Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioners, Mark K. Mast and Kirk E. Mast d/b/a Mast Farm, operate a sixty-acre potato farm on Cracker Swamp Road in or near East Palatka, Florida. The 1991 crop year was the first year in which the two brothers had operated their own farm. This activity was a part-time endeavor since the brothers worked full-time as logging contractors for Georgia Pacific Corporation. Respondent, G & G Sales Corporation, a Minnesota corporation licensed to do business in this state, is a dealer (broker) in agricultural products that purchases potatoes from growers throughout the country for resale to various potato chip companies. Its president and vice-president are Loren R. Girsbirger and George Wilkerson, respectively. As an agricultural dealer, respondent is required to obtain a license from and post a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs (Department). In this case, the bond has been posted by respondent, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company. The amount of the bond is not of record. In order to start their farming operation, it was necessary for the Mast brothers to secure a loan from the North Florida Production Credit Association. That lending institution had a practice of requiring farmers to secure their loans with contracts for the sale of all or a portion of their crop. That is to say, the lender required a farmer to have a sales contract which equaled the amount of the loan. So that petitioners could meet this requirement, on January 29, 1991, the parties executed a contract wherein petitioners agreed to sell respondent 8,000 bags of Atlantic variety potatoes at an agreed upon price of $5.75 per bag, for a total price of $46,000. The lending institution then agreed to loan petitioners that amount of money. Although the brothers asked that respondent purchase more than 8,000 bags, respondent declined since it had only that contract amount (with chip companies) available. A copy of the contract has been received in evidence as joint exhibit The contract was drafted by respondent and it may be inferred from the evidence that it is a "standard" type of contract used by farmers and dealers in the potato business. The contract contained the following relevant conditions in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6: Buyer assumes that Seller will have sufficient amount of potatoes to cover all contracts, including open market sales. This contract does not restrict these open market sales, but Seller does protect Buyer's amount due. In the event of fire, unauthorized strikes, wars, transportation shortages, Acts of God, or events beyond the control of Seller or Buyer which prevent Seller or Buyer from performance in full or in part of the terms of this agreement, it is agreed that such failure to perform shall not be excused and shall not form the basis for any claim of damage or breach of contract. Seller agrees to seed sufficient acreage to cover the potatoes sold for delivery under this contract and other contracts to all purchasers with whom the Seller has contracted for the delivery of potatoes during the upcoming farm season. If, however, on account of shortages of crops not due to any act within the Seller's control or other causes beyond the control of the Seller, he is unable to deliver the full amount of potatoes called for in this contract, the Buyer will accept a prorated delivery with other buyers of the potatoes covered by similar contracts without any claim for damages against the Seller. Seller will grant Buyer all necessary rights to insure and verify that he is receiving his fair and just pro-rate share. Such rights to include, but not limited to, inspection of all records, books, field reports, shipments, etc. Burden of proof rests with Sellers. Finally, paragraph 11 of the contract provided in part that "the terms of this contract cannot be re-negotiated without the written consent of the Buyer and the Seller." Thus, under the terms of the contract, petitioners were obliged to "have sufficient amount of potatoes to cover all contracts". However, if an Act of God prevented the seller from "deliver(ing) the full amount of potatoes called for in (the) contract", the seller was excused from full performance and could prorate its crop. Under those circumstances, respondent was required to "accept a prorated delivery with other buyers of the potatoes covered by similar contracts." In this case, there were no other buyers of potatoes covered by similar contracts. Finally, except for changes approved in writing by both parties, the terms of the contract could not be changed. Petitioners planted their crop on February 2 and 10, 1991. At that time, the brothers hoped to harvest 16,000 bags of potatoes, or around 267 bags per acre. Although the average yield per acre for Atlantic type potatoes in the area had been between 250 and 270 bags, most growers assume a more conservative yield of around 200 bags per acre to insure that all contractual requirements can be met. Here, however, except for a contract with respondent, petitioners had no other contracts with other dealers or individuals. When the contract was signed in January, the brothers expected to sell the remainder of their crop to other buyers on the open market. In this regard, they entered into an agreement (presumably verbal) with their father, who had co-signed the bank note, to split the net proceeds on all sales over and above that required under the G & G Sales Corporation contract. This latter agreement with the father was not a "similar contract" within the meaning of paragraph 6 of the contract and thus the G & G Sales Corporation contract is found to be the only relevant contract for crop year 1991. On April 23, 1991, a severe thunderstorm swept through a part of Putnam County. The storm was accompanied by high winds and hail and followed a path which ran through the potato farm belt in East Palatka. The Circle S farm, which lies about one-half mile from petitioner's farm, was "devastated" by the storm. Petitioners' farm received high winds, heavy rains and some hail. The extent of damage caused by the storm to petitioners' farm is in dispute, but it is agreed that the storm diminished the size of the crop. As it turned out, petitioners dug only 8,802 bags of potatoes, which still exceeded the amount required under their only contract. After the storm struck, Mark Mast immediately contacted Wilkerson by telephone and advised him that the farm had been hit with hail and asked that Wilkerson and Girsbirger survey the damage. On April 24, 1991, Wilkerson and Girsbirger visited the farm and found it "very wet" and muddy but the leaves on the plants still intact. This level of damage was generally corroborated by various other witnesses. Although the above conditions were present at that time, it was still impossible then for anyone to forecast exactly how the storm impacted the volume and quality of petitioners' crop. Most potato farmers purchase crop insurance prior to each farming season. A farmer has the option of purchasing either 50%, 65% or 75% coverage, although 65% coverage is the most common. This means that a farmer must lose at least 50%, 35% or 25% of his crop due to weather or insects in order to file a claim. The amount of insurance is based on a function of the percent of crop the farmer wishes to insure times the value per hundred weight of the crop. For first year farmers, such as petitioners, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) establishes a designated yield per acre which is based on FCIC's estimate, albeit conservative, of what the average yield should be. In the case of petitioners, who purchased 65% coverage, the FCIC (and insurer) set a designated yield of 184 bags per acre which meant petitioner would have a crop approximating 184 hundred weight per acre. Although petitioners had a crop insurance policy in 1991, they did not file a claim after the April 23 storm since they failed to meet the threshold requirements for coverage. Indeed, the local crop insurance agent visited the farm shortly after the storm and verified there was not enough damage to file a claim. However, he noted that there was excessive water for a few days and some of the leaves on the vines had holes caused by the hail. Between May 4 and 18, 1991, petitioners sold respondent nine loads of potatoes totaling 4,101 bags at a price of $5.75 per bag. During the period from April 30, 1991, through May 18, 1991, they sold ten other loads on the open market to two other buyers. The open market sales totaled 4,701.2 bags. Because potato prices had dramatically increased after the contract was executed, nine of these latter loads were sold at an open market price of $19 per bag while one was sold at a price of $18.50 per bag, for a total of $88,806. Petitioners contend respondent agreed that the above ten loads could be sold on the open market and thus it should not be heard now to complain that it was shorted on the contract. In this regard, the evidence shows that after the storm, which is the time period relevant to this contention, Wilkerson told Mark Mast that he had no problem with petitioners selling any extra potatoes on the open market as long as respondent received its 8,000 bags. Girsbirger also advised the Masts that it was okay to sell ten loads of potatoes on the open market if production was 200 bags per acre. However, he cautioned them to sell no more than four loads on the open market if the yield fell to 180 to 185 bags per acre since the remainder would be necessary to meet the terms of the contract. Thus, it is found that respondent did not agree to the sale of the ten loads on the open market if total production did not exceed 8,000 bags. Around May 3, 1991, Mark Mast approached Wilkerson and asked if respondent would renegotiate the contract price upward. Wilkerson declined to do so. On May 6, Mast sent Wilkerson a notice by registered mail advising him that due to the crop loss, which he estimated to be one-third of the crop, he intended to adjust the contract pursuant to paragraph 6 of the contract and supply only two-thirds of the 8,000 bags. This unilateral offer to modify the contract was never accepted by respondent, and in any event, petitioners failed to supply the amount offered in their May 6 letter. In all, respondent received only 51.3% of its contracted amount of 8,000 bags. Petitioners allocated respondent this amount on the theory they had originally planned to sell one-half of their total anticipated crop of 16,000 bags to respondent, that one-half of the anticipated crop was lost in the storm, and thus respondent should receive only one-half of the remaining crop, or around 4,000 bags. At hearing, petitioners defended this decision by treating the April 23 storm as an Act of God within