's crop so as to fulfill the entire contract with Respondent broker. As of the time the Respondent broker made arrangements for pick up of the last two loads of potatoes, potatoes on the open market were selling for $1.75 per hundred-weight, meaning that the broker was paying Petitioner more for potatoes under the terms of their contract than the broker would have had to pay to purchase similar potatoes on the "open market". Respondent broker contacted Petitioner immediately prior to June 17, 1993 and asked that Petitioner cancel the contract between them because of the reduced price potatoes were yielding on the open market. Petitioner rejected the proposal. This strongly suggests that the Respondent broker felt bound by the contract to pay Petitioner at the rate agreed under the contract regardless of what rate the broker sold the potatoes for upon delivery and also suggests that the parties were treating the potatoes as if title to the potatoes passed to the Respondent broker when the broker picked up the potatoes in Petitioner's field. The date selected by the Respondent broker for pick up of the last two loads of potatoes was unusual. The broker picked up the last two loads of potatoes on Thursday, June 17, 1993. However, the Respondent broker's standard practice was not to pick up potatoes in St. Johns County, Florida on Thursdays because of the increased risk that potatoes loaded in the fields on Thursdays would reach the ultimate retail destination assigned by this particular broker at a time when processing plants in that locale would be closed for the weekend, thereby increasing the time the loaded potatoes would remain enclosed in the transport truck and accordingly increasing the risk of spoilage. The method of transport selected by the Respondent broker for the potatoes loaded June 17, 1993 was also unusual and destined to increase the risk of spoilage. On that occasion, the broker sent "pigs" a/k/a "piggy-back rail cars" rather than conventional trucks or refrigerated trucks. On June 17, 1993, Petitioner also loaded two trucks for H.C. Schmieding Produce, a broker not involved in this litigation. Petitioner's potatoes loaded upon Schmieding's trucks and the potatoes loaded on Respondent broker's trucks came from the same fields and "lot" of potatoes. One of Schmieding's trucks was loaded before Respondent broker's trucks, and one of Schmieding's trucks was loaded after Respondent broker's trucks. The potatoes purchased and loaded by Schmieding on June 17, 1993 were received in good condition in Illinois and Tennessee, respectively, and Petitioner received full payment for them. Respondent broker's loads were ultimately refused in Massachusetts. June 21-23, 1993 were all weekdays, and presumably "work days." The best date that can be reconstructed for the date that the potatoes in question were dumped by the Respondent broker is June 22 or 23, 1993, so their "arrival" in Massachusetts must have preceded dumping. By undated letter postmarked June 28, 1994, the Respondent broker notified Petitioner of the rejection of the two loads of potatoes picked up by the Respondent broker from Petitioner on June 17, 1993. The letter also informed Petitioner of the broker's intent to assess charges for inspection and dumping of the potatoes and of the broker's intention not to pay Petitioner for the potatoes. This letter was the first notice received by Petitioner advising of the rejection of the two loads of potatoes in question, 1/ and contained a copy of a U. S. Department of Agriculture Inspection Report dated June 22, 1993 showing 60-100 percent soft rot. 2/ Petitioner's principal had left his home and place of business on June 24, 1993, a date clearly 24 to 48 hours after dumping had already occurred and probably much longer after arrival of the potatoes in Massachusetts. Petitioner did not learn of the Respondent broker's June 28, 1993 letter or the Inspection until July 4, 1993. By July 4, 1993 Petitioner had terminated all harvest operations and was not able to tender two replacement loads of potatoes to the broker. As of the time that Petitioner received the June 28, 1994 notice that the two loads in question were being rejected, the Respondent broker had already disposed of the potatoes. Consequently, Petitioner had no opportunity to avail itself of any alternative or other option regarding disposition of the potatoes. Prompt notification of the broker's rejection of the two loads of potatoes might have allowed Petitioner to negate its losses by marketing the potatoes at a reduced price to other processing plants in Massachusetts or to tender two replacement loads of potatoes to the Respondent broker. After all deductions and calculations, the rejected two loads of potatoes resulted in damages of $10,135.47 to Petitioner producer.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Agriculture enter a final order that: Awards Petitioners $10,134.42 and binds A.F. Business Brokerage Inc. d/b/a Albert Farms d/b/a Washburn Corporation to pay the full amount to Petitioner. Sets out any administrative recourse Petitioner or Respondent broker may have against Titan Indeminity Co. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of July, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1994.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners own and operate a farm in St. Johns County, Florida. During the 1991 potato-growing season, they grew atlantic chipping potatoes on their 400-acre farm, as well as on approximately 30 acres leased from another party by their daughter and son-in-law. The Petitioners' business is known as Pacetti Farms. Rubin is an Illinois corporation licensed to do business in Florida as a broker or dealer in agricultural products. Rubin customarily purchases potatoes from growers throughout the country at the appropriate season for resale, typically to various potato chip manufacturing companies. Mr. Rubin appeared at the hearing and testified on behalf of Rubin and as an adverse witness on behalf of the Petitioners. Rubin is licensed and bonded with a surety bond from Continental in accordance with the statutory authority cited below, enforced and regulated by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("Department"). On December 22, 1990, the Petitioners and Rubin entered into a written contract for the sale and purchase of 50,000 CWT of Florida atlantic chipping potatoes. That contract is in evidence as Exhibit 3 and is also known as the "set price contract". The contract called for shipment of the potatoes at a stated price of $6.35 per CWT, although the parties have stipulated and agreed that the actual contract price was intended as $6.00 per CWT. That figure is not in dispute in this proceeding. Shipment was to be made during the harvesting season between the dates of April 27, 1991 and June 15, 1991. The contract contained an escape clause or exception for "acts of God", with an explanatory parenthetic clause indicating that that was intended to mean circumstances beyond the control of the parties, such as flood, freeze, hail, etc. On or about February 15, 1991, severe cold weather struck the potato- growing area of St. Johns County, Florida. Temperatures ranged from 25 degrees to 19 degrees on that day, with a high wind blowing and very dry conditions. This resulted in soil being blown away from the newly-set potatoes under very cold temperatures. Because of this, the Petitioners had to work with tractors and cultivators far into the night to turn the blown-away soil back into the potato "sets". The Petitioners feared that this would cause some "dry eyes" and, therefore, lowered potato plant and potato production. In fact, however, upon observing the maturing plants during April of 1991, it appeared that the Petitioners would have a healthy, normal crop. The prior year the Petitioners had grown 133,000 CWT of potatoes on their 400 acres (excluding the Kirkers' 30 acres). With this background of an apparently-healthy crop in mind, the Petitioners were approached by Rubin on April 25, 1991 and negotiations ensued which resulted in the sale and purchase from Petitioners to Rubin of six additional loads of potatoes at the open market price of $19.50 per CWT. The six additional loads were in addition to the 50,000 CWT of potatoes agreed upon in the main contract entered into on December 22, 1990. This separate oral agreement for the six loads of potatoes at the market price of $19.50 per CWT was entered into prior to the Petitioners initiating delivery under the terms of the written contract of December 22, 1990. The parties thus agreed for the sale and purchase of six loads of potatoes at that market price to be delivered on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday of the following week, April 29th, April 30th, and May 1, 1991. Part of the consideration for that oral contract was the Petitioners' ability to furnish the six truckloads of potatoes on short notice, on the dates that Rubin required them. In other words, Rubin needed them in a hurry; and it was apparently worth $19.50 per CWT for him to get the potatoes delivered immediately on the dates requested. In the process of negotiating this oral contract, the Petitioners assured Rubin that he would have sufficient potatoes to meet his 50,000 CWT obligation under the written contract of December 22, 1990. This was not a misrepresentation on the part of the Petitioners, at this time, because the Petitioners, in good faith, believed they would be able to meet the 50,000 CWT set price contract and the oral contract for