The Issue At issue is whether an order recommending denial of the subject permits and variance should be rendered.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing statement of the case and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order reversing Monroe County's decision to issue the subject permits and variance. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29 day of January 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29 day of January 1992.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was registered with Petitioner as a pool contractor, Registration No. RP0017996, from January to June 30, 1974 (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2.) On February 22, 1974, Respondent entered into a contract with John G. Hartong, 813 Kings Bay Drive Southwest, Crystal River, Florida, to construct a screened swimming pool for the total price of $7,331.25. Construction of the pool began in July of 1974. Prior to that time, Respondent sent his foreman to the building department of Citrus County to obtain a building permit for the job because the county had issued such permits for work in Crystal River in the past. In actuality, the City of Crystal River began issuing such permits for construction work in that community commencing June 15, 1974. Neither Citrus County nor the City of Crystal River issued a permit for the work at the Hartong residence. Respondent assumed that his foreman had obtained the necessary permit and did not inquire into the matter further. City officials of Crystal River discovered the job in progress in late July. At that time, the gunite for the pool was about two-thirds completed and it would have been impossible to inspect unless everything was "pulled out". Respondent had been ill during this period and receiving daily medical checkups. As a result, he had entrusted his foreman with a great deal more responsibility than usual. Respondent normally had five to ten pool jobs in progress at the same time. In August, 1974, Respondent suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized. Work apparently ceased on the Hartong pool at this point or somewhat earlier and, after numerous attempts to contact Respondent as to completion of the work, Mr. Hartong secured another contractor to do so. However, this firm required that Hartong obtain a release from Respondent prior to taking over the work. Hartong therefore visited Respondent in the hospital and the parties settled the matter by executing a release. Prior to entering the hospital, Respondent had been on the Hartong job on only two different occasions and his first contact from city officials came just before he was hospitalized. After the parties had entered into their settlement, Respondent did no further work on the pool. In October, 1974, the building official of Crystal River advised Respondent by correspondence that he should obtain a permit for the work and furnished him an application for a local Certificate of Competency as a contractor. Although Respondent submitted an application for such a certificate, the city tabled the application pending his compliance with city ordinances concerning permit requirements for the Hartong pool. In view of his release from Hartong, Respondent did not pursue the matter any further. Hartong had been particularly disturbed by the fact that electrical wires from a switch on the wall of his house ran to the pool deck and when the switch was on, the wires were live. He was fearful that his children might put them in the water and create a shock hazard (Testimony of Pulver, Hartong, duPlanti, Respondent; Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3, Petitioner's Exhibits 4 & 6.) About the middle of 1974, Respondent entered into a contract with Craig Marlett to build a pool. It was not established at the hearing as to whether this work was to be performed in Citrus County or within the city limits of Crystal River. Respondent testified that there was no building permit obtained for this work, but that he had subcontracted the job to his foreman and provided him with funds to obtain a proper permit. However, he did not check to see if one had been obtained (Testimony of Respondent, Pulver, Petitioner's Exhibit 7.) Approximately February 28, 1975, pursuant to a pool contract with Jack Freeman, Ocala, Florida, Respondent commenced work by excavating the hole on the site. He testified that he was not aware that he did not have a building permit when he began this work, but obtained it the following Monday. In fact, the application for a building permit to Alachua County was submitted on March 4, 1975, a Tuesday, and the permit was issued on March 10, 1975. Article XIV, Section V, Zoning Regulations for Alachua County, Florida requires that no building shall be constructed, reconstructed, altered or extended unless a building permit has been issued, indicating that such use complies with county requirements (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibits 5 & 8.) Respondent has been building swimming pools for approximately 10 years. His experience includes construction of approximately 700 pools (Testimony of Respondent.)
Recommendation That the allegations against Respondent be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: David Linn, Esquire 217 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida James A. Shook, Esquire 415 North West First Avenue Post Office Box 924 Ocala, Florida 32670
Findings Of Fact Seago Group, Inc., the Applicant/Intervenor, owns a tract of land in Lee County Florida, which is completely surrounded by creeks and canals, including Indian Creek on the north. The Intervenor intends to develop the parcel and is seeking a permit from the Department to construct a bridge over Indian Creek to provide access. There is presently a cul-de-sac at the end of Indian Creek Drive on the north side of the creek. The bridge would extend Indian Creek Drive over the creek onto the applicant's property. The Intervenor held an option to purchase land for the right-of-way on the north side of the creek. The Petitioners own property adjacent to Indian Creek Drive. The Petitioner Helwig owns property upon which be resides, and which adjoins the proposed bridge site. The Petitioner Rowe owns property upon which he resides several lets up Indian Creek Drive from the proposed bridge site. The Intervenor originally made application to construct a road over Indian Creek at a different, but nearby location using a culvert rather than a bridge. The Department's staff appraised the application and recommended that it be denied because deposits of fill around the culverts would have eliminated productive submerged creek bottoms, interfered with the ability of the aquatic habitat to support fish and wildlife populations, and eliminated shoreline vegetation which serves to filter runoff which enters the creek, thus helping to preserve good water quality in the creek. The application was withdrawn by the Intervenor before final action was taken on the Department's staff recommendations. The Intervenor thereafter filed the instant application. The application was to construct: ... A 26 ft. wide by 50 ft. long vehicular bridge constructed with 21" prestressed slabs on pile bent abutments over Indian Creek in Lee County, Florida. The application further provided: All work will be conducted on upland with no need for any equipment or material required to be in the water. All equip- ment and material will be delivered by upland access. The application did not reflect that Intervenor had previously sought a permit for the culvert constructions, but the Department was clearly aware of the previous applications and its appraisal of the bridge application was treated as a supplement to the appraisal of the culvert application. In its Notice of Intent to Issue the Permit, the Department erroneously designated the bridge as a "two-span" bridge. The application is actually for a one-span bridge. In its notice the Department added the following specific conditions: Turbidity screens shall be used during construction. Drainage at bridges approaches shall be by swale and no ditches shall be constructed. Drainage shall meet county specifications. No dredging or filling in Indian Creek. No bridge construction shall take place until ownership or easement is obtained through Mr. David Ruch's property pursuant to letters on file with the Department. The Intervenor has acceded to the specific conditions and agreed to comply with them in the event the permit is ultimately issued. All of the pilings for the proposed bridge would be constructed at or above the mean high water line of Indian Creek. Some turbidity could be expected during construction, however, the use of turbidity screens would eliminate any significant impact upon the water quality, fish and other wildlife resources of Indian Creek during construction. The only potential source of pollution from the bridge after construction would be from runoff entering Indian Creek from the bridge. The amount of runoff that would result from a 50 ft. long by 26 ft. wide bridge is negligible. The limited impact that such runoff could have upon the creek can be eliminated by having drainage flow through a swale system. Since the Intervenor has agreed to utilize a swale system, it does not appear that the bridge would have any adverse impact upon the water quality of Indian Creek or any other water body. Neither does it appear that the bridge would adversely affect fish and wildlife resources. Since all bridge pilings would be constructed at or above the mean high water line, transitional zone vegetation can continue to flourish along the shoreline. The planned clearance between the creek elevation at mean high water and the bridge is seven feet. The bridge would thus impede traffic by any boats that protrude more than seven feet above the water line. This presents no significant navigational impact in Indian Creek. There are two avenues for navigating from the bridge site on Indian Creek to the Caloosahatchee River. One of these avenues is presently obstructed by a bridge with an elevation less than that proposed by the Intervenor. The other avenue is obstructed by a very shallow area that will not permit navigation by other than very small vessels. The Department in the past has denied applications to dredge that shallow area. The Intervenor and the Department have submitted Proposed Findings of Fact. To the extent that these proposed findings have not been included in the foregoing Findings of Fact, they are hereby adopted as fully as if set forth herein.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's intended decision to award a contract, challenged by Petitioner, is contrary to Respondent's governing statutes, rules, policies, or the proposal specifications.
Findings Of Fact Admitted Facts Per Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation The Department advertised for proposals and bids for the Project under procurement contract number E5R63. Commercial was a bidder on the Department's contract E5R63 for the Project. Commercial reviewed the Department's advertisement for proposals and bids for the Project. The Project consists of replacing the existing Daytona Avenue Bridge (Bridge No.: 795502). The Project was advertised as a low bid design-build Project. Commercial did not file a challenge to the specifications for the Project. The advertisement for the Project included pre- qualification requirements for design professionals and pre- qualification work class requirements for the contractor. The advertisement for the Project included requirements for design professional services 8.1 and 8.2, Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 14-75.5/ The bids and technical proposals for the Project were due at the Department's District 5 offices by no later than 2:30 p.m., on June 18, 2012. Commercial submitted a technical proposal for the Project in response to the advertisement for procurement E5R63. Commercial submitted a bid price for procurement E5R63. The technical proposal submitted by Commercial for procurement E5R63 did not contain a firm or individual pre-qualified by the Department to perform work types 8.1 and 8.2. District 5 representatives contacted Commercial and sought to clarify who had been identified in Commercial's technical proposal to meet the pre-qualification requirements for work types 8.1 and 8.2. Andrus Gaudet was identified in response to the inquiry regarding who would satisfy work type 8.1 and 8.2 pre- qualification requirements. As of June 18, 2012, Andrus Gaudet had not been pre- qualified by the Department in work types 8.1 and 8.2 under rule chapter 14-75. The Department determined that Commercial was non- responsive based on its failure to include a firm or an individual possessing the pre-qualification requirements in work types 8.1 and 8.2 as advertised in the procurement solicitation. The advertisement states on page one that "all qualification requirements must be met prior to the Response Deadline." The Department sent a letter to Commercial that informs all responding firms that in order to be considered for the award, the team must be pre-qualified in the areas in the advertisement. Commercial could not be considered for award of this contract since it did not comply with the pre-qualification requirements. Additional Findings of Fact The Department's advertisement summarized the key terms for the Project, which included the following: NOT TO EXCEED BUDGET AMOUNT OR MAXIMUM BUDGET AMOUNT OR BUDGET AMOUNT*: $798,000 * Actual commitment and final execution of this contract is contingent upon an approved legislative budget and availability of funds ESTIMATED CONTRACT TIME: 300 Contract Days SELECTION PROCEDURE: Low Bid Design-Build RESPONSE REQUESTED: Fax Order Form STIPEND AMOUNT: No Stipend PREQUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: CONTRACTOR-WORK CLASS REQUIREMENTS Minor Bridges DESIGN-PROFESSIONAL SERVICES WORK TYPE REQUIREMENTS Major: 4.1.2-Minor Bridge Design Minor: 3.1--Minor Highway Design 4.1.1--Miscellaneous Structure 7.1--Signing, Pavement Marking and Channelization 8.1--Control Surveying 8.2--Design, Right of Way, and Construction Surveying 9.1--Soil Exploration 9.2--Geotechnical Classification Lab Testing 9.3--Highway Materials Testing 9.4.1--Standard Foundation Studies TECHNICAL QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO: http://www2.dot.state.fl.us/construction/bid questionmain.asp. The selection procedure for a low bid design-build project is that the Department's technical review committee starts with the lowest price bidder and reviews that bidder's technical proposal to determine if it meets the technical requirements or if it is non-responsive. If the lowest bidder's technical proposal is deemed non-responsive, the technical review committee proceeds to review the technical proposal of the next lowest bidder. The technical proposals of other bidders are not reviewed at all for responsiveness unless and until the committee deems the lowest bidder's proposal non-responsive. The technical review committee prepares its recommendations as to the responsiveness of the proposals reviewed and identifies which bidder, if any, should be deemed the lowest responsive bidder. The technical review committee recommendations are then submitted to the selection committee, which makes the final decision that is posted as the Department's intended decision. Commercial submitted the lowest bid for the Project in the amount of $780,000. Therefore, the technical review committee began with a review of Commercial's technical proposal. After that review, the technical review committee made the following recommendation: The Technical submitted by [Commercial] was reviewed and is recommended as non- responsive. [Commercial] did not identify how the advertised prequalification requirement on 8.1--Control Surveying and 8.2--Design, Right of Way, and Construction Surveying would be met within their Technical. The technical review committee proceeded to the next lowest bidder, Gregori, with a bid price of $817,500. Gregori's technical proposal was reviewed and found to meet the technical requirements for the Project. The technical review committee recommended that Gregori be deemed the lowest responsive bidder. The decision to award the contract to Gregori was made by the selection committee, which agreed with the technical review committee's recommendations. Before making that decision, the selection committee considered whether Gregori's bid price was reasonable. The selection committee made the judgment that Gregori's bid price, which exceeded the engineer's estimate used to establish the budget amount by a relatively small percentage, was reasonable. Funds for contracts must be provided for in the Work Program. When an RFP is issued, the Department sets aside funds in the Work Program in the estimated budget amount. Therefore, in order for the selection committee to award a contract for a bid price that exceeds the estimated budget amount, the selection committee must get approval to fund the excess amount in the Work Program. In this case, the selection committee obtained approval to add $20,500--the amount by which Gregori's bid price exceeded the advertised budget amount--to the Work Program. Commercial did not contend or attempt to prove that Gregori's bid price was unreasonable. Instead, Commercial's challenge to the intended contract award was that the Department was required to reject the bid as non-responsive, because the bid price exceeded what Commercial referred to as the "advertised not to exceed budget amount." Thus, Commercial's challenge hinges on its characterization of the advertisement as specifying a "not to exceed budget amount." However, the actual language in the advertisement was: "NOT TO EXCEED BUDGET AMOUNT OR MAXIMUM AMOUNT OR BUDGET AMOUNT*: $798,000." Commercial was unable to point to any statute, rule, or RFP specification that narrowed the quoted language or that required the Department to deem a proposal non-responsive solely because the bid price is higher than the advertised budget amount. Without more, the dollar amount identified in the advertisement cannot be considered a "not to exceed budget amount." Instead, the amount was either a "not to exceed budget amount," or a "maximum amount," or simply a "budget amount." Commercial unsuccessfully attempted to prove that the Department's prior practice was to declare non-responsive any bids over the advertised budget amounts. To support its position, Commercial relied on the Department's prior practice in connection with an earlier solicitation for the same bridge replacement project, designated contract no. E5R48 (project E5R48), which resulted in a Department decision to reject all bids and re-advertise. The evidence established that the advertisement for project E5R48 set forth a "NOT TO EXCEED BUDGET AMOUNT OR MAXIMUM BUDGET AMOUNT OR BUDGET AMOUNT" of $650,000. The advertisement specified the same "PREQUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS" in the same work type categories as did the advertisement for the Project at issue here. Potential bidders were given the opportunity to review the RFP and submit questions to the Department. The questions and answers were posted. One question/answer provided as follows: [Question:] The advertisement makes mention of a Maximum Budget for the project. The RFP is silent as to a Maximum Allowable Bid for the project. Is the budget estimate provided in the Advertisement a maximum bid price and will our bid be non-responsive if it is over that amount? [Answer:] No. Technical proposals and bids were submitted by two bidders in response to the solicitation for project E5R48. Following the same selection procedure as for the Project at issue in this case, the technical review committee first reviewed the technical proposal of the bidder with the lower bid, which was in the amount of $798,000. The technical review committee recommended as follows regarding the lower bidder: The Technical submitted by United Infrastructure Group was reviewed and is recommended as non-responsive. United Infrastructure Group did not identify how the advertised prequalification requirement on 9.3--Highway Materials Testing would be met within their Technical. The technical review committee for project E5R48 did not also recommend that the United Infrastructure Group's proposal be declared non-responsive for the additional reason that its bid of $798,000 exceeded the advertised budget amount of $650,000. The technical review committee for project E5R48 then considered the other bidder's proposal, with a bid price of $1,100,000. However, it did not proceed to review that bidder's technical proposal for compliance with technical requirements, for the following reason: The Technical submitted by Superior Construction Company has not been reviewed. The bid submitted by Superior Construction Company is 69% over the Department's advertised Budget Amount. The Technical Review Committee recommends rejecting all bids and readvertising this project. The selection committee for project E5R48 agreed with the technical review committee's recommendations and made the decision to reject all bids and re-advertise. The Department's representative at the final hearing, who served on the selection committees for both bid solicitation rounds for the Daytona Avenue bridge replacement project, confirmed that the selection committee's decision to reject all bids for project E5R48 was not based on a determination that the two bids were "non- responsive" because the bid prices were higher than the advertised budget amount. Instead, the lower bidder for project E5R48 was deemed non-responsive for the same reason that Commercial was deemed non-responsive in this case (non- compliance with all pre-qualification requirements as of the response due date); and the only other bidder proposed a price that was found to be unreasonably high. The Department has the discretion to award contracts when the amounts bid are higher than the advertised budget amounts, absent an RFP specification to the contrary. In deciding whether to exercise that discretion, one factor the Department considers is the magnitude by which the bid price exceeds the advertised budget amount. For project E5R48, after the low bidder was found non-responsive, the only other bid was so much higher than the advertised budget that the Department reasonably exercised its discretion to reject all bids and re-advertise. When bids come in much higher than estimated for a project, the Department will go back to review the engineer's estimate from which the budgeted amount was derived to determine if something needs to be changed in a re-advertisement, such as clarification of the project terms, increase in the budget amount, or both. In this case, the Department clarified the Project terms and increased its budget amount in the re-advertisement of the Project (but not nearly to the level of the very high bid that the Department refused to consider). The Department's exercise of discretion in the prior solicitation round to not consider a bid exceeding the budgeted amount by 69 percent does not dictate that the Department reject Gregori's bid as non-responsive. Instead, the Department's prior practice was shown to be entirely consistent with the Department's exercise of discretion in this case to consider Gregori's bid that was only three percent higher than the advertised budget amount. Petitioner failed to prove any Department's prior practice of rejecting bids as non-responsive when they exceed the advertised budget amount. The evidence showed otherwise. The evidence regarding project E5R48 also demonstrated that the Department's prior practice has been to reject proposals as non-responsive for failure to meet the advertised pre-qualification requirements as of the response submission deadline. That prior practice is consistent with the Department's decision to deem Commercial's proposal non- responsive because the proposal failed to satisfy all of the advertised pre-qualification requirements as of the response submission deadline of June 18, 2012.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Transportation, dismissing the formal protest of Petitioner, Commercial Industrial Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2012.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board denying Petitioner's application for a variance for certain signage is supported by the evidence in the record, or whether it departs from the essential requirements of law. See Section 137.014(f)(3), City of Clearwater Land Development Code.