the meaning of paragraph 6 of the contract. However, reliance on this provision was inappropriate since, despite the effects of the storm, petitioners could still deliver the full amount of potatoes called for in the contract. The testimony is in conflict as to whether petitioners offered respondent more than 4,101 bags during the harvest season. At various times, respondent was offered several "extra" loads at the market price of $19 per bag but declined since it still wanted the contract honored. According to petitioners, they were ready to load a truck on two occasions but respondent failed to send a truck. Respondent denies this assertion. In addition, petitioners claim that a truck arrived late one Sunday afternoon when their farm equipment was inoperable and thus they could not load any potatoes. Conversely, Wilkerson contended that Mark telephoned him on several occasions and told him not to send a truck because Mark was loading for "another contract". Accordingly, it is found that petitioners offered respondent only the 4,101 bags at the contract price but that additional loads were offered at the substantially higher open market price. After receiving the 4,101 bags, respondent presented petitioners a check dated June 17, 1991, in the amount of $4,777.92 as full payment for the 4,101 bags of potatoes. The check carried the notation "The undersigned, upon cashing check, accepts payment in full for attached invoices, with no recourse." It was never cashed by petitioners. Attached to the check was an invoice which calculated the $4,777.92 in the following manner. Respondent first calculated $23,598 by multiplying 4,101 bags times $5.75 per bag and then subtracted $82.08 for "Not Pat dues", an amount not explained but nonetheless unchallenged by petitioners. It then deducted $19,038 from that total for a net amount due of $4,777.92. The latter deduction of $19,038 represented a set-off for damages incurred by respondent in having to buy potatoes elsewhere by virtue of petitioners failing to supply the contracted amount of potatoes. It was calculated by assuming that petitioners would supply 2/3 (or 68%) of its commitment, or 5,440 bags. 1/ Since only 4,104 bags were delivered, this amounted to a shortage of 1,336 bags. Respondent represented, without contradiction, that it had to replace this shortage at the same price which petitioners received for non-contract sales on the open market. Respondent assumed that petitioners sold their potatoes at an open market price of $20, or $14.25 more than the contract price. Thus, it deducted 1,336 x $14.25, or $19,038 from the final payment. In actuality, petitioners sold the bulk of those potatoes at a price of $19 per bag. Thus, respondent's set-off should have been $17,702 rather than $19,038. This amount of set-off ($17,702) is deemed to be reasonable and should be subtracted from the amount owed by respondent to petitioners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services requiring respondent to pay petitioners $5,813.92 within thirty days of date of final order. Otherwise, the surety should be required to pay that amount. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1992. 1/ For purposes of determining damages, respondent decided that petitioners were entitled to some relief under the contract due to the storm. Accordingly, respondent assumed that it would receive only two-thirds of the contract requirement. APPENDIX Petitioners: 1. Covered in the preliminary statement. 2. Accepted in finding of fact 2. 3-4. Accepted in finding of fact 1. 5. Accepted in finding of fact 2. 6. Accepted in finding of fact 3. 7-8. Accepted in finding of fact 4. 9. Accepted in finding of fact 3. 10. Accepted in finding of fact 5. Accepted in findings of fact 1 and 5. Accepted in finding of fact 6. 13-14. Accepted in finding of fact 7. Accepted in finding of fact 8. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. The remainder has been rejected as being contrary to the more persuasive evidence. Partially accepted in findings of fact 11 and 12. Accepted in finding of fact 11. Accepted in finding of fact 9. 21-22. Accepted in finding of fact 14. Accepted in finding of fact 6. Rejected as being contrary to more persuasive evidence. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6 but this finding does not excuse performance under the contract. See finding of fact 12. Respondent: * Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. The remainder is covered in the preliminary statement. Accepted in finding of fact 1. Accepted in findings of fact 2 and 3. Accepted in finding of fact 4. Accepted in findings of fact 3 and 5. 6-8. Accepted in finding of fact 7. 9-10. Accepted in finding of fact 10. Accepted in finding of fact 7. Accepted in finding of fact 9. Accepted in finding of fact 14. * Respondent G & G Sales Corporation filed thirteen unnumbered paragraphs containing proposed findings of fact. The paragraphs have been numbered 1-13 by the undersigned for the purpose of making these rulings. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe C. Miller, II P. O. Box 803 Palatka, Florida 32178-0803 Ronald W. Brown, Esquire 66 Cuna Street, Suite B St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Bureau of License & Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Charles T. Shad, Esquire 601 Blackstone Building East Bay & Market Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (on behalf of St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.) Richard A. Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture & Consumer Affairs The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: In January, 1990, the Respondent filed an application for credit with the Petitioner. The terms and conditions of the credit application provided: "All written 'Terms and Conditions of Sale' on invoices, statements, contracts or other written agreements must be observed and performed as stated." Further, the application provided: Payment of all amounts due shall be made not later than 30 days from the billing date. Amounts in default will be subject to a SERVICE CHARGE of 1 1/2 % per month (18 % Per Annum) on the unpaid balance. Failure to make payment within terms will result in cancellation of credit. Following acceptance of that application, Respondent sought to purchase sod from Petitioner's LaBelle sod farm. Invoices issued by Petitioner to Respondent at the time of the delivery of the sod provided that the amounts owed would be payable upon receipt of invoice. Further, the printed invoice required the purchaser to make claims within 24 hours of delivery or pick up. The invoices reiterated the 18 percent service charge for past due accounts. From December, 1990, through January 17, 1991, Respondent purchased and accepted in excess of $45,000 worth of sod from the Petitioner. The invoices for those purchases are identified in this record as Petitioner's exhibit 2. From January 30, 1991 until March 4, 1991, Respondent purchased and accepted $4,664.00 worth of sod from the Petitioner. The invoices for those purchases are identified in the record as Petitioner's exhibit 3. In February, 1991, when the Petitioner became concerned about nonpayment for the amounts claimed, contact with the Respondent was made for the purpose of resolving the matter. When those efforts failed to secure payment, the Petitioner instituted action through the Department of Agriculture against the Respondent's bond. The Petitioner claimed $45,080.25 was due for the invoices prior to January 30, 1991. The Petitioner claimed $4,664.00 was owed for the invoices subsequent to January 30, 1991. Subsequent to its claims, Petitioner received payments from the Respondent in the following amounts: $5,000.00 on March 11, 1991; $5,000 on March 26, 1991; and $2,000.00 on April 30, 1991. Applying the total of those payments ($12,000) to the indebtedness on the first claim reduces that amount to $33,080.25. Prior to the claims being filed, Respondent had notified Petitioner that some sod deliveries had been unacceptable because of the quality of the sod or the amount. Respondent claimed the Petitioner had "shorted" the square footage amounts per pallet so that Respondent was being charged for a pallet that did not contain the requisite square footage of sod. On one occasion, in January, 1991, the Petitioner gave Respondent a credit in the amount of $1,173.75 for either refund on poor quality sod or a shortage. The Respondent continued to purchase sod from Petitioner until its credit was no longer accepted by Petitioner, i.e. March 4, 1991. Respondent did not, within 24 hours of receipt of sod, make a claim regarding the quality of the sod or the amount. By letter dated March 14, 1991, the Respondent, through its attorney, advised Petitioner as follows: St. Amour Sod Services, Inc., does not dispute the balance due to you as set forth in your letter and they will pay same in payments that are being determined now. For your information, the balance accrued because of the loss of several of our customers resulting from the poor quality of sod purchased from your firm. Respondent did not timely challenge the quality of the sod accepted, and did not present evidence regarding its alleged poor quality.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order finding that Respondent is indebted to Petitioner in the amounts of $33,080.25 and $4,664.00, with service charge to be computed through the date of the final order; directing Respondent to make payment of the amounts to Petitioner within 15 days following the issuance of the order; and, notifying all parties that if such payment is not timely made, the Department will seek recovery from Respondent's surety, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1992. APPENDIX TO CASE NOS. 91-6388A AND 91-6389A RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY PETITIONER: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 4 are accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT: Paragraph 1 is accepted. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence or unsupported by the record in this case. With regard to paragraph 5, that portion of the paragraph which states the amount of payments made by Respondent ($12,000) is accepted. Otherwise, rejected as stated in 2. above. COPIES FURNISHED: Barry L. Miller P.O. Box 1966 Orlando, FL 32802 Gary A. Ralph 2272 Airport Rd. South, Ste. 101 Naples, FL 33962 Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Dept. of Agriculture & Consumer Svcs. The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Aetna Casualty & Surety Company Attn: Legal Dept. 151 Farmington Ave. Hartford, CT 06156
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner (complainant) is entitled to recover $10,134.72 or any part thereof against Respondents dealer and surety company.