six additional truckloads, because of their belief concerning their crop estimate. This belief was based upon their observance of an apparently healthy crop and their knowledge that on their 400 acres, the year before, they had grown 133,000 CWT, as well as upon their knowledge that a normal crop estimate for the entire 430 acres at this location, under all of the prevailing circumstances, was 120,400 CWT. In fact, the Petitioners only contracted for 116,650 CWT of potatoes which, based upon a reasonable and appropriate crop estimate for this site and circumstances, would have allowed them to meet all their contracts, including the 50,000 CWT contract between the Petitioners and Rubin, although not all of the market sales for the Kirkers. After having thus assured Mr. Rubin that they could meet the contract of December 22, 1990 and still perform the oral contract for the six truckloads at market price, the Petitioners proceeded to carry out that oral agreement. It was a separate and distinct contract from the written contract dated December 22, 1990. Under the separate oral contract, they delivered the six truckloads of potatoes requested by Rubin. Rubin received them and paid $19.50 per CWT for them. On May 2, 1990, the Petitioners began delivering potatoes to Rubin under the terms and conditions of the written contract of December 22, 1990 and continued the deliveries throughout the remainder of the harvesting season. The first was shipped from Pacetti Farms on May 2, 1991 and the last load delivered to Rubin on that contract was shipped on June 1, 1991. During the 1991 growing and harvesting season, the area, including St. Johns County, experienced substantial crop damage due to excessive frost, rain, hail, and wind, which occurred during February of 1991 and then after April 25, 1991, with particular regard to excessive rainfall in May of 1991. This resulted in the area being declared an agricultural disaster area by the United States Department of Agriculture for that growing season. The Petitioners suffered damage to their crop as a result of these elements in February of 1991, as described above, and by excessive rainfall during May of 1991. Excessive rainfall caused root damage to their crop, which resulted in a lowered yield even though the plants viewed above ground appeared to be normal. This was aggravated by the fact that the Petitioners and other growers were legally unable to use the pesticide "Temik", for control of nematodes, during that growing season. Because of the nature of the crop involved, which grows underground, the potato yield is difficult to estimate at any given point in harvesting. The exact nature and extent of damage caused by weather conditions to a single crop is hard to estimate in advance. This difficulty is further compounded by differing soil types and climate conditions present within a particular growing area, especially with regard to farmers such as the Petitioners, who have their crops spread over multiple fields and farms. In mid-May of 1991, the Petitioners realized that there would be a crop shortage. The crop was damaged due to the weather-related factors mentioned above. The Petitioners notified Rubin that they expected their potato crop to fall short of expectations and that they would probably be unable to completely fill the contract with Rubin for the entire 50,000 CWT contracted for on December 22, 1990. In the meantime, before the 1991 planting season began, the Petitioners and Renee and Keith Kirker had entered into an agreement, whereby the Kirkers initiated their own farming operation on 30 acres of potato-growing land. The Kirkers leased that acreage from Diane Ross and received operating assistance from the Petitioners in the form of advances of all their operating costs, pursuant to an agreement between the Petitioners and the Kirkers, whereby the Petitioners would be repaid the estimated production costs for that 30-acre crop in the amount of $1,776.85 per acre, upon the sale of those 30 acres of potatoes. Potatoes are planted and harvested in the same sequence. Since the Petitioners assisted the Kirkers in planting their potatoes prior to the planting and completion of their own fields, the Petitioners borrowed some of the Kirkers' potatoes to fill their own contracts because those potatoes matured earlier, with the understanding that the Kirkers would be repaid in kind from the Petitioners' own fields during the remainder of the harvesting season. This is a common practice according to Ronald Brown, who testified for the Petitioners as an expert witness on farming practices. However, after the heavy rains in May of 1991, the Petitioners discovered that it would be necessary, in their view, to retain a portion of their last acreage in order to have potatoes to pay back the Kirkers for the potatoes borrowed. These potatoes would be sold by the Petitioners at market price, as agreed with the Kirkers. Upon discovering that their crop would not meet their contract obligations, the Petitioners attempted to prorate their remaining potatoes between their remaining contract customers in what they considered a fair and reasonable manner. On behalf of the Kirkers, the potatoes allocated for repayment to them were offered to Rubin, who, through its President, Mr. Rubin, declined to purchase them at the market price at which they were offered (higher than the contract price). The Petitioners' expert, Ronald Brown, established that, based upon accepted growers practices and his experience in the Hastings area, the Petitioners should have anticipated the yield for their 1991 crop at no more than 280 CWT per acre for the Petitioners' 430 acres (30 acres of which was the Kirkers' land). It is customary farming practice in the area, according to Brown, to enter into contracts for no more than 80% of the maximum anticipated yield of potatoes. The anticipated yield on the entire 430 acres of the Petitioners' and the Kirkers' land was, therefore, 120,400 CWT of potatoes. The principle of contracting no more than 80% of a maximum anticipated yield is designed to protect contracting parties in the event a smaller than anticipated yield occurs. A 280 CWT per acre yield is the generally-accepted yield amount under good growing conditions, according to Mr. Brown. The year before, the Petitioners had produced a total yield of 133,000 CWT on only 400 acres. The Petitioners entered into a total of six separate contracts for delivery of a total of 116,650 CWT of potatoes out of a reasonably anticipated maximum yield for the 430 acres of only 120,400 CWT. Thus, the Petitioners contracted 97% of the customary, accepted, anticipated maximum yield for the 430 acres for 1991. Thirty (30) of those acres, however, represent the potatoes which the Petitioners were obligated to the Kirkers to sell on their behalf at market price, rather than contract price. In spite of the fact that the Petitioners contracted 97% of the accepted, projected crop yield for 430 acres, the Petitioners, in fact, produced 117,000 CWT (approximate) on those 430 acres. Therefore, had they not diverted a certain amount of the crop to open market sales, they could have met their 116,650 CWT contractual obligations to the six contracting parties, including Rubin. It is also true, however, that that 117,000 CWT actual yield included the 30 acres of potatoes which the Petitioners were separately obligated to sell at open market price to repay the Kirkers. Notwithstanding the fact that the Petitioners had contracted 97% of the commonly-accepted, projected maximum yield, the Petitioners diverted 10,301.6 CWT of the 1991 crop on the entire 430 acres from contract sales to open market sales at much higher prices. Of those open market sales, 2,789.5 CWT were sold at market price after the last contract sales were made to Rubin. Had the Petitioners sold the entire 10,301.6 CWT of potatoes on contract, instead of at open market, all of the Petitioners' contractual requirements could have been met, including the contract with Rubin, although they would not then have been able to meet their obligations to the Kirkers. Based upon the above Findings of Fact supported by competent evidence, it is found that the preponderant evidence in this case does not support the Petitioners' contention that the Petitioners were unable to fulfill their contract obligation to Rubin due to an act of God. Although it is true that the Petitioners established that poor weather conditions, coupled with the absence of the ability to use the pesticide "Temik", had a deleterious effect on their crop production. The record shows that in spite of this, the Petitioners had the ability to fulfill their contract with Rubin if only approximately 5,000 CWT of the 10,301.6 CWT of potatoes sold on the open market had instead been allocated to the Petitioners' contract with Rubin to fill out the difference between the approximately 45,000 CWT honored under the contract and the contractual obligation to supply 50,000 CWT. The Petitioners produced on their own 400 acres 108,000 CWT. The remainder of the 117,582.5 CWT of potatoes from the total crop represented the potatoes grown on the Kirkers' 30 acres. Thus, the Kirkers' land produced approximately 8,600 CWT. The Petitioners supplied approximately 3,000 CWT under the separate, oral contract at market price and which were delivered to Rubin on April 29th, 30th, and May 1st (six loads at approximately 500 CWT per load). Then, the Petitioners sold the remainder of the total of 10,301.6 CWT of the entire Pacetti/Kirker crop or approximately 