The Issue The issues in these cases are whether the Respondent, Roy Palmer, is entitled to a Noticed General Environmental Resource Permit, under Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-341, and a Consent of Use under Florida Administrative Code Chapter 18-21.
Findings Of Fact Procedural History On or about February 13, 1995, the Respondent, Roy Palmer (Palmer), applied for a wetland resource permit to construct a 395-foot boat dock for use at his single-family residence at property he owned on Sarasota Bay, an Outstanding Florida Water. As proposed, this dock was to originate from the northern part of Palmer's property and have a terminal platform with two boat moorings and two boat lifts. On September 1, 1995, the Department of Environmental Protection (the Department or DEP) gave notice of intent to issue a permit for a shorter (370-foot) dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property. The Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging the intended action. DEP referred the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 95-5311. On or about December 11, 1995, Palmer applied for a noticed general environmental resource permit (ERP) permit for his dock under new DEP rules went into effect on October 3, 1995. This proposal was for the 370-foot dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property. On or about January 10, 1996, DEP acknowledged receipt of the noticed general ERP (No. 582819483) and informed Palmer that it appeared to meet the requirements of the new rule. DEP also gave notice of intent to grant Palmer's application for consent of use of sovereign submerged lands necessary to construct the dock. (The record is not clear when the application for consent of use was filed.) The Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging agency action regarding both the noticed general ERP and the consent of use. DEP also referred this petition to DOAH, where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 96-0736. Palmer withdrew the original permit application and moved to dismiss DOAH Case No. 95-5311. In July, 1996, Palmer applied for a noticed general ERP to build a still shorter (232-foot) dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property (Permit No. 292583). Apparently, no notice of the application was published or required to be published. It is not clear whether the Petitioners "filed a written request for notification of any pending applications affecting the particular area in which the proposed activity is to occur." Palmer's second noticed general ERP (No. 292583) was amended on or about August 19, 1996, to eliminate one boat mooring and one boat lift. DEP took no action on Palmer's second application for a noticed general ERP No. 292583. On September 23, 1996, Palmer filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Administrative Proceeding in DOAH Case No. 96-0736 because he had withdrawn the previous application for a noticed general ERP for a 370-foot dock (No. 582819483) and was proceeding only on the second noticed general ERP (No. 292583) for the 232foot dock. Palmer's intent was to dismiss only the portion of his prior application regarding the noticed general permit, but not the consent of use. On October 28, 1996, the Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging noticed general ERP No. 292583 for the 232-foot dock. This petition alleged that the Petitioners filed a written objection to noticed general ERP No. on September 16, 1996, which requested a written response, and that no response of any kind was received until the Petitioners inquired and were told that DEP did not intend to respond to either the noticed general ERP (No. 292583) or the Petitioners' objection. Proposed Dock at Issue The proposal at issue is for a 227-foot access pier and 20 foot by 5 foot terminal platform with only one boat mooring and one boat lift. The length, location, and design of Palmer's proposed dock was changed in an attempt to satisfy the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP or the Department) and Palmer's neighbors. Palmer's task in this regard was difficult in part because a longer dock with a terminus in deeper water could have less impact on seagrasses (the major environmental concern) but would have a greater impact on the neighbors' views of Sarasota Bay (the major infringement of riparian rights concern.) In the final version, Palmer tried to balance these conflicting concerns. As proposed, neither the terminal platform, boat lift, nor mooring location occurs over submerged grassbeds, coral communities or wetlands. Starting at the mean high water line, the first 75 feet of the access pier for the proposed dock will traverse essentially no sea grasses. In the next 75 feet to 150 feet of the access pier, there will be approximately 80% vegetative cover consisting primarily of the seagrass halodule wrightii. Between 150 feet and 200 feet, there will be approximately 20% vegetative cover consisting of the seagrasses halodule wrightii and thalassia testudinum. Between 200 feet and 232 feet, seagrasses consisted primarily of thalassia testudinum, except that the terminal platform is located in an area of essentially bare sand. Starting at 80 feet from the mean high water line, the access pier for the proposed dock will ramp up to 5 feet above mean high water for the next 20 linear feet and continue at that elevation for the next 112 feet to reduce shading of the seagrasses. Then it will descend stairs for the next 5 linear feet, until it is 3.5 feet above mean high water, and will continue at that elevation for 10 more feet to where it joins the 20 foot by 5 foot terminal platform. In this way, wherever it traverses seagrasses, the access walkway portion of the pier will be elevated 5 feet above mean high water. The access walkway will be only 4 feet wide and will have half-inch wide gaps between its deck boards to allow sunlight through and further reduce shading of the seagrasses. The access walkway also will have handrails that are maintained in such a manner as to prevent use of the access walkways for boat mooring or access. As proposed, the terminal platform and boat lift occurs in a location with minimum depth of 2.2 feet below the mean low water level. There is some water 1.7 feet deep in the vicinity of the terminal platform, but the structure can be used without traversing the shallow water. The structure is designed so that boat mooring and navigational access will be in water at least 2 feet deep. Including access pier and terminal platform, the total area of Palmer's proposed dock over sovereign, submerged land would be 1,008 square feet. There will be no wet bars or living quarters over wetlands or surface waters or on the pier, and there will be no structures enclosed by walls or doors. There will be no fish cleaning facilities, boat repair facilities or equipment, or fueling facilities on the proposed dock. No overboard discharges of trash, human, or animal waste, or fuel will occur from the dock. The only dredging or filling associated with construction of Palmer's proposed dock will be the minimum dredge and fill required for installation of the actual pilings for the pier, terminal platform, and boat lift. Altogether, less than 30 square feet of bay bottom will be disturbed during construction and displaced to accommodate the pilings. Palmer's noticed general ERP is subject to the general conditions set out in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 341.427. Among those conditions is the requirement that Palmer implement best management practices for erosion, turbidity, and other pollution control to prevent violation of state water quality standards. The pilings will be jetted, not driven, into place to minimize disturbance of the bay bottom and temporary increases in turbidity. Turbidity barriers will be installed and maintained in a functional condition at each piling until construction is completed and soils are stabilized and vegetation has been established. Used properly, turbidity barriers have proved effective in containing temporary turbidity from dock construction. Based on the expert testimony, it is found that the construction of Palmer's proposed dock will not significantly impact seagrasses. The Petitioners presented expert testimony on seagrasses, but their expert testified only generally based on studies showing that shading negatively impacts seagrasses. He had no prior knowledge of the Palmer dock design, seagrass coverage, or the depth of the water. When apprised of some information concerning Palmer's proposed dock, he admitted that the studies involved far more severe shading conditions than would be caused by the proposed dock. He could not testify that the Palmer dock design would harm seagrasses, with the exception of those actually removed by the installation of the pilings. Accidental boat propeller dredging in using a dock can be a secondary impact on seagrasses from dock construction. But while a dock could perhaps attract a few boats, the dock's presence also might cause boaters to steer clear of the dock or reduce speed in the vicinity of the dock, which could result in a net reduction in the risk of damage to seagrasses from accidental prop dredging. Petitioners Dr. Franklin Pfeiffenberger, James Castoro, and Winifred Castoro jointly own a dock to the south of the Palmer property. This dock, which was built in the 1930's, projects 190 feet into Sarasota Bay and traverses seagrasses. Unlike the proposed Palmer dock, the Pfeiffenberger dock is not elevated, and it terminates in seagrasses. The seagrasses under the Pfeiffenberger dock are the same types as those located in the Palmer dock alignment--a combination of halodule wrightii and thalassia testudinum. The dock has been rebuilt a number of times over the years. Upon physical inspection, apparently healthy and growing seagrasses were found underneath the Pfeiffenberger dock. The proposed dock will not harm wildlife, including manatees (the only endangered species in the area, animal or plant). Manatees use Sarasota Bay in general, but the east side of the bay, where the Palmer property is located, is not a high use area. It is shallow and would not be considered "select" habitat for manatees. The proposed dock would not have any detrimental effect on manatee travel patterns; they could easily swim around the dock. Manatees eat seagrasses and other aquatic vegetation, but the proposed dock will not have significant adverse impact on those resources. Finally, while a dock could perhaps attract a few boats, the dock's presence also might cause boaters to steer clear of the dock or reduce speed in the vicinity of the dock, which could result in a net reduction in the risk of injury to manatees in the area from boat collisions and prop scarring. Except for temporary turbidity during construction, no other water quality parameters will be violated as a result of the construction of Palmer's proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock and its use will not significantly impede navigability in Sarasota Bay. The bay is approximately 18,000 feet wide at that point, and it is approximately 4,800 feet from Palmer's property to the Intracoastal Waterway. Since the water is shallow near shore in the vicinity of the Palmer property, relatively few boats frequent the area. Those that do are generally smaller boats. These boats easily could navigate so as to avoid the dock; very small boats, such as canoes and kayaks, might even be able to carefully pass under the elevated portion of the dock. Palmer's proposed dock also would not be a serious impediment to other recreational uses of Sarasota Bay in the area. The water is too shallow for swimming. Fishing could improve because the dock could attract baitfish. People could continue to wade-fish by walking around or even under the proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock is aesthetically consistent with the area in which it is located. All the Petitioners have some sort of man-made structure projecting out into Sarasota Bay from their property. As already mentioned, Dr. Pfeiffenberger and the Castoros have a 190-foot dock projecting straight out into Sarasota Bay. Within the past five years, Dr. Pfeiffenberger has installed a bench to sit on at the end of the dock. To the north of the Palmer property, property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Cabaniss has a yacht basin formed by a sea wall that projects roughly perpendicular to the shoreline out into the bay. Immediately north of the Cabaniss property, there is a boat house on the Goldman property where it abuts the yacht basin. The Goldmans' boat house is approximately 20 feet in length and 10 feet in height from ground level. Immediately south of the Palmer property, Ms. Stenhouse has a small dock (which appears to be located over seagrasses.) As a result, the viewsheds of Palmer and the Petitioners already contain many docks and man- made structures. In addition, the Ringling Causeway and bridge can be seen from all of these properties. Palmer's proposed dock will appear in some views from the Petitioners' properties. Generally, the closer the neighbor, the more will be seen of Palmer's proposed dock. Some of the Petitioners will only be able to see the proposed dock if they go out to the westerly edge of their properties on the bay. While the proposed dock will appear in and alter these views, it will not eliminate any Petitioner's view of Sarasota Bay. Even the closest neighbors will have some unobstructed views around the proposed dock. It also will be possible to see over and under the proposed dock, similar to the way in which many of the Petitioners now enjoy their views. There are tall pine and palm trees on the Cabaniss property between their house and their view of the bay. Most of the other properties in the vicinity appear to have similar viewsheds. Ms. Stenhouse has a large stand of mangroves of the western edge of her property; they cover approximately 60 percent of the panorama from her house, but they are trimmed up so she can see through them. While some people would prefer not to have the Palmer dock there, other people might view the availability of single- family residential docks to be an asset to the properties in the neighborhood. Based on expert testimony, it cannot be found that property values in the area would go down as a result of Palmer's proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock does little if anything to further the idealistic goals and objectives of the City of Sarasota Comprehensive Plan and the Sarasota Bay Management Plan to restore and expand seagrasses in Sarasota Bay in that the proposed dock will eliminate some seagrasses. However, only approximately 30 square feet of seagrasses will be lost. Otherwise, the proposed dock is consistent with other goals and objectives of the City of Sarasota Comprehensive Plan and the Sarasota Bay Management Plan in that the dock has been aligned and planned so as to minimize impacts on seagrasses while balancing the neighbors' desire to minimize the impact on their views of Sarasota Bay. Palmer's Riparian Rights Palmer and his wife received a Warranty Deed, dated August 27, 1993, from James Kirk, II, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Marie Ferguson. The deed describes Lots 27 and 28 of the Indian Beach subdivision in Sarasota, Florida, with a western boundary "along the shores of Sarasota Bay." Palmer attached this deed to his applications. Since at least November 1992, the mean high water line of Sarasota Bay has been west of a seawall on the Palmer property. The evidence was clear that the seawall has been there since at least 1944 and that Palmer has not filled the area to the west of the seawall or built any structure that influences its existence. The evidence was not clear as to the creation and history of upland to the west of the seawall. From aerial photographs, it appears that at least some upland has existed to the west of the seawall at least from time to time for at least the last 30 years. For reasons no witness could explain, the Palmers also received a Warranty Deed from Kirk, dated September 3, 1993, purporting to convey title only up to the seawall on the Palmer property. Likewise for reasons no witness could explain, a land surveyor named Lawrence R. Weber prepared a boundary survey based on the description in the September 3, 1993, Warranty Deed. Also for reasons no witness could explain, the Palmers received a Quit Claim Deed from Kirk, dated October 20, 1993. This instrument quitclaimed to the Palmers "all of the Grantor's property to the mean high water line of Sarasota Bay, including riparian rights." Except for the mysterious September 3, 1993, Warranty Deed from Kirk, all deeds in the chain of title back to at least 1944 reflect an intention to convey riparian rights. A deed given by Helen and Frederick Delaute to Cecilia and Harold Wilkins, dated April 19, 1944, described the westerly boundary of the property as running northerly along the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced riparian rights. (This deed attached a survey showing the still-existing seawall.) The next deed in the chain of title was from the widowed Cecilia S. Wilkins to Edward and Laura Williams dated December 27, 1954. The metes and bounds description again referenced the westerly boundary as running along the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights. The next deed in the chain of title was from Edward and Laura Williams to Aidan and Wilma E. Dewey dated June 30, 1958. This deed again defined the westerly boundaries of the property as the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights. The next deed in the chain of title was from Aidan and Wilma Dewey to Edward and Marie Ferguson dated August 23, 1967. This deed again defined the westerly boundary of the property as the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order issuing Noticed General Environmental Resource Permit (No. 292583) and Consent of Use (No. 582819483) to Roy Palmer. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Filson, Esquire Filson and Penge, P.A. 2727 South Tamiami Trail, Suite 2 Sarasota, Florida 34239 Thomas I. Mayton, Esquire T. Andrew Zodrow, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 David M. Levin, Esquire Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg Post Office Box 4195 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Alexandra St. Paul, Esquire The Riverview Center 1111 3rd Avenue, West Suite 350 Bradenton, Florida 34205 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the Department's Motion, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1995, Petitioners, who desired to construct a single-family, concrete dock in the Hillsboro Canal (in Broward County, Florida) for their 171-foot yacht and to perform dredging adjacent to the dock (Project), filed with the Department a Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use State Owned Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit (Application). In the Application, Petitioners indicated that their mailing address was: c/o Flynn Enterprises 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60611 Flynn Enterprises, Inc., is a business owned by Petitioner Donald Flynn. The Application listed "Jeff Adair, Project Manager" of "Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 N. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309," as the "agent authorized to secure permit" for Petitioners. The application form that Petitioners used to submit their Application contained the following signature page: By signing this application form, I am applying, or I am applying on behalf of the applicant, for the permit and any proprietary authorizations identified above, according to the supporting data and other incidental information filed with this application. I am familiar with the information contained in this application and represent that such information is true, complete and accurate. I understand this is an application and not a permit, and that work prior to approval is a violation. I understand that this application and any permit issued or proprietary authorization issued pursuant thereto, does not relieve me of any obligation for obtaining any other required federal, state, water management district or local permit prior to commencement of construction. I agree, or I agree on behalf of my corporation, to operate and maintain the permitted system unless the permitting agency authorizes transfer of the permit to a responsible operation entity. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430, F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below) Signature of Applicant/Agent Date (Corporate Title if applicable) AN AGENT MAY SIGN ABOVE ONLY IF THE APPLICANT COMPLETES THE FOLLOWING: I hereby designate and authorize the agent listed above to act on my behalf, or on behalf of my corporation, as the agent in the processing of this application for the permit and/or proprietary authorization indicated above; and to furnish, on request, supple- mental information in support of the appli- cation. In addition, I authorize the above- listed agent to bind me, or my corporation, to perform any requirement which may be necessary to procure the permit or authorization indicated above. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430. F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant Signature of Applicant Date (Corporate Title if applicable) Please note: The applicant's original signature (not a copy) is required above. PERSON AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY MUST COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: I either own the property described in this application or I have legal authority to allow access to the property, and I consent, after receiving prior notification, to any site visit on the property by agents or personnel from the Department of Environ- mental Protection, the Water Management District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers necessary for the review and inspection of the proposed project specified in this application. I authorize these agents or personnel to enter the property as many times as may be necessary to make such review and inspection. Further , I agree to provide entry to the project site for such agents or personnel to monitor permitted work if a permit is granted. Typed/Printed Name Signature Date (Corporate Title if applicable) The name "Jeff Adair" appears on the "Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below)" line under the first paragraph on the signature page of Petitioners' Application; however, neither Adair's signature, nor any other signature, appears on the signature line under this paragraph. Petitioner Donald Flynn's signature appears on the signature lines under the second (agent designation and authorization) and third (access to property) paragraphs on the page. By letter dated November 17, 1995, the Department informed Petitioners of the following: Preliminary evaluation of your project leads staff to the conclusion that the project as proposed cannot be recommended for approval. While this is not final agency action or notice of intent, it does represent the staff review of your application based on consider- able experience in permitting matters. We are sending you this letter at this stage of the processing to allow you to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for design dependent on permit issuance. . . . In summary, please revise plans to: (1) reduce the amount of dredging; (2) reduce impacts to natural resources; (3) reduce the size of the dock; (4) reduce encroachment on navigational channel; (5) reduce encroachment on adjacent properties; and (6) after minimization, offer mitigation plans that would address the loss of seagrass in the vicinity (watershed or basin) of the project site. Your application is currently "incomplete" and Final Agency Action will not occur until a reasonable amount of time is allowed for the submittal of a revised plan. A completeness summary has been sent under separate cover, addressing the items that are still outstanding. Staff will continue to process your application in the normal manner; however, I suggest you contact Tim Rach of this office . . . to discuss these possible alternatives regarding your project. The Department's November 17, 1995, letter was addressed to Petitioners "c/o Jeff Adair, Project Manager, Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 North Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2132," as were subsequent requests for additional information made by the Department and other correspondence from the Department concerning the Project. Adair responded to the Department's requests for additional information and otherwise corresponded and communicated with the Department on behalf of Petitioners. In July of 1996, Adair participated in a telephone conference call during which the Department advised him that, if the Application was not withdrawn, it would be denied. On August 13, 1996, Adair sent the following letter to the Department concerning the Project: Pursuant to our recent discussions pertaining to the proposed mitigation plan and final review and processing of the Flynn Dock application, we have been advised via Mr. Flynn's attorney not to withdraw the application. Therefore, we await the Department's final decision relative to the permittability of this project. As you have indicated, we are anticipating the Depart- ment's response toward the end of this month. In making your decision, we strongly urge you to consider the merits or our innovative and "no risk" mitigation plan. We believe our mitigation plan more than compensates for proposed impacts and provides substantial net benefits to the environment and the research community. In particular, information obtained from our proposed research effort would not only benefit our project, but would also facilitate scientific analysis and review of similar applications and issues. As always, please do not hesitate to call should you have any questions or concerns. On August 19, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611," the address that Petitioners had indicated in the Application was their mailing address: We have reviewed the information received on May 31, 1996 for an Environmental Resource Permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands. The Department has deemed the application complete as of this date. Final action on your application for an Environmental Resource Permit and sovereign[] submerged lands authorization will be taken within 90 days of receipt of your last item of information unless you choose to waive this timeclock. If you have any questions, please contact me at . . . . A copy of this August 19, 1996, letter was sent by the Department to Adair. On August 27, 1996, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Denial (Notice) in which it announced its preliminary decision to deny Petitioners' Application. The Notice contained the following advisement: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's action may petition for an administrative proceeding (Hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitions filed by the permittee and the parties listed below must be filed within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Third party Petitioners shall mail a copy of the petition to the permittee at the address indicated above at the time of filing. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right such person may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under Section 120.57, F.S. The Petition must contain the information set forth below and must be filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel of the Department at 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000: The name, address, and telephone number of each petitioner, the permittee's name and address, the Department Permit File Number and county in which the project is proposed; A statement of how and when each petitioner received notice of the Depart- ment's action or proposed action; A statement of how each petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of the material facts disputed by petitioner, if any; A statement of facts which petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of which rules or statutes petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; and A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, stating precisely the action petitioner wants the Department to take with respect to the Department's action or proposed action. If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process will constitute a renewed determination of the Department's decision on the application. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this letter. Persons whose substantial interests will be affected by any decision of the Department with regard to the permit have the right to petition to become a party to the proceeding. The petition must conform to the requirements specified above and be filed (received) within 14 days of receipt of this notice in the Office of General Counsel at the above address of the Department. Failure to petition within the allowed time frame constitutes a waiver of any right such person has to request a hearing under Section 120.57, F.S., and to participate as a party to this proceeding. Any subsequent intervention will only be at the approval of the presiding officer upon motion filed pursuant to Rule 28-5.207, and 60Q-2.010, F.A.C. This Notice constitutes final agency action unless a petition is filed in accordance with the above paragraphs or unless a request for extension of time in which to file a petition is filed within the time specified for filing a petition and conforms to Rule 62-103.070, F.A.C. Upon timely filing of a petition or a request for an extension of time this Notice will not be effective until further Order of the Department. . . . The Notice was mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611." Although the Notice's certificate of service reflected that a copy of the Notice had been mailed to Adair "before the close of business on AUG 27 1996," in fact, as a result of inadvertence on the part of Department staff, a copy of the Notice had not been mailed to Adair. On September 3, 1996, the Notice sent to Petitioners was received by a Flynn Enterprises, Inc., employee at the address to which it was mailed. The employee executed a return receipt upon receiving the Notice. The Notice was referred to Victor Casini, Esquire, the general counsel of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., on September 4, 1996. Casini set the document aside for filing. He did not believe that there was any immediate action that he or anyone else in the Flynn Enterprises, Inc., office in Chicago needed to take in response to the Notice. Casini noted that Adair's name was listed in the Notice as among those who purportedly had been furnished copies of the Notice. He knew that Adair was handling all matters relating to the permitting of the Project for Petitioners. He therefore assumed that any action that needed to be taken in response to the Notice would be taken by Adair on behalf of Petitioners. Inasmuch as it appeared (from his review of the Notice) that the Department had already furnished Adair with a copy of the Notice, he saw no reason to contact Adair to apprise him of the issuance of the Notice. In taking no action in response to the Notice other than setting it aside for filing, Casini acted reasonably under the circumstances. Adair first learned of the issuance of the Notice during a telephone conversation he had on September 9, 1996, with an employee of Broward County, who mentioned to him, in passing, that the Department had denied Petitioners' Application. 2/ Adair thereupon immediately telephoned the Department to confirm that the Application had been denied. The Department representative to whom he spoke confirmed that the Notice had issued, apologized for the Department's failure to have sent him a copy of the Notice, and promised to rectify the error by sending him a copy of the Notice as soon as possible. Keith Skibicki, the vice president of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., in charge of its day-to-day operations, served as the liaison between Adair and Petitioners. On September 12, 1996, Adair telephoned Skibicki to inquire (for the first time) if Petitioners had received a copy of the Notice. Skibicki, who previously had neither seen nor heard about the Notice, asked around the office and learned that the Notice had been received and was in Casini's files. Skibicki related this information to Adair. Later that same day, September 12, 1996, Adair received the copy of the Notice that the Department had sent him. He then faxed a copy of the Notice to Harry Stewart, Esquire, the Florida attorney who had been retained by Petitioners to assist them in their efforts to obtain favorable action on their Application. Shortly thereafter Adair telephoned Stewart to discuss what they should do in response to the Notice. During their conversation, Stewart expressed the opinion that the 14-day period for filing a petition for an administrative proceeding began to run only upon Adair's receipt of the Notice and that therefore Petitioners had until September 26, 1996, to file their petition. During the two-week period that followed their telephone conversation, Adair and Stewart worked together to prepare such a petition. The petition was filed with the Department on September 26, 1996 (which was 23 days after the Notice had been delivered to the Chicago office of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., but only 14 days after Adair, Petitioners' designated agent in their dealings with the Department, had received a copy of the Notice). The actions taken on behalf of Petitioners in response to the Notice were intended to preserve Petitioners' right to challenge the proposed denial of their Application. At no time was there any knowing and intentional relinquishment of that right.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter an order finding that Petitioners' petition challenging the proposed denial of their Application is not time-barred and remanding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the merits of Petitioners' challenge. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of February, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this appeal are whether the decision of the Community Development Board (Board) to approve Flexible Development Application FLD2017-07012 filed by Gulfview Lodging, LLP (Gulfview), cannot be sustained by substantial competent evidence before the Board, or that the decision of the Board departs from the essential requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact The 0.59-acre project site is located at the northeast corner of South Gulfview Boulevard and Fifth Street and wraps around the McDonald’s parking lot and Frenchy’s Beach Café (Frenchy’s) to the west. The project site includes two parcels owned by Gulfview, and 2,195.09 square feet of the South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way, which will need to be vacated by the City. Gulfview’s proposal is to demolish all structures currently on the project site and build a seven-floor hotel with 150 units per acre, which would be 88 rooms if the City vacates the 2,195.09 feet of right-of-way. Gulfview’s application for development approval was filed with the City on July 28, 2017, including design plans. The subject property is zoned Tourist (T) District with an underlying Future Land Use Plan (FLUP) category of Resort Facilities High (RFH). The subject site is located in the Beach Walk district of Beach by Design.2/ The maximum permitted density for the site pursuant to Beach by Design is 150 units per acre. The application contemplates a subsequent vacation process for the 2,195.09 square feet of City right-of-way. On July 20, 2017, the City Council approved the allocation of up to 59 units from the Hotel Density Reserve under Beach by Design (Case No. HDA2017-04001) and adopted a resolution to the same effect (Res. No. 17-19). Preston’s attorney admitted that he attended the July 20, 2017, City Council hearing that resulted in the July 28, 2017, Hotel Density Reserve Development Agreement (Development Agreement) between Gulfview and the City. Preston’s attorney attended the July 20 City Council hearing on behalf of Frenchy’s, but conceded to the Board and at oral argument that Frenchy’s is located on the land owned by Preston, as trustee, and Preston is the sole shareholder of Frenchy’s. The Development Agreement was recorded in Book 19727, Page 2465-2503 of the Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida, on August 2, 2017. The Development Agreement includes Exhibit “B”-- the same set of design plans that were filed with Gulfview’s July 28, 2017, application for development approval. Section 6.2.4 of the Development Agreement specifically states: The overall number of proposed units density provided for by this Agreement (88 units) is contingent upon the proposed vacation of the 2,195.09 square feet of South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way within the Beach Walk district. The City shall process a right-of- way vacation ordinance to vacate the 2,195.09 square feet of South Gulfview Blvd. right of way within the Beach Walk district conditioned upon submission of a complete set of building plans for construction of the improvements shown on Exhibit “B”. Regardless of whether or not the vacation is granted the maximum permitted density of the property may not exceed 150 units per acre. Gulfview’s application requires a Level Two approval. Under Section 4-206 of the Community Development Code, a Level Two approval requires mailing of a notice of application to owners of properties “within a 200-foot radius of the perimeter boundaries of the subject property.” The notice mailed by the City identifies both the north parcel and the south parcel by address and parcel number. The notice also describes the quasi-judicial public hearing process before the Board and ends with an invitation “to discuss any questions or concerns about the project and/or to better understand the proposal and review the site plan” with the assigned planner. The City Clerk mailed notice of Gulfview’s application to owners of parcels located within 200 feet of the two parcels identified in the notice, including Preston. Preston does not dispute receiving the notice. Section 4-206 of the Community Development Code also requires the posting of a sign on the “parcel proposed for development.” Preston does not dispute that the sign was posted. Preston objected that the mailed and posted notices did not reference the proposal to vacate 2,195.09 square feet of right-of-way. He argued that if he had known more than “a few days ago” when he received the Staff Report ahead of the October 17, 2017, Board meeting that the right-of-way was proposed to be vacated, he would have had expert witnesses at the hearing to give “an equal presentation” in response to Gulfview’s presentation. Preston requested a continuance citing lack of proper notice and insufficient time to prepare for the public hearing. Preston did not introduce any testimony or other evidence regarding the application. Preston’s primary objection to the project was vacation of the right-of-way and he wanted the opportunity to present witnesses regarding that issue. Vacating the right-of-way is a separate process and the hearing before the Board is not the proceeding in which the right-of-way vacation is decided. However, the substantial competent record evidence shows that Preston had actual notice as early as July 20, 2017, that the proposed project contemplated vacating 2,195.09 square feet of right-of-way. Preston’s other objection was that Gulfview’s design plans did not meet the requirements of Beach by Design’s Beach Walk District overlay. Preston argued to the Board that the hotel’s proposed design did not meet the redevelopment goals for addition of facilities and amenities generally described as areas for outdoor dining, outside cafes, and other seaside amenities.3/ However, although Preston had actual notice of the hotel design plans as early as July 20, 2017, he did not introduce any expert testimony or other evidence to support those objections. The Staff Report states that Beach by Design proposed to create a great beach front, known as “Beach Walk,” by relocating South Gulfview Boulevard from the existing right of way. Beach by Design recognized that the redevelopment and revitalization of the properties that front on South Gulfview were and, to a certain extent, still are generally constrained by several factors including small parcel sizes and the Coastal Construction Control Line. As a result, most of the motels and hotels which existed along the east side of South Gulfview would have limited opportunities for redevelopment even if Clearwater Beach were repositioned in the tourism market place. Beach by Design proposed to relocate South Gulfview to the west of its current alignment in order to achieve multiple purposes. First, it would create a drive with a real view of the Beach and the Gulf of Mexico. Second, it would allow the City to vacate the east 35 feet of the existing right of way in favor of the properties along the eastern frontage of existing South Gulfview as an incentive for appropriate redevelopment. Many of those existing properties would substantially benefit from an additional 35 feet of depth which could be used for the addition of facilities and amenities such as safe and comfortable areas for outdoor dining. The creation of Beach Walk and the realignment of South Gulfview Boulevard have all been realized. Several segments of the South Gulfview Boulevard have already been vacated and many of the properties along South Gulfview Boulevard have, in the years since the initial adoption of Beach by Design, been redeveloped with hotels. As noted, this proposal also includes a vacation of a portion of the South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way which will facilitate the redevelopment of the subject site with a new hotel playing an important role in the ongoing renewal and revitalization of the Beach. Specifically, the vacation will allow for the location of an outdoor seating area providing a strong link between Beach Walk and the proposed hotel as supported by Beach by Design. Therefore, the proposal is consistent with this provision. (Emphasis added). The Staff Report concluded that the proposed project is consistent with applicable provisions of the Community Development Code, applicable components of the City’s Comprehensive Plan, the Beach Walk District of Beach by Design, and the Design Guidelines of Beach by Design. Mark Parry, Senior Planner with the City, testified that “the proposed number of units, 88, is contingent on vacation of that right-of- way,” and if the right-of-way is not later vacated, it “would knock out about eight units.” Mr. Parry also testified that the proposed project provides amenities and an outdoor seating area as specified by Beach by Design. Preston only conducted a very short cross-examination of Mr. Parry, despite having party status to do so. Sue Ann Murphy, an experienced land use planner, also testified that the proposed development complied with all applicable Community Development Code, Comprehensive Plan and Beach by Design requirements. The project architect, Istvan Peteranecz, AIA, was accepted by the Board as an expert. Mr. Peteranecz answered questions from Board members regarding the design of the proposed hotel’s main entrance, including the porte cochere and public seating area adjacent to the Beach Walk and immediately south of Frenchy’s. Preston did not cross- examine Ms. Murphy or Mr. Peteranecz, despite having party status to do so. Substantial competent evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the proposed project is consistent with applicable provisions of the Community Development Code, applicable components of the City’s Comprehensive Plan, the Beach Walk District of Beach by Design, and the Design Guidelines of Beach by Design. At the conclusion of the public hearing, the Board acknowledged Preston’s pending request for continuance and proceeded with discussion. After extensive discussion among the Board members, a motion was made and seconded for the Board “to approve case number FLD2017-07012 based on the evidence, the testimony presented, and the application, the staff report, and at today’s hearing, and to adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated in the staff report with all of the conditions of approval, as listed.” The motion carried. On October 19, 2017, the City entered a Development Order memorializing the Board’s decision. The Development Order includes a Finding of Fact that “[t]he total lot area includes 2,195 square feet of the South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way which would need to be vacated by the City,” and includes a Condition of Approval that “application for a building permit be submitted no later than October 17, 2019, unless time extensions are granted.” The City represented at oral argument that if the proposed development is not consistent with the Development Order (e.g., if the approximately 2,195 square feet of the South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way is not vacated), Gulfview will not be able to get a building permit without going through a minor amendment process for a less intense project.