Findings Of Fact This cause is governed by the four corners of the November 2, 1993 complaint. It involves only two loads out of twenty loads of potatoes. Petitioners are growers of potatoes and qualify as "producers" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondent A.F. Business Brokerage is a broker-shipper of potatoes and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. A.F. Business Brokerage, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of brokering (purchasing and re-selling) potatoes and operates under one or more of the following names: A.F. Business Brokerage, Inc., Washburn Corp., and/or Ben Albert Farms. The contract at issue herein listed the name of the broker as "Albert Farms d/b/a Washburn Corporation." Payments made by the Respondent broker to Petitioner for potatoes received under the terms of the contract were in the form of checks drawn on the account of A.F. Business Brokerage, Inc. For purposes of this litigation, "Albert Farms d/b/a Washburn Corporation," and "A.F. Business Brokerage, Inc." will be considered as describing the same party. Although Titan Indemnity Company received notice of the filing of Petitioner's Complaint and failed to request a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S., no evidence or admission was presented at formal hearing which would permit a finding that Titan Indemnity Company was surety for Respondent A.F. Business Brokerage at all times material. That is not to say that Titan Indemnity is found not to be the surety for Respondent A.F. Business Brokerage. The foregoing finding only means that this case in the administrative forum cannot resolve the issue of indemnity as between Respondents because insufficient evidence on that issue has been presented, and it may be necessary for that issue to be litigated in Circuit Court pursuant to the surety contract/bond, if any. On or about December 28, 1992, Petitioner and Respondent broker confirmed in writing the terms of a telephoned agreement, whereby Petitioner agreed to sell and the broker agreed to purchase twenty truckloads of potatoes. The agreement/contract, prepared by Respondent broker was titled "Standard Confirmation of Sale". It specified in pertinent parts: "Unless the seller or buyer makes immediate objection upon receipt of his copy of this Standard Confirmation of Sale, showing that contract was made contrary to authority given the Broker, he shall be conclusively presumed to agree that the terms of sale as set forth herein are fully and correctly stated. Sale made (F.O.B. or Delivered): F.O.B. Special Agreement, if any: Potatoes shipped are for potato chipping and must cook on arrival to be subject to this agreement. This confirmation is issued and accepted in agreement with, and subject to the rules and regulations and definitions of terms as recognized and approved by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture under the Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act. *4 Truckloads chipping potatoes, April $7.75 FOB 16 Truckloads chipping potatoes, May, June $7.00 FOB *Loads not shipped by seller in April apply to May, June portions of agreement." (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Under Section 672.319 F.S., The Uniform Commercial Code, the abbreviation "F.O.B." means "free on board" and is interpreted differently, dependent upon what words follow the abbreviation. Regardless of what words follow the abbreviation, the term "F.O.B." places shipping responsibility and shipping costs upon a "seller" as opposed to the one accepting delivery, the ultimate buyer. Testimony and arguments by the parties at formal hearing and in their respective proposals suggest that if "F.O.B." had been used by itself, in place of the word "delivered," and without more, the contract would have signified that sale herein occurred at the time of pickup in the field by the broker/shipper, and that title to the produce would have transferred from the producer to the broker/shipper at that point in time as opposed to title transferring at the time the broker/shipper delivered the produce to its ultimate destination. However, here, the Respondent broker elected the term "F.O.B." and rejected the term "Delivered," and also added the requirement that the potatoes cook to chips at their destination. Petitioner made potatoes available for pick up by the broker at Petitioner's fields beginning in May, 1993 in accord with the contract and the price specified therein. Without incident, the broker picked up and accepted the first eighteen loads of potatoes which it had agreed to purchase. All arrangements for shipment of the potatoes at issue were controlled and paid for by the Respondent broker. These arrangements made and controlled by the Respondent broker included the method of transportation, the exact date when the potatoes would be picked-up from Petitioner's fields, the place to which the potatoes ultimately would be transported, and the time during which the potatoes would remain "in transit". This unilateral control by the broker suggests that the parties were treating the potatoes as if title thereto had passed to Respondent broker when it picked them up in Petitioner's field and clearly shows that the broker had control over what condition the potatoes were in when they reached the retailer at their ultimate destination. As of the time Petitioner began to honor the contract by making potatoes available for pick up by the broker, Petitioner could have sold potatoes on the "open market" for $25.00 per hundred-weight instead of the $7.00 per hundred-weight called for under the terms of the contract. Nonetheless, Petitioner honored its contract with Respondent broker by making potatoes available to the Respondent broker and by reserving a sufficient amount of Petitioner's crop so as to fulfill the entire contract with Respondent broker. As of the time the Respondent broker made arrangements for pick up of the last two loads of potatoes, potatoes on the open market were selling for $1.75 per hundred-weight, meaning that the broker was paying Petitioner more for potatoes under the terms of their contract than the broker would have had to pay to purchase similar potatoes on the "open market". Respondent broker contacted Petitioner immediately prior to June 17, 1993 and asked that Petitioner cancel the contract between them because of the reduced price potatoes were yielding on the open market. Petitioner rejected the proposal. This strongly suggests that the Respondent broker felt bound by the contract to pay Petitioner at the rate agreed under the contract regardless of what rate the broker sold the potatoes for upon delivery and also suggests that the parties were treating the potatoes as if title to the potatoes passed to the Respondent broker when the broker picked up the potatoes in Petitioner's field. The date selected by the Respondent broker for pick up of the last two loads of potatoes was unusual. The broker picked up the last two loads of potatoes on Thursday, June 17, 1993. However, the Respondent broker's standard practice was not to pick up potatoes in St. Johns County, Florida on Thursdays because of the increased risk that potatoes loaded in the fields on Thursdays would reach the ultimate retail destination assigned by this particular broker at a time when processing plants in that locale would be closed for the weekend, thereby increasing the time the loaded potatoes would remain enclosed in the transport truck and accordingly increasing the risk of spoilage. The method of transport selected by the Respondent broker for the potatoes loaded June 17, 1993 was also unusual and destined to increase the risk of spoilage. On that occasion, the broker sent "pigs" a/k/a "piggy-back rail cars" rather than conventional trucks or refrigerated trucks. On June 17, 1993, Petitioner also loaded two trucks for H.C. Schmieding Produce, a broker not involved in this litigation. Petitioner's potatoes loaded upon Schmieding's trucks and the potatoes loaded on Respondent broker's trucks came from the same fields and "lot" of potatoes. One of Schmieding's trucks was loaded before Respondent broker's trucks, and one of Schmieding's trucks was loaded after Respondent broker's trucks. The potatoes purchased and loaded by Schmieding on June 17, 1993 were received in good condition in Illinois and Tennessee, respectively, and Petitioner received full payment for them. Respondent broker's loads were ultimately refused in Massachusetts. June 21-23, 1993 were all weekdays, and presumably "work days." The best date that can be reconstructed for the date that the potatoes in question were dumped by the Respondent broker is June 22 or 23, 1993, so their "arrival" in Massachusetts must have preceded dumping. By undated letter postmarked June 28, 1994, the Respondent broker notified Petitioner of the rejection of the two loads of potatoes picked up by the Respondent broker from Petitioner on June 17, 1993. The letter also informed Petitioner of the broker's intent to assess charges for inspection and dumping of the potatoes and of the broker's intention not to pay Petitioner for the potatoes. This letter was the first notice received by Petitioner advising of the rejection of the two loads of potatoes in question, 1/ and contained a copy of a U. S. Department of Agriculture Inspection Report dated June 22, 1993 showing 60-100 percent soft rot. 2/ Petitioner's principal had left his home and place of business on June 24, 1993, a date clearly 24 to 48 hours after dumping had already occurred and probably much longer after arrival of the potatoes in Massachusetts. Petitioner did not learn of the Respondent broker's June 28, 1993 letter or the Inspection until July 4, 1993. By July 4, 1993 Petitioner had terminated all harvest operations and was not able to tender two replacement loads of potatoes to the broker. As of the time that Petitioner received the June 28, 1994 notice that the two loads in question were being rejected, the Respondent broker had already disposed of the potatoes. Consequently, Petitioner had no opportunity to avail itself of any alternative or other option regarding disposition of the potatoes. Prompt notification of the broker's rejection of the two loads of potatoes might have allowed Petitioner to negate its losses by marketing the potatoes at a reduced price to other processing plants in Massachusetts or to tender two replacement loads of potatoes to the Respondent broker. After all deductions and calculations, the rejected two loads of potatoes resulted in damages of $10,135.47 to Petitioner producer.