7,301.6 CWT on open market sales to others. The remainder of the 108,000 CWT grown on the Petitioners' own 400 acres, not sold to Rubin under the contract of December 22, 1990 or under the oral contract of April 25, 1991 (the six loads at market), were contracted out to other buyers. The ultimate effect of these contracts was that the Petitioners had contracted for 116,650 CWT. Thus, the Petitioners had imprudently contracted approximately 97% of the accepted, projected crop yield of 120,400 CWT, knowing that they were obligated to sell the Kirkers 8,600 or so CWT at market price and not on contract. Thus, the Petitioners clearly over- contracted the crop yield which they reasonably should have expected on the total 430 acres under the generally-accepted method of calculation of crop yield, under good growing conditions, of 280 CWT per acre, established by expert witness, Brown. This over-contracting practice, together with selling an excess amount of potatoes at market price (over and above those sold at market by the separate, oral contract with Rubin at the initial part of the harvesting season), is what actually prevented the Petitioners from fulfilling Rubin's contract of 50,000 CWT, rather than an act of God, predetermined condition for claiming impossibility of performance on that contract due to the above- described weather conditions. Even though the Petitioners were obligated to sell the Kirkers' entire 30 acres of yield, approximately 8,600 CWT, at market price, the Petitioners would still have had enough potatoes, even with their less-than-expected yield of 108,000 CWT represented by their own 400 acres, to have filled out the Rubin contract if they had not contracted out so many potatoes to other contracting buyers and had not sold as many potatoes at market price off contract as, indeed, they sold. Since the act of God condition is not what prevented the Petitioners from filling the written contract with Rubin for 50,000 CWT, it is clear that the Petitioners thus breached that contract. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the written contract with Rubin was entered into before any of the other contracts for the potato crop in question. The two contracts with Rubin are, however, separate contracts. The Petitioners established that there was a separate oral agreement entered into on April 25th between the Petitioners and Rubin and that the consideration flowing from the Petitioners to Mr. Rubin was that he needed the six loads of potatoes on short notice delivered on specific dates, April 29th, 30th, and May 1st, for which he was willing, therefore, to pay the $19.50 market price, knowing that it was for other potatoes that he contracted at $6.00. The Petitioners performed by providing the loads of potatoes when he wanted them and he paid for them in full. Thus, that contract was executed by consideration passing from each party to the other, and the contract was completed. The written contract with Rubin dated December 22, 1990 for the 50,000 CWT was the contract which the Petitioners breached for the above-found reasons. Rubin would, therefore, be entitled to damages for that breach based upon the facts proven in this case. There is no counterclaim or other action pending in this forum by Rubin against the Petitioners, however. Consequently, any damages proven by the breach of the written contract can only, at best, be applied against the amount due and owing the Petitioners for the billed, but unpaid, loads; that is, against the amount in controversy of $40,015.20. Rubin, however, has not produced any evidence to show what his damages might be. The record establishes, as found above, that, of the 48,361 CWT of potatoes delivered to Rubin, approximately 3,000 of which were delivered under the separate oral contract for six loads, Rubin only received approximately 45,000 CWT under the 50,000 CWT written contract. Thus, Rubin would appear to be entitled to damages caused by failing to get the last approximately 5,000 CWT of potatoes. The record, however, does not establish what those damages might be because it is not established whether Rubin had to purchase potatoes from another source at a higher price to meet the remainder of the 50,000 CWT amount, or, conversely, whether Rubin was able to purchase them from another source at a lower price than the $6.00 per CWT contract price, so that Rubin would actually benefit by the Petitioners' breach of that contract. Neither does the record reflect another possible scenario whereby Rubin might have simply accepted the approximate 5,000 CWT shortage and simply lost customers and potential profits represented by that amount of potatoes, or, finally, whether he simply did not purchase the shortage of 5,000 CWT from another source and had no missed sales for that amount of potatoes anyway and, therefore, no loss and no damage. The record simply does not reflect what Rubin's damages might have been because of the shortage under the written contract deliveries. In any event, the record evidence establishes that the oral contract was fully performed, with consideration flowing to each of the parties and that those potatoes were fully paid for at the market price. Then, the Petitioners delivered the written contract loads at $6.00 per CWT to Rubin represented by the claimed $40,015.00. That remains unpaid by Rubin. Rubin is obligated to pay that amount because Rubin was obligated to, and received those potatoes at the $6.00 contract price. Rubin would then appear to be entitled to claim damages if, indeed, any were suffered, for the breach of that written contract by the Petitioners' failure to supply the last (approximate) 5,000 CWT due Rubin under that contract. That resolution of their dispute, however, cannot be performed in this forum because of insufficient evidence, as delineated above, and remains to be resolved by another action by Rubin in another forum.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Respondents, Jack Rubin & Son, Inc. and Continental Casualty Co., Inc. be found jointly and severally liable for payment of $40,015.20 to the Petitioners for potatoes delivered to the Respondent, Jack Rubin & Son, Inc., for which payment has not yet been made. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-548A Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact 1-16. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter because the evidence establishes that 30 acres of potatoes belonged to the Kirkers even though Pacetti Farms was responsible for all operations with regard to planting and harvesting those 30 acres, furnishing costs, operational expertise, equipment and labor as an advance against the Kirkers' crop sale. 2-5. Accepted, except that it is not found that the entire 430 acres of potatoes were the Petitioners' potatoes. 30 acres of potatoes belonged to the Kirkers. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence, to the extent that the 97% of the accepted projected crop yield contracted for by the Petitioners represents an inclusion of the 30 acres of the Kirkers' potatoes in that percentage of crop yield projection. This is erroneous because the 30 acres were the Kirkers' potatoes which the Petitioners were handling for them. Accepted in concept, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esq. General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 John Michael Traynor, Esquire Charles E. Pellicer, Esquire 28 Cordova Street St. Augustine, Florida 32084 C. Holt Smith, III, Esquire 3100 University Boulevard So. Suite 101 Jacksonville, FL 32016
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner, Carl Hiers was a "producer" of agricultural products in the state Of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc. (Nichols) was a licensed "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, issued license number 1547 by the Department, and bonded by U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (Fidelity) for the sum of $50,000.00, bond number 790103-10-115-88-1, with an effective date of March 22, 1988 and a termination date of March 22, 1989. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Nichols was authorized to do business in the state of Florida. Prior to Petitioner selling or delivering any watermelons (melons) to Nichols, Petitioner and Nichols agreed verbally that: (a) Petitioner would sell Nichols melons on a per pound basis at a price to be quoted by Nichols on the day of shipment; (b) Petitioner would harvest and load the melons on a truck furnished by Nichols; (c) a weight ticket with the weight of the truck before and after loading would be furnished to Petitioner; (d) Nichols or its agent in the field would have the authority to reject melons at the place of shipment (loading) which did not meet the quality or grade contracted for by Nichols; (e) the melons were to be of U.S. No. 1 grade and; (f) settlement was to be made within a reasonable time after shipment. Although Nichols assisted Petitioner in obtaining the crew to harvest and load the melons, Petitioner had authority over the crew and was responsible for paying the crew. On a daily basis, L.L. Hiers would contact Nichols and obtain the price being paid for melons that day. The price was marked in the field book with the net weight of each load shipped that day. Nichols contends that the price quoted each day was the general price melons were bringing on the market that day but the price to be paid to the Petitioner was the price Nichols received for the melons at their destination minus a 1 cent per pound