Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this hearing, Petitioner held a license issued by the Florida Department of Insurance as a general lines insurance agent. On or about April 3, 1979, Steven B. Atkinson entered the Okeechobee Insurance Agency in West Palm Beach, Florida, from whom he had purchased his auto insurance for approximately three years. His intention at this time was to purchase only that insurance necessary to procure the license tags for his automobile, a seven-year-old Vega. He told the person he dealt with at that time at the insurance agency that this was all he wanted. He did not ask for auto club membership, did not need it, and did not want it. He asked only for what he needed to get his tags. However, he was told by a representative of the agency that he needed not only "PIP" insurance, but also auto club membership and accidental death and dismemberment insurance. Of the $144 premium, $31 was for the required "PIP" coverage, $75 was for auto club membership (not required), and $38 was for accidental death and dismemberment (AD&D) (not required). Representatives of the agency told him that he needed all three to get the tags and, though he knew what he was getting and knew he was purchasing all three, he agreed because he was told by the agency representatives that he needed to have all three in order to get his tags. 3 Diane Phillipy McDonald contacted the Okeechobee Insurance Agency in April, 1979, because she had heard on the radio that their prices were inexpensive. All she wanted was personal injury protection (PIP), which was what she thought the law required to get tags on her automobile. When she first called the agency and asked how much the coverage she wanted would be, she was told she could pay a percentage down and finance the rest. When she entered the agency, she was waited on by a man whose name she cannot remember. However, she did not ask for auto club coverage or accidental death and dismemberment coverage, nor did those subjects ever come up in the conversation. She asked only for PIP, and she paid a $50 deposit on her coverage. In return for her deposit, she was given a slip of paper that reflected that she had purchased PIP coverage. She was not told she was charged for auto club membership or accidental death and dismemberment. The forms that she signed, including those which reflect a premium for all three coverages in the total amount of $137, bear her signature, and though she admits signing the papers, she denies having read them or having them explained to her before she signed them. In fact, she cannot recall whether they were even filled out when she signed them. In regard to the papers, the premium finance agreement signed by the witness on April 3, 1979, reflects in the breakdown of coverage total premium of $137. However, immediately below, the total cash premium is listed as $158, $21 more than the total of the individual premiums for the three coverages, and the financing charge is based on that amount1 less the down payment. Marvin W. Niemi purchased his auto insurance from the Okeechobee Insurance Agency in March, 1979, after he heard their advertisement on the radio and went in to get the insurance required by the State in order to get his license tags. When he entered the agency, he asked personnel there for the minimum insurance required to qualify for tags because he was strapped for money at the time and could not afford anything else. He definitely did not want auto club membership. In fact, discussion of that did not even arise, nor did he want the accidental death policy. When he left the agency, he thought he was only getting what he had asked for; to wit, the PIP minimum coverage. All the forms that he signed were blank when he signed them. This application process took place very quickly during his lunch hour from work. He admits giving his son's (David Robert) name as the beneficiary on his insurance, but did not realize at the time that he was purchasing coverage other than the minimum coverage required. His rationale for giving his son's name as beneficiary was that agency personnel asked and the witness felt if there was any money involved, it should go to his son. In fact, Mr. Niemi was sold not only the PIP, but membership in an auto club and PIP coverage with an $8,000 deductible. Again, the total premium was $137, when the actual premium for the coverage he asked for was only $24. Frank Johnson purchased his insurance from Okeechobee Insurance Agency in April, 1979, because he had heard and seen their advertisement on radio and television and it appeared to be reasonable. He wanted only PIP coverage as required by law sufficient to get his license tags. When he entered the agency, he spoke with a man whose name he does not know, who after consulting the books came up with the premium for the coverage to be purchased. During this meeting, the question of motor club or AD&D coverage was not mentioned. His signature does not appear on the statement of understanding, which outlines the coverage and the premium therefor. In this case, because Mr. Johnson had had some prior traffic tickets, his total premium came to $243. His coverage, however, included bodily injury liability, property damage liability, PIP, and auto club. After paying a $50 down payment, he made two additional payments which totaled approximately $50, but thereafter failed to make any additional payments. On August 1, 1980, Marguerite and Steven von Poppel entered the Federal Insurance Agency in Lake Worth, Florida, to purchase their automobile insurance coverage. They purchased policies which included bodily injury and property damage liability, PIP coverage, and comprehensive and collision coverage. The PIP coverage had a deductible of $8,000, and the comprehensive and collision coverage both had $200 deductibles. Mrs. von Poppel indicates that it was not their intention to have such large deductibles on their coverage. In any event, on that day, they gave a check for down payment in the amount of $320 and advised the employee of the agency that upon billing for the balance due of the $915 total premium, they would send the check. Neither Mrs. von Poppel nor Mr. von Poppel desired to finance the balance due of $595, and Mrs. von Poppel did not affix her signature to an application for premium financing with Devco Premium Finance Company dated the same day which bears the signature of Kevin D. Cox as agent. This premium finance agreement lists a cash premium of $966, as opposed to $915. The receipt given to the von Poppels initially reflects a down payment of $320, which is consistent with the receipt, and an amount financed of $646, as opposed to $595, which would have been the balance due under the cash payment intended and desired by the von Poppels. Somewhat later, Mrs. von Poppel received a premium payment booklet from Devco in the mail. When she received it, she immediately went to the Federal Insurance Agency, told them she did not desire to finance the payments, and that day1 September 3, 1980, gave them a check in the amount of $595, which was the balance due on their insurance coverage. This check was subsequently deposited to the account of Federal Insurance Agency and was cashed. This did not end the von Poppel saga, however, as subsequently the von Poppels were billed for an additional amount of $116.18, which reflects the interest on the amount ostensibly financed. When the von Poppels received this statement, they contacted the Federal Insurance Agency and were told that there was some mistake and that the matter would be taken care of. They therefore did not make any further payments, except a total payment of $20, which they were told was still owing. This $20 payment was made on May 29, 1981, after their insurance had been cancelled for nonpayment of the balance due on the finance agreement. The policy was, however, subsequently reinstated, back-dated to the date of cancellation, after the von Poppels complained. Their complaints, however, did nothing to forestall a series of dunning letters from a collection agency to which Devco had referred the von Poppels' account. It is obvious, therefore, that Federal Insurance Agency did not notify Devco of the fact that the amount due and payable had been paid, and did not clear the von Poppels with Devco or with the collection agency thereafter. As a result, the von Poppels filed a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner's office. That terminated their difficulty on this policy. On September 15, 1980, Federal Insurance Agency submitted a check in the amount $595, the amount paid to them by the von Poppels in full settlement of their account, to Devco. There appears to have been no additional letter of explanation, and though Devco credited this amount to the von Poppel account, it did not know to cancel the finance charges since the von Poppels' decline to finance their premium. Of the total amount of the von Poppel premium, the majority, $636, was attributable to the basic insurance in the amount of $10,000-$20,000 liability written by American Risk Assurance Company of Miami, Florida. The supplemental liability carrying a premium of $180 and covering $40,000-$80,000 liability was written by Hull and Company, Inc., out of Fort Lauderdale for Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company. The third portion of the coverage carrying a charged premium in the amount of $150 covered the AD&D covered by Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company (RSLIC) of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This coverage, in the principal sum of $10,000 in the case of Mr. von Poppel and $5,000 in the case of Mrs. von Poppel, was included without the knowledge or the cosnet of the von Poppels. The policies, numbered 10753 R and 10754 R, were never delivered to the von Poppels as, according to an officer of RSLIC, they should have been, but are in the files of the Federal Insurance Agency. Further, the von Poppels were overcharged for the coverage. Respondent, however, did not remit any of the premium to Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company Instead, on August 1, 1980, the same day the von Poppels were in to purchase their insurance, he issued a sight draft drawn on Devco Premium Finance Company to Reliance Standard Life in the amount of $150. Reliance Standard Life was not the same company as Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, was not controlled by Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, and in fact had no relation to Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company. Reliance Standard Life was a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida in which Kevin D. Cox was president and Howard I. Vogel was vice president-secretary. Of the $150 premium, 90 percent was retained by Respondent or his company as commission and 10 percent was transmitted to Nation Motor Club along with a 10 percent commission on policies written for other individuals. Nation Motor Club would then transmit the bona fide premium of 24 cents per $1,000 coverage to RSLIC. More than a year later, on October 16, 1981, Federal Insurance Agency reimbursed the von Poppels with a check for $42.50, representing the unearned portion of the unordered AD&D coverage. Clifford A. Ragsdale went to the Federal Insurance Agency in Lake Worth on April 19, 1982, to purchase his auto insurance because after calling several agencies by phone and advising them of the coverage he wanted, this was the least expensive. To do this, he would read off the coverage from his old policy and get a quote for the identical coverage. After getting this agency's quote, he went to the office where, after talking with two different ladies to whom he described the coverage he desired, he got to the person with whom he had talked on the phone and read his current coverage, and who already had some of the paperwork prepared. During all his discussions with the agency's employees on the phone and in person, he did not speak of, request, or desire auto club membership. He has been a member of AAA since 1977, and his membership there covers all the contingencies he is concerned with. Additional auto club membership in another club would be redundant. He gave the agency representative a check for $247 as a down payment and agreed to finance the balance due through Premium Service Company. Though he was given a receipt for the $247 deposit, the premium finance agreement he signed that day at the Federal Insurance Agency reflected a cash down payment of only $147, thus falsely inflating the balance due to be paid by the client. The $100 difference was refunded to Mr. Ragsdale by Federal Insurance Agency on October 25, 1982, some six months later after he complained to the Insurance Commissioner's office and was told that the $100 difference was for membership in a motor club that he did not desire or agree to. As late as December 29, 1982, over eight months later, the agency had still not remitted the $147 to Premium Service Company, who then added this deposit already paid by the client back to the account balance. Mr. Ragsdale did not read all the documents he signed at the agency, and he never received the policy he ordered. He was told he was signing an application for insurance and signed several instruments in blank at the request of the personnel at Federal Insurance Agency. He was told they would later fill in what wad needed. Respondent was the general lines agent of record for the Okeechobee Insurance Agency, located at 1874 Okeechobee Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida, during March and April, 1979, and at the Federal Insurance Agency, 3551 South Military Trail, Lake Worth, Florida, during the period which included August, 1980, and April, 1982. In each agency, he had instructed his' personnel how to serve and handle customers who came to the agency requesting the lowest minimum required insurance in which the agency specialized and which the agency, through its advertising program, purported to offer. As testified to by Linda Holly, an employee of Federal Insurance Agency, and as admitted by Respondent, when a prospective customer entered the agency requesting the minimum required coverage, the agent was to ask if the customer knew what the minimum was. The agent would then explain what was required and quote a premium which included not only the minimum required insurance, but also some additional service which, depending on the time, could be AD&D, towing, motor club, or the like, none of which was required by the State of Florida. Respondent instructed his employees to do this on the rationale that the premiums and commissions on the minimum required insurance were so low that the agency could not make sufficient profit on the sale of it, alone, to stay in business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's license as a general lines agent in the State of Florida be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1983 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire Department of Insurance Legal Division 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Kevin Denis Cox 1483 S.W. 25th Way Deerfield Beach, Florida 33441 The Honorable Bill Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Petitioner, Department of Insurance, (Department), was the state agency responsible for the licensing and registration of insurance agents in Florida and for the regulation of the insurance industry in this state. At the same time, Respondent was licensed in Florida as a general lines agent, a life and health (debit) agent, a life and health agent, and as a dental health care services contract salesman. He was president, director and registered agent of, and was the only licensed insurance agent working at, Devor of Brandon, a general lines insurance agency located in Brandon, Florida. At the times in issue, Respondent employed Jay Schetina, not a licensed insurance agent in Florida, to work as a salesman at the Brandon office. Mr. Schetina worked directly under the supervision and control of the Respondent and was in charge of the Brandon office when Respondent, who worked four days a week at the other office he owned in Cape Coral, Florida was not there. On January 11, 1989, Nellie Wynperle Henry went to the Respondent's Brandon agency to buy automobile insurance. She dealt with Mr. Schetina who sold her a policy to be issued by Underwriters Guarantee Insurance Company for an annual premium of $1,288.00, and to be effective January 17, 1989. She gave Mr. Schetina a $429.00 down payment and ultimately was issued policy no. 12207947. The policy reflected Respondent as agent for the company. Though she was not told what it was and does not recall signing it, an application for an auto service contract, to be issued by Century Auto Service, was also prepared and bears what