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Agriculture enter a final order that: Awards Petitioners $10,134.42 and binds A.F. Business Brokerage Inc. d/b/a Albert Farms d/b/a Washburn Corporation to pay the full amount to Petitioner. Sets out any administrative recourse Petitioner or Respondent broker may have against Titan Indeminity Co. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of July, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1994.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners own and operate a farm in St. Johns County, Florida. During the 1991 potato-growing season, they grew atlantic chipping potatoes on their 400-acre farm, as well as on approximately 30 acres leased from another party by their daughter and son-in-law. The Petitioners' business is known as Pacetti Farms. Rubin is an Illinois corporation licensed to do business in Florida as a broker or dealer in agricultural products. Rubin customarily purchases potatoes from growers throughout the country at the appropriate season for resale, typically to various potato chip manufacturing companies. Mr. Rubin appeared at the hearing and testified on behalf of Rubin and as an adverse witness on behalf of the Petitioners. Rubin is licensed and bonded with a surety bond from Continental in accordance with the statutory authority cited below, enforced and regulated by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("Department"). On December 22, 1990, the Petitioners and Rubin entered into a written contract for the sale and purchase of 50,000 CWT of Florida atlantic chipping potatoes. That contract is in evidence as Exhibit 3 and is also known as the "set price contract". The contract called for shipment of the potatoes at a stated price of $6.35 per CWT, although the parties have stipulated and agreed that the actual contract price was intended as $6.00 per CWT. That figure is not in dispute in this proceeding. Shipment was to be made during the harvesting season between the dates of April 27, 1991 and June 15, 1991. The contract contained an escape clause or exception for "acts of God", with an explanatory parenthetic clause indicating that that was intended to mean circumstances beyond the control of the parties, such as flood, freeze, hail, etc. On or about February 15, 1991, severe cold weather struck the potato- growing area of St. Johns County, Florida. Temperatures ranged from 25 degrees to 19 degrees on that day, with a high wind blowing and very dry conditions. This resulted in soil being blown away from the newly-set potatoes under very cold temperatures. Because of this, the Petitioners had to work with tractors and cultivators far into the night to turn the blown-away soil back into the potato "sets". The Petitioners feared that this would cause some "dry eyes" and, therefore, lowered potato plant and potato production. In fact, however, upon observing the maturing plants during April of 1991, it appeared that the Petitioners would have a healthy, normal crop. The prior year the Petitioners had grown 133,000 CWT of potatoes on their 400 acres (excluding the Kirkers' 30 acres). With this background of an apparently-healthy crop in mind, the Petitioners were approached by Rubin on April 25, 1991 and negotiations ensued which resulted in the sale and purchase from Petitioners to Rubin of six additional loads of potatoes at the open market price of $19.50 per CWT. The six additional loads were in addition to the 50,000 CWT of potatoes agreed upon in the main contract entered into on December 22, 1990. This separate oral agreement for the six loads of potatoes at the market price of $19.50 per CWT was entered into prior to the Petitioners initiating delivery under the terms of the written contract of December 22, 1990. The parties thus agreed for the sale and purchase of six loads of potatoes at that market price to be delivered on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday of the following week, April 29th, April 30th, and May 1, 1991. Part of the consideration for that oral contract was the Petitioners' ability to furnish the six truckloads of potatoes on short notice, on the dates that Rubin required them. In other words, Rubin needed them in a hurry; and it was apparently worth $19.50 per CWT for him to get the potatoes delivered immediately on the dates requested. In the process of negotiating this oral contract, the Petitioners assured Rubin that he would have sufficient potatoes to meet his 50,000 CWT obligation under the written contract of December 22, 1990. This was not a misrepresentation on the part of the Petitioners, at this time, because the Petitioners, in good faith, believed they would be able to meet the 50,000 CWT set price contract and the oral contract for six additional truckloads, because of their belief concerning their crop estimate. This belief was based upon their observance of an apparently healthy crop and their knowledge that on their 400 acres, the year before, they had grown 133,000 CWT, as well as upon their knowledge that a normal crop estimate for the entire 430 acres at this location, under all of the prevailing circumstances, was 120,400 CWT. In fact, the Petitioners only contracted for 116,650 CWT of potatoes which, based upon a reasonable and appropriate crop estimate for this site and circumstances, would have allowed them to meet all their contracts, including the 50,000 CWT contract between the Petitioners and Rubin, although not all of the market sales for the Kirkers. After having thus assured Mr. Rubin that they could meet the contract of December 22, 1990 and still perform the oral contract for the six truckloads at market price, the Petitioners proceeded to carry out that oral agreement. It was a separate and distinct contract from the written contract dated December 22, 1990. Under the separate oral contract, they delivered the six truckloads of potatoes requested by Rubin. Rubin received them and paid $19.50 per CWT for them. On May 2, 1990, the Petitioners began delivering potatoes to Rubin under the terms and conditions of the written contract of December 22, 1990 and continued the deliveries throughout the remainder of the harvesting season. The first was shipped from Pacetti Farms on May 2, 1991 and the last load delivered to Rubin on that contract was shipped on June 1, 1991. During the 1991 growing and harvesting season, the area, including St. Johns County, experienced substantial crop damage due to excessive frost, rain, hail, and wind, which occurred during February of 1991 and then after April 25, 1991, with particular regard to excessive rainfall in May of 1991. This resulted in the area being declared an agricultural disaster area by the United States Department of Agriculture for that growing season. The Petitioners suffered damage to their crop as a result of these elements in February of 1991, as described above, and by excessive rainfall during May of 1991. Excessive rainfall caused root damage to their crop, which resulted in a lowered yield even though the plants viewed above ground appeared to be normal. This was aggravated by the fact that the Petitioners and other growers were legally unable to use the pesticide "Temik", for control of nematodes, during that growing season. Because of the nature of the crop involved, which grows underground, the potato yield is difficult to estimate at any given point in harvesting. The exact nature and extent of damage caused by weather conditions to a single crop is hard to estimate in advance. This difficulty is further compounded by differing soil types and climate conditions present within a particular growing area, especially with regard to farmers such as the Petitioners, who have their crops spread over multiple fields and farms. In mid-May of 1991, the Petitioners realized that there would be a crop shortage. The crop was damaged due to the weather-related factors mentioned above. The Petitioners notified Rubin that they expected their potato crop to fall short of expectations and that they would probably be unable to completely fill the contract with Rubin for the entire 50,000 CWT contracted for on December 22, 1990. In the meantime, before the 1991 planting season began, the Petitioners and Renee and Keith Kirker had entered into an agreement, whereby the Kirkers initiated their own farming operation on 30 acres of potato-growing land. The Kirkers leased that acreage from Diane Ross and received operating assistance from the Petitioners in the form of advances of all their operating costs, pursuant to an agreement between the Petitioners and the Kirkers, whereby the Petitioners would be repaid the estimated production costs for that 30-acre crop in the amount of $1,776.85 per acre, upon the sale of those 30 acres of potatoes. Potatoes are planted and harvested in the same sequence. Since the Petitioners assisted the Kirkers in planting their potatoes prior to the planting and completion of their own fields, the Petitioners borrowed some of the Kirkers' potatoes to fill their own contracts because those potatoes matured earlier, with the understanding that the Kirkers would be repaid in kind from the Petitioners' own fields during the remainder of the harvesting season. This is a common practice according to Ronald Brown, who testified for the Petitioners as an expert witness on farming practices. However, after the heavy rains in May of 1991, the Petitioners discovered that it would be necessary, in their view, to retain a portion of their last acreage in order to have potatoes to pay back the Kirkers for the potatoes borrowed. These potatoes would be sold by the Petitioners at market price, as agreed with the Kirkers. Upon