commission for Nichols, taking into consideration freight, if any. Nichols was not acting as Petitioner's agent in the sale of the melons for the account of the Petitioner on a net return basis nor was Nichols acting as a negotiating broker between the Petitioner and the buyer. Nichols did not make the type of accounting to Petitioner as required by Section 604.22, Florida Statutes, had Nichols been Petitioner's agent. The prices quoted by Nichols to L.L. Hiers each day was the agreed upon price to be paid for melons shipped that day subject to any adjustment for failure of the melons to meet the quality or grade contracted for by Nichols. On June 24 and 25, 1988, L.L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped on June 24 and 25, 1988 was 4.5 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the net weight of each load of melons shipped on June 24 and 25, 1988. There were 2 loads of melons shipped on June 24, 1988 and 3 loads of melons shipped on June 25,1988 that are in dispute. They are as follows: load nos. 11252, and 11255 weighing 23,530 and 49,450 pounds respectively shipped on June 24, 1988, for which Nichols paid 2 cents per pound and; load nos. 11291, 11292 and 11294, weighing 43,000, 47,070 and 47,150 pounds respectively, shipped on June 25, 1988, for which Nichols paid 4 cents per pound. The total amount in dispute for these 6 loads is $2,510.60. Nichols contends that the 2 loads of melons shipped on June 24, 1988, were rejected at their destination and paid Petitioner 2 cents per pound. There was insufficient evidence to show that these melons were rejected at their destination or that the price received for the melons at their destination minus the 1 cent per pound commission was less than the agreed upon price of 4.5 cents per pound. On the 4 loads of melons shipped on June 25, 1988, load nos. 11291, 11292 and 11294, Nichols contends that the melons were below the quality for which he contracted. Nichols failed to present sufficient evidence to support his contention of low quality or that the price received at destination would have resulted in Petitioner receiving less than the agreed upon price of 4.5 cent per pound. There is no evidence that any of the loads in dispute were federally inspected at their origin or destination. Nichols has refused to pay Petitioner the amount in dispute on the 6 loads of melons shipped on June 24 and 25, 1988.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent Jay Nichols, Inc., be ordered to pay the Petitioner, Carl Hiers the sum of $2,510.60. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Jay Nichols, Inc., fails to timely pay Petitioner, Carl Hiers as ordered, then Respondent U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. Respectfully submitted and entered this 20th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Carl Hiers Route 5, Box 339 Dunnellon, Florida 32630 Steve Nichols, Vice President Jay Nichols, Inc. Post Office Box 1705 Lakeland, Florida 33801 U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. Post Office Box 1138 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Mallory Horne, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 513 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Ben Pridgeon, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Lab Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1650
The Issue Whether Redland Brokers Exchange, Inc., is owed $2,602.60 for agricultural products ordered by and delivered to Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Redland Brokers is an agent for producers of Florida-grown agricultural products. Mo-Bo is a dealer in such products in the normal course of its business and is bonded by Armor. During the period from October 28, 1994, until November 11, 1994, Mo-Bo ordered various agricultural products from Redland Brokers. In accordance with the usual practice of Redland Brokers when doing business with Mo-Bo, the orders were accepted by telephone and the items were loaded onto trucks sent by Mo-Bo to Redland Brokers's warehouse. Redland Brokers sent the following invoices to Mo-Bo for agricultural products order by and delivered to Mo-Bo: November19, 1994 Invoice Number 275 $180.00 November5, 1994 Invoice Number 290 756.00 November11, 1994 Invoice Number 319 793.00 November19, 1994 Invoice Number 334 353.60 November19, 1994 Invoice Number 338 520.00 TOTAL $2,602.60 Payment was due twenty-one days from the date each invoice was mailed. Despite repeated demands, Mo-Bo has not paid any of the amounts reflected in these invoices. As of September 6, 1995, the date of the formal hearing, $2,602.60 remained due and owing to Redland Brokers.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order ordering Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc., to pay $2,602.60 to Redland Brokers Exchange, Inc., and, if Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc., does not pay this amount, ordering Armor Insurance Company to pay this amount, up to its maximum liability under its bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank T. Basso, Jr., Owner Amy L. Glasow, Owner Redland Brokers Exchange, Inc. 401 North Redland Road Homestead, Florida 33030 Paul Boris Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc. Post Office Box 1899 Pompano Beach, Florida 33061 Mark J. Albrechta, Esquire Armor Insurance Company Legal Department Post Office Box 15250 Tampa, Florida 33684-5250 The Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether respondents or either of them owe petitioner money for two carloads of potatoes shipped on June 12, 1990?
Findings Of Fact On June 12, 1990, Stone, Inc. loaded 472.4 hundredweight of Atlantic potatoes in Hastings, Florida, on a truck owned by Gemini Transportation Services (Gemini) of Greensburg, Pennsylvania, for shipment to Mike Sell's Potato Chip Company (Sell's) in Dayton, Ohio. Stone, Inc. assigned this load number AT 1263232. The same day Stone, Inc. also loaded in Hastings 477.9 hundredweight of Atlantic potatoes on a truck owned by Ranger Transportation, Inc. (Ranger) of Jacksonville, Florida, for shipment to Sell's plant in Ohio. Stone, Inc. assigned this load number AT 1263235. Both loads evidently reached the potato chip plant in Dayton early on June 14, 1990. At half past nine that morning, Sell's notified Stone, Inc. by telephone that it was accepting 76 hundredweight of load No. AT 1263235, but that it was refusing the rest of load No. AT 1263235, and all of load No. AT 1263232. Stone, Inc. did not exercise its right to demand that an independent agricultural inspector examine the potatoes to determine whether their condition justified Sell's refusal to accept them. Instead, on the afternoon of June 14, 1990, Mr. Stone called Frank R. Thomson, Jr., vice-president of Black Gold, and told him Sell's had rejected the potatoes, but that Sell's sometimes rejected loads for no good reason. There was no discussion of price or of freight charges. Mr. Thomson has never bought potatoes rejected by a buyer and knows of no other broker who has, at least without seeing them, but he agreed on Black Gold's behalf to take both loads on consignment. He told Mr. Stone he would "try to find a home for the potatoes." Mr. Thomson told Mr. Stone he would send one load to Bockers Potato Chip Plant and the other to Howard Dennis' farm. For several years, the standard brokerage fee has been $0.25 a hundredweight, if a sale is consummated, but no mention was made of this in the telephone conversation. Customarily the grower bears the expense of transporting rejects. Black Gold directed load No. AT 1263232 to Bockers Potato Chip Plant in Fulton, Missouri; and, when Bockers turned it down, to a repacker, Neumiller rarms, Inc., in Savanna, Illinois. There it was "dumped because of excess rot and breakdown," Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, or so Black Gold was eventually advised. Vicki McDonald said the potatoes had been "running out the back of the truck," when they reached the Bockers plant. Black Gold directed load No. AT 126235, i.e., the 401.9 hundredweight that Sell's had not accepted, to the H. Dennis Potato Farm (Dennis), a repacker in Wauseon, Ohio. As was customary, Dennis reportedly unloaded the potatoes thought suitable for packaging for retail sale, and placed them in coolers to arrest spoilage. Dennis told Black Gold that soft rot was a problem on the day it said the potatoes arrived or the day after. At least nine days to two weeks later, but before August 10, 1990, Dennis told Black Gold, Dennis "ran" the potatoes on a conveyor belt, and concluded they were unusable. Under Stone, Inc.'s agreement with Sell's, Sell's reimbursed Stone, Inc. in full for freight charges incurred on loads Sell's accepted, or at the rate of $2.50 per hundredweight for partially accepted loads, but not at all for loads totally rejected. Stone, Inc. paid Gemini $2,287.75 for freight on load No. AT 126232. Of this sum, $1,181 was charged for shipment to Sell's, while $1,106.75 was charged for detention at Dayton, Ohio, shipment to Fulton, Missouri, and thence to Savanna, Illinois. Stone, Inc. paid Ranger $1,177.25 for freight on load No. AT 126235. Ranger did not charge extra to take the potatoes from Sell's to Dennis. Stone, Inc. deduced that load No. AT 126235 had reached Wauseon, Ohio, from Ranger's invoice, which it received shortly after June 19, 1990. But Stone, Inc. was not told the final disposition of either load until August 21, 1990, when Black Gold advised that load No. AT 126232 had been dumped. In mid-June of 