purports to be her signature. That application was prepared and submitted without her knowledge or permission. The fee for the policy was $40.00, of which the agency got to keep 90%. Since she was already a member of AAA and had their service coverage, Ms. Wynperle did not need the service club policy sold to her at Respondent's agency and, in fact, had told Mr. Schetina so. Though she was charged for the service policy, she never received a copy of it and did not know she had it. At the time she applied for the auto insurance, Ms. Wynperle also applied to finance the unpaid balance due over and above the down payment through Underwriter's Financial of Florida, Inc., a premium finance company. The premium finance agreement includes the amount of the unwanted service policy, and is also incorrect in that it reflects that the down payment tendered by Ms. Wynperle was only $389.00. Dorothy Lunsford purchased auto insurance from the Respondent's agency on January 18, 1989. The premium for her policy, also with Underwriters Guarantee, was $707.00 and she made a down payment, by check, of $217.00. She financed the balance but the application for financing showed a down payment of only $177.00. On the same day, an application form for an auto service policy was also submitted in Ms. Lunsford's name. The cost of this policy was $40.00. On January 31, 1989 Joanne Coleman applied for automobile insurance at Respondent's agency. She was to be insured by two companies' policies, one issued by United Guarantee and one by Hamilton Insurance Company. The total combined premium was $670.00. Both policies were issued and Respondent's agency was listed as agent on both. She paid for the policies with a check for $687.00. No explanation was given for the difference. At the same time she applied for the auto insurance, though she had had no discussion with the clerk with whom she dealt at the agency about it, an application for an auto service policy was also filled out in her name, carrying a premium of $20.00. She did not receive a service policy. She neither authorized or consented to the submittal of the service club application in her name. Ms. Coleman's memory of the events, however, was not clear, but it is clear that she did not want the service policy she was charged for. On February 9, 1989, Kathy Gall applied for auto insurance with the Respondent's agency. The annual premium was$733.00 and at the time, she gave the agent a check for the down payment in the amount of $240.00. She applied to finance the balance but when prepared at the agency, the application form reflected a down payment of only $220.00. This was in error. However, at that same visit, an application for an auto service policy was also filled out in Ms. Gall's name. The policy bore a premium of $20.00. At no time did Ms. Gall authorize that service policy nor, in fact, was it ever discussed with her and she did not know she was purchasing it. Finally, on February 6, 1989, Lucinda Romano applied with the Respondent's agency for an automobile insurance policy with Allegheny Mutual Casualty Company. At that time, she gave Devor a check for $61.80. Though at the time she went into the agency she did not intend to purchase an auto service contract because she was having financial problems and wanted only the most basic lawful coverage, and did not sign the application for it, she was charged for an auto service policy at a cost of $20.00. She thought she was purchasing only PIP coverage which cost $60.00. Ms. Romano subsequently requested a refund of the amount she paid for the auto service policy and the payment was refunded by check on May 19, 1989 from Jay Schetina. Sometime after the Devor agency was taken over by Sam Capitano/Action Insurance Agency, and the latter's employees were servicing the company's files, Ms. Brown-Parker, an employee of Action found the auto service policies, including those issued in the name of Ms. Romano, Ms. Gall, Ms. Coleman, and Ms. Wynperle,and Ms. Lunsford, which had not been transmitted to the policyholders. Both copies of the policy were in the file. Respondent is also the subject of a Consent Order issued on February 26, 1990, subsequent to the date of the matters in issue herein. The Settlement Stipulation For Consent Order, on which the Order is based, refers to the matters in issue here which relate to Respondent's allowing his non-licensed employees to use his license to practice insurance, and allowed the agency to operate, at least at times, without an active, full time agent in charge. At paragraph 10(c), the Stipulation provides, in part: ... If the Department has good cause to believe that, after the issuance of the Consent Order in this cause, unlicensed individuals are transacting insurance at any agency at which Respondent operates as a general lines agent ..., or that any agency at which Respondent operates ... is not at all times after issuance of the Consent Order in this cause under the active, full-time charge of a general lines agency, the Department shall initiate proceedings to suspend or revoke the licenses and eligibility for licensure and registrations of the Respondent based upon the original grounds as alleged in the Administrative Complaint referred to herein. The original charges referred to, supra, relate to Respondent's alleged authorization of unlicensed employees to transact insurance, and his alleged authorization of the agency to, at times, operate without an active, full-time agent in charge. It did not refer to the incidents alleged herein, to wit: theimproper charges for undesired auto club membership and the preparation of false premium finance applications.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued dismissing the allegations that Respondent, John W. Ganter, violated Section 626.611, Florida Statutes, but finding him guilty of violations of Section 626.621, 626.9521 and 626.9541(1)(k)1, Florida Statutes, as to Ms. Wynperle, Ms. Gall, Ms. Coleman, Ms. Romano, and Ms. Lunsford, and imposing a suspension of his licenses and eligibility for licensure for a period of one year. However, under the provisions of Section 626.691, it is further recommended that in lieu of the suspension, the Respondent be placed on probation for a period of two years under such terms and conditions as specified by the Department. DONE and ENTERED in Tallahassee, Florida this 10th day of October, 1991. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. 6. & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. - 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. - 22. Accepted and incorporated herein. 23. & 24. Accepted. 25. Not a Finding of Fact. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted expect for the representation that Petitioner presented no evidence as to Count II. The Stipulation of the parties clearly makes detailed reference to the allegations regarding Ms. Lunsford. Accepted as to Counts VI, VII & VIII. Rejected as to Count II. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected. - 20. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected. & 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. - 34. Accepted as to the actual dealings of the Respondent. COPIES FURNISHED: David D. Hershel, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Orrin R. Beilly, Esquire The Citizens Building, Suite 705 105 S. Narcissus Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a Resident General Lines Insurance Agent was properly denied by the Department of Financial Services.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns two insurance agencies, All Florida Insurance and Tax Services ("All Florida") and One Florida Insurance Agency, Inc. ("One Florida"). On or about January 5, 2010, Gardonal Marcellot ("Marcellot") filled out an application and interviewed with Petitioner for an insurance agent position. The same day, Petitioner offered Marcellot a job at All Florida as an insurance agent.1/ Marcellot accepted the job and provided Pierre a copy of his 2-20 General Lines Insurance Agent license and Social Security card. Pierre informed Marcellot that his start date for employment with All Florida would be January 15, 2010. Soon thereafter, there was a major earthquake in Haiti, and Petitioner informed Marcellot by email that she had to go out of the country to help her family and she was pushing back his start date with the company. Marcellot never reported to work or started his employment with All Florida after Pierre left the country.2/ On or about February 12, 2010, Petitioner applied for agency licensure with the Department for All Florida and named Christopher Jeremie as the Agent in Charge. Pierre also named Marcellot as the secretary and treasurer of All Florida on the application. Marcellot never held a corporate officer position at All Florida. While operating All Florida, Pierre engaged in all the activities that require an insurance agent license. She admitted during the hearing that she ran the office, met with customers by phone and in person, responded to fax and email insurance requests, provided insurance quotes for customers, completed forms for customers, input the insurance information in the computer to get quotes for customers to review, input the information online, and processed numerous insurance applications. On February 26, 2010, Petitioner filled out an application for a Change of Agent in Charge for All Florida and named Marcellot Agent in Charge without his permission. 3/ Pierre continued to utilize Marcellot's licensure information and name him Agent in Charge without his permission to obtain Agency appointments with companies4/ for at least five insurance applications. On May 22, 2010, Pierre next utilized Otto Latimer's ("Latimer") licensure information without his permission and changed the Agent in Charge for All Florida by naming Latimer to the position.5/ On June 22, 2010, Petitioner submitted an Application for Agency Licensure online to the Department on behalf of One Florida and also named Latimer as the Agent in Charge without his permission. Latimer never worked at or served as Agent in Charge for All Florida or One Florida. Latimer owns his own business, Service Ace Corporation, where he works full time. He has been licensed since 1983 as a General Lines Insurance agent. At some point, Latimer discovered that Pierre was having problems getting a 2-20 license agent. He offered to help her by allowing her to rent space at his agency location and for her to work under his license. He never gave her permission or allowed her to use his license or name him as Agent in Charge for appointments. Pierre utilized Latimer's licensure information without his permission for her insurance companies and named him Agent in Charge for both Universal Property and Casualty Insurance Company and Citizens Property Insurance Corporation ("Citizens") insurance appointments for a total of about 19 insurance applications. On August 11, 2010, Citizens terminated All Florida's Agent Appointment Agreement after determining that Pierre had committed forgery and larceny based on false personification because Pierre signed Marcellot's name to the agent appointment application and named him as agent of record. On December 13, 2010, Pierre filed an application with the Department for a Resident General Lines Agent license. On December 21, 2010, Petitioner signed and issued All Florida check number 1003 to Del Rio Discount Corporation, in the amount of $1,000.00. Pierre cut check number 1003 as the gross down payment on a premium finance agreement dated October 1, 2010, for the homeowner policy purchased by Bernard and Eleanor Woodside. The check was returned for insufficient funds. Del Rio Finance filed a complaint with the Department against Petitioner for Pierre issuing check 1003 on behalf of All Florida because the check bounced for insufficient funds. Wendi Cameron ("Cameron"), the Department's investigator in this matter, started investigating the complaint in January 2011. She went to Pierre's office location to see Latimer, whom she believed was the Agent in Charge based on the paperwork Pierre had falsely completed and filed. Latimer was not present and so Cameron spoke to Pierre, who told Cameron that Latimer was out of the office. On May 29, 2011, while Pierre's insufficient funds investigation was still pending, Cameron received another complaint about Pierre namely that Citizens Insurance Company had terminated Pierre's appointment after being advised by Marcellot that Pierre had used his identity without his knowledge and forged his name on applications. Cameron visited Petitioner's office three times during Petitioner's investigations and an Agent in Charge was never present. Pierre was managing the office on each visit. On the fourth visit to the office, it was closed with a note on the door. Cameron was never able to speak to an Agent in Charge and was always informed that one was not available each time she called or visited. The Department concluded its investigation of Pierre and denied her application for licensure based on the Department's sections 626.112(1)(a), (b)4, 626.112(9), 626.172(2), (3), 626.611(7), (8), 626.621(2),(3), and (6).
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a General Lines Insurance Agent in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 2012.
The Issue Whether proposed rules promulgated by the Florida Department of Insurance related to sale of insurance products by agents affiliated with financial institutions are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Insurance is responsible for regulation of insurance transactions in the State of Florida. On January 29, 1997, the Department of Insurance issued a notice to interested parties of a rules workshop to address "parity" of insurance regulation. The workshop was conducted on February 21, 1997. The Department of Insurance published the final rule proposal on May 23, 1997. A public hearing was conducted on June 19, 1997. The record of the public hearing remained open until June 25, 1997, for submission of written comments. A Notice of Change was published on July 18, 1997. A Second Notice of Change was published on August 8, 1997. The Petitioners timely filed petitions challenging the proposed rules. All parties have standing to participate in this proceeding. As set forth in the rule proposal, the purpose and effect of the proposed rules is as follows: Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, requires the Department to adopt rules to assure parity of regulation in this state of insurance transactions as between an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with a federally chartered financial institution, an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with a state- chartered financial institution, and an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with an entity that is not a financial institution. (Emphasis supplied.) The summary portion of the published rule proposal states that the "proposed rules implement standards to provide parity pursuant to Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes." Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity statute," provides as follows: The department shall adopt rules to assure the parity of regulation in this state of insurance transactions as between an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with a federally chartered financial institution, an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with a state-chartered financial institution, and an insurance agency owned by or an agent associated with an entity that is not a financial institution. Such rules shall be limited to assuring that no insurance agency or agent is subject to more stringent or less stringent regulation than another insurance agency or agent on the basis of the regulatory status of the entity that owns the agency or is associated with the agent. For the purposes of this section, a person is "associated with" another entity if the person is employed by, retained by, under contract to, or owned or controlled by the entity directly or indirectly. This section does not apply with respect to a financial institution that is prohibited from owning an insurance agency or that is prohibited from being associated with an insurance agent under state or federal law. (Emphasis supplied.) The word "parity" is not defined in the statute. Webster's Dictionary defines "parity" as "[t]he quality or state of being equal or equivalent." Pursuant to the specific statute requiring the Department to adopt rules, the Department's authority to adopt rules related to this issue is limited to those rules which provide for equivalent regulation of insurance transactions without regard to ownership or affiliation of the insurance agent or agency. Rule 4-224.002 (Settings and Circumstances) Proposed Rule 4-224.002 provides as follows: 4-224.002 Setting and Circumstances of Insurance Transactions. The setting and circumstances in which insurance transactions occur shall be structured so as to avoid deception as to, and to assist the consumer in understanding, the nature of the product sold, the identity of the insurer, and the identity and representative capacity of the insurance agent. When an agent is transacting insurance, any business cards and stationery used shall reflect his status as an insurance agent. Other materials used in insurance transactions which address the representative capacity of the agent shall identify the individual as an insurance agent. The published rule proposal indicates that Proposed Rule 4-224.002, Florida Administrative Code, is specifically authorized by Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, and implements Sections 624.307, 626.5715, 626.951, 626.9521, 626.9541, 626.9561 and 626.9611, Florida Statutes. Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, provides the Department with the general authority to adopt "reasonable rules necessary to effect any of the statutory duties of the department...." and states that willful violation of Department rules may result in a range of penalties including revocation of licensure. Section 624.307, Florida Statutes, generally sets forth the powers and duties of the Department. Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity" statute, provides as set forth herein. Section 626.951, Florida Statutes, is the "declaration of purpose" for the Unfair Insurance Trade Practices Act, and in part states as follows: The purpose of this part is to regulate trade practices relating to the business of insurance in accordance with the intent of Congress as expressed in the Act of Congress of March 9, 1945 (Pub. L. No. 15, 79th Congress), by defining, or providing for the determination of, all such practices in this state which constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices and by prohibiting the trade practices so defined or determined. Section 626.9521, Florida Statutes, prohibits and penalizes unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices and provides penalties. Section 626.9541, Florida Statutes, addresses "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts" and provides as follows: UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AND UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS.--The following are defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices: Misrepresentations and false advertising of insurance policies.--Knowingly making, issuing, circulating, or causing to be made, issued, or circulated, any estimate, illustration, circular, statement, sales presentation, omission, or comparison which: Misrepresents the benefits, advantages, conditions, or terms of any insurance policy. Misrepresents the dividends or share of the surplus to be received on any insurance policy. Makes any false or misleading statements as to the dividends or share of surplus previously paid on any insurance policy. Is misleading, or is a misrepresentation, as to the financial condition of any person or as to the legal reserve system upon which any life insurer operates. Uses any name or title of any insurance policy or class of insurance policies misrepresenting the true nature thereof. Is a misrepresentation for the purpose of inducing, or tending to induce, the lapse, forfeiture, exchange, conversion, or surrender of any insurance policy. Is a misrepresentation for the purpose of effecting a pledge or assignment of, or effecting a loan against, any insurance policy. Misrepresents any insurance policy as being shares of stock or misrepresents ownership interest in the company. False information and advertising generally.--Knowingly making, publishing, disseminating, circulating, or placing before the public, or causing, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public: In a newspaper, magazine, or other publication, In the form of a notice, circular, pamphlet, letter, or poster, Over any radio or television station, or In any other way, an advertisement, announcement, or statement containing any assertion, representation, or statement with respect to the business of insurance, which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading. Defamation.--Knowingly making, publishing, disseminating, or circulating, directly or indirectly, or aiding, abetting, or encouraging the making, publishing, disseminating, or circulating of, any oral or written statement, or any pamphlet, circular, article, or literature, which is false or maliciously critical of, or derogatory to, any person and which is calculated to injure such person. Boycott, coercion, and intimidation.-- Entering into any agreement to commit, or by any concerted action committing, any act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation resulting in, or tending to result in, unreasonable restraint of, or monopoly in, the business of insurance. False statements and entries.-- Knowingly: Filing with any supervisory or other public official, Making, publishing, disseminating, circulating, Delivering to any person, Placing before the public, Causing, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person, or placed before the public, any false material statement. Knowingly making any false entry of a material fact in any book, report, or statement of any person, or knowingly omitting to make a true entry of any material fact pertaining to the business of such person in any book, report, or statement of such person. Stock operations and advisory board contracts.--Issuing or delivering, promising to issue or deliver, or permitting agents, officers, or employees to issue or deliver, agency company stock or other capital stock, benefit certificates or shares in any common- law corporation, or securities or any special or advisory board contracts or other contracts of any kind promising returns or profits as an inducement to insurance. Section 626.9561, Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to "investigate the affairs of every person involved in the business of insurance in this state in order to determine whether such person has been or is engaged in any unfair method of competition or in any unfair or deceptive act or practice. " Section 626.9611, Florida Statutes, provides for the adoption of Department rules as follows: 626.9611 Rules.--The department may, in accordance with chapter 120, promulgate reasonable rules as are necessary or proper to identify specific methods of competition or acts or practices which are prohibited by s. 626.9541 or s. 626.9551, but the rules shall not enlarge upon or extend the provisions of ss. 626.9541 and 626.9551. (Emphasis supplied.) Proposed Rule 4-224.002 is an invalid delegation of legislative authority. The proposed rule exceeds the Department specific grant of rulemaking authority which is limited in this case to those rules which provide for equivalent regulation of insurance transactions without regard to ownership or affiliation of the insurance agent or agency. The rule does not provide parity of regulation. Proposed Rule 4-224.002 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions and vests unbridled discretion in the agency. The proposed rule provides no information as to how an insurance transaction may be "structured" so as to "avoid deception" of the purchaser. The determination of whether an insurance transaction has been "structured" to "avoid deception" is at the discretion of the Department. The proposed rule provides no standards for Department decisions which will be made under the rule. The proposed rule provides no assistance or information to regulated parties as to what types of transaction structures are prohibited or acceptable, other than to require that the agent be identified as such during the insurance transaction. Proposed Rule 4-224.002 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Neither the testimony of the Department's witnesses, nor the research information offered by the Department in support of the proposed rule, are sufficient to support validation of this rule. The evidence fails to establish the existence of substantial consumer confusion regarding marketing of insurance products by financial institutions. The Department cites a previous administrative action related to the sale of insurance products in a financial institution as evidence that consumer confusion exists. The Department also cites another administrative action where the agency prosecuted an insurer for the misleading sale of insurance products. The evidence establishes that the cited cases were prosecuted under currently existing rules and regulations and does not establish the validity of the proposed rules at issue in this proceeding. The existence of other rules relating to manner and means of insurance product sales is insufficient to establish the validity of the proposed rules at issue in this case. Rule 4-224.004 (Underwriting of Insurance- Authorization Required) Proposed Rule 4-224.004 provides: No entity which is not licensed as an insurer by the Department shall directly or indirectly assume the obligation to provide the benefits of an insurance contract, or otherwise transact insurance as an insurer in this state. As identified in the published rule proposal, Proposed Rule 4-224.004, Florida Administrative Code, is specifically authorized by Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, and implements Sections 624.11, 624.401, 626.5715, 626.051 and 628.151(1), Florida Statutes. Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, provides general rulemaking authority to the Department. Section 624.11, Florida Statutes, prohibits any person from transacting insurance in Florida without complying with the provisions of the Insurance Code, and provides for operation of "risk retention groups" pursuant to law. Section 624.401, Florida Statutes, requires each insurer to obtain a certificate of authority from the Department in order to conduct business either directly or indirectly, and provides that failure to obtain a certificate is a third degree felony. The section also provides for preemption by the state of the field of regulating insurers and their agents and representatives from local regulation. Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity" statute, provides as set forth herein. Section 626.051, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "life agent." Section 628.151(1), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: No domestic insurer shall engage directly or indirectly in any business other than the insurance business and business activities reasonably and necessarily incidental to such insurance business. At the hearing, the Department's witness testified that the proposed rule was in response to comments offered by participants in the rulemaking proceeding suggesting that recent court decisions would permit financial institutions to act as insurers and to assume the obligations of insurance contracts. Proposed Rule 4-224.004 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the specific grant of rulemaking authority which is limited in this case to those rules which provide for equivalent regulation of insurance transactions without regard to ownership or affiliation of the insurance agent or agency. The proposed rule does not implement, interpret or make specific any provision of Florida law. Proposed Rule 4-224.004 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Anecdotal recollections of comments made by unidentified persons during rulemaking workshops do not constitute competent substantial evidence. Rule 4-224.007 (Primary Agent) Proposed Rule 4-224.007 provides: Each agency location where a licensed and appointed insurance agent is engaged in transactions with respect to insurance products shall be considered an insurance agency for purposes of Section 626.592, Florida Statutes. In those instances where an agent legally conducts insurance transactions at two or more agency locations, a separate primary agent need not be designated at each location, provided that no insurance transactions shall occur at any location when the agent is not present, and no unlicensed employee at the location has engaged in insurance activities requiring licensure. In those instances the agent shall be responsible for insurance transactions occurring at each location and one location shall be designated as the primary location. As identified in the published rule proposal, Proposed Rule 4-224.007, Florida Administrative Code, is specifically authorized by Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, and implements Sections 626.5715, 626.031, 626.041, 626.0428, 626.051, 626.062, 626.094, 626.112, 626.592, Florida Statutes. Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, sets forth the general rulemaking authority of the Department. Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity" statute, provides as set forth herein. Section 626.031, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "agent." Section 626.041, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "general lines agent." Section 626.0428, Florida Statutes, provides limitations on the activities of agency personnel as follows: 626.0428 Agency personnel powers, duties, and limitations.-- An individual employed by an agent or agency on salary who devotes full time to clerical work, with incidental taking of insurance applications or quoting or receiving premiums on incoming inquiries in the office of the agent or agency, is not deemed to be an agent, customer representative, or solicitor if his or her compensation does not include in whole or in part any commissions on such business and is not related to the production of applications, insurance, or premiums. No employee of an agent or agency may bind insurance coverage unless licensed and appointed as a general lines agent or customer representative. No employee of an agent or agency may initiate contact with any person for the purpose of soliciting insurance unless licensed and appointed as a general lines agent, customer representative, or solicitor. Section 626.051, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "life agent." Section 626.062, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "health agent." Section 626.094, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "insurance agency" as follows: 626.094 "Insurance agency" defined.--An "insurance agency" is a business location at which an individual, firm, partnership, corporation, association, or other entity, except for an employee of the individual, firm, partnership, corporation, association, or other entity, and other than an insurer as defined by s. 624.03 or an adjuster as defined by s. 626.101, engages in any activity or employs individuals to engage in any activity which by law may be performed only by a licensed insurance agent or solicitor. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 626.112, Florida Statutes, requires licensure of agents, agencies and related personnel. Section 626.592, requires the designation of "primary agents" as follows: 626.592 Primary agents.