Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
BRENDA STEINER vs SUMMER PLACE CONDO ASSOCIATION/PEGGY SHANBARKER, 05-000567 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Feb. 16, 2005 Number: 05-000567 Latest Update: Oct. 02, 2024
# 1
ROBERT PAGANO vs THE FOURTH BAYSHORE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., KARL STEMMLER AND RICHARD GROVE, 12-002279 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Jun. 28, 2012 Number: 12-002279 Latest Update: Nov. 16, 2012

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents, The Fourth Bayshore Condominium Association, Inc. (“Bayshore”), Karl Stemmler (“Stemmler”), and/or Richard Grove (“Grove”), discriminated against Petitioner, Robert Pagano (“Pagano"), on the basis of his physical handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Findings Of Fact Pagano is a Caucasian male who is handicapped by virtue of medical complications which resulted in the amputation of his left leg in March 2008. He has been confined to a wheelchair since that time. At all times relevant hereto, Pagano was renting a condominium unit at Bayshore. In January 2012, Pagano saw another unit at Bayshore advertised for rent. He called Grove, listed as the owner of the unit, and inquired about renting the property. Grove told Pagano that a key to the unit would be left under a mat between the screen door and front door on January 19, 2012. On that day, Pagano went to inspect the unit, accompanied by a friend, Philip Saglimebene. Upon arrival at the unit, Pagano and his friend began looking for the hidden key, but could not find it. They apparently made some noise while searching for the key, because they were confronted by Stemmler. According to Pagano, Stemmler began asking them in unfriendly terms who they were and what they were doing at the unit. The friend then told Stemmler they were looking for a key so they could go in and inspect the unit as Pagano was interested in renting it from Grove. Stemmler, supposedly identifying himself as a “building representative,” said there was no key to be found. He also reputedly told Pagano and his friend that they would not need a key anyway, “because you are not moving in.” When the friend explained that the unit was for Pagano, not him, Stemmler allegedly said that Pagano was not moving in either because he was an “undesirable.” When asked to explain that comment, Stemmler purportedly said, “He just is; that’s all you need to know.” (None of Stemmler’s comments were verified by competent evidence and, without verification or support, cannot be relied upon to make a finding of fact in this case.) Pagano believes Stemmler’s purported comments were based on the fact that he (Pagano) has long hair and a beard and does not fit into the conventional norm at Bayshore. He also believes that his handicap served as a basis for Stemmler’s alleged comments. There was no credible evidence presented at final hearing to substantiate Pagano’s suppositions. Grove had put his condominium unit up for rent at the beginning of the year. When Pagano called to inquire about it, Grove – who lives out-of-state – notified a friend to leave a key under the mat, as described above. That friend simply forgot to leave a key at the unit on the designated date. Grove knew nothing about Pagano’s interaction with Stemmler. Grove had not spoken to Stemmler prior to the day he and Pagano had their interaction. Stemmler had no authority to speak for Grove or to make a decision concerning to whom Grove would rent his condominium unit. Subsequent to the day Pagano visited the unit, Grove took the unit off the rental market because his wife decided to use the unit to house family and friends rather than renting it out to someone else. It took several weeks for the rental advertisement for the unit to be removed from a locked bulletin board at Bayshore. Grove said that if the unit ever went back on the market, he would call Pagano first about renting it, i.e., Grove had no opposition whatsoever to Pagano’s being a tenant. Van Buren, president of Bayshore, explained that the condominium association utilizes the support of voluntary building representatives to assist with security and minor maintenance at Bayshore. The volunteers, who are generally seasonal residents at Bayshore, do not hold keys to individual units and have no authority to grant or deny an applicant’s request to rent a unit. Stemmler is one of many building representatives who resides part-time at Bayshore. Pagano does not know of any non-handicapped individual who was allowed to rent a unit at Bayshore to the exclusion of himself or any other handicapped person. In fact, Pagano currently resides in another unit at Bayshore; he is already a resident there.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Robert Pagano in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2012.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.23760.34760.37
# 2
SINGER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. LSCMH, 81-000078RX (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000078RX Latest Update: Mar. 24, 1981

The Issue Administrative determination of the validity of Rule 7D-17.01(3), Florida Administrative code, pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. On January 15, 1981, Petitioner filed its petition with this division seeking a determination of the invalidity of Rule 7D-17.01(3), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner also filed a motion for consolidation of this case with three other cases involving the same parties, DOAH Cases Nos 81-013, 81-014, 81-015. Those cases deal with Notices to Show Cause issued against Petitioner by Respondent for alleged violation of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, and Rule 7D-17.01(3), F.A.C. The motion as to consolidation of Cases Nos. 81- 013, 014, and 015 was granted, but the motion was denied as to consolidation of Case No. 81-078RX due to the 30 day time limitation involved in the hearing of cases filed under Section 120.56, F.S. The parties stipulated that the factual allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 4 of the Petition are true and correct, and agreed that only legal issues remained for determination. The stipulated facts are as follows:

Findings Of Fact This is a proceeding pursuant to section 120.56, Florida Statutes, for the determination of the invalidity of a rule being enforced by the Division of Land Sales and Condominium. The Petitioner is a developer of condominium in the State of Florida subject to the provisions of chapter 718 Florida Statutes. Petitioner has been served with a Notice to Show Cause in a separate docket for closing on the sale of several condominiumminium units in violation of Rule 7D-17.01(3), Florida Administrative Code, and is thereby substantially affected by the workings and enforcement of such rule. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida empowered by the provisions of Section 718.501, Florida Statutes, to enforce and insure compliance with the provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. Petitioner filed a proposed prospectus with the Respondent pertaining to the sale of condominiumminium units located within the Cypress Tree Condominiumminium, Nos. 6 and 7, located at 4141 Northwest 21st Street, Lauderhill, Florida. Respondent thereafter notified Petitioner of several alleged deficiencies in its filing and issued Notices to Show Cause to Petitioner, relative to Cypress Tree Condominiumminium building Nos. 6 and 7, which allege that Petitioner has failed to correct certain alleged deficiencies and has closed on the sale of units in the subject condominium in violation of Rule 7D-17.01(3), Florida Administrative Code.

Florida Laws (7) 120.56718.103718.501718.502718.503718.504718.506
# 3
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. GERALD SCHULTZ AND CHOICE RENTALS AND REALTY CORPORATION, 81-002330 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002330 Latest Update: Mar. 25, 1982

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Gerald Schultz was a real estate broker holding License #0215135 and active firm broker for Choice Rentals and Realty Corporation (formerly Choice Rentals, Inc., and hereinafter "Choice Rentals"), which was a corporate broker holding License #0195222. Rosemary Hufcut entered into a contract with Choice Rentals on July 30, 1980, for Choice Rentals to provide her with rental information based upon criteria she gave Choice Rentals. Hufcut paid a fee of $50 to Choice Rentals for its services. Hufcut was looking for an apartment for herself and her two daughters. She specified she wanted a good neighborhood with good schools. Hufcut was given rental data by Choice Rentals and, with her father, visited a number of the apartments listed. The apartments were not suitable. On the following day, Hufcut requested a refund and submitted a written request for a refund on August 6, 1980. On August 26, 1980, Hufcut's refund request was denied by a letter from Choice Rentals (Petitioner's Exhibit #6). This letter provided in part: Refusal to accept available rental properties meeting the requirements as set forth in your contract with us, does not constitute cancellation of contractual agreement. (This is pursuant to the Florida Law regarding "obtaining a rental".) note - produced available rental property meeting the requirements stated on contract. Hufcut has never received a refund from Choice Rentals. The Board introduced Petitioner's Exhibits #1 through #6, which were received in evidence.

Recommendation Having found the Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Board of Real Estate suspend the licenses of Respondents for ten years. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore J. Silver, Esquire 9445 Bird Road Miami, Florida 33165 Mr. Gerald Schultz c/o John Hume, Esquire 5100 North Federal Highway, Suite 405 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Choice Rentals & Realty 3367 North Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25475.453
# 4
FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. THE OAKS OF BROWARD, INC., 79-000560 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-000560 Latest Update: May 23, 1980

Findings Of Fact The Declaration of Condominium for Oaks of Broward was filed by Margen, a Florida Partnership, in May, 1974 in the Public Records of Broward County and with the Petitioner. All documents required to be filed by Margen with Petitioner were filed and the fees paid. Simultaneously a recreational lease was filed of property adjacent to the condominium in which Barnett Bank of Hollywood was named as Trustee and Lessor, and The Oaks Condominium Association, Inc. of Broward as Lessee. Between May 1974 and early 1976 Margen sold to individuals 39 condominium units at Oaks of Broward. In early 1976, Housing Investment Corporation, mortgagee, began foreclosure proceedings which resulted in title to all of the Oaks condominium property, except for the 39 units previously sold, being taken by The Oaks of Broward, Inc., Respondent. Thereby Respondent became successor in title to the previously unsold 75 units in the building and to the position of the Lessor on the long-term recreational lease. On or about August 1977, Respondent offered for sale the 75 condominium units pursuant to prospectus admitted into evidence as Exhibit 2. In addition thereto and as part of the sales effort Respondent executed and recorded the Declaration Waiving Rents, a copy of which was admitted into evidence as Exhibit Neither of these documents was filed with Petitioner. The 75 units owned by Respondent were sold with the recreational lease rents waived. Pursuant to the terms of the recreational lease the original 39 buyers pay $20 per month, either to the Association or directly to the Lessor. This lease is a net/net lease, which means the Lessor performs no services except to provide the premises themselves. The Condominium Association is responsible for and pays all maintenance, taxes, upkeep and expenses for the operation of the Recreation Area. All condominium units, the original 39 as well as the remaining 75, pay to the Association, as part of the common expenses, their pro rate share of those operating expenses. It is this disparate treatment of the two groups of unit owners with respect to the recreational lease rent payment of $20 per month that is one subject of Petitioner's request for a cease and desist order. The second subject of the Petition for a cease and desist order is Petitioner's contention that Respondent is a Developer and is required to file documents and pay a $10 filing fee for each of the 75 condominiums sold, regardless of whether fees for these 75 units were paid by Respondent's predecessor in title.