discovering that their crop would not meet their contract obligations, the Petitioners attempted to prorate their remaining potatoes between their remaining contract customers in what they considered a fair and reasonable manner. On behalf of the Kirkers, the potatoes allocated for repayment to them were offered to Rubin, who, through its President, Mr. Rubin, declined to purchase them at the market price at which they were offered (higher than the contract price). The Petitioners' expert, Ronald Brown, established that, based upon accepted growers practices and his experience in the Hastings area, the Petitioners should have anticipated the yield for their 1991 crop at no more than 280 CWT per acre for the Petitioners' 430 acres (30 acres of which was the Kirkers' land). It is customary farming practice in the area, according to Brown, to enter into contracts for no more than 80% of the maximum anticipated yield of potatoes. The anticipated yield on the entire 430 acres of the Petitioners' and the Kirkers' land was, therefore, 120,400 CWT of potatoes. The principle of contracting no more than 80% of a maximum anticipated yield is designed to protect contracting parties in the event a smaller than anticipated yield occurs. A 280 CWT per acre yield is the generally-accepted yield amount under good growing conditions, according to Mr. Brown. The year before, the Petitioners had produced a total yield of 133,000 CWT on only 400 acres. The Petitioners entered into a total of six separate contracts for delivery of a total of 116,650 CWT of potatoes out of a reasonably anticipated maximum yield for the 430 acres of only 120,400 CWT. Thus, the Petitioners contracted 97% of the customary, accepted, anticipated maximum yield for the 430 acres for 1991. Thirty (30) of those acres, however, represent the potatoes which the Petitioners were obligated to the Kirkers to sell on their behalf at market price, rather than contract price. In spite of the fact that the Petitioners contracted 97% of the accepted, projected crop yield for 430 acres, the Petitioners, in fact, produced 117,000 CWT (approximate) on those 430 acres. Therefore, had they not diverted a certain amount of the crop to open market sales, they could have met their 116,650 CWT contractual obligations to the six contracting parties, including Rubin. It is also true, however, that that 117,000 CWT actual yield included the 30 acres of potatoes which the Petitioners were separately obligated to sell at open market price to repay the Kirkers. Notwithstanding the fact that the Petitioners had contracted 97% of the commonly-accepted, projected maximum yield, the Petitioners diverted 10,301.6 CWT of the 1991 crop on the entire 430 acres from contract sales to open market sales at much higher prices. Of those open market sales, 2,789.5 CWT were sold at market price after the last contract sales were made to Rubin. Had the Petitioners sold the entire 10,301.6 CWT of potatoes on contract, instead of at open market, all of the Petitioners' contractual requirements could have been met, including the contract with Rubin, although they would not then have been able to meet their obligations to the Kirkers. Based upon the above Findings of Fact supported by competent evidence, it is found that the preponderant evidence in this case does not support the Petitioners' contention that the Petitioners were unable to fulfill their contract obligation to Rubin due to an act of God. Although it is true that the Petitioners established that poor weather conditions, coupled with the absence of the ability to use the pesticide "Temik", had a deleterious effect on their crop production. The record shows that in spite of this, the Petitioners had the ability to fulfill their contract with Rubin if only approximately 5,000 CWT of the 10,301.6 CWT of potatoes sold on the open market had instead been allocated to the Petitioners' contract with Rubin to fill out the difference between the approximately 45,000 CWT honored under the contract and the contractual obligation to supply 50,000 CWT. The Petitioners produced on their own 400 acres 108,000 CWT. The remainder of the 117,582.5 CWT of potatoes from the total crop represented the potatoes grown on the Kirkers' 30 acres. Thus, the Kirkers' land produced approximately 8,600 CWT. The Petitioners supplied approximately 3,000 CWT under the separate, oral contract at market price and which were delivered to Rubin on April 29th, 30th, and May 1st (six loads at approximately 500 CWT per load). Then, the Petitioners sold the remainder of the total of 10,301.6 CWT of the entire Pacetti/Kirker crop or approximately 7,301.6 CWT on open market sales to others. The remainder of the 108,000 CWT grown on the Petitioners' own 400 acres, not sold to Rubin under the contract of December 22, 1990 or under the oral contract of April 25, 1991 (the six loads at market), were contracted out to other buyers. The ultimate effect of these contracts was that the Petitioners had contracted for 116,650 CWT. Thus, the Petitioners had imprudently contracted approximately 97% of the accepted, projected crop yield of 120,400 CWT, knowing that they were obligated to sell the Kirkers 8,600 or so CWT at market price and not on contract. Thus, the Petitioners clearly over- contracted the crop yield which they reasonably should have expected on the total 430 acres under the generally-accepted method of calculation of crop yield, under good growing conditions, of 280 CWT per acre, established by expert witness, Brown. This over-contracting practice, together with selling an excess amount of potatoes at market price (over and above those sold at market by the separate, oral contract with Rubin at the initial part of the harvesting season), is what actually prevented the Petitioners from fulfilling Rubin's contract of 50,000 CWT, rather than an act of God, predetermined condition for claiming impossibility of performance on that contract due to the above- described weather conditions. Even though the Petitioners were obligated to sell the Kirkers' entire 30 acres of yield, approximately 8,600 CWT, at market price, the Petitioners would still have had enough potatoes, even with their less-than-expected yield of 108,000 CWT represented by their own 400 acres, to have filled out the Rubin contract if they had not contracted out so many potatoes to other contracting buyers and had not sold as many potatoes at market price off contract as, indeed, they sold. Since the act of God condition is not what prevented the Petitioners from filling the written contract with Rubin for 50,000 CWT, it is clear that the Petitioners thus breached that contract. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the written contract with Rubin was entered into before any of the other contracts for the potato crop in question. The two contracts with Rubin are, however, separate contracts. The Petitioners established that there was a separate oral agreement entered into on April 25th between the Petitioners and Rubin and that the consideration flowing from the Petitioners to Mr. Rubin was that he needed the six loads of potatoes on short notice delivered on specific dates, April 29th, 30th, and May 1st, for which he was willing, therefore, to pay the $19.50 market price, knowing that it was for other potatoes that he contracted at $6.00. The Petitioners performed by providing the loads of potatoes when he wanted them and he paid for them in full. Thus, that contract was executed by consideration passing from each party to the other, and the contract was completed. The written contract with Rubin dated December 22, 1990 for the 50,000 CWT was the contract which the Petitioners breached for the above-found reasons. Rubin would, therefore, be entitled to damages for that breach based upon the facts proven in this case. There is no counterclaim or other action pending in this forum by Rubin against the Petitioners, however. Consequently, any damages proven by the breach of the written contract can only, at best, be applied against the amount due and owing the Petitioners for the billed, but unpaid, loads; that is, against the amount in controversy of $40,015.20. Rubin, however, has not produced any evidence to show what his damages might be. The record establishes, as found above, that, of the 48,361 CWT of potatoes delivered to Rubin, approximately 3,000 of which were delivered under the separate oral contract for six loads, Rubin only received approximately 45,000 CWT under the 50,000 CWT written contract. Thus, Rubin would appear to be entitled to damages caused by failing to get the last approximately 5,000 CWT of potatoes. The record, however, does not establish what those damages might be because it is not established whether Rubin had to purchase potatoes from another source at a higher price to meet the remainder of the 50,000 CWT amount, or, conversely, whether Rubin was able to purchase them from another source at a lower price than the $6.00 per CWT contract price, so that Rubin would actually benefit by the Petitioners' breach of that contract. Neither does the record reflect another possible scenario whereby Rubin might have simply accepted the approximate 5,000 CWT shortage and simply lost customers and potential profits represented by that amount of potatoes, or, finally, whether he simply did not purchase the shortage of 5,000 CWT from another source and had no missed sales for that amount of potatoes anyway and, therefore, no loss and no damage. The record simply does not reflect what Rubin's damages might have been because of the shortage under the written contract deliveries. In any event, the record evidence establishes that the oral contract was fully performed, with consideration flowing to each of the parties and that those potatoes were fully paid for at the market price. Then, the Petitioners delivered the written contract loads at $6.00 per CWT to Rubin represented by the claimed $40,015.00. That remains unpaid by Rubin. Rubin is obligated to pay that amount because Rubin was obligated to, and received those potatoes at the $6.00 contract price. Rubin would then appear to be entitled to claim damages if, indeed, any were suffered, for the breach of that written contract by the Petitioners' failure to supply the last (approximate) 5,000 CWT due Rubin under that contract. That resolution of their dispute, however, cannot be performed in this forum because of insufficient evidence, as delineated above, and remains to be resolved by another action by Rubin in another forum.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Respondents, Jack Rubin & Son, Inc. and Continental Casualty Co., Inc. be found jointly and severally liable for payment of $40,015.20 to the Petitioners for potatoes delivered to the Respondent, Jack Rubin & Son, Inc., for which payment has not yet been made. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-548A Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact 1-16. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter because the evidence establishes that 30 acres of potatoes belonged to the Kirkers even though Pacetti Farms was responsible for all operations with regard to planting and harvesting those 30 acres, furnishing costs, operational expertise, equipment and labor as an advance against the Kirkers' crop sale. 2-5. Accepted, except that it is not found that the entire 430 acres of potatoes were the Petitioners' potatoes. 30 acres of potatoes belonged to the Kirkers. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence, to the extent that the 97% of the accepted projected crop yield contracted for by the Petitioners represents an inclusion of the 30 acres of the Kirkers' potatoes in that percentage of crop yield projection. This is erroneous because the 30 acres were the Kirkers' potatoes which the Petitioners were handling for them. Accepted in concept, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esq. General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 John Michael Traynor, Esquire Charles E. Pellicer, Esquire 28 Cordova Street St. Augustine, Florida 32084 C. Holt Smith, III, Esquire 3100 University Boulevard So. Suite 101 Jacksonville, FL 32016
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent owes Petitioner money for watermelons and, if so, how much.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and Respondent M. Pagano & Son's, Inc. (Respondent) have done business for 20 years. Petitioner grows watermelons, and Respondent buys watermelons for resale. Petitioner's employees have always done business with Respondent by telephone with Morris Pagano. Following a telephone call between Mr. Pagano and Buddy Session, who is Petitioner's salesman, Petitioner sold Respondent a load of watermelons at 14) per pound on May 9, 1995. The weight of the watermelons was 43,560 pounds. On May 10, 1995, Petitioner sold Respondent two loads of watermelons at a preagreed price of 14) per pound. The weight of the first load was 40,080 pounds, and the weight of the second load was 44,940 pounds. On May 13, 1995, Petitioner sold Respondent two loads of watermelons at a preagreed price of 8) per pound. The weight of the first load was 47,660 pounds, and the weight of the second load was 47,740 pounds. On May 14, 1995, Petitioner sold Respondent a load of watermelons at a preagreed price of 8) per pound. The weight of the load was 45,920 pounds. On May 15, 1995, Petitioner sold Respondent a load of watermelons at a preagreed price of 8) per pound. The weight of the load was 43,420 pounds. The total due for the seven truckloads of watermelons was $32,780.40. After a few days, Mr. Session telephoned Mr. Pagano and asked for payment. As in all other telephone calls that he initiated, Mr. Session called Mr. Pagano at Respondent's telephone number. At no time did Mr. Pagano or anyone else inform Mr. Session or anyone else employed by Petitioner that the sale was not to Respondent. Following the telephone call, Mr. Pagano sent his field representative to Petitioner's office to settle the account. The field representative was the same person who normally represented Respondent. The market for watermelons had deteriorated since the beginning of May. Respondent's field representative tried to negotiate the price down on this basis, but he did not mention anything about a change in the identity of the buyer. Mr. Session refused to reduce the price, noting that they did not have any complaints about the quality of the watermelons. The field representative then gave Mr. Session a check dated May 22, 1995, drawn on Morris Pagano, Inc., in the amount of $22,214, which Mr. Session accepted as part payment of the amount due. On June 7, 1995, Carlie Nolan Mancil, as president of Petitioner, sent a certified letter, return receipt requested, to Mr. Pagano at Respondent, advising of the unpaid balance of $10,566.40 and warning that he would file a complaint with the Department of Agriculture, if payment were not made within 10 days. Respondent never responded to the letter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order determining that Respondent M. Pagano & Son's, Inc. owes Petitioner the sum of $10,566.40. ENTERED on October 19, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 19, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Buddy Session Nolan Farms, Inc. 3401 Sand Road Cape Coral, FL 33909 M. Pagano & Son's, Inc. 59 Brooklyn Terminal Market Brooklyn, NY 11236
The Issue The issue is whether the claims of $98,935.20 and $19,147.70, filed by Petitioner under the Agricultural Bond and License Law, are valid. §§ 604.15 - 604.34, Fla. Stat. (2008).
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been a producer of agricultural products located in Plant City, Florida. At all material times, American Growers has been a dealer in agricultural products. Respondent Lincoln General Insurance Company, as surety, issued a bond to American Growers, as principal. American Growers is licensed by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("DACS"). Between December 16, 2008, and February 4, 2009, Petitioner sold strawberries to American Growers, each sale being accompanied by a Passing and Bill of Lading. Petitioner sent an Invoice for each shipment, and payment was due in full following receipt of the Invoice. Partial payments have been made on some of the invoices, and as of the date of this Recommended Order, the amount that remains unpaid by American Growers to Petitioner is $117,982.90, comprising: Invoice No. Invoice Date Amount Balance Due 103894 12/16/08 $7,419.00 $1,296.00 103952 12/22/08 $18,370.80 $1,944.00 103953 12/23/08 $3,123.60 $648.00 193955 12/26/08 $8,164.80 $1,728.00 103984 12/28/08 $28,764.40 $28,764.40 104076 12/31/08 $17,236.80 $17,236.80 104077 1/5/09 $17,658.00 $17,658.00 104189 1/5/09 $1,320.90 $1,320.90 104386 1/20/09 $16,480.80 $16,480.80 104517 1/29/09 $17,449.20 $17,449.20 104496 2/4/09 $13,456.80 $13,456.80 TOTAL $117,982.90
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order requiring Respondent, American Growers, Inc., and/or its surety, Respondent, Lincoln General Insurance Company, to pay Petitioner, Crown Harvest Produce Sales, LLC, the total amount of $117,982.90. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capital, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Christopher E. Green, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Citrus License and Bond Mayo Building, Mail Station 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Glenn Thomason, President American Growers, Inc. 14888 Horseshoe Trace Wellington, Florida 33414 Katy Koestner Esquivel, Esquire Meuers Law Firm, P.L. 5395 Park Central Court Naples, Florida 34109 Renee Herder Surety Bond Claims Lincoln General Insurance Company 4902 Eisenhower Boulevard, Suite 155 Tampa, Florida 33634 Glenn C. Thomason, Registered Agent American Growers, Inc. Post Office Box 1207 Loxahatchee, Florida 33470
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes, (1983). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Rentz was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 4103 by the Department, and bonded by Respondent Nationwide in the sum of $14,000 - Bond No. LP 505 761 0004. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Nationwide was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Petitioner harvested, loaded and shipped sixteen (16) loads of watermelons to various receivers on instruction from Respondent Rentz during the 1985 watermelon season but only four (4) loads were in dispute on the date of the hearing with a claim of $3,807.98. 1/ Petitioner in previous watermelon seasons loaded and shipped watermelons for Respondent Rentz and on all occasions, including the 1985 season, had been paid for the watermelons either in cash by Respondent Rentz or by check drawn on Respondent Rentz's account. The invoicing of all loads of watermelons shipped by Petitioner for Respondent Rentz was done by Respondent Rentz and payments made by the various receivers were made to Respondent Rentz. Petitioner's understanding that Respondent Rentz was acting as a buyer and not a broker was credible and supported by Respondent Rentz's actions subsequent to the watermelons being loaded and shipped. 2/ Although Respondent Rentz contended that he was acting as a broker, the more credible evidence shows that Respondent Rentz was acting as a buyer and that risk of loss passed to him upon shipment, with all remedies and rights for Petitioner's breach reserved to him. For purposes of Sections 604.15-604.30, Florida Statutes, the Department's policy is to consider a person a broker, requiring only a minimum bond ($13,000.00) for licensure, when that person does not take title to the product and whose function is to bring buyer and seller together and assist them in negotiating the terms of the contract for sale but not to invoice or collect from the buyer.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Rentz be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $3,807.98. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Rentz fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Nationwide be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983). Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1986.
Findings Of Fact Wayne and Suzanne Stewart, doing business as Circle S Farms, grow potatoes in East Palatka, Florida. On approximately March 1, 1991, Stewart entered into two contracts with J.P. Mach, Inc., for the sale of potatoes. The terms of the contracts related to potatoes to be shipped between April 28 and May 31, 1991. Stewart agreed to sell 30,000 CWT of Atlantic potatoes guaranteed to chip for $5.75 per CWT and to sell 10,000 CWT of Sebago potatoes 1 and 7/8 inches in diameter for $6.00 per CWT. Both contracts provided as follows: If through any act of God, labor disturbance, war or any other circumstances beyond the control of Seller or Buyer, the Seller or Buyer are prevented from full or partial performance of the terms of this agreement, it is agreed that such failure to perform shall be excused and shall not form the basis for any claim of damage or breach. As part of the overall arrangement between these parties, Mach provided seed potatoes to Stewart and Stewart was required to reimburse Mach for those seed potatoes. In early April, 1991, the financial institutions which had loans to Circle S Farms wanted to see signed contracts between Circle S and licensed and bonded dealers. Stewart found out that J.P. Mach, Inc., and J.P. Mach Agri- Marketing, Inc., were not licensed and bonded in Florida. When Stewart brought this up to Mach, Mach demanded payment for the seed potatoes in order to pay the bond. Stewart was unable to pay for the seed potatoes at that time, but he did eventually pay for some of the seed potatoes. While there was conflicting testimony about the amount of the seed potato bill which remains unpaid, the greater weight of the competent, substantial evidence establishes that Stewart owes Mach $31,943.13 for the seed potatoes. Mach finally was licensed and bonded in Florida on April 25, 1991, as J.P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc. Pursuant to a separate verbal agreement, Stewart sold potatoes to Mach between April 22 and 27, 1991, at the established market prices of $19.50 CWT for LaChippers and for Atlantics. Mach never paid Stewart for the following deliveries: (1 load of LaChippers and 3 loads of Atlantics, respectively) 4/23 45,540 lbs @$19.50 $8.880.30 4/26 47,420 lbs @$19.50 $9,246.90 4/27 44,340 lbs @$19.50 $8.646.30 4/27 43,880 lbs @$19.50 $8,556.60 TOTAL $35,330.10 On April 23, 1991, a devastating tornado, which brought high winds, rain and hail, struck East Palatka and inflicted major damage to the potato crop on Circle S Farms. The damage to the potato crop at Circle S included the complete destruction of the vines, the erosion of the soil from around the roots, the exposure of the potatoes, and the pitting, cracking and splitting of the potatoes. Stewart immediately harvested the potatoes that could be shipped and covered the roots and potatoes in the field. He did what could be done to save the vines and allow them to regrow. The potatoes shipped to Mach between April 23 and 28, 1991, were from these salvaged potatoes. Between April 23 and 30, 1991, Stewart and Mach renegotiated the contracts based on the severe damage to the potato crop. Finally, on April 30, 1991, they entered into a verbal modification of the contract for the Atlantic potatoes that involved shipments that had been shipped on April 28-30, 1991, at $19.00 CWT and 8 shipments of Atlantics at $12.00 CWT, with shipment of late potatoes and those that recovered from the damage in June, 1991, at the contract rate of $5.75 CWT. The contract for Sebagoes was not renegotiated because the Sebagoes had vascular rings and could not be salvaged for the making of potato chips. That contract became void based on the destruction of the Sebago crop by the storm. Mach was offered Sebagoes, but turned them down because they were not chipping quality. Stewart shipped the Atlantics at $12.00 CWT except that he did not have enough potatoes to completely fill the eighth truck. After the time that the contract for Atlantics was renegotiated, Stewart sold no Atlantic potatoes to any other dealer and he shipped to Mach all of the Atlantic potatoes he had. He fulfilled the renegotiated verbal contract to the extent possible in light of the act of God which had occurred. The following shipments of Atlantics were made pursuant to the renegotiated verbal contract: 4/30 47,580 lbs @19.00 CWT $9,040.20 4/30 44,360 lbs @19.00 CWT $8,428.40 4/30 46,400 lbs @19.00 CWT $8,816.00 4/30 43,340 lbs @19.00 CWT $8,234.60 4/30 46,060 lbs @19.00 CWT $8,751.40 4/30 47,740 lbs @12.00 CWT $5,728.80 5/1 45,000 lbs @12.00 CWT $5,400.00 5/1 48,280 lbs @12.00 CWT $5,793.60 5/1 45,670 lbs @12.00 CWT $5,480.40 5/2 48,780 lbs @12.00 CWT $5,853.60 5/6 49,080 lbs @12.00 CWT $5,889.60 5/6 40,780 lbs @12.00 CWT $4,893.60 TOTAL $82,310.20 Mach never paid for these potatoes. For the remainder of May, 1991, Stewart had only LaChipper potatoes available. He had no contract with Mach for LaChippers, so Stewart sold the LaChipper potatoes to another dealer. On June 2 and 3, 1991, Stewart shipped five loads of Atlantics to that same dealer. Stewart shipped his last three loads of potatoes, on June 4 and 5, 1991, to that same dealer, but none were Atlantics. Mach sent no trucks to Circle S Farms for loading after May 6, 1991. Stewart made calls to Mach regarding the late potatoes he had promised, but Mach did not return the calls. At no time during this period did Mach send a truck to Circle S Farms which was refused potatoes. By the third week of June, Stewart's crop had recovered and Circle S Farms was again producing for the market. Stewart offered these late potatoes to Mach, but Mach had already left Florida. Stewart sent a FAX to Mach in Wisconsin which stated "I thought you wanted my late potatoes?" Mach never replied. Stewart also sent an invoice for the potatoes which Mach had received, but for which he had never paid. Because Stewart believed that the renegotiated verbal contract with Mach promised Mach the late crop of Atlantic potatoes, Stewart left a forty acre field of late Atlantic potatoes in the field rather than harvest them and sell them to someone else. He believed that he needed to do so based on his discussion with Mach about his unpaid bill, during which Mach advised that he thought Stewart had breached his contracts. Mach made many allegations in defense of his failure to pay for these potatoes, however the credible evidence at hearing failed to support his claims that Stewart failed to fulfill his obligations under the contracts, original and renegotiated, that Stewart fraudulently breached the contracts, that Stewart intended to breach the contracts all along and used the tornado as an excuse, that the renegotiated contract required delivery of all varieties of potatoes to be applied to the contract or else the price of the delivered loads would revert back to the original contract price, or that Stewart owed to Mach any amount except for $31,943.13 for the seed potatoes. Mach made many outrageous allegations against Stewart, but did not present any credible evidence to support them. Mach failed to pay for $117,640.30 worth of potatoes which were delivered to him by Circle S Farms. Circle S Farms owes Mach $31,943.13 for seed potatoes. Therefore it is found that Mach owes Stewart and Circle S Farms $85,697.17.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order and therein: Determine that J.P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc., is indebted to Wayne Stewart d/b/a Circle S Farms in the amount of $85,697.17. Order J.P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc., to pay the indebtedness to Wayne Stewart d/b/a Circle S. Farms within fifteen days after the entry of the Final Order. Order the payment of the bond of J.P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc., in the amount of $50,000 to Wayne Stewart d/b/a Circle S Farms if Mach fails to pay said indebtedness within the fifteen days allotted for said payment. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-3327A The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Wayne Stewart d/b/a Circle S Farms Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-3(1); 4(7); 6(7); 8 & 9(10);10(14); 11(18); and 12(15 & 16). Proposed findings of fact 5 and 7 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, J.P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc. 1. The proposed findings of fact offered by Mach are contained in such long and rambling paragraphs that making of specific rulings is extremely difficult. Additionally, Mach has intermixed proposed findings of fact, summaries of testimony and argument so extensively that the actual proposed findings of fact cannot be separated. However, the proposed findings of fact are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order, except for those proposed findings of fact which relate to the allegations discussed in Finding of Fact 17, which are rejected as being unsupported by the credible, competent and substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: J. P. Mach J. P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc. Post Office Box 7 Plover, WI 54467 Wayne Stewart Circle S Farms Route 1, Box 60 East Palatka, FL 32131 Joyce D. Mahr, Asst. Manager First Performance Bank Post Office Box 306 Hastings, FL 32145 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Triple M Packing, Inc. (Triple M) is in the business of selling produce, particularly tomatoes from its principal business address of Post Office Box 1358, Quincy, Florida. The Respondent, Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. (Fair Chester), is primarily engaged in the business of packaging, distributing and brokering tomatoes in the New York City metropolitan area. It purchases produce from various sellers around the country in tomato-producing areas for resale at markets in the New York City area. Since it is a licensed agricultural dealer, the Respondent is required under the pertinent provisions of Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, to file a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department), designed to guarantee payment of any indebtedness to persons selling agricultural products to the bonded dealer to whom the dealer fails to make accounting and payment. Fair Chester has thus obtained a 50,000 surety bond which is underwritten by its Co-Respondent, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford). During the 1984 growing season, the Petitioner sold certain shipments of tomatoes to the Respondent for a price of $12,276. Thereafter, curing middle-to-late 1984, the Respondent Fair Chester, found itself in straitened financial circumstances such that it was unable to pay its various trade creditors, including the Petitioner. In view of this, various creditors at the behest of a lawyer retained by Fair Chester, eventually entered into a composition agreement, whereby the unsecured trade creditors agreed to settle, release and discharge in full their claims against Fair Chester on the condition that each creditor signing that agreement be paid thirty-three and one-third percent of its claim. It was determined that the composition agreement would be operative if the trade creditors representing 95 percent or more in dollar amount of all unsecured debts accepted the terms and provisions of that composition agreement on or before November 13, 1984. All the Respondent's unsecured trade creditors were contacted and ultimately those representing more than 95 percent of the outstanding creditor claims against Respondent accepted the terms and provisions of the composition