-- On or before January 1, 1990, and annually thereafter, each person operating an insurance agency and each location of a multiple location agency shall designate a primary agent for each insurance agency location and shall file the name of the person so designated, and the address of the insurance agency location where he or she is primary agent, with the Department of Insurance, on a form approved by the department. The designation of the primary agent may be changed at the option of the agency and any change shall be effective upon notification to the department. For the purpose of this section, a "primary agent" is the licensed agent who is responsible for the hiring and supervision of all individuals within an insurance agency location who deal with the public in the solicitation or negotiation of insurance contracts or in the collection or accounting of moneys from the general public. An agent may be designated as primary agent for only one insurance agency location. For the purpose of this section, an "insurance agency" is a location where any agent is engaged in the business of insurance. The department may suspend or revoke the license of the primary agent if an insurance agency employs any person who has had a license denied or any person whose license is currently suspended or revoked. However, when a person has been denied a license for failure to pass a required examination, he or she may be employed to perform clerical or administrative functions for which licensure is not required. The primary agent in an unincorporated agency, or the primary agent in an incorporated agency in which no officer, director, or stockholder is an agent, shall be responsible and accountable for the acts of salaried employees under his or her direct supervision and control, while acting on behalf of the agency. Nothing in this section shall be construed to render any person criminally liable or subject to any disciplinary proceedings for any act unless such person personally committed or knew or should have known of such act and of the facts constituting a violation of this chapter. The department may suspend or revoke the license of any agent who is employed by a person whose license is currently suspended or revoked. No insurance agency location shall conduct the business of insurance unless a primary agent is designated at all times. Failure to designate a primary agent as required under this section shall constitute grounds for requiring that the agency obtain a license in accordance with ss. 626.112 and 626.172. Any insurance agency may request, on a form prescribed by the department, verification from the department of any person's current licensure status. If a request is mailed to the department within 5 working days after the date an agent is hired, and the department subsequently notifies the agency that an employee's license is currently suspended, revoked, or has been denied, the license of the primary agent shall not be revoked or suspended if the unlicensed person is immediately dismissed from employment as an insurance agent with the agency. (emphasis supplied) Proposed Rule 4-224.007 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the grant of rulemaking authority provided in Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes. The proposed rule does not provide parity of regulation. The proposed rule is not limited to assuring that no insurance agency or agent is subject to more stringent or less stringent regulation than another insurance agency or agent on the basis of the regulatory status of the entity that owns the agency or is associated with the agent. Proposed Rule 4-224.007 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges, modifies and contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented. The proposed rule specifically states that "where an agent legally conducts insurance transactions at two or more agency locations, a separate primary agent need not be designated at each location. " Section 626.592, Florida Statutes, requires the designation of a primary agent for each insurance agency location. An insurance agency is defined as a location where any agent is engaged in the business of insurance. No insurance agency location can conduct the business of insurance unless a primary agent is designated at all times. A primary agent may be so designated for only one insurance agency location. The Department has no authority to waive the requirements of Section 626.592, Florida Statutes. Further, the proposed rule permits an agent to designate one location of several as a "primary location." There is no statutory authorization for designation of a "primary location." Proposed Rule 4-224.007 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The only testimony regarding this proposed rule relates to the alleged expense involved in requiring separate primary agent designation for some banks which may choose to offer insurance products. The testimony is not persuasive and does not constitute competent substantial evidence supporting the rule. Rule 4-224-012 (Coercion) Proposed Rule 4-224.012 provides: 4-224.012 Coercion No person shall by words, actions, or distribution of written materials require or imply that the purchase of insurance by a borrower or prospective borrower from a particular agent, agency, insurer or other entity is required as a condition of, or will influence the terms or conditions of, the lending of money or the extension of credit. To the extent that insurance may permissibly be marketed in connection with or in conjunction with any activities described in this section; The agent shall disclose at or before the initial discussion or in response concerning insurance coverage required or offered in connection with a loan or credit application, that: the purchase of insurance from any particular source is not a condition to the provision of, and will not affect the terms of, any loan of money or extension of credit; Insurance is available through agent not associated with a lender or creditor; and The choice of another insurance provider will not affect decisions relating to or terms of any loan or credit extension. 1. A written disclosure which addresses the elements of paragraph (a) above shall be provided to the consumer in a separate documents on Form DI4- (rev /97) or Form DI4- (rev /97) [sic] which are adopted and incorporated herein by reference, or on another form approved in advance by the Department that provides equivalent disclosure, at or before the time the consumer completes an application or enrollment form or otherwise applies for coverage. 2. One copy of the form signed by the consumer shall be retained by the agent. The requirements of this rule 4-224.012 are inapplicable to credit insurance for which disclosures provided satisfy the disclosure requirements for excluding the premium of charge for insurance from the finance charge pursuant to Federal Truth in Lending Regulation Z, Section 12 CFR 226.4(d)(1) and (2), which is adopted incorporated herein by reference. As identified in the published rule proposal, Proposed Rule 4-224.012, Florida Administrative Code, is specifically authorized by Sections 624.308 and 626.9611, Florida Statutes, and implements Sections 626.5715, 626.051, 626.9541, 626.9551, and 626.9641, Florida Statutes. Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, provides the Department's general rulemaking authority. Section 626.9611, Florida Statutes, provides the Department's authority to adopt rules pursuant to Section 120, Florida Statutes, which specifically identify prohibited methods of competition, but limits such rules to those acts prohibited under Sections 626.9541 and 626.9551. Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity" statute, provides as set forth herein. Section 626.051, Florida Statutes, defines "life agent." Section 626.9541, Florida Statutes, addresses "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts" and is set forth herein. Section 626.9551, Florida Statutes, addresses the issue of coercion or "favoritism" and provides as follows: 626.9551 Favored agent or insurer; coercion of debtors.-- No person may: Require, as a condition precedent or condition subsequent to the lending of money or extension of credit or any renewal thereof, that the person to whom such money or credit is extended, or whose obligation the creditor is to acquire or finance, negotiate any policy or contract of insurance through a particular insurer or group of insurers or agent or broker or group of agents or brokers. Unreasonably disapprove the insurance policy provided by a borrower for the protection of the property securing the credit or lien. For purposes of this paragraph, such disapproval shall be deemed unreasonable if it is not based solely on reasonable standards, uniformly applied, relating to the extent of coverage required by such lender or person extending credit and the financial soundness and the services of an insurer. Such standards shall not discriminate against any particular type of insurer, nor shall such standards call for the disapproval of an insurance policy because such policy contains coverage in addition to that required. Require, directly or indirectly, that any borrower, mortgagor, purchaser, insurer, broker, or agent pay a separate charge in connection with the handling of any insurance policy required as security for a loan on real estate or pay a separate charge to substitute the insurance policy of one insurer for that of another. This paragraph does not include the interest which may be charged on premium loans or premium advances in accordance with the security instrument. Use or disclose information resulting from a requirement that a borrower, mortgagor, or purchaser furnish insurance of any kind on real property being conveyed or used as collateral security to a loan, when such information is to the advantage of the mortgagee, vendor, or lender, or is to the detriment of the borrower, mortgagor, purchaser, or insurer, or the agent or broker, complying with such a requirement. The department may investigate the affairs of any person to whom this section applies to determine whether such person has violated this section. If a violation of this section is found to have been committed knowingly, the person in violation shall be subject to the same procedures and penalties as provided in ss. 626.9571, 626.9581, 626.9591, and 626.9601. Section 626.9641, Florida Statutes, sets forth a series of standards known as Policyholder's Bill of Rights and provides as follows: 626.9641 Policyholders, bill of rights.-- The principles expressed in the following statements shall serve as standards to be followed by the department in exercising its powers and duties, in exercising administrative discretion, in dispensing administrative interpretations of the law, and in promulgating rules: Policyholders shall have the right to competitive pricing practices and marketing methods that enable them to determine the best value among comparable policies. Policyholders shall have the right to obtain comprehensive coverage. Policyholders shall have the right to insurance advertising and other selling approaches that provide accurate and balanced information on the benefits and limitations of a policy. Policyholders shall have a right to an insurance company that is financially stable. Policyholders shall have the right to be serviced by a competent, honest insurance agent or broker. Policyholders shall have the right to a readable policy. Policyholders shall have the right to an insurance company that provides an economic delivery of coverage and that tries to prevent losses. Policyholders shall have the right to a balanced and positive regulation by the department. This section shall not be construed as creating a civil cause of action by any individual policyholder against any individual insurer. Proposed Rule 4-224.012 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the Department's grant of rulemaking authority. Such authority is limited to those rules which provide for equivalent regulation of insurance transactions without regard to ownership or affiliation of the insurance agent or agency. The evidence fails to establish that this rule provides for parity of insurance regulation. Proposed Rule 4-224.012 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges the specific provisions of law being implemented. The rule mandates a statement of disclosure for which there is no statutory requirement. The statutes cited as being implemented by this proposed rule clearly prohibit coercive activities, but do not impose any disclosure requirement as would be required by the rule. Proposed Rule 4-224.012 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because there is no competent substantial evidence supporting the rule. The Department asserts that research indicates consumers can be, and are, coerced into purchasing insurance products by lenders during credit transactions. The Department also cites a previous administrative action prosecuted under existing statutes as evidence that coercion occurs. The evidence offered by the Department, including the testimony of the Department's witnesses, fails to support the assertion that coercion by financial institutions in the sale of insurance products is a substantial problem. Neither the cited research nor the related testimony by the Department's witnesses was persuasive. The greater weight of the evidence, including the testimony of Dr. Michael White, establishes that there is little empirical evidence of coercion in the sale of insurance products by financial institutions. As additional support for the rule, the Department offered testimony related to the existence of other regulatory disclosure rules and of model language adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Neither the other rules or the model language establish that the proposed coercion rule meets the current requirements of law. Other disclosure regulations were adopted prior to recent amendments to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which altered the "reasonableness" standard under which such rules could have been appropriate. The relevant model language of the NAIC has not been adopted by the Florida legislature. Rule 4-224.013 (Remedies) Proposed Rule 4-224.013 provides as follows: 4-224.013 Remedies Any person violating the provisions of the Insurance Code implemented by this rule chapter shall be subject to the issuance of a Cease and Desist Order in accordance with the provisions of Sections 624.310(3) and 626.9581, Florida Statutes, and to the imposition of an administrative penalty pursuant to Sections 624.310(5) and 626.9521, Florida Statutes, and to such other sanctions or proceedings as are authorized by the Florida Insurance Code. If the majority owner, partner, manager, director, officer or other person who manages or controls an insurance agency violates any provision of the Insurance Code or any department rule, or knowingly permits violation of any requirement of these rules by an agent or employee of the agency, the agency must obtain a license as an insurance agency in accordance with the provisions of Section 626.112(8), Florida Statutes. As identified in the published rule proposal, Proposed Rule 4-224.013, Florida Administrative Code, is specifically authorized by Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, and implements Sections 624.310, 624.4211, 646.418, 626.5715, 626.051, 626.112, 626.9521 and 626.9581. Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, provides the Department with general rulemaking authority. Section 624.310, Florida Statutes, provides the Department with enforcement and prosecutorial powers for violations of the Insurance Code, including cease and desist orders, administrative fines, and removal of "affiliated parties." Section 624.4211, Florida Statutes, provides for imposition of administrative fines in lieu of other disciplinary penalties. Section 624.418, Florida Statutes, provides suspension or revocation of certificates of authority for certain violations and other conditions. Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity" statute, provides as set forth herein. Section 626.051, Florida Statutes, provides a definition of "life agent." Section 626.112, Florida Statutes, provides for licensure of agencies, agents and other representatives. Section 626.9521, Florida Statutes, prohibits and penalizes unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices which are statutorily defined or determined pursuant to Sections 626.951 and 626.9651, Florida Statutes. Section 626.9581, Florida Statutes, provides the Department with the ability to issue cease and desist orders related to the commission of unfair or deceptive acts or practices or the unlawful transaction of insurance, and states as follows: 626.9581 Cease and desist and penalty orders.