1990, the market price for Atlantic potatoes in bulk, free on board in Hastings, was $2.75 per hundredweight. Black Gold was never paid anything on account of either load. Attached to its answer are statements purportedly from both repackers attesting to excess rot. `CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Since the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services referred respondent's hearing request to the Division of Administrative Hearings, in accordance with Section 120.57(1)(b)3., Florida Statutes (1989), "the division has jurisdiction over the formal proceeding." Section 120.57(1) (b)3., Florida Statutes (1989). As a "person . . . engaged within this state in the business of purchasing, receiving or soliciting agricultural products from the producer," Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1989), Black Gold is a dealer in agricultural products for purposes of Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, required to be licensed by Sections 604.17 and 604.18, Florida Statutes (1989) and, as a condition of licensure, to "deliver to the department a surety bond or certificate of deposit in the amount of at least $3,000 . . . ." Section 604.20(1), Florida Statutes (1990 Supp.). Potatoes are "agricultural products" because they are "natural products of the farm, nursery, grove [or] orchard," Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes (1989), and Stone, Inc. is a producer within the meaning of Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1989). Petitioner has the burden to establish the allegations of the complaint by a preponderance of the evidence. J.T. Cochran and R.B. Strange d/b/a C & S Tree Farm v. Beach Landscaping, Inc. d/b/a Landscape Technologies and Regency Insurance Co., No. 90-7494 (DOAH; April 19, 1991); Pine Stand Farms, Inc. v. Five Brothers Produce, Inc. and Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., No. 90-6460A (DOAH: Mar. 18, 1991); Florida Farm Management, Inc. v. DeBruyn Produce Co. and Peerless Insurance Co., No. 90-2966A (DOAH; Cct. 23, 1990). Black Gold has not proven any written agreement, but relies on the verbal agreement it alleged. See J.R. Sales, Inc. v. Dicks, 521 So. 2d 366, 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). In its complaint, Stone, Inc. alleges that Black Gold "agreed to purchase the potatoes at . . . $2.75 cwt plus freight," and contends, "If there was a problem with either or both loads we should have been notified timely to allow us to market the potatoes elsewhere." But the evidence did not establish either that Black Gold agreed to purchase the potatoes or that belated notice caused petitioner any loss attributable to an inability to market the potatoes after their rejection in Ohio, Missouri and Illinois. In its post-hearing submission, Stone, Inc. argues that respondent, as a grower's agent, was "required to give an account of sale within 48 hours," citing Section 604.22, Florida Statutes (1989). But here there were no sales, so respondent had no duty to account for any sales. For the first time in its post-hearing submission, Stone, Inc. also invokes federal regulations promulgated under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, notably for the proposition that documentation of the dumpings was inadequate under federal law. However this may be, petitioner failed to prove the indebtedness it claimed in its complaint.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services enter an order dismissing petitioner's complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1991. APPENDIX Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 12, all evidence regarding the quality of the potatoes at their destinations was hearsay. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 13, the actual disposition was not established by competent evidence. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 15 is properly argument rather than a finding of fact, for the most part. These loads apparently took two days to reach Sell's. COPIES FURNISHED: John W. Stone Post Office Box 74 Hastings, FL 32045 John Michael Traynor, Esquire 22 Cathedral Place St. Augustine, FL 32084 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Richard Tritshcler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral testimony and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioners were producers of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent GMS was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license no. 936 by the Department and bonded by Commercial Union Insurance Company (Commercial) in the sum of $50,000.00 - Bond No. CZ 7117346. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Commercial was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Prior to Petitioners selling or delivering any watermelons (melons) to Respondent GMS, Petitioners and Respondent GMS entered into a verbal contract whereby: (a) Petitioners would harvest and load their melons on trucks furnished by Respondent GMS at Petitioners' farm; (b) the loading, grading and inspection, if any, was to be supervised by, and the responsibility of Respondent GMS or its agent; (c) the melons were to be U.S. No. 1 grade; (d) the melons were purchased F.O.B. Petitioner's farm subject to acceptance by Respondent GMS, with title and risk of loss passing to Respondent GMS at point of shipment (See Transcript Page 95 lines 5-7); (e) the price was left open subject to Petitioners being paid the market price for the melons at place of shipment on the day of shipment as determined by Respondent GMS less one (1) or two (2) cent sales charge, depending on the price; and requiring Respondent GMS to notify Petitioners on a daily basis of that price and; (f) the settlement was to be made by Respondent GMS within a reasonable time after the sale of the melons by Respondent GMS. Respondent GMS was not acting as Petitioners agent in the sale of the melons for the account of the Petitioners on a net return basis nor was it acting as a negotiating broker between the Petitioners and the buyers. Respondent GMS did not make the type of accounting to Petitioners as required by Section 604.22, Florida Statutes had it been their agent. Although Respondent GMS purchased over twenty (20) loads of melons from the Petitioners, there are only ten (10) loads of melons in dispute and they are represented by track report numbers 536 dated April 29, 1985, 534 dated April 30, 1985, 2363 and 537, dated May 1, 1985, 2379, 2386 and 538 dated May 2, 1985, and 2385, 2412 and 2387 dated May 3, 1985. Jennings W. Starling (Starling) was the agent of Respondent GMS responsible for loading; grading- inspecting and accepting and approving the loads of melons for shipment that Respondent GMS was purchasing from Petitioners during the 1985 melon season. Petitioners and Starling were both aware that some of the melons had hollow hearth a conditions if known, would cause the melons to be rejected. Aware of this condition in the melons, Starling allowed Petitioners to load the melons on the truck furnished by Respondent GMS. Starling rejected from 20 percent to 40 percent of the melons harvested and brought in from Petitioners' fields before accepting and approving a load for shipment. Starling accepted and approved for shipment all ten (10) of the disputed loads of melons. On a daily basis, Robert E. McDaniel, Sr., one of the Petitioners, would contact the office of Respondent GMS in Lakeland Florida to obtain the price being paid that day by Respondent GMS to Petitioners but was not always successful, however, he would within a day or two obtain the price for a particular day. Robert E. McDaniel did obtain the price to be paid by Respondent GMS for the ten (10) disputed loads and informed his son Robert E. McDaniel, Jr. of those prices. The prices quoted to Robert E. McDaniel, Sr. by Respondent GMS on the ten (10) disputed loads were 12 cents, 10 cents, 8 cents, 8 cents, 8 cents, 8 cents, 8 cents, 7 cents, 7 cents, and 7 cents on tract reports number 536, 534, 2363, 537, 2379, 2386, 538, 2385, 2412 and 2387, respectively. No written record of their prices was produced at the hearing but the testimony of Robert E. McDaniel Sr. concerning these prices was the most credible evidence presented. After the melons were shipped, sometimes as much as one week after, a track report was given to Robert E. McDaniel Jr. by Starling for initialing. Sometimes a price would be indicated on the track report but this price was based on selling price at point of destination and not the market price at point of shipment. Also, the letters "H.H." would also appear on the track report which, according to the testimony of Starling, indicated hollow heart but the evidence was insufficient to prove that Starling had rejected these loads for shipment because of a hollow heart condition in the melons. The loads in question were paid for by Respondent GMS based on a price at point of destination under its drafts no. 831912 and 851311. The amount in dispute is as follows: DATE TRACK NET AMOUNT AMOUNT SHIPPED