The Issue Does the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Condominiums, Timeshares and Mobile Homes’ (“the Division”), approval of timeshare developers’ requests to provide purchasers with a public offering statement via a website link amount to an unadopted rule within the meaning of section 120.52(8)(a), Florida Statutes (2017).1/ Also, does the Division’s approval of timeshare developers’ requests to provide purchasers with public offering statements via a website link amount to an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of section 120.52(8)(c).
Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact are based on exhibits accepted into evidence, admitted facts set forth in the pre- hearing stipulation, and matters subject to official recognition. Relevant Statutes and Rules Pertaining to Timeshares Chapter 721 of the Florida Statutes is known as the “Florida Vacation Plan and Timesharing Act” (“the Act”). § 721.01, Fla. Stat. The Florida Legislature intends for the Act to “[p]rovide full and fair disclosure to the purchasers and prospective purchasers of timeshare plans.” § 721.02(3), Fla. Stat. The Division is the state agency responsible for enforcing the Act. Section 721.10(1), Florida Statutes, provides that a purchaser2/ can cancel a contract to purchase a timeshare interest “until midnight of the 10th calendar day following whichever of the following days occur later: (a) The execution date; or (b) The day on which the purchaser received the last of all documents required to be provided to him or her ” (emphasis added). Section 721.10(1) further provides that “[t]his right of cancellation may not be waived by any purchaser or by any other person on behalf of the purchaser. Furthermore, no closing may occur until the cancellation period of the timeshare purchaser has expired.” A “public offering statement” is the term describing a single-site timeshare plan or a multisite timeshare plan, including any exhibits attached thereto as required by sections 721.07, 721.55, and 721.551. Section 721.07(6)(a) requires that a timeshare developer “shall furnish each purchaser” with “[a] copy of the purchaser public offering statement text in the form approved by the division for delivery to the purchasers.” (emphasis added). Florida Administrative Code Rule 61B-39.004(1) provides that “a developer of a single-site timeshare plan shall deliver to every purchaser of the single-site timeshare plan a single-site purchaser POS.” (emphasis added). Rule 61B-39.004(1) mandates that a public offering statement shall contain: A copy of the single-site registered public offering statement text as prescribed in Section 721.07(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61B-39.003, F.A.C.; A copy of the exhibits prescribed in Sections 721.07(5)(ff)1., 2., 4., 5., 8., and 16., Florida Statutes, as applicable. Pursuant to Section 721.07(6)(b) and Section 721.07(5)(ff)19., Florida Statutes, if the single-site is one created as a tenancy-in-common, the purchaser shall receive the document or documents creating the tenancy-in-common, including at a minimum a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions; and Any other exhibit that the developer has filed with the division pursuant to Section 721.07(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61B-39.003, F.A.C., which the developer is not required but elects to include in the purchaser POS pursuant to Section 721.07(6)(d), Florida Statutes. In short, a public offering statement contains all of the documents that a timeshare developer is required to give to a purchaser. Its purpose is to apprise a purchaser of everything that he or she needs to know about a timeshare. As a result, a public offering statement can be as much as 100 pages long. Section 721.07(3)(a)1. requires that: Any change to an approved public offering statement filing shall be filed with the division for approval as an amendment prior to becoming effective. The division shall have 20 days after receipt of a proposed amendment to approve or cite deficiencies in the proposed amendment. If the division fails to act within 20 days, the amendment will be deemed approved. The Division allows timeshare developers to provide purchasers with a POS through “alternative media.” As set forth in rule 61B-39.008(1), Developers may provide purchasers with the option of receiving all or any portion of a single-site or multi-site purchaser POS through alternative media in lieu of receiving the written materials in the format prescribed in Rule 61B-39.004 or 61B- 39.006, F.A.C., as applicable. The purchaser’s choice of the delivery method shall be set forth in writing on a separate form which shall also disclose the system requirements necessary to view the alternative media, which form shall be signed by the purchaser. The form shall state that the purchaser should not select alternative media unless the alternative media can be viewed prior to the 10 day cancellation period. The alternative media disclosure statement shall be listed on the form receipt for timeshare documents in the manner prescribed in DBPR Form TS 6000-7, Receipt for Timeshare Documents, or DBPR Form TS 6000-7, Receipt for Multisite Timeshare Documents, as both of which are referenced in Rule 61B-39.003, F.A.C. Rule 61B-39.001(1) defines “alternative media” as “any visually or audibly perceptible and legible display format which may require the use of a device or a machine to be viewed, including CD-ROM, microfilm, electronically transferred data, computer disk, computer or electronic memory, cassette tape, compact disk or video tape.” Rule 61B-39.008(3) provides that: Prior to delivery of the purchaser POS through alternative media, the developer must submit to the division a copy of the purchaser POS through the alternative media proposed to be used by the developer together with an executed certificate, using the form prescribed in DBPR Form TS 6000-8, the Certificate of Identical Documents, referenced in Rule 61B-39.003, F.A.C., certifying that the portion of the purchaser POS delivered through the proposed alternative media is an accurate representation of and, where practical, identical to the corresponding portion of the written purchaser POS. Facts Specific to the Instant Case Orange Lake Country Club, Inc. (“Orange Lake Country Club”), is the “developer” within the meaning of section 721.05(1) for the timeshare plans known as Orange Lake Country Club Villas, a Condominium (“Orange Lake”); Orange Lake Country Club Villas III (“Orange Lake III”); and Orange Lake Country Club Villas IV, a Condominium (“Orange Lake IV”). The aforementioned timeshare plans shall be collectively referred to as the “Orange Lake Timeshare Plans.” The Orange Lake Timeshare Plans are “single-site timeshare plans” as defined by rule 61B-39.001(13). Via letters dated April 24, 2015, Orange Lake and Orange Lake III filed amendments to their alternative media disclosure statements with the Division. In addition to providing for purchasers to receive documents such as the POS in writing or via CD-ROM, the amended alternative media disclosure statements gave purchasers the option of receiving documents through the internet at http://orangelake.com/legaldocuments/index.php. The amended alternative media disclosure statements contained a notice that a PDF reader and one of three web browsers (Internet Explorer 9 or above, Google Chrome, or Firefox) were required. The amended alternative media disclosure statements instructed purchasers how to access documents through the link: Open the link, http://orangelake.com/ legaldocuments/index.php. in your web browser. Enter the user name: hoEXliday and password: welcome! Follow the following steps: Step 1: Please select the link to your resort. Step 2: Please select the Condominium, if applicable. Step 3: Please select the State where you purchased. Step 4: Please select the Public Offering Statement. Via letters dated April 28, 2015, the Division approved the amended alternative media disclosure statements “for filing and use in the timeshare plan.” Before retiring, Mr. Rudisill worked as a regional service manager for York International. He oversaw 50 service technicians and sales engineers. Mr. Rudisill used a computer at work and had an e-mail address associated with his position at York International. Mr. Rudisill acquired his first home computer 35 to 40 years ago and has owned a home computer ever since. He currently has an e-mail address and internet access via three different web browsers. Ms. Rudisill has no reported employment history. She uses a home computer and has an e-mail address. The Rudisills maintain a permanent residence in Georgia but travel to Florida for vacations. Between 2002 and 2015, the Rudisills purchased approximately 11 timeshare interests for use as vacation residences. Neither Mr. Rudisill nor Ms. Rudisill read any of the public offering statements associated with the aforementioned timeshare purchases. Ms. Rudisill considers she and her husband to be well- versed with the process of purchasing timeshares. On June 14, 2015, the Rudisills executed purchase agreements to acquire week 32 for unit 5280 at Orange Lake and week 29 for unit 87911 at Orange Lake III. These purchases were made so that they would have vacation residences. Both acquisitions utilized the alternative media disclosure statements that had been approved by the Division on April 28, 2015. As noted above, the Rudisills had the option to receive documents in written format, via a CD-ROM, or through a website link. The Rudisills placed their initials next to a box indicating they agreed to accept documents electronically via a link to http://orangelake.com/legaldocuments/. On June 14, 2015, the Rudisills executed documents pertaining to the Orange Lake and Orange Lake III timeshares stating that “[t]he undersigned acknowledges that the items listed below have been received and the timeshare plans and specifications have been made available for inspection.” The aforementioned items included “Public Offering Statement Text.” However, neither Mr. Rudisill nor Ms. Rudisill ever attempted to access the link provided to them by the Orange Lake Country Club. Neither Mr. Rudisill nor Ms. Rudisill ever asked for the documents to be provided in a different format. The Rudisills initiated the instant litigation in order to cancel the purchase agreements. They cannot afford the timeshares and are unable to travel. There is no allegation that Orange Lake Country Club coerced the Rudisills into purchasing the timeshares at issue or took advantage of them in any way.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether a major conditional use development order issued by Monroe County to Boot Key Harbor Plaza for development of a commercial complex in Marathon, Florida, is consistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations.
Findings Of Fact Most of Monroe County, including the subject property, is designated an area of critical state concern under Sections 380.05 and 380.0552, Florida Statutes. Respondent Boot Key Harbor Plaza is the owner and developer of a tract of submerged land and uplands totalling 33 acres, more or less, located at approximately Mile Marker 49 Oceanside in Marathon, Monroe County, Florida. It proposes to develop the property with a commercial complex containing approximately 98,100 sq. ft. of commercial retail space, a sit-down restaurant of 2,650 sq. ft. more or less, a free standing fast food restaurant of 3,200 sq. ft. more or less, a marina of 33 wet boat slips, 16 employee housing units, and associated utilities, accessory uses, and required parking, known as Boot Key Harbor Plaza ("the project"). The proposed development is depicted on that certain site plan prepared by A. J. Verde - Architects, P.A., Miami, Florida, dated 7-18-89, revised seven (7) times, the last revision dated 12-21-89. The subject property is in an Urban Commercial (UC) land use district. The commercial' complex proposed by Boot Key Harbor Plaza includes high intensity retail uses, commercial apartments, and a marina, all of which are allowed as conditional uses in a UC district. On August 20, 1990, the Monroe County Board of County Commissioners adopted Resolution No. 395-1990, which is the subject of this proceeding. The Resolution overturned a prior decision of the Monroe County Planning Commission denying major conditional use approval for the project. In overturning the Planning Commission decision, the Board of County Commissioners granted major conditional use approval to Boot Key Harbor Plaza. The Resolution states that "[a]ny stipulated agreement made by the applicant [Boot Key Harbor Plaza] concerning conditions are hereby adopted and made part of this Resolution." The Department and Boot Key Harbor Plaza stipulated that there is no agreement concerning conditions which was or could have been adopted and made part of the Resolution. The Department contends, and Boot Key Harbor Plaza concedes, that the Monroe County land development regulations require that conditions on development be included in any conditional use approval for development in Monroe County, Florida. Central to the issues raised in the Department's Petition for Appeal are Sections 9.5-61, et seq., Monroe County Code, which govern conditional uses, and in particular the following provisions: Sec. 9.5-61. Purpose. Conditional uses are those uses which are generally compatible with the other land uses permitted in a land use district, but which require individual review of their location, design and configuration and the imposition of conditions in order to ensure the appropriateness of the use at any particular location. (emphasis added) Sec. 9.5-67. Conditions. The director of planning or the planning commission may attach such conditions to a conditional use permit as are necessary to carry out the purposes of the plan and to prevent or minimize adverse effects upon other property in the neighborhood, including but not limited to limitations on size, bulk and location; requirements for landscaping, lighting and provision of adequate ingress and egress and off-site but project-related improvements; duration of the permit; hours of operation; and mitigation of environmental impacts. The planning commission or the director of planning may attach a condition requiring submission and approval of a final development plan pursuant to section 9.5-70 before development is commenced for either a minor or major conditional use. The Settlement Agreement executed by the Department and Boot Key Harbor Plaza identifies conditions on development which are appropriate for the proposed development and which are consistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order denying Boot Key Harbor Plaza permission to develop under Resolution No. 395-1990, as adopted by Monroe County. It is further recommended that such final order grant Boot Key Harbor Plaza permission to develop the proposed commercial complex on its property in Marathon, Florida, described in Exhibit B hereto, as depicted on the Site Plan prepared by A. J. Verde - Architects, P.A., Miami, Florida, dated 7-18-89, revised seven (7) times, the last revision dated 12-21-89, as a conditional use development, subject to all applicable provisions of the Monroe County Code and under the conditions agreed to by the Department and Boot Key Harbor Plaza and set forth in paragraph 6, subsections a through i, of the above Conclusions of Law. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 3rd day of April, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: William E. Sadowski, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Steven Pfeiffer, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Sherry A. Spiers, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Ray Allen, Esquire 618 Whitehead Street Key West, FL 33040 William E. Williams, Esquire Huey, Guilday, Kuersteiner & Tucker, P.A. 106 East College Avenue Highpoint Center, Suite 900 Post Office Box 1794 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Randy Ludacer Monroe County Attorney 310 Fleming Street Key West, FL 33040 Honorable Wilhelmina Harvey Mayor, Monroe County Board of County Commissioners Monroe County Courthouse 500 Whitehead Street Key West, FL 33040 Jack Osterholt, Director South Florida Regional Planning Council 3400 Hollywood Boulevard Suite 140 Hollywood, FL 33021 Douglas M. Cook, Secretary Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Office of the Governor The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0001 David Maloney Assistant General Counsel Office of the Governor The Capitol, Room 209 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0001
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent Raymond C. Riddles has been certified as a law enforcement officer since September 1, 1971. He holds certificate number 090171. November 3, 1976 On November 3, 1976, Joseph A. Vi11ar, at the time a policeman with the Pensacola Police Department, arrested respondent Riddles at the wayside park off Gregory Street, near the northern end of Pensacola Bay bridge. In November of 1976, travelers, fishermen and other members of the public regularly made use of the park and the public bathrooms there. The park featured a double picnic table and ten or twelve other picnic tables. The old bridge across Pensacola Bay had been halved, and the park was near the end of one of the halves used as a fishing pier. The park had also gained notoriety as a meeting place of homosexuals: on two nights in 1974 police arrested 18 persons on various charges. On the night of November 3, 1976, Mr. Villar, wearing blue jeans and a pullover to disguise the fact that he was a policeman, entered the men's room in the park, after respondent Riddles called him into the bathroom. In the bathroom, Mr. Riddles beckoned Mr. Villar to a stall and, from the adjoining stall, asked if he wanted to "fool around." The partition between the toilet stalls had been to some extent removed; Villar's view of Riddles was unimpeded. Riddles first addressed Villar with his back to him, then turned around, penis in hand, continuing to masturbate. At this point, Mr. Villar placed him under arrest. Eventually Mr. Riddles stood trial on charges arising out of the incident, and was found guilty of lewd and lascivious behavior in a public place. September 12, 1984 In September of 1964, complaints that men were romping through the woods in various states of undress at a place called the Old Chimney, an abandoned steam plant site near the Scenic Highway, reached the Pensacola Police Department. As a result, on September 12, 1984, Jim Leath, a supervisor with the Pensacola Police Department, in charge of the vice unit, visited the site. Numerous persons of various sexual persuasions had come to use the area as a park. Vehicles were parked along the road, including one in which Mr. Leath spotted a Florida Highway Patrolman Auxiliary cap. Walking down a footpath, Mr. Leath came to respondent Riddles at about one o'clock in the afternoon. He recognized Mr. Riddles as someone he had seen before and remembered the cap he had noticed through the window behind the back seat in a vehicle parked in the area in which he himself had parked. Mr. Riddles stood next to a tree. A conversation arose between the two men, during which Mr. Riddles rubbed his crotch. Mr. Riddles said that he came to the Old Chimney on a regular basis to meet people, then turned away, withdrew his penis from his trousers and turned back, displaying his semi-erect penis. Only seconds had elapsed when Mr. Riddles heard someone else approach, left off stroking his penis, tucked himself in, and zipped his trousers up. Mr. Leath returned to the parking lot and made a note of the license tag number of the vehicle with the cap. He later determined that the vehicle was registered to Mr. Riddles, and located a photograph of Mr. Riddles. Eventually he obtained a warrant and arrested Mr. Riddles. In due course, Riddles pleaded nolo contendere to lewd and lascivious behavior, and to exposure of sexual organs. He was adjudicated guilty of these offenses and placed on six months' probation, on conditions including that he pay $20 a month and stay out of the area of the Old Chimney.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Edward Abdo, held correction certificate number 502-00180 issued by petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission). Respondent has held his license since July 3, 1981. When the events herein occurred, Abdo was employed by the Department of Corrections as a correctional officer I at a correctional facility in Daytona Beach, Florida. He will turn 62 years of age in May and will have completed eleven years of employment at that facility in June 1992. At that time, he plans to retire. The charges against respondent are based upon two incidents which occurred in May 1990 and June 1991, respectively. The first incident involved a charge of retail theft lodged against Abdo in May 1990 while the second incident involved a charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The facts giving rise to those charges are set forth in the subsequent findings. On May 4, 1990, respondent was shopping at Publix store number 304 located at 1500 Bevill Road, Daytona Beach, Florida. William C. Rhodes was then the store manager. Rhodes observed Abdo push a cart filled with various grocery items through a "fire code lane" between cash registers 5 and 6 and continue out of the store without first stopping at a cash register. None of the items were bagged. Rhodes followed Abdo into the parking lot where he observed Abdo stop at an automobile and begin placing some items into the car. At that point, Rhodes confronted Abdo and asked him if he had anything which he had not paid for. Abdo responded that he had purchased the groceries and reached into his pocket looking for a receipt but could not find one. Abdo then told Rhodes that maybe he had not paid for the groceries and offered to pay for them in the parking lot. Rhodes asked Abdo to put the items already placed in the car back into the shopping cart and to return to the store. When Abdo could produce no cash register receipt and declined to have the cash register girls verify his claim that the groceries were paid for, the police were called and Abdo was charged with retail theft. The value of the groceries was approximately $20. They consisted of a ten pound bag of potatoes, eight heads of lettuce, four green peppers, and five packages of tomatoes. On July 26, 1990, Abdo pled no contest to the charge of retail theft, adjudication was withheld, and he was placed on six months probation and fined $150. The arrest and plea were later expunged and sealed pursuant to an order of the Volusia County Court entered on April 18, 1991. Although respondent agreed that he had been arrested for retail theft and pled no contest to that charge, he maintained he did so only because he could never find his receipt. He contended at hearing that except for two packs of cigarettes he had inadvertently placed in his pocket, which Rhodes and the arresting officer never saw, he had previously paid for all grocery items and they were bagged. However, this version of the facts is not deemed to be credible. Around 1:20 a.m. on June 22, 1991, respondent was stopped in the 4800 block of Spruce Creek Road by a City of Port Orange police officer, B. S. Stiltner. Abdo, who was driving a 1987 automobile with two passengers, had been followed by Stiltner for approximately three minutes. During that period of time, Abdo failed to maintain a single lane, crossed the center line several times, went onto the right-of-way while negotiating a turn, and continued weaving until stopped. Upon approaching Abdo, Stiltner smelled an odor of alcohol on his breath and noted that Abdo had slurred speech, "watery" eyes, red coloration in the face, and fumbled for his driver's license. Abdo was given four roadside field sobriety tests by Stiltner and flunked each test. After being taken to the Port Orange police station, Abdo blew .151 and .140 on the Intoxilizer 5000 Series machine, indicating that he was driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of state law. He was thereafter arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. Under a then-effective policy of the Port Orange city attorney, first time DUI offenders were allowed to plead guilty to reckless driving. Accordingly, Abdo, who had no previous DUI arrests on his record, pled guilty to reckless driving, had his license suspended for ninety days, and served three months probation. At hearing, Abdo acknowledged that he had drunk a number of beers without eating over a six and one-half hour period at a local social club. However, he blamed his arrest on a strict arrest policy in the City of Port Orange and cited a poorly lit road and a "bad street" that was "slightly pitched" as causing his weaving. Also, he attributed his failure to pass several coordination tests to arthritis in his right shoulder and both knees. To the extent these matters are true, they are still insufficient to overcome the clear and convincing evidence that respondent was driving while under the influence of alcohol on the morning of June 22, 1991. In terms of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, there is no evidence of any prior disciplinary actions taken against respondent during the eleven years he has been certified. Also, neither offense occurred while respondent was on duty, and respondent did not use his official authority to facilitate his misconduct. The potential pecuniary gain to Abdo by his misconduct amounted to approximately $20, and as it turned out, the store retrieved all stolen merchandise.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of failing to maintain his qualifications and this his correctional officer certification be placed on probation for two years. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of March 1992. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March 1992.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Jim and Paulette Holzinger own Lot 17, Section B, Long Beach Estates, located on Big Pine Key in unincorporated Monroe County, Florida. The property is south of Long Beach Drive. The property is located within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. See Sections 380.05 and 380.0552, Florida Statutes. Under these statutes, Monroe County adopted a comprehensive plan and implemented it with land development regulations which are consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development found in Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes. The Department of Community Affairs approved the County's comprehensive plan in Rule Chapter 9J-14, Florida Administrative Code, and the Administration Commission approved the comprehensive plan in Chapter 28-29, Florida Administrative Code. The County's comprehensive plan is implemented through its land development regulations, codified as Chapter 9.5 of the Monroe County Code. Monroe County is responsible for issuing development orders for land development in unincorporated Monroe County, including these development orders (building permits). The Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act, Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, restricts the County from permitting development which is inconsistent with the Monroe County Comprehensive Land Use Plan, Sections 163.3161(2) and 163.3194(1), Florida Statutes. No person may undertake any development within an area of Critical State Concern except in conformity with Chapter 380; Section 380.05(16), Florida Statutes. After the County issued the three related permits, the Holzingers engaged Pinewood Enterprises, Inc., as general contractor, for the construction of their single-family residence. Those permits were rendered to the Department of Community Affairs on July 21, 1992, and the Department issued its notice of appeal of those permits on September 4, 1992. No party disputes the timeliness of the appeal. The Holzingers' lot is vegetated by mangroves, transitional plant species, and beach berm plant species. The site plan, and which was part of the Holzingers' application for the permits, which Monroe County approved, includes the approval of dredging of a portion of Lot 17 and the placement of fill on site to provide driveway access to the single-family residence. The site plan locates the single-family residence in an area of Bay Cedar thicket. The mangroves are located along the north of the lot along Long Beach Drive. Facts Found Based on Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing The Holzingers' lot is located at the southernmost area of Big Pine Key, and is separated from the rest of the key by a wetland to the north of the property. To its south is the Atlantic Ocean. The lot is approximately 100' x 230' and contains approximately 22,750 square feet from property line to property line. On the lower keys land elevations only extend from sea level to a maximum of approximately five or six feet above sea level. The soil or substrate conditions on the lot are white calcareous deposits which appear to the untrained eye to be sand. It is not quartzite, but deposits from the breakdown of marine grasses or marine algae which have the appearance of sand. There is no caprock on the property. B (1). Habitats Recognized in the Monroe County Plan The Monroe County Comprehensive Development Plan is based upon the Data and Analysis found in volume 1 of the Plan. According to that Data and Analysis, there are different types of habitat found in the Keys. These include salt marsh, salt marsh and buttonwood association, mangrove community, tropical hardwood hammock, and beach berm complex. The most significant one here is beach berm complex; it includes: "bare, sandy shoreline with a mound or ridge of unconsolidated sand that is immediately landward of and usually parallel to the shoreline and beach. The sand is calcareous material that is the remains of marine organism such as corals, algae and mollusks. The berm may include forested costal ridges and may be colonized by hammock vegetation." Section 9.5-4(B-3), Monroe County Code [the land development regulations]. In the Data and Analysis, the County records that on Long Beach Key the most landward area of the berm is tropical hardwood hammock. The low hammocks are upland hardwood forest communities containing species such as blolly, buttonwoods, darling plums, spanish stopper and wild dilly, all of which are found on the vegitation survey of the lot done by a biologist for Mother Nature's Enterprises, Linda Pierce, as part of the Holzinger building permit application. See Section 9.5-4(L-10), Monroe County Code, which defines low hammocks. Low hammocks include berm hammock, and the beach berm association described in the County comprehensive plan includes berm hammocks (Tr. 184). B (2). The Land Use Maps and their Designations The existing conditions map which is part of the Monroe County comprehensive plan designates the area of the Holzingers' property as beach berm association. That map is drawn at the sale of one inch equals 2,000 feet. Similar aerial maps at a scale an order of magnitude smaller (one inch equals 200 feet) also show the land as beach berm with fringing mangroves. These aerial photographs have been overlaid with the Comprehensive Plan's habitat designations for use in the practical application of the land development regulations by County employees. Under the land use regulations found in the Monroe County Code, the County Commission is required to follow the existing conditions map it adopted, Section 9.5-227, Monroe County Code. Under the first paragraph of Section 9.5- 345 the environmental design criteria applicable to development of a parcel of land depend upon the habitat designated for the parcel on the existing conditions map (the map drawn at the larger scale of one inch equals 2,000 feet). Ground proofing of the habitat on the lot done by the Lower Keys' biologist, Diana Stephenson, and by the Department of Community Affairs planner/biologist, Kathleen Edgerton, show that the land is actually beach berm from the ocean to the mangroves, and there is a small area of disturbed saltmarsh landward from the mangroves to the county road which runs down the center of the key. I am not persuaded by the testimony of the biologist for the Holzingers, Mr. Smith, who believes that there is a separate tropical hardwood hammock habitat on the Holzingers' lot. A full habitat analysis would have been required if there were mixed habitats on the lot (Tr. 88, 96) and the Holzingers did not submit one to the County as part of their application. Because the County biologist found no separate low hardwood hammock habitat on the lot, she believed that no habitat evaluation index was required in processing the Holzinger application, and none was done independently by the