Florida Laws (7) 718.103718.104718.116718.501718.502718.503718.504
# 5
JERRY COLEMAN, BRUCE MOORE, R. SMITH, MARGARET A. ADORJAN, LOUIS A. ADORJAN, THOMAS AHERN, ANN LIGHTHALL, RONALD LEONARD, CHRIS TAGGART, JOHN BEHMKE, WENDY ASHCROFT, THOMAS WALTERS, CLINTON J. BARRAS, ET AL. vs DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, 99-000667GM (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Key West, Florida Feb. 11, 1999 Number: 99-000667GM Latest Update: Mar. 14, 2001

The Issue The issue in these cases is whether a land development regulation adopted as City of Key West Ordinance 98-31, and approved by a Final Order of the Department of Community Affairs, DCA Docket No. DCA98-OR-237, is consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development for the City of Key West Area of Critical State Concern set forth in Rule 28-36.003(1), Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact The Parties. All of the Petitioners in Case No. 99-0666GM, except Neal Hirsh and Property Management of Key West, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Abbe Petitioners"), are all involved in the rental of real property in Key West, Monroe County, Florida. No evidence was presented concerning the identity of Mr. Hirsh or Property Management of Key West, Inc. The Abbe Petitioners are involved in the rental of Key West real property as owners or as rental managers of residential properties which are rented to tourists for periods of less than 30 days or one calendar month (hereinafter referred to as "Transient Rentals). None of the properties used as Transient Rentals by the Abbe Petitioners constitute the Abbe Petitioners' primary residences. Petitioner in Case No. 99-0667GM, Jerry Coleman, owns residential property located in Key West. Mr. Coleman rents the residential property owned by him to tourists for periods of less than 30 days or one calendar month. Mr. Coleman also resides in Key West. Petitioner in Case No. 99-1081DRI, John F. Rooney, failed to present any evidence in support of his case or his standing. Respondent, the Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department is charged with responsibility for, among other things, the approval or rejection of the comprehensive growth management plan, plan amendments, and land development regulations adopted by the City of Key West. Intervenor, the City of Key West (hereinafter referred to as the "City"), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. Consistent with the requirements of Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, the City has adopted a comprehensive growth management plan, the City of Key West Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "City's Plan"). The City's Plan became effective in 1993. The City's Plan consists of twelve elements: (a) Land Use; (b) Historic Preservation; (c) Traffic Circulation; (d) Housing; (e) Public Facilities; (f) Coastal Management; (g) Port Facilities; (h) Conservation; (i) Open Space and Recreation; (j) Intergovernmental Coordination; (k) Capital Improvements; and (l) General Monitoring and Review. Data Inventory and Analysis in support of the City's Plan was compiled by the City. The City has been designated as an area of critical state concern (hereinafter referred to as the "City ACSC"), pursuant to Sections 380.05 and 380.0552, Florida Statutes, since 1974. Rule 28-36.001, et seq., Florida Administrative Code. As an area of critical state concern, all comprehensive plan amendments and land development regulations adopted by the City must be reviewed by the Department for consistency with the Principles for Guiding Development (hereinafter referred to as the "Principles"), set out in Rule 28-36.003(1), Florida Administrative Code. The Principles were adopted by the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Administration Commission, in February 1984. Intervenors, Henry and Martha duPont, reside at 326 Whitehead Street, Key West, Florida. The duPonts reside in an area known as the "Truman Annex." The properties on both sides of the duPonts' residence are used as Transient Rentals. Key West History and Tourism. The City is located primarily on the southern-most bridged island of the Florida Keys, a chain of islands, or keys, which run in a generally southwesterly direction from the southeastern tip of the Florida peninsula. The City, like the Florida Keys, is bounded on the west by the Gulf of Mexico and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean. The City is connected to the Florida peninsula by a series of bridges which connect the keys. The road which runs the length of the Florida Keys is designated U. S. Highway 1. It is approximately 112 miles from the Florida mainland to the City. Prior to the early 1970s, the two most significant components of the City's economy were commercial fishing and the military. Tourism also played a role, but not to the extent that it does today. Toward the middle and end of the 1970s the military presence in the City was significantly reduced and the fishing industry was on the decline. To replace the fading fishing and the lost military components of the City's economy, the City turned to tourism. The City's efforts began in earnest during the 1980s and have continued through the present. The City is now a major tourist destination. The City's most attractive features include its historic character, especially the area of the City designated as "Old Town," its warm climate, its extensive shoreline, and its water resources, including coral reef systems. Approximately two-thirds of the City's economic base is now associated with tourism. While the City shares many of the characteristics of most tourist-resort destinations, it also features certain unique characteristics not found in other destinations. Those features include its geographic remoteness and its limited size. The island where the City is principally located is only approximately eight square miles. Currently, approximately 6.82 million tourists visit the City annually. Approximately 62 percent, or 4.25 million visitors, stay overnight in the City. Approximately 480,000 tourists, or about 11 percent of the overnight guests, stay in Transient Rentals. Tourism in the City represents, directly and indirectly, approximately 66 percent of the economic base of the City. The City's economy in turn represents approximately half of the economy of Monroe County. Approximately 15,000 of the 23,000 jobs in Monroe County and Key West are associated with the tourist industry. Of those jobs, 54 percent of all retail sales jobs are involved in the tourist industry. Approximately 50 percent of the estimated $187 million of Monroe County-wide personal income comes from the tourist industry. The tourist industry should continue to prosper in the City as long as the natural environmental characteristics of the City (the climate, surrounding waters, and tropical features of the Keys) and the unique historical and "community" character of the City remain vibrant. It is the natural environment, the climate, and local community character in combination with the historical and cultural attractions of the City that create a diverse mix of attractions which make the City a unique vacation destination. The City's mixture of attractions must be served by a mixture of tourist accommodation services, including hotels, motels, guest houses, and Transient Rentals. Those accommodations are currently available. There are approximately 3,768 hotel/motel rooms available in the City. There are also approximately 507 residential properties with 906 units which are licensed as Transient Rentals in the City and approximately 647 unlicensed residential properties used for Transient Rentals. The loss of the availability of unlicensed Transient Rentals will not have a lasting adverse impact on tourism in the City. The City's Plan recognizes the importance of tourism. Objective 1-1.3, "Planning for Industrial Development and Economic Base," of the land use element of the City's Plan provides, in pertinent part, the following: . . . . Tourism is the most significant component of the City of Key West economic base. The City of Key West is a major tourist destination. It's principal attributes are its historic character, warm climate, extensive shoreline, water resources, the coral reef system, abundant water related and water-dependent activities, and the ambiance of Old Town. The historic district contains many old structures which do not comply with the City's size and dimension regulations since many structures pre-date these local regulations. Realizing the significant contribution of Old Town, especially the unique character of its structures and their historic and architectural significance, and realizing the substantial impact of tourism to the economic base, the City shall direct considerable attention to its growth management decisions to maintaining the historic character of Old Town and preserving tourism as a major contributor to the City's economic base. Similarly, the City shall carefully consider supply and demand factors impacting tourism and the local economy to ensure the long term economic stability. The two policies adopted to implement Objective 1-1.3, Policies 1-1.3.1, "Mandatory Planning and Management Framework for Industrial Development," and Policy 1- 1.3.2, "Pursue Nuisance Abatement Standards and Criteria," provide for measures to deal with industrial development and not tourism. Reliance upon Objective 1-1.3 of the City's Plan by Petitioners' witnesses is misplaced. While the Objective does reflect the importance of tourism in the City, it does not provide any guidance concerning appropriate land uses which may be allowed throughout the City. There is no direction in the Objective concerning land uses which the City must maintain. Land uses are considered and dealt with in other provisions of the City's land use element. Additionally, the reliance upon Objective 1-1.3 of the City's Plan fails to give adequate weight to other provisions of the Plan. The Historic Significance of the City and "Old Town." The importance of the City's history is recognized throughout the Plan. Objective 1-1.3 of the City's Plan quoted, supra, points to the City's history and the role it plays in tourism. An area of the City has been designated as the Key West Historic District. The area is described in the Data Inventory and Analysis as the "physical manifestation of the 170 year existence of [the City]." Page 1A-11 of the Data Inventory and Analysis. Objective 1-2.3 of the Future Land Use Map Goal of the City's Plan deals with the importance of the Key West Historic District and an area which is largely located within the historic district known as "Old Town": OBJECTIVE 1-2.3: MANAGING OLD TOWN REDEVELOPMENT AND PRESERVATION OF HISTORIC RESOURCES. Areas delineated on the Future Land Use Map for historic preservation shall be planned and managed using a regulatory framework designed to preserve the form, function, image, and ambiance of the historic Old Town. The City's Historic Architectural Review Commission (HARC), in addition to the Planning Board, shall review all development proposals within the historic area designated by the National Register of Historic Places. The land development regulations shall be amended upon plan adoption to incorporate design guideline standards recently adopted by HARC. Development in any area of Old Town within and outside the HARC review area may impact the historic significance of Old Town. Any development plans for these areas shall be subjected to site plan review and shall be designed in a manner compatible with historic structures within the vicinity. While Objective 1-2.3 makes reference to the preservation of the "function" of Old Town, the Objective does not require that any particular "land use" which may exist in Old Town be preserved in perpetuity. The Objective and other provisions of the City's Plan addressing the historic significance of the City evidence a concern for the overall character of the area, not particular land uses. That character is described in, and adopted as part of, the Future Land Use Map of the City's Plan. See Policy 1-3.4.1 and Objective 1-3.4 of the City's Plan. Objective 1-1.5 of the Land Use element emphasizes the importance of maintaining and enhancing the appearance of gateway corridors into the City and the "major activiy centers such as Old Town." The Historic Preservation Element of the City's Plan, Chapter 1A, deals with historic resources, structures, and sites. No particular land use of these resources, structures, and sites, other than "housing," is mentioned. Throughout the history of the City, residents have to varying degrees rented their residences or parts of their residences on a short-term basis to tourists and other guests to the City. Most of the rentals involved the rental of portions of a residence while the owner of the property continued to reside in the rest of the property. Monroe County Commissioner Wilhelmina Harvey, Joe Crusoe, Robert Lastres, Vincent Catala, and Olivia Rowe, all long-term residents of the City, all testified about such rentals. The evidence failed to prove, however, that the types of rentals historically undertaken in the City constitute a part of the significant "history" of the City, at least not in the context of the historical significance of the City addressed in the City's Plan. Nor were the historical rentals testified to during hearing of the scale and scope of the rentals that now exist in the City. Additionally, to the extent that Transient Rentals are considered to be part of the significant "history" of the City, nothing in the land development regulation which is the subject of this proceeding absolutely prohibits such rentals. In fact, Transient Rentals of property for which a transient rental license has been obtained are not impacted by the land development regulation. Transient Rentals will, therefore, continue in the City. Nothing in the City's Plan dealing with the historical significance of the City requires that the City allow Transient Rentals of residential property to continue unregulated in the City. Regulation of the extent and location of Transient Rentals in the City does nothing to harm the historical significance of the City. In suggesting that Transient Rentals constitute part of the "history" of the City, and in particular, a part of the history of Old Town, the Abbe Petitioners have relied upon Policy 1-2.3.9, which provides, in part, the following: Policy 1-2.3.9: Retention of Historic Character and All Permanent Single Family Housing Units. The City desires to retain in perpetuity the existing character, density, and intensity of all historic sites and contributing sites within the historic district; and shall protect all the City's permanent single family housing stock citywide which was legally established prior to the adoption of the plan or a legal single family lot of record. Therefore, the City shall protect and preserve these resources against natural disaster, including fire, hurricane, or other natural or man-made disaster, by allowing any permanent single family units within the City, or other structures located on historic sites or contributing sites, which are so damaged to be rebuilt as they previously existed. . . . The reliance upon Policy 1-2.3.9 is misplaced. First, this Policy deals with all permanent single-family housing stock of the City and not just housing used for Transient Rentals. Secondly, the Policy does not provide for the protection of any particular use of single-family housing stock; it provides for the protection of the structures used as single-family housing. It recognizes the unique, historical construction of homes in the City and provides for their continued protection. The Impact of the City's Limited Land Mass and the City's Effort to Control Transient Rentals. As a relatively small island, the City has a limited land area and little opportunity for expansion without significantly altering the traditional character of the City. Because of the limited land area, maintaining adequate housing, including affordable housing, is a significant concern in the City. Residential property in the City has been used by tourists for accommodations for many years, long before the tourist boom now being experienced in the City. Transient uses of residential property were less organized and were less available than they are today, however. Often times, transient uses of residential property consisted of people renting out rooms in their residences to tourists. While the extent to which residential property has been used historically for tourist accommodations was not accurately quantified by the evidence, the evidence did establish that the use of residential property for Transient Rentals has significantly increased since the 1980s. As tourism has increased since the 1980s, there has been an increasing demand for tourist accommodations of all types. This demand for tourist accommodations, especially the demand for Transient Rentals, has adversely impacted the need and demand for residential housing in the City. In an effort to address the problem the Key West City Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "City Commission"), adopted a Growth Management Ordinance in 1985 mandating a ratio of Transient Rentals to residential units for the City. The intent of the 1985 Growth Management Ordinance was to maintain a suitable balance between tourist accommodations and housing for permanent residents of the City. In 1993 the City Commission adopted a dwelling unit allocation ordinance, or the "rate of growth ordinance," which was designed, at least in part, to achieve a balance between the demand for tourist accommodations and the need for permanent housing, including affordable housing. The 1993 rate