Findings Of Fact On or about August 2, 1989, the Petitioner applied for a variance concerning certain signage on its property located at 2626 Gulf to Bay Boulevard, in Clearwater, Florida, which is zoned CH (highway commercial). At hearing, Petitioner abandoned its variance request concerning total square footage of its signage, and stated that the only variance presently by the Petitioner is for 21 feet in height to allow a 41 foot high pole sign to remain after October 13, 1992. This is an sign which has been in place since 1971, and, thus, was in place when the pertinent provisions of the Land Development Code governing sign height were enacted. The Petitioner does not propose to change this sign in any way, but simply seeks authorization to retain the sign after October 13, 1992, the date on which all nonconforming signs must be brought into compliance. Petitioner's property is located on the northeast corner of the intersection of U.S. 19 and Gulf to Bay Boulevard. At that point, U.S. 19 passes over Gulf to Bay Boulevard, and Petitioner contends that without the additional 21 feet in height, this sign will not be visible to motorists along U.S. 19, or to those approaching this intersection driving east on Gulf to Bay Boulevard. Without a variance, Petitioner will be required to bring this sign into conformance with the signage height requirements of the Land Development Code by October 13, 1992, and for property zoned CH, the maximum height allowed for signs is twenty feet. The Development Code Adjustment Board denied Petitioner's variance application on September 14, 1989, and Petitioner timely filed this appeal of the Board's decision. The only reason given in support of this variance is that without the continued authorization for the additional height, this sign will be of little economic benefit to Petitioner after October 13, 1992, and Petitioner would be unwilling to expend the funds necessary to reduce the height of this sign since the resulting 20 foot high sign would be of little benefit. Petitioner would rather just remove the sign than to have a 20 foot high sign that is of no economic benefit, according to Nichols.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT), properly denied Petitioner's Application for Qualification to perform work on DOT contracts which exceed $250,000.00 pursuant to Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 14-22, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Morse Diesel Civil, LLC ("Morse Diesel"), is a new company created to perform heavy civil construction, in particular large road and bridge projects. Morse Diesel is owned 80 percent by Morse Diesel Civil, Inc., and 20 percent by KPG, Inc. Morse Diesel Civil, Inc., is owned by AMEC Holdings, Inc. KPG, Inc., is owned by Richard Kelly ("Kelly") and Jack Palmer ("Palmer"). Together, Kelly and Palmer have over 50 years' experience in heavy civil construction. On October 8, 1998, Morse Diesel filed an application for qualification with the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT") to perform all classes of road and bridge work except for bascule bridge rehabilitation. Since the company was new and had not yet performed any work, the letters of recommendation provided in the application related to Morse Diesel International, Inc. ("MDI"). MDI is a large commercial construction management company owned by AMEC Holdings, Inc. Through DOT requests for additional information, Morse Diesel learned that DOT was interested in the experience of its principals and recommendations regarding their work. The work experience of Kelly, Palmer, John Zito, and Grant Ralston was provided to DOT in response to those requests. Under Rule 14-22.003, Florida Administrative Code, DOT thoroughly evaluated Morse Diesel and awarded it an Ability Score of 75 out of 100. DOT found that Morse Diesel had the necessary organization and management, adequate equipment, and a satisfactory work performance record which included an evaluation of the quality of completed work, any history of payment of liquidated damages, untimely completion of projects for which liquidated damages were not paid, cooperative attitude, contract litigations, claims, and defaults. Their score of 75 also included an evaluation of their integrity and responsibility. To date, Morse Diesel's ability score remains unchanged and in effect. On January 11, 1999, Morse Diesel was granted a Certificate of Qualification to perform all classes of work requested except major bridges and provided a maximum capacity rating of $200,000,000; that is, the total aggregate dollar amount of uncompleted work a contractor may have in progress at any time. Thereafter, Morse Diesel applied for a revised Certificate of Qualification to include major bridge classifications. DOT requested and was supplied additional information regarding the work experience of Kelly, Palmer, Zito and Ralston. DOT served a Notice of Intent to Deny the application for additional classes of work and Morse Diesel filed a request for a Section 120.57, administrative hearing. That case was dismissed as moot when Morse Diesel did not renew its Certificate of Qualification. On February 2, 2000, Morse Diesel applied for a Certificate of Qualification for all classes of road and bridge work except for bascule bridge rehabilitation. DOT denied its application on March 3, 2000. The decision to deny an application for Qualification is a very serious matter and each application is thoroughly evaluated by DOT. Less than one percent of all applications are denied. The decision to deny the February 2, 2000, application of Morse Diesel was made by the DOT pre-qualification engineer, Lewis Harper. The Notice of Intent to Deny the Application ("Notice of Intent") was written by Mr. Harper and Brian McGrail of the legal staff and identified the factual bases for the denial of the application and all the statutory and rule criteria utilized in the review of the application. Summary of Allegations The grounds for denial identified by DOT in the written Notice of Intent are: (a) a record of contract litigation, claims, uncooperative attitude, untimely completion of projects without payment of liquidated damages, and defaults by the management of Morse Diesel (Kelly and Palmer) when they worked for S. J. Groves and Sons, Inc., and Balfour Beatty Construction, Inc., on major bridge projects in Alabama, West Virginia, and Florida; (b) S. J. Groves was defaulted on the Cochrane Bridge Project by the State of Alabama; (c) Kelly and Palmer had substantial supervisory and management responsibilities for the Cochrane Bridge project and contributed substantially to the difficulties experienced by the Alabama Road Department; (d) The answer to Question 19-2 of the application regarding Kelly's and Palmer's involvement in the Cochrane Bridge project does not accurately reflect their role and is considered false, deceptive or fraudulent; (e) Kelly and Palmer had responsibility for prosecuting work and making decisions for filing claims on the Wierton-Stubenville Bridge project in the State of West Virginia and there were substantial delays and disputes over settlement of claims; (f) Kelly and Palmer were litigious and claims-oriented when they were associated with Balfour Beatty in Florida; (g) MDI is an affiliate of Morse Diesel because Norm Fornella is an officer is both companies and MDI was not listed in the application as an affiliate; (h) Morse Diesel did not advise DOT of the default of MDI; and (i) KPG is an affiliate of Morse Diesel because Kelly is an officer in both companies and KPG was not listed in the application as an affiliate. The application was not denied due to a lack of adequate experience or equipment. Although Morse Diesel listed the same affiliates in its 1998 application as it did in its 2000 application, the 1998 application was partially granted and the failure to list affiliates was not a ground for denial of the request for additional classes. Allegations (a)-(d): Record of Contract Litigation, Claims, Uncooperative Attitude, Untimely Completion of Projects and Defaults by Management of Morse Diesel The right to submit a claim is a valuable right of the contractor. If a contractor contends he/she is due additional time and money, it is common for him/her to pursue his/her claims rights. If the liability for unforeseen circumstances falls on the owner, the contractor typically pursues claims based upon the increased cost associated with the extra time and expense occasioned by the unforeseen circumstances. Kelly and Palmer have been involved in very difficult, highly technical jobs throughout their careers. It is common for these projects to involve a number of problems and related change items. Industry-wide, complex projects often involve change item costs ranging between 12 percent and 20 percent of the contract price. The Cochrane Bridge Project; Kelly's and Palmer's Involvement; and Application Question 19-2 Construction on the Cochrane Bridge was begun in 1985. Kelly was an executive vice president of S. J. Groves at the time and was also responsible for 30 or 40 other projects. At the same time, Palmer was a vice president of operations for S. J. Groves responsible for 10 to 12 projects. The project manager for the Cochrane Bridge project reported to Palmer and Palmer visited the project every two weeks, mainly to solve problems. The Cochrane Bridge was one of the first cable-stayed bridges built in the United States. It was designed by an Italian design firm and could not be built in accordance with the method of construction proposed by the designer. Moreover, each time there was a design problem, the Italian design firm had to be consulted, which took a great deal of time and caused delays. The Cochrane Bridge was designed to withstand a certain maximum load after construction was completed. The bridge, however, was undergoing greater stress while it was under construction. Consequently, disagreement ensued over the sequence of erection, whose responsibility it was to develop the erection sequencing, whether additional strengthening was needed during construction and, if so, who would pay for it. While these issues were addressed, S. J. Groves stopped work on the project. The State of Alabama requested Groves to work on other areas of the project during the down-time, but Mr. Groves refused for economic reasons. Alabama threatened to default Groves if they did not return to work. Kelly and Palmer attended several high-level company meetings where the issue of whether to continue the project was discussed by Franklin Groves, the owner of S. J. Groves, as well as the company's president and general counsel. Although Kelly and Palmer recommended that S. J. Groves remain on the project, their recommendation was overruled and a default was entered by the State of Alabama. Kelly and Palmer left S. J. Groves within 6 months of the default and formed their own company, RNE, in 1989. There is no reliable evidence that they "contributed substantially to the difficulties experienced by the Alabama Road Department" as charged in the Notice of Intent to Deny. S. J. Groves pursued litigation against the Alabama road department regarding the default and a settlement was reached. The contractor chosen to take over the job after the Groves default, filed claims of approximately $10,000,000 to $12,000,000, and also wound-up in litigation with the State of Alabama. There were thirty to forty vice presidents of S. J. Groves. Neither Kelly nor Palmer understood that they served as a corporate officer of S. J. Groves until after Morse Diesel had filed the 1998 application and were shown corporate forms filed with the Secretary of State. In response to Question 19-2 in the application, Morse Diesel stated: "Richard Kelly and Jack Palmer were denominated vice presidents of S. J. Groves, which defaulted on a job in Alabama in 1989. S. J. Groves had a number of people denominated as Vice Presidents and neither Mr. Kelly nor Mr. Palmer was at the level of management responsible for the decision to abandon the Cochrane Bridge Project. Both Mr. Kelly and Mr. Palmer recommended against abandoning the project and were overruled. They then left the company." There is no evidence which contradicts this finding. Allegation (e): Kelly's and Palmer's Involvement in the Wierton- Stubenville Project DOT presented no evidence to support its charge in the Notice of Intent that Kelly and Palmer were responsible for making the decision to file claims on the Wierton-Stubenville Bridge in the State of West Virginia and that there were substantial delays and disputes over settlement of claims. The only direct evidence is that Kelly was not involved in the preparation of claims or claims settlement on the Wierton- Stubenville project. The record is silent as to Palmer's involvement, if any. Allegation (f): Kelly's and Palmer's Involvement in Litigation and Claims at Balfour Beatty Kelly and Palmer were involved in Balfour Beatty's initial foray into the heavy civil construction business in Florida. In the early 1990's, Kelly met with DOT on Balfour Beatty's application for qualification to bid. At that time, DOT was on notice and inquired about Kelly's and Palmer's involvement in the S. J. Grove's default in Alabama. The Cochrane Bridge project was discussed in detail during a meeting held at DOT headquarters in Tallahassee. After being qualified, Balfour Beatty bid $82,000,000 on a large I-95 project in Broward County and was the successful low bidder by $1,000,000. In the beginning of the project Kelly and Palmer acquired staff and equipment, wrote purchase orders for materials, and supervised the project. On December 31, 1991, Dan White was hired as the project manager and Palmer visited the site every couple of weeks until problems on the project escalated. As the project manager, Dan White was in charge of the job and was responsible for the filing of claims. There were right-of-way problems and contaminated soil which delayed the project from the beginning. An initial design problem resulted from the project having been designed by two different design firms operating from different types of surveys. Consequently, the road was not aligned at the same elevation to match existing structures. These elevation problems shut down the project for months. None of the design, right-of-way, or soil contamination problems was the fault of Balfour Beatty. Nonetheless, DOT rejected all change items and required Balfour Beatty to file claims. A lawyer for DOT eventually became involved in the project in an attempt to settle the disputes which resulted in the preparation of Supplemental Agreement Number 73. SA-73 settled the claims up to that date, set new dates for project completion and paid money for completion by those dates. SA-73 was entered into based upon DOT's assurance that a constructibility review had been completed to make sure that the remainder of the project could be constructed in accordance with the existing plans and there would be no further design problems. However, the constructibility review was not complete and new design problems occurred immediately. The design of the parking lots was changed as they were being built. Core holes, used to determine the depth and density of the pavement had not been drilled. This caused more delays and claims. Balfour Beatty filed a lawsuit against DOT, Morrison Knudsen, the CEI on the project, and DOT personnel on site. The case was settled against DOT and its personnel for $4,750,000 and a jury awarded $4,300,000 against Morrison Knudsen. Balfour Beatty remains qualified to bid on DOT projects and was awarded a contract to build the Fuller Warren Bridge in Jacksonville. Kelly and Palmer, as consultants to Balfour Beatty, participated in preparing the bid for the Fuller Warren Bridge and that project is currently staffed with many of the same personnel who worked on the Broward County I-95 project, including the project manager, Dan White. The Broward County I-95 project was awarded on a bid of $82,000,000. DOT paid Balfour Beatty $97,000,000. The completion of the I-95 project was one to two years late and resulted in over 100 claims being filed. The Fuller Warren Bridge project was awarded on a bid of $81,000,000 and has cost to date approximately $94,000,000 to $96,000,000. None of the problems on the I-95 project were caused by Kelly or Palmer. Neither Kelly nor Palmer was involved in the preparation of the lawsuit or its settlement. ALLEGATION (g): Statements in the Application on Affiliations According to DOT's application, "The term 'affiliate' means a predecessor or successor of a contractor under the same, or substantially the same, control or a group of business entities which are connected or associated so that one entity controls or has the power to control each of the other business entities. The term 'affiliate' includes the officers, directors, executives, shareholders active in management, employees and agents of the affiliate. The ownership by one business entity of a controlling interest in another business or a pooling of equipment or income among business entities shall be prima facie evidence that one business entity is an affiliate of another." In its application for bid qualification, Morse Diesel listed Morse Diesel Civil, Inc. and AMEC Holding, Inc. as its affiliates. Morse Diesel did not identify either MDI or KPG as "affiliated companies" in response to question number 8 in the application. The application was prepared under the direction of Morse Diesel's President, Mitchell Becker who has a master's degree in civil engineering and a law degree. Based upon his interpretation of the definition, he determined in good faith that MDI and KPG were correctly omitted from the response to question 8 because neither met the criteria for "affiliate" as defined in the application. The answer to question 8 is the same in both the 1998 application and the 2000 application and DOT did not request additional information in the 1998 application related to the response nor did it list the failure to name MDI and KPG as affiliates as a ground for denial of the additional classes of work in 1999. There was a notation on page 2 of 19 in the 1998 application referring to MDI as a "sister company." The question requested letters of recommendation. Morse Diesel was a newly formed company, and did not have recommendations for projects it had completed. Instead, it supplied the recommendations of MDI. It became apparent to Morse Diesel through subsequent requests for additional information that DOT was interested in recommendations about the principals and management of Morse Diesel, not MDI. Consequently, when filing its 2000 application, Morse Diesel did not supply MDI letters of recommendation and instead provided recommendations on previous work completed by Morse Diesel personnel while associated with other companies. The only entities that are predecessor entities or have any control over Morse Diesel are Morse Diesel Civil, Inc. and AMEC Holding, Inc. KPG is not a predecessor or successor of Morse Diesel and has no ability to control it with 20 percent ownership. Similarly, MDI is not a predecessor or successor entity and has no controlling interest in Morse Diesel. There was no intent to hide the nature of Morse Diesel's relationship with MDI or KPG. The fact that Mr. Becker and Mr. Fornella are officers of both Morse Diesel and MDI is clearly stated in their résumés in the application. It is DOT's policy to deny application for misrepresentation only when it is intentional. Morse Diesel listed MDI as an affiliate in its Virginia application because the definition of "affiliate" in that application was broader and appeared to encompass MDI. Footnote 3 on page 7 of the audited financial statements refers to a transfer of funds from MDI to Morse Diesel. Mr. Becker, as president of Morse Diesel testified that the footnote in the financial statement attached to the application was a mistake. MDI has never advanced money to Morse Diesel. The advances made to Morse Diesel were made by Morse Diesel Civil, Inc. Mr. Becker as president of Morse Diesel is aware of the financial condition of the company and reviews the financial statements each month. There is no pooling of equipment or income between Morse Diesel and MDI. Allegation (h): Notice of the MDI Default Question 19-2 on page 16 of 23 of the application asks whether "any officer or partner of your organization has ever been an officer, partner or owner of some other organization that has failed to complete a construction contract?" In response to that question, Morse Diesel explained in the application that Kelly and Palmer had been associated with S. J. Groves when it defaulted on the Cochrane Bridge project in Alabama, but otherwise answered the question "no." Although Mr. Becker and Mr. Fornella are officers of both MDI and Morse Diesel, the application did not reveal the default of MDI on a project in St. Louis because the company is contesting the default and has not as yet failed to complete that construction contract; it is in litigation. There is no credible evidence that Morse Diesel or Mr. Becker intentionally omitted any information from the 2000 application. Allegation (i): See Findings for Allegation (g). Morse Diesel has demonstrated that it is competent and has experience to prosecute the work requested in the application. DOT has allowed at least one other applicant to amend its application to identify related companies as affiliates after DOT has denied certification on that basis. The résumés in the application and evidence presented at hearing reflect the work experience of the management of Morse Diesel and indicate extensive experience in heavy civil construction, including highly complex projects. The management of Morse Diesel has experience constructing all the types of road and bridges for which qualification is sought. Morse Diesel has been qualified in New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. Furthermore, Pennsylvania qualified Morse Diesel on the condition that Mr.Palmer remain associated with Morse Diesel and involved in any project awarded there.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Morse Diesel be permitted to supply DOT with corrections to the unintentional inaccuracies in its application and be pre-qualified in the classifications for which it applied. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire Brian A. Newman, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Brian A. Crumbaker, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue Whether the construction activities undertaken by Respondent at the home of George Scantland which lies seaward of the Sarasota County Coastal Construction Control Line constitute a violation of Section 161.053(12), Florida Statutes, and Rule 16B-33.004(4), Florida Administrative Code, and, if so, should an administrative fine be assessed against the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. George Scantland owns a single-family home on Casey Key in Sarasota County, Florida, which lies seaward of the Sarasota County Coastal Construction Control Line ("CCCL"). Scantland contracted with the Respondent to perform certain construction activities at his home. At the time Respondent entered into the contract, Garry Battaglia was President of the Respondent corporation. On February 13, 1990, the Respondent requested a consultation from the Department regarding the proposed construction activities at Scantland's home. The Respondent submitted a plan of the proposed construction along with the consultation request. At the time of the consultation request, Scantland's single-family home consisted of an on-grade slab on the ground floor level and an elevated second floor with a wooden cantilevered deck on the north and south sides of the property. The consultation request and plan indicate that the Respondent wished to construct a third-story addition including a cupola above the existing second floor, an elevator within the existing wall on the south side of the home, and an enclosure for stairs outside on the existing south side wall. On June 4, 1990, a Department engineer responded to the consultation request in a letter notifying the Respondent that the proposed third-story addition, the cupola and the elevator qualified for an exemption. However, construction of the stairwell enclosure did not qualify for an exemption pursuant to Section 161.053(12), Florida Statutes, because the enclosure modified the existing structure outside the limits of the existing foundation. And, pursuant to Rule 16B-33.004(4), Florida Administrative Code, a permit was required for the proposed stairwell enclosure because the enclosure constituted an addition to a major structure proposed above a preexisting concrete deck. On October 18, 1990, the Department's area inspector visited Scantland's home, prepared a site inspection report, and took photographs. The site inspection report indicates that Respondent was engaged in construction activities at Scantland's home and requested comment from the Department's staff as to whether the work was exempt or required a permit. The first photograph (Exhibit 2A) taken on October 18, 1990, by the area inspector indicates that the existing concrete deck on the ground floor of the north side of the house had been drilled and rebar had been inserted and that concrete blocks were being placed at the bottom of the drills and rebar locations. Another photo (Exhibit 2C) taken on October 18, 1990, by the area inspector depicts the southern wall of the house with temporary shorings supporting the remains of the second floor wooden deck located on top of the preexisting concrete deck. The photo shows that wooden posts in the concrete deck, which had supported the second floor elevated wooden deck, had been flush cut to the ground. After reviewing the site inspection report and photographs, the area engineer in Tallahassee asked the inspector to revisit the site to gather further information regarding Respondent's construction activities. The area inspector revisited the site on October 24, 1990, and prepared a Warning Notice and Violation Report which he hand-delivered to an employee of the Respondent on the job site. The area inspector also took additional photographs (Exhibits 5A-5C) during this visit. The Warning Notice was issued for the placement of drilled rebar and block columns atop an existing concrete slab and placement of a tie-beam system atop the block columns. The Warning Notice put the Respondent (owner's agent) on notice that a violation has possibly occurred and instructed the Respondent to stop construction pending a determination from the Department's Tallahassee office. The Violation Report, which begins the formal entry into the violation process, was issued to both Scantland and the Respondent for the construction of new perimeter block walls atop an existing ground floor concrete deck seaward of the CCCL without obtaining a permit from the Department. The area inspector's initial determination that Respondent's construction activities constituted a statutory violation was confirmed by the Department's engineering staff in Tallahassee. The photographs (Ex. 5A - 5C) taken by the area inspector on October 24, 1990 demonstrate that even after receipt of the Warning Notice, the Respondent continued construction at Scantland's home. The first photograph (Ex. 5A) taken from the north side of the house, shows that placement of the rebar and columns had been completed and a beam had been constructed across and underneath the existing wooden deck on the second floor. A second photograph (Ex. 5B) taken from the south side of the house, shows the new columns and new tie-beams constructed atop the preexisting concrete deck. On November 16, 1990, the area inspector conducted a follow-up inspection of the site, prepared a site inspection report, and took photographs (Ex. 7A -7B). The site inspection report confirms that Respondent was still engaged in construction activities at the site. The report indicates that the area inspector spoke with Garry Battaglia on the site and that Battaglia planned to continue construction until a stop work order was received. Battaglia advised the area inspector at this time that he was applying for a permit for the work. The first photograph (Ex. 7A) taken by the area inspector on November 16, 1990 is an exterior view of the south side of the house which shows that the wall atop the preexisting concrete deck on the southern addition was completed. The second photograph (Ex. 7B) shows the interior of the southern wall where construction of the second story was taking place over the new column wall and tie-beam system built atop the preexisting concrete deck. The Respondent received a copy of a Notice of Apparent Violation of Section 161.053(2), Florida Statutes, dated November 20, 1990, issued by the Department to Scantland for unauthorized construction/excavation seaward of the Sarasota County CCCL. The Notice advised the parties to stop construction activities pending compliance with the law. On December 10, 1990, the Department received an after-the-fact permit application, plan of construction, and survey of the property from the Respondent as agent for Scantland. The plan of construction accurately depicts the structure which is currently on the property, as modified by the Respondent. The completed construction is totally different from the construction activities described in Respondent's consultation request of February 13, 1990. The consultation request submitted to the Department by Respondent in February, 1990 did not indicate that any construction would occur on the north or west side of the structure above the preexisting concrete deck or that the elevator would be constructed on the southwest corner of the home outside the existing wall or that an enlarged garage/storage area would be constructed. All of the above were ultimately constructed by Respondent. The survey of the property, dated March 23, 1990, shows that there was preexisting concrete deck on the ground floor level and a wooden deck on the second floor and that the concrete deck was a separate entity from the strip footing supporting the preexisting structure and that there was no enclosed space above the preexisting concrete deck. On December 19, 1990 the area inspector returned to the site and took additional photographs (Ex. 10A - 10C) and filed a site inspection report. The Respondent continued to engage in construction on the house even after receipt of the Warning Notice and Notice of Apparent Violation. The construction on the south and west sides of the house were never completed, there was a new corridor wall between the elevator shaft and the interior wall of the house, a new column and some new slabs on the ground outside the preexisting foundation of the house. On January 2, 1991, in response to the after-the-fact permit application, plan and survey filed by the Respondent, the Department staff advised the Respondent by letter that the application was incomplete and told the Respondent to stop any further construction activities on the site that had been identified as requiring a Department permit. On January 10, 1991, the Department received from Respondent another plan of the existing structure entitled "Existing First Floor Drawing" drawn on October 25, 1990. The drawing indicates that there was open lattice on the south side of the house; and, the drawing refers to the concrete on the north and south sides of the home as "concrete walk". On January 17, 1991, the area inspector visited the site again, took additional photographs (Ex. 12A -12C) and filed a site inspection report. Again, it was evident that Respondent continued construction on the house despite receipt of the Department's notice of January 2, 1991 advising Respondent to cease any further construction activities. The Respondent received a Notice of Violation, Cease and Desist Order issued by the Department on January 17, 1991 for unauthorized construction seaward of the CCCL. On July 22, 1991, the Department issued Permit No. ST-807 ATF CF to the Respondent as agent for Scantland, authorizing the after-the-fact activities and the proposed minor structures with the condition that the violation would be addressed by the Department through a separate agency action. The generally-accepted definition of "foundation" states that a foundation is the support part of a structure and is restricted to the structural member that transmits the superstructure load to the earth. The strip footing, or wall footing, directly beneath Scantland's home transmits the load of the superstructure to the ground and thus constitutes the foundation of the preexisting structure. The footings on the north and south sides of the home underneath the concrete deck did not support the preexisting structure but rather only supported the preexisting second story wooden deck. As such, the footings below the concrete deck did not constitute part of the foundation of the preexisting structure. The construction at Scantland's home constitutes construction outside the foundation of the Scantland's home and additions to the Scantland's home above the preexisting concrete deck. Respondent knew, or should have known, that a construction permit was required for the construction activities at the Scantland home based on the Department's response to the consultation request. Respondent's continued construction activities at the Scantland home constitutes a violation of the statutes and rules and was intentional in that the Respondent continued the construction activities at the Scantland home despite the repeated notices and warnings by the Department to cease construction until the matter was resolved. The Respondent was agent for Scantland and responsible for obtaining all necessary permits. The construction activities conducted at the Scantland home by the Respondent does not come within the exemption provided for in Section 161.053(12), Florida Statutes, and Rule 16B-33.004(4), Florida Administrative Code, adopted in accordance with the Department's statutory authority. Therefore, the construction was a violation of the statute and Department rule in that Respondent failed to obtain a permit before beginning construction. And, such violation could subject the Respondent, as the owner's agent responsible for obtaining the permit, to a possible assessment of an administrative fine pursuant to Section 161.054, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order assessing an administrative fine in the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($1,500.00) against Respondent. In making this recommendation, I am mindful of Respondent's repeated failure to comply with the repeated notices and warnings without any attempts to resolve the matter. Another basis for the fine is to ensure immediate and continuous compliance in the future as set forth in Section 161.054(4), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 1992 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-2292 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner The following proposed findings of fact are adopted as modified in substance in the Recommended Order. The number(s) in parenthesis is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the preceding proposed finding(s) of fact: 1-9(1-9 respectively): 10(10-11); 11(12); 12(13); 13(13, 14); 14(15); 15(16); 16(17); 17(18-20); 18(21); 19(22); 20(23-24); 21(25); 22(26); 23(27); 24(28-29); 25 (30); 26-28(31); 29(32); 30(33); 31-33(34); 34(35); 35(36); 37(37); 38(38-39); 39(40); and 40-42(41-44). The Department's proposed finding of fact 36 is covered in the Preliminary Statement. The Respondent did not file any proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Lanette M. Price, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Garry Battaglia, Qualified Representative G & R builders of Distinction, Inc. 107 Corporation Way, Suite B Venice, Florida 34292 Virginia B. Wetherell Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station #10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kenneth Plante General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station #10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent's engineering license should be disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 471, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Michael V. Carr, P.E. is a licensed professional engineer in the State of Florida, holding license number PE0026675. He has been engaged in the practice of engineering for more than 15 years. Mr. Carr's area of expertise is in civil and structural engineering. He is not experienced in electrical or mechanical engineering. In 1989, Mr. Carr was employed as a full-time engineer and construction project manager by a local development and construction company. He also operated, on a part-time basis, an engineering business. The purpose of his part-time business was to offer engineering services to people who are experienced in the construction industry or are working with someone who is experienced in the construction industry and have to varying degrees developed their own plans. Respondent also would serve as the construction manager on those projects. During 1989, Respondent performed engineering services on four buildings owned by four different owners. All four buildings, involved relatively simple construction. Three of the buildings, Dr. Zummarraga's office, the Raulerson/Liberty National building, and Bay Podiatry Center, were designs comparable to residential structures. The Eleventh Street Office Park, while a larger structure, was a shell building and a simple structure, as well. Respondent was not retained to provide engineering for the construction of the interior of the Eleventh Street Office Park. In regards to all four buildings, the Respondent was not retained to provide plumbing, electrical or mechanical engineering services. Those items were left to the respective trades involved in the construction of the project. The limited plans submitted for the plumbing, electrical and mechanical aspects of the four buildings met the standard of practice in the Bay County area and were sufficiently complete for the various trades to perform its respective part of each project. Moreover, the simplicity of the construction plans for these four buildings meant that standard construction methods are provided in the Standard Building Code and/or are known in the industry. Such standard construction methods include detail on roof systems, spacing and connections, as well as live load requirements. Therefore, not as much detail needed to be provided on the plans for these projects. It was standard engineering practice in the Bay County area not to include such detail if it was adequately covered in the building code. In each instance, the owners of the buildings contacted Respondent to perform limited engineering services and to act as the construction manager on each project. Except for Mr. Raulerson, each owner had, prior to the time Respondent was hired, worked out some rough plans with a person qualified to create such plans and had a general idea of what type of building they wanted. Mr. Raulerson had drafted a fairly complete set of building plans. The goal of each owner of the four projects was to obtain a set of plans from what the owner already had developed which would at least minimally meet the local building code requirements sufficiently to allow a building permit to be issued for the construction project. In each instance, the Respondent's plans were submitted to the local building code enforcement agency which reviewed and accepted the plans. A building permit was issued for each building project. During the construction of each building, Respondent provided engineering inspections on each project. The plans submitted to the Bay County building department were not as-built plans and were never intended to be 100% complete plans since several of the owners had not made final decisions on a number of details such as roof line or plumbing facilities. 1/ Such open-ended plans were justified by the specific circumstances of each case and the professional judgment of Respondent, especially since Respondent acted as the project manager of the construction project. For purposes of clarity the facts and circumstances surrounding each building and any violations of Chapter 471, Florida Statutes, in regards to each building will be outlined individually. No alleged violations of Chapter 471, Florida Statutes, were established by the evidence unless it is specifically noted below. Zummarraga Building The plans for the Zummarraga building were signed and sealed by Respondent on October 24, 1989. Dr. Zummarraga had contacted Rich Koehnemann of Koehnemann Construction Company to build an office building for him. Mr. Koehnemann sent the doctor to Jeff Robinson, a draftsman in the Bay County area, to work up a draft of the office plans the doctor desired. The doctor or Mr. Koehnemann gave Mr. Robinson a rough sketch of the office building. Mr. Robinson informed the doctor that a structural engineer would have to be involved since the County would require the plans to have the signature and seal of an architect or engineer in order to obtain a building permit. At that point, Respondent was retained to help develop a set of plans for Dr. Zummarraga. Mr. Carr was hired to draft plans for an office building. He was not hired by Dr. Zummarraga to design a building for a specific site. Therefore, no substantial site information, site work, grading or contouring details were provided on the plans for the Zummarraga project. By passing drafts of plans back and fort, a set of plans was devised by Mr. Robinson under the direct supervision and control of Respondent. Therefore, Respondent is not guilty of improperly affixing his seal to the plans for the Zummarraga project. Later, after the structure's plans were finalized, the contractor determined that a detention pond would have to be designed for the site and a DER permit obtained for the pond. Respondent was retained to design a detention pond for the site and worked with DER to meet its extensive permitting requirements for such a pond. See Chapter 17-4, 17-25 and 17-512, Florida Administrative Code. That design was submitted to DER and a permit was issued for the detention pond. The original unsealed set of plans was amended for the building department. The specific details of the more rigid DER requirements, such as site work, grading and contouring, were not included on the plans filed with the building department and the owner did not contract with Respondent to include redundant detail on the building department's plans. Essentially, the building department's plans reflected the location of the detention pond and the area of the wetlands on the property which were subject to DER jurisdiction. Additionally, the plans contained some specifications which guided the contractor on pond requirements and in grading and contouring the site. These notes in conjunction with the DER permit requirements were sufficient to accomplish the building of the detention pond. Therefore, the desire of the owner and the avoidance of unnecessarily redundant detail between the DER permit and the building department's plans justified the lack of any extensive site work detail on the building department's set of plans for the Zummarraga project. The plans devised by Mr. Carr did not contain any architectural work which was not incidental to the engineering work he performed. 2/ Therefore, Respondent is not guilty of improperly affixing his seal to plans depicting work outside his field or of practicing outside of his field. In every instance, the plans of Dr. Zummarraga's office building were of sufficient detail to meet the building department's requirements for the issuance of a building permit, to allow the contractor to construct the project according to the Standard Building Code and to obtain a certificate of occupancy from the building department. Obviously, on these facts, the plans met the standard of practice in the community for the engineering services Respondent was hired to perform. Moreover, the lack of code related, electrical or mechanical details was justified under the facts and circumstances of the Zummarraga project and it was well within the professional judgment of the Respondent to omit such details given the standards of practice in the Bay County area. Raulerson/Liberty National Building The plans for the Raulerson/Liberty National building were signed and sealed by Respondent on July 31, 1989. Mr. Raulerson is an experienced developer in the Bay County area and acts as a general contractor on his own projects. Prior to hiring Respondent, Mr. Raulerson had been working with a local draftsman and Liberty National's architect to create a set of plans for the construction of Liberty National's office building in Bay County. Mr. Raulerson contacted Respondent on the advice of Bayne Collins, a local architect. Mr. Collins advised Mr. Raulerson that his plans were complete and all he needed was an engineer to check the wind loads. 