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent GMS be ordered to pay to the Petitioners the sum of $11.212.31. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent GMS fails to timely pay the Petitioners as ordered, then Respondent Commercial be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioners in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983). Respectfully submitted and entered this 13th day of June, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 13th day of June, 1986.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing; the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceedings Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes, (1983). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Rentz was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 4103 by the Departments and bonded by Respondent Nationwide in the sum of $14,000 - Bond No. LP 505 761 0004. At all times pertinent to this proceedings Respondent Nationwide was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). On June 21, 1985; Petitioner harvested from his field and loaded on a trucks procured by Respondent Rentz, 2,835 pee wee grey watermelons (watermelons) weighing a total of 43,380 pounds. On June 21, 1985, Petitioner harvested from his field and loaded on a trucks procured by Petitioner on Respondent Rentz's instructions, 1850 pee wee grey watermelons (watermelons) weighing a total of 43,460 pounds. The agreed upon price for both loads of watermelons was 2 1/2 cents per pound for a total gross sale price of $2,171.00 of which $353.55 was paid by Respondent Rentz on October 25, 1985 by check no. 290 drawn on the account of Mr. or Mrs. Ronald D. Rentz leaving a balance of $1,817.45. This amount does not include either the $20.00 for lumber added on to the June 21, 1985 invoice or the $20.00 added to the complaint for lumber. There was no evidence that the lumber was an agricultural product or that Petitioner produced the lumber charged to Respondent Rentz. Also the price of the lumber was added on and not included in price of the watermelons. The watermelons were invoiced to Seaway Produce by Petitioner on its invoice showing Ron Rentz as brokers at Respondent Rentz's request. Petitioner's understanding that Respondent Rentz was acting as buyer and not as a broker was credible and supported by Respondent Rentz's actions subsequent to the watermelons being loaded and shipped. Although Respondent Rentz contended that he was acting as a brokers the more credible evidence shows that Respondent Rentz was acting as a buyer and that risk of loss passed to him upon shipments with all remedies and rights for Petitioner's breach reserved to him. There was no official inspection of the watermelons when they were loaded and the evidence presented by Petitioner that the watermelons were of good quality and in good condition when shipped was believable and went unrebutted by Respondent Rentz. For purposes of Sections 604.15-604.30, Florida statutes; the Department's policy is to consider a person a brokers requiring only a minimum bond ($13,000.00) for licensure when that person does not take title to the product and whose function is to bring buyer and seller together and assist them in negotiating the terms of the contract for sale but not to invoice or collect from the buyer.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Rentz be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $1,817.45. It is, further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Rentz fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Nationwide be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes Respectfully submitted and entered this 14th day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32301 Robert Chastain General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Buildings Room 513 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Ron Weaver, Esq. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32301 Mr. Joe W. Kight Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32301 Mr. Ronald Rentz Route 1, Box 3510 Havana, FL Bigham Hide Company, Inc. Post Office Box 188 Coleman, FL 33521 Lawrence J. Marchbanks Esq. P. O. Box 879 Wildwood, FL 32785 Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company Attention: Robert Brand, Esq. Post Office Box 1781 Gainesville, FL 32602 Robert D. Stinson P. O. Box 1739 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Findings Of Fact On August 6, 1986, an indemnity bond was executed between RAINMAKER as principal and FIDELITY as surety. The effective dates of the bond were from October 21, 1986, to October 20, 1987. The bond was required under Sections 604.15-604.30, Florida Statutes, in order for RAINMAKER to become licensed as a dealer in agricultural products in Florida. The purpose of the bond is to secure the faithful accounting for a payment to producers or their agents or representatives of the proceeds of all agricultural products handled or purchased by RAINMAKER. The Petitioner, SHAN-RON, is a corporation whose address is 276 Cypress Street, La Belle, Florida. Its purpose is to conduct business by finding buyers for sod located on acreage owned by various cattle ranchers in Lee County, Florida. This practice is commonly known as "bird dogging" in the agricultural trade. The way the business is conducted is as follows: SHAN-RON is contracted by sod installers to whom it sells sod in specific quantities for a fixed price. Once the oral agreement is made, SHAN-RON tells the sod installer where a sod field is located. At this point in the business transaction, the sod installer sends independent truck drivers to the designated sod field. If the sod installer is unable to locate truckers, he telephones a SHAN-RON field foreman. The foreman, as a courtesy, will check to see if any of the independent truckers currently as the sod field can haul a load for the sod installer. Once a trucker is located, employees from SHAN-RON mow the grass, cut the sod, and load it onto pallets owned by SHAN-RON. The truck is loaded with pallets by SHAN-RON employees and the driver is given two copies of the load ticket, one for him and one for the sod installer. The driver delivers the sod and pallets to the address placed upon the load tickets. Upon delivery, the driver has the responsibility to deliver the load ticket to the business office of the sod installer. If he does not deliver the ticket, he does not get paid for hauling the sod. Employees of the sod installer are usually at the delivery site. The sod is laid and the empty pallets are returned to the sod field by the truckers. Every Friday, a representative of SHAN-RON personally delivers a weekly bill to the sod installer in order to collect is owed. When the money is collected, the funds are divided between the rancher whose sod was sold and SHAN-RON. The accountability system used within the sod industry leaves room for a high margin of error at various stages. The SHAN-RON employees occasionally short pallet loads or two layers of sod. The truck drivers occasionally misnamed the sod installer to whom the sod is to be delivered. The truck drivers also occasionally do not take empty pallets under their control back to SHAN-RON. They sell the pallets and pocket the money. The sod installer is financially responsible for the pallet costs. RAINMAKER is a corporation whose address is Post Office Box 7385, Ft. Myers, Florida. The company is primarily in the business of installing sod. It transacted business with SHAN-RON between November 11, 1986, and January 8, 1987. At the time of these transactions, RAINMAKER was licensed as a dealer in agricultural products supported by surety bond number 974 52 23 in the amount of $13,500.00. SHAN-RON, through testimony and the introduction of its business records, proved a prima facie case that RAINMAKER owes $12,964.00 for the purchase of sod between November 11, 1986, and January 8, 1987. Both parties Stipulated that $4,000.00 has been paid on the balance of the account which should be deducted from the balance owed SHAN-RON. In rebuttal to SHAN-RON's presentation, RAINMAKER presented testimony and a business record summary which revealed that six invoices were improperly charged, against its account in the amount of $1,260.00. The record summary was based upon a comparison of load tickets against production records during the time period involved. In addition, RAINMAKER's records reveal that the two drivers, Stormy and Fred Bower, were not paid for delivering the sod to RAINMAKER under the load ticket presentation to the sod installer which was previously described as an accounting method within the business. Because RAINMAKER set forth the issue of delivery discrepancies in its answer to the complaint and competent evidence was presented, $1,260.00 should be deducted from the `balance owed. SHAN-RON presented testimony that it is customary for the company to spray the sod for pest control. RAINMAKER received defective sod from SHAN-RON which contained "Creeping Charlie" weeds during the time of the deliveries in dispute. SHAN-RON was timely notified of the problem, and toad RAINMAKER to have the sod sprayed. A copy of the invoice for $300.00 was sent to SHAN-RON and has not been paid. Although the issue was not raised in RAINMAKER's answer to the complaint, it is properly before the Hearing Officer because of RAINMAKER's timely notification and cure of the defect in the product. The $300.00 should be deducted from the amount owed. Testimony relating to possible sod shortages was rejected as no evidence was presented that shortages occurred in the orders for which SHAN-RON seeks payment. The customary procedure In the sod business for handling credits for shortages requires the buyer to notify the seller within a responsible length of time of the shortages. Such notification did not take place as to the orders in dispute. The amount owed to SHAN-RON by RAINMAKER is $7,404.00. It is officially noticed that SHAN-RON's complaint was originally filed with the department on June 19, 1987, within nine months from the date of sale.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Agriculture enter a final order requiring the Respondent RAINMAKER to make payment to the petitioner SHAN-RON in the amount of $7,404.00. In the event that RAINMAKER does not comply with the department's order within fifteen days from the date it final, FIDELITY should be ordered to provide payment and the conditions and provisions of the bond furnished to RAINMAKER. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of April, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Clinton H. Coutler, JR., Esquire Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Ben Pridgeon, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture Lab Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1650 Shan Ron Sod, Inc. 276 Cypress Street LaBELLE, FLORIDA 33935 Rainmaker Sod, Inc. 2290 Bruner Lane, South East Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland Post Office Box 1227 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Robert Chastain General Counsel Department of Agriculture Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether respondents owe petitioner money on account of sales of potatoes?
Findings Of Fact In order to finance his 1991 crops, petitioner Daniel Methvin of Hastings, had to borrow money at the end of the year before. To do that, he was told, he needed to execute contracts for the sale of the potatoes he intended to grow. He had been glad to have future contracts for the 1990 season, when a glut of potatoes pushed the price below three dollars a hundredweight (cwt). Respondent J.P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc. (or the company of which it is a subsidiary) had honored those contracts and paid considerably more than the market price for potatoes then. On November 24, 1990, Mr. Methvin executed a contract entitled "Sales Confirmation" agreeing to sell 10,000 cwt of "REPACK REDS", Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 ("92% US #1 INCH AND 1/2 MIN. AT LEAST 95% SKIN, Id.) to J.P. Mach, Inc. during the period April 28 to May 31, 1991, at $6.50 per cwt. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. Consolidating smaller, earlier agreements, Mr. Methvin executed another contract entitled "Sales Confirmation" agreeing to sell 45,000 cwt of Atlantics ("85% U.S. #1") to J.P. Mach, Inc. during the period April 28 to May 31, 1991, at $5.75 per cwt, guaranteeing the potatoes would be suitable for chips. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. With these contracts (or, as to the chipping potatoes, their predecessors) as collateral, Mr. Methvin raised the funds necessary to plant. Both contracts between Mr. Methvin and J.P. Mach, Inc. had "act of god clauses" excusing Mr. Methvin's nondelivery of potatoes he failed to harvest on account of, among other things, tornadoes or hail. As it happened, tornadoes and hail prevented Mr. Methvin's reaping all he had sown. Petitioner only harvested 6,300 cwt of red potatoes and approximately 43,000 cwt of Atlantic potatoes. Another result of the bad weather was extremely high market prices, at some times exceeding $20 per cwt. On April 27, 1991, J.P. Mach visited Mr. Methvin's farm and the two men discussed incentives to keep Mr. Methvin from "jumping his contract," i.e., selling his potatoes to others at the market price. In the course of their conversation, Mr. Methvin said he needed to realize $450,000 from that year's potatoes; and Mr. Mach replied, "I will help you out", and "I will keep you in business." There was general talk of incentives and bonuses. Eventually, Mr. Mach said he would pay a premium over the contract price if Mr. Methvin fulfilled the original contracts to the fullest extent possible, by delivering all the potatoes he had; and Mr. Mach began remitting premium prices, as promised. On June 1, 1991, however, Mr. Methvin advised Mr. Mach of his intention to sell what remained of his harvest, some 1100 cwt of Atlantics, on the open market. When he carried through on this, Mr. Methvin realized approximately $200,000. Even at that, he lost $40,000 that season. Meanwhile Mr. Mach and his companies were sued for $550,000 for failure to deliver potatoes; and were not paid another $172,000 for potatoes they shipped to chip plants and others to whom they had promised still more potatoes. (Mr. Methvin was not the only grower who defaulted on contracts to ship potatoes to J.P. Mach, Inc.) As of June 1, 1991, Mr. Mach, his companies or his agents had paid Mr. Methvin "about $200,000," which was more than the contract price of the potatoes Mr. Methvin had loaded. Neither Mr. Mach nor his companies paid Mr. Methvin anything after June 1, 1991. At hearing, Mr. Methvin calculated the value of the loads as to which nothing had been remitted as of June 1, 1991, as "a few hundred more than $36,000," assuming the contract price plus the premium. But Mr. Mach and his companies or employees recalculated the price of the loads he had paid for by eliminating the premium, since Mr. Methvin had not, as promised on his side, delivered all his potatoes. J.P. Mach, Inc. was duly licensed during the 1990 season. After its license lapsed, a new license was issued to J.P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc. on April 24, 1991. A $50,000 certificate of deposit was filed with First Performance Bank as a condition of licensure.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner's complaint be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Methvin Route 1, Box 92 Palatka, Florida 32131 Jeffrey P. Mach, President J. P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc. P.O. Box 7 Plover, Wisconsin 54467 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agricutlure 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether or not Petitioners (complainants) are entitled to recover $5,640.19 or any part thereof against Respondent dealer and Respondent surety company.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are growers of watermelons and qualify as "producers" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondent Eddie D. Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company is surety for Respondent Griffin d/b/a Quality. Petitioners' claims against the dealer and his bond are listed in the Amended Complaint in the following amounts and categories: 6-18-92 Inv. #657 45,580 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $2,279.00 Advance - 700.00 NWPB* - 9.12 $1,569.88 6-19-92 Inv. #668 2,490 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $ 124.50 (paid for 42,860 lbs. short 2,490 lbs.) NWPB* - .50 124.00 6-20-92 Inv. #695 6,818 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $ 340.90 (paid for 39,062 lbs. short 6,818 lbs.) NWPB* 1.36 339.54 6-20-92 Inv. @ #702 .05 39,880 lbs. Sangria melons lb. $1,994.00 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 7.98 Pmt. - 90.00 1,186.02 6-21-92 Inv. @ #706 .05 44,740 lbs. Sangria melons lb. $2,237.00 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 8.95 1,518.05 6-22-93 Inv. @ #716 .04 11,280 lbs. Crimson melons lb. NWPB* - 2.32 460.88 6-22-92 Inv. @ #709 .04 46,740 lbs. Crimson melons lb. $1,869.60 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 9.35 1,150.25 Deducted for #706 - 441.82 441.82 PAID 708.43 Total Claimed $5,640.19 *NWPB = National Watermelon Promotion Board Fee Petitioners and Respondent dealer have had an oral business relationship for four to five years. Both parties agree that their oral agreement initially called for a federal inspection to be done on each load if the load were refused in whole or in part by the ultimate recipient. Respondent Griffin contended that over the years there had been further oral agreements to "work out" or "ride out" small discrepancies or partial refusals of loads without resorting to federal inspections, the cost of which inspections could eliminate the entire profit on single loads. Petitioners denied that such an amended oral agreement was ever reached and further maintained that the amounts of the loads at issue herein could not be considered "small" by any interpretation. Respondent submitted no evidence as to what the relative terms, "large" and "small," mean in the industry. Consequently, it appears that there was never a meeting of the minds of the parties on the alleged oral contract amendments relied upon by Respondent. Respondent testified that in past years, prior to 1992, he had interpreted the term "ride it out" to mean that he would simply accept the hearsay statements of ultimate recipients that named poundages of melons were bad and he would let the ultimate recipients pay for only the melons they said were good. Respondent would thereafter absorb any losses himself, not passing on the loss by deducting any amount from the full amount he would normally pay to the growers within ten days. However, 1992 was such a bad year for melons that the Respondent dealer chose not to absorb the greater losses and passed them on to the growers by way of deductions on "settlement sheets." In 1992 Respondent sent Petitioners the settlement sheets with the deductions explained thereon with the net payments as much as thirty days after the ultimate sales. Upon the foregoing evidence, it appears that Respondent had established a course of business whereby Petitioners could reasonably have expected him to absorb any losses occasioned by Respondent's reliance on hearsay statements of the ultimate recipients concerning poor quality melons unless Respondent chose