of growth ordinance was subsequently incorporated into the City's Plan as Objective 1-3.12. Pursuant to the City's Plan, Transient Rentals are not to exceed 25 percent of single family units permitted annually. Note 2 to Policy 1-3.12.3 of the Plan provides that "[t]he number of transient units reflect a preference for preserving housing opportunities for permanent residents as opposed to transient residents since historical trends indicate an erosion of the permanent housing stock which is largely attributed to conversion of permanent housing units to transient housing." The City's Failure to Control Transient Rentals; The "50% Rule." In 1989, the City required that an occupational license be obtained by property owners using their property for both long-term rentals and Transient Rentals. These occupational licenses were not subject to review by the Department for consistency with the City's Plan and land development regulations. Occupational licenses are essentially a revenue raising requirement. The issuance of an occupational license does not constitute a zoning decision or otherwise constitute the approval of a land use. By the time the City adopted the 1993 rate of growth ordinance and the City's Plan, the number of occupational licenses issued for Transient Rentals had already exceeded the allocation of Transient Rentals which are allowable in the City. As a consequence, owners of residential property who desired to use their property for Transient Rental purposes have been unable to obtain an occupational license for such use. The lack of allowable Transient Rentals under the City's Plan did not, however, actually stop individuals from using their property for Transient Rentals. In addition to licensed Transient Rentals, there are approximately 647 unlicensed Transient Rental properties in the City. Properties owned by the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman are among these unlicensed Transient Rentals. The Abbe Petitioners who own Transient Rentals rather than manage them have occupational licenses issued by the State of Florida and Monroe County, but not a Transient Rental occupational license issued by the City. Mr. Coleman has a "nontransient" license issued by the City and occupational licenses issued by the State and Monroe County, but not a Transient Rental occupational license from the City. The number of unlicensed Transient Rental properties in the City has been contributed to, in part, by an interpretation of a former definition of "tourist and transient living accommodations" found in the City's land development regulations. The definition was adopted in 1986. Accommodations meeting this definition were prohibited in a number of zoning districts in the City. Accommodations which did not come within the definition were not prohibited in those districts. The 1986 definition of "tourist and transient living accommodations" (hereinafter referred to as the "Former Transient Definition"), was as follows: Tourist and transient living accommodations. Commercially operated housing principally available to short-term visitors for less than twenty-eight (28) days. Pursuant to this definition, any property used "principally" for visitors for less than 28 days constituted a tourist or transient living accommodation. There were some who advocated that the term "principally" meant that a residence had to be used as a 28-day short-term visitor accommodation for at least 50 percent of the year. Pursuant to this definition, any residence used at least 50 percent of the year for 28-day or less rentals is considered to constitute a "tourist and transient living accommodation." Conversely, if a residence was used less than 50 percent of the year for 28-day or less rental the property is not considered to constitute a tourist or transient living accommodation. This interpretation of the Former Transient Definition has been referred to as the "50% Rule." Pursuant to the 50% Rule, the owner of residential property in the City could rent the property for periods of less than 28 days without obtaining an occupational license for the property as long as the property was not rented more than half of the year. This rationale was assumed to apply regardless of where the property was located; even in land use districts where Transient Rentals were prohibited. The developer of Truman Annex, an area formerly owned by the Navy located to the immediate south of Old Town, advocated the 50% Rule in his dealings with the City in the early 1990s. The City's licensing department also issued "non- transient" licenses for residences which met the 50% Rule. Code enforcement citations against owners of residences used as Transient Rentals for less than 50 percent of the year without an occupational license were withdrawn. Despite the foregoing, the evidence at hearing in these cases failed to prove that the 50% Rule became an official "policy" of the City Commission. What the evidence proved was that the City took no action to adopt or reject the 50% Rule as an official position. The City simply failed to take any action to reject the 50% Rule and interpret the definition of tourist and transient living accommodations in a more reasonable manner. Given the City's efforts to limit Transient Rentals through the adoption of the 1985 Growth Management Ordinance, the 1993 rate of growth ordinance, and the City's Plan, it is clear, however, that reliance upon the 50% Rule is not reasonable. See findings of fact 39 through 45 of the Department of Community Affairs and City of Key West's Joint Proposed Recommended Order, which are hereby incorporated herein by reference. Finally, even if the 50% Rule did constitute the legislative intent of the City Commission in adopting the Former Transient Definition, it was eliminated by the City Commission in 1997 by the adoption of City Ordinance 97-20. City Ordinance 97-20 was adopted September 16, 1997, and was approved by Final Order of the Department dated November 19, 1997. The new definition of transient living accommodations adopted by City Ordinance 97-20, and still in effect today, is as follows: SECTION 5-21.2: DEFINITION OF TERMS TRANSIENT LIVING ACCOMMODATIONS. Any unit, group of units, dwelling, building, or group of buildings within a single complex of buildings, which is 1) rented for periods of less than 30 days or 1 calendar month, whichever is less; or which is 2) advertised or held out to the public as a place regularly rented to transients. (Emphasis added). The current definition of transient living accommodations has eliminated the reference to properties "principally" used as a Transient Rental. The new definition includes any residence rented for any period of time, even once a year, as long as the rental is for a period of less than 30 days or one calendar month, whichever is less. The Former Transient Definition and, consequently, the 50% Rule, was also superceded by the adoption of the City's Plan. The City recognized the foregoing history in the ordinance which is the subject of this proceeding. In rejecting the notion that the City had adopted the 50% Rule as City policy, the City stated the following in the ordinance: . . . . In 1986, the City enacted former zoning code Section 35.24(44) which provided the following definition of a transient living accommodation "Commercially operated housing principally available to short-term visitors for less than twenty-eight (28) days." (This definition shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Former Transient Definition.") Some property owners and developers interpreted the Former Transient Definition to mean that an owner could rent his or her residential dwelling for less than half the year without the dwelling losing its residential status, and therefore without the need for City-issued transient license . . . . This interpretation went unchallenged by the City. . . . . . . . Therefore, the City of Key West intends by these regulations to establish a uniform definition of transient living accommodations, and to halt the use of residences for transient purposes in order to preserve the residential character of neighborhoods. . . . Based upon the foregoing, any reliance by Petitioners in these cases upon the 50% Rule as City policy is rejected. The City's Adoption of Ordinance No. 98-31. During 1997 and 1998 the City conducted workshops and held public meetings to consider and develop an ordinance regulating Transient Rentals. The workshops were conducted by City staff and were attended by representatives of essentially all those interested in the Transient Rental issue. An effort was made to achieve consensus on the issue. During these workshops, the 50% Rule and the history of Transient Rentals in the City were fully considered. In addition to the workshops conducted by the City, the City hired Frank Pallini with PRG, Real Estate Research and Advisory Services, Clearwater, Florida, to conduct an analysis of the economic impact of an ordinance limiting Transient Rentals. The report prepared by Mr. Pallini (hereinafter referred to as the "Pallini Report"), was submitted to the City on August 28, 1998. The Pallini Report and, consequently, the negative economic impact of the ordinance at issue in this proceeding was fully considered by the City when it adopted the ordinance. On June 2, 1998, the City Commission adopted Ordinance 98-16, which amended the definition of "transient living accommodations" in the City's land development regulations. Unlicensed short-term Transient Rentals were expressly prohibited by Ordinance 98-16 with the exception of four specified City land use districts. Those districts, referred to during the hearing as "gated communities," are all single, contiguous zoning district areas of the City with controlled access and which are governed by homeowners' or condominium associations. Truman Annex was one of the four excluded gated communities. Ordinance 98-16 was found by the Department to be inconsistent with the Principles on July 29, 1998, by Final Order DCA98-OR-135. The Department concluded that Ordinance 98- 16 was inconsistent with the Principles because it allowed the use of residential property as Transient Rentals in areas where, according to the Department, such rentals were prohibited under the City's Plan. The City initially challenged the Department's decision, but subsequently withdrew its challenge. The City subsequently repealed Ordinance 98-16. On November 10, 1998, the City adopted Ordinance 98-31 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance"), which is the subject of this proceeding. The Ordinance contains the same provisions, except the exception for gated communities, that had been contained in Ordinance 98-16. The Ordinance is a "land development regulation" as defined in Section 380.031(8), Florida Statutes. It is, therefore, subject to review for consistency with the Principles by the Department. During the process of adopting the Ordinance the City recognized the confusion that the 50% Rule had caused concerning the intent of the City's Plan with regard to Transient Rentals. The City expressly dealt with the 50% Rule and rejected it as policy of the City. In particular, the Ordinance provides that the City's purpose in enacting the Ordinance was to phase out unlicensed transient uses of residential properties in land use zoning districts in which they are not permitted. This goal is accomplished by further modifying the definition of "transient living accommodations" adopted in 1997 in Section 5-21.2 of the City's land development regulations: Sec. 5-21.2 Definition of terms. Transient Living Accommodations. Or Transient Lodging. Any unit, group of units, dwelling, building, or group of buildings within a single complex of buildings, which is 1) rented for a period or periods of less than 30 days or 1 calendar month, whichever is less; or which is 2) advertised or held out to the public as a place rented to regularly regularly rented to transients. , regardless of the occurrence of an actual rental. Such a short-term rental use of or within a single family dwelling, a two family dwelling or a multi-family dwelling (each also known as a "residential dwelling") shall be deemed a transient living accommodation. (Words struckstruck through were eliminated from the definition and underlined words were added). The Ordinance also adds Section 2-7.21 to the City's land development regulations explaining its action in modifying the definition of transient living accommodations and expressly prohibiting unlicensed Transient Rentals of less than 30 days or one calendar month, whichever is less. The Ordinance does not provide for a complete ban on Transient Rentals. On the contrary, Transient Rentals of properties for which transient occupational licenses have been issued by the City are expressly allowed by the Ordinance. The City estimated that 507 residential properties containing a total of 906 transient units hold such licenses. Under the Ordinance, these units may continue to be used as Transient Rentals. The Department's Review of the Ordinance. On November 24, 1998, the City transmitted a copy of the Ordinance to the Department for approval or rejection pursuant to Section 380.05(6), Florida Statutes. The Department conducted its review of the Ordinance following its customary procedures for review of land development regulations that impact an area of critical state concern. The review included a consideration of Chapter 28-36, Florida Administrative Code, including the Principles, the City's Plan, and the legislative intent of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. The Ordinance was directed to Kenneth Metcalf, the person in the Department responsible for supervision of the City ACSC. Mr. Metcalf reviewed the ordinance and assigned it to the Department's Field Office with directions as to which issues the Field Office should address during its review. Following staff review, an evaluation was prepared addressing the Ordinance's consistency with the Principles. The evaluation was reviewed by Mr. Metcalf. After receipt and review of the evaluation, it was discussed at a meeting of Department staff. As a result of the meeting, it was recommended that the Secretary of the Department find the Ordinance consistent with the Principles. On January 5, 1999, the Department entered a Final Order, DCA98-OR-237, finding that the Ordinance was consistent with the Principles. The Department caused notice of the Final Order to published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Petitioners' Challenge to the Ordinance. The Abbe Petitioners, Mr. Coleman and over 200 other owners of property in Truman Annex, and Mr. Rooney all timely filed petitions challenging the Department's Final Order pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, to the Department's Final Order approving the Ordinance. The petitions were filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Department. The petitions were designated Case Nos. 99-0666GM, 99-0667GM and 99-1081DRI, respectively. Following dismissal of the petitions in all three cases, amended petitions were filed. Mr. Coleman's amended petition, filed on or about June 14, 1999, named Mr. Coleman as the only Petitioner remaining in that case. Standing. The parties stipulated to certain facts relating to the standing of the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman. In addition to stipulating to the facts found, supra, concerning the ownership and use of real property by the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman in the City, it was agreed that the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman have transient occupational licenses issued by the State of Florida and Monroe County for their City real property. The Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman suggested in their proposed orders that it had been stipulated during the hearing that they have standing to initiate, and participate in, this proceeding. A close reading of the stipulation of the parties, however, fails to support this contention. What the Department, City, and the duPonts stipulated to were certain underlying facts; they did not stipulate to the ultimate finding. The Department, City, and duPonts did not stipulate to whether the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman will suffer an immediate injury as a result of the Ordinance. The evidence proved that, the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman do not have the legal right to use their properties as Transient Rentals. Neither a reasonable interpretation of existing land development regulations nor the 50% Rule legalizes such use. As a consequence, the Ordinance cannot have the effect of preventing the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman from using their properties for Transient Rental purposes because that is not a purpose for which they are legally authorized to use the properties anyway. The evidence also proved, however, that the City has allowed the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman to continue to use their properties as Transient Rentals, legally or not, and that, without the City's taking some action, the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman would continue to do so. As a consequence, the Ordinance will have the practical and real effect of preventing the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman from continuing to use their properties as Transient Rentals, to their economic detriment. The Abbe Petitioners, other than Neal Hirsh and Property Management of Key West, Inc., and Mr. Coleman have proved that they have standing to institute and participate in this proceeding. The duPonts proved that they have standing to participate in this proceeding. The City proved that its substantial interests were determined