--After the hearing provided in s. 626.9571, the department shall enter a final order in accordance with s. 120.569. If it is determined that the person charged has engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice or the unlawful transaction of insurance, the department shall also issue an order requiring the violator to cease and desist from engaging in such method of competition, act, or practice or the unlawful transaction of insurance. Further, if the act or practice is a violation of s. 626.9541 or s. 626.9551, the department may, at its discretion, order any one or more of the following: Suspension or revocation of the person's certificate of authority, license, or eligibility for any certificate of authority or license, if he or she knew, or reasonably should have known, he or she was in violation of this act. Such other relief as may be provided in the insurance code. The Department presented no evidence with respect to Proposed Rule 4-224.013. The Department asserts only that the proposed rule is intended to provide notice to non-traditional sellers of insurance that a violation of the Insurance Code will subject them to the penalties set forth in the Insurance Code. Proposed Rule 4-224.013 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is redundant and unnecessary. The rule does not implement, interpret or make specific any provision of Florida law. There is no competent substantial evidence which establishes the validity of the proposed rule. Rule 4-224.014 (Confidential Information) Proposed Rule 4-224.014 provides: 4-224.014 Confidential Information Obtaining confidential information for a stated purpose unrelated to the transaction of insurance when it is known that the information will or may be used for purposes of marketing insurance, and when the insurance-related purpose is not disclosed, constitutes a deceptive statement or omission and is an unfair and deceptive act or practice under the provisions of the Unfair Insurance Trade practices Act, Part X, Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. (2)(a) Any entity which is a non-insurance transaction obtains confidential information concerning an individual or entity where it is known the information will be used by an affiliate insurance agent or agency for purposes of marketing insurance, or where it is known or reasonably should be known that there is a present intent or plan to use such information in such a manner, shall conspicuously and clearly disclose that fact to the person at the time the information is obtained and the consumer should be afforded an opportunity to object to the utilization of such information. (b) If the disclosure is not provided on a separate form, it must be made on a document signed by the person, in which case the disclosure shall be made in a larger type size than that used elsewhere in the document, or in a manner that is otherwise clearly distinguishable from the remaining text of the document, and must appear immediately adjacent to the person's signature. If the disclosure is made on a separate form and if information obtained as a result of future transaction may be used for marketing purpose; The disclosure shall clearly reflect such fact, and After a period of three years a new disclosure form must be provided if additional confidential information is secured and this paragraph is not complied with. (3)(a) Insurance agents and insurance companies are prohibited under the Insurance Code from engaging in practices which are injurious to policyholders or the public. (b) Use of confidential information concerning any person for purposes of marketing insurance when the person has directed that the information not be used for such purposes entails conduct which is injurious to policyholders or the public. (4) For purposes of this rule 4-224.014, confidential information is information pertaining to an individual or entity that is generally not available, provided that in no event shall the name, address, or telephone number or any person be considered confidential. As identified in the published rule proposal, Proposed Rule 4-224.013, Florida Administrative Code, is specifically authorized by Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, and implements Sections 624.418(1)(b), 626.5715, 626.621(6), 626.9541(1), 626.9611 and 626.964(1), Florida Statutes. Section 624.308, Florida Statutes, provides the Department's general rulemaking authority. Section 624.418, Florida Statutes, provides suspension or revocation of certificates of authority for certain violations and other conditions. Subsection (1)(b) specifically provides for such penalties where the insurer is using such methods and practices in the conduct of its business as to render its further transaction of insurance in this state hazardous or injurious to its policyholders or to the public. Section 626.5715, Florida Statutes, the "parity" statute, provides as set forth herein. Section 626.621(6), Florida Statutes, sets forth grounds for denial or suspension of licensure, and provides as follows: 626.621 Grounds for discretionary refusal, suspension, or revocation of agent's, solicitor's, adjuster's, customer representative's, service representative's, managing general agent's, or claims investigator's license or appointment.--The department may, in its discretion, deny an application for, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license or appointment of any applicant, agent, solicitor, adjuster, customer representative, service representative, managing general agent, or claims investigator, and it may suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license or appointment of any such person, if it finds that as to the applicant, licensee, or appointee any one or more of the following applicable grounds exist under circumstances for which such denial, suspension, revocation, or refusal is not mandatory under s. 626.611: * * * (6) In the conduct of business under the license or appointment, engaging in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as prohibited under part X of this chapter, or having otherwise shown himself or herself to be a source of injury or loss to the public or detrimental to the public interest. Section 626.9541, Florida Statutes, addresses "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts" and is set forth herein. Section 626.9611, Florida Statutes, provides the Department's authority to adopt rules pursuant to Section 120, Florida Statutes, which specifically identify prohibited methods of competition, but limits such rules to those acts prohibited under Sections 626.9541 and 626.9551. Section 626.9641(1), Florida Statutes, is the "Policyholder's Bill of Rights" and is set forth herein. Proposed Rule 4-224.014 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the Department's grant of rulemaking authority. The evidence fails to establish that the cited statutes provide the Department with the authority to prohibit the collection or utilization of information. The proposed rule exceeds the Department's specific grant of rulemaking authority which is limited in this case to those rules which provide for equivalent regulation of insurance transactions without regard to ownership or affiliation of the insurance agent or agency. Proposed Rule 4-224.014 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions and vests unbridled discretion in the agency. The rule states that collection of information "when it is known that the information will or may be used for purposes of marketing insurance, and when the insurance-related purpose is not disclosed, constitutes a deceptive statement or omission. " The phrase "when it is known that the information...may be used" is vague and requires a post-collection determination of the intent of the data collector at the time the information was gathered. Further, proposed definition of "confidential information" as that which is "generally not available" is vague. The vagueness of the rule results in a lack of adequate standards for decision making and vests unbridled discretion in the Department. Proposed Rule 4-224.014 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The testimony related to this proposed rule consisted primarily of an analysis of the statutory support for the rule. The evidence is insufficient to establish that the undisclosed collection of information which may be used at some time in a non-insurance setting constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice. There is no statutory provision which prohibits or restricts the sharing of information between a financial institution and an affiliated insurance agency. There is evidence that such prohibition as the Department intends to impose by this rule may violate the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 12 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(2), and the state Banking Code, Section 655.059(2)(b), Florida Statutes.
The Issue Does Petitioner, Department of Financial Services (DFS), have authority to determine if Respondent, Alberto Luis Sotero (Mr. Sotero) and Respondent, FalconTrust Group, Inc. (FalconTrust), wrongfully took or witheld premium funds owed an insurance company while a civil action between the insurance company and Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust pends in Circuit Court presenting the same issues? Should the insurance agent license of Mr. Sotero be disciplined for alleged violations of Sections 626.561(1), 626.611(7), 626.611(10), 626.611(13), and 626.621(4), Florida Statutes (2007)?1. Should the insurance agency license of FalconTrust be disciplined for alleged violations of Section 626.561(1), 626.6215(5)(a), 626.6215(5)(d). 626.6215(5)(f), and 626.6215(5)(k), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Sotero is licensed by DFS as an insurance agent in Florida and has been at all times material to this matter. He holds license number A249545. FalconTrust is licensed by DFS as an insurance agency in this state and has been at all times material to this matter. It holds license number L014424. Mr. Sotero is an officer and director of FalconTrust and held these positions at all times material to this proceeding. Mr. Sotero also controlled and directed all actions of FalconTrust described in these Findings of Fact. Zurich American Insurance Company is a commercial property and casualty insurance company. FalconTrust Commercial Risk Specialists, Inc., and Zurich-American Insurance Group entered into an "Agency-Company Agreement" (Agency Agreement) that was effective January 1, 1999. The Agency Agreement bound the following Zurich entities, referred to collectively as Zurich: Zurich Insurance Company, U.S. Branch; Zurich American Insurance Company of Illinois; American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company; American Zurich Insurance Company; and Steadfast Insurance Company. The Agreement specified that FalconTrust was an "independent Agent and not an employee of the Company [Zurich.]". . .. The Agency Agreement also stated: All premiums collected by you [Falcontrust] are our [Zurich's] property and are held by you as trust funds. You have no interest in such premiums and shall make no deduction therefrom before paying same to us [Zurich] except for the commission if any authorized by us in writing to be deducted by you and you shall not under any circumstances make personal use of such funds either in paying expense or otherwise. If the laws or regulations of the above state listed in your address require you to handle premiums in a fiduciary capacity or as trust funds you agree that all premiums of any kind received by or paid to you shall be segregated held apart by you in a premium trust fund account opened by you with a bank insured at all times by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and chargeable to you in a fiduciary capacity as trustee for our benefit and on our behalf and you shall pay such premiums as provided in this agreement. (emphasis supplied. The Agency Agreement commits Zurich to pay FalconTrust commissions "on terms to be negotiated . . . ." It requires FalconTrust to pay "any sub agent or sub producer fees or commissions required." The Agency Agreement also provides: Suspension or termination of this Agreement does not relieve you of the duty to account for and pay us all premiums for which you are responsible in accordance with Section 2 and return commissions for which you are responsible in accordance with Section 3 [the Commission section.] The Agency Agreement was for Mr. Sotero and Falcontrust to submit insurance applications for the Zurich companies to underwrite property and casualty insurance, primarily for long- haul trucking. The Agency Agreement and all the parties contemplated that Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust would deduct agreed-upon commissions from premiums and remit the remaining funds to Zurich. On September 14, 2000, Zurich and Mr. Sotero amended the Agency Agreement to change the due date for premium payments and to replace FalconTrust Group, Inc. (FalconTrust) for FalconTrust Commercial Risk Specialists, Inc., and to replace Zurich-American Insurance Group and Zurich Insurance Company, U.S. Branch, with Zurich U.S. Mr. Sotero and Zurich's authorized agent, Account Executive Sue Marcello, negotiated the terms of the commission agreement as contemplated in the Agency Agreement. Mr. Sotero confirmed the terms in a July 20, 1999, letter to Ms. Marcello. The parties agreed on a two-part commission. One part was to be paid from the premiums upon collection of the premiums. The second part, contingent upon the program continuing for five years, was to be paid by Zurich to Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust. The total commission was 20 percent. FalconTrust and Mr. Sotero were authorized to deduct 13 percent of the commission from premiums before forwarding them to Zurich. The remaining seven percent Zurich was to pay to Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust at the end of the program or after the fifth year anniversary date. The letter spelled out clearly that Zurich would hold the money constituting the seven percent and was entitled to all investment income earned on the money. The passage describing the arrangement reads as follows: Our total commission is 20 percent however Zurich will hold and retain the first 7 percent commission where they are entitle [sic] to earn investment income. I understand that FalconTrust will not benefit from this compounded investment income. However you mentioned you would increase our initial commission that is set at 13 percent currently from time to time depending on FalconTrust reaching their goals, but it will never exceed a total commission of 20 percent. It is to our understanding that the difference will be paid at the end of the program or after the fifth year anniversary date being 12/31/2005, but not earlier than five years. I do understand that if Zurich and/or FalconTrust cancels the program on or before the fourth year being 12/31/2004 that we are not entitle [sic] to our remaining commission that you will be holding. If the program is cancelled after 12/31/2004 by FalconTrust and/or Zurich it is understood that all commission being held will be considered earned. (emphasis added.) Until the program ended, the parties conducted themselves under the Agency Agreement as described in the letter. At some point the parties agreed to decrease the percentage retained by Zurich to five percent and increase the percentage initially paid to and kept by FalconTrust to 15 percent. During the course of the relationship FalconTrust produced approximately $146,000,000 in premiums for Zurich. At all times relevant to this matter, all premium payments, except for the portion deducted by sub-agents and producers before forwarding the payments to Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust were deposited into a trust account. The various sub-agents of FalconTrust collected premiums and forwarded them to FalconTrust, after deducting their commissions, which were a subpart of the FalconTrust 13 percent commission. FalconTrust in turn forwarded the remaining premium funds after deducting the portion of its 13 percent left after the sub-agent deduction. This was consistent with the Agency Agreement and accepted as proper by Zurich at all times. All parties realized that the held-back seven percent, later five percent, was money that Zurich would owe and pay if the conditions for payment were met. The parties conducted themselves in keeping with that understanding. Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust described the practice this way in their Third Amended Complaint in a court proceeding about this dispute: "In accordance with the Commission Agreement, Zurich held the contingency/holdback commission and received investment income thereon." (Emphasis supplied.) In 2006 Zurich decided to end the program. In a letter dated December 8, 2006, Tim Anders, Vice President of Zurich, notified Mr. Sotero that Zurich was terminating the Agency-Company Agreement of January 1, 1999. The letter was specific. It said Zurich was providing "notification of termination of that certain Agency-Company Agreement between Zurich American Insurance Company, Zurich American Insurance Co. of Illinois, American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co., American Zurich Insurance Company, Steadfast Insurance Company . . . and FalconTrust Grup, Inc. . . ., dated January 1, 1999, . . .." Mr. Sotero wrote asking Zurich to reconsider or at least extend the termination date past the March 15, 2007, date provided in the letter. Zurich agreed to extend the termination date to April 30, 2007. At the time of termination FalconTrust had fulfilled all of the requirements under the Agency-Agreement for receipt of the held-back portion of the commissions. Mr. Sotero asked Zurich to pay the held-back commission amounts. He calculated the amount to exceed $7,000,000. Zurich did not pay the held- back commission amounts. As the program was winding down and the termination date approached, FalconTrust continued to receive premiums. As the Agency Agreement and negotiated commission structure provided, FalconTrust deducted its initial commission from the premium payments. But, reacting to Zurich's failure to begin paying the held back commission amounts, Mr. Sotero engaged in "self help." He deducted at least $6,000,000 from the premium payments from customers, received and deposited in the trust account. He took the money as payment from Zurich of earned and held back commissions.3 Nothing in the Agency Agreement or negotiated commission agreement authorized this action. In March of 2007, Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust also brought suit against Zurich in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida. The issues in that proceeding include whether Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust wrongfully took premiums and how much Zurich owes them for commissions. As of the final hearing, that cause (Case Number 07-6199-CA-01) remained pending before the court and set for jury trial in August 2010. There is no evidence of a final disposition. But the court has entered a partial Summary Judgment determining that FalconTrust wrongfully took premium funds for the commissions that it maintained Zurich owed. The court's Order concludes that the issue is not whether Zurich owed money to FalconTrust, but whether FalconTrust was entitled to take the funds when it did. Like the undersigned, the court determines that it was not. Between December 8, 2006, the date of the cancelation letter, and April 30, 2007, the program termination date, Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust did not remit to Zurich any of the approximately $6,000,000 in premium payments received. Despite not receiving premiums, Zurich did not cancel or refuse to issue the policies for which the premiums taken by Mr. Sotero and FalconTrust were payment. The policies remained in effect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services suspend the license of Adalberto L. Sotero for nine months and suspend the license of FalconTrust Group, Inc. for nine months. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2010.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents offered and sold securities in Florida, in violation of the registration requirements of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes; offered and sold securities in Florida while Respondents were unregistered, in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; or committed fraud in the offer, sale, or purchase of securities in Florida, in violation of Section 517.301(1)(a), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is the penalty to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent James A. Torchia (Respondent) held a valid life and health insurance license. Respondent was the president and owner of Respondent Empire Insurance, Inc. (Empire Insurance), a now-dissolved Florida corporation. Empire Insurance was in the insurance business, and Respondent was its sole registered insurance agent. At no material time has Respondent or Empire Insurance held any license or registration to engage in the sale or offer for sale of securities in Florida. At no material time were the investments described below sold and offered for sale by Respondent or Empire Insurance registered as securities in Florida. These cases involve viaticated life insurance policies. A life insurance policy is viaticated when the policy owner, also known as the viator, enters into a viatical settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the viator sells the policy and death benefits to the purchaser for an amount less than the death benefit--the closer the viator is perceived to be to death, the greater the discount from the face amount of the death benefit. The viatical industry emerged to provide dying insureds, prior to death, a means by which to sell their life insurance policies to obtain cash to enjoy during their remaining lives. As this industry matured, brokers and dealers, respectively, arranged for the sale of, and bought and resold, life insurance policies of dying insureds. Prior to the death of the viator, these viaticated life insurance policies, or interests in such policies, may be sold and resold several times. In these cases, viators sold their life insurance policies to Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc. (FinFed). Having raised money from investors, American Benefit Services (ABS) then paid FinFed, which assigned viaticated policies, or interests in the policies, to various trusts. The trusts held the legal title to the policies, and the trust beneficiaries, who are the investors from whom ABS had obtained the funds to pay FinFed, held equitable title to the policies. Sometimes in these cases, a broker or dealer, such as William Page and Associates, intervened between the viator and FinFed. At some point, though, ABS obtained money from investors to acquire policies, but did not pay the money to FinFed to purchase viaticated life insurance policies. The FinFed and ABS investment program eventually became a Ponzi scheme, in which investor payouts were derived largely, if not exclusively, from the investments of other investors. ABS typically acquired funds through the promotional efforts of insurance agents, such as Respondent and Empire Insurance. Using literature provided by ABS, these agents often sold these investments to insurance clients. As was typical, Respondent and Empire Insurance advertised the types of claims described below by publishing large display ads that ran in Florida newspapers. Among the ABS literature is a Participation Disclosure (Disclosure), which describes the investment. The Disclosure addresses the investor as a "Participant" and the investment as a "Participation." The Disclosure contains a Participation Agreement (Agreement), which provides that the parties agree to the Disclosure and states whether the investor has chosen the Growth Plan or Income Plan, which are described below; a Disbursement Letter of Instruction, which is described below; and a Letter of Instruction to Trust, which is described below. The agent obtains the investor's signature to all three of these documents when the investor delivers his check, payable to the escrow agent, to purchase the investment. The Disclosure states that the investments offer a “High Return”: “Guaranteed Return on Participation 42% at Maturity.” The Disclosure adds that the investments are “Low Risk”: “Secured by a Guaranteed Insurance Industry Receivable”; “Secured by $300,000 State Insurance Guarantee Fund”; “Short Term Participation (Maturity Expectation 36 Months)”; “Principal Liquid After One Year With No Surrender Charge”; “State Regulated Participation”; “All Transactions By Independent Trust & Escrow Agents”; and “If policy fails to mature at 36 months, participant may elect full return of principal plus 15% simple interest.” The Disclosure describes two alternative investments: the Growth Plan and Income Plan. For the Growth Plan, the Disclosure states: “At maturity, Participant receives principal plus 42%, creating maximum growth of funds.” For the Income Plan, the Disclosure states: “If income is desired, participation can be structured with monthly income plans.” Different rates of return for the Growth and Income plans are set forth below. For investors choosing the Income Plan, ABS applied only 70 percent of the investment to the purchase of viaticated life insurance policies. ABS reserved the remaining 30 percent as the source of money to "repay" the investor the income that he was due to receive under the Income Plan, which, as noted below, paid a total yield of 29.6 percent over three years. The Disclosure states that ABS places all investor funds in attorneys’ trust accounts, pursuant to arrangements with two “bonded and insured” “financial escrow agents.” At another point in the document, the Disclosure states that the investor funds are deposited “directly” with a “financial escrow agent,” pursuant to the participant’s Disbursement Letter of Instruction. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction identifies a Florida attorney as the “financial escrow agent,” who receives the investor’s funds and disburses them, “to the order of [FinFed) or to the source of the [viaticated insurance] benefits and/or its designees.” This disbursement takes place only after the attorney receives “[a] copy of the irrevocable, absolute assignment, executed in favor of Participant and recorded with the trust account as indicated on the assignment of [viaticated insurance] benefits, and setting out the ownership percentage of said [viaticated insurance] benefits”; a “medical overview” of the insured indicative of not more than 36 months’ life expectancy; confirmation that the policy is in full force and effect and has been in force beyond the period during which the insurer may contest coverage; and a copy of the shipping airbill confirming that the assignment was sent to the investor. The Disclosure states that the investor will direct a trust company to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. When the life insurance policy matures on the death of the viator, the insurer pays the death benefits to the trust company, which pays these proceeds to the investor, in accordance with his interest in the trust. Accordingly, the Letter of Instruction to Trust directs FinFed, as the trust company, to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. The Letter of Instruction to Trust provides that the viaticated insurance benefits obtained with the investor's investment shall be assigned to this trust, and, at maturity, FinFed shall pay the investor a specified sum upon the death of the viator and the trustee's receipt of the death benefit from the insurer. The Disclosure provides that, at anytime from 12 to 36 months after the execution of the Disclosure, the investor has the option to request ABS to return his investment, without interest. At 36 months, if the viator has not yet died, the investor has the right to receive the return of his investment, plus 15 percent (five percent annually). The Disclosure states that ABS will pay all costs and fees to maintain the policy and that all policies are based on a life expectancy for the viator of no more than 36 months. Also, the Disclosure assures that ABS will invest only in policies that are issued by insurers that are rated "A" or better by A.M. Best "at the time that the Participant's deposit is confirmed." The Disclosure mentions that the trust company will name the investor as an irrevocable assignee of the policy benefits. The irrevocable assignment of policy benefits mentioned in the Disclosure and the Disbursement Letter of Instruction is an anomaly because it does not conform to the documentary scheme described above. After the investor pays the escrow agent and executes the documents described above, FinFed executes the “Irrevocable Absolute Assignment of Viaticated Insurance Benefits.” This assignment is from the trustee, as grantor, to the investor, as grantee, and applies to a specified percentage of a specific life insurance policy, whose death benefit is disclosed on the assignment. The assignment includes the "right to receive any viaticated insurance benefit payable under the Trusts [sic] guaranteed receivables of assigned viaticated insurance benefits from the noted insurance company; [and the] right to assign any and all rights received under this Trust irrevocable absolute assignment." On its face, the assignment assigns the trust corpus-- i.e., the insurance policy or an interest in an insurance policy--to the trust beneficiary. Doing so would dissolve the trust and defeat the purpose of the other documents, which provide for the trust to hold the policy and, upon the death of the viator, to pay the policy proceeds in accordance with the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The assignment bears an ornate border and the corporate seal of FinFed. Probably, FinFed intended the assignment to impress the investors with the "reality" of their investment, as the decorated intangible of an "irrevocable" interest in an actual insurance policy may seem more impressive than the unadorned intangible of a beneficial interest in a trust that holds an insurance policy. Or possibly, the FinFed/ABS principals and professionals elected not to invest much time or effort in the details of the transactional documentation of a Ponzi scheme. What was true then is truer now. Obviously, in those cases in which no policy existed, the investor paid his money before any policy had been selected for him. However, this appears to have been the process contemplated by the ABS literature, even in those cases in which a policy did exist. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction and correspondence from Respondent, Empire Insurance, or Empire Financial Consultant to ABS reveal that FinFed did not assign a policy, or part of a policy, to an investor until after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In some cases, Respondent or Empire Insurance requested ABS to obtain for an investor a policy whose insured had special characteristics or a investment plan with a maturity shorter than 36 months. FinFed and ABS undertook other tasks after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In addition to matching a viator with an investor, based on the investor's expressed investment objectives, FinFed paid the premiums on the viaticated policies until the viator died and checked on the health of the viator. Also, if the viator did not die within three years and the investor elected to obtain a return of his investment, plus 15 percent, ABS, as a broker, resold the investor's investment to generate the 15 percent return that had been guaranteed to the investor. Similarly, ABS would sell the investment of investors who wanted their money back prior to three years. The escrow agent also assumed an important duty--in retrospect, the most important duty--after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents; the escrow agent was to verify the existence of the viaticated policy. Respondent and Empire Insurance sold beneficial interests in trusts holding viaticated life insurance policies in 50 separate transactions. These investors invested a total of $1.5 million, nearly all of which has been lost. Respondent and Empire Insurance earned commissions of about $120,000 on these sales. Petitioner proved that Respondent and Empire Insurance made the following sales. Net worths appear for those investors for whom Respondent recorded net worths; for most, he just wrote "sufficient" on the form. Unless otherwise indicated, the yield was 42 percent for the Growth Plan. In all cases, investors paid money for their investments. In all cases, FinFed and ABS assigned parts of policies to the trusts, even of investors investing relatively large amounts. On March 21, 1998, Phillip A. Allan, a Florida resident, paid $69,247.53 for the Growth Plan. On March 26, 1998, Monica Bracone, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $900,000, paid $8000 for the Growth Plan. On April 2, 1998, Alan G. and Judy LeFort, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on June 8, 1998, the LeForts paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In the second transaction, the yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement notes a 36-month life expectancy of the viator. The different yields based on life expectancies are set forth below, but, as noted above, the standard yield was 42 percent, and, as noted below, this was based on a 36-month life expectancy, so Respondent miscalculated the investment return or misdocumented the investment on the LeForts' second transaction. On April 29, 1998, Doron and Barbara Sterling, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on August 14, 1998, the Sterlings paid $100,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield for the second transaction is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement notes that the Sterlings were seeking a viator with a life expectancy of only 30 months. When transmitting the closing documents for the second Sterling transaction, Respondent, writing ABS on Empire Insurance letterhead, stated in part: This guy has already invested with us (15,000) [sic]. He gave me this application but wants a 30 month term. Since he has invested, he did some research and has asked that he be put on a low T-cell count and the viator to be an IV drug user. I know it is another favor but this guy is a close friend and has the potential to put at least another 500,000 [sic]. If you can not [sic] do it, then I understand. You have done a lot for me and I always try to bring in good quality business. If this inventory is not available, the client has requested that we return the funds . . . In a third transaction, on February 24, 1999, the Sterlings paid $71,973 for the Growth Plan. The yield is only 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects the typical 36-month life expectancy for the viator. Although the investors would not have received this document, Respondent completed an ABS form entitled, "New Business Transmittal," and checked the box, "Life Expectancy 2 years or less (28%). The other boxes are: "Life Expectancy 2 1/2 years or less (35%)" and "Life Expectancy 3 years or less (42%)." On May 4, 1998, Hector Alvero and Idelma Guillen, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $6000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on October 29, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a third transaction, on November 30, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. For this investment, Ms. Guillen requested an "IV drug user," according to Respondent in a letter dated December 1, 1998, on Empire Financial Consultants letterhead. This is the first use of the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants, not Empire Insurance, and all letters after that date are on the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants. In a fourth transaction, on January 29, 1999, Ms. Guillen paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On April 23, 1998, Bonnie P. Jensen, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $120,000, paid $65,884.14 for the Growth Plan. Her yield was 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 20, 1998, Michael J. Mosack, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $70,600 for the Income Plan. He was to receive monthly distributions of $580.10 for three years. The total yield, including monthly distributions, is $20,883.48, which is about 29.6 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 27, 1998, Lewis and Fernande G. Iachance, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On June 3, 1998, Sidney Yospe, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $1,500,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 30-month life expectancy. On June 12, 1998, Bernard Aptheker, with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 10, 1998, Irene M. and Herman Kutschenreuter, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 9, 1998, Daniel and Mary Spinosa, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 5, 1998, Pauline J. and Anthony Torchia, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000 and the parents of Respondent, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 29, 1998, Christopher D. Bailey, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction on the same day, Mr. Bailey paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. Petitioner submitted documents concerning a purported purchase by Lauren W. Kramer on July 21, 1998, but they were marked "VOID" and do not appear to be valid. On July 22, 1998, Laura M. and Kenneth D. Braun, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $150,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan, as Respondent completed the Participation Agreement. However, the agreement calls for them to receive $205.42 monthly for 36 months and receive a total yield, including monthly payments, of 29.6 percent, so it appears that the Brauns bought the Income Plan. In a second transaction, also on July 22, 1998, the Brauns paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Roy R. Worrall, a Florida resident, paid $100,000 for the Income Plan. The Participation Agreement provides that he will receive monthly payments of $821.66 and a total yield of 29.6 percent. On July 16, 1998, Earl and Rosemary Gilmore, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on February 12, 1999, the Gilmores paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of two years or less. On July 14, 1998, David M. Bobrow, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $700,000 on one form and $70,000 on another form, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction, on the same day, Mr. Bobrow paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 27, 1998, Cecilia and Harold Lopatin, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 30, 1998, Ada R. Davis, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Income Plan. Her total yield, including monthly payments of $246.50 for three years, is 29.6 percent. In a second transaction, on the same day, Ms. Davis paid $30,000 for the Income Plan on the same terms as the first purchase. On July 27, 1998, Joseph F. and Adelaide A. O'Keefe, Florida residents with a net worth of $300,000, paid $12,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 5, 1998, Thurley E. Margeson, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 19, 1998, Stephanie Segaria, a Florida resident, paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 26, 1998, Roy and Glenda Raines, Florida residents, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of 30 months or less. In a second transaction, on the same day, the Raineses paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy, although, again, the New Business Transmittal notes the life expectancy of 30 months or less. On November 24, 1998, Dan W. Lipford, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan in two transactions. In a third transaction, on January 13, 1999, Mr. Lipford paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 1, 1998, Mary E. Friebes, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 4, 1998, Allan Hidalgo, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 17, 1998, Paul E. and Rose E. Frechette, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including monthly payments of $205.41 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 26, 1998, Theodore and Tillie F. Friedman, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 19, 1999, Robert S. and Karen M. Devos, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Arthur Hecker, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $410.83 for 36 months, is 29.6 percent. On February 11, 1999, Michael Galotola, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on the same day, Michael and Anna Galotola paid $12,500 for the Growth Plan. On November 3, 1998, Lee Chamberlain, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 23, 1998, Herbert L. Pasqual, a Florida resident, paid $200,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $1643.33 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 1, 1998, Charles R. and Maryann Schuyler, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. Respondent and Empire Insurance were never aware of the fraud being perpetrated by FinFed and ABS at anytime during the 38 transactions mentioned above. Respondent attempted to verify with third parties the existence of the viaticated insurance policies. When ABS presented its program to 30-40 potential agents, including Respondent, ABS presented these persons an opinion letter from ABS's attorney, stating that the investment was not a security, under Florida law. Respondent also contacted Petitioner's predecessor agency and asked if these transactions involving viaticated life insurance policies constituted the sale of securities. An agency employee informed Respondent that these transactions did not constitute the sale of securities.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order: Finding James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., not guilty of violating Section 517.301(1), Florida Statutes; Finding James A. Torchia guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; Finding Empire Insurance, Inc., guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes, except for transactions closed on or after December 1, 1998; Directing James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., to cease and desist from further violations of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes; and Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $120,000 against James A. Torchia. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Fred H. Wilsen Senior Attorney Office of Financial Institutions and Securities Regulation South Tower, Suite S-225 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1799 Barry S. Mittelberg Mittelberg & Nicosia, P.A. 8100 North University Drive, Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33321
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, Respondent, Charles Edward Hinchey, was licensed by the State of Florida as: a Life and Health (Debit Agent), a Life agent, a Life and Health Agent, a General lines - Property, casualty, surety, and Miscellaneous Agent, a Health Insurance Agent At no time pertinent to the allegations herein was he either licensed or eligible for licensure as a Surplus lines - Property, Casualty and Surety Surplus lines Agent. The Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer, (Department), is the state agency charged with regulating the activities of licensed insurance agents in Florida. At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, the Respondent, Hinchey, was President and a Director of C. Edward Hinchey & Company, Inc. Sometime in September, 1986, Charles R. Safarik, a sales representative and energy consultant operating his own firm, contacted Respondent on the basis of a reference from his prior insurance agent, relative to securing completed products insurance for his business. As a result of these discussions, he and Respondent entered into an agreement for Mr. Safarik to purchase the desired coverage from Respondent at an acceptable yearly premium of $1,789.00. Mr. Safarik gave a check for this amount dated September 8, 1986, payable to C. Edward Hinchey & Co., and endorsed for deposit to that company's account. When the check was handed over, Respondent gave Mr. Safarik a binder which he signed which reflects Lloyds of London, (Lloyds) as the underwriter. Lloyds of London is authorized to insure for Surplus Lines in Florida. Mr. Safarik thought, as a result, that he was insured by Lloyds of London and though he never received a policy to that effect, in February, 1987, upon his request, he received from the Respondent a photo copy of a Lloyds policy reflecting Respondent as agent, which purports to insure Mr. Safarik's company as requested. When he received this document, Mr. Safarik called Lloyds directly to inquire, giving the policy number. In response, he was advised the company would not issue any policy with the stated number, and was referred to Lloyds' counsel in New York. When Mr. Safarik requested an original policy from Lloyds' American counsel, he was advised, after investigation, by letter in April, 1987, that he had no insurance with Lloyds. The letter in question further indicated that the certificate of insurance issued by Respondent's company and signed By Respondent was issued without the authorization of Lloyds. In March, 1987, after receiving the purported policy and bogus Certificate of Insurance from Respondent, Mr. Safarik advised the Department of Insurance personnel of the situation as it then appeared. Before he received an answer, however, in mid-March, 1987, Respondent gave Mr. Safarik a check for a full return of the premium paid, a letter to Hinchey for Safarik to sign requesting the policy be voided, and a proposed letter to the Department of Insurance indicating the matter had been resolved to his satisfaction. Mr. Safarik signed neither. Though Mr. Safarik cashed Respondent's check, he did not have the insurance coverage he thought he had when dealing with Respondent. Should anything go wrong with any of the equipment sold during that period, he may have liability for any loss occasioned. Though Respondent never stated he was a representative of Lloyds, his actions in delivering a binder and certificate of insurance, both of which bore his agency as correspondent/agent, and the Lloyds name as insurer, implied an agency representation relationship. Respondent did nothing to discourage that conclusion. The Florida authorized underwriter for Lloyds categorically denies having signed any of those documents. The documents appear to bear the signature of his policy typist, but they were not signed as they appear now. For example, the Florida Surplus Lines Number C-562-85, which appears on the photo copy of the policy given to Mr. Safarik, was actually the number on a different company's policy issued to Tanner Trucking, Inc., in August, 1985. He also believed the tax stated thereon is incorrect for the premium charged, (Counsel for Respondent disputed this in a post-hearing letter to the undersigned), but that is irrelevant except as to indicate manipulation of the policy. It is clear, and the testimony of Mr. Rowley and Ms. Walker, the policy typist, confirms, that the policy which Respondent delivered to Mr. Safarik was fraudulent and invalid. It is an obvious cut and paste forgery. George B. Reed owns and operates D&B Trucking in Brandon, Florida. His rolling stock includes three tractors and 16 trailers, some of which are financed under an agreement which requires him to carry liability and other insurance on them. When he bought 10 trailers in April, 1986, he purchased insurance for them through the Respondent. On April 14, 1986, he gave Respondent a check for $4,292.29, as partial premium, made payable to Real Insurers, (Real), with whom Respondent was affiliated at the time. Thereafter, he received a binder dated April 18, 1986, issued on American Trucking Insurance Company, signed by the Respondent. Since Mr. Reed had never heard of the company, he asked around about it but could get no information. Though he asked Respondent several times for a policy to support the binder, he never received one. Respondent repeatedly claimed it had something to do with his files. Mr. Reed also made additional premium payments monthly in May, June, July, and August, 1986, but he did not receive a policy from either the Respondent or the company. The policy was in force for, he believed, one year during which Mr. Reed had some claims he thought were covered. When he notified Respondent of these claims, Respondent said he was covered and he, Respondent, would have to get into the files to process them. Mr. Reed received no reimbursement at all on these claims, however, and had to pay for the supposedly covered damage himself. Mr. Reed ultimately determined there was no such company as American Trucking Insurance Company. Repeated inquiries to the Respondent were met with repeated stalling. Respondent told Mr. Reed he had placed the insurance through Day and Associates in St. Petersburg which had gone out of business when Mr. Day died. This information was communicated to Mr. Reed by the Respondent by letter dated January 14, 1987. In that letter Respondent also pointed out that he had returned the premium paid for the nonexistent coverage and attempted to lay the entire blame for the lack of coverage on Day. When Mr. Reed found out he had no coverage, he nonetheless stayed with Respondent who purportedly got him coverage with AllState. It subsequently was determined that this latter coverage was only for one truck, however, and if the binder introduced by Respondent at the hearing is for the coverage referred to here, it must be noted that the binder reflects Lloyds of London rather than AllState as the underwriter. It also was determined that of the $4,292.29 paid by Reed in the initial check to Real, all but $1,962.00, which was reimbursed by Read to Hinchey, was for cargo and liability insurance with Occidental Insurance Company, not American Trucking Insurance Co. The terms of Hinchey's agreement with Real called for him to independently procure the truck insurance that Reed thought he was getting and against which the claims were filed. He placed the coverage, if placed at all, with a firm not licensed in this state, and, as will be seen, there is some question he did even that. When Mr. Hinchey paid Mr. Reed back the $4,292.29, he enclosed a letter which, when signed by Reed, would have constituted a release of all claims Reed had against him. Reed had not solicited this though he signed it. All of these dealings with Mr. Reed took place when Respondent was an agent working for Real Insurers. The co-owner of that agency had no idea Respondent was conducting his own incorporated business out of her agency until confronted with the Reed situation. She knew nothing of any dealing with American Trucking Insurance Company or of Day and Associates. While Day and Associates was at one point in business in Florida, the Department of Insurance certifies that American Trucking Insurance Company is not authorized to act as an insurer in any capacity in Florida. It is clear, therefore, that Respondent accepted $1,962.00 from Mr. Reed under false pretenses of providing coverage on 10 trailers; issued a binder on a company which did not exist; and then attempted to cover up his actions by paying Reed back after Reed complained to the Department. Respondent denies any intentional wrongdoing. He stated that when Mr. Safarik first contacted him, he contacted several agents and brokers from a list of agents offering the desired coverage, which he had compiled over the years. Because of the dangerous nature of Safarik's business, he had a difficult time finding someone to issue the coverage. Day and Associates was on the list though