County. Mr. Smith contended at final hearing that there are several distinct habitats on the single lot. Moving south from Long Beach Drive toward the ocean he first finds a disturbed saltmarsh of approximately 4,000 square feet; then a mangrove community of about 2,500 square feet; then a saltmarsh and buttonwood association of about 2,500 square feet; next a tropical hardwood hammock of moderate quality and finally, closest to the ocean, beach berm complex. This analysis, which designates a separate saltmarsh and buttonwood association waterward of the mangrove community, and then a separate tropical hardwood hammock waterward of the saltmarsh and buttonwood association, fails to give significant weight to the fact that low hammocks are typically found within beach berm complex. While Mr. Smith testified to the square footages for each of the five habitats, he only performed rough calculations for their size, he was not working with, nor did he perform an actual survey which would define the boundaries of the various habitats he believes are present. He readily acknowledged his preliminary habitat analysis was incomplete. Moreover, accepting for the sake of argument that there is a mixed habitat on the lot under the evidence adduced by the Holzingers, a complete habitat evaluation index should have been performed by the Holzingers as a necessary part of their application, since the County biologist did not do one in the belief there was no need for one. The essential problem with the view expressed by Mr. Smith that there are five habitats on this 100-foot lot is his contention that due to the very small changes in elevation through the Keys, one must identify different habitats recognized in the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations by assessing the predominance of different types of vegitation typical of a habitat. To Mr. Smith, if the vegitation is of a type normally found in a tropical hardwood hammock, and it predominates over the other vegitation, that area must be classified as a tropical hardwood hammock. At that level of generalization, the statement is no doubt true. Neither the land development regulations or the County's Comprehensive Plan require, or even permit, a microanalysis of the vegitation for the purpose of defining multiple habitats on a lot. Taking a broad view, such as that embodied in the existing conditions map, the predominate vegetative and soil conditions on the southern part of the island where Lot 17 is located are consistent with the categorization as beach berm association. The same is true using the aerial maps on which the different habitat designations from the land development regulations have been overlaid. What Mr. Smith has done is to look for small areas within the 100' x 230' parcel to identify areas where tropical hardwood species may be said to "predominate." The obvious purpose of Mr. Smith's division of the lot into small areas is to be able to characterize these uplands species as "predominating." This is essential to justify intensive use of the property. The comprehensive plan and the land development regulations do not permit any use of areas colonized by mangroves, which are wholly protected by a 100 percent open space requirement. This means that 100 percent of the area colonized by mangroves must be maintained in its natural condition and free and open to the sky, Section 9.5-343, Monroe County Code. Open space ratio for saltmarsh and buttonwood associations is .85 but for moderate quality low hammocks is only .60. Beach berm association is highly protected, with an open space requirement of 90 percent. Only 10 percent of the land area waterward of the mangrove habitat, therefore, can be covered with the footprint of the single-family residence and any associated driveway or other access way because it is beach berm complex. Accepting the mangrove line contained in the vegitation assessment submitted by the Holzingers in their application done by Mother Nature's Enterprises, and then using a "planimeter" to measure the area from the mangrove line to the mean high water line on the lot, there is 16,594 square feet of property. Given the 90 percent open space requirement, a very small area of 1,659 square feet may be covered with the footprint of the single-family home, including its porch, eaves, and driveway. The footprint of the house, its porch, and driveway shown on the site plan approved by the County, with the addition of a five-foot clearing zone around the footprint of the house [because it is essentially impossible to clear land only to the footprint of the completed building] reveals that the County's permits would allow the clearing of 2,880 square feet. Even without the five-foot construction zone around the house, porch and driveway, the County permits allow the clearing of 2,172 square feet. It is very difficult to understand how the Monroe County official in charge of the office which issues building permits could have determined that the development proposed by the Holzingers was permittable. That official did not testify. The County biologist for the Lower Keys who did testify, Ms. Stephenson, was adamant that the project was never permittable under the Monroe County land development regulations. The only explanation by which the permit conceivably could have been granted would be to do something the land development regulations do not permit: aggregate the square footage which the code makes available for development on the landward side of the mangroves, in the area of disturbed saltmarsh between the road and the mangroves, and add the usable square footage for that habitat area to the usable square footage on the waterward side of the mangroves, in the beach berm association. But the amount of each habitat which must remain as open space is determined for each habitat type. They cannot be aggregated across habitats, to give some total usable number of square feet, to be cleared anywhere on the property. That would ignore the significance of the separate habitat designations. The 1,659 square feet available for development in the beach berm association must be used only within that habitat, and square footage available for development within the disturbed salt marsh cannot be added to it. Fill Issues The site plan approved by the County permits fill to be used to construct a driveway on the property through the mangrove area and the beach berm area. This is simply an error on the part of the County, for no party disputes that fill is forbidden in these areas. The performance standards in the land development regulations do permit certain piers, docks, utility pilings and walkways over mangrove areas, but no fill is permitted. Section 9.5- 345(m)(1), Monroe County Code (Tr. 139). The Holzingers could receive a permit to build a raised bridge over the mangroves for access to the beach berm association portion of the lot, as has been done on a nearby lot to the west of the Holzingers' lot. They cannot, however, fill the mangroves to create the driveway shown on the site plan the County approved. The building permit the County granted which purports to allow fill in mangrove areas is inconsistent with the County's own land development regulations and cannot stand. The next question is whether there is some alternate means of access to the lot which can be used instead of that permitted. At the final hearing Mr. Smith stated that on a recent visit to the Holzingers' property, he found an old road on the east side of the property which is high land which could serve as a location for a driveway or accessway to the interior of the Holzingers' property. There is, however, actually no old road anywhere on Lot 17. There was an old road on Lot 16, and a bit of the spoil from that road may be found on Lot 17, but there simply never has been a road on the Holzingers' lot which they can use for a driveway. Fill will be required to locate any driveway, and that is inconsistent with the County land development regulations. The only thing the Holzingers can do to overcome this problem would be to build a bridge over the mangrove area and completely avoid the use of any fill. Summary of Findings The scarified or a disturbed saltmarsh area from the county road to the mangrove area is too small to be useful. The Holzingers do not plan to build in that area. Whatever portion of that area which is not required to be open space cannot be "banked" to allow additional clearing in the beach berm association on the waterward side of the mangroves. For all practical purposes, that disturbed saltmarsh area adds nothing to the buildable or clearable area on Lot 17. The mangrove area has a 100 percent open space requirement. Mangroves are a highly protective habitat, which contribute nothing to the buildable area on Lot 17. The remaining portion of the Lot 17 waterward from the mangrove area to the mean high water line is too small to permit the construction and erection of the house and driveway permitted by the development orders (building permits) issued by Monroe County. The buildable area in the beach berm association is no more than a total of 1,660 square feet for the house, its porch, the driveway. The County has issued a permit to use 2,880 square feet of that habitat (including an allowance for a construction zone), or at least 2,172 square feet, assuming the location of the house, porch, and an eight-foot wide driveway and no construction clearing around the footprint around the house/porch. This fails to meet the 90 percent open space requirement found in the Monroe County Code. The building permits issued by Monroe County to the Holzingers are therefore invalid. To obtain valid permits, the Holzingers must substantially reduce the footprint of the house, including an allowance for a construction clearing zone. A house that small may be undesirable, but it could be permitted. What the County has attempted to permit, however, is invalid under its own regulations.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that development approval for the subject lot be denied, unless the applicant presents, and the County and the Department approve, a revised permit and site plan which demonstrates compliance with the mandatory open space requirements for the beach berm and mangrove habitats, and which eliminates the placement of fill in the beach berm complex and the mangrove wetlands on site. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of July 1993. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July 1993. APPENDIX The Findings of Fact proposed by the Department have been generally adopted, although the long quotation from Volume I and II of the County Comprehensive Plan are not essential or necessary. See proposed finding 10. The Respondents submitted no proposed Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie M. Callahan Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Theodore W. Herzog, Esquire 209 Duval Street Key West, Florida 33040 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 G. Steven Pfeiffer, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 David K. Coburn, Secretary Florida Land & Water Adjudicatory Commission Executive Office of the Governor 311 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