by the Department's decision in this matter. The City has standing to participate in this proceeding. Mr. Hirsh, Property Management of Key West, Inc., and Mr. Rooney failed to prove that they have standing to institute or participate in this proceeding. The Principles. Rule 28-36.003, Florida Administrative Code, contains the Principles: Strengthen local government capabilities for managing land use and development; Protection of tidal mangroves and associated shoreline and marine resources and wildlife; Minimize the adverse impacts of development of the quality of water in and around the City of Key West and throughout the Florida Keys; Protection of scenic resources of the City of Key West and promotion of the management of unique, tropical vegetation; Protection of the historical heritage of Key West and the Key West Historical Preservation District; Protection of the value, efficiency, cost-effectiveness and amortized life of existing and proposed major public investments, including: The Florida Keys Aqueduct and water supply facilities, Sewage collection and disposal facilities, Solid waste collection and disposal facilities, Key West Naval Air Station, The maintenance and expansion of transportation facilities, and Other utilities, as appropriate; Minimize the adverse impacts of proposed public investments on the natural and environmental resources of the City of Key West; and Protection of the public health, safety, welfare and economy of the City of Key West, and the maintenance of Key West as a unique Florida resource. In determining whether the Ordinance is consistent with the Principles, the Principles should be considered as a whole. No specific provision should be construed or applied in isolation from the other provisions. The Ordinance has little or no impact on those Principles that relate to the natural resources of, and public facilities in, the City. Those Principles include Rule 28- 36.003(1)(b), (c), (d), (f), and (g), Florida Administrative Code. Those Principles are considered neutral in the determination to be made in these cases. The determination of whether the Ordinance is consistent with the Principles is limited to a balancing of the Principles listed in Rule 28-36.003(1)(a), (e), and (h), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as "Principles A, E, and H," respectively). Principle A: The Ordinance Strengthens the City's Capabilities for Managing Land Use and Development. In order for the Ordinance to be considered as strengthening the City's capabilities for managing land use and development, the Ordinance must be consistent with the City's Plan. The evidence proved that it is. The City's Plan contains various land use districts, all of which have certain allowable and prohibited uses. The districts established in the City's Plan and the relevant prohibition of transient lodgings are as follows: Coastal Low Density Residential Development district: prohibits "transient lodging and guest homes." Single Family Residential Development district: prohibits "transient accommodations" and "transient rental housing." Medium Density Residential Development district: prohibits "transient lodging and guest homes." Mixed Use Residential/Office: prohibits "transient lodging." Limited Commercial Development: Prohibits "transient residential land use activities." Historic High Density Residential Development and Historic Medium Density Residential Development districts: prohibit "transient residential uses, including guest homes, motels, or hotels." Historic Residential Commercial Core 2: prohibits "transient residential uses." Historic Residential/Office district: prohibits "transient lodging or guest houses" unless previously licensed. Conservation, Military, and Public Services districts: prohibit transient uses. The following districts established by the City Plan allow Transient Rentals: Salt Pond Commercial Tourist: allows "motels, [and] limited scale tourist facilities." General Commercial Development: allows "transient lodging including hotels and motels, timesharing or fractional fee residential complexes, and other transient quarters." Mixed Use Planned Redevelopment and Development districts: uses are determined, not by the City's Plan, but the land development regulations and development approvals for these large scale development districts. Historic Residential Commercial Core 1 and 3 districts: allow "transient residential accommodations" and "tourist accommodations." Historic Neighborhood Commercial: allows "transient rental accommodations" in HNC-1 and HNC-3 districts as long as they do not displace permanent resident housing and "transient accommodations" in HNC-2 districts. Historic Commercial Tourist: allows "hotels, motels, and/or transient lodging facilities." The most reasonable interpretation of the restricted and allowable land uses for the land use districts established under the City's Plan is that references to "transient rental accommodations," "transient residential uses," "transient rental housing," and "transient lodging facilities" are intended to include Transient Rentals. One other district is established by the City's Plan which is relevant to this matter: Historic Planned Redevelopment and Development districts (hereinafter referred to as "HPRD" districts). Land uses allowable in an HPRD district are to be established by land development regulations. The only HPRD district in the City is currently the Truman Annex. Truman Annex was being developed at the time the City's Plan was adopted. While the City's Plan provides that the specific requirements for any HPRD district is to be provided by land development regulations, Policy 1-2.3.4 of the City's Plan does provide, among other things, that the regulations are to "[a]void replacement of permanent housing stock with transient lodging." The Ordinance, and its application to Truman Annex, is consistent with this direction of the City's Plan. Truman Annex was developed as a development of regional impact, or "DRI." As a DRI and HPRD district, land uses in Truman Annex are subject to development agreements between the City and the developer of Truman Annex. Those agreements have been amended 12 times. The Truman Annex development agreements allow the development of "housing units," which included both transient and non-transient uses. "Housing units" were further broken down into the following types: "affordable," "hotel transient housing units," "time share transient housing units," and "other residential housing units." "Affordable" and "other residential housing units" are intended to be "residential" development in the context of the Truman Annex development agreements; "hotel transient housing units" and "time share transient housing units" are intended to be Transient Rentals in the context of the Truman Annex development agreements. Given the distinction between "transient" housing units and other uses in the Truman Annex development agreements, no approval of Transient Rentals of "affordable" or "other residential housing units" was contemplated or allowed by the City. The Truman Annex development agreements and the HPRD district land development regulations do not authorize the use of "affordable" or "other residential housing units" in Truman Annex as Transient Rentals. The Ordinance is, therefore, consistent with the Truman Annex development agreements and the HPRD district land development regulations. The Ordinance, if nothing else, clarifies the state of the law with regard to which Transient Rentals are allowed and which are prohibited in the City. The Ordinance eliminates any lingering confusion caused by the failure of the City to reject the 50% Rule in all circumstances and to properly interpret the Former Transient Definition. The suggestion of the Abbe Petitioners that the 50% Rule was adopted as a part of the City's Plan because it existed when the City's Plan was adopted is not supported by the evidence. Again, the 50% Rule was never adopted as the official policy of the City; it simply went unchallenged by the City. In fact, the 50% Rule was allowed to be advanced by some despite the adoption of the City's Plan and its prohibition against Transient Rentals in the land use districts described, supra. Nor does Objective 1-1.3 of the City's Plan support the Petitioners' position in these cases. That Objective does not require that any particular land use be continued in the City. Nor do those provisions of the City's Plan dealing with the historic significance of the City detract from the conclusion that the Ordinance is consistent with the City's Plan. The provisions dealing with the historic significance of the City are concerned with the significance of structures which have been a part of the history of the City's existence. The City's Plan also evidences a desire to preserve historically significant housing, not any particular use of those structures. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the Ordinance is consistent with Principal A. Principle E: Protection of the Historic Heritage of the City and the Key West Historical Preservation District. Principle E requires a consideration of significant events in the history of the City, famous visitors and residences of the City throughout its history, the architectural history of the City, and other aspects of the City's character. This conclusion is supported, in part, by Rule 28-36.003(2)(e), Florida Administrative Code: (e) Historic Resource Protection. A management and enforcement plan and ordinance shall be adopted by the City of Key West providing that designs and uses of development reconstruction within the Key West Historical Preservation District shall be compatible with the existing unique architectural styles and shall protect the historical values of the District. The City of Key shall maintain an architectural review board established pursuant to Section 266.207(2), Florida Statutes. . . . . The evidence in these cases proved that the Ordinance will preserve and ensure the preservation of the City's historical significance. It will do so by limiting the destruction of the character and community of the City, as discussed, infra. Principle E does not support a conclusion, as argued by Petitioners, that Transient Rentals have played such a large part in the history of the City that they should not be regulated in the manner the Ordinance provides for. Petitioners' argument also fails because the Ordinance only regulates Transient Rentals, it does not eliminate historical Transient Rental uses. The City's Plan also fails to support Petitioners' argument. The City's Plan does not address, or require, the continuation of "historical" land uses such as Transient Rentals. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, it is concluded that the Ordinance is consistent with Principal E. Principle H: Public Health, Safety, and Welfare and the Economy of the City. Principal H requires a consideration of the public health, safety, and welfare, and the economic viability of the City. These factors are inextricably tied to the tourist industry of the City. Without the tourist industry, the City's economy would likely falter to the detriment of the public health, safety, and welfare. A large part of what makes the City attractive, to tourist and residents alike, is the unique community atmosphere and the historical character of the City. The health of the tourist industry in the City is, in part, caused by the City's vibrant and viable communities. An essential characteristic of that vibrancy is the fabric of the people that inhabit the City and the interactions of those inhabitants among themselves and with tourists. As long as tourists continue to enjoy the unique character of the City, they will continue to enjoy their experience and will continue to come back to the City. If that unique character is significantly diminished or lost, so too will be the tourist industry. A number of factors threaten the quality of the tourist experience in the City and, therefore, the continued viability of the tourist industry. Those factors include the shortage of available and affordable housing, a shortage of labor to serve the tourist industry, crowding, and conflicts between tourist and residents of the City. All of these factors are related and must be adequately addressed in order to protect the economic viability of the City. Left unchecked, tourism in the City will likely be seriously impacted. Tourism requires a large labor force to provide the services which tourist expect. The labor force must provide lodging, food, retail sales, amusements, and other services. Indirect services, such as fire protection, police, and others must be provided for also by the labor force. The labor force necessary to serve a tourist industry must be provided with adequate housing. The ability to meet this need must be balanced with the need to provide adequate accommodations to the tourists who visit a destination. The need to balance these competing interests is an even greater challenge in the City because of the existing shortage of available residential property in the City and the lack of viable measures which can be taken to address the shortage. The City's shortage of residential property is caused by the fact that the supply of available land in the City is so restricted it simply cannot meet the demand. The problem caused by the lack of available land is exacerbated by restrictions on development, including those imposed by the rate of growth ordinance and the City's Historic Architectural Review Commission. Actions of the City's Historic Architectural Review Commission cause increases in the cost of redeveloping property and limits the types of redevelopment that may be pursed. Alternatives, like housing the labor force some distance from a tourist destination and providing transportation to bring the labor force into the destination, cannot be utilized in the City to meet the demand for housing for its labor force. The unavailability of adequate land is a problem throughout the length of the Florida Keys. Tourist are now demanding a variety of accommodations. The national trend has seen a increase in the demand for accommodations other than the traditional hotel or motel. Many tourists desire accommodations that include multiple rooms, including kitchen facilities. Transient Rentals have become increasingly available in order to meet part of this demand. Hotels and motels have also begun to offer efficiency- like units. Transient Rentals have also increased because of 1986 changes in federal income tax laws. Those changes have resulted in more owners of vacation housing turning their properties into Transient Rentals in order to offset the cost of the properties. The availability of Transient Rentals has significantly increased in scope and magnitude over what was historically experienced in the City. In addition to the impact on the types of accommodations desired by tourist and the tax benefits of converting property to Transient Rental use, tourism itself has increased dramatically during the past 30 years, further increasing the demand for tourist accommodations. According to a report on housing in the City known as the "Shimberg Report," from 1990 to 1995 the number of housing units decreased from 12,221 to 11,733, a decrease of 488 units. Despite this decrease, the number of households in the City during the same period increased from 10,424 to 11,298, an increase of 874. Economically, a commercial-type use, such as Transient Rentals, will usually be more profitable than a residential use of the same property. The City has experienced this economic impact. As a result of the higher economic value of using a residence as a Transient Rental, tourist use of residential property have in many cases displaced the residential use of property. The demand for Transient Rentals and the need to provide for housing for the labor force necessary to serve the City's tourist industry involve competing and inconsistent goals. In order to meet the need for Transient Rentals in the City, it has been necessary to convert housing formerly used to house the City's residents, including those who make up the labor force. The resulting decrease in residential housing and the increase in Transient Rentals also result in crowding, with members of the labor force in the City being required to share available space with tourists. Crowding results in unacceptable densities of use and increased user conflict. The resulting decrease in residential housing caused by the increase in Transient Rental use in the City has not only resulted in permanent residents leaving the City's communities, but in their departure from the City and the Florida Keys altogether. In addition to the negative impacts on housing, a tourist destination can become so popular that the very quality of the location is negatively impacted or even destroyed. John Pennekamp State Park, located in the northern part of the Florida Keys, has been so successful at attracting visitors that it has been negatively impacted. Although tourism has not reached a point where it is destroying the unique character of the City, the very thing that attracts many visitors to the City, it has the potential of reaching that stage without adequate planning by the City. Shopping by residents in the "downtown" area of the City has already been displaced by shopping areas located away from Old Town. Dr. Virginia Cronk testified during the hearing of these cases concerning what can happen to a community's identity if tourism becomes too dominate. The City is already showing some signs of the negative impact tourism can have on a community. As more stress from overcrowding is placed on the City's communities, the very base of the City's tourist industry is impacted. Not only will the labor force be moved out, the