Respondent had never dealt with them and knew nothing about them. He contacted Day by phone and transacted all their business that way, without ever meeting Mr. Day. He claims this is not unusual. According to Respondent, the placement of Safarik's coverage with Lloyds was accomplished by Day, and Respondent issued the binder on the basis of a price quoted him by Day. The policy number and company name were also given to him, he claims, by Day to whom he transmitted 85 percent of the premium paid by Mr. Safarik. Respondent has no evidence by way of cancelled checks, letters, or other written memoranda to back up this claim. It is patently false. Mr. Hinchey relates that in 1975 he worked directly with a Lloyds underwriter and was, therefore, familiar with their policy form. The policy he received for Mr. Safarik was not unusual, and bearing the Lloyds seal, it did not raise any suspicions. When Mr. Safarik told him that he had not received his policy, Respondent made a copy of his copy and sent it on without, he asserts, making any changes thereto or placing any entries thereon. His typed company name which appears thereon as correspondent, instead of Day and Associates who procured the policy must, therefore, have been placed there by Day or the company. This is unlikely. Respondent claims he first found out the policy was not genuine in April, 1987, when he received a phone call from Lloyds' New York attorney about it. He corresponded with the Department's investigator in Tampa who was looking into the matter and heard no more about it. In his mind, he had no reason to doubt that Day and Associates had authority to write the policy. As to the trucking company policy, Respondent indicates he placed the insurance with American Trucking Insurance Company, out of the Grand Cayman Islands through Day and Associates. The policy he wrote showed coverage from 4- 18-86 to 4-18-87 at a premium of $4,200.00 and an attached schedule reflects 10 trailers covered. The binder Respondent introduced in support of this coverage, however, reflects a coverage period of 8-27-87 to 9-24-87, less than one month, relates to only one vehicle, and shows no premium. This document in no way supports Respondent's position. Again, Respondent contends that 85 percent of the premium he received from Real Insurers for the American Trucking Insurance Company policy was paid to Day and Associates. There is, again, no cancelled check for this payment as it was paid in cash to a "woman [who] came by and picked it up." There are no receipts or anything with the Day name on it to verify this. Anything of that nature would have been in a file, according to Respondent, which was not presented for consideration. Respondent does not know what is in there. Again, it is clear from the evidence that Respondent, working his own operation out of the Real Insurers office, accepted premiums from Mr. Reed and issued a policy on a company which, if it exists at all, is not licensed to do business in Florida. This resulted in the client not being covered. He thereafter attempted to cover his actions up by blaming the matter on Day and Associates, a defunct organization previously headed by an individual now deceased. His story is unworthy of belief.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that all licenses to engage in the business of insurance currently held by the Respondent, CHARLES EDWARD HINCHEY, be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of October, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-2587 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. For the Petitioner: 1-3. Accepted and incorporated herein. 4-7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8-12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13-14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15-16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17-18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20-21. Accepted and incorporated herein. 22-24. Accepted and incorporated herein. 25-27. Accepted and incorporated herein. 28. Rejected as a summary of the Respondent's presentation from the Petitioner's point of view and not a proposed Finding of Fact. For the Respondent: 1-3. Accepted and incorporated herein. 4-6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7-9. Accepted and incorporated herein. 10-12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. Accepted and Incorporated herein. 14-15. Accepted and incorporated herein. 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17-18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19-20. Accepted and incorporated herein. 21. Rejected as how Mr. Phillips testified. The testimony related was given by Mr. Charles Rowley who works for Gordon B. Phillips Co. Also while there is no direct evidence that Respondent forged Mr. Rowley's signature to the policy, the circumstantial evidence is great that he did and it was so found. 22-23: Accepted and incorporated herein. 24-26. Accepted and incorporated herein. 27. Accepted except for the statement that one of his associate agents referred Respondent to Day & Associates. There was no affirmative indication of that point. Cited reference to transcript is inferential only. 28-29. Rejected as unsupported by credible evidence of record. 30-32. Accepted and incorporated herein except for the proposed finding that Respondent procured valid substitute insurance for Mr. Reed which is not supported by credible evidence of record. Rejected as contra to the evidence. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Office of Legal Services 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Kennan G. Dandar, Esquire The Ashley Tower, Suite 1360 100 South Ashley Drive Tampa, Florida 33602 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue for consideration is whether Respondent's licenses and eligibility for licensure as a life agent, a life and health agent, a general lines agent, a health agent and a dental health care contract salesman in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the matters in issue herein, the Department of Insurance and Treasurer was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of insurance agents and regulation of the insurance industry in this state. Respondent, Michael Charles Peppe was and is currently licensed and eligible for licensure in Florida as a life insurance agent, a life and health insurance agent, a general lines agent and a health insurance agent. He was an officer and director of M. Peppe Agency, Inc., a Florida corporation. During the period in issue herein, Respondent's agency had a brokerage agreement with William Sanner and Mary Lou Sanner who were employed as sub- agents. Constance Abraham, an 85 year old widow first met William Sanner when she moved to Ft. Lauderdale, some 20 or so year ago. They were neighbors in the same apartment building. At that time she was insured with Mutual of Omaha and her policy was transferred to him, an agent for that company, for service. Over the years she purchased quite a bit of other insurance from him. They were all different kinds of health insurance policies and over time, she estimates, she purchased somewhere around 50 policies. During the period between 1985 and 1991, Mrs. Abraham purchased numerous health policies for both herself and her son through Mr. and Mrs. Sanner, though she does not recall ever having dealt with Mrs. Sanner. Records disclose that her coverage was placed with nine different companies and provided coverage in such areas as Medicare Supplement, nursing home insurance, cancer insurance, and hospital expense - indemnity insurance. Over the years approximately 60 policies were issued through Respondent's agency to either Mrs. Abraham or her son. The applications were taken by Sanner who would collect the initial premiums and forward both to Respondent's agency for processing to the various insurers. Some policies were signed by Sanner as agent of record and some were signed by Respondent in that capacity. Only a few were signed by Mrs. Sanner. Mrs. Abraham claims she didn't realize how much health insurance she had. Mr. Sanner would come to her apartment and talk to her about a new policy and she would abide by his advice. Her purchases amounted to approximately $20,000.00 per year in premiums which she would pay by check to Mr. Sanner. At no time did she ever deal with or meet the Respondent, Mr. Peppe. She did not question Sanner deeply about why he was selling her so much insurance. Whenever she asked about a new policy, he would usually have what appeared to he to be a good reason for it such as something was lacking in her coverage. Even when she recognized he was selling her duplicate coverage, he told her it was a good idea to have more. At no time did he or anyone else tell her she had too much insurance. Mrs. Abraham claims to know nothing about insurance herself. However, she was cognizant of the nature of the policies she had, utilizing without prompting the terms, "indemnity", "supplemental", and "accident." Mr. Sanner would come to her home at least once a month She trusted him to help her with her health insurance and would talk with him whenever a policy came up for renewal. On some occasions he would recommend she renew and on others would recommend she drop that policy in favor of another. At no time was she aware, however, of the fact that she was duplicating policies. She also claims she never had to tell Mr. Sanner what she wanted from her coverage. He always seemed to know and would handle not only the purchase of her policies but also the filing of her claims. She can recall no instance where she asked for any coverage and he tried to talk her out of it. Mrs. Abraham denies she was the person who complained to the Department. It was her daughter who noticed what was going on and took matters into her own hands. At no time did either Sanner or the Respondent attempt to contact her after the complaint was filed. Mrs. Abraham and her husband had four children. Her son, Lewis, who is somewhat retarded, lives with her and she also purchased some policies for him. Over the years she has had many occasions to file claims under her policies. It is important to her that she have protection to provide full time care if necessary because she has no family locally to provide that care for her. She had coverage that provided nursing care, a private room in the hospital, and some policies which provided for extended or nursing home care. She recognizes that such care is expensive and wanted enough policies to give her total coverage without out of pocket expense if the care was needed. She keeps track of the policies she has on her personal computer and has been doing so for some six or seven years. She apparently is sufficiently computer literate that she knows what she has and what she is doing. Mrs. Abraham owns a condominium at the Galt Ocean Mile apartment in Ft. Lauderdale. The $20,000.00 figure in policy premiums she mentioned were for her policies only. Those for her son were extra. She has sufficient income from stocks and bonds to pay her premiums, pay her mortgage, and still live comfortably. Her son has his own income from a trust fund and his own investments. At one point in time, when Mrs. Abraham had some recurring health problems and was in and out of hospitals regularly, she received in benefits far more than her actual expenses and made a tidy profit. Nonetheless, she adamantly disclaims she purchased the policies she had for that purpose claiming instead that she wanted merely that both she and her son be able to pay for the best medical care possible in the event it is needed. To that end, Lewis Abraham has filed very few claims against his carriers. Most, if not all, of the companies which provided the coverage for Mrs. Abraham and her son have limits on the amount of total coverage any one policy holder can have in any line of insurance. The limit is cumulative and not limited to policies with a specific company. Taken together, the policies in force for Mrs. Abraham in some cases exceeded that limit and had the insurers been made aware of the totality of her coverage, their policies would not have been issued. This information was not furnished to the companies, however, by either Sanner or Respondent. In addition, on many of the policies the mental condition of a policy holder must be disclosed if that person is retarded or not fully competent. Respondent did not know of Lewis' condition though Mr. Sanner was fully aware of it both as it related to his retardation and his drop foot. On none of the policy applications relating to him, however, was either ever mentioned. Some companies indicated that if Lewis's mental and physical condition had been properly disclosed on the application, they either would not have issued the coverage or, at least, would have referred the matter to the underwriter for further evaluation and a determination as to whether to issue the policy and if so, at what premium. Even more, Lewis' physical and mental condition may have caused the company to decline payment of a claim within two years of issuance of any policy actually written. Respondent received monthly statements from the various insurers with whom his agency did business detailing the transactions for that month. Commissions on each sale were paid by the insurers to Respondent's agency and thereafter, pursuant to an agreement between Respondent and Sanner, the commissions were divided. The commissions paid to Respondent's company by the insurers on all these policies amount to in excess of $18,000.00. Respondent asserts that Mrs. Abraham knew exactly what she was doing and was, in effect, conducting if not a scam, at least an improper business activity through the knowing purchase of duplicative policies and redundant coverage. This well may be true, but even if it is, Mr. Sanner was a knowing accomplice and participant. In addition, while it is accepted that Respondent might not know the status of every policy purchased through his agency or the total activity with any particular client, when his name appears as signatory on policy applications forwarded to a company for whom he accepts or solicits business, as here, it is hard to find he did not have at least a working familiarity with the business written by his sub-agents . This finding is supported by the analysis done of Respondent's pertinent activities here by Milton O. Bedingfield, a 39 year insurance agent and broker for 10 companies, a Certified Life Underwriter, and an expert in life and health insurance. Mr. Bedingfield concluded, after a review of all the policies written for the Abrahams through Respondent's agency, there was a gross oversale of policies and repeated omissions of pertinent information on policy applications. He found a duplication of benefits and overlapping coverage, all without legitimate purpose, especially for an 85 year old woman. Since the average hospital stay is less than 2 weeks, she would not likely benefit from her insurance for the stay. He could not see where Mrs. Abraham would get back in benefits what she has paid in premiums. In Mr. Bedingfield's opinion, this is the worst case of oversale he has seen in his 39 years in the insurance business. He contends the agent stands in almost a fiduciary capacity to his clients - especially the aged who rely on their agent to properly advise them on adequate coverage. There is often an element of fear involved that the unscrupulous agent can profit from. Here, he feels, Respondent's practice falls far short of the state's standard of acceptability on the sale of Medicare Supplemental insurance. On balance, however, Mr. Bedingfield does not know if all the policies he saw stayed in force throughout the period of the policy. Many could have lapsed or been cancelled. In all fairness, as well, where insurance is brokered, as here, the ultimate placing agent normally does not meet the client but must rely on what he is told by the offering agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent in this case, Michael C. Peppe, be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-2708 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. - 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. & 22. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by evidence or record except for the fact that Respondent sign and processed applications and premium payments and received a financial benefit from the sales. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted so far as it relates Ms. Abraham was well informed and aware of her coverage. Not established, but insufficient evidence of actionable misconduct. Accepted. - 6. Not proper Findings of Fact but more Conclusions of Law. Accepted. Not a proper Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson & Cowdrey 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