agreement by the deadline. A document indicating acceptance by the Petitioner was signed by one Robert Elliott, purportedly on behalf of the Petitioner, Triple M Packing, Inc. In this connection, by letter of November 13, 1984 (Respondent's Exhibit 4) Attorney Howard of the firm of Glass and Howard, representing the Respondent, wrote each trade creditor advising them that the required acceptance by 95 percent of the creditors had been achieved, including the acceptance of the agreement signed and stamped "received November 8, 1984" by Robert Elliott, sales manager of Triple M. In conjunction with its letter of November 13, 1984, Glass and Howard transmitted Fair Chester's check for one-third of the indebtedness due Triple M or $4,092. The Petitioner's principal officer, its president, Kent Manley, who testified at hearing, acknowledged that he received that letter and check, but he retained it without depositing it or otherwise negotiating it. In the meantime, on October 29, 1984 a complaint was executed and filed by Triple M Packing, Inc. by its president, Kent Manley, alleging that $12,276 worth of tomatoes had been sold to Respondent on June 13, 1984 and that payment had not been received. The purported acceptance of the composition agreement executed by Robert Elliott, sales manager, was not executed until November 8, 1984 and the check for $4,092 in partial payment of the Triple M claim was not posted until November 13, 1984. Mr. Manley's testimony was unrefuted and established that indeed Mr. Elliott was a commissioned salesman for Triple M, was not an officer or director of the company and had no authority to bind the company by his execution of the composition of creditors agreement. Mr. Manley acted in a manner consistent with Elliott's status as a commissioned salesman without authority to bind the Petitioner corporation since, upon his receipt of the "one- third settlement" check with its accompanying letter, he did not negotiate it, but rather pursued his complaint before the Department. In fact, in response to the Department's letter of December 20, 1984 inquiring why the complaint was being prosecuted in view of the purported settlement agreement, Mr. Manley on behalf of Triple M Packing, Inc. by letter of December 28, 1984, responded to Mr. Bissett, of the Department, that he continued to hold the check and was not accepting it as a final settlement. Thus, in view of the fact that the complaint was filed and served before notice that 95 percent of the creditors had entered into the composition agreement and never withdrawn, in view of the fact that on the face of the complaint Robert C. Elliott is represented as a salesman indeed, for an entity known as "Garguilo, Inc.," and in view of the fact that Mr. Manley as president of Triple M, retained the check without negotiating it and availing himself of its proceeds, rather indicating to the Department his wish to pursue the complaint without accepting the check as settlement, it has not been established that the Respondent, Fair Chester, was ever the recipient of any representation by Manley, or any other officer or director of the Petitioner corporation, that it would accept and enter into the above-referenced composition of creditors agreement. It was not proven that Triple M Packing, Inc. nor Mr. Manley or any other officer and director either signed or executed the composition agreement or authorized its execution by Robert C. Elliott. Respondent's position that Mr. Manley and Triple M acquiesced in the execution of the settlement agreement by Elliott and the payment of the one-third settlement amount by the subject check has not been established, especially in view of the fact that the complaint was filed after Attorney Howard notified Triple M of Respondent's settlement offer and prior to notice to Triple M that the settlement agreement had been consummated by 95 percent of the creditors and prior to the sending of the subject check to Triple M. Mr. Manley then within a reasonable time thereafter, on December 28, 1984, affirmed his earlier position that the entire indebtedness was due and that the settlement had not been accepted.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, the evidence of record and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. pay Triple M Packing Company, Inc. $12,276. In the event that principal fails to or is unable to pay that indebtedness, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company should pay that amount out of the surety bond posted with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearings Hearings 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Kent Manley, Jr. Post Office Box 1358 Quincy, Florida 32351 P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 16th day of September, Arthur Slavin, Esquire BLUM, HAIMOFF, GERSEN, LIPSON, GARLEY & NIEDERGANG 270 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10016 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Joe W. Kight Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =========================================================== ======
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral testimony and the documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner, Carl Hiers and Rachel Hiers were "producers" of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc., (Nichols was a licensed "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, issued license number 1547 by the Department, and bonded by the U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (Fidelity for the sum of $50,000.00, bond number 790103-10-115-88-1, with an effective date of March 22, 1988 and a termination date of March 22, 1989. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Nichols was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The Complaint filed by Petitioners was timely in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. Prior to Petitioners selling or delivering any watermelons (melons) to Nichols, Petitioners and Nichols agreed verbally that: (a) Petitioners would sell Nichols melons on a per pound basis at a price to be quoted by Nichols on the day of shipment; (b) Petitioners would harvest and load the melons on trucks furnished by Nichols; (c) a weight ticket with the weight of the truck before and after loading would be furnished to Petitioners; (d) Nichols or its agent in the field would have the authority to reject melons at the place of shipment (loading) which did not neet the guality or grade contracted for by Nichols; (e) the melons were to be of U.S. No. 1 grade; and, (f) settlement was to be made within a reasonable time after shipment. Although Nichols assisted Petitioners in obtaining the crew to harvest and load the melons, Petitioners had authority over the crew and was responsible for paying the crew. On a daily basis, L. L. Hiers, would contact Nichols and obtain the price being paid for melons that day. The price was marked in a field book with the net weight of each load. Nichols contends that the price quoted each day was the general price melons were bringing on the market that day. The price to be paid Petitioners was the price Nichols received for the melons at their destination minus 1 cent per pound commission for Nichols, taking into consideration freight, if any. Nichols was not acting as Petitioners' agent in the sale of the melons for the account of the Petitioners on a net return basis nor was Nichols acting as a negotiating broker between the Petitioners and the buyer. Nichols did not make the type of accountiig to Petitioners as required by section 604.22, Florida Statutes, had Nichols been Petitioners' agent. The prices quoted by Nichols to L. L. Hiers each day was the agreed upon price to be paid for melons shipped that day subject to any adjustment for failure of the melons to meet the quality or grade contracted for by Nichols. On June 11, 1988, L. L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 6 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the net weight of the load of melons shipped on June 11, 1988. Only a partial load, no. 10896 weighing 11,420 pounds for which Nichols paid 5 cents per pound, is in dispute. The amount in dispute is $114.70. On June 13, 1988, L. L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 5 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the net weight of 3 loads of melons shipped that day that are in dispute. The 3 loads in dispute are as follows: (a) Load No. 10906, weighing 48,620 pounds for which Nichols paid 4 cents per pound; (b) Load No. 10904, weighing 50,660 pounds for which Nichols paid 4 cents per pound, and; (c) Load No. 10902, weighing 45,030 pounds for which Nichols paid 4 cents per pound. The amount in dispute is as follows: (a) Load No. 10906, $486.20; (b) Load No. 10904, $253.30; and (c) Load No. 10902, $450.30. On June 20, 1988, L. L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 5 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the weight of 52,250 for which Nichols paid 2 cents per pound. The amount in dispute is $1,567.50. On June 23, 1988, L. L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 5.25 cents per pound. This price is 0.25 cent per pound less than that quoted on the same day in Case No. 88-5632A which is apparently due to the variety, Crimson Sweet, as opposed to Charmston Grey, since the average size of the melons shipped that day was within 4 ounces. This price was recorded in the field book with the load of melons shipped that day weighing 44,140 pounds for which Nichols paid 5 cents per pound. The load in dispute is load no. 11251, and the amount in dispute is $110.35. The total amount in dispute is $2,982.35. Load no. 11090 was federally inspected and failed to meet U.S. No. 1 grade on account of condition, not quality requirements. Therefore, the price of 2 cents per pound is a reasonable price and within the terms of the verbal contract. On all other loads, Nichols contends that the quality was low resulting in a lesser price than that agreed upon. However, Nichols failed to present sufficient evidence to support this contention. Nichols has refused to pay Petitioners the difference between the agreed upon price for load nos. 10896, 10902, 10904, 10906, 11090, and 11251, and the price paid by Nichols as indicated in the settlement sheet. The total difference is $2,982.35. However, subtracting $1,567.50, the difference in load no. 11090 that was rejected, from the total differnce results in a net difference of $1,414,85 and the amount owed to Petitioners.
Recommendation Upon cnsideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc., be ordered to pay the Petitioners, Carl Hiers and Rachel Hiers, the sum of $1,414.85. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc., fails to timely pay Petitioners, Carl Hiers and Rachel Hiers, as ordered, then Respondent, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, and that the Department reimburse the Petitioners in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Doyle Conner, Commissioner Mr. Carl Heirs Depaftment of Agriculture and Mrs. Rachel Hiers Consumer Service Route 5, Box 339 The Capitol Dunnellon, Florida 32630 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mallory Horne, Esquire Jay Nichols, Inc. Department of Agriculture and Post Office Box 1705 Consumer Services Lakeland, Florida 33802 513 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company Ben H. Pridgeon, Chief Post Office Box 1138 Bureau of License and Bond Baltimore, Maryland Mayo Building 21203 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