community atmosphere of communities that is so attractive in the City may be diminished or even destroyed. As in many other tourist destinations, the activities of tourists and permanent residents the City are often incompatible. This is especially true in the City because much of what attracts tourists to the City is associated with the City's residential neighborhoods. Part of the tourist destination of the City is its neighborhoods. The type of visitors attracted to the City over the last decade has changed significantly. Many tourists now come to "party" on Duval Street, often late into the night and the early morning hours. The partying often continues back to, and at, the accommodations that the tourists utilize. Many tourists make every effort to maximize their "fun time" by staying up late and playing hard. Because tourists are on vacation, they are not as concerned about when they go to sleep and when they enjoy the City. They are not required to keep any particular schedule, so they are more at liberty to stay up into the early morning hours. Because tourists are only in the City for a short time, they are also less concerned with getting along with their neighbors. They want to have a good time and assume that everyone around them is there for the same reason. Permanent residents of the City are much like permanent residents everywhere. The adults are employed during the day and their children attend school. They go to bed and rise earlier than tourists generally do. Because of the differences in the goals of tourists and permanent residents, inevitable conflicts arise when tourists and residents mix. Unless those conflicts are controlled in the City, permanent residents will be forced out, threatening to end one of the very features that has made the City so attractive to tourists: the unique community atmosphere and historical character of the City. Dr. Cronk explained the different social forces which impact the behavior of tourists and residents. Tourists are simply not subject to the same informal social controls that residents are. As a result, the behavior of tourists often comes into conflict with the behavior normally associated with a true community neighborhood. Because the behavior of tourists is not subject to the same informal social controls as residents, residents must turn increasingly to more formal social controls such as the police and private security forces. These controls often do not work and are more expensive than the informal social controls normally associated with neighborhoods. Witnesses during the hearing of these cases gave examples of clashes between permanent residents and tourists. Those incidents are fully reported in the transcript of the hearing of this matter and are summarized in the proposed orders filed by the Department and City, and the duPonts. The need to resort to more formal social controls, such as the police and private security was also explained by these witnesses. The credible testimony of Ms. Rowe, Margaret Domanski, and Martha duPont accurately describe the types of conflicts the Ordinance is intended to reduce. The impact which the conversion of residential properties to Transient Rentals has on affordable housing in the City is difficult to measure. The Department has suggested that it is significant. Petitioners argue that there is no impact and that, even if there were some impact, affordable housing is not one of the Principles and, therefore, should play no part in the review of the Ordinance. The principles which apply to Monroe County require that Monroe County "make available adequate affordable housing for all sectors of the population of the Florida Keys." Section 380.0552(7)(j), Florida Statutes. This principle is consistent with the legislative intent set out in Section 380.0552(2)(d), Florida Statutes, that a local government provide affordable housing in close proximity to places of employment in the Florida Keys. The Principles applicable to the City ACSC do not contain a principle specifically requiring that affordable housing be maintained. The lack of a specific requirement concerning affordable housing does not, however, support a conclusion that affordable housing should be ignored when applying the Principles to land development regulations adopted by the City. On the contrary, Principle H is broad enough to require a consideration of affordable housing. After all, any consideration of the "public health . . . welfare, and economy" of the City, necessarily must include a consideration of affordable housing. Without adequate housing for all sectors of the City's population, the public health and welfare of the City cannot be maintained. Nor can the economy of the City survive without adequate housing for all segments of the work force. "Affordable housing" does not mean housing for the poor. "Affordable housing" is defined in terms of the percentage of a household's income spent on housing which is considered "affordable" by very-low income, low-income, and moderate-income persons. What is considered affordable is based upon the median household income of a community's very-low income, low-income, and moderate-income population. The approximate median household income of City residents is $49,000.00. In order for the City to be considered to have adequate "affordable housing," persons making between 80 and 120 percent of the median household income, or $39,000 to $59,000, should be able to afford a house. The average value of a single-family house in the City, however, is $300,000, well above the price affordable to persons with a household income of between $39,000 and $59,000. Because of the disparity between the average price of homes and the low median household income of City residents, an enormous burden is placed on residents to fund any type of housing. As much as 30 percent of residents' income must be spent on housing. The number of residents spending at least 30 percent of their income on housing increased significantly between 1990 and 1995. That number is likely to continue to increase. As the cost of residential property increases, the economic burden on residents for housing continues to increase. The cost of residential property is increasing, and will continue to increase, because of the conversion of residential property to Transient Rentals. If the City takes no action with regard to balancing tourist accommodations, particularly Transient Rentals, and housing for its residents, the ability of residents to afford any housing will continue to be negatively impacted. Even though it is doubtful that the Ordinance will increase the ability of residents to actually own their own home, there is no doubt that their ability to afford any housing will continue to be negatively impacted if Transient Rentals continue to displace the use of property for residential purposes. In adopting the Ordinance, the City recognized the negative impact that tourism is having on the City: . . . the transient use of residential dwellings has had deleterious consequences in the residential neighborhoods of Key West; and . . . the increase in the conversion of residential dwellings to transient use is, in part, responsible for the affordable housing shortage in Key West, a shortage confirmed in a study of the City by the Shimberg Center of the University of Florida . . . The finding concerning affordable housing is consistent with the City's Plan. Objective 3-1.1 and Note 2, Policy 1-3.12.3 of the City's Plan. In adopting the Ordinance, the City took a reasonable step to address the problems associated with tourism. The Ordinance, while causing an initial negative impact to the economy, will promote the protection of residential neighborhoods from unnecessary intrusion, promote affordable housing, and ultimately ensure the continued viability of the tourist economy of the City. By limiting the intrusion of Transient Rentals into most residential neighborhoods in the City, the Ordinance will limit the intrusion of negative tourist activities into those neighborhoods. Those negative impacts testified about by Ms. Rowe, Ms. Domanski, and Ms. duPont will be, in most cases, prevented or at least reduced. The reduction of tourist intrusions into neighborhoods will also ensure that the unique community character of the City remains viable. The Ordinance will go a long way in keeping the charm of the City's neighborhoods intact for tourists and residents both. The Ordinance goes a long way in planning for tourism in the City. Reducing economically competitive uses of property in the City, such as the use of property for Transient Rentals, will ensure that the scarce supply of residential property is not further reduced. Stabilizing the supply of residential property, while not eliminating cost increases, will at least eliminate the increase in housing costs associated with the conversion of residential property to Transient Rental use. Eliminating the unlicensed use of Transient Rentals, which the Ordinance will do, will have the effect of actually returning some residential property to the supply of property available to residents. By prohibiting the use of residential properties as Transient Rentals, the total properties in the City available for housing, including for long-term rentals, for permanent residents, will increase. As supply increases, the demand for all housing, including to a very limited extent affordable housing, will be better met. By reducing the drain on residential properties in the City, the strain on the work force necessary to serve the tourist economy of the City will also be reduced. The City recognized and accepted the fact that the Ordinance will have an initial negative impact on the economy of the City. The Pallini Report was commissioned by, and considered by the City Commission. There will be an immediate reduction in revenues from unlicensed Transient Rentals that comply with the Ordinance and the income associated with providing services to those Transient Rentals. Some tourists who would otherwise select the City as their vacation destination will go elsewhere. Unlicensed Transient Rentals (taxed and untaxed), however, make up no more than ten percent of the total accommodations available in the City. It is estimated that the Ordinance will result in a loss in gross sales of $31 million, a loss in personal income of $9 million, and a loss in City revenues annually of $260,000. It is also estimated that there will be a loss of approximately 500 jobs associated with unlicensed Transient Rentals. These estimates are the "worst case" scenario figures. Actual losses will likely be somewhat less. The losses associated with the Ordinance will, however, not be long-term. Gradually, the tourist industry will adjust to the decrease in tourist accommodations and the negative impact on the economy. Some tourists will adjust the time of year they come to the City, resulting in greater tourist business during traditionally slower times. Persons who experience unemployment as a result of the Ordinance will also very likely find other employment relatively quickly because of the tight labor market in the City. The negative economic impacts to the City caused by the Ordinance should not last longer than three to five years. After that time, the economy will adjust. The overall impact of the Ordinance will be to help balance the need to provide tourist accommodations and the need to protect the charm of the City and the ability of the City to provide a work force. Protection of residential neighborhoods in the City comes within the City's responsibility to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, and is a necessary consideration in providing for the economic well- being of the City. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the Ordinance is consistent with Principal H. Truman Annex. It has been argued by Mr. Coleman that the application of the Ordinance to the Truman Annex supports a conclusion that the Ordinance is not consistent with the Principles. The evidence failed to support this contention. Truman Annex is located within walking distance of most tourist destinations in the City. The character and atmosphere of Truman Annex makes it an attractive tourist destination in itself. The "Little Whitehouse," a house utilized by President Harry Truman, is located within Truman Annex as is a tourist destination itself. While the Truman Annex is located in an area conducive to use as tourist accommodations, nothing in the City's Plan or land development regulations, the development orders associated with Truman Annex, the historic use of Truman Annex, the public health, safety and welfare, or the continued economic viability of the City depends upon such use. Truman Annex consists of residential housing and tourist accommodations, as well as some commercial facilities. Those activities are, however, largely buffered from each other. Most of the commercial activities are located in the western portion of Truman Annex. The residential housing is located primarily in the eastern portion of Truman Annex. Truman Annex without Transient Rentals constitutes appropriate planning by the developer of Truman Annex and the City. The Ordinance, even when applied to Truman Annex, constitutes an appropriate effort of the City to manage land uses and development. The Ordinance, even when applied to Truman Annex, will protect the historic heritage of Truman Annex and, more importantly, the City. Finally, the evidence proved that the application of the Ordinance to Truman Annex will not adversely impact the public health, safety, welfare, or the long-term economy of the City. Consideration of the Principles as a Whole. The evidence in these cases supports a conclusion that the Ordinance has no or little impact on most of the Principles, except Principles A, E, and H. The evidence proved that the Ordinance is neutral with regard to the other Principles. When Principles A, E, and H are considered individually and together, the evidence proved that the Ordinance is consistent with Principles A, E, and H. The Ordinance constitutes an effort of the City to manage land uses and development in the City, consistent with Principal A. The Ordinance will also help to protect the historic heritage of the City by preserving the character of the City's neighborhoods and, as a result, will preserve the tourist industry, consistent with Principal E. Just as clearly, the Ordinance will enhance the safety, health, and welfare of the residents of the City. Finally, the Ordinance is consistent with Principal H because it will benefit the public health, safety, and welfare of the City by protecting neighborhoods from the intrusion of tourists, reducing the impact of the conversion of residential housing for Transient Rentals, and ensuring the continued character of the City. While there will be an initial negative impact on the economy of the City as a result of the Ordinance, ultimately the Ordinance will have a positive impact on the economy of the City due to the positive impact on the City's tourist industry which will result from the regulation of Transient Rentals. Abbey Petitioners' Rule Challenge, Constitutional Issues, and Other Issues. In the Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing (hereinafter referred to as the "Amended Petition") filed by the Abbe Petitioners, the Abbe Petitioners attempted to challenge pursuant to Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, portions of the Final Order of the Department as an unpromulgated rule. The Amended Petition was not, however, filed consistent with the requirements of Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes. This challenge was required to be filed in a separate petition filed solely with the Division of Administrative Hearings (hereinafter referred to as the "Division") and not through an amendment to a petition originally filed with the Department which was subsequently filed by the Department with the Division with a request that the Division hear the matter. Additionally, even if the issue were properly before the Division, the evidence in this case failed to prove that the statements in the Final Order have any application other than to the Ordinance. Therefore, those statements are not "agency statements of general applicability." The statements are not, therefore, "rules" as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes. The Abbe Petitioners also raised issues in the Amended Petition other than the consistency of the Ordinance with the Principles. Other than the question of the consistency of the Ordinance with the Principles, the evidence failed to support the Abbe Petitioners' argument that the issues raised in the Amended Petition are relevant to this matter.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order approving City of Key West Ordinance 98-31 as consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development of Rule 28-36.003(1), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey M. Bell, Esquire Ritter, Chusid, Bivona & Cohen, LLP 7000 West Palmetto Park Road, Suite 400 Boca Raton, Florida 33433 Jerry Coleman, Esquire Post Office Box 1393 Key West, Florida 33041 John F. Rooney 208-10 Southard Street Key West, Florida 33040 Andrew S. Grayson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Robert Tischenkel, City Attorney City of Key West Post Office Box 1409 Key West, Florida 33041 David J. Audlin, Jr., Esquire Eaton Street Professional Center 524 Eaton Street, Suite 110 Key West, Florida 33040 Lee R. Rohe, Esquire Post Office Box 500252 Marathon, Florida 33050 Barbara Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Carol A. Licko, General Counsel Office of the Governor The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Steven M. Seibert, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100