3/ Mr. Raulerson gave Respondent the plans he had developed in conjunction with Liberty National's architect. Mr. Raulerson asked Mr. Carr to go through the plans and do a structural analysis to make sure that wind load requirements were met, that the building was structurally sound and that the building met the requirements for issuance of a building permit. Mr. Carr reviewed the plans and determined that they were an excellent set of plans for a very simple, sound and over-designed structure. He calculated the wind loads for the building and completed a structural analysis of the building. He also made one minor correction to the plans. Mr. Carr thought it ridiculous to put Mr. Raulerson to the expense of copying the Liberty National plans and essentially adopted the plans as his own. In this case, the fact that the plans were not drawn under Respondent's supervision is immaterial since the specific circumstances of the project did not call for such supervision in that the plans were drafted by experienced individuals. The plans were under Respondent's control at the point in time he was hired by Mr. Raulerson and the plans submitted to him for his review and approval, disapproval or amendment. Since copying the plans would be an unnecessary duplication of effort and Respondent did in fact exercise control over the plans by reviewing them before he affixed his seal to them, Respondent is not guilty of improperly affixing his seal to construction plans. The Raulerson/Liberty National plans did not contain any architectural work which was not incidental to the engineering services he performed. Anything in the plans which may be construed as "architectural work" was requested and specified by the owner to be in the plans. Therefore, Respondent is not guilty of improperly affixing his seal to plans depicting work outside his field or of practicing outside his field. The plans did contain a roofing plan which called for pre-engineered trusses. The detail on the plan simply read "pre-engineered trusses." The plans did not contain any requirements relating to who was to design the pre- engineered trusses or requirements for structural submittals on the trusses. In the Bay county area "pre-engineered trusses" means trusses from Fagans, the local truss manufacturer. It is common knowledge, that Fagan's has a licensed engineer on staff who designs all of its pre-engineered trusses from the plans submitted to him. The pre-engineered trusses all have pre-construction documentation available. Also, submittals for the trusses accompany the trusses at the time of their delivery. With such knowledge, it is unnecessary to specify any more information or requirements regarding the truss manufacture on the Liberty National plans. Similarly it was unnecessary to detail that submittals be given to the engineer since such submittals accompanied the trusses. The absence of any more detail was justified by the specific circumstances of the Liberty National project and well within the professional judgment of the Respondent given the nature of the pre-engineered truss market in the Bay County area and the fact that Respondent was the construction manager on the project. As indicated, Respondent also acted as the construction project manager and would visit the construction site about once a week. At the point in time Mr. Raulerson was going to order the trusses, he decided to change the pitch of the roof, Mr. Raulerson did not advise Mr. Carr of his decision. Mr. Carr discovered Mr. Raulerson's change when he visited the construction site. Fortunately, Respondent had the project file with him. With the project file information and the submittals from the truss manufacturer, Respondent checked the load conditions for the changed pitch. No structural concerns were presented due to the change in pitch of the roof. The Liberty National plans were not amended because Mr. Raulerson did not contract for them to be amended. The plans were not required to be amended under Chapter 471, Florida Statutes. Respondent did not commit any violations of Chapter 471, Florida Statutes, in regards to his actions outlined above. Bay Podiatry Center The plans for the Bay Podiatry Center were signed and sealed by Respondent. However, the date the plans were signed and sealed was not included on the plans. It was inadvertently omitted by Respondent. The absence of the date is a de-minimis violation of Chapter 471, Florida Statues, and does not justify the imposition of any formal penalties. However, Respondent should be given a letter of guidance for the violation. Respondent was not brought into the Bay Podiatry Center project until the final draft of the plans was to be done. Up until that time, Dr. Wilkerson, the owner of the project, had worked up preliminary drafts of the project in conjunction with his contractor and a local draftsman. They had developed a building with an attached carport. Mr. Carr did work directly with the draftsman on the final plan. Therefore, the plans were created under the direct supervision and control of Respondent. Since Respondent supervised and controlled the finalization of the project's plans at the crucial time and since the people involved in drafting the plans did not need more supervision and control, Respondent is not guilty of improperly using his seal. There was no clear and convincing evidence which demonstrated that Respondent performed any architectural work which was not incidental to the engineering services he performed. At the time Dr. Wilkerson desired to begin construction and obtain a building permit, he had not decided on a final roofing system. Therefore, the final plans called for the use of pre-engineered trusses and did not have a great amount of detail on a roof framing plan. There was some detail provided on the page of the plans detailing the wall section of the building. This page provided sufficient detail for a competent contractor to construct the building according to code. In fact, the building was so constructed and a certificate of occupancy was issued for the building upon its completion. Again the trusses would come from Fagans. Petitioner did in fact review submittals from Fagan's truss engineer for the pre-engineered trusses used on the Bay Podiatry Center. Included in those submittals was a roofing plan in which the trusses were numbered to fit the sequence shown in the roofing plan. Respondent made sure the trusses and roof system were structurally sound. However, the owner did not contract with Respondent to amend the building department's plans. Chapter 471, Florida Statutes does not require such an amendment. Given the truss market in the Bay County area, the knowledge of Respondent regarding that market, the fact that a decision regarding a roof line had not been made when the plans were sealed, and that it was appropriate to leave such a decision for later in the construction process, no further detail was required in specifying the roof system for this project. No clear and convincing evidence was presented that demonstrated Respondent was negligent in his specifications on the roof system. The only exception to the above was that Respondent did not specify the material of the trusses over the carport. Such information is not supplied by the Code and therefore must be supplied by the engineer. The oversight was caught by the contractor when he was preparing to order the trusses. The contractor contacted Mr. Carr. Mr. Carr determined what the appropriate truss material should be and informed the contractor. The inadequacy of the plans was resolved in less than ten minutes. The omission of such a detail is negligent on the part of Respondent and is a violation of Chapter 471, Florida Statutes. However, on these facts, the omission of the detail is minor. Most of the light, plumbing and mechanical fixtures were prelocated by the owner prior to the time Respondent was hired. Respondent did not purport to draft plumbing, electrical or mechanical plans in detail in the final plan. Except in one respect, the detail was sufficient to guide the respective trades in the performance of their work and no more detail was required. The only exception was that Respondent approved a special detail of the hub drain/trap primer which was not in accordance to code. Since Respondent provided a special detail which did not meet the code requirements and which was not demonstrated to be justified by the circumstances of the Bay Podiatry project, he is guilty of negligence in the drawing of the Bay Podiatry plans in that aspect. Given the fact that this is a very small error in a larger project and that the drain was put in according to code during the construction of the building, Respondent's violation is a minor one. Finally, the draftsman, without instructions from Respondent, put some plumbing and mechanical notes in the plans which clearly did not relate to the project. Respondent did not catch the inclusion of the notes and sealed the plans with the superfluous notes in them. However, it was obvious that the notes did not relate to the project and the trades involved ignored them. The notes did not cause any problems during the construction and were not shown to be inimical to the public health and safety. Therefore, while the inclusion of the notes was sloppy work, there was no negligence shown on the part of Respondent. Eleventh Street Office Park The plans for the Eleventh Street Office Park were signed and sealed by Respondent on January 31, 1989 The Eleventh Street Office Park project demonstrates best the dynamism involved in an evolving construction project. Often, as with the Eleventh Street project, an owner is not sure of the best method or design (usually determined by lowest cost) to utilize prior to construction or whether he wants to go forward with the expense of construction of a building given certain designs. On the Eleventh Street project three plans were developed, beginning with a three story structure with structural steel and precast walls, and ending with a large, one story, cement block structure on a cement slab. All the plans were for a shell building and did not include any floor plan. Preliminary rough drawings were completed by a draftsman who was hired by the project's owner. Respondent reviewed these rough drafts and over the course of several weeks made numerous structural changes. After the plans were re-drawn to Respondent's satisfaction, he submitted them to the building department in order to obtain a building permit. There is no question that the plans for the Eleventh Street project were drawn under Respondent's direct supervision and control. Therefore, Respondent is not guilty of improperly using his seal. The plans submitted to the building department were not intended to be complete. For instance, the owner had not decided where to locate the restrooms in the building. However, the owner, for unspecified reasons, wanted to proceed with obtaining a building permit. With that decision open, the detail for the plumbing aspects of the plan were not intended to be complete or to match as to specifics. Such limited detail was intended only to place the building department and the contractor on notice that some consideration had to be given to the upcoming plumbing. The same considerations applied to the electrical and mechanical aspects of the plans. All of the evidence concerning deficiencies in the electrical design of the Eleventh Street Office Park was based on Petitioner's expert's review of a single sheet of plans obtained from the building Department. This sheet is mysterious as to its origins and relationship to the Eleventh Street project. The sheet was not prepared by Respondent, did not bear his seal, lacked the fire department's approval which was present on other pages of the project's plans, and was a different size paper than those sealed by Respondent. There was no substantial evidence which demonstrated Respondent had prepared this sheet or that the sheet reflected the electrical plans used in the Eleventh Street project. The absence of extensive detail or the provision of extraneous notes on the electrical, mechanical and plumbing aspects of the plans were justified by the fact that the owner of the project had not made up his mind in regards to those details, such decisions could be determined later in the construction process, the Eleventh Street project was a shell building and there was sufficient detail for the licensed trades to perform their tasks when the time came and the decisions were made. The incompleteness of these plans in that regard was clearly justified by the specific circumstances of the Eleventh Street project. Therefore, Respondent is not guilty of violating Chapter 471, Florida Statutes. As with the Bay Podiatry project, the only exception to the above was that the hub drain/trap primer detail was not in accordance with the building code. For the reasons stated in regards to the Bay Podiatry project, the provision of the hub drain detail constitutes negligence in the practice of engineering in violation of Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Again the violation is a minor one. Similarly, as with the other three projects, no substantial evidence was presented that Respondent performed any architectural services in relation to the Eleventh Street project which were not incidental to the engineering services he performed. There was a great deal of debate among the experts as to the adequacy of the structural aspects of the Eleventh Street Office Park and whether they met the standards of practice for engineers. Most of the debate centered on how much detail needed to be placed on the plans and whether the detail provided was sufficient for a contractor to build a safe building. The better evidence demonstrated that the amount of detail on the plans was sufficient to enable a contractor to build a safe building. The detail which was not contained on the plans was contained in the building code and did not need to be included on the plans. Such a practice comports with the standard of practice in the Bay County area and is a specific circumstance of a project which would enable a professional engineer to exercise his judgment and not include such detail. 4/ Moreover, although the calculations were not contained on the plans, Respondent did, in fact, determine the structural soundness of the Eleventh Street project. Therefore, Respondent is not guilty of violating Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes. The only exception to the above is that Respondent was negligent in specifying the type of mortar to be used in the concrete walls. In essence Respondent specified three different types of mortars. These mortars significantly differed as to each mortar's respective strength. Use of an improper mortar in the concrete walls can effect the strength of the wall and cause them to be unsafe. This inconsistency in detail or specifications differs from the inconsistency in details or specifications where such details or specifications obviously do not apply to the project or where such details or specifications have no contrary reference in the plans. The latter two cases while showing sloppy work are not necessarily indicative of negligence and depend greatly on the surrounding facts and circumstances before a finding of negligence can be made. The inconsistency with the mortar is indicative of negligence since a contractor may very well use the wrong mortar on a project. In this case, the inconsistency did not become a problem and Respondent was present as the project manager to handle any problem which may have arisen. Therefore, the violation of Chapter 471, Florida Statutes, is moderate to minor.
Recommendation That the Department enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of five violations of Chapter 471, Florida Statutes, assessing a total fine of $750.00 and placing the Respondent's license on probation for a period of one year, during which Respondent should be required to take and pass a course or courses on the proper methods of plan drafting for the four violations involving negligence; and issuing a letter of guidance for the violation involving the date. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1991.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation’s (“Department” or DOT”), notice of intent to award a contract to Intervenor, Archer Western De-Moya, Joint Venture (“AWD”), for a transportation project involving the design and reconstruction of federal and state roadways in Miami, Florida (“the Project”), is contrary to governing statutes, DOT’s rules, or the bid specifications; and, if so, whether the award is contrary to competition, clearly erroneous, or arbitrary and capricious.
Findings Of Fact Project, Parties & Participants Respondent, DOT, is the state agency authorized by section 334.30, Florida Statutes, to issue requests for proposals to solicit competitive bids for private-public (“P3”) partnership projects. The Project was located in District VI of the Department. Greg Schiess is the manager of the Strategic Initiatives Office for DOT. Mr. Schiess oversaw the Project and was the agency representative for DOT at the final hearing. Nadine Chinapoo was DOT’s procurement officer who oversaw the RFP process for the Project. The RFP had strict rules of contact between bidders and any DOT employee or officer. The Department designated Ms. Chinapoo as the “single contact and source of information” for the RFP. The Miami-Dade Expressway Authority (“MDX”) is a state agency created in 1994, authorized by Miami-Dade County, and funded through toll revenues. MDX has regional oversight of five expressways in Miami-Dade County, including State Road 836 (“SR 836”). On February 6, 2017, DOT issued the “Design-Build Request for Proposal for SR 836/I-395 from West of I-95 to MacArthur Causeway Bridge and I-95 Pavement Reconstruction and I-95 Southbound to SR 836 Westbound and SR-836 from West of NW 17th Avenue to Midtown Interchange (SR-836/I-395/I-95)” (“RFP”). The Department developed the RFP pursuant to section 334.30, Florida Statutes, which allows DOT to enter into a P3 to finance, design and build transportation construction and facilities. No one timely filed an objection to any of the RFP specifications. The RFP involves two contracts: (1) the DOT contract for federal interstates 95 (“I-95”) and 395 (“I-395”), and a portion of SR 836 leading to and from MacArthur Causeway Bridge; and (2) the MDX contract which involves another portion of SR 836 from Northwest 17th Avenue to the Midtown Exchange at I-95. A key component of the RFP was the replacement for “Bridge No. 8/9” of I-395, which would run east to west (“Signature Bridge”). According to the RFP, the Signature Bridge would take traffic over a portion of downtown Miami to and from the MacArthur Causeway. Ultimately, the winning bidder or design-build firm (“DB Firm”) would provide preliminary designs, coordinate design services with the Department to finalize the engineering and construction plans, and perform construction of the finalized designs. It would also need to self-finance the design and construction of the Project, because payment would be made by DOT into an escrow account and then disbursed to the selected DB Firm on periodic intervals. This form of payment was referred to as “gap financing.” BCC is a private civil engineering firm based in Florida specializing in roadway projects. The Department engaged BCC to advise and draft concept plans and portions of the RFP related to roadway design, roadway geometrics and temporary traffic control (also known as maintenance of traffic (“MOT”)). Staff from BCC also represented the Department in meetings with bidders as allowed by the RFP.4/ The Project Selection Committee (“PSC”) was made up of three members: Javier Rodriguez, Executive Director of MDX; Gerry O’Reilly, Secretary of DOT for District IV; and Dat Huynh, District Planning and Environmental Administrator of DOT for District VI. The PSC selected the Best Value Proposer (“BVP”) based on scores given for the bidders’ Technical Proposals, contract time, price proposals, and a passing grade for the bidder’s financial health. The PSC also met publicly at various times during the RFP process. The Technical Review Committee (“TRC”) was the group in the RFP process responsible for reviewing and scoring the Technical Proposal. The TRC was made up of four DOT engineers and one MDX engineer. The Technical Proposal was made up two volumes. Volume 1 was worth a total of 60 points and included criteria such as construction methods, MOT plans, and innovation. Volume 2 was worth up to 30 points, and addressed aesthetic criteria such as streetscapes, lighting and enhancements. The Aesthetic Review Committee (“ARC”) was the group assigned to review and pass acceptable Signature Bridge options. The ARC also was responsible for reviewing and scoring Volume 2 of the Technical Proposals from each bidder. There were originally five members: four non-DOT representatives from the local community; and Brian Blanchard, the DOT assistant secretary. Mr. Blanchard withdrew from the ARC prior to the scoring of Volume 2, when his duties at DOT increased after the DOT Secretary resigned. Each bidder could submit three bridge designs or options. The ARC members gave a “pass” or “fail” grade to each Signature Bridge option submitted. These pass/fail grades determined which proposals moved to the next phase of the RFP involving the technical aspects of the entire proposal. Although the ARC members also ranked each of the bidders’ options, these rankings were for “informational purposes only.” Leon Corbett, the Department’s finance manager for the RFP, was responsible for overseeing the final phase of the RFP process of evaluating the financial fitness of the intended DB Firm. Mr. Corbett was experienced in evaluating financial proposals submitted in response to requests for proposals, and specifically had experience in evaluating bidders for proposals involving P3s. Mr. Corbett and DOT staff evaluated the financial proposal of the highest scorer on a pass/fail basis. Petitioner, FAM, is a joint venture organized specifically to submit a response to the RFP. The corporate members of FAM are Fluor Enterprises, Inc. (“FEI”), Astaldi Construction Corporation and Munilla Construction Management, LLC (“MCM”). All three members of FAM are civil construction contractors that were prequalified by DOT to submit bids to the RFP. Hope Grumbles, FEI’s director of sales and infrastructure, served as the corporate representative for FAM at the hearing. AWD was also organized to submit a response to the RFP. AWD is composed of Archer Western Contractors, LLC (“Archer”), and the de Moya Group, Inc. (“de Moya”), both DOT- prequalified contractors. Ultimately, DOT issued a notice of intent that AWD had been chosen as the winning proposer or DB Firm. Kevin McGlinchey, the vice-president over Florida and the Caribbean for Archer, served as the corporate representative for AWD at the hearing. History and Groundwork for Project and RFP Planning for improvements to I-395 and the bridge to the MacArthur Causeway began in the early 1990s, but did not result in any renovations. Research on the project began again in 2004 with the beginning of a project development and environmental study (“PD&E”) and culminated in 2010 with the issuance of a Final Environmental Impact Statement and the Record of Decision.5/ The purpose of the PD&E study was to produce a recommendation for final designs and construction. Separate PD&E studies were done for the I-395 and SR 836 projects. The original PD&E premise was simply to replace the bridge on I-395, but that project did not move forward because of concerns that the bridge and the construction itself may have negative impacts on the area underneath and adjacent to the bridge, including Overtown, a historic black neighborhood located adjacent to I-395. At some point after the release of the PD&E studies, DOT created a Project Advisory Group which met numerous times until 2013. The Project Advisory Group consisted of representatives of numerous stakeholders in the road improvements, including governmental agencies and civic organizations from the local area. Meanwhile in 2010 and early 2011, BCC, on behalf of the Department, began developing the RFP language. Although it was not involved in the original I-395 PD&E, BCC reevaluated the PD&E for factors, such as environmental and socioeconomic impacts, traffic issues, and right-of-way requirements. These changes were incorporated in the concept plans and procurement language for the final advertisement requesting proposals for the Project. In 2013, a lawsuit filed against DOT in Miami-Dade County sought equitable relief relating to any bridge renovations by DOT. As a result, DOT agreed that any renovation or improvements by DOT to the I-395 interchange would include a “Signature Bridge” as part of the Project. In furtherance of this goal and to allow local input regarding the visual impact of the bridge on the area, DOT created an Aesthetic Steering Committee to review alternatives for the “Signature Bridge” and recommend a specific bridge design to DOT. Despite meeting numerous times, however, this committee was unable to reach consensus on any one specific design. The committee disbanded, but the concept of the committee’s role was incorporated in the RFP process in the form of the ARC. During this time, MDX also had plans to reconstruct portions of SR 836. DOT and MDX agreed to conduct the SR 836 renovations and the bridge replacement as part of the same project for convenience and to save resources. As a result, DOT partnered with MDX to conduct a multi-phased and comprehensive reconstruction project that would address the traffic and aesthetic concerns of the local citizens. The project would include three major components: (1) a “Signature Bridge”; (2) SR 836 renovations; and (3) I-395 renovations. Also as a result of the public’s concerns related to the visual impact of the Project to the surrounding areas, the Department developed an Aesthetic Manual (found at Joint Exhibit 3) for the Project. This manual focused on the Signature Bridge and area underneath the bridge. As explained in the Aesthetic Manual: [T]he signature bridge will be the crown jewel of the Project. The purpose of this structure is two-fold: to provide Downtown Miami with a contemporary infrastructure icon, and to improve the quality of the space below 1-395 by relieving it of obstructing piers and columns. . . . Irrespective of the ultimate design, the Signature bridge shall still adhere to [certain] constraints: [The] Signature bridge shall have a constant depth superstructure. The signature bridge shall be two fully independent bridges that are made to look like one form (e.g. twin basket handle bridges void of a visually unifying element will not be allowed). This structural autonomy is necessary because the EB and WB structures will be constructed sequentially, yet the stakeholders have insisted upon the appearance of one aesthetic entity. Concept Plans To provide bidders with an established