not to test the questionable melons with a federal inspection. Petitioners obtained Exhibit P-5 for load 657 at Respondent dealer's place of business, but were not certain it applied to the load Mr. Tucker claimed he delivered to Respondent on 6-18-92 because Mr. Tucker did not know his load number that day. The exhibit represents the weight ticket Petitioners believe applies to the load which Mr. Tucker claimed to have delivered to Respondent dealer on 6-18-92. However, the exhibit bears two other names, "Jones and Smith," not Petitioners' respective names of Tucker or Watson. It has "WACC" handwritten across it, which Mr. Tucker claimed signified the name of his watermelon field. The number "657" also has been handwritten across it. There is no evidence of who wrote any of this on the exhibit. Respondent denied that load 657 was received from Mr. Tucker. The exhibit shows a printed gross weight of 78,900 lbs., tare weight of 32,860 lbs. and net weight of 66,800 lbs. Net weights are supposed to signify the poundage of melons delivered to the dealer. Nothing on the exhibit matches Mr. Tucker's journal entry (Petitioners' Exhibit 3) of delivering 45,580 lbs. of watermelons to Respondent dealer on 6- 18-92. Mr. Tucker testified that he was never paid for his delivery. Respondent denied there was such a delivery and testified that he paid Jones and Smith for load 657. Petitioners have established no entitlement to their claim of $1,569.88 on Invoice 657. Petitioners' Exhibit P-4 represents two weight tickets secured from Respondent dealer's records that Petitioners contend apply to load 668. The first page has "45,350/6-19-92/Scott Tucker WACC" handwritten across it. None of the four poundages imprinted thereon match any of the amounts claimed by Petitioners for invoice 668, and subtracting amounts testified to also does not conform these figures to Petitioners' claim on load 668. The second page weight ticket shows a date of 6-18-92 and a weight of 34,260 lbs. It also does not match Petitioner's claim that they were owed for 45,350 lbs. but were paid for only 42,860 lbs., being paid 2,490 lbs. short. Exhibit P-8 is the 668 invoice/settlement sheet which Respondent provided to Petitioners and shows invoice 668 with date of 6-19-92, tare and pay weight of 42,860 lbs. at $.05/lb. for $2,143.00 less $8.57 melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB, see supra) for $2,134.43, less a $700.00 advance and $10.00 for packing straw for a total due Petitioners of $1,424.43 which Respondent has already paid. Petitioners have established no entitlement to their claim of $124.00 on Invoice 668. Petitioners Exhibit P-6 represents two weight tickets secured from Respondent dealer's records. The first page has "45,880 lbs./6-20-92/Scott Tucker Crimson WACC 695" handwritten across it. None of the printed gross, tare, or net weights thereon match any of the amounts claimed by Petitioners for invoice 695. The second page shows the date 6-20-92 and a printed net weight of 32,000 lbs. Respondent dealer provided Petitioners with Exhibit P-7, invoice/settlement sheet 695 dated 6-20-92 showing tare and pay weights of 39,062 lbs. priced at $.05/lb. totalling $1,953.10, less melon adv. assoc. (a/k/a NWPB) fee of $7.81, for $1,945.29, less $700.00 advanced, less $10.00 for packing straw for a total of $1,235.29. The foregoing do not support Petitioner Tucker's claim based on his journal entry (P-3) that he was entitled to be paid for 45,880 lbs. he claims he delivered that day instead of for 39,062 pounds (short by 6,818 pounds) with balance owing to him of $339.54. Respondent has paid what was owed on invoice 695. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 9 shows that Petitioner Tucker delivered 39,880 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-20-92 and Petitioner Watson received back from Respondent dealer an invoice/settlement sheet 702 showing 39,880 pounds @ $.05/lb. equalling $1,994.00 and that although $1,994.00 was owed Petitioners, Respondent thereafter subtracted for $800.00 worth of returned melons, a $700.00 advance, $7.98 for melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB), and $10.00 for packing straw, and that a balance was paid to Petitioners of only $90.00. This is arithmetically illogical. The subtractions total $1,517.98. Therefore, if all of Respondent's subtractions were legitimate, the total balance due Petitioners would have been $476.02. If the right to deduct for the $800.00 in returned melons were not substantiated by Respondent dealer, then Petitioners would be due $1,276.02. Since all parties acknowledge that $90.00 was already paid by Respondent dealer, then Petitioners are due $1,186.02 if Respondent did not substantiate the right to deduct the $800.00. Load 702 was "graded out," i.e. accepted as satisfactory, by a representative of Respondent dealer or a subsequent holder in interest when the melons were delivered by Petitioners to Respondent dealer. That fact creates the presumption that the melons were received in satisfactory condition by the Respondent dealer. Nothing persuasive has been put forth by the Respondent dealer to show that the situation concerning the melons' quality had changed by the time the load arrived at its final destination. Respondent got no federal inspection on this load and relied on hearsay statements by persons who did not testify as to some melons being inferior. In light of the standard arrangement of the parties over the whole course of their business dealings (see Findings of Fact 5-7 supra), Petitioners have proven entitlement to the amount claimed on load 702 of $1,186.02. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite 10 shows Petitioners Tucker and Watson delivered 44,740 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-21-92. At $.05/lb., Petitioners were owed $2,237.00, less melon adv. association fee (a/k/a NWPB) of $8.95, $700.00 for an advance, and $10.00 for straw. Those deductions are not at issue. Therefore, Petitioners would be owed $1,518.05, the amount claimed, from Respondent. However, the invoice also notes that Respondent made a $268.18 deduction for melons returned. Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1 purports to be a BB&W Farms Loading Sheet and Federal Inspection Sheet. Respondent offered this exhibit to show that only $68.18 was realized by him on load 706 which he attributed to Petitioner Watson. However, the federal inspector did not testify as to the results of the inspection, the inspection sheet itself is illegible as to "estimated total," the "estimated total" has been written in by another hand as "$62.60," and there was no explanation on the Composite Exhibit or in testimony as to how Respondent dealer came up with $200.00 in "return lumping charges" as also indicated on Exhibit R-1. Accordingly, Petitioners have established that with regard to load/invoice 706, they delivered watermelons worth $2,237.00 to Respondent dealer and Respondent dealer did not affirmatively establish that any melons were bad, despite the federal inspection sheet introduced in evidence. Petitioners have proven entitlement to their claim on invoice 706 for $1,518.05. However, Petitioners conceded that Respondent actually paid them $441.82 on invoice/settlement sheet 706. Therefore, they are only entitled to recoup a total of $1,076.23 on their claim for Invoice 706. In the course of formal hearing, Respondent dealer admitted that, with regard to load invoice 716, (Tucker) he did owe Petitioners $460.88 for 275 watermelons, and that it had not been paid purely due to clerical error. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 12 (Invoice and Weight Tickets 709, Watson) shows Petitioner Watson delivered 46,740 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-22-92 and at $.04 lb., Petitioners were owed $1,869.60, less appropriate deductions. Petitioners conceded that Respondent dealer appropriately deducted $9.35 for melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB), $700.00 for an advance, and $10.00 for packing straw, bringing the amount they were owed to $1,150.25. Petitioners and Respondent are in agreement the Respondent paid only $708.43 of the $1,150.25 owed on invoice/settlement sheet 709 because Respondent dealer also deducted from the amount owed on invoice 709 the $441.82 he had previously paid out on Invoice 706. See, Finding of Fact 13, supra. Since Petitioners have established that they were owed $1,518.05 on invoice 706 but were paid only $441.82 thereon, it appears that Petitioners should be paid $1,076.23 on Invoice 706 and realize nothing on Invoice 709.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order awarding Petitioners $1,186.02 on invoice 702, $1,076.23 on invoice 706, and $460.88 on invoice 716 for a total of $2,723.13, dismissing all other claimed amounts, and binding Respondents to pay the full amount of $2,723.13, which in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company's case shall be only to the extent of its bond. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott Tucker and Phillip Watson Route 2 Box 280 Trenton, FL 32693 Eddie D. Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage Post Office Box 889 Immokalee, FL 33934 William J. Moore USF&G Post Office Box 31143 Tampa, FL 33631 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company Post Office Box 1138 Baltimore, MD 21203 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture Division of Marketing, Bureau of Licensure and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