Florida Laws (11) 120.52120.54120.56120.569120.57163.318435.24380.031380.05380.055290.706 Florida Administrative Code (2) 28-36.00128-36.003
# 6
RUBYE JOHNSON vs CANONGATE CONDOMINIUM APARTMENTS NO. ONE INC., 10-005015 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 12, 2010 Number: 10-005015 Latest Update: Nov. 03, 2011

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful housing practice by discriminating against the Petitioner on the basis of race, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Dr. Rubye Johnson, is an African-American woman and, thus, is a member of a class protected under the Florida Fair Housing Act, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Canongate Condominium Apartments No. One, Inc., is the condominium association responsible for operation of the Canongate Condominium Apartments No. One ("Canongate"). Petitioner is a resident of Canongate and currently resides in Unit 201. She previously owned and lived in Canongate Unit 207, the unit at issue in this proceeding.3 She no longer owns Unit 207. Petitioner could not recall precisely when she became a resident of Canongate.4 She testified that when she became a resident of Canongate she was a renter, and she rented Unit 207. The evidence indicates that she likely moved into Unit 207 sometime before February 4, 2000. On February 4, 2000, the Association voted to amend Canongate's Declaration of Condominium, Article VII, Paragraph G, Section i. This amendment (the "2000 Amendment") prohibits the leasing or rental of units in Canongate. Existing leases and tenants as of the amendment's effective date were grandfathered for the balance of the lease term; however, no lease extensions or renewals were allowed. Institutional mortgagees' existing rights under the Declaration of Condominium were expressly preserved. At some point after Petitioner began renting Unit 207, the unit owner told her that due to the 2000 Amendment, she either would have to purchase the unit or move out in five years' time. The owner told her he thought the 2000 Amendment was approved because Respondent's Board of Directors ("Board") did not want any more black residents in the building.5 Petitioner purchased Unit 207 in or about 2004. When she purchased the unit, she was aware of the 2000 Amendment. She acknowledged that the 2000 Amendment prohibits the leasing or rental of units in Canongate without regard to race or gender. Petitioner testified that when she came home one day, Laura Ochacher, who had owned Unit 210, approached her about renting one of her units. Ms. Ochacher told Petitioner that Unit 210 was the subject of foreclosure and that her family was being evicted. Petitioner saw the eviction notice. Ms. Ochacher told Petitioner that Canongate property manager Marsha Allen had found a company to purchase Unit 210, and that the company had allowed them to remain in and rent Unit 210. Through examining a document printed out from the Miami-Dade County Property Appraiser's Office website, Petitioner learned that Lansdowne Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Lansdowne") owned Unit 210. From this information, Petitioner surmised that Lansdowne had purchased Unit 210 and rented it to the Ochachers. She believed that Ms. Allen and the Board were complicit in what she viewed as a rental arrangement that violated the 2000 Amendment. Her belief was based on her knowledge of the screening and approval process entailed in purchasing a unit in Canongate. Petitioner did not independently investigate the matters that Ms. Ochacher relayed to her. She did not ask Ms. Allen whether she had found a company to purchase Unit 210; whether Unit 210 was, in fact, being rented; or whether she or the Board knew of and allowed rental of the unit. Petitioner understood Lansdowne to be a land company that bought and sold land on a large scale. She did not know whether Lansdowne is white, black, or of any other race. Petitioner also heard rumors from other Canongate residents that other units were being rented. She identified these units as 618, 520, 602, 105, 309, 106, 115, 120, 315, 515, 313, 410, 430, 503, 514, "and perhaps more." She did not identify who told her about these units, nor did she independently investigate whether the units were, in fact, being rented. Following her discussion with Ms. Ochacher, Petitioner decided to ask the Board whether she could rent Unit 207. She sent a communication to the Board, dated April 11, 2009, entitled "Issues and Concerns."6 Item 12 of this communication states: 12. It is rumored that there are renters in the building and that the board of directors are [sic] sanctioning these arrangements. Is this true? If so, under what circumstance would the board of director's [sic] sanctions [sic] renters in the building? If not, do you have a clue how this perception has been generated? Petitioner's testimony regarding whether she had actually requested permission from the Board to rent her unit was inconsistent. In her deposition, she testified that she viewed the statement in Item 12 as a request to rent Unit 207, but conceded that the request was "implied." At the final hearing, she acknowledged that her statement in Item 12 did not constitute a specific request, but stated that she previously had sent letters asking to rent the unit. She was unable to recall any specific letters she sent, when she sent them, or to whom the letters were sent. No such letters were proffered or admitted into evidence. Petitioner claimed that she had orally asked Ms. Allen and various Board members, on numerous occasions, whether she could rent her unit. However, she could not recall who, other than Ms. Allen, she ostensibly had asked, nor did she recall the substance or details of such conversations. Petitioner testified that, "by the way they acted," she knew she was not allowed to rent her unit. She stated that she also had been informed, orally and in writing, that she could not rent her unit. However, she could not recall who informed her, or any details of those discussions. She did not provide any evidence of written refusal to allow her to rent her unit. Petitioner testified that she had discussed with Marsha Allen her concern that white unit owners were allowed to rent their units, while she was not. She acknowledged that no one had ever told her she was not allowed to rent her unit because she is black. Canongate property manager Marsha Allen testified on behalf of Respondent. Ms. Allen's duties as property manager include overseeing the day-to-day operation of Canongate, reporting to the Board, and serving as Respondent's records custodian. Ms. Allen testified that rental of units in Canongate is prohibited under the 2000 Amendment. She testified that neither she nor the Board have allowed Canongate owners to rent their units, and that whenever owners have asked, they have been denied permission because of the rental prohibition. Ms. Allen testified that none of the units Petitioner identified was, in fact, being rented. Ms. Allen stated that Petitioner never had asked her whether she could rent her unit. She was not aware of Petitioner ever having asked the Board or any Board member whether she could rent her unit. Ms. Allen did not interpret Item 12 of Petitioner's April 11, 2009, communication as constituting a request for permission to rent her unit. Ms. Allen also stated that she never had discussed Canongate's rental policy with Petitioner, and she never had refused a request from Petitioner to rent her unit. She testified that she never had been directed by the Board or any Board member to refuse to allow Petitioner to rent her unit. Ms. Allen testified that Petitioner never had complained to her that she was being discriminated against by not being allowed to rent her unit, while white owners were allowed to rent theirs. Lansdowne sent a letter dated October 30, 2008, to Ms. Allen. The letter asked her to inform the Board that Lansdowne had acquired title to Unit 210 through foreclosure and that they were entering into an agreement with the borrower, Laura Ochacher, to continue her occupancy for 12 months, during which she could redeem the property by paying the foreclosure judgment. The letter stated: "[t]his should not be considered a rental arrangement." The letter explained that Lansdowne had paid the past due assessments for the unit and would pay outstanding legal fees once the Board approved the occupancy agreement. Upon receiving the letter, Ms. Allen reviewed the Canongate Declaration of Condominium, specifically, Article VII, Paragraph H., to ensure that the occupancy agreement for Unit 210 did not violate the 2000 Amendment's rental prohibition. Article VII, Paragraph H., provides that if the mortgagee of a condominium unit subject to an institutional mortgage given as security becomes the owner of the unit, the owner has the unqualified right to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the unit. Ms. Allen determined that, based on this provision, the occupancy agreement did not violate the 2000 Amendment. Ms. Allen consulted with Respondent's legal counsel, who independently verified that the occupancy agreement did not violate the 2000 Amendment. Respondent also presented the testimony of Joyce Meade, who has served as Respondent's president since 2008. Ms. Meade's duties as President include enforcing Respondent's condominium documents, overseeing the Board, conducting meetings, and supervising Canongate's property manager. Ms. Meade testified that Petitioner did not ask her for permission to rent her unit. She also testified that, to the best of her knowledge, Petitioner did not ask the Board for permission to rent her unit, and the Board did not specifically refuse. Ms. Meade testified that had Petitioner asked to rent her unit, she would not have been allowed because all rental requests are refused due to the 2000 Amendment. Ms. Meade testified that Petitioner never complained to her that she was being discriminated against because she was not allowed to rent her unit, while white owners were allowed to rent theirs. She also was not aware of any such complaints by Petitioner to the Board. Determinations of Ultimate Fact Petitioner failed to present persuasive evidence that she requested Respondent's permission to rent Unit 207. Petitioner subjectively may have believed that she requested permission in Item 12 of her April 11, 2009, communication, but that item cannot reasonably be read to constitute such a request. Item 12 merely asks if there are renters in Canongate and the circumstances under which the Board would allow renters. No other items in the April 11, 2009, communication constitute a request to rent the unit. Petitioner did not present any evidence that she submitted other written requests to rent her unit, and her testimony that she had orally requested to rent her unit was unpersuasive. Respondent's witnesses credibly testified that Petitioner had never requested, orally or in writing, to rent her unit. Petitioner also failed to establish that her request to rent her unit was refused. Her testimony on this point was unclear, imprecise, and unpersuasive, and she provided no evidence of written refusal to allow her to rent her unit. By contrast, Respondent's witnesses testified unequivocally that they had not refused to allow Petitioner to rent her unit. They also credibly testified that Petitioner never had complained to them that she was refused permission to rent her unit because she is black, while white owners were allowed to rent theirs. Petitioner did not establish that she was qualified and able to rent out her unit. The uncontroverted evidence established that the Canongate Declaration of Condominium prohibits leasing or rental of units. Accordingly, Petitioner could not have been allowed to rent her unit, even if had she asked. Petitioner did not present any competent substantial evidence establishing that Respondent allows similarly situated white unit owners to rent their units, while refusing to allow Petitioner to rent hers. Petitioner's testimony that Lansdowne was a purchaser and that the occupancy agreement for Unit 210 actually constituted a rental arrangement was merely her personal opinion, unsupported by any competent substantial evidence. Respondent showed that Lansdowne is an institutional mortgagee that took title through foreclosure and, therefore, was not similarly situated to Petitioner and the other owners who had purchased their units. Moreover, Petitioner presented no evidence that Lansdowne was white. In sum, there is no competent substantial evidence in the record to support a finding of unlawful housing discrimination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding Canongate Condominium Apartments No. One, Inc., not liable for housing discrimination and awarding no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2011.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.23760.37
# 7
OFFICE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION vs SCOTT W. SPOR, 05-000515 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 11, 2005 Number: 05-000515 Latest Update: May 18, 2012