set of design objectives (i.e., an idea of what it was looking for in the final product), DOT created concept plans that identified the project’s physical boundaries, the scope of the interstate reconstruction and proposed layouts. The RFP concept plans were developed and approved as part of the PD&E studies that were conducted for the I-395 and SR 836 projects prior to the issuance of the RFP. It is clear from the RFP itself and the testimony at the hearing that changes to the concept plans were anticipated and encouraged. A bidder’s improvements to the basic requirements and layouts to the concept plans could garner more points in the final bid score. The RFP described the purpose of concept plans. The Concept Plans have been developed to illustrate the work required for the Total Project. The Design-Build Firm may make use of the design in the Concept Plans as a starting point for the design. However, the Design-Build Firm is not limited to only the work identified in the Concept Plans but must stay within the constraints of the Department Commitments and the requirements of the RFP. Anthony Jorges, a civil engineer and the BCC consultant working with the Department on the roadway design, geometrics and MOT requirements of the RFP, gave clear and convincing testimony. He testified the concept plans were to serve as a launching pad for the proposals. [The concept plans are] essentially a starting point for the design-build teams. [I]t really is a conceptual level, about a 30 percent level design, but it gives the teams a point to start. It by no means is final or unmodifiable. It’s just a starting point . . . a baseline to start off with. No one timely filed any protest of the concept plans. RFP Timing and Process The procurement process took place over a year, from the date of advertisement to the selection of the DB Firm. The RFP process was broken down into four phases. Phase I: Short Listing Phase II: Aesthetic Signature Bridge Submission Pass/Fail Phase III: Technical Proposal Submissions and Scoring Phase IV: Price Proposal and Financial Proposal Submittals Although addressed in detail below, in summary, prequalified bidders were first required to submit a letter of response with specific preliminary information about the bidder. DOT then created a shortlist of bidders based on review of these letters. Each shortlisted entity was then given the opportunity to submit Aesthetic Signature Bridge Proposals. Each bidder that had a passing Aesthetic Bridge submission was permitted to submit a Technical Proposal and Financial Proposal. After the Technical Proposals were scored, the scores were announced along with each bidder’s price proposal and proposed contract time. After getting a pass grade on its financial proposal from the Department, the PSC selected the BVP. Phase I In Phase I, each proposer was to provide DOT a “Letter of Response” with general information, such as the proposer’s past projects and résumés of designated key staff positions. Specific to this protest, bidders were to designate a bridge architect and engineer of record for the Signature Bridge. Each timely Letter of Response submitted to the Department was to be evaluated on specific criteria by the PSC. DOT would then post a shortlist of bidders authorized to submit proposals. Petitioner and Intervenor submitted a Letter of Response and the PSC selected both for the shortlist, thereby advancing both to the second phase of the RFP process. Phase II Each proposer that was shortlisted provided a draft submittal of its Signature Bridge design or design options. These drafts were vetted by DOT through meetings that allowed the proposers and the Department to discuss any questions or concerns either had about the draft proposals. No members of PSC, TRC or ARC attended these “vetting” meetings; the meetings were solely intended to provide feedback and answer questions between DOT staff and the proposers. After the “vetting” meetings, each shortlisted proposer submitted up to three final Signature Bridge options to the ARC. Each ARC member then gave each option a “pass” or “fail” grade. If a proposer submitted more than one option, the ARC members ranked that proposer’s options by preference. These grades and rankings were provided to the PSC for review. To move to the third phase, a proposer must have received at least one “pass” rating. The RFP specifically provided the ARC’s rankings of individual options “are purely for informational purposes only, and will have no direct impact on the Pass/Fail decision or on the evaluation of the Proposer’s Technical Proposal.” On August 19, 2016, DOT issued the “Aesthetic Bridge Proposals Pass/Fail Posting Notice” indicating that the PSC had reviewed the ARC’s rankings. As allowed by the RFP, the PSC determined that the bidders that received three out of five passes would move on. AWD’s Signature Bridge proposal was a fountain-like design with multiple arches sprouting from a unified point. FAM’s Signature Bridge design consisted of two cabled structures that were similar, but inverted. Each had an arm with a rotating disk extending into the air. Ultimately, the PSC approved these submissions from FAM and AWD to proceed to the third phase of the RFP process. Phase III Whereas Phase II focused on the Signature Bridge, Phase III involved the Technical Proposals from the bidders. Each Technical Proposal was made up of a Technical Volume (Volume 1) and Aesthetic Volume (Volume 2). The TRC members reviewed and scored both volumes; the ARC members only scored Volume 2. According to the RFP, the technical scores were based on an “adjectival scoring system” that required each of the TRC and ARC members to review the volume or volumes of the proposals he or she was assigned and give each section an “excellent,” “very good,” “good,” “fair,” or “poor.” These descriptive ratings were later converted to a numerical value and announced at the public meeting held on April 24, 2017, to open the contract time and price proposals. Ms. Chinapoo provided the Technical Proposals, the individual scores of the evaluators, and a spreadsheet compiling all the scores to the PSC for review prior to the April 24 public meeting. Unlike the other bidder’s proposals, AWD’s Technical Proposal included a viaduct made up of two by-pass lanes in each direction on an elevated freeway along the center of the existing SR 836. The viaduct had construction and safety advantages over traditional “parallel lane” formats and would eliminate interaction between I-95 traffic and special event traffic in downtown Miami. Because this was a novel concept not addressed in the RFP or concept plans, AWD was required to get DOT’s approval before submitting the preliminary designs. After the TRC and ARC members reviewed the Technical Proposals, AWD received a 53.980 out of 60 points on Volume I and 24.389 out of 30 points on Volume II; FAM received 50.180 points for Volume I and 28.656 on Volume II. ATC Process Bidders were allowed to obtain permission to deviate from the concept plans and RFP requirements in certain aspects. The RFP outlined a process for approving requests for an Alternative Technical Concept (“ATC”), which included any deviation from a component of the technical requirements, or any proposed material or technology not addressed in the RFP. The RFP schedule anticipated that bidders would submit their ATC requests after Phase I and, if approved, incorporate them in the Technical Proposals submitted in Phase III. The purpose of the ATC process was to allow “innovation, flexibility, time and cost savings on the design and construction of Design-Build Projects while still meeting the Department Commitments.” The ATC process included one-on-one discussion meetings between the Department (or its representatives from BCC) with bidders “to describe proposed changes to supplied basic configurations, Project scope, design criteria, and/or construction criteria.” The purpose of these one-on-one ATC meetings was to discuss the ATC proposals, answer questions that the Department may have related to the requested deviations, review other relevant information, and establish whether the ATC proposal met the requirements for approval when possible. Representatives from the bidders and/or their engineers or designers, and DOT staff were involved as needed to provide feedback on the ATC. None of the TRC, ARC, and PSC members attended ATC meetings or participated in the ATC process. An ATC was deemed worthy of approval if the concept suggested was equal to or better than the existing requirements of the RFP, as determined by the Departments. ATC requests, which reduced scope, quality, performance or reliability, would be rejected. The Department retained discretion to approve or deny an ATC without a need to state justification. Once approved, an ATC was treated one of two ways: with an addendum to the RFP so all proposers were aware of the deviation; or (2) without an addendum so only the proposer that submitted the ATC would be permitted to utilize the approved ATC in its design. Not all concept plans or RFP requirements were modifiable; some could not be changed through an ATC. Specific to these proceedings, the RFP had “specific ATC restrictions” (or what the parties referred to as “nonmodifiables”) on the following requirements: Minimum basic number of lanes [for I-395 and I-95] as shown in Attachment A-33. All Signature Bridge components shall be part of the structural system that carries bridge Dead Load (DL) and Live Load (LL). Minimum basic number of lanes [for SR 836] as shown in Attachment MDXA-02. Minimum widths of mainline lanes and ramp lanes [for MDX]. Preliminary Plans and Confirmation Letter During Phase III, each remaining bidder was required to submit a technical proposal in which the bidder provided design concepts with preliminary plans. The RFP did not seek proposals of final designs that were ready for construction. Rather, as explicitly stated, the actual preparation of final plans and designs was to be part of the contract work being solicited, and would be performed after contract execution. As was clear from the RFP and testimony at the hearing, the goal of the procurement was not for the award recipient to provide final signed and sealed plans. Instead, it would provide plans as deliverables in the contract, submitted to DOT engineers for review, comment, and approval. More precisely, the RFP and contract required the winning bidder to submit--during contract performance--60- percent plans (plans that are 60-percent complete) for DOT comment and approval, followed by 90-percent plans for further DOT review. Only after the 90-percent plans were finalized, were they to be signed, sealed, and submitted to DOT for construction. In other words, the final design plans were to be developed by the DB Firm’s designers in collaboration with DOT’s (and MDX) staff as part of contract performance and deliverables--not as part of the procurement itself. Because of the unique fluid nature of the proposal drawings, the RFP provided that DOT may waive minor irregularities in proposals as follows: Waiver of Irregularities The Department may waive minor informalities or irregularities in Proposals received where such is merely a matter of form and not substance, and the correction or waiver of which is not prejudicial to other Proposers. Minor irregularities are defined as those that will not have an adverse effect on the Department’s interest and will not affect the price of the Proposals by giving a Proposer an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other Proposers. Any design submittals that are part of a Proposal shall be deemed preliminary only. Preliminary design submittals may vary from the requirements of the Design and Construction Criteria. The Department, at their discretion, may elect to consider those variations in awarding points to the Proposal rather than rejecting the entire Proposal. In no event will any such elections by the Department be deemed to be a waiving of the Design and Construction Criteria. Because the proposal plans were merely preliminary, DOT required each bidder to submit a “Written Confirmation Letter” (“Compliance Letter”) stating that regardless of the preliminary plan, if chosen as the DB Firm, it would comply with and be bound by all requirements in the contract documents during contract performance. The winning bidder was required to fully comply with the Design and Construction Criteria and other RFP requirements for the price bid, regardless of the preliminary designs or if the proposal was based on a variation. AWD and FAM each submitted Compliance Letters. Phase IV and Selection of AWD as BVP In Phase IV, FAM, AWD, and two other bidders submitted their price proposal and total project calendar days. During the public meeting on April 24, 2017, price proposals from each proposer were opened. The price proposals also included each proposer’s total estimated contract time. Based on the formula set forth in the RFP, each proposal received a score for its price proposal. The members of the PSC were not involved in evaluating the price proposals or the contract time. Instead, the prices and contract times were evaluated by DOT staff, who were to alert the PSC members to issues with a proposer’s price or contract time. The record established DOT staff were not concerned and did not alert the PSC members to any issues. Both AWD and FAM received a score of 4.99 points for their price proposals. AWD proposed a total contract time of 1,460 days; FAM proposed a total contract time of 1,825 days. The RFP provided the formula for scoring the proposed contract times as: 5 x (a/b), where a = lowest number of calendar days proposed by any bidder; and b = number of calendar days proposed by that bidder. Using this formula, AWD received 5.00 out of 5 points; and FAM received 4.00 points. The total scores were then noticed by the Department. The next step in this phase was for the Department to evaluate the financial fitness of the intended award. The Department’s finance manager for the RFP, Leon Corbett, and DOT staff evaluated the financial proposal of the highest scorer on a pass/fail basis. As noticed in the RFP, the financial review portion for this RFP was to occur after the April 24 public meeting announcing the technical scores and price proposals. The RFP states that the “PSC shall select the BVP for the Total Project.” It also states that “[t]he Proposer with a responsive Proposal will be evaluated by the PSC for award of the I-395 Agreements as the Best Value Proposer as set forth in this RFP.” Finally, the RFP provides as follows: The PSC will review the evaluations of the Technical Proposal and the scores for the Proposed Contract Time and Scored Price Proposal for each Proposer and make a final determination of the highest score. The PSC has the right to correct any errors in the evaluation and selection process that may have been made. The Department is not obligated to award the I-395 Agreements and the PSC may decide to reject all Proposals. If the PSC decides not to reject all Proposals, the I-395 Agreements will be awarded to the Proposer determined by the PSC to be the Best Value Proposer. Before the scheduled PSC meeting on May 12, 2017, Ms. Chinapoo provided each PSC member with the technical proposals submitted by the vendors, the individual scores of the evaluators, and a spreadsheet compiling the scores. On May 12, 2017, the PSC met to consider the scores, as well as DOT staff’s evaluation of the AWD financial proposal. The PSC unanimously determined that AWD was the “Best Value Proposer” based on the highest technical score, the best value proposer and the best contract time. One PSC member, Mr. Rodriguez, testified that before the May 12 meeting he spent about 12 hours reviewing the material before making the final decision as to which bidder would be BVP. He also testified that he considered AWD the BVP because “they had the best score, after they were scored, they had a compliant price, and they had the best time.” Mr. Rodriguez indicated he would have asked any questions at the meeting had he seen anything unusual, untoward, or problematic about the scoring of the proposals. Mr. Rodriguez noted there was one anomaly in the technical scores of one ARC member who preferred the FAM’s proposal. Whereas the other members of the ARC gave AWD scores of 26.2, 24.6, and 17.80 out of 30 points for Volume 2, John Richard gave AWD a score of 7.20 points; while awarding FAM a nearly perfect score of 29.300. Mr. Richard awarded the other two proposals (not FAM or AWD) 9.00 and 2.5 points. Mr. Rodriguez considered, but was not concerned about Mr. Richard’s individual scores because Mr. Rodriguez felt the scores were based on “aesthetics” and just “an opinion” about which proposal Mr. Richard thought offered the prettier bridge. There is no evidence establishing the PSC failed in its responsibilities or did not follow the RFP process in selecting the BVP as described in the RFP. After the PSC determined the intended award, the Federal Highway Administration was required to concur, the DB Firm was required to submit final financial documents, and the parties would then execute the contracts. DOT’s Scoring In the Amended Protest, FAM asserts the bid award should be rejected because the Department used the wrong methodology for assigning the technical scores for Volume 2. DOT took all of the reviewers’ scores, added them together and divided them by the number of reviewers. FAM claims that correct methodology would be to take the ARC members’ individual scores and average them to one score (x); take the TRC members’ individual scores and average them to another score (y); and then average x and y to arrive at a technical score for Volume 2. Although the RFP was specific as to what criteria the ARC and TRC members were to use in grading the technical proposals, and how those grades were converted to numbers, it was silent as to how the individual reviewers’ scores would be combined to come up with one score for Volume 2. As explained previously, all members from the TRC and the ARC used an “adjectival scoring system” that required individual evaluators to rate portions of the proposals as “excellent,” “very good,” “good,” “fair,” or “poor.” Consistent with the RFP, non-reviewers (Mr. Schiess and a DOT in-house attorney) assigned numerical equivalents to the adjectival scores. These individual numerical conversions were delivered to Ms. Chinapoo, who kept them secure until the scores of all proposers were presented in a spreadsheet during a public meeting on April 24, 2017. As established by the evidence at the hearing, typically in DOT procurements there are technical reviewers scoring the technical part of proposals. In that situation all of the reviewers’ scores are averaged (i.e., added all together and divided by the total number of reviewers). Unlike other procurements that are based only on technical components and price, this RFP involved an additional component relating to aesthetics. Therefore, in this RFP process there were two separate scoring committees, ARC and TRC, each starting out with five members each. Mr. Rodriguez testified the method used by DOT-– calculating the final score by adding up the scores from the individual reviewers and then dividing it by the number of reviewers--was common practice. Theoretically, under this typical method, for the Aesthetic volume of the Technical Proposals, DOT would have added the scores from each of the ten committee members and divided by ten to reach the technical score. During the course of the procurement, however, one of the members, Brian Blanchard (the sole DOT representative on the ARC) resigned from the committee, and was not replaced. The RFP is silent as to how the absence of a committee member should be treated. DOT addressed the reduction in ARC membership by notifying the proposers that Mr. Blanchard was no longer on the ARC; and explaining the “scoring of your Technical Volume 1 will be done by the five-member Technical Review Committee (TRC), who will also score your Aesthetic Volume 2, along with the four remaining members of the ARC.” It did not clarify how the individual scores would be used to arrive at a total score. As reflected in Joint Exhibit 46, DOT converted the adjectival description provided by each ARC and TRC member and then calculated the scores of each of the reviewers to reach a total sum, which was then divided by the number of reviewers for each volume of the technical proposal. The language in DOT’s notice announcing Mr. Blanchard’s departure from the ARC is ambiguous. The fact, however, that the Department did not provide a formula (as it did for scoring the price proposal or contract time scores) and that it mentioned the “members,” and not the committees, supports the use of the typical averaging methodology, averaging scores of all nine evaluators. As Mr. Schiess testified, this is the way an evaluator’s scores would be treated in any other procurement. Q.: Do you know who made the decision on how to average those numbers? A.: The decision to average the scores has been something the Department has been doing. That’s just common practice. Q.: And what is the common practice? A.: To average the scores of the evaluators. Q.: Just take a straight average, add up all the evaluators and divide the scores by the number of evaluators? A.: Correct. Similarly, the testimony of the PSC members established this was common practice. Mr. Rodriquez testified that he has served on numerous DOT project selection committees over the years and that scores of evaluators are typically averaged. Dat Huynh, another PSC member, described the process as “regular averaging” as “just combining the number and dividing by the number of people that were in participation.” The testimony established any contrary method would need to have been clearly spelled out in the RFP. At the May 12 public hearing, FAM’s representatives raised the issue of the scoring and claimed it defeated the public’s role in the process. The evidence, however, established the public did have a key role in the selection of the Signature Bridge. The ARC’s role was to provide public input. In addition to scoring Volume 2, the ARC evaluated the Signature Bridge design proposals on a Pass/Fail basis and served as the “gate-keeper” keeping any designs it did not approve from moving further in the process.6/ John Morris, president of the third-place proposer, also indicated at the May 12 public meeting that based on his experience the process was not unusual: My team came in third in that process. And I’m not really here representing my joint venture team. I’m really more here as someone who has done a great deal of work with the Department of Transportation and bid on a lot of design-build projects over the last 20 years, and as far as I’m concerned, the DOT followed the process that they laid out in the RFP. Additionally, a plain reading of the RFP indicates it was the weight of the individual ARC members, not the ARC as a whole, that was valued. For example under the section titled “Aesthetic Signature Bridge Proposals Pass/Fail,” the RFP stated in relevant part: Each ARC member will independently pass or fail each option submitted. Each ARC member will also rank the options provided by a Proposer against the other options provided by the same Proposer against the other options provided by the same Proposer. * * * Although the ARC members will rank the different options . . . these rankings are purely for information purposes only, and will have no direct impact on Pass/Fail decision or on the evaluation of the Proposer’s Technical Proposal. * * * [T]he PSC will recalculate the options based on “passing” being lowered to three (3) out of five (5) passes from the ARC members. (RFP at 20)(emphasis added). There is also support for using individual scores in the RFP section titled “Final Selection Process,” which provides that at the public meeting where the price proposals are opened, “the Department will announce the adjectival scores for each member of the TRC and ARC, by category, for each Proposer.” (emphasis added). This interpretation makes sense given that the previous form of the ARC, the Aesthetic Steering Committee, could not come up with a consensus regarding a style or appearance for the Signature Bridge. Moreover, given that it was the DOT’s representative and not a public member that resigned, it cannot be said that the method used by DOT undermined the public’s participation in the process. There is no evidence that the method put forth by FAM is supported by the RFP, any rules or by any industry or departmental precedent; nor is there evidence that the ARC and TRC were to contribute to the scoring process equally. There is no evidence that the averaging methodology used by DOT is contrary to any statute or rule. The Department’s deriving the total score for Volume 2 by averaging all the evaluator’s scores was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition or arbitrary and capricious. AWD’s Contract Time As stated previously, the RFP provided the formula for scoring the proposed contract times as: 5 x (a/b), where a = lowest number of calendar days proposed by any bidder; and b = number of calendar days proposed by that bidder. Additionally, the RFP noted: “The Proposed Contract Time should incorporate and set forth an aggressive but realistic time frame for the required completion of the Total Project.” According to the RFP, any time more than 1,825 days would be nonresponsive. AWD’s Proposed Contract Time was 1,460 days; FAM’s Proposed Contract Time was the maximum provided by the RFP-– 1,825 days. This comes out to be a 365-day or a one-year difference. As a result, using the formula in the RFP, AWD achieved a score of 5.0 out of 5 points for its contract time, and FAM achieved a score of 4.0 points. FAM challenges AWD’s contract time, claiming it was not realistic. FAM argues the 1,460 days proposed by AWD was unrealistic and insinuates this number was done solely to manipulate the scoring. AWD counters, not only was it realistic, it was aggressive, as requested by the RFP. There is no evidence of collusion or that AWD knew the individual technical scores before it came up with its proposal or that there was any kind of unethical or improper conduct relating to the contract time. Rather there was competent and convincing evidence that AWD’s shorter time proposal was realistic given its resources and experience. Kevin McGlinchey, who was involved in developing AWD’s contract time, testified the calculation of AWD’s contract time was an on-going process and was not finalized until a short time before the price and time submission was due. The evidence established AWD’s joint members had previous experience with DOT and P3/design-build projects. In addition, AWD was a very large contractor in the state with access to adequate local labor. Archer employs 1,300 workers in the area; de Moya employees up to 300 workers in the area. For example, depending on equipment availability AWD could have five eight-hour shifts, five ten-hour shifts, or six eight-hour shifts; or AWD could increase the number of crews working each shift. This access to labor afforded AWD the ability to increase its crews and shifts, thereby reducing the length of total work time. AWD also reduced its contract time over the procurement process by changes in its construction plan that allowed it to overlap construction phases and work on more than one segment of the Project concurrently, instead of running consecutively as originally anticipated when it submitted preliminary design documents and MOT plans. Mr. Schiess testified that he and a DOT bridge expert reviewed AWD’s Proposed Contract Time to determine whether it was realistic. This review was conducted between the time the scores were publicly released on April 24, 2017, and the PSC meeting on May 12, 2017. Mr. Schiess testified “based on our experience in Florida and other projects [with] these contractors [Archer and de Moya], that [1,460 days] was not an unrealistic time.” Because there was competent evidence AWD had the resources and a plan to complete the Project in the 1,460 days, its contract time proposal was aggressive, realistic, and responsive to the RFP. AWD’s Financial Proposal FAM also challenges the “Pass” grade DOT awarded AWD on its Financial Proposal. It argues (1) DOT failed in not reviewing FAM’s financial proposal; (2) AWD’s original financial proposal was non-responsive; and (3) DOT improperly allowed AWD to supplement information to its original financial proposal. Section VI, M., of the RFP addresses the financial requirements of the RFP and the documentation that must be provided by bidders. The financial evaluation is a two-step process with an initial Financial Proposal to be submitted on the due date for the price proposals. After the PSC chose a BVP, Mr. Corbett and his staff was also responsible for reviewing a final letter of commitment or credit provided by the DB Firm, which was due 15 days following the Department’s posting of its Intent to Award. Mr. Corbett and his staff conducted the initial financial review for this procurement after the public meeting, announcing the technical scores, price proposals and contract times. The Department was to give the highest scoring bidder either a pass/fail grade, which was relayed to the PSC to make its final decision. During this period, the RFP specifically allowed Mr. Corbett to obtain additional financial information. It states: The Department’s evaluation of a Financial Proposal is solely for the benefit of the Department and not for the benefit of the Design-Build Firm, any entity related thereto, the public or any member thereof, nor create for any third party rights. . . . The Departments evaluation of each Financial Proposal will be on a pass/fail basis. Analysis of the Design-Build Firm’s Financial Proposal by the Department will include, but not be limited to the following: * * * d. Review of the Lender Letter(s) of Commitment or Demonstration of Line(s) of Credit to determine if it meets the financing needs established in the Project Financial Plan. * * * The Department reserves the right to request any additional information or pursue other actions required to meet its obligations to complete the financial due diligence. (RFP at 70.) As an initial matter, although Mr. Corbett did not conduct a concurrent pass/fail review of the financial proposal submitted by FAM (or the other bidders who made it to Phase IV), nothing in the RFP required the Department to review and assess the financial proposals of all the bidders. FAM asserts by failing to have its financial proposal evaluated, the PSC was deprived of the option of awarding the contract to FAM. However, if the PSC had opted not to award the contract to AWD despite its status as the highest scoring bidder, nothing in the RFP would have precluded the Department from initiating a pass/fail review of the FAM financial proposal at that point to assess FAM’s financial viability for the contract award. The Department did not err in evaluating only the highest scoring bidder, AWD. Regarding AWD’s responsiveness to the financial requirements of the RFP, AWD timely submitted its financial proposal to DOT on August 24, 2017, which included a preliminary letter of commitment (“PLOC”) from BankUnited. According to the RFP, the PLOC was required to contain the following information at a minimum: The lender was interested in providing financial support for the project; The lender had reviewed the financial requirements of the RFP; The amount of financial support the Lender intended to provide (no minimum amount was required by the RFP); Any special conditions to the PLOC. After AWD was ranked as the highest scoring bidder, Mr. Corbett and his staff conducted DOT’s initial review of AWD’s financial proposal. There is no dispute that DOT had the right to request any additional information or pursue other actions required to meet its duty of due diligence. The evidence established the original financial proposal met the minimum requirements of the RFP, but DOT requested additional assurances and clarification regarding its PLOC, which AWD provided. As Mr. Corbett explained, AWD’s Financial Proposal was responsive to the RFP requirements, but he had questions relating to the PLOC. Q.: And so this determination of responsiveness was made after you had the original financial proposal, Archer Western- de Moya, the first supplemental proposal and a second supplemental proposal that we just went over, correct? A.: So I mean, there is responsiveness and there is pass/fail, and I think that’s where we have to explore a little bit more. The letter states responsive, meaning it meets the minimum requirements. And then there is the pass/fail, which I don’t know why I didn’t address pass/fail, why I didn’t say it’s a pass in the letter. But the pass came at that point, too, yes. * * * So my answer is it wasn’t an additional proposal, it was--the original proposal was what was evaluated for responsiveness. We asked for additional assurances to make sure they were headed towards a path of getting the resources necessary to finance the project. So the determination was made after receiving all that information. It is evident on the face of the BankUnited PLOC that it is responsive, as it complies with the following minimum RFP requirements. BankUnited confirmed “its interest in providing financing” for the project. BankUnited stated it “has taken careful consideration to review and understand the financial elements of the Project.” BankUnited specified it was “prepared to provide a credit facility up to” $125 million; and the $125 million credit facility consists of $75 million from BankUnited and another $50 million from other participating banks. It is this reference to “other participating banks” that triggered Mr. Corbett to request further information. Attached to the PLOC was a term sheet from BankUnited that sets forth the conditions for its $125 million credit facility. Although FAM contends that the BankUnited PLOC is nonresponsive because BankUnited is only committing to provide $75 million of the $125 million credit to AWD, the evidence at the hearing established BankUnited was proposing to provide a single credit facility totaling $125 million, some of which BankUnited may obtain through group or a “pool” of lenders. The financial proposal was that BankUnited would be the lead arranger of multiple banks participating in the “lending pool.” Nothing in the RFP prohibited this type of “pool,” and the testimony at the hearing established DOT has accepted this kind of loan structure in the past. Where a single credit facility in the form of a loan pool is being proposed, there is nothing in the RFP that precluded BankUnited, as the lead arranger, from submitting the PLOC on behalf of all of the lenders that are or would be participating in the credit facility. Regardless, even if BankUnited’s PLOC is treated as offering a credit facility in the amount of $75 million rather than the full $125 million, this does not render the AWD financial proposal nonresponsive since the RFP merely requires that the PLOC state the “amount the Lender intends to lend,” and does not require what amount that should be. The RFP only states that the commitments “should meet the required amount [of gap financing] identified in the Project Financial Plan.” Obviously, the goal was to ensure the winning bidder had the ability to secure preliminary commitments equaling the amount it may have to put forward for completion of the Project because DOT would be making period payments, but not until after the DB Firm had incurred the expenses. Given BankUnited’s PLOC meets the minimum requirements of the RFP, AWD’s financial proposal was responsive. Moreover, the RFP allowed DOT to look beyond the bare minimum requirements of the RFP to obtain a higher level of assurance before finalizing a “passing” grade. Mr. Corbett also wanted the information in anticipation of questions that the PSC members may have. Specifically, the evidence established that on April 25, 2017, Ms. Chinapoo’s requested AWD to provide additional information regarding the proposed pooling loan being offered by BankUnited. In particular, Mr. Corbett sought “additional assurances” that BankUnited would be able to obtain the balance of the “pool” financing from other participating banks. On April 27, 2017, AWD responded to DOT’s request for additional assurances. In this response, AWD reaffirmed that BankUnited was committed to provide the Final Letter of Commitment that was required under DOT’s RFP. Because AWD’s compliance with the request for information was provided prior to the agency’s announcement that it intended to award the contract to AWD, these additional documents did not violate section 120.57(3)(f). On April 28, 2017, AWD also confirmed to DOT that it had taken steps toward finalizing the $125 million pooling credit facility described in the BankUnited PLOC. AWD also provided another PLOC from Private Bank indicating Private Bank also had an interest in participating in the BankUnited credit facility. Private Bank’s PLOC proposed that it would participate in BankUnited’s credit facility (rather than offering its own credit facility) and that its proposed $50 million loan to the $125 million pool would be the same as the conditions set forth in BankUnited’s term sheet. AWD’s April 28 response also advised that it was continuing to explore the possibility of having BankUnited provide a credit facility for the entire $125 million in gap financing needed. The details regarding this alternative credit facility were described in a letter from BankUnited that was attached to AWD’s April 28 response. Mr. Corbett admitted he considered the additional information received from AWD before announcing his final decision to “pass” the AWD financial proposal; and this information solidified his decision to give AWD a passing grade. Although hypothetically it is possible that had AWD provided different information, Mr. Corbett would have not been assured and may have reached a different result, this is not evidence of an error. Rather it is the essence of conducting “due diligence.” It is also true the additional information BankUnited provided included information that was not contained in AWD’s April 24 financial proposal. Based on this, FAM argues that the April 27 and April 28 responses constitute modified or amended financial proposals that were submitted after the RFP’s financial proposal deadline in violation of section 120.57(3)(f). However, FAM’s position must be rejected for several reasons. First, the RFP expressly authorized DOT “to request any additional information or pursue other actions” in furtherance of its financial due diligence. This clearly is broad authority that does not limit DOT’s inquiry to information that merely clarifies the financial proposal. Having failed to challenge this “due diligence” language in the RFP provision within the time permitted by section 120.57(3)(b), FAM has waived any objection to DOT’s use of this provision. Further, in both its April 27 and 28 responses, AWD reaffirmed that it was prepared to move forward with the BankUnited credit facility proposed in AWD’s April 24 financial proposal. Although AWD’s April 28 response included information from Private Bank, this information did not propose a new or different credit structure, it simply provided additional information regarding the pool structure expressed originally by BankUnited. Because the BankUnited credit facility indicates that there would be other lenders participating in its credit facility, the identification of Private Bank is consistent with, rather than amending or modifying, the financing plan presented in AWD’s financial proposal. Again, the purpose of the Financial Proposal and PLOC was not to obtain a final commitment from the DB Firm to a particular financing arrangement with a particular lender. Instead, the RFP only required the proposer to present its “preliminary” or possible financing plans so that DOT could evaluate the likelihood that the final award would go to a proposer that had the financial resources necessary to finish the project on time. Only after the contract was awarded would AWD be required to present DOT with its final financing plan in the form of a final letter of commitment. Nothing in the RFP required that this final financing plan be identical to the preliminary financing plan that was presented in AWD’s initial Financial Proposal. As such, the Department’s request for and consideration of the information from AWD regarding the BankUnited PLOC and the pooling credit structure did not violate section 120.54(3)(f), and was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition or arbitrary and capricious. FAM also argues the Preliminary Term Sheet (“PTS”) attached to the BankUnited PLOC conflicts with the RFP, which specifies the circumstances under which money paid under the proposed contract may be assigned to a lender as security for a loan. The RFP provision at issue, referred to by the parties as the “Assignment Clause,” states in relevant part, as follows: Reimbursement shall be made to the Design- Build Firm by warrant mailed to the Project Specific Escrow Account [“PSEA”] using a unique vendor number sequence. The Design-Build Firm may, with the express written consent of the Surety(ies) and the Lender(s) Financier(s), sell assign or pledge any monies paid into the Project Specific Escrow Account by the Department in favor of third parties and including but not limited to the Design-Build Firm’s Surety(ies) and Lender(s)/Financier(s); however, any such sale, assignment or pledge must only attach to payments made by the Department after such funds have been paid by warrant mailed to the Project Specific Escrow Account, and no sale, assignment or pledge of any receivable from the Department is authorized nor will be permitted by the Department. (RFP at 63)(emphasis added). AWD submitted with its Financial Proposal the BankUnited PLOC, which had an attachment with the following relevant language: Seller [AWD] proposes to sell the right of certain future [DOT] payments . . . to one or more Purchasers in order to finance the Project. As established by Mr. Corbett and Department e-mails, the intent of the Assignment Clause was to make “each [contract] payment payable to the vendor/contractor executing the agreement.” In this regard, the RFP treats the deposit of funds into the PSEA as payment to the contractor. The assignment is permitted under the RFP’s Assignment Clause if AWD’s assignment of a contract payment to a lender does not divert DOT’s payments away from the PSEA to BankUnited. In other words, there is no violation if the funds continue to be deposited into the PSEA. If, however, the assignment gives BankUnited the right to receive payments from DOT before the payments are mailed to the escrow account, it violates the RFP’s Assignment Clause. There is no dispute that the BankUnited PTS purports to assign certain rights held by AWD to the BankUnited as collateral for the proposed credit facility. The terminology used to describe the assignment is non-specific and creates ambiguity as to what the particular right is that is being assigned or sold. For instance, there is language in the PTS indicating that AWD is selling or assigning its “right to payment from DOT” without describing what that right is. In order to know what “right to payment” is being assigned, it has to be determined what right to payment AWD would actually have under its DOT contract since AWD cannot sell or assign contract rights that it does not have. See Cole v. Angora Enters., Inc., 403 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). As established by the RFP and testimony at the hearing, AWD will have no right under the DOT contract to receive payments directly from DOT; rather, payments from DOT will first be deposited into the PSEA, which will then be available for disbursement to the DB Firm. Because AWD will have no right to direct payment from DOT (as opposed to indirectly through disbursement from the PSEA), AWD cannot assign or sell a right to direct payments from DOT to any lender, including BankUnited. Stated differently, the only “right to payment” that AWD can assign is its right to payment from the PSEA. Moreover, the plain meaning of the PTS establishes AWD does not intend to assign or sell to BankUnited the right to receive payments from DOT before the payments are deposited into the Project Specific Escrow Account. The PTS states as follows: The Seller [AWD] shall establish a project specific escrow account (the “Project Specific Escrow Account”) with the Escrow Agent. All payments payable by DOT under the Department Contract will be deposited into the Project Specific Escrow Account. (emphasis added). Consistent with this directive, the PTS requires the parties, including BankUnited, to execute the “DOT Project Specific Escrow Account Form” as part of their financing transaction. As established by the Department’s exhibits, the purpose of DOT Project Specific Escrow Account Form, which must be signed by both the bidder and lender (or in this case AWD and BankUnited), is to “irrevocably” request, authorize and direct DOT “to process, issue and transmit any and all future payments otherwise payable directly to [the DB Firm] to now be processed, issued and transmitted using DB Firm’s Project Specific Escrow Account . . . in lieu of DB Firm’s regular vendor account. . . .” This irrevocable request to DOT would be made in the name of AWD as the DB Firm contracting with DOT. As the lender, BankUnited’s signature on the form would indicate its consent and agreement “to be so bound by the entirety of the terms of [AWD’s] Request for Specific Escrow Account ” In other words, by signing this form, BankUnited will be agreeing to be bound by AWD’s irrevocable request to have all DOT payments deposited into the Project Specific Escrow Account. This means that, in accordance with the RFP’s Assignment Clause, BankUnited will be irrevocably agreeing not to receive payments from DOT before payments are deposited into the Project Specific Escrow Account. The arrangement between AWD and BankUnited does not violate the Assignment Clause and is, therefore, responsive. AWD’s Technical Proposal FAM challenges a number of aspects of AWD’s technical plan as being non-responsive to the RFP. Specifically, it claims AWD’s proposal violates the non-modifiable requirements for the number of lanes on certain portions of the Project and the lane width requirements. Basic/Continuous Lane Requirements for I-395 (Attachment A-33) As described earlier, AWD made substantial changes to the RFP’s concept plans for I-395 and SR 836 by proposing a two- tiered road formation made up of a two-lane viaduct on an upper level and a collector road system on the lower level. In order to pursue this design, AWD submitted an ATC proposal which was eventually approved as “ATC 12C”. The proposed viaduct would have two continuous lanes in each direction between the two major highway systems, SR 836 and I-395, without being impeded by local SR 836 traffic. The local traffic would be carried on a lower roadway or Collector- Distributor (“CD”) road underneath the viaduct. This lower CD road would also have one continuous lane in each direction, for a total of three continuous lanes in each direction. DOT determined that the viaduct concept and changes were an improvement over the RFP concept plan. As explained by Anthony Jorges, a traffic roadway engineer for BCC: First with the viaduct, by separating the traffic, it provides you unimpeded access to and from Miami Beach to the east, so it improves the emergency evacuation and improves access for emergency services. This addresses the event traffic issue that I brought up earlier. While you have events that may cause backups on the lower level for local traffic, we do have a separate level for the mainline that’s going to carry through. So you have those two lanes on top free at all times. So that was a significant advantage that we were looking at. And in addition to that, there is also the additional lane on the westbound to northbound--I am sorry, the eastbound to northbound movement, and that is taking it from the one lane that was in the RFP concept to the two lanes that Archer Western de Moya provided. That provides significant improvements to the operations of the mainline. It also provides safety benefits because now traffic that was queuing up on this ramp back on to the mainline is separated. Whatever traffic queues up here is separate from the mainline, and you won’t have the possibility for the speed differential, which contributes significantly to accidents. FAM contends that DOT erred in approving a technical proposal ATC 12C, because the number of continuous basic lanes on the highway was a non-modifiable requirement of the RFP. According to the testimony at the hearing and American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets (“AASHTO Manual”), highway lanes can be grouped into two categories: basic lanes and auxiliary lanes.7/ A basic lane is essentially one that is designated and maintained over a significant length of a route, irrespective of changes in traffic volume and lane balance needs. The parties also referred to a “basic lane” as a “continuous” lane-–one that allows traffic to move over a “significant length of route” without having to change lanes. An auxiliary lane is essentially all lanes other than the basic lanes. It is defined as “the portion of the roadway adjoining the through lanes for speed change, turning, storage for turning, weaving, truck climbing and other purposes that supplement through-traffic movement.” As part of the 2010 I-395 PD&E, DOT found that I-395 lacks sufficient capacity “for system linkage” with SR 836 and other roadways due, in part, to the fact that it has only one continuous lane in each direction while the linking roadways have three. One continuous lane on I-395 was inadequate to provide the necessary access or linkage to the other road systems. Initially, the Federal Highway Authority (“FHWA”) approved a plan to address I-395’s deficiencies which added one additional continuous lane in each direction. On June 15, 2015, however, the FHWA approved the Final Re-Evaluation (completed by BCC) for the I-395 PD&E. This version included a design change allowing “three (3) continuous lanes in each direction to match 836 on the west and MacArthur Causeway on the east.” (emphasis added). DOT noted that this design change was supported by AASHTO design principles, including the basic lane concept. A concept plan for the I-395 project, which included the three continuous lanes and later became the RFP concept plan, was attached to the Final Re-Evaluation. Section VI of the Final Re-Evaluation addressed DOT’s commitments for the I-395 project, including commitment number 14: “[m]aintain and enhance continuity between SR 836/I-95 facility on the west and the MacArthur Causeway on the east.” DOT concluded on page 18 of the Final Re-evaluation that the addition of the third continuous lane on I-395 was necessary to support this commitment, stating: STATUS: [ ] Design Changes No. 1 and No. 7 describe the need to add an additional lane in each direction and widen a portion of the westbound MacArthur Causeway Bridge in order to accommodate the changes to the ingress and egress points of the Port of Miami Tunnel. These changes allow the I-395 project to be compatible with both roadways to the east and west and provide system continuity. DOT also noted that the I-395 project would be constructed concurrently with the SR 836 project, which was the subject of a separate PD&E that was completed in 2011. The SR 836 PD&E Study noted on page 6: More specific improvements potentially involve the provision of a minimum of six continuous (i.e., 3 directional) mainline lanes and the provision of parallel collector distributor facilities to separate the system to system traffic from the local to system traffic. This language establishes MDX also intended that there be three continuous lanes in each direction as proposed by DOT for the I-395 project. In short, DOT’s intent was to have three continuous lanes that would extend from the western boundary of SR 836 to the eastern boundary of I-395. This would allow a driver in any of these lanes to travel from one end of the project to the other without having to change lanes. As a result of the re-evaluation of the PD&E, BCC developed the language for the RFP that related to continuous lane requirements also found in Attachment A08. This language states, in relevant part: The Department has prepared a set of Reference Documents, which include Concept Plans. These plans convey an established set of design objectives to which the Design-Build Firm is required to accomplish in [the I-395] component of the project. The Department’s design objectives include: * * * Provide 3 continuous through lanes to the I-395 Mainline in the Eastbound and Westbound direction. The RFP also provided “[t]he Design-Build Firm shall not modify the following requirements with an ATC Proposal . . . Minimum basic number of lanes shown in Attachment A-33.” Mr. Jorge’s testimony was that the purpose of this language was to be consistent with the objective to provide three continuous lanes in each direction on I-395 to and from the Signature Bridge. The reason the word “minimum” was included in there was we wanted to make sure that we were getting at least three lanes in each direction, and that is the intent behind having the word “minimum.” We did understand that there would be a possibility for changes. But we wanted to make sure that we had at least three lanes in each direction. Attachment A-33 is titled, “I-395 Lane Schematic” and includes information relating to the number of “basic lanes,” “auxiliary lanes,” and the “direction of lanes” at various points of entry via connector roads and ramps onto I-395. For the Signature Bridge, Attachment A-33 has a footnote that states, “The Signature Bridge Shall Accommodate a Minimum of Four 12’ Lanes in Each Direction[.]” The plain reading of Attachment A-33 in the context of the RFP is that the three continuous or basic lane requirements applied to the roadways, but that the Signature Bridge was required to have four continuous lanes. On its face, Attachment A-33 is a schematic drawing that shows all of the lanes in the RFP concept plan for I-395. Although four of the lanes depicted in Attachment A-33 are identified as auxiliary lanes, the rest are identified as basic lanes. However, absent is any indication of some “minimum” number of basic lanes that must be maintained and that cannot be altered through the ATC process, except at one location, which is at the Signature Bridge. For that specific location, Attachment A-33 states that there must be a “minimum of four 12’ lanes in each direction.” (emphasis added). The fact that a minimum is specified at one location on Attachment A-33, but not others, is an indication that DOT did not intend to establish a minimum for other locations on the schematic. Indeed, if DOT had intended for all basic lanes depicted at each location to be the minimum number of lanes for that location, then there would have been no point to including a specific note to express that the number of lanes at the Signature Bridge location was a minimum of four lanes. Mr. Jorges confirmed that this language requiring four lanes in each direction in Attachment A-33 applied only to the Signature Bridge. Q.: And what is the minimum number of basic lanes that there need to be at that [the Signature Bridge] location? A.: Four. Q.: And is a minimum number of basic lanes indicated on attachment A-33 at any other location? A.: No, it’s not. Q.: Can you explain how indicating a minimum number of lanes at the signature bridge is consistent with the PD&E? A.: The PD&E called for three lanes in each direction of I-395, so at the signature bridge, you have 16 a situation where you have the three lanes from I-395 plus the one lane from the eastbound connector, and that’s how we arrived at the four. Like I mentioned before, it was beyond the minimum three that we were expecting, and that’s why we felt it was necessary to identify minimum for that specific location. * * * Q.: Do you have a view or an opinion as to whether or not it would make sense to have a minimum basic number of lanes at every location that’s depicted on A-33? A.: Well, if every lane there was designated as a minimum requirement, there would be no room for any sort of modification or changes by the team, so it essentially eliminates any possibility for innovation and really negates the design- build process. Q.: Can you explain whether or not that would be consistent or inconsistent with the objective of the RFP? A.: It’s--the attachment is consistent with the objectives. One of the key objectives was to have three lanes in each direction. And there is other objectives stated, but they are not specific as to the number of lanes. Although Petitioner’s roadway engineer offered its own interpretation of the Attachment A-33 and the RFP language regarding continuous lanes, Mr. Jorges’ testimony was more reliable and convincing. Mr. Jorges was familiar with the history of “continuous lane” requirements and the reasons for including that requirement in the RFP. He and others from BCC were involved in drafting the concept plans and the RFP language that included the “three continuous-lane” requirement in the RFP. In reality, while the RFP stated the proposals were to “adhere to the number of lanes” in the concept plans, each bidder also had the option of pursuing an ATC that would allow it to deviate from this requirement. The purpose of the ATC process was to encourage the proposers to offer innovative solutions or an approach that was equal to or better than the RFP concept plans or other requirements in the RFP. The viaduct design offered by AWD was found to be “equal to or better” to the concept plan and thus meets the standard for issuing an ATC because (1) AWD’s ATC proposal does not preclude DOT from “meeting the Department Commitments,” which are defined to include the ones “listed in the PD&E, FEIS/ORS and any Reevaluations attached” and (2) AWD’s ATC proposal did not violate the Specific ATC Restrictions set forth in the RFP. Attachment A-33 plainly states there must be a minimum number of basic lanes at the Signature Bridge location only. FAM’s argument that every basic lane identified on Attachment A-33 should be treated as a “minimum” continuous lane that cannot be modified is rejected. The Department did not violate the RFP by issuing ATC 12C, and AWD’s proposal with this ATC is responsive to the RFP. Basic Lane Requirements for SR 836 (Attachment MDXA-02) FAM also challenges the number of lanes proposed by AWD for the MDX’s portion of SR 836 of the Project, which are established by attachment MDXA-02. Specifically, FAM argues AWD’s plan is “one basic lane short of the four basic lanes required by the RFP from Northwest 10th Avenue going eastbound through to I-395.” (FAM’s PRO, p. 16 at para. 45) The issue to be determined is whether the RFP and MDXA-02 requires four continuous lanes for this portion of the Project. Unlike Attachment A-33, Attachment MDXA-02 is not a schematic of all the lanes on the SR 836 concept plan. Instead, Attachment MDX-A02 contains only “typical sections” or a view of a cross-section (not a linear) of the roadway at a particular location. It is not possible to determine from only a cross- section view of a segment of the roadway whether any of the lanes are continuous over a significant length of SR 836. Thus, Attachment MDX-A02 does not reveal which lanes on SR 836 are basic or continuous. Although Mike Madison, FAM’s roadway engineer, testified it was “possible” by reference to the typical sections “to determine what the basic lane requirements are for State Road 836 even if they are not identified as basic lanes on those typical sheets,” he did not rely on (or even refer to) Attachment MDX-A02. Instead, he relied on the RFP concept plan and the industry definition of “basic lane.” The RFP’s SR 836 concept plan referenced by Mr. Madison does identify which lanes are continuous. Again, the concept plans were to serve as reference documents for proposers to build off of and improve. The SR 836 concept plan serves as “general information only,” except as “specifically set forth in the body of” the RFP. Regardless, both parties offered evidence that AWD’s SR 836 proposal includes three basic or continuous lanes. Mr. Jorges’ testimony established the SR 836 concept plan has three basic lanes on the mainline and no basic lanes on the adjacent collector ramp. Instead, the fourth lane that FAM claims was necessary and non-modifiable was actually an auxiliary lane, not a basic lane. The evidence established the “fourth lane” in question is a CD road. Although a CD road can be a continuous lane, here it was not. In the concept plan, the CD road merely collects traffic from Northwest 12th Avenue, which it then distributes to I-395 without providing any access to or from SR 836. Because the CD road on the concept plan does not serve traffic that originates from SR 836, the concept plan’s CD road does not serve the function of a continuous or basic lane for SR 836. Further, the alleged “fourth lane” on the RFP concept plan’s CD road is not continuous and, thus, cannot be considered a “basic” lane. Mr. Madison admitted the concept plan’s CD road does not originate at the western boundary of the SR 836 project. Instead, the concept plan’s CD road originates at Northwest 12th Avenue, nearly halfway between the Project’s western and eastern boundaries. Thus, traffic cannot navigate the length of the SR 836 project on this fourth lane without changing lanes as required by the PD&E. Hypothetically, as explained by Mr. Jorges, a driver would not have access to a continuous lane on the concept plan’s CD road; on the concept plan, a driver entering the CD road via the northbound Northwest 12th Avenue entrance cannot reach the interchange and I-395 without shifting to another lane. After the interchange, this same driver would be forced to shift to another lane again to reach the MacArthur Causeway. By contrast, a driver accessing AWD’s CD road at the western boundary of SR 836 would be able to reach the MacArthur Causeway with no lane changes. Finally, as noted above, the Final Re-Evaluation for the I-395 PD&E proposed the addition of a third continuous lane to I-395 so that I-395 would have “three continuous lanes to match 836 on the west.” (emphasis added). The goal of the I-395 project was therefore symmetry in the number of basic lanes to improve linkage between the I-395 and SR 836 systems. The RFP required three basic or continuous lanes for the MDX portion of SR 836. AWD’s proposal was responsive to this basic lane requirement. Minimum Lane Width Requirements FAM next contends AWD’s proposal is non-responsive because it reduces the lane width for the lane and ramps for the SR 836/I-95 interchange. There is no dispute AWD’s lanes were reduced by an ATC from 12 feet to 11 feet at the ramp in question, but at issue is whether the ramp is in the I-95 portion of the Project, which is modifiable (i.e., not subject to the ATC restrictions); or is in the MDX portion of the Project, which is non-modifiable. The RFP states that “services performed by the Design-Build Firm shall be in compliance with” DOT’s Plans Preparation Manual (“PPM”). (RFP at 77.) Included in the PPM is a 12-foot lane-width requirement. For that portion of the roadwork within the scope of the MDX project, the RFP states that the winning bidder “shall not modify” through the ATC process the “[m]inimum widths of mainline lanes and ramp lanes.” (RFP at 84.) However, pursuant to Addendum 11, this ATC restriction was removed from the RFP for roadwork that is part of DOT’s I-395 project. In ATC 12C, AWD indicated it would be reducing the lane width of the SR 836 west-north connector from 12 feet to 11 feet starting at the physical gore. A “gore” is the area where a ramp joins the mainline or where two streams of traffic converge. Although there was testimony about a “theoretical gore” as opposed to a “physical gore,” engineers use the physical gore to mark the point where the ramp ends and the highway begins. In this case, AWD, through ATC 12C, sought to narrow the width of the traffic lanes at the point where the northbound ramp physically joins and transitions onto I-95. According to FAM’s roadway engineer, this reduction in the lane width is necessary because this ramp connects eastbound SR 836, which has 12-foot lanes, with northbound I-95, which has 11-foot lanes. The evidence establishes the portion of the connector road at issue is not part of the MDX project because it is owned and maintained by DOT, not MDX. This is confirmed by the fact that DOT owns the Northwest 17th Street Bridge (Bridge ID 870369), which is on the connector road to the south of the lane-width reduction area. DOT’s ownership of the lane-width reduction area is also consistent with DOT’s I-395/I-95 maintenance map, which shows that DOT (and not MDX) maintains this part of the roadway. FAM does not rely on the jurisdictional or maintenance maps, but rather relies on two documents in AWD’s ATC 12C application in which AWD referred to “836” as the applicable “State Road Number” and “MDX” as the “Approving Agency” for the proposed lane-width reduction. FAM also noted that AWD used station markers referring to SR 836 to identify the lane-width reduction area. However, as confirmed by the attachments to the RFP, including the DOT maintenance maps and DOT’s bridge inspection report, AWD was mistaken that MDX owned this segment of the roadway. This does not make DOT’s granting of the ATC erroneous. Moreover, FAM offered no document prepared by either DOT or MDX, including the RFP itself, which established MDX’s jurisdiction over this portion of the roadway. Here, the lane-width reduction occurs north of the physical gore, which is the point where the lanes originating from the ramp become physically connected to the lanes on the existing highway, I-95, via pavement that lies between the converging lanes. For safety purposes, according to the AASHTO Manual, once a roadway becomes physically connected to the highway, it is good engineering practice to design the roadway to match the criteria for the highway (e.g., 11-foot lanes) rather than to continue using the ramp criteria (e.g., 12-foot lanes). Even FAM’s roadway engineer acknowledged that, at some point before reaching I-95, the lanes joining I-95 from the connector road must transition from 12 feet to 11 feet to match the I-95 lanes, and that good engineering practice requires that this transition be done gradually rather than “suddenly.” He conceded that the lane-width transition proposed by AWD was reasonable, but disagreed whether the ramp ended at the physical or theoretical gore point. Q.: Right. You agree with me that at some point the lanes that are coming in to I-95 have to transition from 12 to 11 to match? A.: They would have to at some point. Q.: You can’t just go from 12 and all of a sudden have an 11-foot lane, right, that’s bad engineering practice? A.: Yes. Q.: As a matter of fact, the PPM won’t let you do it that way and AASHTO, too, you’ve got to have a transition? A.: Correct. Q.: Okay. So we are not questioning the reasonableness of having a transition? A.: Reasonableness, no. Q.: Okay. So I think to figure out the disconnect again, do you think the ramp doesn’t end at the gore? A.: No, it ends north of the gore, the other side of the gore point. Q.: But you just said there are two points. A.: Theoretical gore points. Q.: You believe the ramp ends at the theoretical gore point? A.: Yes. At the same time, FAM offered no evidence to show that it would still be possible to comply with the gradual transition requirement in the PPM and AASHTO if the lane reduction were delayed until after the theoretical gore when there is no longer any pavement separating the 12-foot lanes from the connector road and the existing 11-foot I-95 lanes. Because MDX neither owns nor maintains that part of the roadway where the lane is narrowed to 11 feet, this road segment is not within MDX’s portion of the Project or jurisdiction. Because the portion of AWD’s proposed lane narrowing for the ramp to I-95 was in the Department’s I-95 jurisdiction, it was modifiable. Therefore, AWD’s ATC proposal with the lane-width reduction was responsive and also a reasonably safe way to transition traffic to I-95. FAM’s Proposal Prior to and at the hearing, AWD argued FAM’s proposal was non-responsive to the RFP and to DOT’s regulations in a number of ways: (1) FAM’s engineer of record, FIGG-WGI, was a joint venture and, as such, could not work on the Project; FAM’s bridge architect, Linda Figg, was not qualified to serve in that capacity; (3) FAM’s Financial Proposal lacked the requisite audited financial statements; and (4) FAM’s technical proposal was inconsistent with the RFP requirements. FIGG-WGI, Inc. First, AWD claims FAM’s designation of FIGG-WGI as an engineer of record violates Florida Administrative Code Rule 14- 75.003(2), which states as follows: (2) The Department shall not recognize joint ventures for purposes of qualifying consultants to work for the Department. Each individual or firm will be annually qualified based upon individual or firm capability. FAM designated in its Letter of Response both “FIGG Bridge Engineers, Inc.,” and “Wantman Group, Inc.” as two subcontractors as part of the FAM team. Later, however, FAM designated FIGG-WGI as FAM’s “Lead Design Firm.” Prior to submitting its Letter of Response, David Wantman asked DOT what information a design joint venture needed to submit to receive DOT approval to participate in this procurement. Carla Perry, a DOT procurement manager, was responsible for the prequalification process for this RFP. She informed FIGG-WGI engineering joint ventures “are not recognized” and that WGI would need to be designated as the engineering firm instead of the joint venture. She suggested the following: The foreign firm could sub to the Construction JV (or to Wantman), but the Engineering JV you referenced below would not be recognized for purposes of fulfilling the technical qualification in the engineering work types, and would be found non-responsive. . . . FAM’s position at final hearing and in its PRO was that FIGG–WGI was not a “legal joint venture.” This position is contrary to the evidence in FAM’s technical proposal noting FIGG–WGI was “organized as a fully integrated, single-purpose entity, which is the engineering firm of record” and the testimony at the hearing establishing FIGG-WGI was formed for legal reasons to insulate its members (Figg Engineering and Wantman) from third-party liability on large construction projects. FIGG-WGI is a joint venture and its participation in the Project, had FAM been chosen, would have violated DOT’s rules regarding what type of business structures can work on DOT projects. The violation, however, was curable. The RFP allows changes in designated key personnel and “teaming arrangements” subject to the Department’s approval. Approval of changes would be based on “whether or not the proposed substitutions in Partner/Teaming Arrangements are comparable to the Partner/Teaming Arrangements identified in the Letter of Response and/or Technical Proposal.” Here, the evidence establishes that the members of the joint venture are both individually prequalified to do work for DOT. In reality, their employees are the same employees of the joint venture which would have been working on the Project had FAM been chosen as the BVP. Moreover, the testimony at the hearing established that if FAM was chosen, both Figg Bridge Engineers, Inc., and Wantman Group, Inc., would have individually contracted with FAM in whatever corporate form would have been required by DOT. The RFP “Waiver or Irregularities” also provides FDOT may waive irregularities in proposals “where such is merely a matter of form and not of substance, and the correction . . . of which is not prejudicial to other Proposers.” Here, AWD failed to sufficiently establish how it suffered (either potentially or actually) from FAM’s designation of FIGG-WGI, LLC. Nor was there any evidence of how AWD would have been prejudiced if FAM was allowed to substitute the individual members of the joint venture, if FAM had been chosen to be the BVP. Any error in designating FIGG-WFI, LLC, as its lead designer and engineer of record was a curable minor irregularity that would not have made FAM’s proposal non-responsive. Linda Figg Second, AWD makes the same arguments regarding Linda Figg’s designation as “Bridge Architect” as it did in its pre- hearing motions as to why FAM’s proposal was non-responsive: the RFP required bidders to designate a bridge architect; and Linda Figg, the person designated by FAM, is not an architect. FAM designated Ms. Figg in its Letter of Response as its “Lead Bridge Architect.” Ms. Figg is not licensed as an architect with the State of Florida under chapter 481, Florida Statutes, (Architecture, Interior Design, and Landscape Architecture) nor is she licensed in any other state. The RFP is silent as to the qualifications of a bridge architect. Nothing in the RFP indicates the designated bridge architect must be registered or licensed; nor does it require the designated bridge architect to meet specific educational or other qualifications. No evidence was provided at the hearing as to how the Department defined “bridge architect.” In fact, FDOT did not join with AWD in this argument. Nor was there evidence at the hearing establishing the industry standard for defining a “bridge architect.” Merriam-Webster defines “architect” as “a person who designs buildings and advises in their construction.” Architect, Merriam-Webster Online (2017), https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/architect (accessed on February 23, 2017). Ms. Figg meets this definition of “architect.” Moreover, Figg Engineering is prequalified by DOT and has available professional staff (other than Ms. Figg) who are licensed architects and/or professional engineers. As such, FAM’s designation of Ms. Figg as its Lead Bridge Engineer did not make its proposal non-responsive. FAM’s Bridge Design – Load AWD also asserts FAM’s Signature Bridge proposal violates the RFP’s non-modifiable requirement that “[a]ll Signature Bridge components shall be part of the structural system that carries bridge Dead Load (DL) and Live Load (LL).” “Dead load” is the actual weight of the bridge structure; “live load” is the added weight of the traffic traveling on the bridge. As explained at the hearing, “components” are the necessary parts of the bridge: superstructure (what cars drive on); substructure (pylons or columns); and foundation (what the pylons and columns are set on). In contrast, railings are safety devices and considered “appurtenances” as opposed to “components.” FAM’s bridge design contained two rotating disks, each on top of an extended arm. Bridge components that do not serve a purpose or carry any weight were not allowed by the RFP, and bidders could not obtain an ATC to change this requirement. FAM’s own bridge engineer, Denny Pate, testified that nonstructural parts of the bridge were prohibited by the RFP. Q.: Can you give the judge an example of a nonstructural bridge component that would be noncompliant under the RFP? A.: The RFP requirement, obviously, is--in my opinion, is saying: We don’t want fake bridge components. For example, there is a project development over here just west of Port St. Joe on the coast there called WindMark. And as part of their entrance to their development, they have a very standard short-span girder bridge, but they have put up steel, fake steel trusses along the sides that basically add interest to the bridge, make it visually more unique, but they don’t do anything. They are not structural. Mr. Pate went on to testify that the rings on the tops of FAM’s proposed bridges do not carry any live load. They were not necessary and could be removed without any effect on the bridge’s structural integrity.8/ This was consistent with the testimony of John Corven, AWD’s bridge engineering expert. Mr. Corven explained the loads in FAM’s Signature Bridge proposal picked up by the cables into the pylon did not find their way into the single arm with a rotating disc and, thus, the arm and disc would not be part of the load-carrying capability of the bridge. The inclusion of non-load bearing components was more than a minor irregularity. One could imagine a scenario where an aesthetic design may compromise safety concerns. More importantly, failure to adhere to the restriction requiring only load-carrying components had the potential of prejudicing other bidders who complied with this requirement from coming up with more eye-pleasing bridge designs. Mr. Corven testified: Q.: As an engineer, what would be the impact if that restriction were lifted in terms of the work you are doing from an engineering standpoint, meaning if you no longer had to worry about dead and live load components, how does that impact how you go about designing a structure? A.: Well, I think it would free the engineer to more artistic and aesthetic expressions for elements that might capture a visual appeal but not be functional structurally. Although the rotating ring may have been aesthetically and architecturally interesting, it was prohibited by the RFP. As such, FAM’s Signature Bridge design with the arm and rings was non-responsive. Twin Structures AWD also asserted FAM’s Signature Bridge proposal violated the RFP’s prohibition against “twin structures” found in the Aesthetic Manual for the RFP which states: The signature bridge shall be two fully independent bridges that are made to look like one form (e.g. twin basket handle bridges void of a visually unifying element will not be allowed). This structural autonomy is necessary because the EB and WB structures will be constructed sequentially, yet the stakeholders have insisted upon the appearance of one aesthetic entity. Elsewhere the RFP notes, the bridge proposals must adhere to the following minimum requirements: “No twin structures.” The common sense meaning of “twin structures” is two bridges that are identical or exact duplicates. Simply looking at the design, FAM’s proposal’s eastbound and westbound structures are not identical, but rather inversely similar. Moreover, as established by Mr. Pate’s unrefuted testimony, there were a number of “non-twinning” aspects of FAM’s Signature Bridge proposal. The westbound bridge runs straight, whereas the eastbound bridge contains a horizontal curve. The towers are mirrored so that the features are not in the same direction. The features on the two structures are staggered. There are a different number of spans in the overall length of the structures. The overall structures are different lengths: Bridge 8 (eastbound) has a signature bridge length of 980 feet and 1,432 feet of overall length between the spans; and Bridge 9 (westbound) has 977 feet for the Signature Bridge and 1,207 feet in overall length. FAM’s proposed Signature Bridge design did not contain twin structures prohibited by the RFP requirements. Constant Girder Depth AWD also challenges FAM’s Signature Bridge as being non-responsive to the Aesthetic Manual’s requirement “the signature bridge shall have a constant depth superstructure.” The language of the RFP does not include this reference, but does require “[g]irder depth on each side of the expansion joints shall be the same, i.e., no steps allowed.” As explained at the hearing “girder depth” is “basically what your eye sees as the distance from the top to the bottom of the roadway surface.” Both AWD’s and FAM’s bridge engineering experts testified the girder depth on each side of the expansion joint was the same in FAM’s Signature Bridge design and complied with the RFP language requiring equal girder depth on each side of the expansion joint. FAM’s Signature Bridge was responsive to the RFP’s girder depth requirement. MOT Plan Next, AWD contends FAM’s MOT plans are non-responsive because (1) the plans do not illustrate pedestrian access; (2) the plans do not have the requisite number of traffic lanes; and (3) the plans contain two reverse curves without a tangent. The RFP requires the following: The Construction Phasing/Sequencing Plan shall provide information regarding Traffic management for Total Project . . . [and] shall include a narrative describing the means by which the Design Build Firm will move vehicular, bicycle and pedestrian traffic along the Project Limits. The evidence established FAM provided a narrative description of pedestrian access in its technical proposal and submitted MOT plans that allow for the same level of pedestrian access as exists in the present condition. As such, FAM met the pedestrian access requirements of the RFP, and its MOT was responsive to the pedestrian access requirements. AWD next contends that the RFP requires that three lanes of traffic be maintained during all MOT phases because that is what exists in the present condition. However, DOT clarified in writing during the Q&A phase that proposers need only provide the same number of lanes shown in the RFP concept plans during MOT. The evidence at the hearing established FAM provides the same number of traffic lanes shown in the Concept Plans, and as such its MOT plans are responsive to this requirement. Finally, AWD contends FAM’s MOT plans are deficient because one of the ramps (Ramp D1) contains two reverse curves without a tangent. A tangent is the straightaway leading a driver in a certain direction when he or she comes around the curve. Although the testimony surrounding the curves in the MOT plan was highly technical, Mr. Madison, FAM’s roadway engineer, convincingly explained that the two reverse curves in FAM’s MOT are not super-elevated or abnormally cross-sloped. A cross-slope is the pitch of the roadway from one side to the other; a normal cross-slope is two percent. The testimony at trial established FAM’s MOT plan contains two curves that are two percent in one direction at all times and meet industry safety standards. Thus, they do not require a tangent. Regardless, even if the curves required a tangent, there was no evidence that failure to include this tangent put other bidders at a disadvantage. Finally, if Ramp D1 required a tangent, the plans AWD complains about are preliminary in nature. During the Q&A phase, DOT notified FAM that its Ramp D1 design needed a tangent between two curves or otherwise needed to be redesigned to meet the standards. FAM agreed to do so. Because this was a “modifiable” aspect of the MOT, had the PSC selected FAM as BVP, adjustments and corrections to Ramp D1 could be achieved per FAM’s commitment to comply with the RFP in its Confirmation Letter. FAM’s MOT plans were responsive to the RFP, and any need for an adjustment to include a tangent could have been provided in the final plans as allowed and anticipated by the RFP. Audited Financial Statements AWD argues FAM’s Financial Proposal was non- responsive because it did not contain audited financial statements from one of the members of its joint venture. The winning bidder was required to self-finance portions of its work as it would not receive full payment from DOT until after it had incurred costs for design and construction. This type of structure is often referred to as “gap financing.” The RFP required each bidder to submit a Financial Proposal “so the Department can be assured that the Design-Build Firm has sufficient financial resources to construct the Department Project within the allotted Contract Time, based on the Cash Availability Schedule.” To satisfy itself that the entity who would ultimately design and build the Project was able to finance the labor and construction costs, the Department required each bidder to provide a financial proposal that contained, among other things, audited financial statements. The RFP required the following in the Financial Proposals: The minimum required documents the Design- Build Firm must submit to the Department as part of the Design-Build Firm’s Financial Proposal shall include, but may not be limited to, the following: . . . Financial Statements of members of the Design-Build Firm or any partners of the joint venture that make-up [sic] the Design-Build Firm that will be responsible for the repayment of financial support related to the Department Project or directly provides financial support related to the Department Project. Lenders that are not members of the Design-Build Firm or partners of the joint venture that make up the Design-Build Firm are not required to provide Financial Statements. Financial Statements shall include: For the most recent two (2) fiscal years in which audited Financial Statements are available, audited Financial Statements prepared in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Required Financial Statements shall include: Opinion Letter (Auditor’s Report); Balance Sheet; Income Statement; Statement of Retained Earnings or Changes in Stockholders Equity; Statement of Cash Flows; and Notes to Financial Statements. * * * If audited Financial Statements are unavailable for the most recently completed fiscal year, unaudited Financial Statements, prepared in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, shall be provided for such fiscal year. An affirmative statement shall be provided indicating that the Financial Statements for the most recently completed fiscal year are still being audited. These unaudited Financial Statements shall be certified as true, correct and complete by the Chief Financial Officer or treasurer of the entity. Requirements for unaudited Financial Statements are the same as for audited Financial Statements, except an Opinion Letter (Auditor’s Report) is not required. (RFP at 67–68.) As described in the RFP, the RFP required a joint- venture bidder to submit the audited financial statements of each of its members in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP); if a partner of a joint-venture member would provide financial support for the project, that partner’s audited financial statements were required to be submitted as well. There is no dispute FAM did not and could not include any audited financial statements for one of its members, FEI, because FEI is not audited. There is also no dispute that FEI will be responsible for the repayment of financial support related to the Project or would directly provide financial support related to the Project. FAM did not qualify for the alternative included in the RFP for providing audited financial statements when such statements are unavailable for the most recent fiscal year. Moreover, it was clear from the testimony put on by FAM that such audited statements could not have been provided in a timely matter, even if the Department had allowed FAM to supplement its financial proposal. Brian Smith, the assistant corporate controller for Fluor Corporation, testified if FAM had been selected BVP and the Department had requested the audited financial statements for FEI, it could not have provided them until well after the May 18, 2017, date set forth in the RFP for selecting the BVP. Q.: Had you been asked by DOT for an FEI audited financial statement for 2016 back in April of 2017, what is the soonest that FEI could have provided that information to DOT? A.: An audit of this nature would generally take four to six weeks, on an expedited basis, probably four weeks. FAM counters it provided equivalent information and thus there was no effective harm. The RFP, however, specifically requires audited financial statements, not the information in those statements. This seems especially prudent given the size of the Project and when, as in this case, the bid was awarded as a public–private transportation facility under section 334.30, Florida Statutes, which emphasizes the financial health of bidders. Moreover, the failure to submit audited financial statements has been found to render a proposal non-responsive when such statements are required by an RFP. See Jani-King Gulf Coast Region v. Escambia Cnty. Sch. Bd., Case No. 16-2762BID, RO at 23 (Fla. DOAH Aug. 26, 2016) (explaining the importance of audited financial statements, noting they “provide a much higher level of assurance as to the validity of the financial information presented,” than unaudited statements). Nor can FAM satisfy the requirement for audited statements from FEI simply by submitting such statements from FEI parent corporation. See Consultec, Inc., d/b/a Gen. Am. Consultec, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Admin., Case No. 91-5950BID, RO at 29 (Fla. DOAH Nov. 25, 1992) (finding submission of financial information from parent company failed to satisfy RFP requirement to provide audited financial statements and thus proposal was non-responsive). As explained in Consultec, FAM would have had an advantage had it not been required to provide such statements. Succinctly, . . . its failure to comply with the audited financial statement requirement of the RFP gave it an advantage not enjoyed by other bidders since by submitting the balance sheet of its parent company, as opposed to its own financial statements, HCPP effectively precluded any assessment of its own financial soundness. Id. As such, FAM’s failure to include the audited financial statements of FEI renders its Financial Proposal non- responsive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing Petitioner Fluor-Astaldi-MCM, Joint Venture’s Amended Formal Written Protest, and affirming Respondent Florida Department of Transportation’s Notice of Intent to award to Intervenor Archer Western-de Moya, Joint Venture. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners own residential property near South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) Canal C-24. The canal is owned and maintained by SFWMD, an agency of the State of Florida. The State property includes the banks and bottom of Canal C-24 and a 50-foot-wide strip of land which separates Petitioners' property from the canal. However, some of the Petitioners have obtained permits from SFWMD to maintain boat docks in the canal and to cross the 50 feet of intervening property as necessary. Canal C-24 is closed to navigation immediately west of Petitioners' property by a SFWMD dam used to control the water level. However, the canal is open to navigation east of the dam and connects with the St. Lucie River which flows into the Atlantic Ocean. Respondent GDC plans the residential development of property east of that owned by Petitioners. Construction of the proposed bridge will improve access to the GDC property and other portions of southeast Port St. Lucie which are now blocked on the north and east by water and on the west by the Florida Turnpike. On August 28, 1980, Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) issued its Notice of Intent to grant a permit for construction of the bridge with 17 feet clearance. The bridge was originally planned to provide 12 feet clearance which was approved by SFWMD and the City of Port St. Lucie. Based on Petitioner's objections and the recommendation of the US Coast Guard, the clearance was increased to 17 feet. However, Petitioners maintained their opposition, giving rise to these proceedings. At 17 feet the bridge would be approximately six feet below the Florida Turnpike bridge which is situated between the GDC residential development and Petitioners' property. Thus, Petitioners are currently limited to a 23-foot navigation clearance by the Florida Turnpike bridge which was present when they purchased their property. None of the Petitioners operates any boat at his Port St. Lucie residence which would be affected by construction of the proposed bridge. Rather, Petitioners' objections are based on the obstruction of larger boats they might acquire and on the belief that resale value of their property would be diminished. They also content that use of the canal as a hurricane refuge for large boats will be restricted. Finally, Petitioners argue that bridge pilings will cause erosion and thus create a surface hazard in addition to the height impediment. The Petitioners indicated no plans to acquire any power boats of such size as to be restricted by a 17-foot clearance, nor did their plans include the purchase or use of any sailboats which would not already be blocked by the 23- foot turnpike bridge. No studies, appraisals or together evidence was introduced to establish that property values would be affected by construction of the proposed bridge. Conflicting evidence was presented on the use of the canal by third parties as a hurricane refuge. However, the expert testimony given by Respondents' witnesses established that use of the canal during storms was unsafe and impractical due to the narrowness of the canal, the absence of trees to reduce the force of the wind or secure the boats, and the possibility of strong currents caused by operation of the flood control dam. Further, this testimony established that safer moorings are available on the adjacent portion of the St. Lucie River, which has the added advantage of being directly accessible to the ocean. Such moorings are preferable because of the greater maneuverability in the river and the presence of mangroves which provide anchorage and wind protection. The alleged erosion problem was not supported by any studies or expert testimony, but was based on Petitioners' observations of some soil erosion around turnpike bridge pilings. GDC's construction proposal has been considered by DER, and its engineering plans will be reviewed by the City of Port St. Lucie before it authorizes construction. This process should insure that any potential erosion problems are minimized. Furthermore, there was no evidence to indicate that soil erosion, even if it did occur at the site of the proposed bridge, would create any hazard to navigation. The City Manager of Port St. Lucie supports construction of the bridge at its present level. His concern, and that of the City Commission, is centered on the need to deliver police, fire and ambulance service to the area south of the proposed bridge. Additionally, opening of the bridge will result in the improved flow of vehicular traffic in the community. A local contractor who owns lots on both sides of the canal opposes any further elevation of the bridge as it would reduce the view from houses he intends to construct in this area. The GDC evidence established that raising the height of the bridge would also enlarge the property on either side of the canal required for bridge purposes. Finally, the cost of construction of further increasing bridge height would be substantial, amounting to approximately $40,000 per foot.
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation grant the permit to General Development Corporation as reflected in the Notice of Intent issued on August 28, 1980. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of January, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Kenneth J. Thomas 2649 SW Harem Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Ms. Anita R. Cockerham 2549 SW Harem Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. Walter J. Konrad Ms. Victoria Konrad 2657 Harem Circle, SW Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. Henry Albright Ms. Nancy Albright 2651 Harem Circle, SW Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. William Isaacs 2645 SW Harem Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. and Mrs. Frederick C. Walrath 2647 SW Harem Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Ms. Mary Bruins Kars 2659 Harem Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. Norman Zlinkoff 1814 Erwin Road Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. Donald M. Homer General Development Corporation 111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33131 Randall E. Denker, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph Z. Fleming, Esquire 620 Ingraham Building 25 SE Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33131