The Issue In relation to DOAH Case No. 05-0515, does the case involve the sale of securities as described in Chapter 517, Florida Statutes (2002), that would confer jurisdiction upon OFR to proceed to a hearing on the merits of the Administrative Complaint that forms the basis for DOAH Case No. 05-0515, and to what extent, if any, the named Respondents have been involved with the sale of securities sufficient to declare jurisdiction over their activities? Preliminary to that determination is the related issue concerning the possible pre-emption of OFR's regulatory authority by virtue of the regulatory action previously taken by the State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (DBPR) under authority set forth in Chapter 721, Florida Statutes (2002)? Argument has also been set forth concerning the significance of court cases as they might influence OFR's ability to declare their regulatory authority in this instance.

Findings Of Fact * * * 2. RESPONDENT is the 'creating developer' of the Universal Luxury Lease Plan, a personal property 'timeshare plan' as those terms are defined in sections 721.05(9)(a) and 721.05(37), Florida Statutes, located in the city of Sanford, Florida. * * * On or about July 10, 2003, DIVISION was made aware of a newspaper advertisement for Universal Luxury Lease Plan. This advertisement, promoted the purchase of a timeshare interest in the Universal Luxury Lease Plan as an investment that offered purchasers a 10 percent per year return on their investment. On July 25, 2003, DIVISION'S investigators were given an application package containing the Universal Luxury Lease Plan Enrollment Forms, CD-ROM, Public Offering Statement, Contracts and Motor Coach Brochures. The application package stated that it was advertising material being used for the purposes of soliciting timeshare interests. It described a component of the timeshare plan called the 'Affinity Rental Program' and stated that the program will typically produce a monthly income of 10 percent of the lease-hold ownership interest.

Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That an order be entered by OFR finding jurisdiction to proceed with the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 05- 0515 on its merits. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2006.

Florida Laws (17) 120.565120.569120.57517.021517.12517.221517.3017.221721.02721.05721.056721.06721.07721.11721.111721.23721.26
# 8
DIVISION OF LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. A. R. M. LTD., INC., D/B/A TRAILS AT ROYAL PALM BEACH, 87-002917 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002917 Latest Update: May 20, 1988

Findings Of Fact Respondent A.R.M. Limited, Inc., is the developer of the residential condominium known as Trails at Royal Palm Beach, a phase condominium containing a total number of 230 units when completed, located in Royal Palm Beach, Florida. During 1981 Respondent submitted to Petitioner all documents required to properly register the condominium, including the Declaration of Condominium and the Contract for Sale. By letter dated June 16, 1981, Petitioner notified Respondent that the documents it had received were in acceptable form and that Respondent would soon be advised as to the results of the Petitioner's "content examination". By letter dated July 14, 1981, Petitioner notified Respondent that it had completed its examination, and the condominium documents were proper. On April 27, 1982, Respondent recorded the Declaration of Condominium for Phases I and II in the public records in Palm Beach County. The Offering Circular, the Declaration of Condominium, and the Contract for Sale contained a developer's guarantee of common expenses for a two-year period commencing with the recording of the Declaration of Condominium and guaranteeing that the unit owners' monthly assessment would not exceed $75 a month for the period of the guarantee. Accordingly, the initial guarantee period terminated April 27, 1984. Thereafter, the guarantee period was extended by the developer until April 27, 1985, and again until December 31, 1985. No evidence was offered to show that any unit owner objected to the extension of the guarantee period. However, no vote of the unit owners was taken regarding either of the two extensions, and no written agreement was obtained. During the period of time between the initial guarantee period and January 1, 1986, Respondent did not pay assessments on a regular basis but instead paid the difference between the association's expenses and income. In other words, the developer did fund all shortfalls through December 31, 1985. The Offering Circular approved by Petitioner in 1981 contained a copy of the Contract for Sale which was to be used, and in fact has been used, for the condominiums units. That Contract specifically provides for purchasers to pay an initial contribution to working capital in the amount of "$300 . . . which may be used by the Association for start-up expenses as well as ordinary expenses . . . " Pursuant to that contract, Respondent utilized start-up funds to off set common expenses of the condominium arising from the sale of 28 units between April 27, 1984 and April 27, 1985. Fourteen of those units were sold between April 27, 1984 and October 1, 1984, and 14 of those units were sold between October 1, 1984 and April 27, 1985. In a phase condominium, since the total number of units within the condominium increases as phases are added, the number of unit owners paying assessments for common expenses increases and, consequently the percentage of ownership of the common elements and percentage of common expenses liability changes per unit. When Respondent registered the condominium with Petitioner in 1981 Respondent filed all documents necessary for the entire project (including all phases) but only paid the filing fee related to Phases I and II at that time. As Respondent continued developing the condominium and selling additional units in subsequently-constructed phases, appropriate amendments to the original Declaration were recorded in the public records. Respondent, however, failed to file copies of those recorded amendments with Petitioner. By cover letter dated March 3, 1986, Respondent filed with Petitioner a developer's filing statement for subsequent phases and enclosed a check in the amount of $940 to cover filing fee requirements. According to an attachment to that filing, Respondent was filing Phases 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300, 1400, 2000, 2100, 2200, 2400, and 2500, which in totality comprised 94 units. According to the same attachment, these Phases were added to the condominium through recordation of amendments to the original Declaration with such recordation occurring between 1983 and 1986. According to information submitted by Respondent to Petitioner, as of March 3, 1986, closings had taken place on 77 units in Phases 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300, 1400, 2100, 2400, and 2500 prior to Respondent's filing the subsequent phase documents with Petitioner. There is no allegation that the documents when filed were improper or that Respondent failed to provide them to the unit owners at the time they were executed. In January of 1988 unit owners other than the developer elected a majority of the board of administration of the condominium association, and turnover of control of the association from developer control to control by unit owners other than the developer occurred.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it Is'; RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent guilty of the allegation contained within count one; Finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained within counts two and three of the Notice to Show Cause; Requiring Respondent to effectuate the financial review discussed in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order and pay to the condominium association any amount of unpaid assessments for the time period in question; and Assessing a fine against Respondent in the amount of $1000. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of May, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 87-2917 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, the first sentence of 9, the third sentence of 15, and 16-20 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 8 has been rejected as being immaterial to the issues under consideration herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 4, 6, 9 except for the first sentence, 10-14, and 15 except for the third sentence have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel or recitations of the testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Van B. Poole, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 A.R.M. Limited, Inc. Trails at Royal Palm Beach Suite 315 1300 North Florida Mango Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Dennis Powers, Esquire Suite 315 1300 North Florida Mango Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33409

Florida Laws (5) 120.57718.116718.502718.503718.504
# 9
CARLOS GOMEZ vs VESTCOR COMPANIE, D/B/A MADALYN LANDING, 05-000565 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Feb. 16, 2005 Number: 05-000565 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2005

The Issue The two issues raised in this proceeding are: (1) whether the basis and reason Respondent, Vestcor Companies, d/b/a Madalyn Landings (Vestcor), terminated Petitioner, Carlos Gomez's (Petitioner), employment on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for Petitioner's protected conduct during his normal course of employment; and (2) whether Vestcor committed unlawful housing practice by permitting Vestcor employees without families to reside on its property, Madalyn Landing Apartments, without paying rent, while requiring Vestcor employees with families to pay rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, and Chapter 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).

Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness while testifying, exhibits offered in support of and in opposition to the respective position of the parties received in evidence, stipulations of the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (2002), and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant, material, and substantial facts are determined: Petitioner filed charges of housing discrimination against Vestcor with the Commission on August 30, 2002. Petitioner alleged that Vestcor discriminated against him based on his familial status and his June 28, 2002, termination was in retaliation for filing the charge of discrimination. Vestcor denied the allegations and contended that Petitioner's termination was for cause. Additionally, Vestcor maintained Petitioner relinquished his claim of retaliation before the final hearing; and under oath during his deposition, asserted he would not pursue a claim for retaliation. Petitioner was permitted to proffer evidence of retaliation because Vestcor terminated his employment. The Commission's Notice was issued on January 7, 2005. The parties agree that Petitioner was hired by Vestcor on June 25, 2001, as a leasing consultant agent for Madalyn Landing Apartments located in Palm Bay, Florida. Petitioner's job responsibilities as a leasing consultant agent included showing the property, leasing the property (apartment units), and assisting with tenant relations by responding to concerns and questions, and preparing and following up on maintenance orders. Petitioner had access to keys to all apartments on site. At the time of his hire, Petitioner was, as was all of Vestcor employees, given a copy of Vestcor's Employee Handbook. This handbook is required reading for each employee for personal information and familiarity with company policies and procedures, to include the company requirement that each employee personally telephone and speak with his/her supervisor when the employee, for whatever reason, could not appear at work as scheduled, which is a basis and cause for termination. The parties agree that Vestcor's handbook, among other things, contains company policies regarding equal employment; prohibition against unlawful conduct and appropriate workplace conduct; procedures for handling employee problems and complaints associated with their employment; and procedures for reporting illness or absences from work, which include personal notification to supervisors, and not messages left on the answering service. Failure to comply with employment reporting polices may result in progressive disciplinary action. The parties agree that employee benefits were also contained in the handbook. One such employee benefit, at issue in this proceeding, is the live-on-site benefit. The live-on- site benefit first requires eligible employees to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, and be a full-time employee. The eligible employee must pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the live-on-site unit. Rent-free, live-on-site benefits are available only to employees who occupy the positions of (1) site community managers, (2) maintenance supervisors, and (3) courtesy officers. These individuals received a free two-bedroom, two-bathroom apartment at the apartment complex in which they work as part of their employment compensation package. The rent-free, live-on-site benefit is not available for Vestcor's leasing consultant agent employees, such as Petitioner. On or about July 3, 2001, Petitioner entered into a lease agreement with Vestcor to move into Apartment No. 202-24 located at Madalyn Landing Apartments. The lease agreement ended on January 31, 2002. The lease agreement set forth terms that Petitioner was to receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, which became effective on September 3, 2001. Although he was eligible for the 25-percent monthly rental concession, to have given Petitioner the full 25 percent of his monthly rental cost would have over-qualified Petitioner based upon Madalyn Landing Apartment's tax credit property status. Petitioner and Vestcor agreed he would receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, thereby qualifying him as a resident on the property. Petitioner understood and accepted the fact that he did not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. Petitioner understood and accepted Vestcor's $50.00 monthly rental concession because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. The rental concession meant Petitioner's regular monthly rental would be reduced by $50.00 each month. On September 1, 2001, Henry Oliver was hired by Vestcor as a maintenance technician. Maintenance technicians do not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Oliver did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Oliver was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 13, 2001, Michael Gomez, the brother of Petitioner (Mr. Gomez), commenced his employment with Vestcor as a groundskeeper. Groundskeepers did not meet the qualifications for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Gomez did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Gomez was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 21, 2001, 81 days after his hire, Mr. Oliver commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 203-44 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Mr. Oliver's leasing consultant agent was Petitioner in this cause. Like other eligible Vestcor employees and as a part of the lease application process, Mr. Oliver completed all required paperwork, which included, but not limited to, completing a credit check, employment verification, and income test to ensure that he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Fifteen days later, on November 28, 2001, Mr. Gomez commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. As part of the leasing process, Mr. Gomez, as other eligible Vestcor employees who intend to reside on Vestcor property, completed all necessary paperwork including, but not limited to, a credit check and employment verification and income test to ensure he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Included in the paperwork was a list of rental criteria requiring Mr. Gomez to execute a lease agreement to obligate himself to pay the required rent payment, consent to a credit check, pay an application fee and required security deposit, and agree not to take possession of an apartment until all supporting paperwork was completed and approved. Mr. Gomez's leasing consultant was Petitioner. On December 28, 2001, Petitioner signed a Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 206-24, effective February 1, 2002. The Notice to Vacate was placed in Vestcor's office files. Petitioner's reasons for vacating his apartment stated he "needed a yard, garage, more space, a big family room, and some privacy." Thirty-four days later, February 1, 2002, Mr. Gomez moved into Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments without the approval or knowledge of Vestcor management. On January 9, 2002, a "Corrective Action Notice" was placed in Petitioner's employee file by his supervisor, Genea Closs. The notice cited two violations of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Specifically, his supervisor noted Petitioner did not collect administration fees from two unidentified rental units, and he had taken an unidentified resident's rental check home with him, rather than directly to the office as required by policy. As a direct result of those policy violations, Ms. Closs placed Petitioner on 180 days' probation and instructed him to re-read all Vestcor employees' handbook and manuals. Petitioner acknowledged receiving and understanding the warning. At the time she took the above action against Petitioner, there is no evidence that Ms. Closs had knowledge of Petitioner's past or present efforts to gather statements and other information from Mr. Gomez and/or Mr. Oliver in anticipation and preparation for his subsequent filing of claims of discrimination against Vestcor. Also, on January 9, 2002, Petitioner was notified that his brother, Mr. Gomez, did not qualify to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments because of insufficient credit. Further, Petitioner was advised that should Mr. Gomez wish to continue with the application process, he would need a co-signer on his lease agreement or pay an additional security deposit. Mr. Gomez produced an unidentified co-signer, who also completed a lease application. On January 30, 2002, the lease application submitted by Mr. Gomez's co-signor was denied. As a result of the denial of Mr. Gomez's co-signor lease application, Vestcor did not approve Mr. Gomez's lease application. When he was made aware that his co-signor's application was denied and of management's request for him to pay an additional security deposit, as was previously agreed, Mr. Gomez refused to pay the additional security deposit. As a direct result of his refusal, his lease application was never approved, and he was not authorized by Vestcor to move into any Madalyn Landing's rental apartment units. At some unspecified time thereafter, Vestcor's management became aware that Mr. Gomez had moved into Apartment No. 206-24, even though he was never approved or authorized to move into an on site apartment. Vestcor's management ordered Mr. Gomez to remove his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24. Subsequent to the removal order, Mr. Gomez moved his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24 into Apartment No. 103-20. Mr. Gomez's move into Apartment No. 103-20, as was his move into Apartment No. 206-04, was without approval and/or authorization from Vestcor's management. Upon learning that his belonging had been placed in Apartment No. 103-20, Mr. Gomez was again instructed by management to remove his belongings. After he failed and refused to move his belongings from Apartment No. 103-20, Vestcor's management entered the apartment and gathered and discarded Mr. Gomez's belongings. As a leasing contract agent, Petitioner had access to keys to all vacant apartments. His brother, Mr. Gomez, who was a groundskeeper, did not have access to keys to any apartment, save the one he occupied. Any apartment occupied by Ms. Gomez after his Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 103-20 was without the knowledge or approval of Vestcor and in violation of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Therefore, any period of apartment occupancy by Mr. Gomez was not discriminatory against Petitioner (rent-free and/or reduced rent), but was a direct violation of Vestcor's policies. On February 10, 2002, Mr. Oliver signed a one-year lease agreement with Vestcor. Mr. Oliver's lease agreement reflected a 25-percent employee rental concession. Throughout Mr. Oliver's occupancy of Apartment No. 203-64 and pursuant to his lease agreement duration, Mr. Oliver's rental history reflected his monthly payment of $413.00. There is no evidence that Mr. Oliver lived on site without paying rent or that Vestcor authorized or permitted Mr. Oliver to live on site without paying rent, as alleged by Petitioner. On June 2, 2002, Ms. Closs completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal report. Performance ratings range from a one -- below expectations, to a four -- exceeds expectations. Petitioner received ratings in the categories appraised as follows: Leasing skills -- 4; Administrative skills -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork, computer updating, and policy adherence; Marketing skills -- 4, with comments that Petitioner had a flair for finding the right markets; Community awareness -- 3, with no comment; Professionalism -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork reporting; Dependability -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in attendance; Interpersonal skills -- 3, with no comments; Judgment/Decision-making -- 3, with no comments; Quality of Work -- 2, with comments that work lacked accuracy; Initiative -- 4, with no comment; Customer service -- 3, with no comments; Team work -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in the area of resident confidence; Company loyalty -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in adherence to company policy and procedures; and Training and development -- 3, with no comments. Petitioner's Overall rating was 2.5, with comments that there was "room for improvement." On June 27, 2002, while on 180 days' probation that began on January 9, 2002, Petitioner failed to report to work and failed to report his absence to his supervisor, Ms. Closs, by a person-to-person telephone call. This conduct constituted a violation of Vestcor's policy requiring all its employees to personally contact their supervisor when late and/or absent from work and prohibited leaving messages on the community answering service machine. On June 28, 2002, Petitioner reported to work. Ms. Closs, his supervisor, informed Petitioner of his termination of employment with Vestcor for failure to report to work (i.e. job abandonment) and for probation violation, as he had been warned on January 9, 2002, what would happen should a policy violation re-occur. It was after his June 28, 2002, termination that Petitioner began his personal investigation and gathering of information (i.e., interviews and statements from other Vestcor employees) in preparation to file this complaint. Considering the findings favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Vestcor, when they terminated his employment on June 28, 2002. Considering the findings of record favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of housing and/or rental adjustment discrimination by Vestcor, based upon familial status of himself or any other employer. Petitioner failed to prove Vestcor knowingly and/or intentionally permitted, approved, or allowed either Mr. Gomez or Mr. Oliver to live on site without a completed and approved application followed by appropriate rent adjustments according to their employment status and keeping within the tax credit requirement, while requiring Vestcor employees with families (or different employment status) to pay a different monthly rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Petitioner failed to prove his termination on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for his actions and conduct other than his personal violation, while on probation, of Vestcor's policies and procedures.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Florida Commission on Human Rights enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief alleging discrimination filed by Petitioner, Carlos Gomez. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2005.

USC (2) 42 U.S.C 2000e42 U.S.C 3604 Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57741.211760.11760.23
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer